Stanford Encyclopedia of PhilosophyPainFirstpublishedFriSep30,2005substantiverevisionFriMay29,2009

Painisthemostprominentmemberofaclassofsensationsknownasbodilysensations,whichincludesitches,tickles,tingles,orgasms,andsoon.Bodilysensationsaretypicallyattributedtobodilylocationsandappeartohavefeaturessuchasvolume,intensity,duration,andsoon,thatareordinarilyattributedtophysicalobjectsorquantities.Yetthesesensationsareoftenthoughttobelogicallyprivate,subjective,selfintimating,andthesourceofincorrigibleknowledgeforthosewhohavethem.Hencethereappeartobereasonsbothforthinkingthatpains(alongwithothersimilarbodilysensations)arephysicalobjectsorconditionsthatweperceiveinbodyparts,andforthinkingthattheyarenot.Thisparadoxisoneofthemainreasonswhyphilosophersareespeciallyinterestedinpain.Oneincreasinglypopularbutstillcontroversialwaytodealwiththisparadoxistodefendaperceptualorrepresentationalviewofpain,accordingtowhichfeelingpainisinprinciplenodifferentthanundergoingotherstandardperceptualprocesseslikeseeing,hearing,touching,etc.Buttherearemanywhothinkthatpainsarenotamenabletosuchatreatment.

1.Thecommonsenseconceptionofpain1.1Firstthread:painassomethinginabodypart1.2Secondthread:painassubjectiveexperience1.3Thetensionbetweenthetwothreads

2.Sensedatumtheories2.1Introduction2.2Problemsforsensedatumtheories

3.Perceptualtheories3.1Introduction3.2Theappearance/realityproblem3.3Theproblemofpainlocation3.4Directandindirectperceptualtheories3.5Adverbialistperceptualtheories

4.Representationaltheories4.1Introduction4.2Theproblemoffocus4.3Theproblemofaffectivequalia

5.Evaluativeandmotivationaltheories6.Eliminativismaboutpain

6.1Theargumentfromreactivedissociationforeliminatingpain6.2Otherargumentsforeliminativism

7.ConclusionBibliographyAcademicToolsOtherInternetResourcesRelatedEntries

1.Thecommonsenseconceptionofpain

Therearetwomainthreadsinthecommonsenseconceptionofpainthatpullinoppositedirections.

Wemightcallthistensiontheactobjectduality(orambiguity)embeddedinourordinaryconceptofpain.

1.1Firstthread:painassomethinginabodypart

Thefirstthreadtreatspainsasparticularsspatiallylocatedinbodyregions,ormoregenerally,asparticularconditionsofbodypartsthathavespatiotemporalcharacteristicsaswellasfeaturessuchasvolumeandintensity(amongothers).Thisthreadmanifestsitselfincommonwaysofattributingpainstobodilylocations,suchasthefollowing:

(1)Ihaveasharppaininthebackofmyrighthand(2)Thereisathrobbingpaininmyleftthigh(3)Myrightshoulderhurts(4)Mywisdomtoothachesintensely.

Accordingtothisthread,painsarelikephysicalobjects,orspecificconditionsofphysicalobjects.Wealsocommonlyusetheverbsfeelorexperiencetodescribeourepistemicrelationtopainsattributedtobodyparts:

(5)Ifeelasharppaininthebackofmyrighthand(6)Iamexperiencingpaininmyupperleftthigh,etc.

(5)suggeststhatwestandinsomesortofperceptualrelationtoaspatiotemporalparticular.Withoutanindefinitearticle,(6)suggeststhatIperceivesomequantifiablefeatureorconditionofmythigh.Whenwefeelpainsinbodilylocations,ourattentionandnursingbehavioraredirectedtowardthoselocations.

Lessfrequently,wealsotalkaboutthesamepainreturningorlastingintermittently:

(7)IhavebeenhavingthesamepaininmykneeassoonasIstartjogging(8)Myheadachereturnedthemomentwestartedhavingthesameargumentagain.

Soaccordingtothisthreadwhenwefeelpaininpartsofourbodies,weperceivesomethingorsomeconditioninthoseparts,andwhenwereportthembyutteringsentenceslike(1)through(8),weseemtomakeperceptualreports.Thesereportsseemonaparwiththemorestraightforwardperceptualreportssuchas:

(9)Iseeadarkdiscolorationonthebackofmyrighthand(10)Iseetheredappleonthetable(11)Iheardabigexplosion(12)Iamsmellingthesweetodorcomingfromtherosegarden(13)Ifeelthesmoothtextureofthesurface,etc.

Compare,forinstance,(5)and(9):theyseemtohavethesamesurfacegrammardemandingasimilarperceptualreadingaccordingtowhichIstandinsomesortofperceptualrelationtosomething.

Thus,thisthreadinourordinaryconceptionfavorsanunderstandingofpainsasiftheyweretheobjectsofourperceptions.Whenthisiscombinedwithourstandardpracticeoftreatingpainsashavingspatiotemporalpropertiesalongwithothersimilarfeaturestypicallyattributedtophysicalobjectsorquantities,itthuspointstoanunderstandingofpainsaccordingtowhichpainsmightplausiblybeidentifiedwithphysicalfeaturesorconditionsofourbodyparts,probablywithsomesortofphysicaldamageortraumatothetissue.Indeed,whenwelookatthewaysinwhichwetalkaboutapain,weseemtobeattributingsomethingbadtoabodilylocationbyreportingitssomatosensoryperceptionthere,justaswereporttheexistenceofarottenappleonthetablebyreportingitsvisualperception.

Nevertheless,theverysamecommonsense,althoughitpointsinthatdirection,resistsidentifyingapainwithanyphysicalfeatureorconditioninstantiatedinthebody.Thusitalsoseemstoresistidentifyingfeelingpaininbodyregionswithperceivingsomethingphysicalinthoseregions.

Aquickthoughtexperimentshouldconfirmthis.Supposethatwedoinfactattributeaphysicalcondition,callitPC,whenweattributepaintobodyparts,andthatPCistheperceptualobjectofsuchexperiences.So,forinstance,John'scurrentexcruciatingexperience(callthisE)iscausedbyandrepresentsaphysicalconditioninhisrightthighandourordinaryconceptofpainappliesinthefirstinstancetothisconditioninhisthigh.Fromthisitwouldfollowthat

(a)JohnwouldnothaveanypainifhehadE,butnoPCinhisthigh(asinthecaseof,forinstance,phantomlimbpainsandcentrallygeneratedchronicpainssuchassciatica),

and,conversely,

(b)JohnwouldhavepainifhehadPCbutnoE(aswouldbethecase,forinstance,ifhehadtakenabsolutelyeffectivepainkillersorhisthighhadbeenanesthetized).

Butthesestatementsareintuitivelyincorrect.Theyappeartoclashwithourordinaryordominantconceptofpain,whichseemstotracktheexperienceratherthanthephysicalcondition.Thisresistancetoidentifyingpainswithlocalizablephysicalconditionscomesfromthesecondthreadfoundintheverysamecommonsenseconceptionofpain.

1.2Secondthread:painassubjectiveexperience

Thatpainisasubjectiveexperienceseemstobeatruism.Givenourcommonsenseunderstandingofpain,thisseemstobethemoredominantthread:insteadoftreatingpainsasobjectsofperceptualexperience,ittreatsthemasexperiencesthemselves.Indeeditisthisthreadthattheofficialscientificdefinitionofpainpicksupandemphasizes,whichwasfirstformulatedinthe1980sbyacommitteeorganizedbytheInternationalAssociationfortheStudyofPain(IASP),andhasbeen,sincethen,widelyacceptedbythescientificcommunity:[1]

Pain:Anunpleasantsensoryandemotionalexperienceassociatedwithactualorpotentialtissuedamage,ordescribedintermsofsuchdamage.

Note:Painisalwayssubjective.Eachindividuallearnstheapplicationofthewordthroughexperiencesrelatedtoinjuryinearlylife...Experienceswhichresemblepain,e.g.,pricking,butarenotunpleasant,shouldnotbecalledpain.Unpleasantabnormalexperiences(dysaesthesia)mayalsobepainbutarenotnecessarilysobecause,subjectively,theymaynothavetheusualsensoryqualitiesofpain.Manypeoplereportpainintheabsenceoftissuedamageoranylikelypathologicalcauseusuallythishappensforpsychologicalreasons.Thereisnowaytodistinguishtheirexperiencefromthatduetotissuedamageifwetakethesubjectivereport.Iftheyregardtheirexperienceaspainandiftheyreportitinthesamewaysaspaincausedbytissuedamage,itshouldbeacceptedaspain.Thisdefinitionavoidstyingpaintothestimulus.Activityinducedinthenociceptorandnociceptivepathwaysbyanoxiousstimulusisnotpain,whichisalwaysapsychologicalstate,eventhoughwemaywellappreciatethatpainmostoftenhasaproximatephysicalcause.(IASP1986,p.250cf.IASPTaskForceOnTaxonomy1994)

Likeotherexperiencesasconsciousepisodes,painsarethoughttobeprivate,subjective,selfintimating,andthesourceofincorrigibleknowledge.Theseelementscancertainlybefoundinthe

IASPcharacterization,whichalsoaddsthatpainexperiencesareunpleasant.Indeed,byemphasizingthatpainisalwaysapsychologicalstatethenotewarnsagainstaconceptionofpainsuggestedbythefirstthreadabove.

Interestingly,however,whenwetalkaboutpainsasexperiences,wealso,inthesamebreath,talkaboutfeelingthemasiftheseexperienceswerealsotheobjectofsomesortofinnerperception,whichsuggestsintrospection.Indeedthediscussionofprivacy,subjectivity,selfintimation,andincorrigibilitynaturallyforcesustotalkthisway.

Painsaresaidtobeprivatetotheirownersinthestrongsensethatnooneelsecanepistemicallyaccessone'spaininthewayonehasaccesstoone'sownpain,namelybyfeelingitandcomingtoknowoneisfeelingitonthatbasis.Thissharplycontrastswiththepublicnatureofobjectsofstandardperception,thatis,perceptionofone'simmediateextramentalenvironmentincludingone'sbody.Let'scallthisexteroception,tocontrastwithintrospectionwhichisaccesstoone'sintramentalactivity.So,forinstance,theverysameappleIseeonthetablecanbeseenbyothersinpossiblytheexactwayIseeit,soisnotprivateinthissense.

Painsalsoseemtobesubjectiveinthesensethattheirexistencedependsonfeelingthem.Thereisanairofparadoxwhensomeonetalksaboutunfeltpains.Oneisnaturallytemptedtosaythatifapainisnotbeingfeltbyitsownerthenitdoesnotexist.Againcomparethesubjectivityofpainstotheobjectivityoftheobjectsofstandardexteroception.TheappleIseedoesnotdependonmyperceivingitinordertoexist:(paceBerkeleyandphenomenalists)itsexistenceisindependentofmy,orforthatmatteranyoneelse's,seeingit.

Notonlypeopleseemtohaveaspecialepistemicaccesstotheirpains,theyseemtohaveaveryspecialepistemicauthoritywithrespecttotheirpain:theyseemtobeincorrigible,oreveninfallible,abouttheirpainsandpainreports:necessarily,ifIsincerelybelievethatIaminpain,thenIaminpain.Conversely,ifIfeelpain,thenIknowthatIaminpain.Againthisconditionalseemsnecessarilytrue.Thisistheselfintimatingaspectofpainexperiences.

Inshort,theredoesn'tseemtobeanyroomforapossiblegapbetweentheappearanceofpainandbeinginpain(thatis,noappearance/realitydistinctionisapplicabletopain).AsKripkefamouslyputit:

Tobeinthesameepistemicsituationthatwouldobtainifonehadapainistohaveapaintobeinthesameepistemicsituationthatwouldobtainintheabsenceofpainisnottohaveapain.Painisnotpickedoutbyoneofitsaccidentalpropertiesratheritispickedoutbyitsimmediatephenomenologicalquality.Ifanyphenomenonispickedoutinexactlythesamewaythatwepickoutpain,thenthatphenomenonispain.(Kripke1980,pp.15253)

Ifthereisnoappearance/realitydistinctionapplicabletopain,thenitseemsthatonecannotbemistakenaboutone'sbeliefsaboutone'spainformedonthebasisoffeelingpaininthewayonecanbemistakenabouttheexistenceandpropertiesoftheappleonesees.Inthelattercase,appearancescanbemisleadingpreciselybecausetheperceptualappearanceofanapplemightnotcorrespondtowhattheappleislikeinreality.Inapparentcontrasttopain,normalexteroceptionalwaysinvolvesthepossibilityofmisperception,andthusmiscategorization(thatis,misapplicationofconceptstotheobjectsofexteroception).

