Monetáris makroökonómia€¦ · Vagyonmérleg Vagyonmérleg Eszközök Források Mishkin könyv 25000 Saját vagyon 50000 Élelmiszer 25000 Eszközök összesen 50000 Források

Monetáris makroökonómiaSzabó-Bakos Eszter

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www.mnb.hu

www.ecb.int

www.federalreserve.gov

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Vagyonmérleg

Vagyonmérleg

Eszközök Források

A gazdasági szereplő számára értékkel bíró dolgok. A gazdasági szereplővel szemben fennálló követelések (azaz a gazdasági szereplő tartozásai)

Eszközök összesen Források összesen

Vagyonmérleg

Vagyonmérleg


Mishkin könyv 25000

Élelmiszer 25000

Eszközök összesen 50000 Források összesen

Vagyonmérleg

Vagyonmérleg


Mishkin könyv 25000 Saját vagyon 50000

Élelmiszer 25000

Eszközök összesen 50000 Források összesen 50000

Vagyonmérleg

X gazdasági szereplő vagyonmérlege



Élelmiszer 25000


Y gazdasági szereplő vagyonmérlege



Vagyonmérleg

X gazdasági szereplő vagyonmérlege



Élelmiszer 12500

Követelés Y gazdasági szereplővel szemben 12500


Y gazdasági szereplő vagyonmérlege


Élelmiszer 12500 Tartozás X gazdasági szereplőnek 12500


Mi az a pénzügyi eszköz?

Értékmérő funkció

Vagyontartási eszköz funkció

Általánosan elmondható, hogy a pénz hasznos, mert...

A pénz nem keverendő össze a...

Fizikai tulajdonságok

Fizikai forma

Why Are Scandinavians So Far Ahead of Americans in Using Electronic Payments?Frederic Miskin (2004) Money, banking and financial markets. p.50

Americans are the biggest users of checks in the world. Close to 100 billion checks are written every year in the United States, and over three-quarters of noncash transactions are conducted with paper. In contrast, in most countries of Europe, more than two-thirds of noncash transactions are electronic, with Finland and Sweden having the greatest proportion of online banking customers of any countries in the world. Indeed, if you were Finnish or Swedish, instead of writing a check, you would be far more likely to pay your bills online, using a personal computer or even a mobile phone. Why do Europeans and especially Scandinavians so far outpace Americans in the use of electronic payments?

First, Europeans got used to making payments without checks even before the advent of the personal computer. Eu-ropeans have long made use of so-called giro payments, in which banks and post offices transfer funds for customers to pay bills. Second, Europeans---and particularly Scandinavians---are much greater users of mobile phones and the Internet than are Americans. Finland has the highest per capita use of mobile phones in the world, and Finland and Sweden lead the world in the percentage of the population that accesses the Internet. Maybe these usage patterns stem from the low population densities of these countries and the cold and dark winters that keep Scandinavians inside at their PCs. For their part, Scandinavians would rather take the view that their high-tech culture is the product of their good education systems and the resulting high degree of computer literacy, the presence of top technology companies such as Finland’s Nokia and Sweden’s Ericsson, and government policies promoting the increased use of personal com-puters, such as Sweden’s tax incentives for companies to provide their employees with home computers. The wired populations of Finland and Sweden are (percentage-wise) the biggest users of online banking in the world

Americans are clearly behind the curve in their use of electronic payments, which has imposed a high cost on the U.S. economy. Switching from checks to electronic payments might save the U.S. economy tens of billions of dollars per year, according to some estimates. Indeed, the U.S. federal government is trying to switch all its payments to electronic ones by directly depositing them into bank accounts, in order to reduce its expenses. Can Americans be weaned from paper checks and fully embrace the world of high-tech electronic payments?

Are We Headed for a Cashless Society?Frederic Miskin (2004) Money, banking and financial markets. p.52

Predictions of a cashless society have been around for decades, but they have not come to fruition. For example, Busi-ness Week predicted in 1975 that electronic means of payment “would soon revolutionize the very concept of money itself,” only to reverse itself several years later. Pilot projects in recent years with smart cards to convert consumers to the use of e-money have not been a success. Mondex, one of the widely touted, early stored-value cards that was launched in Britain in 1995, is only used on a few British university campuses. In Germany and Belgium, millions of people carry bank cards with computer chips embedded in them that enable them to make use of e-money, but very few use them. Why has the movement to a cashless society been so slow in coming?

