MASARYKOVA UNIVERZITA FAKULTA SOCILNCH STUDI

Katedra politologie

THE RELIGIOUS CLEAVAGE AND ITS

IMPACT ON PARTIES BEHAVIOUR IN

INDIA

MAGISTERSK PRCE

Ing. Bc. Ladislav Kudlek

Vedouc prce: Mgr. Tom md, PhD. UO: 42062 Obor: Politologie Imatrikulan ronk: 2007 Brno, New Delhi, 2008

2

Prohlauji, e jsem tuto magisterskou diplomovou prci na oboru politologie Fakulty

socilnch studi Masarykovy univerzity vypracoval samostatn a pouze za pouit

uvedench pramen a literatury.

..................................................

Ladislav Kudlek

student magisterskho prezennho studia politologie

3

Podkovn

Srden dkuji vedoucmu prce Mgr. Tomi mdovi PhD. za odborn veden prce a

profesoru M. P. Singhovi z University of Delhi za uiten pipomnky k prci. Dkuji rovn

Shaguft Anzum Suheily za pomoc pi konen jazykov prav.

Ladislav Kudlek

4

Contents:

Abstract ...................................................................................................................................... 6 Introduction ................................................................................................................................ 7 1. Democratization in society with strong cleavages ............................................................... 9 1.1. Donald L. Horowitz: Model of integrative and exclusive Majoritarianism .............. 12 1.2. Arend Lijphart: Consociational democracy .............................................................. 14 1.3. Steven I. Wilkinson: Relationship between party competition and a states response to anti-minority polarization and violence ........................................................................... 17

2. Electoral systems in India and its analysis in the context of Horowitz and Lijpharts concepts .................................................................................................................................... 19 2.1. Electoral systems basic description ........................................................................ 19 2.2. Electoral systems theoretical understanding .......................................................... 21

3. Affiliation of the main political parties by the religion cleavage ....................................... 23 3.1. Parties with secularism affiliation ............................................................................. 24 3.1.1. Secularism in Indian Context .............................................................................. 24 3.1.2. Congress party and United Progressive Alliance ................................................ 25 3.1.3. Leftist parties ....................................................................................................... 26

3.2. Parties with Hinduism affiliation .............................................................................. 27 3.3. Parties with Islamic (Muslim) affiliation .................................................................. 29 3.4. Parties with other mostly regional or specific community affiliation ....................... 31 3.5. The characteristics of the main relevant political parties in India ............................. 32 3.5.1. Indian National Congress .................................................................................... 33 3.5.2. Bharatiya Janata Party ......................................................................................... 33 3.5.3. Communist Party of India (Marxist) ................................................................... 35 3.5.4. Bahujan Samaj Party ........................................................................................... 37 3.5.5. Samajwadi Party .................................................................................................. 38

4. Analysis of the election on the federal level in relation to the main religious disorder and clashes in the context of Horowitz, Lijphart ............................................................................ 39 4.1. Indian federalism based and minority autonomy ...................................................... 39 4.2. Horowitzs majoritarism ........................................................................................... 42 4.3. Lijpharts Indian Puzzle ............................................................................................ 51

5. Analysis of the election results in regions with large and frequent religious conflicts in Indian States in the context of Wilkinson ................................................................................ 56 5.1. Gujarat case study ..................................................................................................... 60 5.2. Orissa case study ....................................................................................................... 65 5.3. Uttar Pradesh case study ........................................................................................... 69 5.4. Kerela case study ....................................................................................................... 74 5.5. Rajasthan case study .................................................................................................. 81 5.6. Maharashtra case study ............................................................................................. 85 5.7. Bihar case study ........................................................................................................ 89 5.8. Wilkinsons hypothesis and its modification and alternative explanation ................ 94

Conclusion ................................................................................................................................ 97 Sources and Literatures ............................................................................................................ 99 List of Tables .......................................................................................................................... 103 List of Figures ........................................................................................................................ 105 List of Figures ........................................................................................................................ 105 List of Diagrams ..................................................................................................................... 106 List of Abbreviation ............................................................................................................... 107

5

Appendix 1 Political map of India Union States and Territories ..................................... 108 Appendix 2 Structure of Indian population ......................................................................... 109

Poet znak: 174 000 znak vetn mezer bez poznmek pod arou 178 527 znak vetn mezer a poznmek pod arou

6

Abstract

The work has evaluated the hypothesis that government without minority electorates

requirement does not protect the minorities against violence, riots and aggression from

majority. There is a critical view on Indian political system which has been evaluated and

compared with Lijpharts theory of consensual democracy and Horowitz theory of

Majoritarism. Some significant points which support division and clashes in Indian societies

have been found. These points are evaluated by the two mentioned theoretical approaches.

The other evaluated theoretical assumption in this work is based on Wilkinson hypothesis

which describe relationship between party competition and a state's response to anti-minority

polarization and violence. Wilkinson supports Lijphart and Horowitz assumption of office

holding and proportional representation. Without that the riots and violence against minorities

have bigger intensity. The work has compared selected cases of governments and parties

behaviour in particular Indian states using Wilkinsons and Varshneys data and enlarged

them by new data collection based on Times of India records. There is a link between

minority support (as well as proportional representation) for government increasing its fair

behaviour and minority protection from government. However, there are also some deviations

from this hypothesis which need explanation. The numbers of riots and deaths as a one

measurement of their intensities compare the party and government behaviour in particular

cases. The number of parties in government and their core electoral support indicates the

intensity as well as quantity of communal violence in India. This work has enlarged the

hypothesis and the cases of moderate Multipartism with bipolar spectrum have been included

Wilkinsons assumption.

7

Introduction

India is a country of many religions which have coexisted for several centuries. This

coexistence could be generally characterised as peaceful, but also has some historical and

ideological clashes, which have generated problems in both the past and present time. The

nationalism and its ideology have brought new troubles to the political and common life of

many religious communities in many parts of India. The identity of Indians with the Indian

state has been eroded by these clashes and the Indian political system as well as the main

political parties have to cope with these challenges.

The main challenge and also the topic of this work is to study the religious clashes and

Hinduisms and Muslims nationalism. These religious cleavages have brought problems such

as terrorism and community riots. This work will analyse these problems of Indian religions

in political life. The main goals of this thesis are:

1. Thesis will find the highlighted points of Lijphart and Horowitz theoretical approach of

problem solving of electoral democracy in divided Indian society and find which of these

points have any practical connection in India similar to those.

2. Willkinsons hypothesis of the impact of number of the parties in the political system on

India states government minorities policy. Practical cases show how strong is the

influence of Majoritarism election system on ethnic policy.

These goals will be following by verification of two main hypotheses which have been

analysed in this text. The hypotheses are:

1. Hypothesis has based on comparison of Indian real political system with the theoretical

approach of Lijphart and Horowitz. The ethnic disorder is produced by the system gaps

which do not follow the Lijpharts and Horowitzs ideal model and recommendation.

2. The number of parties in Indian state governments has strong influence on the number of

ethnic disorder. If the government depends on minorities votes or secular and minority

parties, the number of ethnic violence is lower. If the government depends on majority

population the number of death in violence increases.

There is a statistical comparison of a number of death and number of ethnic violence in

selected Indian states.

The work uses selected case studies of Indian states - Gujarat, Uttar Pradesh, Kerala, Orissa,

Maharashtra, Rajasthan and Bihar. They were selected because together they constitute most

8

of the examples which are possible to find in India relating to our study. Gujarat and

Rajasthan are examples of two parties competition, Kerala is an example of a peaceful state

with secular party system as oppose to the violent Gujarat. Uttar Pradesh and Bihar are

examples of states with successful state parties having tremendous influence in federal level

and with different level of responsibility. Gujarat, Maharashtra and Orissa gave the examples

of increasing level of violence with growing electoral success of nationalistic parties in

different environment. These examples together complete the scale of potential example of

party competition in India. The deeper explanation of case studies selection is explained in

chapter 5.

