Title Proxy humanitarianism : Hong Kong's Vietnamese refugeecrisis, 1975-79

Author(s) Yuen, Hong-kiu;

Citation

Issued Date 2014

URL http://hdl.handle.net/10722/210188

Rights Creative Commons: Attribution 3.0 Hong Kong License

Abstract of thesis entitled

Proxy Humanitarianism: Hong Kongs Vietnamese Refugee Crisis, 1975-79

Submitted by

Yuen, Hong Kiu

for the degree of Master of Philosophy

at The University of Hong Kong

in August 2014

Set against the backdrop of the Cold War and the declining British Empire, this thesis

explores how the Hong Kong government handled the Vietnamese refugee crisis of the

1970s. The Vietnamese refugee influx started after the fall of Saigon in 1975 and

temporarily stopped after the Geneva Conference on Indochinese refugees in 1979.

Drawing extensively upon recently declassified files from the National Archives in

London and the National Archives in Maryland, the thesis discusses several important

themes, for example, international concerns about human rights during the Cold War

era, interpretations of humanitarianism, and Hong Kongs autonomy in the age of

decolonization. It argues that Britain exerted its international influence by forcing Hong

Kong to be a first asylum for refugees. Hong Kong played an important role in

demonstrating Britains contribution to resolving the refugee crisis. The colony served as

a place for Britains proxy humanitarianism. This thesis shows that international

expectations of human rights conflicted with local politics in Hong Kong. Unlike

studies that stress Hong Kongs increasing autonomy, this thesis shows that the colonial

authorities played a passive role in the refugee crisis, and the British government still

had the final say on Hong Kongs refugee policy.

This thesis comprises three chapters. The first chapter investigates the case of two

freighters that rescued Vietnamese refugees in 1975 and 1976. The Danish-registered

Clara Maersk arrived in Hong Kong on 30 April 1975, marking the beginning of the

refugee crisis. As the British and Hong Kong governments were uncertain about the

scale of the influx and had different expectations about Britains contribution to ending

the refugee problem, the Clara Maersk incident triggered heated debates. The incident

demonstrates how Britains domestic affairs led to the British governments reluctant

assistance to Hong Kong. The Burmese-registered Ava that arrived in Hong Kong on 6

July 1976 with ninety-eight refugees reveals the unclear responsibility for shipwrecked

refugees rescued by foreign vessels. The Ava incident shows how Hong Kongs refugee

influx was treated as an American problem. The U.S. government saw Hong Kongs

regional role of strengthening Southeast Asian countries involvement in Americas

refugee program. The second chapter investigates the second wave of Vietnamese

refugees. The deteriorating Sino-Vietnamese relations in 1978 led to an exodus of ethnic

Chinese from Vietnam. The Vietnamese government officially permitted the ethnic

Chinese to leave in return for payment. This chapter examines the pre-arranged vessels

that transported refugees to other countries under collaboration with the Vietnamese

authorities. The final chapter focuses on how the British government relieved Hong

Kongs refugee burden as cheaply as possible. On the one hand, the British government

wanted to show its contribution to resolving the refugee crisis by maintaining Hong

Kongs humanitarian policy. On the other hand, it did not want to take the Vietnamese

refugees because of Britains own immigration problems. By initiating an international

conference on Indochinese refugees, the British government internationalized the

refugee problem and minimized its responsibility for the crisis.

Proxy Humanitarianism: Hong Kongs Vietnamese Refugee Crisis, 1975-79

by

Yuen, Hong Kiu

B.A. L.U.

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for

the Degree of Master of Philosophy

at The University of Hong Kong.

August 2014

i

Declaration

I declare that this thesis represents my own work, except where due acknowledgment is

made, and that it has not been previously included in a thesis, dissertation or report

submitted to this University or to any other institution for a degree, diploma or other

qualification.

Signed..

Yuen Hong Kiu

ii

Acknowledgements

There are many people I would like to thank for their support in these two years.

First and foremost, my deepest gratitude goes to my primary supervisor Professor

John Carroll, who offered professional advice and encouragement throughout the

writing of this thesis. Under his supervision, I learned the determination and

meticulousness required of a professional historian. Without him, this thesis would

have more mistakes than the present one does. I am also very grateful to my

co-supervisor Dr. David Pomfret for commenting on the draft of the thesis. Thanks

also to the two examiners of my thesis, Dr. John Wong and Professor Glen Peterson.

My gratitude also goes to the Department of History of Lingnan University. I

truly appreciate Dr. Mark Hampton for inviting me to his thesis-writers meeting.

Professor Richard Davis and Dr. James Fichter (now at the University of Hong Kong)

were very supportive and recommended me to pursue my postgraduate studies at the

University of Hong Kong when I was an undergraduate at Lingnan.

I am thankful to my extremely nice colleagues and friends in the Department of

History. Zardas Lee was very helpful and generous in reading the first chapter of this

thesis. Aurelio Insisa, Carol Tsang, Chi Chi Huang, Federico Pachetti, Maurits

Meerwijk, Phoebe Tang, and Vivian Kong have provided invaluable insights for my

research.

Finally, special thanks are due to my family and my girlfriend Queenie, who

offered unlimited support and love throughout my postgraduate studies at the

University of Hong Kong.

iii

Table of Contents

Declaration i

Acknowledgements ii

Table of Contents iii

Introduction 1

Chapter 1

The First Wave of Refugees 12

Chapter 2

The Second Wave: The Pre-Arranged Vessels 46

Chapter 3

The Second Wave: Political and Humanitarian Realities 68

Conclusion 89

Timeline 99

Bibliography 100

1

Introduction

Perhaps the most famous Vietnamese phrase in Hong Kong is Bt u T Nay,

which literally means from now on and was frequently broadcast on Radio

Television Hong Kong (RTHK) Radio One, one of the most popular radio channels,

in 1988. The Hong Kong government also broadcast the announcement through a

special short wave frequency which would directly reach Vietnam.1 The phrase

comes from the first four words of a Vietnamese announcement about Hong Kongs

screening policy towards Vietnamese refugees:

From now on, those boat people from Vietnam who seek enter Hong Kong due to economic reasons will be considered illegal immigrants. As illegal immigrants, they will not have the chance to settle in third country, and they will be detained until

repatriated to Vietnam.2

By broadcasting Hong Kongs new policy on the radio, the government wanted to

warn the Vietnamese that they would face detention and repatriation if they came to

Hong Kong. Not surprisingly, a Vietnamese announcement on the local radio

channel caught Hong Kong peoples attention, and the phrase was often repeated in

movies and television programs. The announcement became so popular that Hong

Kong people even transliterated the Vietnamese phrase into Cantonese: .

This announcement can be traced back to the Hong Kong governments

decision on 15 June 1988 that new Vietnamese arrivals would be subject to screening

conducted by the Immigration Department. Vietnamese who qualified for refugee

status would remain in the detention center for resettlement. Those who were

considered non-refugees would be repatriated to Vietnam.3 As the screening

procedures were controversial, and the policy involved involuntary repatriation, the

1 South China Morning Post, 2 October 1988. 2 Quoted in Yuk-Wah Chan, Revisiting the Vietnamese Refugee Era, in Yuk-Wah Chan, ed., The Chinese/Vietnamese Diaspora: Revisiting the Boat People (New York: Routledge, 2011), 8. 3 Janelle Diller, In Search of Asylum: Vietnamese Boat People in Hong Kong (Washington, D.C.: Indochinese Resource Action Center, 1988), 2.

2

policy was widely criticized for being inhumane to the Vietnamese.4 Besides, on 2

July 1982, Hong Kongs closed-camp policy led to criticism of violating human rights.

Unlike those already in Hong Kong, the new Vietnamese arrivals were detained in

closed resettlement centers. They were allowed out only if they chose to leave Hong

Kong.5 But there was no criticism of Hong Kongs refugee policy in the 1970s.

Governor Murray MacLehose later agreed that Hong Kong did not subject to any

criticism on the refugee issues during his governorship.6 Whether voluntary or not,

the Hong Kong government maintained its humanitarian policy of accepting all

Vietnamese arrivals throughout the 1970s.