Although e-money might be more convenient and may be more efficient than a payments system based on paper, sev-eral factors work against the disappearance of the paper system. First, it is very expensive to set up the computer, card reader, and telecommunications networks necessary to make electronic money the dominant form of payment. Sec-ond, electronic means of payment raise security and privacy concerns. We often hear media reports that an unauthor-ized hacker has been able to access a computer database and to alter information stored there. Because this is not an uncommon occurrence, unscrupulous persons might be able to access bank accounts in electronic payments systems and steal funds by moving them from someone else’s accounts into their own. The prevention of this type of fraud is no easy task, and a whole new field of computer science has developed to cope with security issues. A further concern is that the use of electronic means of payment leaves an electronic trail that contains a large amount of personal data on buying habits. There are worries that government, employers, and marketers might be able to access these data, thereby encroaching on our privacy.

The conclusion from this discussion is that although the use of e-money will surely increase in the future, to paraphrase Mark Twain, “the reports of cash’s death are greatly exaggerated.”

Hogyan mérjük a pénzkínálatot?

Mi a pénzkínálat?

Központi bank vagyonmérlege

Központi bank


Eszközök Tartalékok

Refinanszírozási hitelek Forgalomban lévő készpénz


Kereskedelmi bankrendszer vagyonmérlege

Kereskedelmi bankrendszer


Hitelek Betétek

Tartalékok Refinanszírozási hitelek

Egyéb pénzügyi eszközök


Bankrendszer vagyonmérlege

Központi bank


Eszközök Tartalékok



Kereskedelmi bankrendszer


Hitelek Betétek

Tartalékok Refinanszírozási hitelek



Példa

Pénzmultiplikátor

Fontos fogalmak

Pénzmultiplikátor

Pénzmultiplikátor

Központi bank


Eszközök +100 Tartalékok +100



1. Kereskedelmi bank


Hitelek Betétek

Tartalékok +100 Refinanszírozási hitelek

Egyéb pénzügyi eszközök +100


Pénzmultiplikátor

Központi bank


Eszközök +100 Tartalékok +100





Hitelek +100 Betétek +100




Pénzmultiplikátor

Pénzmultiplikátor



Hitelek +49 Betétek +50+49






Hitelek +100 Betétek +100-50-50

Tartalékok +100-50-50 Refinanszírozási hitelek



Pénzmultiplikátor

Pénzmultiplikátor



Hitelek +24,01 Betétek +24,5+24,01

Tartalékok +24,5 Refinanszírozási hitelek





Hitelek +49 Betétek +50+49




Pénzmultiplikátor

Pénzmultiplikátor



Hitelek +11,7649 Betétek +12,005+11,7649






Hitelek +24,01 Betétek +24,5+24,01




Pénzmultiplikátor

Pénzmultiplikátor

Feladat

Feladat

Pénzmultiplikátor

of excess reserves, and their level should fall. We have the following result: The excessreserves ratio e is positively related to expected deposit outflows.

Additional Factors That Determine the Money Supply

So far we have been assuming that the Fed has accurate control over the monetarybase. However, whereas the amount of open market purchases or sales is completelycontrolled by the Fed’s placing orders with dealers in bond markets, the central bankcannot unilaterally determine, and therefore cannot perfectly predict, the amount ofborrowing by banks from the Fed. The Federal Reserve sets the discount rate (inter-est rate on discount loans), and then banks make decisions about whether to borrow.The amount of discount loans, though influenced by the Fed’s setting of the discountrate, is not completely controlled by the Fed; banks’ decisions play a role, too.

Therefore, we might want to split the monetary base into two components: onethat the Fed can control completely and another that is less tightly controlled. The lesstightly controlled component is the amount of the base that is created by discountloans from the Fed. The remainder of the base (called the nonborrowed monetary

C H A P T E R 1 6 Determinants of the Money Supply 381

F I G U R E 1 The Excess Reserves Ratio e and the Interest Rate (Federal Funds Rate)

Source: Federal Reserve: www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h3/hist/h3hist2.txt.