Main goals will be enriched by description of Indian secularism as well as by concept of

Indian (Hinduism) nationalism Hindutva ideology. There will be also an analysis and

description of main political parties in India (mainly on federal level) and their affiliation to

religion.

9

1. Democratization in society with strong cleavages

The third wave of democratization brought tremendous discussion about the role of electoral

system in reproduction of democratic system. Many scholars such as Lijphart, Horowitz,

Reynolds or Reilly discussed their ideal concept of electoral system in divided societies and

compared the practical cases from real political world. Their works introduce also their

normative view on ideal election system, however, their researches are based on practical

cases. This work has focused mainly on popular normative attitude to this problem presented

by Lijphart and Horowitz. The fundamental base of these case studies is built on consensus

that first-past-the-post (FPTP) system is not the best electoral design for divided societies with

strong multi-ethnical cleavages. Westminsters model of democracy does not generate inter-

ethnical cooperation and increases the probability of mono-ethnical majority in legislative

assembly and government. The minorities have then lower chance to enunciate its interest in

normal political way. (compare with Chytlek 2007: 145-146) Horowitz and Lijphart

described their views on the ideal electoral model for divided societies.

The evaluation of the electoral system plays an important role for understanding the

practice of politics. Its role is significant, because electoral system helps determine how

many parties a country has, how cohesive they are, who forms the government, and how long

the government cabinets tend to last. Electoral system is expressed in electoral laws and their

impact depends on the way politicians and voters make use of these laws. At times, flawed

electoral laws can undo democracy or lead to staleness. (Taagepera 2007: 1)

However, as also Horowitz wrote no electoral system simply reflects voter preferences or the

existing pattern of cleavages in a society or the prevailing political party configuration. Every

party shape and reshapes these features of the environment, and each does so in different

waysThe best electoral system is the one that straightforwardly and most accurately reflects

the preferences of voters. (Horowitz 2003a: 3) There are also six significant goals which

Horowitz defined as the potential best way to achieve the functioning electoral system in

divided societies. The choice must also be geared to the pre-existing features of the political

environment, since the functioning of electoral mechanisms varies with the context. Here are

the six Horowitzs possible goals:

1. proportionality of seats to votes;

2. accountability to constituents;

3. durable governments;

10

4. victory of the Condorcet winner;

5. interethnic and inter-religious conciliation;

6. minority office holding. (Horowitz 2003a: 4)

Chapter 1.1. will discuss these six point in detailed perspective as well as Horowitz model of

integrative and exclusive Majoritarianism which give normative recommendations for ideal

system for divided societies. Then this theoretical perspective will be compared with Indian

reality.

Arend Lijphart, the other scholar, who tried to find ideal electoral system for society with

strong ethnical, religious cleavages in his article The Puzzle of Indian Democracy: A

Consociational Interpretation defined the Indian model of ethnical divided society and

function saying that the Indian experience does not resemble ethnically accommodative

consociation democracy. For one, the structures of majoritarianism excluded elements of

proportionality and autonomy central to consociationalism; for another, the partition of India

was a partition against consociationalism and for the construction of a majority and unitary

state. Lijpharts effort to understand the puzzle of Indian democracy in the form of a

consociation interpretation misunderstands religious encapsulation as autonomy, tactical

political accommodation within the Congress as elite power-sharing, and linguistic pluralism

within meta-Hindu areas as developed federalism. In an ideal consociational system minority

rights are entrenched, guaranteed and backed by a minority veto. (Singh 2000: 46)

Consociationalism is meant to apply where cleavages are deep and unmediated by multiple

memberships. To manage conflict in such societies, Lijphart argues, requires using four

mechanisms of governance: segmental autonomy, a grand coalition of governing elites,

proportional representation and mutual vetoes. Consociations are systems characterized by

these four distinguishing features. (Eisenberg 2006) Look at the precondition of consensual

democracy as Lijphart called in Indian concept the Indian puzzle:

A) Grand coalition governments include representatives of all major linguistic and

religious groups.

B) A minority veto with regard to vital minority rights and autonomy.

C) Proportionality in political representation and civil service appointments.

D) Cultural autonomy for linguistic and religious groups.(Lijphart 1996: 258)

The issue of ideal model of consociationalism, consocional or consensual democracy (in this

work will be used as synonym) will be discussed in detailed perspective in chapter 1.2.

11

Lijphart also defined his normative evaluation of electoral system in divided societies based

on mentioned consociationalism which will be discussed also in the same chapter. Lijpharts

theoretical perspective with his practical description of Indian political system will be

critically evaluated from the present Indian perspective. He also presented his ideal model of

one size power sharing or consensual democracy which should give the best fit for dividing

societies (Lijphart 2004: 99) and have been described also in chapter 1.2. The Indian model of

consensual democracy will be discussed in chapter 2 and 4.

Table 1 offers the overview of theoretical approaches to designing of electoral systems and

gives also the abstract of their functioning. This work has focused mostly on Lijphart and

Horowitz model.

Table 1 Models of democracy for divided societies

Characterisations characterisation and goal of electoral system

mechanical effect of electoral system

strategic effect of electoral system

implication for dividing societies

Exclusive majoritarism

Westminster model of democracy

FPTP system support artificial majorities

Strong Strong supporting exclusion of some minority group

Consensus model (Lijphart)

great coalition, proportional representation (proportional electoral system), proportionality in sources allocation, multilateral veto, segmental autonomy

proportional electoral system, goal is the most realistic vote transformation to the seats

Weak Weak function of electoral system in allocation process is neutral, moderation is duty of political elites in great coalition (seat-pooling)

Integrative consensual model (Reynolds)

parliamentalism, great coalition, federalism, proportional electoral system STV

STV electoral system support crosscutting cleavages

Weak Medium connection between consensual practices on the level of elites (seat pooling) and interethnic appeals through vote pooling in constituencies

Inclusive majoritarism (centripetalism, integrative majoritarism) (Horowitz, Reilly)

presidentialism, alternative voting system, federalism

alternative voting, the goal is to enforce interethnic appeals in heterogenic constituencies

Strong Strong strong support of interethnic appeals through vote pooling or constituency pooling

Source: Chytlek 2007: 146

12

Chapter 1.3. describes another view on communal violence which focuses more on existing

examples of election results than on normative approaches of electoral design. Moreover,

there is a strong link between normative approaches of Lijphart and Horowitz. Their ideal

models predict the output of the electoral system and number of parties in government which

is important for Wilkinson hypothesis.

1.1. Donald L. Horowitz: Model of integrative and exclusive Majoritarianism

One of the leading theorists of democratic institutional design, Donald L. Horowitz,

emphasizes how powerful the electoral system can be in shaping the character of a democracy

and how vexing the choices can be. There are numerous ways that voter preferences can be

aggregated in order to determine which parties get how many seats in parliament. Every

electoral system has biases and no system merely passively translates individual wishes into

a collective choice. Horowitz identifies six above mentioned possible aims of an electoral

system, some of which directly conflict with one another. (Diamond and Plattner 2006: X).

First goal of Horowitz is the normative goal of proportionality the closest possible matches

for the relative party shares of the vote. It could be call also as fairness. (Diamond and

Plattner 2006: X) Scholars and decision makers are inclined to judge electoral systems by

their ability or inability to produce proportional results. (Horowitz 2003a: 4) Horowitz

emphasized that this is not one of the most important goal among the other six.

Accountability to constituents should show that the elections to representative bodies

assume some degree of accountability of legislators to those who elect them. Generally the

electoral systems which limit the power of central party leaders to choose candidates produce

more responsive representatives. This shows the sovereignty of the voter to choose the

candidates. When central party leaders have power to select candidates, the voters

sovereignty to choose the candidates, rather than just to choose among candidates, is thought

to be impaired. Horowitz said that possibilities to choose among candidates (such as in open

list in proportional representation) can have perverse consequences, especially in multiethnic

societies. (Horowitz 2003a: 5)

Durable government is a third goal. An electoral system is not able to represent the

idiosyncratic opinions of every voter. Nevertheless, according to Horowitz, some systems

make it possible for many shades of opinion to be represented, sometimes so many that the

legislature ends up being fragmented, with no party having anywhere near 50 % of the seats.