This thesis is a study of Hong Kongs policy towards Vietnamese refugees. The

refugee crisis began in 1975 and lasted twenty-five years, but the crisis in the 1980s

and the 1990s has received more attention from scholars. Previous studies have

focused on the refugees themselves, for example, their life in Vietnam and the

reasons that motivated them to leave.7 Scholars have studied living conditions within

the refugee camps and refugee adaption in Hong Kong.8 Some have investigated the

4 On the criticism of Hong Kongs screening policy, see Michael Chugani and Simon Macklin, US Pressure Groups Want to See Camps, South China Morning Post, 17 August 1988; Screened from Freedom, South China Morning Post, 4 June 1989; Michael Chugani, Take Detention to Court: Lawyers Group, South China Morning Post, 11 June 1989; James Freeman and Nguyen Dinh Huu, Voices from the Camps: Vietnamese Children Seeking Asylum (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1989), 87-137; Diller, In Search, 18-33, 56-62; Peter Hansen, Thanh Loc Hong Kongs Refugee Screening System: Experiences from Working for the Refugee Communities, in Chan, Chinese/Vietnamese, 85-98. 5 On the criticism of the closed-camp policy, see Roy Edmonds, Horror of Closed Camps, South China Morning Post, 2 January 1983; Closed Camps Not the Answer, South China Morning Post, 7 July 1983; A Staff Reporter, Waiting in Refugee Camps Brings Mental Disorders, South China Morning Post, 23 August 1983; Kristen Hughes, Closed Camps: Vietnamese Refugee Policy in Hong Kong, PhD dissertation, University of California, Berkeley, 1985, 211-25. 6 Sir Murray MacLehose, interview by Dr. Steve Tsang, 13 and 26 April 1989; 12, 13, 14, and 29 March 1991, Transcript of Interviews with the Lord MacLehose of Beoch, KT, GBE,KCMG, KCVO, DL Political Adviser, Government of Hong Kong (1959-62), Governor of Hong Kong (1971-82),461, the Bodleian Library, University of Oxford; electronic version accessed from the Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies Special Collection, Harvard University Library. 7 Ramses Amer, The Boat People Crisis of 1978-79 and the Hong Kong Experience Examined Through the Ethnic Chinese Dimension, in Chan, The Chinese/Vietnamese, 40-47; Ronald Skeldon, Hong Kong's Response to the Indochinese Influx, 1975-93, Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 534 (July 1994): 91-105. 8 Daniel Tsang, Visions of Resistance and Survival from Hong Kong Detention Camps, in Chan, The Chinese/Vietnamese, 99-115; Diller, In Search, 9-62; Freeman, Voices; Joe Thomas, Ethnocide: A Cultural Narrative of Refugee Detention in Hong Kong (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2000); Joyce Sau-Han, Chang,

3

ethnic Chinese exodus from Vietnam to China and Hong Kong.9 Others have

examined how Vietnamese refugees were portrayed in the Hong Kong media and

how public attitudes towards Vietnamese refugees led to the shift of government

policies.10 Some scholars are interested in Hong Kongs refugee policies in the 1980s,

for example, the effectiveness and the influence of the closed-camp policy and the

screening policy.11 There are also journalistic accounts of Hong Kongs Vietnamese

refugee crisis.12

My thesis commences in 1975, after the fall of Saigon on 30 April, and ends in

1979, after the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)

conference on Indochinese refugees on 21 July. The thesis is neither a study of

refugees themselves nor an evaluation of refugee policies in the 1980s, but a study of

Hong Kongs involuntary proxy humanitarianism in the international dynamics. As

the thesis will show, Hong Kong played an important role in demonstrating Britains

contribution to resolving the refugee crisis.

This thesis enhances our understanding of Hong Kongs autonomy. Robert

Bickers argues that the Hong Kong government in the nineteenth century was largely

Brenda Ku, Lum Bik, and Betty Ann Maheu, eds., They Sojourned in Our Land: The Vietnamese in Hong Kong (Hong Kong: Social Work Services Division, Caritas-Hong Kong, 2003); Ravi Lulla,De Facto Local Integration: A Case Study of Vietnamese Refugees in Hong Kong, PhD dissertation, University of Hong Kong, 2007; Ocean W.K. Chan, Vietnamese Youth and their Adaptation in Hong Kong, in Chan, The Chinese/Vietnamese, 76-84; Yuk-Wah Chan and Terence C.T. Shum, The Vietnamese Minority: Boat People Settlement in Hong Kong, in Chan, The Chinese/Vietnamese, 65-75. 9 Ramses Amer, The Boat People, 36-51; Tana Li, In Search of History of the Chinese in South Vietnam, 1945-75, in Chan, The Chinese/Vietnamese, 52-61; Tom Lam, The Exodus of Hoa Refugees from Vietnam and their Settlement in Guangxi: China's Refugee Settlement Strategies, Journal of Refugee Studies 13.4 (2000): 374-90. 10 Kwok-Bun Chan, Hong Kongs Response to the Vietnamese Refugees: A Study in Humanitarianism, Ambivalence and Hostility, Southeast Asian Journal of Social Science 18.1 (1990), 94-110; Sophia Suk-Mun Law, Vietnamese Boat People in Hong Kong: Visual Image and Stories, in Chan, The Chinese/Vietnamese, 116-29. 11 Diller, In Search, 64-119; Hughes, Closed Camps; Oxfam, Vietnamese Refugee: Whose Responsibility? (Hong Kong: Justice and Peace Commission of the Hong Kong Catholic Diocese, 1990); Thomas, Ethnocide. 12 Barry Wain, The Refused: The Agony of the Indochina Refugees (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1981); Bruce Grant, The Boat People: An Age of Investigation with Bruce Grant (New York: Penguin Books, 1979); Keith St. Cartmail, Exodus Indochina (Auckland: Heinemann, 1983); Robinson Courtland, Terms of Refuge: The Indochinese Exodus and the International Response (London: Zed Books Ltd, 1998).

4

autonomous, as Hong Kong could evade the British governments undesirable orders

by delaying or hindering implementation.13 David Faure, Leo Goodstadt, and

Norman Miners have examined the tensions between Hong Kong and Britain over

commercial and domestic policies. They argue that the colony was relatively

autonomous after the Second World War.14 Gavin Ure argues that the Hong Kong

governments autonomy in implementing domestic reforms from 1918 to 1958

depended on whether the issues were in the British governments political interests.

The Hong Kong government was autonomous in implementing policy once the

British government indicated the direction.15 Ray Yep and Tai-Lok Lui have

investigated the Hong Kong governments autonomy under the MacLehose era from

1971 to 1982. They argue that the Hong Kong government was able to implement

social reforms at its own pace.16 Chi-Kwan Mark argues that after the 1967 riots, the

Hong Kong government enjoyed a higher degree of autonomy, and decolonization

was manifested in the mentality of British politicians and officials and in the

changing relationship between the home government and the colonial authorities.17

My thesis challenges the degree of Hong Kongs autonomy. By analyzing

recently declassified governmental records, it shows that Hong Kong lacked

autonomy in handling the influx of Vietnamese refugees in the 1970s. The Hong

13 Robert Bickers, Loose Ties that Bound: British Empire, Colonial Authority and Hong Kong, in Ray Yep, ed., Negotiating Autonomy in Greater China: Hong Kong and Its Sovereign Before and After 1997 (Copenhagen: Nordic Institute for Asian Studies Press, 2013), 29-54. 14 David Faure, Colonialism and the Hong Kong Mentality (Hong Kong: Centre of Asian Studies, Hong Kong University Press, 2003), 69-85; Leo Goodstadt, Uneasy Partners: The Conflict between Public Interest and Private Profit in Hong Kong (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2009), 50-70; Norman Miners, The Government and Politics of Hong Kong (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1998), 214-22. 15 Gavin Ure, Autonomy and the Origins of Hong Kong's Low-cost Housing and Permanent Squatter Resettlement Programmes, in Yep, Negotiating Autonomy, 76-77; Gavin Ure, Governors, Politics, and the Colonial Office: Public Policy in Hong Kong, 1918-58 (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2012), 7-8, 28-43, 159-61, 188. 16 Ray Yep and Tai-Lok Lui, Revisiting the Golden Era of MacLehose and the Dynamics of Social Reforms, in Yep, Negotiating Autonomy, 136-38. 17 Chi-Kwan Mark, Lack of Means or Loss of Will? The United Kingdom and the Decolonization of Hong Kong, 1957-1967, The International History Review 31. 1 (December 2009): 46; On the 1967 riots, see Ray Yep, The 1967 Riots in Hong Kong: The Domestic and Diplomatic Fronts of the Governor, in Robert Bickers and Ray Yep, eds., May Days in Hong Kong: Riots and Emergency in 1967 (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2009), 21-36.

5

Kong government failed to resist the British governments orders to accept the

refugees.

Through studying the Vietnamese refugee crisis, this thesis enhances our

understanding of humanitarianism. According to the mission statement of the oldest

major humanitarian organization, the International Committee of the Red Cross

(ICRC), it is an impartial, neutral and independent organization whose exclusively

humanitarian mission is to protect the lives and dignity of victims of armed conflict

and other situation of violence and to provide them with assistance.18 In short, the

ICRCs definition of humanitarianism is to help those who are in need with

maximum effort. By examining the humanitarian operations carried out by non-state

actors such as the ICRC and the UNHCR, scholars have focused on how

humanitarianism operates in different circumstances and the consequences of

humanitarian intervention. For example, Fiona Terry has demonstrated how

humanitarian aid can lead to even more harmful results, Janice Stein has discussed

the accountability of humanitarianism, and Michael Barnett and Jack Synder have

examined strategies adopted by humanitarian organizations.19 Scholars have also

been interested in the interconnection between politics and humanitarianism.