0.0

0.001

0.002

0.003

0.004

0.005

0.006

0.007

5

10

15

20Interest Rate

Excess Reserves Ratio

1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 20050

ExcessReserves Ratio,

e InterestRate (%)

0.008

0.009

0.010

Pénzmultiplikátor

Pénzmultiplikátor

C H A P T E R 1 6 Determinants of the Money Supply 389

accounts, and c would rise. Our earlier analysis of the excess reserves ratiosuggests that the resulting surge in deposit outflows would cause the banksto protect themselves by substantially increasing their excess reserves ratio e.Both of these predictions are borne out by the data in Figure 5. During thefirst bank panic (October 1930–January 1931) c began to climb. Even morestriking is the behavior of e, which more than doubled from November 1930to January 1931.

The money supply model predicts that when e and c increase, themoney supply will fall. The rise in c results in a decline in the overall level ofmultiple deposit expansion, leading to a smaller money multiplier and adecline in the money supply, while the rise in e reduces the amount ofreserves available to support deposits and also causes the money supply tofall. Thus our model predicts that the rise in e and c after the onset of the firstbank crisis would result in a decline in the money supply—a predictionborne out by the evidence in Figure 6. The money supply declined sharplyin December 1930 and January 1931 during the first bank panic.

Banking crises continued to occur from 1931 to 1933, and the patternpredicted by our model persisted: c continued to rise, and so did e. By the

F I G U R E 5 Excess Reserves Ratio and Currency Ratio, 1929–1933

Sources: Federal Reserve Bulletin; Milton Friedman and Anna Jacobson Schwartz, A Monetary History of the United States, 1867–1960 (Princeton, N.J.: PrincetonUniversity Press, 1963), p. 333.

1929 1933193219311930

0.40

0.01

0.02

0.03

0.04

0.05

0.06

0.07

0.08

0.05

0.10

0.15

0.20

0.25

0.30

0.35

Start ofFirst Banking

Crisis

End ofFinal Banking

Crisis

Excess ReservesRatio, e

Currency Ratio,c

0.0

c

e

0.0

end of the crises in March 1933, the money supply (M1) had declined byover 25%—by far the largest decline in all of American history—and it coin-cided with the nation’s worst economic contraction (see Chapter 8). Evenmore remarkable is that this decline occurred despite a 20% rise in the levelof the monetary base—which illustrates how important the changes in c ande during bank panics can be in the determination of the money supply. It alsoillustrates that the Fed’s job of conducting monetary policy can be compli-cated by depositor and bank behavior.

390 P A R T I V Central Banking and the Conduct of Monetary Policy

F I G U R E 6 M1 and the Monetary Base, 1929–1933

Source: Milton Friedman and Anna Jacobson Schwartz, A Monetary History of the United States, 1867–1960 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1963), p. 333.

1933193219311930192906789

1920212223242526272829

Money Supply($ billions)

End ofFinal Banking

Crisis

M1

Monetary Base

Start of First Banking

Crisis

Summary

1. We developed a model to describe how the moneysupply is determined. First, we linked the monetary baseto the money supply using the concept of the moneymultiplier, which tells us how much the money supplychanges when there is a change in the monetary base.

2. The money supply is negatively related to the requiredreserve ratio r, the currency ratio c, and the excessreserves ratio e. It is positively related to the level ofdiscount loans DL from the Fed and the nonborrowedbase MBn, which is determined by Fed open market

The general outline of the movements of the currency ratio c since 1892 is shown inFigure 1. As you can see, several episodes stand out:

1. The declining trend in the ratio from 1892 until 1917, when the United Statesentered World War I

2. The sharp increase in the ratio during World War I and the decline thereafter3. The steepest increase in the ratio that we see in the figure, which occurs during

the Great Depression years from 1930 to 19334. The increase in the ratio during World War II5. The reversal in the early 1960s of the downward trend in the ratio and the rise

thereafter6. The halt in the upward trend from 1980 to 19937. The upward trend from 1994 to 2002