1.3Thetensionbetweenthetwothreads

Nowthatthetwothreadsinourordinaryconceptionofpainareinfullview,wecanbetterappreciatewhytheyareintension.Experiencesareinthehead,iftheyareanywhere.Indeed,formostphysicalists,theyareintheheadbybeingrealizedinthebrainorinthecentralnervoussystem.Sowe

can'tbelocatingpainsquaexperiences(orquasensations,forthatmatter)inbodypartswhenwecorrectlyuttersentencessuchas(1)through(6)discountingheadachesperhaps.Butthenwhatarewelocatingwhenweseemtoattributepainstobodyparts?Recallthat,althoughthefirstthreadinourcommonsenseconceptiontreatspainsasspatiotemporallylocatableparticularsorparticularconditionsofbodyparts,itdoesnotidentifypainswiththemitonlyexertspressuretowardssuchanidentificationinthelightofthefactthattheredoesn'tseemtobeanyothercrediblealternative(butseebelow).WehavealreadyconductedalittlethoughtexperimenttobringthisoutinSection1.1.Comparingthefollowingtwosentenceswillhelpusunderstandthetensionbetter:

(5)Ifeelasharppaininthebackofmyrighthand(9)Iseeadarkdiscolorationonthebackofmyrighthand.

Itisreasonablyclearthatfor(9)tobetrue,Ihavetostandintheseeing(perceiving)relationtoadarkdiscolorationinthebackofmyrighthand,i.e.,toacertainsurfaceregiononthebackofmyhandmarkedbyadarkershadeoftheusualcolorofmyskin,acertainregionthatcanbeseenbyotherspossiblyinthesamewayinwhichIseeit.NotethatifIamhallucinatingadarkdiscolorationonthebackofmyhand,then(9)issimplyfalse.Alsonotethatalthoughthetruthof(9)doesn'trequirethepossessionofanyconceptbymeexpressedbythewordsmakingupthesentence,myutteringof(9)tomakeareporttypicallydoesifwetakesuchutterancesasexpressionsofone'sthoughtsandtakethoughtstobecomposedofconcepts.Somyseeingwouldtypicallyinducemetoconceptuallyidentifysomethingonthebackofmyhandasadarkdiscoloration.Thisisatypicalcaseofcategorizationofsomethingextramentalunderaconceptinducedbyanexteroceptiveexperience.Ofcourse,myutteringof(9)doesmorethanattributeaphysicalpropertytoabodilyregion,italsoreportsthatIamseeingit.

Whathastobethecasefor(5)tobetrue?Whateverthecompleteanalysisofsentenceslike(5)turnsouttobe,onethingseemsreasonablyclear:thetruthconditionsof(5)putnoconstraintswhatsoeveronhowthingsphysicallyarewithmyhand.Anyonewhohasasufficientmasteryofourordinaryconceptofpainhasnodifficultyinunderstandinghow(5)couldstillbetrueeventhoughthereisnothingphysicallywrongwithmyhand,whichistypicallythecaseincentrallycausedchronicpainsyndromes.[2]

Sowestandardlyusesentenceslike(5)tomakecorrectstatementsaboutapainfeltinabodilylocationevenwhenthereisnothingwrongwiththatlocation.Inotherwords,whenwemakeclaimsaboutwhereithurts(attributepaintobodilylocations),strictlyspeakingweinfactrescindfromlogicallycommittingourselvestotherebeinganythingphysicallywronginthoselocationseventhoughwenormallyexpecttofindsomephysicaldisorderinthem.Comparethistomyuttering(9)onthebasisofmyhavingaveryvividvisualhallucinationofadiscolorationonthebackofmyhand.Insuchacase,myutterancewouldbeincorrect,becauseinuttering(9)Icommitmyselftofindingsomephysicalcondition(namely,adarkdiscoloration)onthebackofmyhand.IfandwhenIrealizethatIhavehallucinated,thenIcorrectmyselfandreverttointrospectivemodebysayingthingslikeIseemedtoseeadiscolorationonthebackofmyhandoritappearedtomethattherewasadiscoloration,etc.NothingofthissorthappenswhenIrealizeoramtoldthatthereisnothingphysicallywrongwithmyhand:IstillcorrectlycontinuetoreportthepainIfeeltherebyutteringtheverysamesentence,(5),oritsequivalents.Idon'tneedtomakeanycorrectioninmypainreport.Thisshowsthatdespitethepressureexertedbythefirstthread,itisthesecondthreadthatseemstocapturethedominantcommonsenseconceptionofpainasindeedtheIASPdefinitionaboveindicates.

Stillthepuzzleremains:whatisitthatIamdoingwhenIappeartobeattributingsomethingtothebackofmyhandbycorrectlyuttering(5)if,asagreed,Iamnotattributingamentalexperienceoraphysicalconditionthere?Itisnotclearwhetherthereisacommonsenseanswertothisquestion.Justasthescientificdefinitiondoesn'ttouchontheissueofourcommonpracticeofcorrectlylocatingpainsinhealthybodyparts,thecommonsensewouldprobablydrawablankiftheproblemwerearticulatedexplicitlyandthequestionispressedreallyhard.

Ormaybenot.Intuitivelyandsomewhatnaively,whatcommonsensewoulddriveustosaywhenpressedhardmightbesomethinglikethefollowing.[3]Granted,byuttering(5)Iamnotattributinganysortofphysicalthingorconditiontothebackofmyhand,noramIlocatingamentalexperiencethereexperiencesandsensationsarestrictlyspeakingintheheadiftheyareanywhere.ButwhenIattendtomyhandwithmymind'sinnereye,sotospeak,Iclearlyfeelsomethingthere.Icanintrospectivelyexaminedifferentqualitiesofthatthingsuchasitssharpness,volume,intensity,unpleasantness,burningquality,etc.Icaninrealtimefollowthechangesinit:itisnowsomewhatlessintenseandunpleasant,nowmoreitisgettingdullernow,itwassharperandbrighteramomentagoitseemstobemovingtowardmyfingers,etc.Clearly,IseemtobeconfrontedoracquaintedwithsomethingthatIcanintrospectivelyexaminecarefullyinrealtimeandreportonitsvariousqualities.Itisthisthing,theobjectofmyinnerattention,whichislocatedinthebackofmyhand,whichseemsessentiallyprivate,subjective,andaboutwhichIcan'tbewrong.

Ifthisiswhatonemightliketosayintuitivelyandnavely,oneshouldbepreparedtoswallowitsstrangeconsequences:thisobjectofmyinnerattentionisbothlocatedinpublicspaceandlogicallyprivate,thatis,onlyIcanhaveepistemicaccesstoitdespiteitsbeingspatiotemporallylocated.Also,theexistenceofthisobjectseemstoliterallydependonmyepistemicaccesstoit:itseemstogooutofexistencewhenIceasetofeelit(perceiveit).Inaddition,ifitistheobjectofmyattention(separatefrommyattention),howcoulditbethecasethatIcannotbewrongaboutit?Andimportantly,ifthisobjectisnotphysical,whatsortofthingcoulditbe?AghostlymentalparticularthatIcanintrospectivelyattendtowhichisneverthelessspatiotemporallylocatedbeyondmyhead?

Theactobjectdualityembeddedinourordinaryconceptofpainyieldsstrangeresultswhenfollowedintuitivelyandnaivelytoitslogicalend.Butperhapsthisdualityisarobustsymptomofadeepertruthunderlyingallperceptionandintrospection.Perhapspainissimplythemostparadigmaticexampleofabroadrangeofperceptualexperienceswherethisdeepunderlyingicebergshowsittipmostprominentlyandrevealinglyalbeitconfusedly.Indeedthisisexactlythecaseaccordingtosocalledsensedatumtheories,ormorebroadly,indirectrealism.

2.Sensedatumtheories

2.1Introduction

Standardperception(exteroception)canbeanalyzedasinvolvingtheperception(act)ofapublicobject.Theperceptualactonthepartoftheperceivingsubject,inturn,isanalyzedasinvolvinganexperiencewhichtypicallyinducesconceptualcategorization,i.e.,applicationofconceptstotheobjectofperceptionanditsqualitiesnottotheexperience.Thusperceptualexperiencesseemtransparenttotheperceiver,whomaybesaidtoperceivetheextramentalrealitydirectly,withoutfirstperceivingorsomehowbeingawareoftheexperienceitselforitsqualities.Thisviewissupportedbycommonsenseandistypicallycallednaiveordirectrealism.

Accordingtotheindirectrealists,thisdirectnessisanillusionweareinfactdirectlyawareofexperientialintermediaries,andweperceivetheextramentalworldonlyindirectly,invirtueofbeingdirectlyawareoftheseintermediaries.Mostearlyindirectrealists(e.g.,Moore1903,1939Russell1912Price1950)thoughtoftheseintermediariesasphenomenalormentalparticulars,typicallycalledsensedata.Considerahallucinationofaredapple.Intuitively,thepersonhavingthehallucinationseemstoseesomething.Thissomethingisnot,ofcourse,anapple.Butitisanobject,accordingtosensedatumtheorists,whichisshapedlikeanappleandisreallyred.Itisasensedatum,aphenomenal(mental)individualwhichreallyhasthequalitiesthatitvisuallyappearstohave.Sensedata,however,arenoordinaryobjects:theyareprivate,subjective,selfintimating,andthesourceofincorrigibleknowledge.Accordingtosensedatumtheorists,sensedataareinternaltoone'sconsciousness:theyarenotbeforeone'ssenseorgans.Thesetheoriesclaimthatthereisahiddenactobjectstructureintheperceptualawarenessitself.Everyperceptualawarenessinvolvestheactof

beingawareofphenomenalobjectsthatcharacterizethisperceptualawareness,whetherornotthisawarenessisanhallucinationoraveridicalperceptionofexternalobjects.

Soonsensedatumtheories,oneperceivesexternalobjectsandtheirqualitiesindirectlybydirectlyperceiving(beingawareof,oracquaintedwith)sensedatainternaltoone'sconsciousnessthatresembleinvariousdegreesthephysicalobjectsthatcausethem.Accordingtosensedatumtheorists,however,wearerarely,ifever,awareofthisindirectioninordinary(veridical)exteroception.Itisonlycriticalphilosophicalreflectiononfeaturesofperceptualawarenessthatrevealsthattheindirectionmustoccur.Theimportanceofpainandother(intransitive)bodilysensationsliesinthefactthattheindirectionseemstobeeasilyrevealedintrospectivelyasisshownbyourunwillingnesstoidentifythepainweattributetobodypartswithanythingphysicalinthoseparts.

Whatevermeritssensedatumtheoriesmighthavewithrespecttogenuineperception(exteroception)andmisperception,itsattractionseemsundeniablewhenitcomestoitstreatmentofpainsandotherintransitivebodilysensationslikeitches,tickles,tingles,etc.[4]Accordingtomanysensedatumtheorists,painsareparadigmexamplesofphenomenalindividuals,mentalobjectswithphenomenalqualitieswhoseexistencedependsontheirbeingsensedorfelt,andthusarelogicallyprivatetotheirownerswhofeelthem.Thispositionpresumablyexplainswhywehavetheactobjectdualityorambiguityinpaintalkthatwediscussedearlier:painsqualocalizableobjectscannotexistwithoutthecorrespondingacts,i.e.,withoutsomeone'sactsofexperiencingthem(Broad1959).[5]Inotherwords,theconceptofpainplausiblyappliestoboththeobjectpartoftheactobjectpairandtotheactofbeingdirectlyawareoftheseobjects.

Thepuzzleoflocatingpainsinbodypartscanbetreatedinmorethanonewaywithinthisframework.Themoststraightforwardwayissimplytotakethephenomenaatfacevalueandsaythatpainsasmentalobjectsorsensedataareliterallylocatedwheretheyseemtobelocatedinbodypartsoreveninemptyspacewhereone'slimbwouldhavebeen,say,beforetheamputation.Thatpainsarementalparticularsanddependfortheirexistenceonbeingsensedapparentlydoesnotlogicallyprecludetheirbeingcapableofhaving,literally,aspatiallocation(seeJackson1976,1977forthisline).[6]

Asecondandmorepopularwayofhandlingthelocationproblemistosaythateventhoughpainscannotliterallybelocatedinphysicalspace,theycanhavelocationinaphenomenalspaceorfieldthatissomehowisomorphicorsystematicallyrelatedtotheircounterparts(say,tissuedamage)inphysicalspace.Infact,thismovewouldalsoworkforvisualsensedatathatrequiresomespatiotemporalframework.Inthecaseofbodilysensations,thisphenomenalspaceissometimescalledone'ssomaticfieldbyanalogytoavisualfieldthatmapsontophysicalspace(Price1950).[7]

2.2Problemsforsensedatumtheories

Themostimportantstrengthofsensedatumtheoriesisthattheyaretailormadeforthepeculiaritiesofpainexperiencesaswellasotherintransitivebodilysensationsthatwehavediscussedabove.Indeed,thesetheoriesseemtotakethenave,perhapssomewhatconfusedbutintuitiveunderstandingofpainembeddedincommonsenseandturnitintoafullfledgedphilosophicaltheorysupportedonageneralandindependentplatformaboutwhatperceptioninvolves.Inotherwords,thesetheoriesseemtovindicatetheactobjectdualityembeddedincommonsenseconceptionofpain.