Although humanitarian organizations often claim to be impartial, neutral, and

apolitical, politics always influence the ways humanitarian action is carried out.20 As

Michael Barnett and Thomas Weiss argue, it is neither possible nor desirable to

separate humanitarianism from politics.21

18 The Mandate and Mission of the ICRC, International Committee of the Red Cross-ICRC, http://www.icrc.org/eng/who-we-are/mandate/index.jsp; accessed on 16 June 2014. 19 Fiona Terry, Condemned to Repeat? The Paradox of Humanitarian Action (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002); Janice Stein, Humanitarian Organizations: Accountable - Why, to Whom, for What and How?, in Michael Barnett and Thomas Weiss, eds., Humanitarianism in Question: Politics, Power, Ethics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008): 124-42; Michael Barnett and Jack Synder, The Grand Strategies of Humanitarianism, in Barnett and Weiss, Humanitarianism in Question, 143-71. 20 Michael Barnett, Empire of Humanity: A History of Humanitarianism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2011). 21 Michael Barnett and Thomas Weiss, Humanitarianism Contested: Where Angels Fear to Tread (London:

6

While these studies focus on non-state actors, my thesis pays more attention to

how state actors such as Britain and Hong Kong perceived and implemented

humanitarianism. My thesis also contributes to the debates on implementing

humanitarianism. Barnett has summarized a few questions that are frequently

discussed in the field, for example, the ethics and universality of humanitarianism.22

These debates emerged in the Hong Kong refugee crisis. For instance, given the

desperate situation of the Indochinese refugees, the Hong Kong government was in

a dilemma of continuing its policy of accepting refugees when this humanitarian

policy encouraged a further outflow of refugees. The governments policy became

even more ambivalent when first-asylum countries such as Malaysia and Thailand

pushed the refugees back to sea, and more refugees changed their destination to

Hong Kong. As reflected in the local press, Hong Kong people opposed accepting

more refugees and wanted the government to adopt tougher measures to deter them.

The thesis demonstrates how humanitarianism was challenged by Hong Kongs

domestic affairs. As it shows, the British government instructed the Hong Kong

government to accept the refugees on humanitarian grounds despite opposition from

the Hong Kong people and the colonial authorities.

My thesis also demonstrates how state actors used the language of

humanitarianism to achieve their political agenda. During the refugee crisis the U.S.

government wanted to attain its humanitarian goal by pushing Hong Kong to

follow the international practice advocated by the UNHCR. Thus the Hong Kong

case could strengthen Southeast Asian countries involvement in the refugee

problem.23 Throughout the 1970s crisis, the British government also frequently used

Routledge, 2011), 11. 22 Barnett and Weiss, Humanitarianism Contested, 112-14, 124-27. 23 Telegram from Secretary of State (Washington) to American Consul (Hong Kong), Central Foreign Policy Files, 1973-1977, (CFPF, 73-77), Record Group 59: General Records of the Department of Sate (Electronic Telegram), Access to Archival Databases, The U.S. National Archives and Records

7

the term humanitarian grounds to justify its instructions to the Hong Kong

government. As Didier Fassin argues, moral sentiments have become an essential

force in contemporary politics: they nourish its discourses and legitimize its

practices.24

A study of Hong Kongs Vietnamese refugee crisis also contributes to the

recent interest in human rights concerns during the Cold War, especially the so-called

Second Cold War. In recent years, the role of human rights during the Cold War

has received more attention from historians, especially during the 1970s.25 For

example, scholars have investigated how the U.S. government incorporated human

rights into foreign policy.26 Some have examined the diplomatic influence of the

human rights movement on specific places, for example, Argentina, Chile, Indonesia,

and South Africa.27 Hong Kongs refugee crisis provides another useful case study of

how international concerns about human rights in the 1970s influenced other

countries. My thesis shows how international expectations of human rights

conflicted with local politics. Hong Kongs refugee crisis thus helps to de-center

Administration, 21 July 1976. 24 Didier Fassin, Humanitarian Reason: A Moral History of the Present (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2012), 1. 25 Samuel Moyn, The Return of the Prodigal: The 1970s as a Turning Point in Human Rights History, in Jan Eckel and Samuel Moyn, eds., The Breakthrough: Human Rights in the 1970s (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013): 2. 26 For examples of human rights influence in the U.S. foreign policy, see Barbara Keys, Congress, Kissinger, and the Origins of Human Rights Diplomacy, Diplomatic History 34.5 (November 2010): 823-51; Barbara Keys and Roland Burke, Human Rights, in Richard H. Immerman and Petra Goedde, eds., The Oxford Handbook of the Cold War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 486-502; David Schmitz and Vanessa Walker, Jimmy Carter and the Foreign Policy of Human Rights: The Development of a Post-Cold War Foreign Policy, Diplomatic History 28.1 (January 2004): 113-43; Kenneth Cmiel, The Emergence of Human Rights Politics in the United States, Journal of American History 86.3 (1999): 1231-50; Rosemary Foote, The Cold War and Human Rights, in Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad, eds., The Cambridge History of the Cold War, Vol. III (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 445-65. 27 Brad Simpson, Human Rights Are Like Coca-Cola: Contested Human Rights Discourses in Suhartos Indonesia, 1968-1980, in Eckel and Moyn, Breakthrough,186-203; Jan Eckel, Under a Magnifying Glass: The International Human Rights Campaign Against Chile in the Seventies, in Stefan-Ludwig Hoffmann, ed., Human Rights in the Twentieth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 321-41; Simon Stevens, Why South Africa?: The Politics of Anti-Apartheid Activism in Britain in the Long 1970s, in Eckel and Moyn, Breakthrough, 204-25; William Schmidli, The Fate of Freedom Elsewhere: Human Rights and U.S. Cold War Policy Toward Argentina (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2013).

8

the Cold War. As Fabio Lanza and Jadwiga Mooney argue, we can gain insight by

focusing on state policies and on the roles of... organized actors, on people and

groups whose activities were related to but not directly dependent on Cold War state

policies at the highest levels.28 The thesis also makes linkages among international

concerns about human rights and Hong Kongs refugee crisis. In short, it contributes

to the global synthesis of the Cold War.

My thesis also sheds light on British history in the 1970s. In 1962, Dean

Acheson, the U.S. Secretary of State, declared that: Great Britain has lost an Empire,

and has not yet found a role.29 Acheson was wrong: notwithstanding its declining

power, Britain certainly had a role. Matthew Grant has concisely summarized

Britains role during the Cold War: To pursue national interests wherever they might

be found. The increasing sense of powerlessness of global prominence slipping

away led to British politicians placing prestige high on the list of national

priorities. Maintaining British power, pursuing prestige was a way of battling against

the fear of decline.30 Britain suffered from economic decline and immigration

problems after 1945.31 Historians argue that, because of Britains diminishing power,

the government sustained its imperial strategy and international influence in an

affordable way and drew support from its allies. Despite its economic decline after

the Second World War, Britain fulfilled its obligations and commitment around the

28 Jadwiga Mooney and Fabio Lanza, Introduction: De-Centering Cold War History, in Jadwiga Mooney and Fabio Lanza, eds., De-Centering Cold War History: Local and Global Change (London, 2013), 3. 29 Douglas Brinkley, Dean Acheson and the Special Relationship: The West Point Speech of December 1962, The Historical Journal 33.3 (September 1990): 599. 30 Matthew Grant, Introduction: The Cold War and British National Interest, in Matthew Grant, ed., The British Way in Cold Warfare: Intelligence, Diplomacy and the Bomb, 1945-1975 (New York: Continuum, 2009), 1, 3. 31 On Britain domestic affairs after the Second World War, see Alec Cairncross, The British Economy since 1945 (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995); David Childs, Britain since 1939: Progress and Decline (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002); Dominic Sandbrook, Seasons in the Sun: The Battle for Britain, 1974-1979 (London: Allen Lane, 2012); Jim Tomlinson, The Politics of Decline: Understanding Post-War Britain (Harlow: Longman, 2000).

9

world by collaborating with Europe, the U.S., and the United Nations.32

As the thesis shows, Hong Kong served as a place to fulfill Britains

humanitarian obligation. Compared to British decolonization and foreign affairs such

as the political unrest in Iran and Rhodesia, the Vietnamese refugee exodus was less

important to the British government. But Britain had to show its contribution to

resolving the refugee crisis in order to maintain its international influence. As the

British government expressed its political calculation about the refugee crisis, it was

important not only that we ourselves contribute, but also that we be seen to do so,

especially by the Americans.33

My thesis demonstrates how a global refugee crisis led to conflicts within

various British bureaucracies. As John Spanier and Eric M. Uslaner argue, because of

the growing dependence between society and the outside world, it becomes difficult

to disentangle international and domestic policies. They term this as intermestic

policy.34 As shown in the thesis, the refugee policy was a mixture of foreign and

domestic policies. It increased the number of actors in the policy-making process

and led to conflicts between different departments which stood for their interests.

The refugee crisis became even more complicated when it involved not only the

British government, but also the Hong Kong government.

32 For examples of Britain foreign policies after 1945, see Anne Deighton, Britain and the Cold War, 1945-1955,in Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad, eds., The Cambridge History of the Cold War, Vol. I (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 112-32; Ashley Jackson, Empire and Beyond: The Pursuit of Overseas National Interests in the Late Twentieth Century, The English Historical Review 122.499 (December 2007): 1350-66; Helen Parr, Britain, America, East of Suez and the EEC: Finding a Role in British Foreign Policy, 1964-67, Contemporary British History 20.3 (August 2006): 403-21; Klaus Larres, Britain and the Cold War, 1945-1990, in Immerman and Goedds, Oxford, 141-57; Simon Smith, Power Transferred? Britain, the United States, and the Gulf, 1956-71, Contemporary British History 21.1 (February 2007): 1-23. 33 Restricted Draft Letter from Evan Luard to Dr. Shirley Summerskill (Parliamentary Under-Secretary, Home Office), FCO 40/995, Refugees from Vietnam in Hong Kong: Vietnamese Boat People, 2 March 1978. 34 John Spanier and Eric M. Uslaner, American Foreign Policy Making and the Democratic Dilemmas (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1985), 6.