13

In these particular cases are coalition governments necessary. Where the legislature is

garmented, it may be difficult to put together durable coalitions. Other electoral design may

force parties to aggregate the diverse opinions in a society for the sake of electoral success.

Where this happens and diverse opinions are represented within parties rather than across

parties. The reduction in the number of parties makes it more likely that durable governments

can be formed. And durable governments are thought to be desirable as they promote policy

consistency and responsibility and may avoid the instability that can result during interregna

or from the creation of fragile, unpredictable coalitions. (Horowitz 2003a: 5-6)

As a forth goal Horowitz mentioned a Victory of the Condorcet winner. The Condorcet

winner is the candidate who would receive a majority of the vote in a paired or head-to-head

contest with each and every other candidate. Winner is obviously the more popular candidate,

whose victory ought to be preferred. However, there are obstacles to this outcome and some

electoral systems can disfavour the Condorcet winner and it could be wanting. Horowitz has

chosen the system of alternative vote as an electoral design that does a good job at picking the

Condorcet winner. (Horowitz 2003a: 6)

Interethnic and interreligious conciliation is fifth goal of Horowitz institutional design.

Electoral systems that produce proportional result or accountability to constituents or durable

governments may or may not foster interethnic conciliation. Important question is whether a

given system provides politicians with electoral inducements for moderate behaviour, that is,

for compromises with members of other ethnic groups for the sake of electoral success.

Electoral systems that allow politicians to be elected without behaving moderately may make

post-electoral conciliation more difficult. For interethnic conciliation, the question is how the

electoral system affects the pre-electoral calculations of parties and politicians. (Horowitz

2003a: 6-7) The necessity to engage in what Horowitz calls vote-pooling in order to win

elections and maintain coalitions is what forces politicians to moderate their demands and

offer protection to minorities. (Wilkinson 2004: 7)

As a last but not least goal for multiethnic successful societies is requirement of minority

office holding. It gives rise to attempts to achieve proportionality between votes and seats,

except that proportionality in that respect is party proportionality rather than group

proportionality. Creation of homogeneous constituencies could mean not only more minority-

dominated constituencies but also more constituencies in which majority-group voters

dominate and in which majority-group candidates do not need to worry about minority

14

support or minority interests. (Horowitz 2003a: 7-8) Horowitz put stress on importance of

majority interest in minority votes also in earlier mentioned goals.

Horowitz and also Australian political scientist Ben Really examined to what extent electoral

systems can encourage cooperation and accommodation among rival groups, and therefore

work to reduce the salience of ethnicity. Both scholars preferred vote-pooling mechanisms,

which make politicians reciprocally dependent on votes from groups other than their own.

Such systems give an advantage to moderate candidates who reach across the divides of party

and ethnicity to appeal for the second and lower-order preferences of the voters, and who

thereby exhibit a capacity to represent groups other than their own. Horowitz evaluated this

system through his mentioned six goals. The potential electoral design see in alternative vote

and see also the value of the single transferable vote (STV), in which voters rank a larger

number of candidates in multimember districts. The advantage of STV is that it is a fairer,

more proportional system than AV, better able to represent minorities. The disadvantage,

Horowitz stressed, is that the low threshold for election in a district provides few incentives

to inter party agreements to transfer votes, and thus generates weaker incentives to

compromise than alternative vote (AV), under which a candidate must ultimately gather

enough lower-order preferences to win a majority of votes in the district. (Diamond and

Plattner 2006: XII-XIII)

1.2. Arend Lijphart: Consociational democracy

Consociational, consensual or consensus democracy described by Arend Lijphart is in his

words kind of democracy can be seen as an institutional arrangement that is able to produce

as much consensus as possible in countries, such as ethnically and religiously divided

societies, where a spontaneous consensus is in short supply. (Lijphart 1998: 100) Lijphart

used the term consociational democracy in his book Democracy in Plural Societies published

in 1977. In this book, he emphasized consociational democracy as a solution for states

where traditional majoritarian democracy might not work due to deep ethnic, linguistic, or

religious cleavages. (Lijphart 1977) Later he advocates consensus democracy in his book

Patterns of Democracy as the ideal governance type for any country. It is not ideal type just

for deeply divided states. (Lijphart 1999a)

The crucial decisions by political leaders are to establish power-sharing in some of the deeply

divided societies. The power-sharing systems that were set up in some societies (such as

15

Switzerland in 1943, Austria in 1945, Malaysia in 1955, Belgium in 1970) have the same

general pattern: an inclusive government consisting of representatives of all of the important

rival groups; as much autonomy for these groups as possible; proportionality in representation

and appointments; and a formal or informal minority veto power with regard to the most vital

and fundamental matters. (Lijphart 1998: 101-102) Lijphart (1998: 102) argued that set power

sharing systems were invented and re-invented time and again because of its compelling

logic: it was the most rational choice to be made in the circumstances of potential or actual

civil strife. The moral is that pure rational-choice decisions can and do occur.

The important part of consensus in society Lijphart found in consisting of the types of

executive power, executive and legislative relations, party system, electoral system, and

interest group system. Democracies that have either broad governing coalitions or minority

cabinets that are dependent on the shifting support of legislative majorities (instead of one-

party majority governments) also tend to have relatively strong legislatures (instead of

dominant, and even domineering, executives), multiparty systems (instead of two-party

systems), proportional election systems (instead of plurality or majority electoral systems),

and corporatist or coordinated interest group systems (instead of free-for-all competitive

pluralism among interest groups). These are the democracies that Lijphart call consensus

democracies, and the democracies characterized by the contrasting cluster of traits are the

majoritarian democracies. Elections by proportional representation allow or encourage

multiple parties to form and to gain representation in parliaments, and multiparty systems

make it more likely that either coalition or minority cabinets will be formed. (Lijphart 1998:

103-104)

Lijphart disagree with Horowitz and his concept of one size fits all recommendation

regarding power sharing rules and institutions while the optimal model should be adapted

according to the particular features of the country at hand. Lijphart disagree that everything

depends on these characteristics. (Lijphart 2004: 99) He offer his own way and outlined nine

areas of constitutional choice and provide own recommendations in each area. He called one

size power sharing model.

Lijphart found as one of the most important choice is the legislative electoral system, for

which three broad categories are proportional representation (PR), majoritarian systems, and

intermediate systems. For divided societies, ensuring the election of a broadly representative

legislature should be the crucial consideration, and PR is undoubtedly according to Lijphart

the optimal way of doing so. (Lijphart 2004: 99-100) Lijphart argued that consensus

16

democracies clearly outperform the majoritarian democracies. The reason for this is partly

structural, because consensus democracies generally use proportional representation (PR) as

their electoral systems. PR makes it much easier for minorities and women to be elected, and

PR also boosts voter turnout in two ways: by minimizing the wasted-vote problem, it makes it

more attractive for voters to vote, and by making it more attractive for parties to campaign in

areas where they are relatively weak, such stronger party efforts will also stimulate turnout.

However, an alternative or additional explanation would be cultural: consensus democracy

itself and what I have just called its "consequences" may both be argued to spring from a

general cultural inclination toward a strong community orientation and social consciousness.

And indeed, the consensus democracies are the kinder and gentler democracies: they are more

likely than majoritarian democracies to be welfare states, to be protective of the environment,

to have less punitive criminal justice systems (as measured by their rates of incarceration and

use of the death penalty), and to be more generous with foreign aid. The moral of this story is

another victory for cultural explanation. (Lijphart 1998: 105-106) The Lijpharts trust in

proportional representation will be significant for critical approach of Indian electoral system

in other part of this work. However, Lijphart also put the stress on guidelines with PR. A

particular type selection within PR system can be significant especially for new democracies

and it is also about creating much or less distance between voters and their representatives.

(Lijphart 2004: 100-101) The distance could enlarge or reduce the possibilities for minorities

representation. Earlier mentioned Horowitzs thought said that possibilities to choose among

candidates (such as in open list in proportional representation) could have perverse

consequences, especially in multiethnic societies. (Horowitz 2003a: 5)

For dividing societies is important choice also the selection between parliamentary or

presidential government. In countries with deep ethnic and other cleavages, the choice

should be based on the different systems relative potential for power sharing in the executive.

