Summary of Habermas's TCA

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Habermas'theoryofcommunicativeactionbyGeraldBenoit

Introduction

To do justice to contemporary German social critic JrgenHabermasmagisterialTheoryofCommunicativeActionrequiresseveral booklength treatments. To understand how his broadcritique of modern society, interactivity, science, and powermightopenoureyestonewviewsofinformationworkrequires,perhaps, looseningonesbounds to strict empiricismandbeingopen to reading far and wide outside the traditional library,information science, and computer science literatures. Theresultwillprovidethereaderwithalucidandviableworldviewand grow a rich tree of ideas that apply to everything ininformation systems, interface design, information seekingbehavior, and the sociology of knowledge. This review,naturally, cannot be all things to all readers and will not dojustice to the subtly and fecundity of Habermas ideas, but itmayprovideausefulaccountofthedevelopmentofthetheoryand suggest to the reader opportunities for applying it ininformationwork.

The Theory of Communicative Action (TCA) is one part ofHabermas long examination of positivist science, society,technology,andstrategicorinstrumentalactionsthatlimitonesability to perform successfully through linguistic means in thepublic sphere. By separating communication into severalelements and focusing on the motivation behind speech,Habermas is able to articulate an entire speech act theory,sociallysensitivemeans of verification, anddemonstrateswitha variety of examples the use of power to control theknowledgebased emancipatory interests of individuals inmodern,democraticsocieties thus themain themeof theTCAisthetheoreticalreconstructionofthecompetenciesthatpeopleuseineverycommunicationtoservetheseinterests.

Habermastheoryonepistemologydifferentiatesthreecognitiveareas in which human interest generates knowledge. Theseareas determine categories relevant to what we interpret asknowledge, that is, they are knowledge constitutive theydetermine the mode of discovering knowledge and whetherknowledge claims can be warranted. These areas definecognitive interests or learning domains, and are grounded in

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different aspects of social existence work, interaction andpower (MacIsaac, 2004). For Habermas, work is acting andusing language instrumentally, typically based in theempiricalanalyticsciencespracticalinterestsarehumansocialinteraction, or communicative action, governed by consensualnorms, reciprocal expectations, and propositions that are validonly in their intersubjectivity of the mutual understanding ofintentions, which are reflected in the historicalhermeneuticdisciplines and, finally, emancipatory knowledge, that is,selfknowledge or reflection, involving recognizing ones ownandothersmotivationsandappropriatereactiontoactions.Thetypes of knowledge are generated and interpreted throughspeechacts.

Communicationstheory

Habermasbeginstheconstructionofhis frameworkbydividingcommunication into social and nonsocial. The nonsocialoperates on instrumental action and might be considered thelinguisticfaceofreification.Theother,social,isalsobifurcatedinto strategic action, oriented to success by objectifyingobjects in the social world and seeking tomanipulate them tosupportonesowninterestsandcommunicativeaction,whichaims at mutual understanding, by meaningful, intersubjectiverelationships.

This is termeduniversalpragmaticsbecausesuchcompetencestranscendspecificculturesandsocietalboundaries.Thereisthecapacity for social actors to produce and to sustain stable,useful, ordered and meaningful social life. Integrating andcritiquingmany important thinkers,primaryamong themKant,Marx, Popper, Husserl, Adorno, Mead, and Peirce, Habermasseekstoworkuptheconstitutivecapacitiesofthesocialagentby calling attention to the takenforgranted practicalattributes of competent social agents in producing andsustaining society. Other authors have pursued the same butarerejectedbyHabermasbecausetheirviewsaremonological,overlooking the effects of human interaction, leading tosubjectlessrulesystems.