10

Lastly, the thesis seeks to answer the question: What did Vietnamese refugees

mean to Hong Kong people, the Hong Kong government, and the British

government? Gil Loescher and John A. Scanlan argue that humanitarian concerns are

often difficult to separate from political agendas, and are far from being neutral or

impartial. They term this as calculated kindness.35 Despite the British

governments claim of the domestic constraints for not accepting Vietnamese

refugees, it accepted refugees from Chile, South Asia, and Uganda. Political choices

were made by the British government as to which refugees from certain regimes were

more desirable. It is interesting to see that the Hong Kong government, as the

political documents show, justified its different policies towards Vietnamese refugees

and Chinese illegal immigrants by emphasizing racial differences. Similar to Hong

Kong peoples attitudes today towards immigrants from mainland China, Hong Kong

people in the 1970s did not want the Vietnamese to come because of the deprivation

of social welfare and the economic competition that they believed would result.

Despite the Vietnamese refugees status, Hong Kong people often compared and

contrasted the different government policies towards Vietnamese refugees and

Chinese illegal immigrants.

The thesis comprises three chapters in chronological order. Based on archival

materials from the National Archives in London and the National Archives in

Maryland, newspapers in the Hong Kong Public Records Office and the University

of Hong Kong library, the thesis shows how Britain exerted its international

influence by using Hong Kong to show its contribution to solving the refugee crisis.

Hong Kong served as a place for Britains proxy humanitarianism. The first chapter

investigates the case of two freighters that rescued Vietnamese Refugees in 1975 and

35 Gil Loescher and John A. Scanlan, Calculated Kindness: Refugees and America's Half-Open Door, 1945 to the Present (New York : Free Press, 1986), xiii-xviii, 209-19.

11

1976. It starts with the Danish-registered Clara Maersk that arrived in Hong Kong

with over 3,700 Vietnamese refugees on 4 May 1975, four days after Saigon fell to

the Viet Cong government. The Clara Maersk incident marked the beginning of the

first wave of Vietnamese refugees in Hong Kong. As the British and Hong Kong

governments were uncertain about the scale of the influx and had different

expectations about Britains contribution to ending the refugee problem, the incident

triggered heated debates between both governments and even within the British

government. The incident demonstrates the British political agendas for determining

which refugees were more desirable to receive and how bureaucratic conflicts led to

the British reluctant assistance to Hong Kong. The Burmese-registered Ava that

arrived in Hong Kong on 6 July 1976 with ninety-eight refugees reveals the unclear

responsibility for shipwrecked refugees rescued by foreign vessels. Still, the Hong

Kong government was forced to accept the refugees under pressure from the British

and American governments. But Southeast Asian countries such as Thailand and

Singapore had successfully rejected Vietnamese refugees before. Thus this chapter

seeks to answer the question: Why Hong Kong? The Ava incident shows how Hong

Kongs refugee influx was treated as an American problem. The U.S. government saw

Hong Kongs regional role of strengthening Southeast Asian countries involvement

in Americas refugee program. Because it was a British colony, the Americans

considered Hong Kong the easiest place to pressure in the region.36

Sino-Vietnamese relations deteriorated in 1978, leading to an exodus of ethnic

Chinese from Vietnam. The Vietnamese government officially permitted the ethnic

Chinese to leave in return for payment. The second chapter examines the organized

vessels that transported refugees to other countries under collaboration with the

36 On the U.S. governments view on Hong Kongs role in the refugee crisis, see Telegram from American Consul (Hong Kong) to Secretary of State (Washington), American Embassy (London), American Embassy (Rangoon), U.S. Mission Geneva, CFPF, 73-77, 24 July 1976.

12

Vietnamese authorities.37 This was the second wave of refugees. The pre-arranged

vessel Huey Fong docked outside Hong Kong waters with 3,300 refugees on 23

December 1978. The Huey Fong incident shows how the Hong Kong government had

no autonomy in refusing the refugees entry. The British government also made its

humanitarian decision without taking the political implications for Hong Kong into

account. Although the Hong Kong authorities established the principle of first port

of call as the normal practice to Vietnamese arrivals after the Ava incident in 1976,

the British government responded to the UNHCRs appeal by breaking Hong Kongs

normal practice. Hong Kong paved its way for the future refugee crisis when it failed

to refuse the Huey Fong from entering.

The final chapter focuses on how the British government relieved Hong Kongs

refugee burden as cheaply as possible. By the end of 1979, Vietnamese arrivals

continued to increase and reached almost 70,000.38 For the Hong Kong government,

the colony had reached its maximum capacity for absorbing more refugees. The

government also felt that it was penalized for maintaining the humanitarian policy of

accepting Vietnamese refugees when countries that took the hard line had more

rapid refugee resettlement rates. The newly elected Conservative government in

Britain saw the political need to relieve Hong Kongs burden, but was unwilling to

accept the refugees. On the one hand, the British government wanted to show its

contribution to resolving the refugee crisis by maintaining Hong Kongs

humanitarian policy. On the other hand, it considered Vietnamese refugees less

desirable to settle in Britain. The result was the UNHCR conference on Indochinese

refugees on 21 July 1979. By internationalizing the refugee problem through the

37 The word organized was adopted by the Hong Kong Security Branch after the Huey Fong entered Hong Kong in January 1979; see Report on the Arrival of the M.V. Huey Fong in Hong Kong, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, United Nations (Political) Department, Series 58 (FCO 58), FCO 58/1747, Vietnamese refugees on the MS Huey Fong, Hong Kong, 23 February 1979. 38 Security Branch: Refugee Division, Monthly Statistical Report (Arrivals and Departures), Fact Sheet: Vietnamese Migrants in Hong Kong at February 1997 (Hong Kong: Government Secretariat, 1997).

13

conference, the British government minimized its responsibility for the refugee crisis.

14

Chapter One

The First Wave of Refugees

The U.K. reaction was that their own ability to take in to resettle, was limited. The U.K. is not traditionally a host country; its a rather over-filled country as it is. But within that limitation I think they were helpful, yes, directly, they were active in encouraging other host countries to help. Hong Kongs reputation in the world had steadily increased over a long period of time and it was very important that this increased respect shouldnt become tarnished. These refugees, so-called, were a highly emotive subjective which the international media focused on. Certainly brutal treatment of them would not have been in Hong Kongs wider interests.

- Murray MacLehose, Governor of Hong Kong (1971-1982)1

In 1991, Governor Murray MacLehose recollected the British governments attitudes

towards the Hong Kong governments predicament during the Vietnamese refugee

crisis in an interview with historian Steve Tsang. MacLehose, however, did not tell

the whole story. He did not mention the lack of financial relief from Britain. The

British assistance was not as helpful as he claimed. Pressure from the British and

American governments were the more important reasons why the Hong Kong

government did not treat the refugees brutally.

On 4 May 1975, the Danish freighter Clara Maersk arrived in Hong Kong with

approximately 3,000 Vietnamese refugees.2 This marked the beginning of an influx

of Vietnamese refugees in Hong Kong. Their responses to the first wave of refugees

reveal how the British and Hong Kong governments viewed the Vietnamese in the

beginning. Using the cases of two freighters, the Clara Maersk and the Ava, this

1 Sir Murray MacLehose, interview by Dr. Steve Tsang, 13 and 26 April 1989; 12, 13, 14, and 29 March 1991, Transcript of Interviews with the Lord MacLehose of Beoch, KT, GBE,KCMG, KCVO, DL Political Adviser, Government of Hong Kong (1959-62), Governor of Hong Kong (1971-82),464-65, 462, the Bodleian Library, University of Oxford; electronic version accessed from the Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies Special Collection, Harvard University Library. 2 Confidential Telegram from Murray MacLehose (Hong Kong) to Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 3 May 1975; Telegram from Murray MacLehose (Hong Kong) to Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Great Britain, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Hong Kong Department, Series 40 (FCO 40), the National Archives, London, FCO 40/651, Resettlement of Vietnamese Refugees from Hong Kong into Other Countries, 5 May 1975.

15

chapter explores the tensions between Hong Kong and Britain in handling the influx

of Vietnamese refugees. The Clara Maersk incident reflected the British governments

ambivalent attitudes towards the Vietnamese refugees. Britain saw its humanitarian

obligations for the refugees, but was unwilling to contribute to the refugee crisis

because of its own worsening domestic situation. This led to different expectations

from the British and Hong Kong governments. The Ava incident shows the regional

role that Hong Kong played in the U.S. governments effort to internationalize the

refugee problem and establish a consistent policy towards the refugees. The

Americans considered Hong Kong as a breakthrough to strengthen the Southeast

Asian countries involvement in solving the refugee problem. Within the context of

Britains domestic situation and its diminishing international power in the 1970s, this

chapter argues that the British government saw Hong Kong as a place to show the

U.S. government its contributions to resolving the refugee crisis.

The Clara Maersk and the First Wave of Refugees

To the Hong Kong government, humanitarianism was not an absolute principle in

the Vietnamese refugee crisis. On 5 April 1975, before the fall of Saigon, the British

and Hong Kong governments had reached a consensus that it would be difficult on

humanitarian grounds to refuse admission if the Vietnamese refugees made their

way to Hong Kong after Saigon fell. The Hong Kong government had two concerns.