Expanding Behavior of the Currency Ratio

appendix 2to chapter

16

F I G U R E 1 Currency-Checkable Deposits Ratio: 1892–2002

Sources: Federal Reserve Bulletin and Banking and Monetary Statistics. www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h6/hist/h6hist1.txt

0.25

1892 1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010

0.50

WWI WWIIGreatDepression

CurrencyRatio c

��1

Pénzmultiplikátor

Bankközi kamatláb

Nyílt piaci műveletek

The analysis of the market for reserves proceeds in a similar fashion to the analysis ofthe bond market we conducted in Chapter 5. We derive a demand and supply curvefor reserves. Then the market equilibrium in which the quantity of reservesdemanded equals the quantity of reserves supplied determines the federal funds rate,the interest rate charged on the loans of these reserves.

Demand Curve. To derive the demand curve for reserves, we need to ask what hap-pens to the quantity of reserves demanded, holding everything else constant, as thefederal funds rate changes. Recall from Chapter 16 that the amount of reserves can besplit up into two components: (1) required reserves, which equal the required reserveratio times the amount of deposits on which reserves are required, and (2) excessreserves, the additional reserves banks choose to hold. Therefore, the quantity ofreserves demanded equals required reserves plus the quantity of excess reservesdemanded. Excess reserves are insurance against deposit outflows, and the cost ofholding these excess reserves is their opportunity cost, the interest rate that couldhave been earned on lending these reserves out, which is equivalent to the federalfunds rate. Thus as the federal funds rate decreases, the opportunity cost of holdingexcess reserves falls and, holding everything else constant, including the quantity ofrequired reserves, the quantity of reserves demanded rises. Consequently, the demandcurve for reserves, Rd, slopes downward in Figure 1.

Supply Curve. The supply of reserves, Rs, can be broken up into two components: theamount of reserves that are supplied by the Fed’s open market operations, called non-borrowed reserves (Rn), and the amount of reserves borrowed from the Fed, calleddiscount loans (DL). The primary cost of borrowing discount loans from the Fed is

Supply andDemand in theMarket forReserves


F I G U R E 1 Equilibrium in theMarket for ReservesEquilibrium occurs at the inter-section of the supply curve Rs andthe demand curve Rd at point 1and an interest rate of i*ff .

Quantity of Reserves, R

Rn

id

1i ff

i ff

i ff

FederalFunds Rate

Rd

Rs

2

*

1


F I G U R E 2 Response to anOpen Market OperationAn open market purchase increasesnonborrowed reserves and hencethe reserves supplied, and shiftsthe supply curve from Rs

1 to R s2.

The equilibrium moves frompoint 1 to point 2, lowering thefederal funds rate from i1

ff to i 2ff .


Rn Rn

id

1

2

i ff

i ff

FederalFunds Rate

R1

R2R1

1

2

s s

1 2

d

F I G U R E 3 Response to a Change in the Discount RateIn panel a when the discount rate is lowered by the Fed from i1

d to i2d, the vertical section of the supply curve just shortens, as in Rs

2, so that theequilibrium federal funds rate remains unchanged at i 1

f f. In panel b when the discount rate is lowered by the Fed from i1d to i2

d, the horizontalsection of the supply curve Rs

2 falls, and the equilibrium federal funds rate falls from i 1f f to i 2

f f .

Quantity ofReserves, R

Rn

FederalFunds Rate

R2

(a) No discount lending


Rn

i ff = i d1

2i ff = i d

FederalFunds Rate

(b) Some discount lending

id1

i ff1

id2

R1d

1

R1s

s

R1s

R2s

R1d

1 1

2 2

A nyílt piaci műveletek előnyei más eszközökkel szemben

Refinanszírozási (diszkont) hitelek


F I G U R E 2 Response to anOpen Market OperationAn open market purchase increasesnonborrowed reserves and hencethe reserves supplied, and shiftsthe supply curve from Rs

1 to R s2.

The equilibrium moves frompoint 1 to point 2, lowering thefederal funds rate from i1

ff to i 2ff .