As the cabinet in a parliamentary system is a collegial decision-making body as opposed to

the presidential one-person executive with a purely advisory cabinet it offers the optimal

setting for forming a broad power-sharing executive. Presidential election is necessarily

majoritarian in nature. (Lijphart 2004: 102-103) As well as selection of the head of the state

is important part of Lijphart theoretical approach.

Lijphart agrees with Horowitz that sharing of executive power and group autonomy are

two key ingredients for successful democracy in divided societies and denominated them as

two "primary characteristics" of consociational democracy. Power-sharing means the

17

participation of the representatives of all significant groups in political decision-making,

especially at the executive level; group autonomy (or nonterritorial autonomy) (Lijphart 2004:

105) means that these groups have authority to run their own internal affairs, especially in the

areas of education and culture. (Lijphart 1999b) Elite bargaining in democratic system has its

own arrangement of mutual checks and balances. To the extent that elected representatives

participate in the bargaining process, they are a channel through which popular desires, goals,

and values enter into governmental decisions. Political and bureaucratic elites in democratic

countries are powerful, far more powerful than ordinary citizens can be; but they are not

despots. (Dahl 1998: 113-114)

Cabinet stability problem, according to Lijphart, should not be overestimated. The vast

majority of stable democracies have parliamentary rather than presidential or semi-

presidential forms of government. This is argument against others which says that cabinets

depending on majority support in parliament can be dismissed by parliamentary votes of no-

confidence which can lead to cabinet instability and, as a result, regime instability. (Lijphart

2004: 103)

The choice between federalism and decentralization is important for divided societies with

geographically concentrated communal groups. Lijphart believes that a federal system is a

good way to provide autonomy for these groups. He also recommends an existence of second

(federal) legislative chamber with strong power. The shape of federalization should be

designed by country to country. (Lijphart 2004: 104-105)

Power sharing beyond the cabinet and parliament is essential. Broad representations of all

communal groups suppose to be also in the civil service, judiciary, police as well as military.

This aim can be achieved (but not necessary) by instituting ethnic or religious quotas.

(Lijphart 2004: 105-106)

1.3. Steven I. Wilkinson: Relationship between party competition and a states response

to anti-minority polarization and violence

The essential question is what determines ethnic violence breaks out and whether the state

will protect minorities or not? One response can be found in Wilkinson hypothesis that

democratic states protect minorities when it is in their governments electoral interest to do so.

It was also described on some cases in Indian states in theses The Religious Clashes in India

and Their Impact on Election Results. Specifically, politicians in government will increase

18

the supply of protection to minorities when either of two conditions applies: when minorities

are an important part of their partys current support base, or the support base of one of their

coalition partners in a coalition government; or when the overall electoral system in a state is

so competitive in terms of the effective number of parties that there is therefore, a high

probability that the governing party will have to negotiate or form coalitions with minority

supported parties in the future, despite its own preferences. The necessity to engage in what

Horowitz calls vote-pooling in order to win elections and maintain coalitions is what forces

politicians to moderate their demands and offer protection to minorities. We can call it the

prospect of vote pooling with profit. In India, vote pooling moderates even the behaviour of

nationalist parties that have no minority support, as long as these parties are forced to form

coalitions with parties that do rely on minority votes. (Wilkinson 2004: 7-8)

On the other hand, politicians in government will restrict the supply of security to minorities

if they have no minority support and the overall levels of party competition in a state would

be low. Figure 1 shows the model of the parties competition and its impact on government

policy making in the field of minorities and religious groups. As it is showed in model A

three or more parties prevent the riots or community violence and care more about minorities.

19

Figure 1 The theoretical relationship between party competition and a state's response to antiminority polarization and violence (ENVP = effective number of parties1)

Source: Wilkinson 2004: 139

2. Electoral systems in India and its analysis in the context of Horowitz and

Lijpharts concepts

2.1. Electoral systems basic description

India is a constitutional democracy with a parliamentary- federal system of government, and

at the heart of the system is a commitment to hold regular, free and fair elections. These

elections determine the composition of the government, the membership of the two houses of

1) The formula for the effective number of parties is ENPV = 1/vi

2 , where vi is vote share of the ith party. This widely used measure weights parties with a higher vote share more heavily than those parties with a very low vote share, thus providing a better measure of the real level of party competition than if we were to simply count the total number of parties competing in a state. (Wilkinson 2004: 7) For this work will be used the formula for effective number of parties in assembly: N=1/si

2, si seat share of the ith parties in assembly. (edo 2006: 87) This formula stresses more on party sharing in assembly and do not count with lost votes. This is more useful if the system use FPTP electoral system.

20

parliament, the state and union territory legislative assemblies, and the Presidency and vice-

presidency.

The country has been divided into 543 Parliamentary Constituencies, each of which returns

one Member of Parliament to the Lok Sabha, the lower house of the Parliament. The size and

shape of the parliamentary constituencies are determined by an independent Delimitation

Commission, which aims to create constituencies and has roughly the same population,

subject to geographical considerations and the boundaries of the states and administrative

areas. (Election Commission of India)

Delimitation is the redrawing of the boundaries of parliamentary or assembly constituencies

to make sure that there are, as near as practicable, the same number of people in each

constituency. In India boundaries are meant to be examined after the ten-yearly census to

reflect changes in population, for which Parliament by law establishes an independent

Delimitation Commission, made up of the Chief Election Commissioner and two judges or

ex-judges from the Supreme Court or High Court. However, under a constitutional

amendment of 1976, delimitation was suspended until after the census of 2001, ostensibly so

that states family-planning programs would not affect their political representation in the Lok

Sabha and Vidhan Sabhas. This has led to wide discrepancies in the size of constituencies,

with the largest having over 2,500,000 electors, and the smallest less than 50,000. (Election

Commission of India)

Parliament has two chambers The House of the People (Lok Sabha) and The House of the

States (Rajya Sabha). Lok Sabha has 545 members (Constitution of India, Chapter II, Article

81a), 543 members elected for a five year term in single-seat constituencies and 2 members

appointed to represent the Anglo-Indian community. The two unelected members are a relic

from the past. The special dispensation of nominating two members of European or Eurasian

blood was created as a transitory arrangement, at the time of Independence in 1947, to protect

the interests of the departing ruling class. The 543 members are elected under the plurality

('first past the post') electoral system.

The House of the States has 245 members, 233 members elected for a six year term, with one

third retiring every two years. (Constitution of India, Chapter II, Article 80) The members are

elected by legislators of the state and union (federal) territories. The elected members are

chosen under the system of proportional representation by means of the Single Transferable

Vote. The twelve members are to be nominated by the President in accordance with the

provisions of clause as given in the Constitution of India, Chapter II, Article 80.

21

The State Assemblies have been divided into federal Parliamentary Constituencies, each of

which returns one Member of Parliament to the Lok Sabha. The size and shape of the

parliamentary constituencies are determined by an independent Delimitation Commission,

which aims to create constituencies and has roughly the same population, subject to

geographical considerations and the boundaries of the states and administrative areas.

(Election Commission of India)

2.2. Electoral systems theoretical understanding

Indian electoral system took the basic electoral law for Lok Sabha and State Assemblies from

British tradition and its Westminster model of Parliamentarism. However, selected FPTP

system has operated differently.

Indian electoral system with a single member district voting does not determinate the same

outcomes as FPTP system in the UK. According to Duverger law the FPTP system should

support two party system. However, Indian reality shows something different. The party

system on federal level produces from 1990s multi-parties when in the period before the

characteristic was party system with predominant party, which was INC. The last two decades

are characterised by multi coalition government and by multi-parties.

Indian party system could be characterises as a puzzle (Lijphart used this word for his

description of Indian political system) of many party subsystems, which exist on the level of

states of Indian union. Electoral concentration corresponds to party systems in particular

Indian states. Federal party system is more puzzles of these states party structures, which

mutually linked to each other. However, state level does not have always two party system

formats as could be awaited according to FPTP and Westminster model (like in Great

Britain). As an example could be mentioned Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Kerela, West Bengal etc.