Playingagameisanexampleofsucharulesystem.Playersofagamerecognizeandrespondtotherulesofagame,knowingwhen amove is appropriate and when it is not, so Habermasincorporates Chomskys structuralism and Wittgensteinsexplanation of language games in how humans recognizeappropriate language use. Wittgenstein states that there is abasiccompetencyabidingbytherulesbut,interestingly,onedoesnotneedtoknowtherulesindetail.Peopleplayinggamesknowhowratherthanknowthat.Innovelsituations,peoplerespondsuccessfullywithoutneedingtoarticulatetherulesandthat the rules differ in the cognitive role of language, e.g., tocommunicate facts about nonlinguistic world (e.g., itsraining).

Using language to describe the state of affairs in the world,e.g., it is raining if and only if it is [actually] raining leadssome to think Habermas calls for a correspondence theory oftruth. He is more concerned about the appropriateness andentailmentsofusingsuchsentences inparticularsettings.Thuslanguagerulesforthereligiouscontextarenotthesameasforsciencenorpoetrythesameasforjournalism,andsoon.Whatis entailed in making a true or even meaningful sentence isdistinctive to that particular language game. In a simplisticexample, to utter a sentence is one thing to utter that same



sentence in response to a different language game and besuccessful means the speaker and hearer need to know therules of that language and need to be able to relate to eachother in concrete situations. It requires knowledge of whencertain forms of questions and answers are appropriate.Moreover, it requires a kind of questioning to createmutuallythe context for a certain form of questioning and so establishthe conditions inwhich the participants can replymeaningfully(Habermas,2001).

Unlike other forms of communications or linguistic analysiswhere utterances are parsed into logical units, assigned truthvalues,and fromthatonedetermines the [logical] truthof thewhole, as the logical atomists and positivists did and certainanalytic philosophers of language do still, Habermas situatesutterances in social theory: people act when they speak toothersincontextsparticipatesrecognize.Thespeechactbehindthe surface of the utterance includes commitments or someaspect of the relationship between the interlocutors, e.g,questioning,promising,ordering, requesting,etc. Forexample,to say Ill meet you at the bar at 6 p.m. is partiallyinformative[thespeakerintendstobeatthebarat6]butalsoanormativecommitmentonthespeakersparttothehearer[Ipromise Illmeetyouat thebarat6]. If thespeakerdoesnotappear at the restaurant at the agreed upon time, then theother person is owed (because of the relationship betweenthem, the normative right) some kind of explanation orapology.

Some of this type of behavior is already institutionalized. Areligious figure (priest, rabbi, shaman, etc.) who pronouncestwo people as married brings those two people (and thecongregation) into the shared religious community and alsochangesthesocialidentityofthenewlymarriedfolk.Thereare,then, various social, moral, religious, behavioral and socialentailments in public speech acts. The theory is not aimedsolely at the individual who is affected, but Habermasuniversal pragmatics is just that: a reconstruction of theconditionsof successful interchangeofall languageuserswhynot,then,wholesocieties,too?

Habermas furthers his idea by considering what types ofrelationshipsthatexistandrecognizestheneedtoexaminetheroleofcognitive languageuse.Heusestheexampleofplayingchess against a computer or against a human. There is nodifference if the humanity of the human player is overlooked.Theinherenettelosofcommunicationismutualunderstandingbetween subjects here themutual anticipation of each othersintentions. [This is foundalso in communications theorywherespeakers will anticipate and so complete sentences for theother.] Keeping to the chess game, Habermas claims that agoodgamecanbestrategicbothsidesplayingtowinandbeenjoyable justby following the rules.Although theprocess canbeginanddrawtoasuccessfulclosewithcheckmate,theremaybe no literal communication between speaker/hearer. Forinstance, when discourse partners begin to misunderstand theothers intentions during the game, then communication willbreakdown,orwhenoneorbothsidesdisregardtherules.Butcommunicationmay continue as language about the language:theplayers can stop thegame toask for clarification,or evento discuss whether they would agree on suspending play longenoughtoaskquestions.