Rn Rn

id

1

2

i ff

i ff

FederalFunds Rate

R1

R2R1

1

2

s s

1 2

d

F I G U R E 3 Response to a Change in the Discount RateIn panel a when the discount rate is lowered by the Fed from i1

d to i2d, the vertical section of the supply curve just shortens, as in Rs

2, so that theequilibrium federal funds rate remains unchanged at i 1

f f. In panel b when the discount rate is lowered by the Fed from i1d to i2

d, the horizontalsection of the supply curve Rs

2 falls, and the equilibrium federal funds rate falls from i 1f f to i 2

f f .


Rn

FederalFunds Rate

R2

(a) No discount lending


Rn

i ff = i d1

2i ff = i d

FederalFunds Rate

(b) Some discount lending

id1

i ff1

id2

R1d

1

R1s

s

R1s

R2s

R1d

1 1

2 2

Kötelező tartalékráta

is lowered by the Fed from i1d to i2

d, the vertical section of the supply curve wherethere is no discount lending just shortens, as in Rs

2, while the intersection of the sup-ply and demand curve remains at the same point. Thus, in this case there is nochange in the equilibrium federal funds rate, which remains at i1ff. Because this is thetypical situation—since the Fed now usually keeps the discount rate above its targetfor the federal funds rate—the conclusion is that most changes in the discount ratehave no effect on the federal funds rate.

However, if the demand curve intersects the supply curve on its flat section, sothere is some discount lending, as in panel b of Figure 3, changes in the discount ratedo affect the federal funds rate. In this case, initially discount lending is positive andthe equilibrium federal funds rate equals the discount rate, i1ff � i1d. When the discountrate is lowered by the Fed from i1d to i2

d, the horizontal section of the supply curve Rs2

falls, moving the equilibrium from point 1 to point 2, and the equilibrium federalfunds rate falls from i1ff to i2

ff (� i2d) in panel b.

Reserve Requirements. When the required reserve ratio increases, required reservesincrease and hence the quantity of reserves demanded increases for any given inter-est rate. Thus a rise in the required reserve ratio shifts the demand curve to the rightfrom Rd

1 to Rd2 in Figure 4, moves the equilibrium from point 1 to point 2, and in turn

raises the federal funds rate from i1ff to i 2

ff . The result is that when the Fed raises reserve requirements, the federal funds

rate rises.2

C H A P T E R 1 7 Tools of Monetary Policy 397

F I G U R E 4 Response to aChange in Required ReservesWhen the Fed raises reserverequirements, required reservesincrease, which increases thedemand for reserves. The demandcurve shifts from Rd

1 to Rd2, the

equilibrium moves from point 1to point 2, and the federal fundrate rises from i 1

f f to i 2f f .


Rn

id

1

2i ff

FederalFunds Rate

R1s

R2d

R1d

i ff1

2

2Because an increase in the required reserve ratio means that the same amount of reserves is able to support asmaller amount of deposits, a rise in the required reserve ratio leads to a decline in the money supply. Using theliquidity preference framework, the fall in the money supply results in a rise in interest rates, yielding the sameconclusion in the text that raising reserve requirements leads to higher interest rates.

www.frbdiscountwindow.org/

Information on the operation ofthe discount window and data

on current and historicalinterest rates.

www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/reservereq.htm

Historical data and discussionabout reserve requirements.

Federal Reserve System

A Fed-hez vezető út

The Political Genius of the Founders of the Federal Reserve SystemFrederic Miskin (2004) Money, banking and financial markets. p.50

The history of the United States has been one of public hostility to banks and especially to a central bank. How were the politicians who founded the Federal Reserve able to design a system that has become one of the most prestigious institutions in the United States?

The answer is that the founders recognized that if power was too concentrated in either Washington or New York, cities that Americans often love to hate, an American central bank might not have enough public support to operate effectively. They thus decided to set up a decentralized system with 12 Federal Reserve banks spread throughout the country to make sure that all regions of the country were represented in monetary policy deliberations. In addition, they made the Federal Reserve banks quasi-private institutions overseen by directors from the private sector living in that district who represent views from that region and are in close contact with the president of the Federal Reserve bank. The unusual structure of the Federal Reserve System has promoted a concern in the Fed with regional issues as is evident in Federal Reserve bank publications. Without this unusual structure, the Federal Reserve System might have been far less popular with the public, making the institution far less effective.

include the following entities: the Federal Reserve banks, the Board of Governorsof the Federal Reserve System, the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC),the Federal Advisory Council, and around 4,800 member commercial banks. Figure 1outlines the relationships of these entities to one another and to the three policy toolsof the Fed (open market operations, the discount rate, and reserve requirements) dis-cussed in Chapters 15 to 17.

