Interface and the Architecture of Self

I. The End of I

There is a story that sleeps deep within our minds, beneath the frantic currents of higher

consciousness. The I-myth, the first and greatest of man’s innumerable social lies; it has

persisted for so long that the very shape of thought has been recast in its explicit terms.

Whatever nameless prophet or prehuman savant first dreamed this mad projection that so

changed us, the hallucination of selfhood has forever marked our species; wrenching the

natural order apart into the enduring tension between human and nonhuman.

It is in such a state that mankind has reached the modern age; driven by a vision of selfhood

that separates each individual from the rest of reality, projecting the strict bounds of ego upon

the boundless acting networks of causality. With this move, man sections himself off from the

natural, and re-centers the universe about this newly defined self. This may be madness, of

sorts; certainly it is flagrant misrepresentation, but it is anything but stupid. The individual

crafted around the cognitive ‘I’ gains much from this dreaming, and the human society

constituted by these illusory selves has made bold use of its peculiar advantages in its

reshaping of the natural world.

Since the philosophic outburst of the Western Renaissance it has been firmly established that

such a self-defined actor gains a series of powerful advantages within a social network of

similarly constructed selves. By projecting a holographic mental model of the world defined

exclusively from individual experience and memory, one is able to make a series of extremely

efficient and highly practical assumptions about the other acting factors that exist that exist

outside the bounded self. Moreover, by willfully casting faith and fate behind the power of this

mode of action to accurately inform choices toward a desired state, one gains the courage to act

within an often seemingly absurd framework. With this talisman charm of the self so excised

from the natural fundament, each individual becomes a functional prophet; proceeding

diligently with action according to the oracular predictions of the self’s bold simulation of

reality.

It is similarly easy to note the stark drawbacks that result from this societal exercise in self-

definition. Since a constructed individual can only access and utilize the modes of action that

are collected in personal memory and synchronized by the acting computation of the ‘self’

projection, there is no way for an external factor to make a truly compelling argument against

action. Because of this gap between the modeled decision tree developed by the self and the

actual resonant consequence of reality, one is capable of (if not prone to) making decisions that

negatively impact the very natural orders one seeks to predict and utilize.

Ironically, even as this polarization of the self against the other serves to buffer the actor from

the immeasurability of consequence, the resulting system of social motivations (i.e. the rise of

human society) has significantly impacted and profoundly changed the ‘natural’ world from

which the self has been differentiated. Most of the issues that significantly impact human

society—environmental, criminal, political, racial—all fundamentally stem from the same

system of ‘human’ motivation; with the ‘person’ nicely isolated within the bounds of self, the

impulse toward self-benefit can very easily influence individual choice and action. Since all

external factors must be referenced against the self at several points, to build up the symbolic

toolset to analyze them and act accordingly, it becomes all too easy to execute a decision that

imparts a small convenience to the self at the expense of some external status quo, whether that

external system be as large as the global environment or as bounded as another human ‘self’.

As such, it is reasonable to posit that the Humanist individual is a functional array of lies that

has allowed mankind to ignore consequence in favor of self-referenced progress. In many

ways, it follows the model of a viral social meme that been firmly established in our cognitive

firmament, reinforced by every societal interaction undertaken. This has achieved much in

terms of the arbitrarily set terms for ‘human progress’, but poses profound risks to the larger

‘natural’ system from which humanity has removed itself. In addition, this choreography of

thought requires that in order for the projected self to be sustained, each individual must be

kept unaware of the virtuality of this construct. Should the self realize the full extent to which

consequence is hidden and uninterpretable, the individual becomes caught up in the “ironic

despair of Postmodernism,” (as Latour so succinctly puts it); the more one becomes aware of

consequence, the harder it becomes to act at all.

As the hybrid networks of the modern age proliferate around and through the human species, it

becomes increasingly difficult for individuals to maintain the calculated self-deception that has

sustained their explosive growth. When, as such, one’s projected psychological identity-

barriers begin to break down—abandoned for the promises of futurist connectivity, perpetual

communication and free information— the mind is left to grapple helplessly for reference

amidst the terrifyingly immense, dynamic systems of the existent. Further complicating

matters, it is clear that if the human and nonhuman were to be effectively dissolved back into

the natural from whence they came, the ‘human’ could not survive unchanged. Where the

Humanist ‘I’ is to be edited from the modern consciousness, the ex-individual is suddenly

faced with the nauseating realization that any action has potential reverberations throughout

reality; consequence, which had been buffered from the psyche by the boundaries of the self,

here comes crashing back upon the helpless networked actor.