Thereisironyinthis.Theironyisthatsensedatumtheoriesfindtheirmostnaturalhomeinintransitivebodilysensationslikepainthathavebeentraditionallyandhistoricallycontrastedwithstandardexteroceptualexperiencesratherthancoclassifiedwiththem(formany,feelingpainisnotaperceptualaffairatall).Thisisironicfortworeasons.First,themainproponentsofsensedatumtheoriesadvancedthesetheoriesmainlyastheoriesofexteroception,thatis,perceptionofexternalphysicalreality.Second,whenappliedtostandardexteroception,sensedatumtheoriesdon'tseemtosupporttheperceptualdirect(nave)realismofcommonsenseatall.Indeed,accordingtocommon

sense,whenIseearedappleonthetable,Iamdirectlyseeingtheapple(atleastitssurfacefacingme)anditsqualitieslikeitsredness.Inshort,althoughsensedatumtheoriesthatareexplicitlyadvancedastheoriesofperception(exteroception)don'tgeneratemuchconviction,theyseemtobemoreconvincingwhenappliedtointransitivebodilysensationslikepainsthatarenotusuallythoughttobeperceptual.

Despitetheclashwithcommonsense,variousphilosophershaveadvancedpowerfulargumentsforsensedatumtheoriesaboutwhatperceptioningeneralinvolves(Moore1903,1939Russell1912Price1950Broad1959Jackson1977,amongothers).Therearealsopowerfulargumentsagainstsensedatumtheories.Bothsortsofargumentstendtobegeneralargumentsnotdirectlyrelatedtopain,sowewon'tcoverthemhere(butseetheentryonsensedata).Whateverthefateofsensedatumtheoriesmightbeasgeneraltheoriesofexteroception,theirappealasamodelforunderstandingpainsandotherintransitivebodilysensationsisverystrong.Indeed,asnotedbefore,introspectionseemstobetherightmodeofaccessinvolvedinpain.Soevenifonefindstheantisensedatumargumentsconvincingandrejectsindirectrealismofthiskindforstandardexteroception,thereisstillroomforadoptingasensedatumtheoryforintransitivebodilysensationsandforpaininparticular.

Nevertheless,itisplausibletoarguethatthemostimportantstrengthofsensedatumtheoriesofpainisalsooneoftheirmainweaknesses,inthattheirfunctionseemstomerelycodifytheconceptualpeculiaritiesofpainintoatheoryratherthanexplainthem.Afterwearetoldhowthesensedatumtheoriestreatpainsandotherbodilysensations,ourunderstandingofthesesensationsdon'tseemtobedeepenedoradvancedsignificantly.Whateverpuzzleswehadatthestartwithonlythecommonsenseconceptionofpainathand,theyseemtobetransformedintopuzzlesaboutwhatthetheoriesthemselvessayorimply.

Forinstance,thequestionaboutwhatitisthatweseemtoattributetoorlocateinourbodypartswhenweclaimtohavepainsinjustthosepartsisanswered,ononeversionofthetheory,bysayingthatweliterallylocatementalobjectswithphenomenalqualitiesinthoseparts.Butpains,evenbythestandardsofsensedatumtheories,areminddependentobjects,andmanyhavetakenthistoimplythatpainsareinternaltoone'sconsciousnessorexperience,andareepistemicallytransparenttotheirownerspartlybecauseofthis(Perkins1983,2006).[8]Iftheywereliterallyinphysicalspace,doesthismeanthatone'smindspatiallyextendsoroverlapswithone'sbody?Alternatively,shouldn'titbepossibleforothers,atleastinprinciple,tocomeacrossthesepains,thatis,accessandinteractwiththemphysically?Itisonethingtosaythatthereisnologicalinconsistencyaboutpainsliterallybeinginphysicalspace,butitisanothertomaketheviewplausible.Thelatterrequiresgivingpositiveargumentsshowingwhyourintuitionstothecontrarymightmisleadushere.

Ontheotherversionofthetheory,wearetoldthateventhoughweseemtolocatesomethinginpublicspace,appearancesaremisleading,wearelocatingprivatementalobjectsinaprivatephenomenalspace.Sopainsarenot,afterall,locatedinbodyparts,ordinarilyunderstood.Butitisnotclearhowthesetwospacesaresupposedtorelatetoorinteractwitheachother.Phenomenalspaceisnotphysicalspace,norisitasubregionofthatspace.Thusthequestionofhowtheycancausallyinteractbecomesanissuefortworeasons.First,thereisthestandardworryabouthowaphysicaleventcaninfluenceorbeinfluencedbyanonphysicaleventinanonphysicalspace.Second,thesetwospacesneedtobesystematicallycorrelatedwitheachother,butitisnotclearwhetheraprincipledmappingfunctioncanbedefinedforthecorrelationespeciallyintheabsenceofcausation.Atanyrate,theseconstitutesignificantchallengestothedefendersofthisview.

Apartfromtheirstrangeconsequences,sensedatumtheoriesseemtocommittheirdefenderstoantiphysicalism.Anaturalistwhoistryingtounderstandpainphenomenawithinaphysicalistframeworkcouldhardlyadmittheexistenceofphenomenalobjects(Lycan1987a,1987b).Iftherearesensedata,physicalismseemsjustfalse.Aphysicalistcannotadmitactualobjects,whichare,say,literallycolored,shaped,movingandsoon,thatoneisdirectlyawareofbutarenotidenticaltotheextramentalobjectsofperception.Sounderstood,thereseemtobenosensedatatobefoundinthe

physicalworld.

3.Perceptualtheories

Becausesensedatumtheoriesaremostplausiblewhenappliedtointransitivebodilysensations,manyphilosophers,whobelievethatanaturalistaccountofordinaryperceptioncanbegivenwithoutintroducingsensedata,haveattemptedtounderstandpainsandotherbodilysensationsasspeciesofordinaryperception(exteroception).Thesocalledperceptualtheoriesofpainareadvancedanddefendedonthehopethatpainsandotherintransitivebodilysensations,contrarytofirstappearances,arespeciesofinformationgatheringwhichworkonthesameprinciplesthatgovernothersensorymodalitiesforwhichasuccessfuldirectrealistaccountcanbegiven.

3.1Introduction

Thecorecommitmentofanyperceptualviewofpain,putasbroadlyaspossible,isthatnormally,inhavingorfeelingpain,oneisperceivingsomethingextramental.Inotherwords,feelingpainnormallyinvolvesperceivingsomethinginthesamesenseinwhichoneperceivesaredapplewhenoneseesitingoodlight.Itinvolvesexteroception.Sometimes,inordinaryparlance,thetermperceptionisusedinconjunctionwithpainasinpainperceptiontomeanawarenessofpain,orjustfeeling/experiencingpain.Thisisintrospectiveuseofperceptionandshouldbesharplydistinguishedfromwhattheperceptualtheoristsmeanwhentheyclaimthatfeelingpaininvolvesperceivingsomething.Theyhaveexteroceptioninmind,andwe'llusethetermalwaysinthissense.

Accordingtoperceptualtheorists,whenonefeels,say,asharppaininthebackofone'shand,oneperceivessomephysicalfeatureorconditionofone'shand.Thepropermodalityforthisperceptionissomatosensory,similartothesensorymodalityoftouchorproprioception(thesensorymodalityinternaltoone'sbodythatinformsoneaboutthepositionandmovementofone'sbodyandbodyparts).Mostperceptualtheoristsidentifythisfeaturewithtissuedamageorsomeconditionofthetissuethatwouldlikelyresultindamageifsustainedinthatcondition.Moreabstractly,itissomesortofphysicaldisorderduetosometissuetrauma,irritation,inflammation,orsomesuchpathologicalcondition,oraconditionclosetosuch.Itisalsopossibletoidentifytheobjectofperceptioninpainwiththeactivationofnociceptorsinnervatingthedamagedorirritatedtissue.(Nociceptorsareperipheralnerveendingsspecializedtorespond,normally,onlytopotentiallydamagingstimuli,i.e.,tonociceptivestimuli).Let'susetissuedamageasastandinforwhateverphysicaldisorderlyconditionofbodilytissueissaidtobeperceivedinfeelingpainaccordingtoperceptualtheorists.Normally,whenwetalkaboutthelocationofapain,wearetalkingaboutthelocationofthisperceptualobject,i.e.,thelocationwherethetissuedamageisoccurringorabouttooccur.

Perceptualtheoriesofpainasalternativestosensedatumtheorieswerefirstexplicitlystatedandphilosophicallydevelopedinthe1960s.ThemostinfluentialandprominentdefenderswereArmstrong(19621968)andPitcher(19701971).Therewereothers,butintermsofsettingthetoneandphilosophicalagendaforthesubsequentdiscussionfordecadestocome,itisfairtosaythatnoonehassurpassedtheirenormousinfluence.[9]Atthetime,thedominantviewwasthatpainsandotherintransitivebodilysensationsarenotperceptualatall:theywereconceivedtobesensationsorexperiences(lasensedatumtheories)thatarereliablycausedby(actualorimpending)injuryordamagetobodytissueorinternalorgans.Theyarethususefulwarningsignals,buttheydon'thavemuchincommonwithstandardwaysofperceivingextramentalworld.Thisviewhasstillsomedefenderstoday:althoughtheconceptionofpainsassensedatahasbeenlargelyabandoned,thosewhoarenotsympathetictoperceptualtheoriesstillholdwhatmightbecalledthesensationorqualiaviewofpain,accordingtowhichpainisnotaphenomenalobjectbutaphenomenalqualityofone'sexperience,oralternatively,itisasubjectiveexperiencewithcertainqualiaorqualitativecharacterthatoneisdirectlyawareofwheninpain.Withthisadjustmentfromobjecttoqualitykeptinmind,mostofwhatwehavesaidaboutsensedatumtheoriesabovecanbeapplied,mutatismutandis,tothe

qualiaviewofpain.(Conee1984defendsaqualiaviewofpain.Buthedrawsadistinctionbetweenthestateofbeinginpainandthisstate'squalitativecontent,qualia.Heclaimsthatweusepainforboth,dependingonthecontext.)

3.2Theappearance/realityproblem

Themainsourceofresistancetoaperceptualviewofpainscomesfromthecommonsenseconceptionofpainaccordingtowhichpainsaresensationswithessentialprivacy,subjectivity,selfintimation,andincorrigibility.Theseapparentlyessentialfeaturesofpainsposedifficultiesforanyperceptualtheory.Indeed,theycanbeusedinadvancingantiperceptualistargumentswhosegeneralformcanbeputinthefollowingway.Genuineperceptionalwaysinvolvesthepossibilityofmisperceivingtheperceptualobjectthatisnotessentiallyprivateandsubjective.Inotherwords,thereisalwaysanappearance/realitydistinctionapplicabletotheobjectsofgenuineperceptionwhichgivesrisetothepossibilitythattheperceptualappearanceofthisobjectmisleadsusaboutwhattheobjectislikeinreality.Themainreasonforthisisthattheseobjectshavearealitybeyondtheirappearances.Theyarethuspublicobjectsandcapableofexistingontheirownwithoutanyone'sperceptionofthem.Butfeelingpainhasnoneofthesefeatures.Therefore,itcannotbegenuineperception.

So,howdotheperceptualtheoristshandlethisobjection,whichliesbehindtheintuitiveresistancetotreatingpainasaformofperception?Giventhecorecommitmentofperceptualviews(namely,thatfeelingpaininvolvesperceivingsomethingextramental),onemightthinkthatperceptualtheoristsidentifypainwithtissuedamage.Indeed,ifonetakesthisview,theaboveobjectionseemsalmostdecisiveagainstit.ButrelativelyfewdefendersactuallytakethisrouteamongthemostnotableareNewton(1989),StephensandGraham(1987),andHill(2004,2006).Mostothers,includingArmstrongandPitcher,bowedtocommonsenseunderstandingofpainandidentifiedpainswithpainexperiencesorsensations,understoodinadirectrealistfashion.Ifpainsareidentifiedwithexperiences,notwiththeircauses(i.e.,tissuedamage),thentheaboveobjectionseemstodisappear(butseebelow).

Itisprimarilyforthisreasonthatmostperceptualtheoristsidentifyfeelingpainwithhavinganexperienceinthefirstplacejustasthepainscientistsdo(seeIASPdefinitionabove)followingthesecondthreadinourordinaryconceptionofpain.Butthisistheexperiencemediatingorinvolvedintheperceptionoftissuedamage.Inotherwords,theygrantthatthe(dominant)conceptofpainistheconceptofasubjectiveexperience,buttheyinsistthatthisexperienceisessentiallyperceptual:itconstitutesourperceptionoftissuedamage.Comparethesituationwithseeing.Inseeingaredappleingoodlight,Iamhavingavisualexperiencewhichisperceptual:itconstitutesmyseeingtheredapple.Thedifferenceliesnotintheflowofinformation,butinthelocusofourspontaneousinterestandconceptualidentificationdirectlyinducedbytheperceptualexperience.Accordingtomostperceptualtheorists,weapplytheconceptofpain,PAIN,primarilytotheperceptualexperiencewearehaving,nottotheobjectofthisexperience,i.e.,tissuedamage(eventhough,asdiscussedabove,commonsensealsousesconfusinglythesamewordpaintoindicatewherethetissuedamagemightbeoccurringbyapplyingittoabodilylocationmoreonthisshortly).Inotherwords,painnamesasubjectiveexperience.Invision,however,thelocusofconceptualidentificationisdifferent:normallyitistheobjectofourvisualexperienceweareinterestedin,say,aredappleseeningoodlightandidentifiedassuch.Thus,webothperceptuallyandconceptuallyfocusonitanditsvisiblepropertiessuchasitsredness,roundness,etc.,byapplyingourconcepts,RED,ROUND,APPLE,toitonthebasisofourvisualexperience.Ofcourse,wearesometimesinterestedinandcanfocusandreportonourvisualexperiencestoo,butthishappensusuallywhenwearenotsureaboutwhatweareseeing.