Ifthegameanalogydistortsrelationsbetweencommunicationit



distortsalsotherelationshipbetweenthespeakerandlanguagebecause communicating partners are intersubjective speakers.Communicators can assess the legitimacy of the socialconnectionaspartof theveryprocessofusing them,butonlyso far as they acknowledge each other as competent subjects.Consider the case of a police officer trying tomake a difficultarrest. The person being arrested might challenge the officerYoucantarrestme... Im inmyownhouse!Asthecountlesstelevision shows about police activity evidence, the officerwillnot engage in communication about the legitimacy of hisactions: the normative right, his role, has already beenestablished,albeittacitly,byboththeuniformedofficerandtheperson being arrested. The relationship between officer andarrestee isestablishedfirstbytheofficersrolebutnotusuallymaintained communicatively: the officer acts strategically toachieve his end, choosing not to respond to some questions.That same officer, out of uniform, offduty, may not entersomeones house andmake an arrest. The potential arresteesdemands for explanations are on a far stronger normativeground.

RespondingpartiallytoJohnL.Austins(1962)andJohnSearles(1969,1998) theoryof speechacts (thatpeopledo thingswithwords, to effect change or to describe something about theworld),andfromKant(that languagehasatranscendentalrolein that language is not the reality but the possibility of ourexperienceofreality(Habermas,2001,p.58)),andfromotherthinkers (that our language acts are interactions, perhaps ourinteraction or labor in the lifeworld), Habermas explains thecognitive role of language in providing both propositionalcontent and illocutionary force. Habermas adopts part ofAustins theory and reshapes it by incorporating the effectintersubjective action exerts over speech. Discourse partnersaware of the norms of behavior between them can expect topursue questions with the other person without necessarilyrupturing their relationship and, importantly, by receiving ananswer, a warrant, for the speakers claim to cashin theclaim.Onecansay,forexample,Imthirsty,getmeaglassofwateramongfriendsintheappropriatediscoursesituation,sayvisitingoneshome,andthehearerwillrespondbyprovidingaglassofwater.Thesameutterancetoagraduatestudentduringalectureraisesdifferentbehaviors:areyousureyouwantmetogetyouaglassofwater?Theresapitcherandglassrightinfrontofyou.OrImyourresearchassistant,notyourwaiterEither way, discourse partners can remove the locus ofattention from the surface or semantic level to the use of theutterance between them, that is the pragmatic level, bydecenteringthediscourse.

Inan idealizedway, ifallparticipantscanchallengetheclaims(both the truth or falsity of an utterances content, or theappropriateness of the utterance and the context of theirinteraction), then to commit a speech act means the otherperson is entitled, given the relationship between them, tochallengeit.Thustodosomethingwithwordsmeansthehearercanchallengeabout the facts in theutterance.Toasserta factin an utterance means the emphasis is upon the relationshipestablished between the speaker/hearer (S/H), rather than thefactitself.

Challenges (whats your right to do X?) risk a potentialbreakdown in the conversationbut conversations can continueusing language to talk about the conversation itself. One doesnot need an artificial language (such as logic systems or



metalanguage) to discuss the language. (Compare this tophilosophyof languagetheoriesthatrequireanutterancetobelabeled p, for proposition, and conversation about p aredescribedsymbolicallythroughametalanguageasthatp.)

On a grander scale, such that of a society, a main point ofspeechacts is that theyareconsideredsuccessful if theyhavetheforcetogenerateaninterpersonalrelationshipbetweentwoormore subjects, freely entered by all partners. Excluding forthe moment institutionalized or already ritualized situations,such as baptisms, the speech act generates the contextwithinwhichaspeakersagreements,promises,etc.,canmakesenseandbebindingonallinvolved.

The second main point is that speech acts focus onunderstandingandacceptingothersintentionsinspeech.

From these theories, Habermas wants to establish a rationalfoundation,thereasonsforacceptingorrejectingclaimsandtoestablish communicative action as an alternative both toinstrumentalanddialecticalreasoning.Thishedoesintheformofvalidityclaims.