How, then, to go on? It is clear that one must be cautious. Rushing headlong into the alien

aggregates of the posthuman would leave one paralyzed and incapable of action, a terrified

slave to causality. For humankind to proceed in the age-old exploration of individual action

within the real, and yet still continue to act in the face of the universal interconnectedness that

unfolds upon inspection, it is obvious that a new model and language for cognition and

interaction must be developed. It is only after an appropriate analytic toolset has been agreed

upon that our species can fully assume the network benefits that beckon us, stumbling, toward

our own outlandish future.

II. GUI Rising

The most straightforward way to begin formulating such an appropriate spectra of analytic foci

is with the detailed examination a specific instance of human/nonhuman interaction. Once the

symbolic language of hybrid communication is established, it should be somewhat easier to

determine how best to apply that toolset to the fullness of human hybridization efforts. A

particularly interesting, uniquely modern and easily deconstructed example of such a

hybridization event is the virtualized computer graphical user interface (GUI), wherein the

signs and modes of contact between the person and the computer are entirely abstracted from

the realities of both the person’s intent and the computer’s mechanical functions.

The abrupt evolution and near-universal social integration of the GUI is a saga in its own right.

The idea of a mechanical computation engine is hardly new, traceable to Babbage’s famous

difference engine (never realized in its time) of 1822. Here, though, the computation was

maintained as a completely transparent mechanical system of gears, seen as a perfunctory

extension of the human mind’s computational ability. As this technology began to be realized

more explicitly, and especially during the explosive growth of electronic crypto-intelligence

networks during the Second World War, these machines rapidly became far too complex to

interact with in a casual manner. Researchers and enthusiasts despaired as computers became

huge, incredibly fragile data powerhouses, inaccessible to all but the excruciatingly well-

trained.

It was clear that this line of progression could not be sustained. As computers began their

manifestation into the nigh-unknowable tangle of logistical detail typical of the modern day, it

was proposed that the technical elements be masked for practical reasons. If a proper,

straightforward interface could be developed, the procedural minutia could be effectively

sidelined (i.e. ‘blackboxed’ in the manner of Latour) from the individual knowledge base

necessary for the individual to even consider engaging with the computer. The conceptual

Memex (a portmanteau of "memory extender") was developed by Vannevar Bush, one of the

great technocrat-engineers of the Cold War era, in his 1945 Atlantic Monthly article As We

May Think, sketched out just such an instantiated interface—based in hypertext, as graphic

systems were as yet too primitive to support meaningful icons, but still a profound leap from

hard-coding any task into the computer.

From this conceptual framework, as graphic display technologies caught up with theory, the

GUI unfolded rapidly. With the release of the Macintosh OS in 1984, a fully realized two-

dimensional symbolic interface entered the public sector for the first time. Merely by being

first on the market, Mac established a firm set of standard symbolic gestures and iconography

with which to frame complex data restructuring commands; in deciding to whimsically

represent discrete data packets with the visual icon of a paper file, for example, they ensured

that the ‘file’ became a standard symbol and term for the computing movement ever since.

The GUI attempts to resolve a very basic problem of higher-order computing; a human mind is

largely unable to stratify information in the rigidly algorithmic manner typical of

computational data structures. To provide a symbolic visual placeholder for data to the human

actor, the abstraction of ‘folders’ is introduced, allowing the human to interact with complex

data systems in a mode of action requiring little depth of functional understanding. What is

significant is that for both the computer and the human, the idea of the ‘folder’ is an untruth,

bearing little to no relation to the actual structures involved for either party, yet it represents an

untruth that allows the useful meshing of the computer’s mechanical effectiveness and the

human’s ability to acquire and interact with data dynamically.

From this type of mechanism, it is interesting to note, arise useful formalizations that bear

meaning exclusively in the context of the interface itself, with the ramifications accepted

passively by either involved party. A good example of this is the ‘drag-and-drop’ concept. This

bears analogical relation to human methodology, in that it standardizes a formal set of spatial

relationships in a similar (albeit grossly simplified) graphical way to physical space, yet is

obviously an artificial construct (i.e. no human would confuse physically moving items from

one place to another with virtual drag-and-drop reallocation of data). The human, as such, must

passively submit to the casual redefinition of physical and informational laws that is unique to

this interface. Similarly, the computer must passively submit to the rules of data movement set

by the interface, even though the binary operations involved are significantly more complex,

and very differently structured than the graphical motion conducted by the actor-human.