First, it would be difficult for Hong Kong people to understand why the Vietnamese

refugees were allowed to stay, while Chinese illegal immigrants, who usually had

some family connections with the Hong Kong people, were repatriated to mainland

China. Second, the government worried that it might be in a situation where those

refused entry to the United States would be left stranded in Hong Kong to add an

unwelcome burden to the limited resources. Colonial Secretary Denys Roberts

16

stated clearly Hong Kongs position: It may be easier to get public support later (if

necessary) for restrictive measures, if Hong Kong had been seen to be doing its bit

to help the genuine refugees in the initial stages.3

The Hong Kong government and the local press were ambivalent about letting

the Vietnamese refugees land when the Clara Maersk docked at Hong Kong with

3,750 refugees on 4 May.4 On the one hand, they knew that it was impossible to

refuse entry. On the other hand, they were uncertain how long the refugees would

stay in Hong Kong, a city with limited resources and an increasing population. A

senior government official expressed his concern in an interview with the South China

Morning Post: On humanitarian grounds, we just cant turn the refugees away. But

how long can we look after them?5 Editorials in Chinese newspapers agreed. The

Sing Tao Daily thanked the captain of the Clara Maersk for rescuing the Vietnamese

boatpeople. But it also emphasized Hong Kongs increasing population and

suggested that the government should endeavor to find other countries to resettle

the refugees.6 The Kung Sheung Daily News agreed that respecting human rights was a

British tradition. Although Hong Kong did not have enough resources for the

refugees to stay permanently, the government should assist them on moral grounds.7

The colonial government was conscious of the potential risk of upsetting Hong

Kong people because of the more generous policy towards Vietnamese refugees

compared to Chinese illegal immigrants and thus emphasized the difference between

Vietnamese and Chinese. Four days after the Clara Maersk arrived, the Sing Tao Daily,

3 Confidential Telegram from Denys Roberts (Hong Kong) to Foreign and Commonwealth Office, FCO 40/651, 5 April 1975. 4 When the Clara Maersk landed at Hong Kong on 4 May, the Hong Kong government noted that there were approximately 4,500 refugees on board, but newspapers later reported that there were 3,750. Confidential Telegram from Murray MacLehose (Hong Kong) to Foreign and Commonwealth

Office, FCO 40/651, 5 May 1975; Kung Sheung Daily News , 7 May 1975; South China Morning Post, 7 May 1975; Wah Kiu Yat Po , 13 May 1975. 5 South China Morning Post, 4 May 1975, 1. 6 Sing Tao Daily , 7 May 1975. 2. 7 Kung Sheung Daily News, 7 May 1975, 2.

17

one of the colonys largest newspapers, commented that although the Chinese

refugees and the Vietnamese refugees were the same in nature, Chinese refugees

were repatriated while Vietnamese refugees were permitted to stay. It also

emphasized the contributions of Chinese refugees to Hong Kong.8 In response, the

Hong Kong government explained the difference between Vietnamese refugees and

Chinese illegal immigrants in an interview with the South China Morning Post:

Comparisons cannot be made between the situation facing war refugees from

Vietnam and that of illegal immigrants sent back to China. The Vietnamese

refugees were a special situation where humanitarian assistance had to be

considered. There was no war and no persecution in China, and the large number

of mainland Chinese who visited Hong Kong with legal travel documents each year

showed the free movement situation.9

Debating Britains Assistance to Hong Kong

John Spanier and Eric M. Uslaner suggest three types of U.S. governments foreign

policies: crisis, non-crisis security, and intermestic policies. Intermestic policy is a

combination of international and domestic policies. For intermestic policy, the

increased bargaining in the policy-making process leads to tensions between different

departments that stand for their own interests.10 Refugee policy is intermestic

policy, as it influences foreign interests and the domestic situation. The same

observation fits the British governments refugee policy. Because of the inseparable

nature of the intermestic policy, within the executive arena, tensions arose between

different departments that stood for their own interests.

8 Sing Tao Daily, 8 May 1975. 9 South China Morning Post, 16 May 1975. 10 John Spanier and Eric M. Uslaner, American Foreign Policy Making and the Democratic Dilemmas (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1985), 6, 18-22.

18

Different expectations about the level and form of British assistance to Hong

Kong put pressure on relations between London and Hong Kong. The debate also

reveals the British governments political agendas for determining what kinds of

refugees were more desirable to accept. To the Hong Kong government, the

reluctance of the British government to provide financial relief and resettlement

places discouraged other countries from helping the colony. It was difficult to seek

assistance from potential host countries when Britain was reluctant to contribute.

Although the British government saw its humanitarian obligations to the refugee

crisis, it provided limited financial relief and resettlement places because of its own

worsening domestic economy and immigration problems. These different

expectations and conflicts led to heated exchanges and debates between London and

Hong Kong.

Financial relief to Hong Kong became an acrimonious debate when the

Ministry of Overseas Development (MOD) deemed the Hong Kong government

unqualified to receive financial assistance from the British government. On 15 April

1975, the FCO and the MOD had discussed the financial contribution to Hong

Kong when they predicted that the Vietnamese would come. Laurence OKeeffe,

head of an FCO sub-branch, suggested that if substantial numbers of Vietnamese

refugees came to Hong Kong, the British government should help relieve Hong

Kongs financial strain.11 The MOD, however, disagreed: the FCO must exclude any

thought that we should volunteer an offer to the Hong Kong government. As the

MOD explained to OKeeffe, Hong Kong is among the richest of the developing

territories and not normally regarded as a suitable recipient of aid funds.12

11 Confidential Letter from P.L. O'Keeffe (Hong Kong and Indian Ocean Department, Foreign and Commonwealth Office) to Pearson (Ministry of Overseas Development), FCO 40/651, 15 April 1975. 12 Confidential Letter from C.R.A. Rae to P.L. OKeeffe (Hong Kong and Indian Ocean Department, Foreign and Commonwealth Office), FCO 40/651, 21 April 1975.

19

To Governor MacLehose, the lack of financial aid from Britain made refugee

resettlement in Hong Kong more difficult. He was unsatisfied with the limited

financial relief provided by Britain. If there was not enough financial support,

potential host countries would have to make up the rest of the relief and would

decrease their refugee intakes. Besides, local newspapers might make unkind

comparisons if the relief was small.13 The MOD revised its policy towards Hong

Kong after the Clara Maersk arrived, but the financial support was still limited. On 29

May 1975, the MOD decided to contribute 20,000, which was only two percent of

Britains financial relief for humanitarian purposes in Vietnam and Cambodia. The

MOD did not want to contribute more than the total costs, but it promised to

reconsider the financial assistance if the refugees stayed longer.14

Opinion about the 20,000 of financial relief to Hong Kong was divided within

the British government, but domestic problems such as the European Communities

membership referendum stopped the debate. Like the Hong Kong government, the

FCO thought that the financial relief was inadequate, but it gave two reasons why the

Hong Kong government should not ask for an increase at this stage. The first was

that MOD Minister Judith Hart was working on the European Communities

membership referendum, and the FCO did not want to distract her. The FCO also

worried that other countries might notice the British inadequate financial support if

the debate continued. This might encourage other countries to provide financial

relief instead of resettlement places.15

13 Confidential Telegram from Murray MacLehose (Hong Kong) to Foreign and Commonwealth Office, FCO 40/652, Resettlement of Vietnamese Refugees from Hong Kong into Other Countries, 26 May 1975. 14 Confidential Letter from Ministry of Overseas Development to Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, Aid to Refugees from Vietnam, FCO 40/653, Resettlement of Vietnamese Refugees from Hong Kong into Other Countries, 29 May 1975. 15 Personal note from P.L. OKeeffe (Hong Kong and Indian Ocean Department, Foreign and Commonwealth Office) to Murray MacLehose (Hong Kong), FCO 40/653, 3 June 1975.

20

The MOD and the Hong Kong government were unsatisfied with the financial

relief. The MOD insisted that Hong Kong be financially responsible for the

Vietnamese refugees after approving extra 50,000 relief for the refugees in Hong

Kong on 24 June 1975. The MOD was clear that the 50,000 was the last financial

assistance to the colony. Thereafter, the Vietnamese refugees would be like the

refugees from Red China, the responsibility of the Government of Hong Kong.16

The MOD was also unwilling to settle the payment, which annoyed the Hong Kong

government. On 6 August, two months after the MOD had promised the 20,000 in

relief, Assistant Political Adviser Charles Drace-Francis complained that the Hong

Kong government had not yet received any payment: All we have received so far is a

typically astringent Treasury letter to [Financial Secretary] Haddon-Cave, informing

him that he will have to produce detailed evidence that he has not embezzled the

money and you can imagine what sort of reaction that has provoked!

Drace-Francis wanted the Treasury to investigate the problem soon, thus he could

silence or at least quieten some of the cynics.17

Resettlement

The resettlement of Vietnamese refugees shows the British governments political

preferences for what kinds of refugees it wanted to take. United Nations High

Commissioner (UNHCR) scholars Gil Loescher and John A. Scanlan argue that the

U.S. governments refugee policy after 1945 was determined by ideology. It preferred

16 Confidential Letter from P.L. OKeeffe (Hong Kong and Indian Ocean Department, Foreign and Commonwealth Office) to Mr. Williams (Ministry of Overseas Development), Resettlement of Vietnamese Refugees at Present in Hong Kong, 16 June 1975; Letter from D. Williams to Mr. King (Minister), FCO 40/653, 24 June 1975. 17 Confidential Letter from C.D.S. Drace-Francis (Hong Kong) to P. L. OKeeffe (Hong Kong and Indian Ocean Department, Foreign and Commonwealth Office), Vietnamese Refugees, FCO 40/653, 6 August 1975.