ValidityClaims

Inprinciple,onecanchallengeanutterance,thatisdemandthatthe speaker demonstrate that what is claimed, implicitly orexplicitly, is valid or acceptable. But to demand this, thespeakermust be free to challenge, based on normative right:what rationales might be valid or acceptable? Habermasdemonstratesthatentailedinanutteranceisafourpartvalidityclaim.Theseclaims(1)bindthespeakertotheutteranceitself,(2) to his own intentions in making the utterance, (3) to thesocialworldoftherelationshipbetweenparticipants,and,(4)totheexternalnaturalworld.Thefourclaimsarelabeled

1. truth [cognitive content the relationship of theutterance tothe objective world], 2. normative right (or rightness) [therelationshipofthespeakertosocial,cultural,andmoralworld],3. intelligibility [the linguistic coherence of the utterance thebasic senseofanutterance that follows the rulesof semanticsand syntax], 4. truthfulness, or sincerity [the intention of thespeaker inmaking the utterance the relationship of utteranceandspeaker].

RedemptionorCashinginoftheclaim

Redemption of the truth claimsmay be at a rather superficiallevel: the speaker could choose an empiricist response, sayshowingsomeoneacopyofabookwiththeauthorsnameonitin response to the question Did John really write that book?More significantly is how a validity claim may disrupt onesknowledgeorthelanguagegame.Newevidence,beitevidencethat is contrary to an earlier promise or facts or some otherentailment that do not hold together, or expectations that areunfulfilled, returnsHabermas tohis original interestwithC.S.Peirces pragmatism. For Peirce, scientific inquiry incorporatesthe takenforgrantedexpectationsand thedisruptivenatureofnew data and how ultimately the totality of [scientific]knowledgeandexpectationsof ituseareadoptedandadjustedby the community of scientists.When there is disruption, it islikely that discourse, or some form of argumentation, isrequiredtoestablishtherelevanceofthecontestedtruthclaim(Habermas, 2001, p. 88). As suggested earlier, it is not solely



the truth of something corresponding with reality, but theprocess through which truth comes to be ascribed to aproposition.

From this Habermas argues to a broader social and discursiveperspective: a proposition is true if and only if everyone elsewhocouldenterintothisdiscoursewithmewouldacceptitastrue (Habermas, 2001, p. 89). It is important to note, though,that Habermas is not arguing for a simple, relativistic view oftruth. Furthermore, Habermas takes this idea from scientificinquiry (the community of scientists) to the larger community,toseethiskindofargumentationasanemancipatoryaccountoftruth (Habermas, 1976a). Propositions are held provisionallytrueargumentationrespondstothedisruptiveevidence.Truth,then,isredeemedthroughdiscourse.

Validityclaimcontributions

Each of the validity claims contributes some facet tounderstanding. Truth and normative right have already beenexpressedasbearingheavilyuponeachother.

The purpose of discourse is to move from the appearance ofrealitytoanunderstandingoftruth,ifallcompetentparticipantscould join in free discussion. The participants are themselvessomewhat bound to the background of takenforgrantedassumptions(lifeworld)andthediscourse,whichmayalsocallinto doubt the competence of earlier disputants, whichreintroducessomehumanityintotruth.Secondly,forcompetentparticipants to join in freely means imbalances of powerbetween speakers need also to be addressed. A community ofdisputants theoretically would address this because all couldraisequestions,explain,justify,etc.,providedallmovetowardsfreeconsensusandmutualunderstanding.