On the other side, it is possible to find almost pure two party system on state level in Gujarat.

Indian party system has its anomalies, which do not reflect Duvergens or Sartoris principles.

Electoral concentration in India does not always follow traditional Indian cleavages

(languages, religious, etc.), but system could be also described as multi-level political and

party system of particular Indian states, which has its own conservancies on federal level. It

is difficult to say that on the federal level is possible to find electoral concentration, but it is

mostly state party system, which has its own specific differences from federal level.

According to Strmiska, Indian political and party system does not have any theoretical

22

background, which is able to substantiate the strength of electoral system to party system.

(Chytlek 2004: 45) It is not really possible to implement Sartoris principles on the federal

level.

If we look at the Horowitz and Lijphart concept, we can see that they see in Westminster

model and in its FPTP electoral system disadvantage for minority. The reductive effect of

FPTP eliminates the minority votes (also Muslims) and its representatives. It means that in

society where Hindus have majority is not possible for minorities (Muslims) gain the

parliamentary seats or to have successful own party. Without the strong concentration of

voters it is not possible to elect own minority representative. However, secular parties (such

Congress) usually gains the minority votes and give a profit from such divided constituencies

where do not exist big concentration of minority votes. The example of Gujarat state shows

how the minority representation in assembly could be suppressed. Similar situation is also on

the federal level. The example of Gujarat was selected, because the state has faced strong

communal violence in past two decades. The number of Muslims in Gujarat is around 9 %.

Nevertheless, it was only 3.2 % of candidates of INC (2.7 % of all elected candidates) in 2007

but it is bigger number compare to BJP. Gujarat has also very strong religious and community

cleavage between Muslims and Hindus. The Muslim minority is underrepresented and main

reason is the effect of FPTP. This is also one significant explanation which supports bi-

partism in Gujarat. The BJP is a party with strong affiliation to nationalism and ideology of

Hindutva and INC opposes to this concept with its idea of secularism. This cleavage cannot

be marginalised because FPTP increases it. Lijphart and as well as Horowitz see the FPTP as

the way which increase communal disharmony due to under representation of minorities and

cleavage increasing.

The other example is Kerala where is strong Muslim community and in northern part of this

state is strong concentration of voters in some constituencies and the local Muslim party -

Muslim league is able to gain majority of votes. On the other hand state Jammu and Kashmir

shows that parties count with strategic electoral behaviour of voters. There is a party which

makes a profit from Hindu minority. Hindus know that BJP cannot be elected and prefer

secular Kashmir Peoples Democratic Party (JKPDP) which has chance to be elected and will

protect their interest. These examples also show that FPTP system in India produce strategic

behaviour among electorates and minorities. They try to vote according the religious

cleavages, the parties which have chance to win and protect their interest. However, this does

not solve the problem of under representation of minorities and low level of vote pooling.

23

Reservation of seats policy for religious minorities for parliamentary election does not exist

on federal level. However, there are seats which are reserved for scheduled caste and

scheduled tribe. Moreover, these backward communities have also special quotas for

government services and higher education. This does not exist on religious base. There are

some cases, which follow also the religious way. For example, the state Andhra Pradesh uses

the reservation seats also for religious communities. However, the reservation of seats for

minorities in election (Muslims) cannot solve the main problem with the effort to marginalize

the community (religious) cleavage. There is no support of inter-ethnic appeals through vote

pooling or constituency pooling as Horowitz mentioned in his work. There is also no active

effort for the moderation by political elites to achieve the consensus or great coalition (seat-

pooling) which is advantage of consensual system described by Lijphart.

Table 2 Muslims in Gujarat Assembly elections (winners/candidates)

Year Congress BJP Independents won

1980 9/9 0/0 0

1985 7/10 0/0 0

1990 2/6 0/0 0

1995 3/10 0/1 1

1998 4/7 0/1 0

2002 3/5 0/0 0

2007 5/6 0/0 0 Source: Najiullah 2008

3. Affiliation of the main political parties by the religion cleavage

Indian political parties do not always follow the religious cleavages. Even in British India

when the Hindu-Muslim communal divide was sharp and deep, only Muslim League and the

Hindu Mahasabha and the Akali Dal followed the religious division in the society. The largest

party INC was not a Hindu Party. After independence, Muslim League (party with this name

still exist in Kerala) left for Pakistan, most Indian Muslims joined Congress or other secular

parties. The other parties of the right and the left in India today are not communal parties with

strong communalist politics as its main profile. They project themselves as secular parties.

Secularism is the national creed. However, there are some differences of understanding of

24

secularism and pressure on its importance. BJP is a party of Hindutva, but even this party

claims to be for positive secularism and its membership is open to all. Its minority basting is

practical political behaviour. These dissimilarities are described in following chapters which

make the division among Indian parties affiliation to secularism.

3.1. Parties with secularism affiliation

Among the main political parties, which exist in India, the secular parties have power in states

with a higher level of the education. As example the states of West Bengal, Kerela or

Tamilnadu and Haryana. These states have different levels of industrialisation and

urbanisation. The level of religious or ethnic minorities is also different, but generally, it is

possible to say that there are large groups of Muslims. Especially states of Kerela and West

Bengal have more than Indian average percentage of Muslims in their population. If we look

at table 8 (p. 60), there are states with generally lower level of religious or ethnic violence

compared to other states with similar level of Muslim population. How can this result be

explained?

3.1.1. Secularism in Indian Context

Indian scholar Mehta described secularism in two dimension: 1) as a term directly concerned

with the value of individual liberty. Those who advocate the disentanglement of the state from

religion as far as is possible are motivated by a concern for freedom. (Mehta 2004: 73) 2) As

a term of communal harmony, secularism as respect for all religions, and secularism as a

project for giving different groups their own space to collectively define their identities. This

secularism is even less motivated by a concern for individual liberty. It is motivated by the

high ideals of peace, sometimes solicitude for pluralism, sometimes a genuine piety towards

the diversity of society. This definition of secularism does not make freedom as a central

value. This version of secularism is not averse to using state power to advance religious ends

provided some kind of parity between different communities is maintained. So, as per this

view, it is all right for the state to ban practices offensive to Hindus so long as it does the

same for Muslims, and so forth. In deed, it could be argued that the parity model, has

dominated Indian secularism. While, the state is not itself religious, its involvement in

religious activity is vast. This state can subsidize religious pilgrimages for Muslims, and ban

cow slaughter for Hindus. (Mehta 2004: 74)

25

Chatterji described concept of the secular state as following:

1. The state guarantees of conscience in matters of religion to all citizens.

2. There is no discrimination between individuals on grounds of religion. This would

imply that there is equality before the law and positions of authority are open to all.

3. The state is not concerned with and, therefore, does not interfere in matters of

religion. (Chatterji 1995: 91)

This is a definition above and applies to the Christian religion. The question arises as to

whether the same principle cannot be invoked in the case of the Indian religions Hinduism,

Islam (Indian Islam), Buddhism and Sikhism? (Chatterji 1995: 92) The secularism in Indian

context has been understood differently.

Firstly, secularism in India (according Dr. Radhakrishran formed vice-president of India)

does not mean irreligion or atheism or even stress on material comfort. It proclaims that it

lays stress on universality of spiritual values which may be attained by a variety of ways. It

tries to build up a fellowship of believers not by subordinately individual qualities to the

group mind but by bringing them into harmony with each other. This fellowship is based on

principle of diversity in unity which alone has the quality of creativeness. Secondly,

secularism in Indian concept means an equal status for religious. (Chatterji 1995: 103)

Concept of Indian secularism described by Chatterji as well as second definition given by

Mehta brought many challenges for India. Secularism, which is based on equal status for

religious and state religious subsidizing, is difficult for maintenance in situation when the

political system is divided to two groups religious nationalist and secularist. Also the

challenge could be finding in electoral system which could not give chance for religious

group proportionality. Nationalism (Hindutva ideology represented by party in government)

and lack of proportional representation could bring privileges for majority religion. For

nationalists it could be difficult to maintenance secularism and to be neutral to the religious

groups; especially in situation when the main electoral support comes from majority.