21

to accept refugees from left-wing regimes rather than those from right-wing ones.18

As the chapter will show, however, the British governments preferences for

accepting refugees were contrary to the wishes of the U.S. government.

The American government awaited the British governments response to the

Vietnamese refugees in Hong Kong, which led to unsatisfactory responses towards

refugee resettlement from other countries in the first week. When Saigon fell on 30

April, the U.S. sent those Vietnamese with American connections to Guam to await

resettlement. Although the Hong Kong government hoped that the refugees could

be sent shortly to Guam, the U.S. government rejected Hong Kongs request, as

refugees had already strained the resources there. The Americans also argued that the

refugees in Guam were different from those on the Clara Maersk. Those in Guam

had been rescued by a planned and monitored operation in Saigon, whereas the

refugees on the Clara Maersk took the initiative to flee from Vietnam and were picked

up by a Danish freighter.19 Countries such as West Germany, Australia, New Zealand,

Denmark, and Sweden all deferred their decisions on resettling the refugees in Hong

Kong.20

Nor was Britain willing to take the Vietnamese refugees, which explains why

other countries deferred their decisions. On 7 May, MacLehose asked the British

government to take the first step towards accepting the refugees because of the

unfavorable responses from other countries and the potential adverse opinion from

Hong Kong people. He believed that if people saw the British governments effort to

resettle the refugees, they would believe that Britain was endeavoring to solve the

18 Gil Loescher and John A. Scanlan, Calculated Kindness : Refugees and America's Half-Open Door, 1945 to the Present (New York : The Free Press, 1986), 209-19. 19 Confidential Telegram from Murray MacLehose (Hong Kong) to Foreign and Commonwealth Office, FCO 40/651, 5 May 1975. 20 Attached Notes on Vietnamese Refugees in Hong Kong, Confidential Letter from P.L. OKeeffe (Hong Kong and Indian Ocean Department, Foreign and Commonwealth Office) to Mr. Male, Lord Goronwy-Roberts, FCO 40/651, 15 May 1975.

22

problem. Thus, it would be easier for people to accept the fact that Chinese illegal

immigrants were repatriated yet Vietnamese refugees could stay.21 The Home Office

(HO), however, was unwilling to commit more, except those 100 refugees who were

already agreed to consider.22 Still, even these 100 offers were not met by the end of

1975.23

Despite the unsatisfactory responses in the first week, more refugees were soon

resettled in other countries as time went on. By 4 June, a month after the Clara

Maersk disembarked, the U.S. had conditionally approved 1,141 boatpeople for entry;

Canada offered 300 resettlement places; France processed 400 boatpeople, 111 of

whom were sent to France.24 Denmark, as the registered country of the Clara Maersk,

agreed to take 100 refugees.25 By the end of 1975, only 161 refugees remained in the

camps in Hong Kong. Over 3,434 refugees were sent to Australia, Canada, France,

and the U.S.26 All in all, the resettlement process of the boatpeople on the Clara

Maersk was quite successful.

Still, tensions arose between the British and Hong Kong governments. On 6

August 1975, as Britain continued to hesitate, Assistant Political Adviser Charles

Drace-Francis pressured the British government by predicting that other countries

might question what Britain has done to help Hong Kong. He told the FCO that

the Chinese unofficial members had made a sarcastic comment about the British

21 Confidential Telegram from Murray MacLehose (Hong Kong) to Foreign and Commonwealth Office, FCO 40/652, 7 May 1975. 22 Confidential Telegram from James Callaghan (Foreign and Commonwealth Office) to Kingston, FCO 40/652, 6 May 1975. 23 Copy of the Letter from N.V. Morley-Fletcher (General Secretary, the British Council for Aid to Refugees) to D.W. Berry (Migration and Visa Department, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office), FCO 40/654, Resettlement of Vietnamese Refugees from Hong Kong into Other Countries, 25 November 1975. 24 Confidential Letter from Alan Donald (Hong Kong) to P.L. OKeeffe (Hong Kong and Indian Ocean Department, Foreign and Commonwealth Office), FCO 40/653, 4 June 1975. 25 Unclassified Telegram from Andrew Stark (Copenhagen) to Foreign and Commonwealth Office, FCO 40/652, 22 May 1975. 26 Copy of Letter from Mr. J.M. Rowlands (Director of Immigration, Hong Kong), Agenda of the Standing Conference of British Organisations for Aid to Refugees to Robin Jandren (Hong Kong Department, Foreign and Commonwealth Office), FCO 40/654, 19 November 1975.

23

government at a recent Executive Council meeting, as Britain had not accepted any

Vietnamese refugees so far. What in fact, Drace-Francis asked, is the Home

Office doing about the applications? He worried that anti-Whitehall feeling would

emerge. The uncertain future of the Vietnamese refugees had already led to several

administration problems in the camps. Any arrangement which could send the

refugees to Britain would keep the refugees happy.27

The Hong Kong governments discontent was manifested in the Legislative

Council, and the government used the local press to show its discontent. At the

Legislative Council meeting on 13 August, Dr. Sze-Yuen Chung, the leading Chinese

unofficial member, asked Acting Colonial Secretary Michael Clinton how many

Vietnamese refugees the British government had agreed to take so far. Clinton

replied that the United Kingdom Government has not given any indication that

they will accept any.28 In order to balance the answer, Clinton mentioned the

70,000 financial relief given by Britain.29 But Clintons response was unconvincing.

One day after the Legislative Council meeting, the Standard suggested that the

financial assistance was a substitute for the resettlement places: Britain has shown

no indication so far that it will take any of the Vietnamese refugees. Instead,

Britain had donated $770,000.30 The Hong Kong government was aware of the

adverse press report. Clinton reminded the FCO that it would be a pity if there

would be negative feeling towards Britain simply for the sake of 75 odd entry visas

to the UK. If Britain could take some of the refugees in Hong Kong, it would help

27 Confidential Letter from C.D.S. Drace-Francis (Hong Kong) to P.L. OKeeffe (Hong Kong and Indian Ocean Department, Foreign and Commonwealth Office), FCO 40/653, 6 August 1975. 28 Hong Kong Hansard: Report of the Meetings of the Legislative Council of Hong Kong, Session 1975 (Hong Kong: Government Printer, 1975), 13 August 1975, 998-99. 29 Confidential Letter from M.D.A. Clinton (Acting Colonial Secretary) to P.L. OKeeffe (Hong Kong and Indian Ocean Department, Foreign and Commonwealth Office), FCO 40/654, , 20 August 1975. 30 Hong Kong Standard, 14 August 1975, Attached Press Cutting in Confidential Letter from M.D.A. Clinton to P.L. OKeeffe, FCO 40/654, 20 August 1975.

24

persuade other countries to take the boatpeople.31

Tensions existed not only between Hong Kong and Britain, but also within the

British government. The HO refused to accept the Vietnamese refugees. On the

morning of 12 August, the FCO approached the HO to accept seventy-one

Vietnamese refugees who expressed their preference to live in Britain. The HO

rejected the FCO on the same day, as only two out of seventy-one refugees had ties

or connections in Britain and some of them had not chosen Britain as their first

choice for resettlement. Therefore, the HO needed to consider whether it should

take only some of them.32 Laurence OKeeffe expressed the FCOs helplessness:

Despite repeated prodding the Home Office are still non-committal and cannot even say when their Ministers will take a decision I am fully aware of the difficulties which the continuing delay presents for you in Hong Kong; equally, you will appreciate that it puts us in diplomatic baulk and open to attack eg the Times

article on 12 August.33

The HOs condition for relaxing the policy left the Hong Kong government in

an embarrassing situation to convince other countries to take the refugees. On 29

August, the HO relaxed its policy by asking the FCO to guarantee that if the HO

agreed to take those seventy-one refugees in Hong Kong, the rest would not choose

to go to Britain. Britain was not the place of last resort for the refugees, and there

was not much hope to take more refugees except those who were going to

consider.34 Not surprisingly, the FCO rejected the HOs request to make a guarantee,

as this would discourage other countries from taking the refugees in Hong Kong.

Unless and until the refugees wanting to come here are allowed to do so, we are

effectively unable to assist Hong Kong in any new diplomatic initiative to seek homes

31 Confidential Letter from M.D.A. Clinton to P.L. OKeeffe, FCO 40/654, 20 August 1975. 32 Letter from P.L. Taylor (Home Office) to P.L. OKeeffe (Hong Kong and Indian Ocean Department, Foreign and Commonwealth Office), FCO 40/653, 12 August 1975. 33 Confidential Letter from P.L. OKeeffe (Hong Kong and Indian Ocean Department, Foreign and Commonwealth Office) to C.D.S. Drace-Francis (Assistant Political Adviser, Hong Kong), FCO 40/653, 15 August 1975. 34 Letter from P.L. Taylor (Home Office) to P.L. OKeeffe (Hong Kong and Indian Ocean Department, Foreign and Commonwealth Office), FCO 40/654, 29 August 1975.