Society is not the free exchange of ideas nor are all contextsequal:enternormativerightagain.Ifthereisanormativerightto initiate a certain social relationship, then one is associatedwithsocialnorms.Forexampleapersonorderinganothergivensome context, such as higher rank, social role, or somethingbasedinotheracknowledgednorms,suchasrespectforelders.Thepoint is the legitimacyof thenormand thenormsbindingpower are present with and controlled by the participants.Legitimacy must, then, differ from a strict empiricist orpositivist view, that logic based systems existing outside theirdomain of use, the way mathematical and logical truths arebelieved by some to be immune from human bias, as anexternal, selflegitimating metalanguage might. Norms do notexpress a morally binding obligation (e.g., ought to dosomething), but instead reflect an is (that a rule is part of areifiedsocialreality)(Habermas,1976b).

The two remaining claims, intelligibility and truthfulness, arestraight forward. Intelligibility is the intelligibility of the actualheard or seen utterance. If a hearer cannot comprehend anutterance,saythesyntax isaskeworonedoesnotunderstandaterm,thespeakercanrephraseorprovideanexplanation.

Truthfulness, or sincere intentionality, is redeemed byexamining the consistency between the utterance and the actovertime.Thevalidityclaimisbasedonobservation:promisingtomeet at the bar at 6 p.m. and appearing fulfills part of theclaim. Having an inconsistent record of fulfilling promises, ofcourse,impactsthis.



Actual communication is not always directed towards mutualunderstanding and people do not often reflect on the normsbetween speaker and hearer there recede at times into thetakenforgranted lifeworld.Onedoesnotsee thesincerityandintentionsofallspeechandsuchspeechmightbesystematicallymanipulated.Whatstandard isavailabletohelpcritiqueandsorecognize strategic action? How does one know when there ismanipulationorsomehowonesacceptanceofspeechactsisnotfully free? Writes Habermas, there will always be disruptionsbut a person, or group, can act strategically by treating theothers as objects to bemanipulated, rather than subjects withwhom one communicates: there is privileged access toweapons,wealthorstanding,inordertowrestagreementfromanotherparty(Habermas,1982)bypreventing,forestalling,orotherwisemanipulatingrationalargumentandaccesstovalidityclaimsbehindutterances.

In sum, the ability to reflect on ones own assumptions and totreat utterances as hypothetical moves discourse from merecommunication between speaker(s) and hearer(s) to themotivations, truths, needs, expectations, and so on, to themutual relationship between them and how they create thecontext in which a utterance might be judged true (in theirlifeworld) and so warrants the groups acceptance as part ofmembers participation in the public sphere, because thespeaker is accountable. Since the way in which this discourseenfolds is critical, Habermasmust address the freedom of theparticipants, their competencies, and how such speech in thepublicspheremightbedistorted.

Systematicallydistortedcommunication

It seems one of themost difficult ideas for some to accept isthat people in the sciences, or those who create technologicalsolutions to human problems based in science, do notnecessarily act objectively and that pure reason necessarilyyields unbiased, objective, and humanlyuseful consequences.There are certainly situations where people resort, perhapsunwittingly,oftenknowingly,tolonghelddeceptions.Therearealso situations where the symbol system of speech chosen bythe speaker and deemed intelligible are unintelligible to thehearer.Resortingtohermeneuticdiscourseinsuchsituationsisuseless because the language has become a private language:unintelligibility distorts the communication and the source ofthat distortion may be intentional as an attempt to avoidconflict.Habermassees thisakin tosystemstheory,almostasdifferent systems coming together but there are powerimbalances in the lifeworlds of these systems, some excludingothers from communication, some deliberately shielding theirwarrants from inspection. In the end, all such efforts destroyconsensus and significantly are replaced by stereotypic,unreflexive, rigid relations. The influence is greater than thesum of the parts because this affects the individuals humandevelopment and by extension the others in the lifeworld andwhole societies, because even the coherency of social normsareaffected.Itisnotmerelytheprocessofrationallegitimationbut the very demand for legitimacy that is challenged. In lightof this, Habermas articulates an idealized model, the idealspeech situation, which is a development of Meads work. Heseestheneed,too,toexplicatetheprocessof legitimationandethicalentailmentsoflegitimacy.[HerethereaderisdirectedtoLegitimation Crisis, but in brief, without falling into moralrelativism, discourse ethics accept the tentative validity of



culturalvaluesandhelpstoexposefalseconsensus,appliedbysome to the repression and marginalization of interests ofcertaingroups.]