3.1.2. Congress party and United Progressive Alliance

A similar situation is in the states where the Congress party lead the government, but the

problem is in strict secular politics, which is sometime not followed by INC. INC has marked

as a Brahmanical party, which is dominated by Hindu elites and Brahmans. However, there is

secular affiliation characterisation.

26

Secular affiliation could be also evaluated by the number of cross religious supporters in

election. Diagram 1 and 2 shows the gain of main political groups or parties among different

religious groups. INC (with coalition partners support) is only one party in election of 1996

and 1998 which were able to recruit their voters across different religious minorities. Muslims

and Christians who are out of Hindutva understanding of Hindu nation preferred Congress.

BJP with its partner do not have support among religious communities. Vice versa, BJP focus

more on Indian religious group where their support is strong mainly Hindus. The Congress

had its strength among the Muslims and the dalits. (Heath and Yadav 2006: 135)

Congress party has tried to follow the Indian way of secularism in governing and its political

programme. Secularism is part of the ideology of the party. In the Congress programme it is

possible to find some points about minorities and its positive discrimination approach.

The Congress believes in affirmative action for all religious and linguistic minorities. The

Congress has provided for reservations for Muslims in Kerala and Karnataka in government

employment and education on the grounds that they are a socially and educationally

backward class. The Congress is committed to adopting this policy for socially and

educationally backward sections among Muslims and other religious minorities on a national

scale. The Congress also pledges to extend reservations for the economically deprived

persons belonging to communities that are at present not entitled to such reservations.

The Congress will adopt all possible measures to promote and maintain communal peace and

harmony, especially in sensitive areas. It will enact a comprehensive law on social violence in

all its forms and manifestations, providing for investigations by a central agency, prosecution

by Special Courts and payment of uniform compensation for loss of life, honour and property.

The Congress commits itself to amending the Constitution to establish a Commission for

Minority Educational Institutions that will provide direct affiliation for minority professional

institutions to central universities. Special steps will be taken to spread modern and technical

education among women in minority communities particularly. (INC 2004)

3.1.3. Leftist parties

In introduction of this chapter are mentioned states which have been active secular parties

such as CPI(M) or INC which have a great deal of political power. In West Bengal and Kerela

the main power in government is the Communist party CPI(M) and has been for almost 40

years (they have had strong power in both state parliaments and governments from 1977 in

27

West Bengal and respectively in Kerela in 1970). This party insists on secularism and

supporting the minorities in their cultural life and education. Strict secularisation and non-

discrimination of all religious and ethnic groups help avoid politically motivated intolerance

among religious communities and unwanted political support of religious cleavage on the side

of government policy making. The connection between the number of religions riots and

secular policy making can probably be found in West Bengal or Kerela (CPI(M) and coalition

government) where the lowest number of riots and violence exists (see table 8, p. 60).

Diagrams 1 and 2 also support the secular affiliation of Communist parties in India. CPI(M)

and CPI were part of LF in 1996 which had bigger gains among religious group than among

Hindu. However, the support among Hindus was similar to other communities. Alliance LF

where also Indian communist parties took part gain the profit from their secular politics and

the support among Muslim population were higher than among other groups.

One successful example of relatively peaceful state under communist party government is

West Bengal. The relative absence of violence against minorities and the lowest castes and

classes in West Bengal has not earned the CPI(M) the credit it deserves. An absence by

definition constitutes an invisible achievement, especially because West Bengal has had a

tradition of harmonious caste and communal relations since the partition in 1948, quite

independently of the CPI(M) actions. However, there is little precedent of historical basis for

some of the most virulent communal conflicts that have occurred elsewhere in India in the

recent period. (Basu 2006: 345-346)

3.2. Parties with Hinduism affiliation

Since the rise of the Indian national movement, three competing themes about India

territorial, cultural, and religious have fought for political dominance. The territorial notion

is that India has a sacred geography, enclosed between the Indus River, the Himalayas and

the seas and emphasized for 2,500 years since the time of the Mahabharata. The cultural

notion is that ideas of tolerance, pluralism, and syncretism define Indian society. India is not

only the birthplace of several religions Hinduism, Buddhism, Jainism, and Sikhism but in

its history, it has also regularly received, accommodated, and absorbed outsiders Parsis,

Jews, and Syrian Christians (whose reached India before Europeans). In the process,

syncretistic forms of culture have emerged and become part of India. The third religious

notion is that India is originally the land of the Hindus, and it is the only land that the Hindus

28

can call their own. India has nearly all of Hinduisms holy places and its holy rivers. A great

deal of diversity may exist within Hindu society: a faith in Hinduism brings the various

practitioners together. India thus viewed is a Hindu nation. (Varshney 2002: 60-61)

In political discourse, the territorial idea is called national unity or territorial integrity, the

cultural idea is expressed as political pluralism, and the religious idea is known as

Hindutva, or political Hinduism. (Varshney 2002: 61) The recognition of Hinduism as a meta-

ethnicity has been an essential component of Indian nation and state-building and has called

for radical revision of the experience of Indian democracy since 1947. It does not conform to

secularized majoritarianism (where the state encourages acculturation and assimilation but

allows ethnic groups to maintain ethnicity in the private sphere, for example the USA). Indian

democracy subordinated secularism to the nationalism of the Hindu majority. (Singh 2000:

45-46)

BJP is the biggest and main party which supports the ideology of Hindutva and Hindu

nationalism. In last Lok Sabha election this ideology went to the backcloth and the main

election topics was economic growth. The present topic before new Lok Sabha election is the

Jammu-Kashmir issue due to 2008 disorder in this state as well as the discussion around US-

India Nuclear deal which also divided political spectrum out of secular anti-secular.

However, the ideology of the BJP is based on Hindutva. In BJP political manifesto is the

emphasis on the Indian nationalism and ideology of Hindutva. (BJP 2004)

The victory of BJP ideology of Hindutva was the decision of the Indian Supreme Court. In a

judgment the Supreme Court ruled that no precise meaning can be ascribed to the terms

'Hindu', 'Hindutva' and 'Hinduism'; and no meaning in the abstract can confine it to the narrow

limits of religion alone, excluding the content of Indian culture and heritage. This gave the

hallmark of legitimacy to the main stream of Indian nationalism ideology. (Kudlek 2006:

24-25, compare with Indian Supreme Court decision from December 11th, 1995 in case of the

election of the Maharashtra Chief Minister, Mr. Manohar Josuu2)

Shiv Sena (meaning Army of Shiva, referring to Shivaji) is a right-wing political party. The

Sena's ideology is based on the concepts of 'Bhumiputra' (Marathi for "Sons of Soil") and

Hindutva or Hindu nationalism. However, in recent times, the Sena has laid more emphasis on

2) The unanimous view expressed by the three Judges regarding Hinduism and Hindutva are based upon the views expressed earlier by the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in a few cases. For example, in Shastri Yagna Purushadji case (1966(3) SCR 242) and in Sridharan case (1976 SCR 478). (Bharatiya Janata Party)

29

Hindutva. (Kudlek 2006: 25) Shiv Sena was part of BJP leaded government (1999-2004)

and has been coalition partner in National Democratic Alliance leaded by same party.

Hindutva and Hinduism politics are the main ideological attributes of NDA and coalition

partners of BJP. This is also the characteristic which give NDA the dimension of opposition

to UPA and INC.

3.3. Parties with Islamic (Muslim) affiliation

Indian Muslim nationalism refers to the political and cultural expression of nationalism,

founded upon the religious tenets and identity of Islam, of the Muslims of the Indian

subcontinent. Some prominent Muslims politically sought a base for themselves, separate

from Hindus and other Indian nationalists, who espoused the Indian National Congress.