(Inwhatfollows,itisusefultodenoteconceptsbycapitalizedwordsthatnamethem.So,forinstance,REDdenotestheconceptofredwhichinturnexpressesthepropertyofbeingred.Inotherwords,REDexpressesthepropertyofbeingred,orrednessinshort.EventhoughhereIassumeforconveniencearepresentationalistframeworkforconceptsaccordingtowhichconceptsaremental

representationsrealizedinthebrainwhichisthepsychologist'spreferredreading,nothingofanyimportancehangsonthis:thereadermaysubstitutehisorherownpreferredinterpretationofhowconceptsaretobeunderstood.Forinstance,conceptsmaybemerelycertainsortsofmentalorbehavioralcapacitiesthatarefunctionallyordispositionallycharacterized.)

Thereisthusanasymmetryinourspontaneousreactiontoincomingstimuliinseeingandhavingpainthatis,ourspontaneousinterestandfocusdirectlyresultingfromtheperceptualexperiencesisdifferentineachcase.Wecanrepresentthisasymmetrywithaschematic(Figure1).

Figure1:Thereisasymmetryinconceptapplicationevenwhenitisassumedthatthestructureofinformationflowissymmetricalinthecontrastcases.

Thustheincorrigibilitymentionedbeforereducestoone'sincorrigibilityaboutone'soccurrentexperiences.Totheextenttowhichweareincorrigibleindiscriminatingandconceptuallyidentifyingourownexperiences,tothatextentwecannotbewrongaboutourownpains.Hencethelocusofconceptapplicationarethepainexperiences,eventhoughitmightseemtousasifwewereapplyingtheconceptofpaintobodilylocations(seebelow).Itfollowsthathallucinationsorillusionsarepossible,inonesense,notaboutfeeling/experiencingpain,butaboutwhethertheseexperiences'correctlyrepresentingsometissuedamage,thatis,theobjectofperceptioninfeelingpain.

Theprivacyandsubjectivityofpainsareexplainedsimilarly.Ifpainsareexperiences,theycannotexistwithoutbeingthestateofsomeone'smind.Inotherwords,theyexistinsofarasonehasthem:theyarementalstatesorevents,henceessentiallyminddependent.Theprivacyofpainsagainreducestotheprivacyofexperiences.Theremaybephilosophicalproblemsabouthowprivacy,subjectivityandincorrigibilityarepossibleinacompletelyphysicalworld,butiftherearesuchproblems,theyaregeneralproblemsabouthavingperceptualexperienceofanykind,notnecessarilypertainingtopainsandotherintransitivebodilysensations.

3.3Theproblemofpainlocation

Theperceptualistidentificationofpainswithexperiencesisnotintheclearyet:theperceptualtheoristhastogiveanaccountofthecommonpracticeofattributingpainstobodilylocations.Forifpainsareperceptualexperiencestheycan'tbeintelligibly(letalonecorrectly)locatedinbodyparts(exceptperhapsinthehead).

Themostcommonperceptualisttreatmentofthisproblemconcedesthatthereisnowaytoanalyzesentencesattributingpaintobodyparts,suchas(1)(6),whichwoulddocompletejusticetoalltheaspectsofourcommonsenseconceptionofpain.Nevertheless,theresultingaccount,itisclaimed,comesprettyclose.Accordingtothebasicproposal,whenIutterasentencelike

(5)Ifeelasharppaininthebackofmyrighthand

Iprimarilyselfattributeacertainkindofexperiencewhichhasanintentionalcontent(Armstrong1962,1968,pp.314316andPitcher1970,pp.383385,1971seealsoDretske1999,2006Tye1997,2006a).Tosaythatanexperiencehasanintentionalcontentistosaythatitrepresentsacertainsituationorstateofaffairs(whichmaybequitecomplex).Soforinstance,whenIseearedappleonthetable,Iamhavingavisualexperiencewhichrepresents,amongotherthings,aredappleonthetable.Someperceptualistsmightdescribetheproperintentionalorrepresentationalcontentofexperiencesinlessobjectualtermsbynotnamingwhatisrepresentedintermsofordinaryobjectslikeapplesandtables.Forthesetheorists,itismoreappropriatetocharacterizetherepresentationalcontentofperceptualexperiencesintermsofthewaysinwhichthesensiblequalitiesofthoseobjectsareinstantiatedordistributedinone'sperceptualfield.Experiencesdetectortrackthesequalities.Forinstance,theymaysaythatmyvisualexperiencerepresentstheinstantiationofrednesswiththeinstantiationofacertain(applelike)shapequality,etc.Butbothwaysofcharacterizingthiscontentaremeanttobeobjectiveinthesensethattheyrepresentextramentalreality(atleast,partlyitalldependsonhowoneconceivesofsocalledsecondaryqualities).Treatingperceptualexperiencesashavingintentionalcontentisappropriateandinlinewiththenaturalisticmotivationbehinddevelopingperceptualaccountsingeneral,becausethisishowtheyservetheirprimaryfunctionofinformingtheirownersabouttheirimmediateextramentalenvironment,includingbodilyenvironment.

Sotheproposalisthat,justlikeotherperceptualexperiences,painexperiencesalsorepresent.Theyrepresenttissuedamageasoccurringinacertainregionofone'sbody.Thelocationofpain,then,isthelocationoftissuedamageasrepresentedbypainexperiences.Thelocationisanintentionallocation.So(5)shouldbeanalyzedasselfattributinganexperiencewhichrepresentsacertainkindoftissuedamageoccurringinthebackofmyhand.Inotherwords,eventhoughthesurfacestructureofsentences(5)suggeststhatthereisanattributionofpaintoabodilylocation(morestrictly,thatIstandinthefeelingrelationtoapainwhichislocatedinapartofmybody),theproposedanalysissaysthatthisisnotwhatisgoingon.WhatIdowhenIutter(5)isanattributionofadifferentsort:Iattributetomyselfafeelingstate(anexperience)whichhasanintentionalcontenttotheeffectthatacertainregionofmybodyisinaphysicalconditionofacertainsort.

Onthisview,thereisthusaconfusionincommonsensewaysoftalking,duetothefactthatthepainisnotinmyhandthepain,beingastateoffeelingorexperience,isinmymind.Itisthephysicaldisturbancethatisinmyhandwhichmyfeelingstaterepresents(inaconfusedandindistinctway,asDescarteswouldputit).Uponreflection,however,wemayrealizethatinuttering(5)Iactuallyattributeanintentionalfeelingstatetomyselfwhichinturnattributesaphysicaldisturbancetomyhand.Thecolloquialwaysofspeakingjustjumblethepainwiththedisturbance,andthusconfuseandmisleadus.Pains,onthisview,areexperiences,notobjectsofourexperiences.Moreover,sincetheseexperienceshaveintentionalcontent,theyhaveaccuracyconditions:theycanbecorrectorincorrecttheycanveridicallyrepresentormisrepresent.Butevenwhentheymisrepresent,theseexperiencesarepainexperiences.SoIcanbeingenuinepain,eventhoughthereisnothingphysicallywrongwithmyhand.

Notethataccordingtothisanalysis,thereare,inasense,twokindsofapropertyattributiongoingon:anattributionofanexperienceandanattributionoftissuedamagetoabodypart.Butinuttering(5)Idoonlytheformerattribution,notthelatter.Thelatterattributionisdonenotbymebutbymyexperience,sotospeak,byrepresentingitashappeninginmyhand.ThisiswhyIamnotlogicallycommittedtofindingtissuedamageinmyhandintrulyuttering(5)eventhoughthisiswhatInormallyexpecttofindthere.Indeed,asobservedinthefirstsection,ifitturnsoutthatthereis

nothingphysicallywrongwithmyhand,Iamnotwrong.(5)isstilltrue.Butmyexperienceisnowwrong:itmisrepresentsthebackofmyhandashavingsomethingphysicallywrongwithit,asifsometissuedamagewereoccurringthere.IamhavinganillusionaboutmyhandbutIamstillingenuinepain.Illusoryorhallucinatorypainexperiencesarestillgenuinepains.

Armstrong'sandPitcher'sperceptualaccountsofpainlocationhavebeenveryinfluential.Treatingpainlocationastheintentionallocationoftissuedamageasrepresentedinthepainexperience,inoneformoranother,seemstodominatethethinkinginthisarea.Nevertheless,thereisasizablephilosophicalliteratureontheproblemofpainlocationorthespatialityofpainingeneral.Thefollowingisasampling.ForaccountspredatingArmstrongandPitcher,seeBaier(1964),Vesey(1965,1967),Taylor(1965,1966),Holborow(1966),andCoburn(1966).Formoremoderndiscussion,seeHolly(1986),Hyman(2003),Wyller(2005),andBain(2007).ThereisalsoanextendeddebatebetweenPaulNoordhofandMichaelTyeaboutwhetherthesenseinwhichwelocatepainsinbodypartsrequirespecialsensesofinthatmightnotbespatialandwhetherthisisinconflictwithrepresentationalismaboutpain.SeeNoordhof(2001,2002,2006)andTye(2002,2006a,2006b).Olivier(2006)isacriticalcommentaryonthedebatebetweenNoordhofandTye.

3.4Directandindirectperceptualtheories

Theperceptualviewofpainaspresentedsofarisaviewevenanindirectrealistcansubscribeto,although,asamatterofhistoricalfact,veryfewindirectrealistshavedoneso(Perkins1983,2006Maund2003,2006).Asensedatumtheoristissomeonewhothinksthatallperceptionofextramentalrealityisindirect,mediatedbyadirectperceptionofsensedatathatstandincertainsystematicrelationstoextramentalobjectsintheworldinvirtueofwhichsensedatacontingentlycometorepresentthem.Soitisentirelypossible,infactreasonable,toholdthatpainsensedataarealsorepresentational.Inotherworlds,directawarenessofpainsensedatacouldconstitutetheindirectperceptionoftissuedamageinbodilyregionswhichtypicallyandsystematicallycausethesesensedata.

Thereasonwhythislinewasnotpursuedbyindirectrealistshasprobablysomethingtodowiththeintuitiveresistanceagainstanyperceptualviewofpainalreadyembeddedinourordinaryconceptionthatwediscussedabove.[10]Indirectrealistslikesensedatumtheorists,aswehavealreadyseen,havethetheoreticalresourcestoaccommodatetheintuitiveunderstandingofpainwithoutforcingitintoaperceptualistmold.Withoutanyqualms,theycansaythatwearedirectlyandimmediatelyawareofpainquaamentalobjectorquality,whetherornotthisrepresentsorsignalstissuedamage.Thisistosaythattheyalreadyhavealocusofconceptapplicationintheirtheoryfortheconceptofpain:PAINdirectlyappliestotheexperienceortoitsinternaldirectobject,i.e.,toeitherasensedatumortoitsdirectawareness.Thisseemstoaccommodatealltheintuitionsembeddedincommonsensewhygofurther?Furthermore,ifoneisnotaperceptualist,onedoesn'thaveanobligationtodealwithwhatwe'llcallbelowtheproblemoffocus,theproblemofexplainingwhythereisanasymmetryinconceptualfocusbetweenpainandstandardexteroceptionifbotharegenuinelyperceptual.

Inpractice,however,almostalldefendersofperceptualviewofpainsaredirectrealists.Ifonewantstorunadirectrealistversionoftheperceptualtheory,however,oneimmediatelyrunsintothedifficultyoffindinganappropriatelocusfordirectperceptualawareness,andforthatmatter,alocusforimmediateconceptapplicationthatis,onerunsintothedifficultyoffindinganobject,state,oreventtowhichwespontaneouslyapplyPAIN,ITCH,TICKLE,etc.,whenweareintrospectivelyawareofourpains,itches,tickles,etc.,andreportthemonthisbasis.Thisdifficultyarisesbecausethemarkofany(early)directrealisminthetheoryofperceptionistherepudiationofconsciouslyavailableperceptualintermediariesthatmediatestandardexteroception:whenIseearedappleonthetable,thereisnoobjectorqualitydistinctfromtheappleanditsrednesssuchthatIseetheappleinvirtueofseeingit(ormoregenerally,invirtueofdirectlyperceivingorbeingawareofit).Onthisview,whenIseeanapple,Idirectlyperceive,oramdirectlyacquaintedwith,theappleanditsqualitiessuchasitsredness.Thisviewworkswellinveridicalperception:thelocusofconcept

applicationisalwaysthepublicobjectofperception,liketheappleanditsproperties.Italsoexplainswhythespontaneousconceptapplicationisthewayitisevenwhenonehallucinatesorhaveillusions:evenwhenonehallucinatesaredapple,oneisnaturallydisposedtoapplytheconceptREDAPPLEtowhatoneeithertakesoristemptedtotaketobethepublicobjectofone'sepistemiceffortsanditspubliclyavailablefeatures,andrarely,ifever,towhatonebelievestobeaprivatementalobjectorquality.