Fromtheorytopractice:lifeworldandsystem

Having articulated a theoretical model, Habermas realizes hismodel in The Theory of Communicative Action (TCA). In thistwovolume work, he explains three themes: concept ofcommunicative rationality, society as consisting of two levels(system and lifeworld), and a theory of modernity. Asalready seen, TCA is both linguistic and intersubjective.Habermas explains in a complex of ideas what happens whenthe notions of intersubjective relationships, language, anduniversal pragmatics coalesce at the societal level, the socialworld inwhichhumanswork,manipulateeachothers,orstriveformutualunderstanding.Whatcompetenciesareneededinthemodern world and how are they formed and used? Whathappenswhen the same linguistic andactionsoccur in similar,but slightly discordant, situations: the contexts shift enough(topicdependent contextual knowledge shifts (Habermas,1999,p.241)tochallengenavepresumptionsofsocialnorms,of interpretation, and lead to significantly different outcomes.The takenforgranted assumptions of shared belief and sociallinks become unstable and those affected must attend to theaffected part of their lifeworld. What do the affectedparticipants share and on what can they agree? As actionschange,sodifferentelementsofthelifeworldbecomerelevant.What is at issue here is the way in which the immediateactivity or situation is defined by those participating in it. Asituation is a segment of lifeworld contexts of relevance(Habermas,1987,p.122)whatbeliefsandcompetenciesfromthe lifeworlds involved are relevant now? The framework ofinterpretationcanshift.

Thebeliefsandcompetenciesoftheparticipantsarepresented,discussed, and validated in and through language. Thismeansthe lifeworld is not the physical reality but the linguisticallymediatedone.Asituation,anutterance,anexperience,etc., ismeaningless initially at least between people until there is asharedunderstanding of the event. It is themutual attempt todraw others into ones takenforgranted background of thelifeworld that establishes meaning and, in some situations,appropriatenessforfutureaction.Thecollectionofabilitiesthatone has at repairing and maintaining social relations inlanguage, moving towards mutual understanding, is onescommunicativecompetence.

These same agents can participate obliquely in situations inwhich they are not actual subjects: one can see other eventsandnarrateeventstoothersorexplicateonesownpasteventsby drawing on the shared cultural and social norms andknowledge. The lifeworld, then, has three parts: culture,society, and personality (Habermas, 1987, p. 138). Habermas(1988)defineseach:

Culture: the store of knowledge fromwhich those engaged incommunicative action draw interpretations susceptible ofconsensusastheycometoanunderstandingaboutsomethingintheworld,

Society: the legitimate order from which those engaged incommunicativeactiongatherrelationshipswithoneanother,



Personality: the acquired competences that render a subjectcapable of speech and action and hence able to participate inprocesses of mutual understanding in a given context and tomaintainhisownidentityintheshiftingcontextsofinteraction.

This does not suggest Habermas is denigrating science,knowledge,or truth into something relativist:his viewof truthincontextultimatelyisboundinempiricalwaystotheobjectiveworld, although he echos Husserls complaint about positivistassumptionsthatthenaturalsciencescananddorepresenttheobjective (physical) world as it is. Habermas denies thatscientificknowledgearenecessarilybound toculturalartifacts.Understanding and action in the world (knowledge) in theframework of TCA are liable to create disruptive situations,which act as a check, and result from agents interacting witheachotherswithinasharedculturaltradition.Interpretationsofeventsarestillboundtorationality,sharedbodiesofknowledgeand social practices. Nor are these bound to a single culture.Habermas abstracts this to the symbolic level, so whileindividualsareshapedbytheirsocietiesandviceversa,itisnotaparticularmemberofsocietyoraspecificsociety.There isasystem of symbolic reproduction that moves between theresources of the lifeworld and the competencies of socialagents. There is not a preexisting role but a dynamism inwhichtheindividualsidentity,values,andbeliefsareinrelationtothenormativestructuresofasocietyandthefullysocializedindividualhastheinterpretiveskillstoparticipateinanddiscusstheobjectiveworld.Societydoesnotdictatetheshapingoftheindividual. Resources, competencies, and normative behaviorsare played out in a culture for the transmission of rationalknowledge and are the source of legitimation for socialinstitutions.