Each of the 12 Federal Reserve districts has one main Federal Reserve bank, whichmay have branches in other cities in the district. The locations of these districts, theFederal Reserve banks, and their branches are shown in Figure 2. The three largest

Federal ReserveBanks

C H A P T E R 1 4 Structure of Central Banks and the Federal Reserve System 337

F I G U R E 1 Formal Structure and Allocation of Policy Tools in the Federal Reserve

Twelve Federal ReserveBanks (FRBs)

Each with nine directors who appoint president and other officers ofthe FRB

Open marketoperations

Board of Governors

Seven members appointedby the president of the United States and confirmed by the Senate

Pol

icy

Tool

sFe

dera

lR

eser

ve S

yste

m

Reviews anddetermines

Appoints threedirectors to each FRB

Elect sixdirectors toeach FRB

Federal Advisory Council

Twelve members (bankers)

Discountrate

Reserverequirements

Select

Sets (withinlimits)

Directs

Establish

Federal Open MarketCommittee (FOMC)

Seven members of Boardof Governors pluspresidents of FRB of NewYork and four other FRBs

Around 4,800membercommercialbanks

www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/frseries/frseri.htm

Information on the structure ofthe Federal Reserve System.

Federal Reserve banks in terms of assets are those of New York, Chicago, and SanFrancisco—combined they hold over 50% of the assets (discount loans, securities, andother holdings) of the Federal Reserve System. The New York bank, with around one-quarter of the assets, is the most important of the Federal Reserve banks (see Box 2).

Each of the Federal Reserve banks is a quasi-public (part private, part govern-ment) institution owned by the private commercial banks in the district that aremembers of the Federal Reserve System. These member banks have purchased stockin their district Federal Reserve bank (a requirement of membership), and the divi-dends paid by that stock are limited by law to 6% annually. The member banks electsix directors for each district bank; three more are appointed by the Board ofGovernors. Together, these nine directors appoint the president of the bank (subjectto the approval of the Board of Governors).

The directors of a district bank are classified into three categories, A, B, and C:The three A directors (elected by the member banks) are professional bankers, andthe three B directors (also elected by the member banks) are prominent leaders fromindustry, labor, agriculture, or the consumer sector. The three C directors, who areappointed by the Board of Governors to represent the public interest, are not allowedto be officers, employees, or stockholders of banks. This design for choosing directorswas intended by the framers of the Federal Reserve Act to ensure that the directors ofeach Federal Reserve bank would reflect all constituencies of the American public.


F I G U R E 2 Federal Reserve System

Source: Federal Reserve Bulletin.

Miami

124

10

9

116

5

3

1

2

7

8

Board of Governors of the FederalReserve SystemFederal Reserve bank cities

Boundaries of Federal Reserve districts(Alaska and Hawaii are in District 12)

Federal Reserve branch cities

Federal Reserve districts1

Seattle

Portland Helena

Dallas

Omaha

Kansas City

Jacksonville

Atlanta

New York

BostonBuffaloDetroit

Salt LakeCity

Los Angeles

El Paso

Oklahoma City

Minneapolis

Chicago

St. Louis

Memphis

Little Rock

Houston

New Orleans

Birmingham

Nashville

Louisville

Richmond

WASHINGTONBaltimore

Philadelphia

Denver

San Francisco

San Antonio

Charlotte

CulpeperCulpeperCulpeperCulpeperCulpeper

PittsburghPittsburghPittsburgh

ClevelandClevelandCleveland

CincinnatiCincinnatiCincinnati

BirmingBirmingBirmingham

www.federalreserve.gov/otherfrb.htm

Addresses and phone numbersof Federal Reserve banks,

branches, and RCPCs and linksto the main pages of the 12reserve banks and Board of

Governors.