25

(in the United States or elsewhere) for the rest.35 The FCO was clear that no

promise could be made to guarantee that the refugees would not choose Britain. The

Hong Kong government had explained in the Legislative Council that the refugee

influx was not merely a problem for Hong Kong, but an international responsibility.36

The HO, however, thought that Britain had no responsibility for the refugees.

The comparison made by the British press between Britains policies towards

Chilean and Vietnamese refugees showed the British governments political

preferences for accepting refugees. As Loescher and Scanlan argue: Generosity has

been real, but it has also been selective. It has extended no further than politics and

the law have permitted.37 Paul Strauss, a reporter for the Guardian, reported that the

Hong Kong government was irritated to learn the British government had accepted

about 2,000 Chilean refugees who came to Britain because of the political

persecution by the right-wing Chilean government. In the meantime, more than

1,700 Vietnamese refugees who escaped from the Viet Cong regime remained in

Hong Kong, yet the British government had not taken any of them. This article

recalled the same comparison made by Member of Parliament Sir Frederic Bennett

in May 1975. The FCO and the HO were conscious of this news article.38 Seventeen

days after the news article was published, the HO granted permission to 150

Vietnamese refugees in Hong Kong. Like the financial relief, the HO emphasized

that the admission of these 150 refugees was the final contribution from Britain, and

35 Restricted Letter from P.L. OKeeffe (Hong Kong and Indian Ocean Department, Foreign and Commonwealth Office) to P.L. Taylor (Home Office), FCO 40/654, 12 September 1975. 36 Hong Kong Hansard: Report of the Meetings of the Legislative Council of Hong Kong , Session 1975 (Hong Kong: Government Printer, 1975), 13 August 1975, 998. 37 Loescher and Scanlan, Calculated, 210. 38 Attached Press Cutting from the Guardian, 16 September 1975, Restricted Letter from R.B. Janvrin (Hong Kong and Indian Ocean Department, Foreign and Commonwealth Office) to Mr. Martin, Mr. Milton, Mr. OKeeffe, FCO 40/654, 24 September 1975; Bennett, Vietnamese Refugees, 21 May 1975; Hansard Parliamentary Debates, 5th ser., vol. 892 [1975], cols. 409; Bennett, Vietnamese Refugees, 23 May 1975. Hansard, 5th ser., vol. 892 [1975], cols. 694-95; Tony Kushner and Katharine Knox, Refugees in an Age of Genocide: Global, National and Local Perspectives During the Twentieth Century (London: Frank Cass, 1999), 289-90.

26

the British government would not be responsible for the rest of the refugees in

Hong Kong.39

The limited financial aid has to be understood within the domestic context of

Britain in the 1970s. Britain was in an economic depression throughout the 1970s,

and the unemployment rate rose from 2.8 percent in December 1972 to 5.1 percent

in December 1975. By the end of 1975, the unemployed population was 977,600.40

The Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 1975 was 3 percent lower than 1973. The

current balance of the British government reached the peak deficit of 3200 million

in 1974 and 1500 million in 1975.41 Public spending in 1975 reached 51.5 billion,

consisted of almost 50 percent of the GDP.42 Major domestic industries such as car

manufacturing collapsed in 1975 because of competition from Japan and the U.S.43

Continuing social unrest in Northern Ireland damaged the British governments

credibility.44 Providing financial relief to Hong Kong became an even more sensitive

issue when Britain was struggling with the costly financial contribution to the

European Community in 1975.45

The Admission of British passport-holders from previous imperial subjects

such as Cyprus, India, Kenya, and Uganda created serious immigration problems. For

example, the arrival of 30,000 Ugandan Asian refugees from 1972 to 1973, and

10,000 Cypriot nationals after 1974 caused enormous antipathy towards immigrants

in Britain.46 This explains why the British government only provided limited

39 Letter from P.L. Taylor (Home Office) to P.L. OKeeffe (Foreign and Commonwealth Office), FCO 40/654, 3 October 1975. 40 James Denman and Paul McDonald, Unemployment Statistics from 1881 to the Present Day, Labour Market Trends 104.1 (January 1996): 7, 11. 41 Alec Cairncross, The British Economy since 1945 (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995), 206-9. 42 Christopher Chantrill, Total Public Spending Expenditure-Charts-GDP Debt in 1975, http://www.ukpublicspending.co.uk/index.php?year=1975; accessed 11 April 2014. 43 Dominic Sandbrook, Seasons in the Sun: The Battle for Britain, 1974-1979 (London: Allen Lane, 2012), 260-63. 44 David Childs, Britain since 1939: Progress and Decline (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002), 205-6. 45 James Callaghan, Time and Chance (London: Collins, 1987): 307-24. 46 For examples of Britains immigration population and adverse opinions towards immigrants in the

27

financial aid and resettlement places, as the government did not want to risk arousing

public anger. The governments decision for taking Chilean rather than Vietnamese

refugees shows its lack of enthusiasm in taking people from Communist regimes.

Almost all the refugees on the Clara Maersk were resettled within a year, and

only fifteen of them remained in Hong Kong by the end of 1976. Among these

fifteen, six were waiting for the U.S. governments permission to resettle in America,

and the other nine were waiting for the Vietnamese authorities approval to return

home.47 After the Clara Maersk incident, the Hong Kong government was aware of

the risk of accepting refugees without any guarantee of resettlement and thus

changed its policy. Vietnamese refugees rescued by foreign vessels were allowed to

land at Hong Kong only if the registered country of the vessel assumed

responsibility for the refugees.48 However, it was still uncertain that what the Hong

Kong government could do if the registered country of the vessel did not provide

any assurance of taking the refugees.

The Ava: The First Wave of Vietnamese Refugees as an American

Problem

The number of Vietnamese refugees in Hong Kong dropped from 4,000 to only 65

1970s, see Kushner and Knox, Refugees, 265-73; Unclassified Telegram from P. Morgan (United Nations Department, Foreign and Commonwealth Office) to S.F. Howarth (Washington), FCO 40/1103, Refugees from Vietnam in Hong Kong, 3 July 1979. 47 Confidential Telegram from Murray MacLehose (Hong Kong) to Foreign and Commonwealth Office, FCO 40/720, Aid from UK for Vietnamese Refugees in Hong Kong, 27 October 1976. 48 For examples of shipwrecked refugees rescued by foreign vessels after the Clara Maersk incident, see Confidential Telegram from Murray MacLehose (Hong Kong) to Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 8 May 1975; Confidential Telegram from James Callaghan (Foreign and Commonwealth Office) to Hong Kong, 8 May 1975; Confidential Letter from P.L. OKeeffe (Hong Kong and Indian Ocean Department, Foreign and Commonwealth Office) to Mr. Male, Mr. Ennals, 9 May 1975; Confidential Telegram from Murray MacLehose (Hong Kong) to Foreign and Commonwealth Office, FCO 40/651, 14 May 1975; Confidential Telegram from Frederick Warner (Tokyo) to Foreign and Commonwealth Office), FCO 40/652, 16 May 1975; Confidential Telegram from Anthony Crosland (Foreign and Commonwealth Office) to United Kingdom Mission to the United Nations Geneva, FCO 40/719, Aid from UK for Vietnamese Refugees in Hong Kong, 14 July 1976.

28

by the end of 1976, less than a year after the Clara Maersk arrived.49 It seemed that

the refugee problem in Hong Kong had been solved. However, the arrival of the Ava,

a Burmese-registered vessel, in 1976 shows how vulnerable the Hong Kong

government was in refusing entry to the refugees. Because of the Ava incident, the

policy of first-scheduled port of call with the UNHCR guarantee of assuming

responsibility for the refugees became the usual practice of the Hong Kong

government in future cases involving Vietnamese refugees rescued by foreign vessels.

On 7 July 1976, the Ava was refused permission to unload ninety-eight refugees

in Hong Kong.50 Thus the ships captain planned to continue on to Japan with the

refugees on board. The Hong Kong government, however, suddenly announced that

the Ava would delay its departure, and soon permitted the refugees to stay. In an

interview with the South China Morning Post on 6 August, Director of Immigration

Martin Rowlands explained that the reason why Hong Kong had originally denied

the boatpeople entry was to arouse the attention of the international community.51

According to the South China Morning Post, the Ava delayed its departure from Hong

Kong because the vessel was waiting for the U.S. governments decision on resettling

the refugees.52 The local press reported that the Hong Kong government granted

the refugees temporary asylum, as the UNHCR had assumed responsibility for

refugee resettlement and accommodation.53

Recently declassified governmental files in the British National Archives,

49 Confidential Telegram from Denys Roberts (Hong Kong) to Foreign and Commonwealth Office, FCO 40/720, 13 November 1976. 50 According to the governmental records, the total number of the shipwrecked refugees on the Ava was ninety-eight, while the local press noted that there were ninety-nine on board. Confidential Telegram from Murray MacLehose (Hong Kong) to Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 6 July 1976; Confidential Telegram from Terrence OBrien (Rangoon) to Hong Kong, FCO 40/719, 8 July 1976; Sing Tao Daily, 7 July 1976; South China Morning Post, 7 July 1976; Hong Kong Standard, 7 July 1976. 51 South China Morning Post, 6 August 1976. 52 South China Morning Post, 30 July 1976. 53 Sing Tao Daily, 31 July and 5 August 1976; Kung Sheung Daily News, 2 August 1976; Wah Kiu Yat Po, 4 August 1976; South China Morning Post, 6 August 1976.