CritiqueoftheTCA

Critique of Habermas theory of communicative action is oftenmerged intocritiqueofhisoverallprogram,criticizers favoringone part or the other. There is no particular dominant themeand, indeed, a review of the literature suggests, among otherthings, strong biases on the part of the critic and littlesustainable,warrantedcomplaint.

The theory has been applied in many fields. Those issues arediscussed below. In general complaints about the TCA rangeoverHabermasopinion, realor imagined,aboutempiricism tothe issue of universality. Given his interest in, and originalwriting on the critique of positivist science, some reviewersfocus on his attitudes of technology. To illustrate, Feenberg(1996) offers what is typical of the rather curious cant. Hewrites Design critique holds that social interests or culturalvaluesinfluencetherealizationoftechnicalprinciples.Forsomecritics, it is Christian ormasculinist values that have given ustheimpressionthatwecanconquernature,abeliefthatshowsup in ecologically unsound technical design for others it iscapitalistvaluesthathaveturnedtechnology into instrumentofdominationoflaborandexploitationofnature....

Other authors complain Habermas view is too limited, toorestricted to that dismissivephrase deadwhitemen.Stanleyand Pateman (1991) lament that Habermas hopeful, universalconsiderations do not indulge sufficiently issues of gender orrace.TheyaskisHabermastheorizingbuiltonaconceptionofthe world in which, surreptitiously, essentialist characteristics(e.g., middle class white males) dominate? It is a fact that



the entire project of modernity and associated discourses ofrationality and progress have historically sided withmen overwomen (Stanley and Pateman, 1991). Their argument,however,offersnorealevidencetheyhaveestablishedintheirmindsthefactofmodernityandproceedtodismissthosewhodisagree.Furthermore,theycomplainthatHabermaseffortsatuniversality are gender blind and therefore malestreams[sic] analysis. On the other hand, feminist philosopher SelyaBenhabib(1986)acceptsthetheoryasanappropriatebasis fornormativecritiqueforsociety.

Gilroycomplains(1992)thatHabermasworkistooEurocentric.McCarthy,a translatorofHabermasworkandsometimecritic,counters: Postmodernist critiques of moral universalism toooften simply ignore the fact that it is precisely notions offairness,impartiality,respectfortheintegrityanddignityoftheindividual, and the like that undergrid respectful tolerance ofdifference by placing limits on egocentrism. Typically, suchnotions are simply taken for granted in antiuniversalistinvocationsofothernessanddifferencewhichare,itevidentlygoeswithoutsaying,toberespected,notobliterated(1978,p.xii).

Inthesameway,someauthorsclaimHabermasisfocusedtoomuchonthebourgeoisie.Givenhisearlysocialandintellectualenvironment, critiqueofMarxian conditions for knowledge in aKantian framework and the influence that an affluentproletariatexertsonhistoricalMarxism,hemayskewthatwaybut an open mind sees that given Habermas interest in theuniversal pragmatic perspective that unless one adopts apaternalistic, postmodernpoint of view, this is not a cripplingconcern. For example, Byberg (2003) analyzes Norwegiansociety of the 17th century as a public sphere as the result ofthe Bishop of Kristiansands establishment of 40 readingsocieties among peasants and the consequences of literacyamongthosegroups.