Muslim scholars, religious leaders and politicians founded the All India Muslim League in

1906. Muslims comprised 25 % to 30 % of (pre-partition) India's collective population. Some

Muslim leaders felt that their massive cultural and economic contributions to India's heritage

and life merited a significant role for Muslims in a future independent India's governance and

politics. (Kudlek 2006: 25)

Parties which support Muslim communities and their rights mostly cooperate with INC,

because its secular politics affiliation supports these communities and give to Muslims the

advantages in the powerful opposition of Hindu nationalism and Hindutva. Now these parties

are in coalition with INC in the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) in the present ruling

coalition of political parties in India. (UPA was formed after the 2004 Lok Sabha elections).

Other parties try to cooperate with other secular parties such as CPI(M). Indian Union Muslim

League is an Islamic nationalist political party in India. The chief support base of the party is

northern Kerala where there is strong concentration of Muslims. Muslims make majority of

voters in some constituencies in Kerala which give them advantage in FPTP system to have

strong electorate support. All India Majlis-e-Ittehadul Muslimeen (All India Council of the

Union of Muslims) is a political party in India that was formed to represent the Muslim

population of Andhra Pradesh. The stronghold of AIMIM is the old city of Hyderabad and

Muslim dominated areas of Andhra Pradesh, though it has its units in some parts of

Mahrashtra and Karnataka also. All India Muslim Forum is a Muslim political party in India.

The president is Nihaluddin and the general secretary is Dr. M. K. Sherwani. The Forum is

30

staunchly opposed to the Hindutva nationalism of BJP. The Forum has collaboration with

Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) Liberation. (Kudlek 2006: 25-26)

Diagram 1 Support for main political parties in 1996 election according to religion3

26,2

28,9

8,4

7,4

3,7

25,4

35,3

3,1

25,3

10,1

1,2

25,0

39,9

3,02,0

5,60,0

49,5

48,3

14,3

16,7

2,45,6

42,7

26,5

6,0

12,0

2,4

4,8

48,3

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

religious group voting

Hindu Muslim Christian Sikh Others

INC+ BJP+ NF LF BSP Others

Source: Prakash 2006: 145

3) 1996 Election: INC+ = INC + All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (AIADMK) BJP+ = BJP + Samata + Shiv Sena + Haryana Vikas Party NF = Janata Dal + Samajwadi Party LF = CPI (M) + CPI + Revolutionary Socialist Party (RSP) + Forward Block (FBL)

31

Diagram 2 Support for main political parties in 1998 election according to religion4

25,6

37,4

17,4

3

16,6

35,1

6,8

34,4

1,3

22,4

42,1

9,1

18,6

0,4

29,8

21,9

39,8

18

10,2

10,1

26,4

10,5

3,9

10,5

26,4

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

riligious group voting

Hindu Muslim Christian Sikh Others

INC BJP+ UF BSP Others

Source: Prakash 2006: 146

3.4. Parties with other mostly regional or specific community affiliation

Samajwadi Party and Bahujan Samaj Party are parties which are out of the main stream

affiliation. They are regional parties based in Uttar Pradesh, but BSP have tried to enlarge

their base to other Indian states. The electoral base is among underprivileged groups of Indian

society as has been already mentioned lower. The main support has been found among

Scheduled Tribes and Scheduled Castes and they also try to find the electoral among other

religious minorities (Muslims), which can give them the voting advantage. (compare with

Chandra 2004: 148-149) However, the main base of BSP is in state of Uttar Pradesh, but the

partys influence is in federal politics as well. The Uttar Pradesh generates high number of

4) In the election 1998: BJP+ = BJP + Samata + Shiv Sena + Haryana Vikas Party + AIADMK + Akali Dal + Trinamool Congress + Lok Shakti + Biju Janata Dal + TDP (NTR) UF = Janata Dal + SP (Mulayam) + Telugu Desan Party (TDP (N)) + AGP + Tamil Maanila Congress (TMC) + Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK) + Maharashtrawadi Gomantak Party (MGP) + CPI + CPI(M) + RSP + FBL

32

seats for BSP in Lok Sabha. The Congress Party historically gains the support from

Scheduled Castes, but BSP took its place in Uttar Pradesh. BSP loudly identified itself as a

champion not of the nation as a whole, but of Bahumaj5 Samaj and the Scheduled Castes in

particular. (Chandra 2004: 151) Uttar Pradesh has around 21 percent of SCs in its population.

India's primary opposition party prior to the BJP was fragmented into several regional parties.

The Samajwadi Party believes in democratic socialism and opposes the unrestricted entry of

multinational companies into India. (Samajwadi Party Mumbai web) Samajwadi Party is

primarily based in Uttar Pradesh, where it bases its support largely on OBCs and Muslims.

Other mostly regional parties such as Janata Dal (United), Shiromani Akali Dal or Biju Janata

Dal are also part of NDA (the BJP led ruling alliance). Their affiliation could be also defined

as a Hinduistic. There are many other more or less successful Janata parties. Anti-secularism

is not significant part of their identity and some of Janata parties could be also pro-secular as

well as pro-hindu. Some Janata parties such as Rashtriya Janata Dal are part of pro-secular

UDA. However, these parties notify their self as adherents of Janata movement from 1970s

and Janata Party.

3.5. The characteristics of the main relevant political parties in India

This chapter characterises the political programme and political base of main political parties

in India. For as much as the number of political parties in India is enormous and their success

in different by the states, this work will focused mostly on two present biggest parties. These

parties lead also two main alliances in the country. Moreover, there is also mentioned Left

Front which is mixture of communist and socialist parties. For all that there will be only study

of Communist Party of India (Marxist) which have been successful in West Bengal and

Kerela and is the biggest and leading party in Left Front. Bahujan Samaj Party and Samajwadi

Party have been selected because their electoral success is perceptually similar to CPI(M) in

both last election. The electoral gains in last two federal elections were bigger than 4 % which

is limitation for this selection. These five parties are the biggest parties in India. Relative to

existing alliances there will be also characteristic of these alliances programme according to

their leaders.

5) Bahujan literally means majority. It means majority of the castes in Hindu society (including untouchable) who are not Brahmins, Kshatriya or Vaishya. (Chandra 2004: 148)

33

3.5.1. Indian National Congress

Indian National Congress (also known as the Congress Party, abbreviated INC) is a major

political party in India. Created in 1885, the Indian National Congress became the nation's

leader in the Independence Movement, with over 15 million Indians involved in its

organisations and over 70 million participants in its struggle against the British Empire. After

Independence in 1947, it became the nation's dominant political party. In the 14th Lok Sabha

(2004-2009), 145 INC members, the largest contingent amongst all parties, serve in the house.

The party is currently the chief member of the ruling United Progressive Alliance coalition

government supported by the Left Front. (Indian National Congress web)

Congress party has tried to follow the secular attitude in governing and its political

programme. Secularism is part of the ideology of the party. In the Congress programme it is

possible to find some points about minorities and its positive discrimination approach. This

has been described in previous chapter 3.1.2. The minority support which Congress has is

strong. Dalit and other minorities were more likely to vote for the Congress than the BJP and

allies in almost all States in last election. Only West Bengal, Assam and Uttar Pradesh have

different affiliation of their voters. (Sings and Saxena 2008: 221) The cleavage which makes

the party different is in their attitude to minorities and more important to unprivileged groups

in Indian society. Congress is traditionally more popular for those groups. However, Congress

also follows its Gandhis heritage.

The economic programme is in present on the right mainstream. The support of liberalisation

of the economy is very strong. Both main relevant parties and alliance support liberal

principles of free market. The market oriented economy is dominant in INC from the

beginning of 1990s. In 1950s, 60s, 70s was INC more pro-socialist oriented economy with

mixture central planning and of free market. The international politics of INC is pro-western

and pro-American. There is strong cooperation with the USA in War on Terror.