Buthowistherepudiationofconsciouslyavailableperceptualintermediariestobereconciledwiththeadmissionthattheconceptofpainistheconceptofasubjectivesensation/experienceofacertainsort?Recallthatmostperceptualtheoristsadmitthatintrospectivereportsofpaininbodyregionsarereportsofexperiencesthatrepresentphysicaldisorderofsomesortinthoseregions.Thisisjusttosaythatwhenoneisinpainoneisdirectlyawareofasensationorexperience,i.e.,pain.Thisinturnmeansthattheconceptswearespontaneouslypromptedtoapplyinhavingpainsandotherintransitivebodilysensationsdirectlyapplytothepromptingsensations/experiencesinthefirstplaceappearancestothecontrary.Sohowtounderstandthedirectrealist'stalkofconscioussensationsorexperiences?

3.5Adverbialistperceptualtheories

Directrealistsrejecttheactobjectanalysisofperceptualexperiencesadvancedbysensedatumtheoristsandotherindirectrealists.Accordingtomostearlydirectrealists(e.g.,Ducasse1952,Sellars1975),evenwhenvisuallyhallucinatingaredappleonthetable,onedoesnotdirectlyseeaprivatementalparticularoraconstellationofmentalqualitiesratheroneishavingavisualexperiencethatislikeanexperiencewhichisnormallybroughtaboutwhenoneactuallyseesarealredappleonthetable.Directrealists,inotherwords,typicallyinsistthatsuchcasesshouldnotbeanalyzedintermsofaperceiverstandinginacertainperceptualrelationtoaprivatementalobjectorquality.Rathertheanalysisinvolvesonlyoneparticular,theperceiverherself,andherbeingincertainsortsof(perceptual,experiential)statesorconditionsthataretypicallybroughtaboutundercertaincircumstancesinwhichonegenuinelyperceivessomething.Instandardcases,whenoneishavingaveridicalperception,theexperientialstateoftheperceiverisbroughtaboutbytheactualobjectofherperception,andtheperceiver'sstateisqualitativelydifferentiatedbythecausalinfluencesofthesensiblequalitiesofthepublicobject.Innonstandardcaseslikeinhallucinationsandillusions,phenomenologicallythesamekindsofstatesarebroughtaboutbydifferentcausalroutes,andthequalitativedifferentiationofone'sexperientialstateinsuchnonveridicalcasesistheresultofdeviantcausalinfluences.(Pitcher1970,p.384)

Thissortofanalysisofexperiencesissometimesknownasadverbialismintheliteraturebecauseinperceivingaredobjectoneissaidtobeinastateofperceivingsomethingredly.Thetheoreticalimportofthiswayoftalkingisthatperceivingsomethingthatisredisamannerofperceivingthatobjectthatwouldbedistinctfromthemannerofperceivingitiftheobjectwereblue,inwhichcaseonewouldbeperceivingitbluely.Similarlywhenonehallucinatesaredobject,thereisonlyoneobject,theperceiverwhoissensinginacertainmanner,namely,redly.Inotherwords,redissaidtoqualifynotaprivateobjectbutratherastateoractivityofaperson,thatstatebeingamannerofperceivingorsensingphysicalobjectsthatarered.[11]Forourpurposes,keepingupwiththegeneralnaturalisticmotivationbehinddevelopingdirectrealistviews,wecantakeadverbialismasanattempttogetridofmysteriousmentalobjectsorqualitiesinfavorofmetaphysicallylesscostlystatesoractivitiesofpersonsormannersofperceivingthatqualifypersonsquasubjectsofexperience.Soapainexperience,foradirectrealist,isaspecificmannerinwhichtissuedamageis(somatosensorially)perceivedinabodilyregion.Whenwereportpain,wereporttheoccurrenceofexperiencesunderstoodthiswayadverbially.

Adverbialismofthissortcanbeeffectivelycombinedwithintentionalismorrepresentationalismaboutexperience(formoreontheconnectionbetweenadverbialismandrepresentationalism,seeKraut1982,andLycan1987a,1987b).Anadverbialisthastosomehowcharacterizethesewaysor

mannersofsensing/perceivingfordistinguishingbetweenthem,andanaturalwaytodothatisbyappealingtothestandardorcanonicalconditionsunderwhichthoseperceptualeventsarebroughtabout(recallhowdirectrealistswanttohandleavisualhallucination:oneishavingavisualexperiencethatislikeanexperiencewhichisnormallybroughtaboutwhenoneactuallyseesarealredappleonthetable).Thusitmaybereasonabletoarguethatthosecanonicalconditionsarewhatthespecificperceptualeventsoractivitiesofthepersonsrepresent.Forinstance,itisplausibletoclaimthataspecificperceptualactivityconstitutestheperceptionofred(=theperceptualeventrepresentingtheinstantiationofred)becauseitisthekindofpsychologicaleventregularly(canonically)causedbyredsurfacesindeedonemightexpectthatthepsychophysicsofsensorymodalitieswoulddetailthesecanonicalorstandardconditionsinobjectiveterms.Althoughthismaneuverisopentodirectrealists,itisoptional.Whenonetakesthisoptiontheresultisprettymuchastrongformofrepresentationalismforwhichseenextsection.

Therearevarioustechnicaldifficultieswithadverbialism,especiallywhendealingwithphenomenologicallycomplexoverallexperiencessuchashavingthreepainsofdifferentqualitativecharactersimultaneouslyoccurringinthreedifferentlocationsinone'sbody.Itisnotclearwhetheradverbialistapproachescansuccessfullytietheappropriatemannerscorrespondingtodifferentqualitieswiththerightpainsortissuedamageondifferentlocations.(SeeJackson1975,1977foradetailedcriticismofthissortTye1996,pp.7477,containsausefulsummary.)Furthermore,evenwhenonemightsuccessfullygetridofmysteriousmentalobjectslikesensedatawiththisadverbialistmove,itisnotclearwhetheradverbialismmightstillleadtoaformofpropertydualismaccordingtowhichoneisdirectlyawareofcertain(nonphysical)phenomenologicalqualitiesinstantiatedbyexperiencesrealizedbybrainstates.Thesequalitiesseemtoberequiredtoexplainhowthemannersofdifferentperceptualactivitiesofaperceivercanbedifferentiated.

Thereareothersourcesofresistancetodirectperceptualtheoriesofpainandotherintransitivebodilysensations.Someobjectionsstemfromconsiderationsaboutwhetherdirectperceptualtheoriescangiveadequateaccountsofperceptioningeneral,soarenotspecifictotheirtreatmentofpain.Oneofthemostfrequentlydiscussedworriesaboutdirectperceptualtheoriesingeneraliswhethertheycandojusticetotheinternalistintuitionthatperceptualexperienceisphenomenallyrichinawaythatcannotbepushedbacktotheextramentalworld.InthecaseofearlydirectrealistlikeArmstrongandPitcher,thisworryisevenmorepressingsincetheywerecognitivistaboutperceptualexperienceingeneralthatis,theyattemptedtoexplainperceptionintermsofbeliefacquisition(or,intermsofacquisitionofbelieflikecognitivestates).Butbeliefsdon'tseemtohavetherightkindofphenomenologyassociatedwithperceptualexperiencesandbodilysensations(seeEveritt1988andGrahek1991forthiskindofcriticism).Aspointedoutearlier,earlydirectrealistsplayeddowntheimportanceofexperientialphenomenologyandsometimesevendenieditsexistencefearingthatacknowledgingitwillleadtotheintroductionofsensedataorirreduciblypsychicqualia.[12]Butthisconcernaboutqualiadrovemanyawayfromtheearlydirectperceptualtheories(especiallythosewhowerenotmuchworriedaboutskepticismandepistemologyingeneral)withtheconvictionthatthesetheoriesarenotadequateafterallforcapturingtherichphenomenologyofperceptualexperiences.

4.Representationaltheories

Confrontedwithsuchdifficultiesandmanyothers,itistemptingtoadoptastrongformofrepresentationalismthatopenlyadmitstheexistenceofphenomenologicallyrichexperiences,whilepreservingthebasicintuitionandnaturalisticmotivationbehinddirectrealism.Indeed,manyhaveyieldedtothistemptation.

4.1Introduction

Representationalismaboutpainistheviewthattheentirephenomenologyofapainexperienceis

strictlyidenticaltoitsrepresentationalorintentionalcontent.Inotherwords,thephenomenalandrepresentationalcontentsofpainareoneandthesamething,thustheycannotcomeapart.AmongthedefendersofpainrepresentationalismunderstoodthiswayareHarman(1990),Dretske(1995,1999,2003),Tye(1996,1997,2006a,2006b),Byrne(2001),Seager(2002),andBain(2003).[13]

Mostearlydirectrealistaccountsofperception,asmentionedbefore,wereshyaboutacknowledgingarobustphenomenologyforexperiences.Thiswasprimarilybecauseexperientialphenomenologywasassociatedwithindirectrealismandsensedatatheoriesinparticular.Manyearlydirectrealistsembracedadverbialismbecauseadverbialismpromisedawayofbeingrealistaboutexperienceswhileavoidinganactobjectviewofthem.Becausemostdirectrealistsidentifiedpainswithsensoryexperiencesratherthantheirobjects,thedirectperceptualtheoristsaboutpainneededarobust(realist)notionofexperience.Adverbialismgavewaytoastrongformofrepresentationalismbysuggestingwaysinwhichintentionalcontentcouldbenaturalizedonthebasisofthosecanonicalconditionsthatcausally/lawfullycontroltheoccurrenceofperceptualexperiencesinvirtueofwhichtheyrepresentthosebodilyconditions.Thisopenedupthepossibilityofdefendingdirectrealismaboutarobustexperientialphenomenologywithcompletelynaturalisticcredentials.Theresultwasstrongrepresentationalismaboutallexperientialphenomenology,accordingtowhichtheentirephenomenal(qualitative)contentorqualiaofanyexperienceismetaphysicallyconstitutedwithoutremainderbyitsrepresentationalcontent.

Hence,representationalismaboutqualiainthiscontextneedstobeunderstoodinareductionistsense.Aswehaveseen,indirectrealism,especiallyintheformofsensedatumtheories,werealsoadvancedasrepresentationalisttheories(perhapsexcludingtheintransitivebodilysensations).Indeed,theoldnameforindirectrealismwasrepresentativerealism.Onthesetheories,inhavingaperceptualexperiencewearedirectlyacquaintedwithqualia,understoodeitherasintrinsicqualitiesofexperiencesorasqualitiesofphenomenalindividualslikesensedata.But,atleastinstandardexteroception,thesequalitiescontingentlyrepresentobjectivesensiblepropertiesofpublicobjectsinvirtueofeitherresemblingthemorbybeingregularlycausedbytheirinstantiationsorboth.Inotherwords,onanindirectrealistapproach,theyaredistinctexistences:qualiaorsensedatacometorepresentpublicobjectsandtheirsensiblepropertiesinvirtueofsomecontingentrelationsholdingbetweenthem(resemblanceorcausation).

However,inheracknowledgmentofphenomenology,thereductionistdirectrealistcannothavesuchphenomenalobjectssomehowinternaltoone'smindorexperience,norcansheendorsetheexistenceofqualitiesintrinsictoexperiencesthatwecanbecomedirectlyawareofinintrospectionthebasicdirectperceptualistintuition,recall,isthatourexperiencesaretransparenttousinthattheypresentustheworlddirectlyandimmediately(thisexternalrelationisprimary).Soifqualiaaretoberetainedinone'sdirectrealistpictureofperception,thesequalianeedtobereducedtorepresentationalcontentofperceptualstates.Wewillsometimesusestrongrepresentationalismtodistinguishthisviewfromrepresentativerealism(seeBlock2006Blockusesrepresentationismtomarkthesamedistinction).

Likeearlierdirectrealists,strongrepresentationaliststendtobenaturalistsorphysicalists.Thereforethesetheoriesusuallycomewithanaturalistaccountofhowthesestates(thoughtofasrealizedinthecentralnervoussystem)acquiretheirrepresentationalcontent.Themostcommonaccountiseitheranidealcausalcovariationtheory(informationalsemanticsseeDretske1981,Fodor1987,AydedeandGzeldere2005)orateleologicalpsychosemantics(seeMillikan1984,Papineau1987)orboth(Dretske1988,1995Tye1996).Theseareexternalisttheories.[14]

Torecap,strongrepresentationalismisthemodernday'sdirectrealismaboutperception,whereadverbialismisreplacedbyrepresentationalismrunonanaturalisticstoryabouthowperceptualexperiencesacquiretheir(analog)representationalcontentthatinturnconstitutestheirphenomenology.So,accordingtostrongrepresentationalism,painexperiencesfeelthewaytheydoinvirtueoftheirrepresentationalcontent,andnothingelse.Theyrepresentvariousdisorderlyconditions

ofbodilytissue.Thewaytheyrepresenttheseconditionsisanalogoustothewayourvisualsystemrepresentscolors.Ifcolorsare(atleast,partly)objectivefeaturesofsurfacesliketheirsurfacespectralreflectances,ourvisualexperiencesdon'trepresentcolorsassuch,sowecannotcometoconceptualizecolorsasspectralreflectancesonthebasisoftheirgrainlessvisualpresentations.Soitisnoobjectiontorepresentationalismthatourpainexperiencesdon'trepresenttissuedamageassuch,whichistosaythatwecannotnecessarilyconceptualizewhatpainexperiencesrepresentastissuedamagesolelyonthebasisoftheseexperiences.