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however, tell another story. The Hong Kong government refused entry to the

Vietnamese boatpeople because the Burmese government was unwilling to take any

responsibility for them. Moreover, the Hong Kong government had never been

interested in allowing the refugees to land, even when the UNHCR assumed all

responsibility for the Vietnamese. In fact, pressure from the U.S. government forced

the Hong Kong government to compromise in the case of the Ava.

The Situation in Hong Kong

Different from the previous positive attitudes towards the Vietnamese refugees on

the Clara Maersk in 1975, the local press opinions about refugees changed one year

later. The adverse opinions towards the Hong Kong governments policies over

Chinese illegal immigrants and Vietnamese refugees changed the governments

attitudes towards the Ava. The Cree incident triggered local criticism of these two

different policies. On 28 May 1976, the shipmaster of the Cree, a British vessel,

picked up nineteen refugees on the way from Hong Kong to Singapore, but the

Singaporean government refused entry to the refugees. As a result, the Cree returned

to Hong Kong on 10 June, and the Hong Kong government permitted the refugees

to land on humanitarian grounds.54

The local press considered Vietnamese refugees the same as Chinese illegal

immigrants. The Hong Kong governments benevolence provoked criticism from the

local Chinese press. For example, the Hong Kong Times, Kung Sheung Evening News, and

Sing Tao Daily all criticized the government for repatriating Chinese illegal immigrants,

but allowing the Vietnamese to stay. They insisted that the colonial government

should stop repatriating Chinese refugees.55

54 Confidential Letter from C.D.S. Drace-Francis (Hong Kong) to R.B. Janvrin (Hong Kong and Indian Ocean Department, Foreign and Commonwealth Office), FCO 40/719, 18 June 1976. 55 Attached Hong Kong Press View 9-15 June 1976, Viet Refugees Treated Better than China

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The FCO was aware of the wider implications of this criticism, especially from

those newspapers deemed pro-Taiwan. The FCO suspected that these criticisms of

the policy were orchestrated by the Free China Relief Association, which was

established in Taiwan.56 Although only thirty-seven Vietnamese refugees remained in

Hong Kong by April, what the Hong Kong government worried about was not the

number of refugees, but the risk of growing criticism from the local population.

This might make the repatriation policy of Chinese illegal immigrants more difficult

to apply.57 The worries about pro-Taiwan forces were not entirely unjustified. After

the Communist Victory in 1949, many Chinese who failed to escape to Taiwan came

to Hong Kong. The Double Tenth Riots in 1956, organized by pro-Taiwan civilians,

demonstrated how influential the pro-Taiwan local Chinese could be.58 Although it

had been twenty years after the riots, a significant number of Hong Kong people still

supported Taiwan. Thus the FCO worried that the different policies towards

Vietnamese refugees and Chinese illegal immigrants might trigger adverse opinions

from local Chinese.

Wider Implications of the Ava Incident

On 6 July 1976, local shipping agents warned the Immigration Department that the

Burmese-registered Ava, which had a regular Rangoon-Hong Kong-Japan-Rangoon

sailing route, would arrive in Hong Kong waters the next day with ninety-eight

Vietnamese refugees who had been rescued at sea. Hong Kong was the Avas

Refugees, Letter from R.B. Janvrin (Hong Kong Department, Foreign and Commonwealth Office) to C.D.S.Drace-Francis (Colonial Secretariat, Hong Kong), FCO 40/719, 1 July 1976. 56 Letter from R.B. Janvrin (Hong Kong Department, Foreign and Commonwealth Office) to C.D.S.Drace-Francis (Colonial Secretariat, Hong Kong), FCO 40/719, 1 July 1976. 57 Confidential Letter from P.L. OKeeffe (Hong Kong Department, Foreign and Commonwealth Office) to Mr. Male and Lord Goronwy-Roberts, FCO 40/719, 7 July 1976. 58 On the Double Tenth Riots in 1956, see Carol Jones and Jon Vagg, Criminal Justice in Hong Kong (Abingdon: Routledge Cavendish, 2007), 293-375; Lawrence, K.K., Ho, Policing Hong Kong, 1842-1969: Insiders Stories (Hong Kong: City University of Hong Kong Press, 2012), 75-99.

31

first-scheduled port of call. Governor MacLehose was clear that the Hong Kong

government would assume no responsibility for these refugees, and requested the

Burmese government and the shipping agents to make suitable arrangements, as the

Hong Kong government usually had with non-British vessels after the Clara Maersk

incident. However, according to the information gathered by the Hong Kong

government, the Burmese government rejected the Hong Kong governments

suggestion and wanted to dispose of the unwanted passengers as quickly as

possible. Since the shipmaster was concerned about his responsibility, the Ava

docked outside Hong Kong waters on 7 July awaiting further instruction from

Burma.59

The Burmese government did not want to bear any responsibility for the

Vietnamese refugees on the Ava. Two days later, the Hong Kong government

suggested airlifting the refugees to Rangoon in cooperation with the

Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration (ICEM). Thereafter, it would

be up to the Burmese government to decide the onward movement of the refugees

or to determine whether they could settle in Burma.60 The Burmese government

appeared not to be interested in accepting the refugees and thus sought help from

the UNHCR. On 12 July, 1976, to facilitate the vessel to dock at Hong Kong, the

UNHCR guaranteed that it would be responsible for the refugees if the refugees

were permitted to disembark at Hong Kong.61 Besides, as reported by colonial

officials, the Burmese government plainly rejected the Hong Kong governments

suggestion by telling the ICEM that it would never allow the Vietnamese to set foot

59 Confidential Telegram from Murray MacLehose (Hong Kong) to Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 6 July 1976; Confidential Telegram from Denys Roberts (Hong Kong) to Rangoon, 8 July 1976; Confidential Telegram from Terrence OBrien (Rangoon) to Hong Kong, FCO 40/719, 8 July 1976. 60 Confidential Telegram from Denys Roberts (Hong Kong) to Foreign and Commonwealth Office, FCO 40/719, 9 July 1976. 61 Restricted Telegram from United Kingdom Mission to the United Nations Geneva to Foreign and Commonwealth Office, FCO 40/719, 12 July 1976.

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in Burma. Because of the rejection by Burma, the Hong Kong government decided

not to issue an immigration clearance to the Ava, and instead declared that the

shipmaster was responsible for removing the refugees. .62 Therefore, the vessel was

unable to unload its cargo in Hong Kong.

The Hong Kong government understood the wider implications of the Ava

incident. The government preferred to turn down the UNHCRs request, for

allowing the refugees to land would encourage further attempts by the Vietnamese.63

Colonial Secretary Denys Roberts was unwilling to permit the refugees to stay even

temporarily. He had three main concerns: the potential risk of attracting more

Vietnamese refugees to Hong Kong, the adverse local opinion about the different

policies towards Chinese illegal immigrants and Vietnamese refugees, and the Hong

Kong governments distrust of the UNHCR.

Roberts feared that shipmasters would consider Hong Kong a safe dumping

ground for unloading the rescued refugees, and the UNHCR would use Hong Kong

as a holding centre for resettling refugees from elsewhere. Relaxing the policy

towards the Vietnamese might lead to a refugee-trafficking business carried out by

Hong Kong fishermen. His forecast came partially true in 1978, though this business

was not run by the fishermen. Secondly, Roberts found it even harder to defend the

policy of repatriating Chinese illegal immigrants if he allowed the Vietnamese

refugees to land, as the majority of the refugees were ethnic Vietnamese who did not

speak Cantonese and had no family connections in Hong Kong. Unlike the

Vietnamese refugees, illegal immigrants from Guangdong shared the same language

with the local people and usually had some family connections in Hong Kong. Lastly,

62 Confidential Telegram from Denys Roberts (Hong Kong) to Foreign and Commonwealth Office, FCO 40/719, 16 July 1976. 63 Confidential Telegram from Denys Roberts (Hong Kong) to Foreign and Commonwealth Office, FCO 40/719, 8 July 1976.

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Roberts distrusted the UNHCR. He recalled the UNHCRs failure in persuading the

Vietnamese government to take back the refugees who wished to return home. He

thought that the UNHCR had made little practical contribution in resettling the

refugees in the previous year, and was skeptical whether the UNHCR could find

enough countries to take the refugees within a tolerable time-scale. He also

questioned why the UNHCR did not take responsibility for the refugees to Burma,

yet asked Hong Kong to reconsider its decision.64 The Hong Kong government and

the FCO agreed that Hong Kongs response should be the same as before. For

example, when the American vessel Oregon, a Norwegian vessel, and the Swedish

vessel MS Japan came to Hong Kong with Vietnamese refugees on board in 1975, the

government had also considered the refugees as the registered countries

responsibility.65

Pressure from the Americans

The first wave of Vietnamese refugees took place against the backdrop of U.S.

foreign policy and Anglo-American relations in the 1970s. Human rights became

incorporated into U.S. foreign policy, for example, the anti-Vietnam War campaign

and the human rights campaigns against Argentina and Chile. Scholars argue that

human rights made inroads into the U.S. government policy-making process during

the Cold War.66 As Stefan-Ludwig Hoffmann puts it, the U.S. invoked human rights

64 Confidential Telegram from Denys Roberts (Hong Kong