3.5.2. Bharatiya Janata Party

The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), literally meaning Indian People's Party, created in 1980, is

one of the two major national political parties in India. It projects itself as a champion of

socio-religious cultural values of the country's Hindu majority, conservative social policies

and strong national defence. Its constituency is strengthened by the broad umbrella of Hindu

nationalist organizations, informally known as the Sangh Parivar (League of Indian nationalist

34

organizations), where the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh6 play a leading role. Since its

inception, the BJP has been a prime opponent of the Indian National Congress. It has allied

with regional parties to roll back the left-of-centre tendencies formerly endorsed by the

Congress Party, which dominated Indian politics for four decades. The ideological rallying

cry of the BJP is Hindutva, literally "Hinduness," or cultural Hindu nationalism. (Kudlek

2006: 21)

As was mentioned in chapter 3.2. the main concept of the ideology on which BJP has been

built is Cultural nationalism, which is called Hindutva. The BJP wants to take its inspiration

from the history and civilisation of India. For this party means Indian nationhood stems from

a deep cultural bonding of the people that overrides differences of caste, region, religion and

language. We believe that Cultural Nationalism for which Indianness, Bharatiyata and

Hindutva are synonyms -- is the basis of our national identity. (BJP 2004) The BJP really

helps the Supreme Court decision about Hindutva that it is not a religious or exclusivist

concept. It is inclusive, integrative, and abhors any kind of discrimination against any section

of the people of India on the basis of their faith. (BJP 2004)

It has also been written in the BJP Vision document 2004 that BJP appeals to the religious

and social leaders of the Hindu and Muslim communities to speed up the process of dialogue

and bring it to an amicable and early fruition. We hope that these efforts will succeed in

heralding a new chapter of amity in Hindu-Muslim relations and fortify national integration.

(BJP 2004) Generally it is possible to say that BJP is a conservative political organisation. It

sees itself as rising to the defence of indigenous culture, and Indian religious systems which

include Hinduism, Jainism, Sikhism and Buddhism. To many Hindu nationalists, Bharat is a

Hindu Rashtra, literally a Hindu nation. According to BJP, this definition does not exclude

Muslims, Christians, or other minorities. Hindu Rashtra is portrayed as cultural nationalism

and Hinduism as the entire complex system of culture, history, faith and worship that have

evolved in India over the past 5,000 years. In the political language of Hindu nationalists, all

the people of India, their culture and heritage are "Hindu," which literally means "inhabitant

of the land of the river Sindhu," the modern-day Indus. The BJP has been accused of being a

xenophobic, racist, and fascist organization by its opponents. Its supporters, on the other hand,

argue that it is no more than a conservative, nationally-oriented party which does not wish to

polarise the country on communal (religious) grounds. (Kudlek 2006: 28) BJP has

6) The Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (Sanskrit, "National Volunteers' Union"; also known as the Sangh or the RSS) is a Hindu nationalist organization in India.

35

promoted and supported an anti-terrorist law, which they feel in its present form could be

misused to harass minority groups such as Muslims. (Satish 2002)

The economic programme is in populist right mainstream. The support of liberalisation of the

economy is in practical way similar to INC. Both main relevant parties and alliance support

liberal principles of free market. However, there is also populist orientation of the policy

making. The BJP is against foreign capital which is against traditional groups interest. The

economic philosophy of the party stood on three pillars: economic development or growth,

social stability or harmony, and self-reliance or swadeshi. Operation experience from BJP

governance showed that BJP continued with on-going policy of economic reforms started by

INC. This was a paradox in BJPs economic policy. Traditionally a party of small traders and

entrepreneurs, the BJP would not like to subject this community to on onslaught of the

international big brand names. However, party showed its willingness to continue with the

reform process to achieving higher economic growth. (Ghosh 2000: 286-305)

The international politics of BJP is pro-western and pro-American and anti-Muslims. There is

an agreement with strong cooperation with the USA in War on Terror. However, the BJP is

not open to the cooperation with the West which could be against Indian national

independence. Example is the new Nuclear Deal agreement with the USA from 2008 with

which the BJP strongly disagree. Anti-Nuclear Deal position goes together with the economic

approach which based on a self-reliant approach. Also BJP and NDA want to be at the

forefront of defending the interests of Indian kisans7 by bringing about a coalition of

developing countries against such unjust practices of developed countries. (BJP Vision

Document 2004) The economic approach goes together with nationalism (cultural

nationalism) which is promoted by BJP and NDA.

3.5.3. Communist Party of India (Marxist)

The CPI(M) was formed at the Seventh Congress of the Communist Party of India held in

Calcutta from October 31 to November 7, 1964. The CPI(M) was born (as they declared) in

the struggle against revisionism and sectarianism in the communist movement at the

international and national level, in order to defend the scientific and revolutionary tenets of

Marxism-Leninism and its appropriate application in the concrete Indian conditions. The

CPI(M) declare its self as the leading Left party and it is committed to build a Left and

7) Kisans - Farmers

36

democratic front which can present a real alternative to the existing bourgeoisie-landlord

policies. (CPI(M) 2006)

CPI(M) declares the party policy and party behaviour as the right communist party in India

with the right Marxist ideology. However, the practical policy is mostly similar to socialist

parties. The background of their programme is on social and economic bases. CPI(M) gives

the special stress on social problems of the Indian society. They are on the side of untouchable

people and also as a secular party they are again caste system. It means that it is not really

popular party among higher class and higher castes. Especially, if it is compared to BJP or

other parties supporting Hindu religion and ideology. The party is mostly supported by rural

people and workers. This is also one of the reasons why the party is very successful in rural

areas and states such as Kerela, Tripoli or West Bengal. (Kudlek 2006: 22)

CPI(M) is a communist party traditionally on the side of secularisation of society and politics.

In religious issues and ethnic and religious violence, this party sees the problem with social

and economic background. They see the problem in lack of equal opportunities and in

discrimination.

A passage is written in the CPI(M) programme about the attitude to this problematic issue: In

conditions of capitalist exploitation the guaranteed rights to the minorities provided in the

Constitution are also not implemented. There is the lack of equal opportunities and

discrimination against the Muslim minorities both in the economic and social sphere.

Communal riots and violent attacks against the Muslims have become a permanent feature.

The RSS and its outfits constantly instigate hatred against the minorities and they target the

Christian community also. This fosters alienation and insecurity among the minorities, which

breeds fundamentalist trends and weakens the secular foundations. Minority communalism

isolates the minorities and hampers the common movement of all oppressed sections. Defence

of minority rights is a crucial aspect of the struggle to strengthen democracy and secularism.

(CPI(M) 2006) As stated in the programme mentioned, the CPI(M) wants to solve the

question of Muslim and other minorities group by invoking strong secular policy.

The economy programme background is in left side of political spectrum. In present time, it is

not communist central planning economy which dominates to the CPI(M). It is more social-

market economy which is more similar to socialist parties. The support of liberalisation of the

economy is only in the way which cannot have bad impact of the lower social groups. The

CPI(M) support the welfare programme against poverty. There is strong focus on rural and

agriculture policy. Party wants to defend the interests of the country against the depredations

37

of imperialism. (CPI(M) 2006) The international politics of CPI(M) and Left Front is neutral

to the West and more anti-American. There is bigger support of Russia and China. Example

could be the new Nuclear Deal agreement with the USA with which the CPI(M) strongly

disagree. CPI(M) also disagree with USA activities in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

3.5.4. Bahujan Samaj Party

The BSP was formed in 1984 by Kanshi Ram who has remained party leader ever since till

his death in 2007. The party emerged from Kanshi Ram's earlier activity promoting the

interests of Scheduled Caste government employees. Although the BSP is recognised by the

Election Commission as a national party it effectively functions on certain North Indian states

only. On 11th May 2007 the Uttar Pradesh BSP was elected as the first single majority party

since 1991 with Mayawati as leader in the party.

BSPs ideology is based on the argument that the majority are oppressed by the select upper

class. It aims to change this using the government power. (Indian elections web) The BSP is

the political party with the stated goal of serving the traditionally lower castes of Indian

society, including Sudras (the fourth Varna) and Dalits (Untouchables). BSP is the party

formed to represent religious minorities, those at the bottom of India's caste system.

The founder of this party was Kanshi Ram, who wanted to mobilize members of his own

ethnic category for the forwarding of his political goals. The principal salient categories that

he could identify a