A Fed feladatai

Fed-bankok (12 részegység)

The Special Role of the Federal Reserve Bank of New YorkFrederic Miskin (2004) Money, banking and financial markets. p.339

The Federal Reserve Bank of New York plays a special role in the Federal Reserve System for several reasons. First, its district contains many of the largest commercial banks in the United States, the safety and soundness of which are paramount to the health of the U.S. financial system. The Federal Reserve Bank of New York conducts examinations of bank holding companies and state-chartered banks in its district, making it the supervisor of some of the most im-portant financial institutions in our financial system. Not surprisingly, given this responsibility, the bank supervision group is one of the largest units of the New York Fed and is by far the largest bank supervision group in the Federal Reserve System.

The second reason for the New York Fed’s special role is its active involvement in the bond and foreign exchange mar-kets. The New York Fed houses the open market desk, which conducts open market operations---the purchase and sale of bonds---that determine the amount of reserves in the banking system. Because of this involvement in the Treasury securities market, as well as its walking-distance location near the New York and American Stock Exchanges, the of-ficials at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York are in constant contact with the major domestic financial markets in the United States. In addition, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York also houses the foreign exchange desk, which conducts foreign exchange interventions on behalf of the Federal Reserve System and the U.S. Treasury. Its involvement in these financial markets means that the New York Fed is an important source of information on what is happening in domestic and foreign financial markets, particularly during crisis periods, as well as a liaison between officials in the Federal Reserve System and private participants in the markets.

The third reason for the Federal Reserve Bank of New York’s prominence is that it is the only Federal Reserve bank to be a member of the Bank for International Settlements (BIS). Thus the president of the New York Fed, along with the chairman of the Board of Governors, represents the Federal Reserve System in its regular monthly meetings with other major central bankers at the BIS. This close contact with foreign central bankers and interaction with foreign exchange markets means that the New York Fed has a special role in international relations, both with other central bankers

and with private market participants. Adding to its prominence in international circles is that the New York Fed is the repository for over $100 billion of the world’s gold, an amount greater than the gold at Fort Knox.

Finally, the president of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York is the only permanent member of the FOMC among the Federal Reserve bank presidents, serving as the vice-chairman of the committee. Thus he and the chairman and vice-chairman of the Board of Governors are the three most important officials in the Federal Reserve System.

Tagok

The Role of Member Banks in the Federal Reserve SystemFrederic Miskin (2004) Money, banking and financial markets. p.346

Although the member bank stockholders in each Federal Reserve bank have little direct power in the Federal Reserve System, they do play an important role. Their six representatives on the board of directors of each bank have a major oversight function. Along with the three public interest directors, they oversee the audit process for the Federal Re-serve bank, making sure it is being run properly, and also share their management expertise with the senior manage-ment of the bank. Because they vote on recommendations by each bank to raise, lower, or maintain the discount rate at its current level, they engage in discussions about monetary policy and transmit their private sector views to the president and senior management of the bank. They also get to understand the inner workings of the Federal Reserve banks and the system so that they can help explain the position of the Federal Reserve to their contacts in the private and political sectors. Advisory councils like the Federal Advisory Council and others that are often set up by the dis-trict banks---for example, the Small Business and Agriculture Advisory Council and the Thrift Advisory Council at the New York Fed---are a conduit for the private sector to express views on both the economy and the state of the banking system.

So even though the owners of the Reserve banks do not have the usual voting rights, they are important to the Federal Reserve System, because they make sure it does not get out of touch with the needs and opinions of the private sector.

Kormányzótanács

The Role of the Research Staff

Frederic Miskin (2004) Money, banking and financial markets. p.350

The Federal Reserve System is the largest employer of economists not just in the United States, but in the world. The system’s research staff has around 1,000 people, about half of whom are economists. Of these 500 economists, 250 are at the Board of Governors, 100 are at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, and the remainder are at the other Federal Reserve banks. What do all these economists do?

The most important task of the Fed’s economists is to follow the incoming data from government agencies and private sector organizations on the economy and provide guidance to the policymakers on where the economy may be head-ing and what the impact of monetary policy actions on the economy might be. Before each FOMC meeting, the research staff at each Federal Reserve bank briefs its president and the senior management of the bank on its forecast for the U.S. economy and the issues that are likely to be discussed at the meeting. The research staff also provides briefing materials or a formal briefing on the economic outlook for the bank’s region, something that each president discusses at the FOMC meeting. Meanwhile, at the Board of Governors, economists maintain a large econometric model (a model whose equations are estimated with statistical procedures) that helps them produce their forecasts of the national economy, and they too brief the governors on the national economic outlook.