Itissometimessaidthatperceptualexperiencesrepresentwhattheydononconceptually,whichisoftentimesequatedwithanalogcontent(realizedinpicturelikecontinuousrepresentations).Inthiscontextwecantakethisasaclaimaboutthewayexperiencesarerepresentationallystructured:theyarenotstructuredoutofconcepts(discreterepresentations)asthoughtsareusuallythoughttobe.Everysensorymodalityhasarangeofproprietaryqualitiesthattheycandetect.Painexperiencesarenodifferent,althoughtheymaybelessrichintermsoftheirinformationalcontentcomparedtovisionforinstance.Nevertheless,itisreasonabletoarguethatqualitativedifferencesinpainexperiencesareduetotheirrepresentingdifferentbodilyconditions.Tyelistsanumberofcandidates:

atwingeofpainrepresentsamild,briefcaseofdamage.Athrobbingpainrepresentsarapidlypulsingdisorder.Achesrepresentregionsofdamageinsidethebodyratherthanonthesurface.Theseregionsarerepresentedashavingvolume,asgraduallybeginningandending,asincreasinginseverity,asslowlyfadingaway.Thevolumessorepresentedarenotrepresentedaspreciseorsharplybounded.Thisiswhyachesarenotfelttohavepreciselocations,unlikeprickingpains,forexample.Astabbingpainisonethatrepresentssuddendamageoveraparticularwelldefinedbodilyregion.Thisregionisrepresentedashavingvolume(ratherthanbeingtwodimensional),asbeingtheshapeofsomethingsharpedgedandpointed(likethatofadagger).Inthecaseofaprickingpain,therelevantdamageisrepresentedashavingasuddenbeginningandendingonthesurfaceorjustbelow,andascoveringaverytinyarea.Arackingpainisonethatrepresentsthatthedamageinvolvesthestretchingofinternalbodyparts(e.g.,muscles).(Tye1997,p.333cf.Tye1996,2006a)

Theproblemofpainlocationishandledinthesamewaythattheearlyperceptualtheorieshandledthem:thelocationofpainisthelocationthatthepainexperiencesrepresentaswherethetissuedamageisoccurring.Thissortofaccountbecomesmoreattractiveinthelightofthefactthatwenowhaveamuchmorerobustandrealistnotionofexperiencewhosephenomenologicalcumrepresentationalcontentisadirectguidetothelocationoftissuedamage.Thephenomenologyofpainexperiencesnowdirectly/transparentlypresentstissuedamagetothesuffererinvirtueofitsidentitywithitsrepresentationalcontent(Tye2006a,2006b).

4.2Theproblemoffocus

Oneofthecentraldifficultiesforanyperceptual/representationalviewofpainistoexplainwhy,iffeelingpainisgenuinelyperceivingtissuedamageinabodypart,wereportitsexperienceratherthanthetissuedamage(seePitcher1970,pp.37980Armstrong1962,p.125andAydede,forthcoming,forthestatementofthedifficulty).[15]Wemaycallthisdifficultytheproblemoffocusforperceptualtheoriesingeneral(includingstrongrepresentationalistviews).Accordingtothecommonsenseconceptionofpain,andfollowingit,mostperceptualtheories,weare,epistemologicallyandpsychologically,moreinterestedintheexperiencethanitsobject,tissuedamage.Ourspontaneousconceptualreactionalsofollowsthispattern:thereisamarkeddifferenceinthelocusofconceptapplicationorconceptualidentificationbetweenstandardexteroceptionandpain.AsdepictedinFigure1above,thereisanobviousasymmetrybetweenthetwo.Iffeelingpainisnothingbutperceivingtissuedamageinabodilyregiononaparwithseeingaredapple,thenonewouldnaturallyexpectthatwhenwereportpaininbodyparts,wearereportingaperceptualrelationthatobtainsbetweentheperceiverandanextramentalconditionperceived.

Butthisisnotwhatwefind.Instead,whatwefindisareportofanexperienceofacertainsortwhoseinformational/representationaletiologymakesnodifferencetoitsownconceptualclassification.Apainreportisareportofanexperiencewhoserepresentationalaccuracyisofnorelevancetowhetherthereportitselfisaccurate.Recallthat,onmostperceptualtheories,whenIutterasentencelike(5),IamsayingsomethinglikeIamhavinganexperiencewhichtellsmethatthereissomesortofphysicaldisorderinthebackofmyhand.Inotherwords,Isimplyreportanexperiencethattellsmesomething.WhetherornotIcometobelievewhatittellsmeisamatteroffactorsthatoughtnottobereadintotheanalysisofwhatthetruthconditionsof(5)are.Infact,thissortofanalysisproposedbyperceptualtheoristscomeswithininchestofullycapturingtheordinaryconceptionofpainandthusisanargumentinfavorofsuchtheories.Butthisispreciselywheretheproblemliesforperceptualtheories.Whyisapainreportareportofanexperienceinthefirstinstanceiftheexperienceisgenuinelyperceptual(exteroceptual)?Isn'tthisstrange?Nothingofthissorthappensingenuineperception.Infact,thisasymmetrycanbetransformedintoacompellingargumentagainstperceptual(aswellasstrongrepresentationalist)theoriesinthefollowingwaycf.Aydede(forthcoming).

Everygenuinecaseofperceptioninvitesreportinganinstanceofperceptionintherelevantmodalitybysentencessimilarto(9)(13),wheretheperceptualverbisuseddominantlyasasuccessverb.Forinstance:

(10)Iseearedappleonthetable.

Thisisforgoodreason:perceptionessentiallyisanactivitywherebyonegathersinformationaboutone's(extramental)environmentinrealtime(includingone'sinternalbodilyenvironmentofcourse).Soitisnotsurprisingthatthedominantformofreportingisintheformofarelationbetweentheperceiverandtheperceivedwherethelatterareextramentalobjectsorconditionsofone'senvironment.Itisalsonotsurprisingthatperceptiontypicallyyieldsconceptualcategorizationoftheperceivedobjectorconditioninthefirstinstance:thetypicalresultofaperceptualprocessisbringingtheperceivedobjectunderaperceptualconcept.Genuineperceptionthusputsthepremiumintheperceivedobject,notintheperceptualactivityitselforintheperceptualexperiencewherebyoneistypicallybroughtintoepistemiccontactwithone'sextramentalenvironment.Hencethetypicalresultofperceptionistheacquisitionofbeliefswithcontentsexpressiblebysentenceslike(9)(13).Ifsentencesreportingpaininbodypartsdon'tfollowthispattern,i.e.,iftheyarenottobeconstruedasreportsofperceptualrelationsbetweentheperceiverandtheperceived,thenpainreportsareprimafacienotperceptualreports,reportstotheeffectthatonestandsinaperceptualrelationtosomethingextramental.Butpainreportsreportfeelingpain.Thusfeelingpainisanotaformofgenuineperception.Letuscallthistheargumentfromfocusagainstperceptualtheories.

Thereisanobvioussenseinwhichtheperceptualtheoristisboundtoconcedethatreportingpainisnotacaseofreportingtheobtainingofaperceptualrelationbetweentheperceiverandtheextramentalperceivedobject.Fortotheextenttowhichreportingpainisreportingaconsciousexperienceandonlythat,tothatextentitisanintrospectivereport,reportofintramentalactivity.Nevertheless,aperceptualtheoristwouldinsistthatthisreportedexperienceisaperceptualexperience.Butwhyreporttheexperience,themessenger,ratherthanitsobject,themessage?Whyarewefixatedonthemessengerhere?

Anaturalexplanationthataperceptualtheoristmightgiveisthatunlikeotherperceptualmodalities,theactsofsensingtissuedamageinvolvedinfeelingpain(i.e.,theexperience)haveaverypronouncednegativeaffectivequality:painsareunpleasant,awful,hurtful,painful(seePitcher1970,p.379ffandArmstrong1962,p.125ff1968,p.310ff).Itisthisnegativeaffectthatexplainswhywearefixatedontheexperienceitself,ratherthanwhatitisaperceptionof,i.e.,traumatizedbodyparts.Inotherwords,itisthisnegativequalitythatturnstherecognitionalfocusontoitself,andwithit,ontotheexperienceitattachesto.Ifthisiscorrect,then,ofcourse,painsareequallyunpleasantevenwhentheymisrepresent.Thisiswhywepickoutouractsofsensing(i.e.,theexperiencesthemselves)ratherthantheirexternalobjectsirrespectiveoftheirinformationaletiology:whetherornottheyareveridical,theyequallyhurt.

Thisseemstobeaplausibleexplanationonafirstpass.Indeed,aperceptualtheoristcanevengive,plausibly,anevolutionarystoryaboutwhytheseperceptualexperiencesshouldfeelunpleasant:theyrepresentorsignalapropertyofbodypartsthattendstohindersurvival.However,canthesamesortofexplanationbegivenforotherintransitivebodilysensationslikeitches,tickles,tingles,andorgasms?Perhapsitcanbedoneforexperiencingorgasms,whichareusuallyintenselypleasurableandhasobviousevolutionarybenefits.Butwhataboutothers?Itcheshaveanunpleasantqualitytothemwhichnormallymakesonewanttoscratchthespotwhereoneitches.Butticklesandtinglescanbepleasantattimesandunpleasantatothers,aswellasaffectivelyneutralatstillothertimes.Still,theconceptofatickleortingleisliketheconceptofapaininthattheyapplytotheactsofsensingorexperiencing,ratherthantowhatexternalconditionstheseactsmayberepresentingiftheyrepresentanything.[16]Further,gustatoryandolfactoryexperiencescanbepleasant,unpleasantoraffectivelyneutral,yettheactsofsensinginvolvedintheexerciseofthesesensorymodalitiesseemtobelargelytransparentinthatweapplytherelevantconceptslikeSWEET,BITTER,etc.totheexternalobjectsoftheseexperiencesinthefirstinstance,andonlyderivativelyorincidentallytotheactsofsensingortotheexperiencesthemselves.

Theseobservationscastdoubtontheplausibilityoftheexplanationofferedbytheperceptualtheoristfortheasymmetryinfocus.However,theperceptualtheoristcanstillclaimthatwhatevertheexplanationmightbeinthecaseofotherintransitivebodilysensations,theexplanationofferedforpainisessentiallycorrect,andsuchatheoristmaythusconcludethatshehasdischargedtheburdenofproofinclaimingthatexperiencingpainisengagingingenuineexteroception.Thisreplyhassomeinitialplausibilitysincepainexperienceshavealmostalwaysapronouncednegativeaffect.Nevertheless,ifonesuspectsasoneshouldthattheintransitivityofcertainkindsofbodilysensationsasawholemusthaveaunifiedexplanation,onewouldbewisetoconcludethattheofferedexplanationisprobablynotthewholestory,andthusmightnotbeadequateallbyitself.

ThereisalsoquitesubstantialscientificevidencethatthereareabnormalpainphenomenawherethesensoryandaffectiveaspectsofpainexperiencesaredissociatedfromeachotherseeSection6.1below.Themosttypicalcaseisknownasthepainasymboliasyndrome,wherepeoplewhosufferfromithavepainexperienceswithoutthenegativeaffect.Interestingly,thesepeoplestillidentifytheirexperienceaspain,butshownobodily,emotional,andbehavioralsignstypicallyassociatedwiththeunpleasantaspectofpains.Theyarefeelingapainthatdoesn'thurt!Ifpainsarenotnecessarilyunpleasant,asthissyndromeseemstoshow,itisaninterestingandopenquestionwhetherfeelingpainswithoutitsnegativeaffectwouldstillretainitsintransitivenature.(Forconsiderationsthatitwould,seeAydedeandGzeldere2005.)

Buttherealproblemforthisresponsethatappealstonegativeaffectisthateveniftheprovidedexplanationwerecorrect,itwouldnotsaveaperceptualtheory.Theexplanandum(namely,thatthesemanticfocusofspontaneousconceptapplicationinreportingpainsistheexperienceratherthantheextramentalobjectofthisexperience)canplausiblybeinterpretedasadmissionthatfeelingpaininabodypartisnotperceivingsomethingextramentalthere.Whatjustifiesthisinterpretationisareasonableconditionongenuineperception:anexperiencekindisgenuinelyperceptualonlyifitgenerallygivesrisetoproprietaryconceptapplicationswhosesemanticfocusistheproperobjectofthiskindofexperience.Inotherwords,somecognitiveuptakeofacertainsortisnecessaryforasensoryprocesstobecomegenuinelyperceptual.Generally,conceptsofsecondaryqualitiesaretakentobeproprietaryforeachsensorymodality.Indeedtheseconceptsprimarilyapplytoobjectsofexperiencestypicallygeneratedbythesemodalities,ratherthantotheexperiencesthemselves(oriftheydo,onlyderivatively).Butinthecaseofpain,wedon'tseemtosemanticallyapplyPAIN,orpainforthatmatter,totissuedamage.Againthisisevidencedbythetruthconditionsofpainattributingsentences,aswe'veseenbefore.Sotheexplanansmaybecorrect,butitseemstomissitstarget,theexplanandum:itturnsouttobeanexplanationofwhyfeelingpainisnotgenuinelyperceptual.(SeeAydede,forthcoming,foranextendedelaborationofthiskindofargumentagainstperceptualistaswellasstrongrepresentationalisttheories.)