It may seem that only the object-interactor (in this case, the computer) performs this passive

submittal to the unique laws of the interface. Certainly it is the case that the computer has no

choice or agency in this submittal. It must be noted, however, that it is a bidirectional action of

compromise that allows this interface to function at all. Consider the abject bewilderment on

the part of many who use a computer for the first time, or those who have grown up

unaccustomed to the laws of the GUI. Asking an individual using a computer for the first time

to ‘drag and drop’ something, ‘open’ a 'file', ‘double-click’ an ‘icon’… all these conventions

are utterly confusing unless one has been trained in the ability to passively submit to them.

A key point of consideration is the fact that this formalized submittal to the interface is very

distinct from any actual knowledge of the partner-interactor, other than the general, assumptive

knowledge of its existence. While most moderns regularly utilize the GUI, it is an extremely

small minority that actually knows how the formalized interactions of the interface restructure

the physical data on the other side. Moreover, nothing in the GUI is aimed at communicating

or training the human participant in an understanding of digital data structures, nor educating

the computer in how a human thinks, instead forcing the two distinct and complex entities to

communicate in a highly ritualized virtual arena. Even as user interface systems begin to utilize

adaptive learning, they still serve to provide a holographic environment for communication,

albeit one tailored to the human component’s preferences and needs.

With this analytic mindset, cast in terms of human/nonhuman submission to a mutual interface

ruleset, it is at once a small step and a profoundly premature leap to categorize all of human

interaction in this way. The Humanist revolts at the thought; to remove the reverential

adoration of the human self in favor of a vision of reality wherein action is constituted solely as

the network projection of an extensively interfaced, hallucinogenic miasma of hybrids would

seem ridiculous and obscene to many who prize and respect their particularized vesicles of

being. Nevertheless, such an assay could, at the very worst result in the substitution of a novel

myth for an ancient one, and at best it could well provide for an informed and effective

solution to the ancient tension so firmly established between society and the natural world.

III. Rejoining the Real; the End of Objects

So let the thought experiment continue: it can easily be put forth that all interactions,

human/nonhuman or otherwise, are functions of constructed symbolic interface. The human

mind is exceptionally well adapted to ignore the real in favor of the symbolic; a walk down the

street in any city provides vivid illustration. From coded signals in colored traffic lights to

highly stylized icons directing vehicular and pedestrian movement, to the architectural

language encrypted into the buildings themselves, to the facial expressions and clothing of

fellow citizens; all represent an inherited set of simple societal signals linked to complex

organizational behaviors.

The individual, cast amidst this myriad constellation of symbols is forced to adopt distinct

behavioral patterns— a different “I”, so to speak— in each unique context. Because action

depends heavily upon the projected virtual decision sandbox of the holographic self, one is

often forced to invoke a known set of convenient interface mechanisms, as opposed to

formulating these de novo, for matters of sheer practicality. It is by carefully programmed

reflex response to particular arrangement of known symbols that one knows how best to act, by

informing the choice of a properly bounded, practical set of hybrid communication signals.

This sounds admittedly absurd in theory, and certainly cannot be said to be a truly accurate

rendering of the human decision process, yet it does seem to provide an easier model for

analysis of communication than does the standard Humanist model; by abandoning analysis in

terms of discrete subject-object systems, one effectively avoids the pitfalls associated with that

polarization. For some time, philosophers have struggled to reconcile man’s ease in symbolic

communication with the immensity of the construed gulf between the ‘self’ and the ‘other.’

Practical discussion of individual interaction quickly bogs down in the semantic contradictions

that result from restraining analysis to the classical limits of the self. It becomes surprisingly

easier to comprehend the subtleties of communication when one is willing to embrace a

remarkably different principle of investigation: whereas the classic standpoint posits a ‘self’

and an ‘other’ acting as discrete and observably real components, now we are presented with a

‘self’ that never contacts an ‘other’. Instead, components submit to a consensual virtual

interface; it is that interface that constitutes and defines the acting hybrid, and it is this hybrid

that should replace the ‘self’, now redefined as one of many engaged elements within the

acting system, as the focus of analytical interest.

In general, any input from the ‘other’ must be filtered and processed in a very precise way; first

perceived, then interpreted symbolically, compared to a reference set of symbols, and

interpreted as a hypothetical maxim (in the manner of Kant), which is applied to the projected

model of causality maintained by the actor. Once the model is sufficiently well constructed,

consequence and causality—and hence the individual’s choices toward action— are examined

exclusively in terms of and within this model.