The research staffers at the banks and the board also provide support for the bank supervisory staff, tracking develop-ments in the banking sector and other financial markets and institutions and providing bank examiners with technical advice that they might need in the course of their examinations. Because the Board of Governors has to decide on w ether to approve bank mergers, the research staff at both the board and the bank in whose district the merger is to take place prepare information on what effect the proposed merger might have on the competitive environment. To assure compliance with the Community Reinvestment Act, economists also analyze a bank’s performance in its lending activities in different communities.

Because of the increased influence of developments in foreign countries on the U.S. economy, the members of the re-

search staff, particularly at the New York Fed and the Board, produce reports on the major foreign economies. They also conduct research on developments in the foreign exchange market because of its growing importance in the mon-etary policy process and to support the activities of the foreign exchange desk. Economists also help support the opera-tion of the open market desk by projecting reserve growth and the growth of the monetary aggregates.

Staff economists also engage in basic research on the effects of monetary policy on output and inflation, develop-ments in the labor markets, international trade, international capital markets, banking and other financial institutions, financial markets, and the regional economy, among other topics. This research is published widely in academic jour-nals and in Reserve bank publications. (Federal Reserve bank reviews are a good source of supplemental material for money and banking students.) Another important activity of the research staff primarily at the Reserve banks is in the public education area. Staff economists are called on frequently to make presentations to the board of directors at their banks or to make speeches to the public in their district.

FOMC

Green, Blue, and Beige

Frederic Miskin (2004) Money, banking and financial markets. p.352

What Do These Colors Mean at the Fed? Three research documents play an important role in the monetary policy process and at Federal Open Market Committee meetings. The national forecast for the next two years, generated by the Federal Reserve Board of Governors’ Research and Statistics Division, is placed between green covers and is thus known as the “green book.” It is provided to all who attend the FOMC meeting. The “blue book,” in blue covers, also provided to all participants at the FOMC meeting, contains the projections for the monetary aggregates prepared by the Monetary Affairs Division at the Board of Governors and typically also presents three alternative scenarios for the stance of monetary policy (labeled A, B, and C). The “beige book,” with beige covers, is produced by the Reserve banks and details evidence gleaned either from surveys or from talks with key businesses and financial institutions on the state of the economy in each of the Federal Reserve districts. This is the only one of the three books that is distributed publicly, and it often receives a lot of attention in the press.

Stanley Fischer, who was a professor at MIT and then the Deputy ManagingDirector of the International Monetary Fund, has defined two different types of inde-pendence of central banks: instrument independence, the ability of the central bankto set monetary policy instruments, and goal independence, the ability of the centralbank to set the goals of monetary policy. The Federal Reserve has both types of inde-pendence and is remarkably free of the political pressures that influence other gov-ernment agencies. Not only are the members of the Board of Governors appointed fora 14-year term (and so cannot be ousted from office), but also the term is technicallynot renewable, eliminating some of the incentive for the governors to curry favor withthe president and Congress.

Probably even more important to its independence from the whims of Congress isthe Fed’s independent and substantial source of revenue from its holdings of securities

C H A P T E R 1 4 Structure of Central Banks and the Federal Reserve System 347

F I G U R E 3 Informal Power Structure of the Federal Reserve System

Six othermembers ofthe Boardof Governors

Discountrate

Reserverequirements

Boardstaff

Federal OpenMarketCommittee( FOMC )

Advises

Advises

CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS

Advises Five FederalReserve bankpresidents

Vote

Vote

Sets agenda Supervises Votes andsets agenda

Set ( within limits ) Set

Directs

Open marketoperations

Függetlenség

Documents

Monetáris makroökonómia€¦ · Vagyonmérleg Vagyonmérleg Eszközök Források Mishkin könyv 25000 Saját vagyon 50000 Élelmiszer 25000 Eszközök összesen 50000 Források