Anotherkindofresponsetotheproblemoffocusmightbetotreatitasapseudoproblemthatstemsfromourlinguisticpracticeswithoutaffectingthephenomena.Itmightbearguedinthefollowingway(Chalmersincorrespondencecf.Hill2006).Wecaninventatermsee2suchthatonecansee2evenwhentheperceptualobjectisnotpresent(sosee2appliestothevisualexperience,unliketheordinarysee1).Wecanalsoinventatermfeel1suchthatfeeling1requiresthepresenceoftheperceptualobject,tissuedamage(sofeel1isunliketheordinaryfeel2).Asithappens,inourlanguageseeexpressessee1andfeelexpressesfeel2,butthat'sjustterminology.Atthelevelofphenomena,thetwocasesareonapar.

Buttheproblemwon'tgoawaywiththismaneuver.Foronething,itdoesn'treallyaddresstheantiperceptualistargumentfromfocusgivenabove.Foranother,thequestionisn'twhetherwecanorcannotinventnewtermsorformnewconceptssothatthetwophenomenaturnouttobetypeidentical.Linguisticpracticesreflectourconceptualpractices,howwethinkandconceptuallyrespondtoincomingperceptualinformation.Asamatteroffact,ourconceptualpracticestreatseeingandotherstandardexteroceptiondifferentlythantheytreatfeelingpain,despitethefactthatthetypesofinformationflowseemidenticalinbothcases.Thequestioniswhy?Forthesepracticesareshapedbyourepistemicneedsandpsychologicalpreferencesthatshowupinourbehavior.Theyarenotarbitrary.Ifperceptionisapsychologicalprocessbywhichwegatherinformationabouttheextramentalworldandalignourconceptualandbehavioralresponsesonthisbasisinacertainway,itisafairquestiontoaskwhetherapsychologicalprocessthatdeviatesfromthisisperception,especiallywhenthedeviationseemstoreflectthatourepistemicneedsandpsychologicalpreferencesaremarkedlydifferentthanthoseinvolvedinexteroception.Thequestionofwhetherfeelingpainisperceptionisnotapurelymetaphysicalorphilosophicalquestion,butitisalsopartlyandimportantlyanempirical(psychological)question.

4.3Theproblemofaffectivequalia

Painsarenotonlysensoryorperceptualexperiences,theyarealsoaffectiveemotionalexperiences,oratleasttheyseemtohaveanaffectiveaspect.Feelingpainisnormallyhavinganawful,hurtful,painful,experience.Sowemaysaythatpainshaveanegativehedonicoraffectivevalue.

Strongrepresentationalistsarecommittedtoclaimingthatallqualiaarerepresentational.Soifthisnegativeaffectiveaspectofpain(i.e.,thehurting,painfulqualityofpains)isaproperpartofpain'soverallqualitativephenomenology,thenitmustalsoberepresentational.Butwhatdoesitrepresent?Painphenomenologyseemscomplexinthatitseemstoconsistofatleasttwodimensions,affectiveemotionalandsensorydiscriminative.Representationalists,alongwithearlierperceptualtheorists,claimthatthesensoryaspectofpainisrepresentational:itrepresentstissuedamage.Butwhatdoestheaffectiveaspectrepresent?Theredoesn'tseemtobeaplausiblecandidate.

Theearlyperceptualtheorists,especiallydirectrealists,werecognitivistaboutpain'snegativeaffect.Theyclaimed,roughly,thatitconsistsoftheexperiencer'sspontaneouscognitive/conativereactionstotheirownpainexperiences.Thesereactionswereconceivedasformingconativepropositionalattitudes.Inotherwords,thepainfulnessofpainswasconstitutedbytheirpowertoimmediatelyevokein[one]theperemptorydesirethatthe[pain]perceptionshouldcease(Armstrong1968,pp.31416).(Seealso,StephensandGraham1985,1987Nelkin1986,1994Hall1989.Parfit1984.AccordingtoChisholm's1987presentation,Brentanoalsoheldthatpainsandpleasuresarepartlyconativereactionstosensoryelements.)

Eventhoughtheoreticallycognitivismisanoptionforrepresentationalism,adoptingitwouldseemtoviolatethespiritofstrongrepresentationalism.Italldependshowonewouldliketodevelopthecognitivistline.Oneoptionistosaythattheaffectiveaspectofpainisnotqualitativeorphenomenological.Weareundertheillusionthatitisbecausewearehardwiredtocognitivelyandbehaviorallyreacttothesensorycontentofpaininacertainway.Thisoptionhastheadvantageof

preservingstrongrepresentationalism:ifaffectisnotqualitative,thereisnopressuretotreatitasrepresentationalcf.Tye(1996,pp.11116and134361997,p.3323).Butifitisadmittedthataffectiveaspectofpainisasqualitativeasitssensorycontent,thencognitivismcomesasacompromiseforstrongrepresentationalistbecauseitadmitsthatnotallqualiaarerepresentational.Thislatteroptionmayleadtorepresentationalcumfunctionalistapproachestopainsandotheraffectivelynonneutralexperiencesinthatthesensorycontentofanexperiencemaybegivenapurelyrepresentationalaccountwhileitsaffectivedimensionmaybeamatteroffunctionallyprocessingthiscontentforsettingmotivationalparameters(ontheassumptionthatcognitiveattitudescanbecapturedfunctionally)seebelow.

Theproblemwithcognitivismingeneralisthatitsuffersfromintuitiveimplausibility:itcertainlydoesn'tappearthatthehurtingaspectofpainexperiencesisjustamatterofourcognitivereactionstothemasordinarilyunderstood.Cognitivereactionsintheformofpropositionalattitudesdon'tseemtohaveanyqualitativephenomenologytothem.Butmoreimportantly,thismoveappearstomislocatetheproblem.Thequestionis:inwhatdoesthepainfulness,thehurtingquality,ofpainsconsist?Theanswerofferedseemstobe:inourcognitive/conativereactiontotheexperience,somethinglikehavingadesireforittostop,forinstance.Butonewouldliketothinkthatitisbecausetheexperienceispainfulthatonedesiresittostop,nottheotherwayround.

Themoststraightforwardwaytodealwiththeaffectivequaliaforarepresentationalististosaythattheytooarerepresentational,justlikethesensoryqualia.Inarecentwork,Tyeseemstoproposesuchaview:

Peopleinpaintrytogetridofitortodiminishit.Why?Theanswersurelyisbecausepainfeelsunpleasantorbad,becauseitisexperiencedassuch.Butwhatexactlyisexperiencedasunpleasant?One'sattention,whenonefeelspain,goestoaplacedifferentfromtheoneinwhichtheexperienceofpainislocated.Thequalitiesthatareexperiencedasunpleasantarelocatedinthebodilylocationtowhichoneattends(innormalcircumstances).Peoplewhosepainslacktheaffectivedimensionundergopurelysensory,nonevaluativerepresentationsoftissuedamageofonesortoranotherinalocalizedbodilyregion.Thosewhosepainsarenormalexperiencethesamequalities,butnowthosequalitiesareexperiencedbythemasunpleasant.Itispreciselybecausethequalitiesareexperiencedasunpleasantorbadthatpeoplehavethecognitivereactionstothemtheydo,reactionssuchasdesiringtostopthepain.Toexperiencetissuedamageasbadistoundergoanexperiencewhichrepresentsthatdamageasbad.Accordingly,inmyview,theaffectivedimensionofpainisasmuchapartoftherepresentationalcontentofpainasthesensorydimensionis.(Tye2006a)

SotheexperienceIundergowhenIfeelasharppaininthebackofmyhandfeelsthewayitdoesbecauseitrepresentstissuedamageinmyhandanditrepresentsitasbad.Inotherwords,itrepresentstissuedamageashavingthequalityofbeingbad.

Ofcourse,normallyhavingone'stissuedamagedisbad.Wealsonormallythink/judgethatitisbad.Notonlythat,experiencingtissuedamage(i.e.,feelingpain)isbad.Wethink/judgesotoo.Butitdoesn'tfollowfromthesetruisms(withoutadditionalpremises)thattheexperiencerepresentsthedamageasbad.Thesetruismsshouldnotbeconfusedwiththislastclaim,whichisasubstantivemetaphysicalclaim.Butwhatdoesitmeanforone'sexperiencetorepresenttissuedamageasbad?

Thisisanontrivialquestionforastrongrepresentationalistwhoaspirestobeanaturalist.Recallthatstrongrepresentationalismusuallycomeswithanaturalisticstoryabouthowexperiencesacquiretheirrepresentationalcontent.Soitisimportantthatrepresentingtissuedamageasbadcanbecashedoutintermsofwhatevernaturalisticstoryarepresentationalisthasinhisdisposal.ManyrepresentationalistsincludingTyedefend(oratleaststartwith)aninformationaltheory.Butwhatisthenaturalpropertyofthetissuedamageitselfthatisdetectedortrackedbytheexperiencesothatwecansaytheexperiencecarriesinformationaboutit?Thepropertyofbeingbaddoesn'tseemtobethekindof

propertythatcanbeinformationallydetectedortransduced.Arguably,aninformationtheoreticversionofrepresentationalismseemsnotquiteappropriateforaffectivequalia(butseeTye2006bforaresponse).

Butperhapsafunctionalrolesemanticsmightworkbetterforcashingoutwhatitmeansforpainexperiencestorepresenttissuedamageasbad.Theideaisthatpainexperiencesplayacertainfunctional/causalroleinthebehavioralandmentaleconomyoftheirowners.Inparticular,giventhattheynormallysignalinjury,suchexperiencesaretypicallycausallyassociatedwithacertainbatteryofcognitiveandbehavioraleffects.Itmightbeclaimedthatthiscausalorfunctionalprofileasawhole(ratherthanamereinformationallink)iswhatmakespainexperiencesrepresenttissuedamageasbad.

Itisnotclear,however,whetherrepresentationalismisdoinganyworkinthisproposalonceanappealtofunctionalismismade.Foronething,ittransformsstrongrepresentationalismintoapartlyinternalisttheory.Foranother,whynotsimplysaythatthefunctionalroleitselfconstitutespain'saffectivephenomenology?Indeed,functionalism(orbetter:psychofunctionalism)inthephilosophyofmindhasalwaystreatedpainsasparadigmaticexamplesofqualitativementalstateswhosephenomenologycanplausiblybecapturedbyfunctionalistproposals.Whatmadethisprimafacieplausiblewaspain'saffectivephenomenology(asopposedtoitssensoryphenomenology),whichisessentiallyconnectedwithpain'sbeinganintrinsicmotivator.Butoncefunctionalismisallowed,wedon'tneedtomakeadetourviarepresentationalism.Infact,itishardtoseehowanexperience'srepresentingsomethingasbadcanbeanintrinsicmotivatorallbyitself.Toexplainhow,arepresentationalisthastoadverttoadditional(learning?)mechanismstoconnectrepresentationalcontentwithdriveandmotivation.

5.Evaluativeandmotivationaltheories

Althoughafunctionalisttreatmentofaffectivequaliaseemsproblematicforpurestrongrepresentationalists,itmaybewelcomedbyperceptualtheoristsingeneralwhoareseekingtogiveanaturalisticaccountofpainasaperception.Alltheyneedtodotoaccommodatepain'saffectivephenomenologyistosaythatfeelingpaininvolvesperceptionalthoughperceptiondoesn'texhaustitsnature:feelingpainisalsoanaffective/emotionalexperiencethatcanbeexplainedintermsofthefunctionalroleofpain'ssensory/representationalcontent.(See,forexample,Lycan1987a,pp.6061,Aydede2000,andClark2006,forproposalsroughlyalongthisline.)Thisview,aswemayrecall,iswhattheIASPdefinitionofpainseemstorecommend.Itseemsalsoembeddedinthecommonsenseconceptionofpain.

Indeedanumberoftheoristsembracedthissortofapproachthatmaybeusefullycalledmixedtheoriesofpain.Thesecomeinavarietyofforms,sometimesmotivatedbydifferentsetsofconcerns,andaccordingly,emphasizingdifferentaspectsofpain.Butthebasicideaisthatthenatureofpainiscomplexconsistingofatleasttwomentalelements.Generallyoneelementischaracterizedbyusingoneormoreofthefollowinggroupofterms:sensory,perceptual,representational,discriminating,descriptive,orinformational.Theotherischaracterizedbyoneormoreofthefollowing:affective,emotional,motivational,evaluative,orimperative.Sofarwehavebeenfocusingonthosetheoriesthathaveemphasizedtheformeraspect.Indeedthishasbeentheoverwhelminglydominantstyleoftheorizingatleastinthephilosophicaltradition.Butthereisanincreasingrecognitionofthefactthatpainhasanaffectiveandmotivationalaspectwhichseemsatleastprimafaciedistinctfromitssensoryorperceptualaspect(seenextsectionforscientificevidence).Asobserved,mostperceptualtheoristsandweakrepresentationalistscould,andasamatterofhistoricalfact,didaccommodatetheaffectiveaspectofpaintovariousofdegreesofsuccessmostly,bygoingcognitivistasdescribedabove.