Figure 1.

I.

II.

III.

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8...)

(9)

(10)

(11)

For clarity’s sake, consider the toy, two-dimensional interaction schema diagrammed in Figure

1. This illustrates the utilization of a projected virtual decision model (I) toward decisive

action, by an individual (II), when confronted with an object/person other than itself (III).

Initially, crude observational queries are made of the other (1), the data from which, returned to

the individual (2), is used to inform a more specialized representation of the other in the virtual

(3). This refined model is used to compute a more efficient second set of queries (4), which are

again projected toward the other (5); once more the data collected is organized by the

individual (6) and used to hone the mental projection (7). From here, the process continues in

such a manner (8) until it is recognized that further queries do little to improve the acting

model, implying that a relatively high degree of accuracy has been achieved. The individual

then consults this practically reliable model (9), conducting thought-experiments to predict the

outcomes of particular actions. Once a desirable outcome has been successfully accomplished

in this virtual environment, the specific commands associated with it are relayed to the physical

individual (10), which is positioned to physically effect the ideal action toward the other (11).

Moreover, if the ‘other’ is in fact another acting individual, then the virtual models constructed

by each will become more and more similar; when a common model for communication is

achieved, the term ‘interface’ becomes very appropriate. In terms of the example previously

discussed, the GUI represents a visualized virtual interaction model that has been optimized to

continuity for all involved parties, to the extent that it may be instantiated by reflex, without

necessitation the formulation of a novel interface for each instance of the human/computer

hybrid.

It is clear that there is a wealth of material for practical analysis in this way. For example,

modern society is—perhaps more so than any other, at any point in history—a culture driven

by the altered state. Between institutionalized alcohol and stimulants (caffeine, sugar, nicotine),

a general savor for the pharmaceutical fruits of the high-tech chemical industries, and a well-

connected and pervasive illicit drug counterculture, much of the modern experience of the self

involves a calculated skewing of perception. By utilizing this vast societal chemical knowledge

base, an individual is provided with an array of methods for optimizing (for a very arguable

value of ‘optimal’) the kinetics of interface communication. A shot of espresso before writing a

paper, a glass of wine before a social engagement, a furtive joint on the beach with friends; the

self, which is already being recast for deployment in each new context, is further massaged into

a willing submission to the symbolic ruleset of the human/other barrier.

Of course, it is especially interesting to analytically engage language in terms of this notion of

symbolic interface. The issue of how two individuals can use a simple vocal/textual

instantiation of a particular ‘coded’ set of words to pass discrete information from one to the

other in a meaningful way has drawn much frustrated analysis down the ages (i.e. Lacan).

When examined in terms of two polarized selves, such study again tends to break down in the

semantic fumbling of the self/other boundary. In abandoning these classical limits, it must be

noted, the dissection of linguistic communication becomes much simpler.

Language, in fact, lends itself nicely to deconstruction as a largely virtual artifice. It has been

very well described, the manner in which linguistic communication is effected through a vast,

evolving set of coded symbols—words, grammatical construction, idiomatic style, inflection,

dialect—the appropriate subset of which are carefully chosen in each situation to accurately

transmit particular data from party to party in manageable and interpretable forms. What is

more, for language to be effective, all involved parties must make a conscious effort to utilize

the same set of symbols, ‘lest meaning be lost, skewed or misinterpreted in translation. Noting

this multidirectional effort to assume a common, bounded set of formal symbolic rules, it is

almost impractical to avoid describing language as a virtual symbolic interface.

From even these meager essays into this mode of interface analysis, it is quite clear that the

world of interfaced hybrid-actors is very easily engaged with, and that doing so manages to

skirt many of the pitfalls typical of analysis cast in terms of the self/other barrier. Continuing in

this fashion, it is a bold but relatively straightforward enterprise to begin redefining humanity

entirely in these terms. So viewed, humans function as sophisticated group minds; a society of

loosely bounded, dynamically interfacing human-human and human-nonhuman hybrids.

Whether or not this presents a more accurate model for human behavior than does the classical

self/other dichotomy is certainly arguable. What is obvious, though, is that as homo sapiens

continues its reckless trajectory into the transcendent network density of the posthuman, it will

become increasingly urgent to forcibly expand the classically limited notion of the acting self.

Even if the arguments presented here amount to no more than a trivial thought-experiment, it is

in such a spirit that we must be prepared to deconstruct the central tenants of the ‘human

condition’, if indeed we are to be effectively prepared for the great leaps of consciousness our

future will require of us.