Nevertheless,anumberofsuchtheoristshavefocusedmoreontheaffectiveaspectofpainexperiencesratherthanontheirsensory/perceptualaspect,perhapsfeelingthatitisthisaspectthat

makespainexperiencesandothersimilarbodilysensationsuniqueanddistinctive.Therearehistoricalprecedentstothiskindofapproach(e.g.,Marshall1892,1894a,1894bDuncker1941),butIwillfocusoncontemporarydevelopmentsoftheview.

AgoodexampleisNelkin1994.Nelkincallshistheory,theevaluativetheoryofpain,accordingtowhichpainconsistsoftwocomponents,oneofwhichisanoccurrentphenomenalstaterepresentingvarioustroublesinbodyparts.Thesecondcomponentisasimultaneousandnoninferentialevaluationofthisphenomenalstate.Nelkinconceivesofthisevaluationasaformofspontaneousderejudgmentaboutthephenomenalstateasrepresentingharmtothebody.Hethinksthatbothelementsarenecessaryforpainexperience.Surprisingly,however,Nelkinclaimsthattheevaluativecomponentshouldnotbeequatedwithaffectandmotivationinvolvedinexperiencingpain.AccordingtoNelkin,thesetwoareonlycontingentlyrelatedtopainexperiences.(AsimilarviewispresentedinHall1989.)

AnotherevaluativetheoryisofferedbyHelm(2002)whodevelopstheviewinamoreintegratedfashion.AccordingtoHelm,bodilypainsandpleasuresarejustfeltevaluations,spontaneousevaluationsofwhatishappeninginone'sbodyasgoodorbad.AccordingtoHelm,theseevaluationsaren'tjudgmentsunderstoodordinarily.Nevertheless,theyhaveintentionalcontentsrationallyresponsivetoabroaderrangeofbackgroundconativeandcognitivestatesoftheexperiencer.Thusasfeltevaluationstheyintrinsicallymotivateandrationalizebehaviortypicallyassociatedwithpainandpleasure.Therefore,theyarenotaseparateorseparablecomponentofpain.Painsandpleasurejustarefeltevaluations.Helm'saccountisnuancedinmanywaysasitdependsonhisfairlywellelaboratedtheoryofemotions(Helm2001).

Hall(2008)andKlein(2007)alsoofferaccountsofpainthatbelongtothisclassofevaluativetheories.Theycalltheirviewsimperativetheories,accordingtowhichpainsareexperienceswithpurelyintentionalcontent.AccordingtoHall,painshavecompoundintentionalcontentpartlyconsistingofdescriptivecontent,andpartlyofimperativecontent.Onhisview,painexperiencesbothrepresentactualorpotentialdamageinbodypartsandcommandcertainactionsinvolvingthosepartssuchas:Stop!Stopdoingwhatyou'redoingwiththisbodilypart(Hall2008:534).

Klein(2007)furtherdevelopsthisimperativeaccountofpaininamoreradicalway:heproposesthatpainexperiencesareexhaustedbytheirimperativecontentalone.Heclaimsthattheyhavenodescriptive(inhiswords,representational)contentatall.Heintendshisaccountinthesamemetaphysicalspiritinwhichstrongrepresentationalistspresenttheiraccount:thedifferencebeinginthekindofintentionalcontentpainshave.Accordingtostrongrepresentationalists(inKlein'sterminology,intentionalists),thiscontentispurelydescriptive.AccordingtoKlein,itispurelyimperative:aproscriptionagainstactingwithbodilypartswherepainisfelt.

Gustafson(2006)developsanextendedandmultistageargumentagainstunderstandingpainasasensoryexperience.Onhisview,painsareessentiallyemotions.

Whenthenaturalisticunderpinningsoftheseevaluativetheoriesareexplored,functionalistorpsychofunctionalistreductionsoftheaffective/evaluativedimensionofpainmightturnouttobethemostnaturaloptionforthesetheorists.

6.Eliminativismaboutpain

6.1Theargumentfromreactivedissociationforeliminatingpain

DanielDennett,inhisinfluentialarticle,WhyYouCan'tMakeaComputerthatFeelsPain(1978),arguedthattheordinaryconceptofpainisirremediablyincoherentandshouldbeabandoned.Hisargumentreliedonsomeclinicalpainsyndromeswhichhedubbedthereactivedissociationofpainaffectfromitssensoryaspect.

Ithasbeenwellknownthatcertainsurgicalprocedures,somedrugsandcertainpathologicalconditionsreduceorremovetheunpleasantnessofpainwhilepreservingitssensorydiscriminativeaspects.Thesedatatypicallycomefrompatientswhohaveundergoneprefrontallobotomy(Freemanetal.1942FreemanandWattz1946,1950Hardyetal.1952Barber1959Bouckoms1994)orcingulotomy(FoltzandWhite1962a,1962bWhiteandSweet1969)asalastresortfortheirintractablechronicpain(asfrequentlyinvolvedinphantomlimbpain,neuralgia,causalgia,severepsychogenicandcancerpains),frompatientsundertheeffectsofhypnoticsuggestion(Barber1964Rainvilleetal.1997,1999),nitrousoxide(laughinggas),andsomeopiumderivativeslikemorphine(Barber1959).Thesepatientsbyandlargeagreethatwhentheyareinpain,theycanrecognizeandidentifyitassuch,butdonotfeelorseembotheredbyitordistressedinwayscharacteristictohavingpainexperiences.

Althoughitisusuallynotrecognizedintheliterature,thereare,however,importantdifferencesamongthephenomenaafflictingthesepatients,whicharemanifestedinpatients'reportsandbehavior.Forinstance,painasymboliaalsotypicallyproducesakindofdissociationaratherstrongkindsometimessimilartocingulotomypatients'butinterestinglydifferentfromlobotomypatients'(RubinsandFriedman1948HurtandBallantyne1974Berthieretal.1988,1990Devinskyetal.1995Weinsteinetal.1995).Infact,thereisevidencethatpainasymboliamaybetheonlyformofgenuinedissociation(Grahek2007).Thesepatients,forinstance,don'treacttoevenmomentarypainslikepinpricks,smallcuts,orburns.Experimentalpainstimulifailtoproduceanyrecognizableaffectivereactions.Nevertheless,thepatientsinsistthatthestimulicausepaintheyidentifytheirexperiencesaspain(RubinsandFriedman1948Berthieretal.1988,1990Dongetal.1994Weinsteinetal.1995).Thelobotomyandmorphinepatients,ontheotherhand,doshowtheusualaffectivereactionsandsymptomswhentheyarestimulatedmomentarilybynormallypainfulstimuli.Buttheydon'tseemtocareorarebotheredbytheirstandingpersistentorchronicpains.Probably,theystillfeelthenegativeaffectbutdon'tmindit,whereasthepainasymboliapatientsdon'tevenfeelthemomentarynegativeaffect.

Thesetwocasesalsoneedtobedistinguishedfromsocalledcongenitalinsensitivitytopain,aconditionwherethepatientsdon'tevenreportanypainexperienceuponvariouskindsofnociceptionthesepatientsdon'tlivelong(McMurray1955,1975BaxterandOlszewski1960Sternbach1963BrandandYancey1993).[17]

Inhispaper,Dennettprimarilyreliesonthekindofdissociationinvolvedinlobotomyandmorphinecasesandtreatingthemasiftheyinvolvedthesamekindofstrongdissociationinvolvedinpainasymbolia.HealsopresentscertainaspectsofthegatecontroltheoryofpaintransmissiondevelopedbyMelzackandWallwhichhadalreadystartedtorevolutionizethescientificpainresearch(MelzackandWall1965Melzack1973).Inspiredbythistheory,hethenpresentsaspeculativesubpersonalfunctionaltheoryofpainprocessing,accordingtowhichpainprocessingoccursinmanyfunctionally(evenanatomically)differentcomponentsofthecentralnervoussystem,mostlyinparallel,suchthatsomeofthemcanbeselectivelyimpaired.Thiskindofselectiveimpairment,hesays,canproducenotonlydissociationofthekindwearefamiliarwith,butmanymorebizarrephenomenawecanexpecttofindandimaginehappening.Hisinsightisthatourordinarynotionofpainwithitsessentialistintuitionscannotwithstandtheimplicationsofsuchscientificdevelopmentsinpainresearch.

Accordingtothecommonsenseconceptofpain,Dennettargues,

(14)painexperiencesareessentiallypainful,awful,abhorrent,sothatitisalogicalimpossibilitytohaveanaffectivelyneutralpainexperience.

Butitisalsopartofcommonsensethat

(15)asubject'saccesstoherpainexperiencesisessentiallyprivilegedorinfallibleorincorrigible(1978,p.226).

Inthecaseofreactivedissociation(RD)patients,thesetwomainpillarsofourordinaryconceptofpaincomeintoirremediableconflictaccordingtoDennett.AtotallyalertandconceptuallycompetentRDpatientsincerelybelievesthat(a)sheishavingapainexperience,andthat(b)herpainexperienceisnotpainfulatall.Given(14)and(a),we,aswellasthepatient,mayconcludethatsheishavingapainfulpainexperience.Butthiscontradictsherbelief(b)thatisguaranteedtobetruegiven(15).Sowehaveacontradictoryconceptofpain,whichmeansthatnothingcanbeapainanobjectoreventwithessentiallycontradictorypropertiesdoesnotandcannotexist.Dennettalsoarguesthattheordinarynotionofpainwillnotsurvivegivingupeither(14)or(15).Sopains,asordinarilyunderstood,donotexist.ThisisDennett'seliminativismaboutpain.

WeshouldalsonotethatthepainscientiststhemselveswhowroteuptheIASPdefinitionofpainandtheaccompanyingnoteseemtosidewithDennettonthetruthof(14).Thisisquiteinterestingbecausetheymustknowalltoowellaboutthereactivedissociationcases.Today,almosttwentyyearsaftertheIASPdefinitionwasadopted,weknowthatthesecasesarerealandwehavegoodscientificexplanationsbroadlyinthespiritofDennett'sspeculations.But,strangely,thedefinitionhasnevercomeunderattackfromthesequartersasfarasIknow.Sothen,shouldwegiveup(15)?

OnewaytorespondtoDennett'schallengeistosaythatifthecommonsenseconceptionofpaindidindeedrequire(14)and(15),thenitwassimplywrong(Kaufman1985).Sostrictlyspeakingnothingcorrespondstotheordinarynotionofpain.Butgiventhatpainexperiencesarealmostalwaysunpleasant(infact,alwaysunpleasantinnonpathologicalcases),wecaneasilyreplacethefaultyconceptionwithanewonewhichiscloseenoughnottocausealarmbyitsbeingemptyread(14)withnormallyinsteadofessentially.Asimilarlinecanberunfor(15).

Alternatively,onecanargueagainstDennettthat(14)and(15)arenotreallypartofthecommonsenseconceptofpain(Conee1984,Kaufman1985,Guirguis1998).IndeedwhenwearetoldthecompletedetailsofwhatisgoingoninRDcases,thereisnotendencytoconcludethatpainsturnoutnottoexist.Rather,insuchcaseswerealizethatpainphenomenologymaybecomplex:whatappearstobeasimpleandhomogenousphenomenologyincasualintrospectionturnsouttohaveacomplexstructureincloseandtrainedinspection(challengingastrictreadingof(15)).ThenwhattheRDcasesshowisthattheaffectiveaspectisnotessentialforanexperiencetobeclassifiedaspain.Indeedsuchaconclusionwasurgedbyearlyintrospectionistpsychologistslongbeforethediscoveryofreactivedissociation.Sowelearnthattheidentityofpaingoeswithitssensoryaspectratherthanitsaffectiveaspect(as,indeed,Ploner's1999casestudyseemstoshow).Surprising,yes,butnothinglikeamajorconceptualconfusion.ButpartofDennett'soverallpointshouldbegrantedinanycase:thelimitofwhatcanbeconceptuallyrevisedorabandonedasaresultofscientificdevelopmentsmaybemuchclosertohomethanweordinarilythink.

6.2Otherargumentsforeliminativism

Inherbook,TheMythofPain(1999),ValerieHardcastlealsoarguedforeliminatingthecommonsenseunderstandingofpainandmuchoftheordinarypaintalk.Shearguesthatthecommonsensenotionofpainconceivesofpainsassimplesubjectivesensationsdevoidofanycomplexity.AccordingtoHardcastle,painisacomplexphenomenonconsistingofmanydissociabledimensions.Tothetwocomponents(sensorydiscriminativeandaffectivemotivational)wediscussedabove,sheadds,followingMelzackandWall(1988)andothers,acognitivecomponent(involvingjudgments,beliefs,memories,perceptionofenvironmentandpatient'sownhistory).Hardcastleclaimsthattotheextenttowhichthesecomponentsareignoredbythecommonsenseconceptionofpain,tothatextentit'sinadequate.Moreover,onherview,itisafatalmistaketotakethissubjectivesensationofpainasthenatureofpainbecauseshethinksthatabiologicall