Nikolas Luhann (1982) is a longstanding critic of Habermasefforts, believing that theGerman social theoristswork is toobig, has too many grounds and arguments, and thatcommunication does not necessarily lead anywhere (quoted inBrand, 1990). Luhmann complains that Habermas does notsufficientlydistinguishbetweentwocontextsofanalysis:formaluniversalpragmaticsorempiricalresearch.Someauthors,e.g.,Doorne,thinkHabermasconflatesthemandclaimsHabermasishostile to empirical research and deductive logic. However,Szczelkun,McCarthy,BenoitandothersseeHabermasasusingboth tools, when appropriate. Indeed Szczelkun downplaysHabermas transcendalistgildingandproclaimstheTCA itselfaproduct of empirical investigation. McCarthy emphasizesHabermas point that competing normative claims are gearedtowhateveryonecould rationallywill tobeanormbindingoneveryone alike through reasoning argument among thosesubjecttothenorminquestion(p.viii).Benoitmodelshumancomputer and humanhuman interaction on the TCA and thenuses Habermas validity claims as a quantifiable measure oflinguisticperformanceindifferentnormativeright.

Habermasnolongerusestheidealspeechsituationtorefertoa situation of perfect symmetry among partners and thatperhaps affects presuppositions about rational discourse thatone makes when engaging in argumentation. As Habermaswrites, discourse participants can suspend discourse about anacknowledgedsharedgoaltoconsiderthestructureandrulesof



their linguistic engagement in order to clarify the normativeright between them. Habermas never states specifically thatdiscoursepartersareequalinallparticularsandhetakespainstodescribe the takenforgrantedaspectsof roles in the socialsphere.

But the most interesting point is that Habermas avoidscontextualism in favor of the necessity of communicative orintersubjectivist approaches, thinking of instrumental vs.communicative rationality, and the need to avoid drifting intoprivate language to cashin the validity claims. Heath (2003)criticizes Habermas attempt to introduce a universalizationprinciple governingmoral discourse, aswell as his criteria fordistinguishingbetweenmoralandethicalproblems[byapplyinggametheoreticmodels] tospecify theburdenofproof that theTCAanddiscoursemust assume. It is not convincing, though,in Heaths writing that there is any kind of proof, verificationtechniques,andthelikethatcanaddressmoralproblems,sincetheytendtobetranscendentaland,likeallsuchargumentation,separatefromempiricaldebate.

Themost difficult part of Habermas as a philosopher remainsthe issues of intersubjectivity, role of rationality, and truth.Powells (2002) argument about the role of experience in thevindication of cognitive claims of truth is not sufficient toovercomeHabermasmarryingofhiswork toPeirceandotherpragmatists.Thepragmatistaccountoftruthhasyettobefullyexplained in ways that will settle the minor concerns ofcorrespondence, coherence, and deflationists complaints. Onemust acknowledge, however, that the pragmatist account oftruth is difficult to internalize without slipping into relativism,but one suspects that Bertram Russells frequently cited, halfcitationofWilliamJamessexpressionofthepragmatistaccountoftruthisaconfoundingfactor(Putnam,1995).

Again, Powells complaint about the concept of intersubjecvityand rationalism in linguistic communication does not derideHabermas theory. Habermasian rational communication canlimit the affected aspects of belief (passion, desire, religiousfeeling)providedtherearewillingdiscoursepartners.

Finally, a legitimate difficulty is how to connect rationalcommunicative behaviors to nonrational issues and to nonlinguisticformsofcommunication.

Testing the Theory of Communicative Action is, naturally, thebestwaytoexposeweaknesses.

ApplicationsoftheTCA

The TCA has been applied to society in general, to organizedworkandtointerpersonalcommunicativebehaviors.Ithasbeentested empirically in a variety of disciplines management,information retrieval, etc. as amodel for humanhumanandhumanmachineinformationexchangesandasaframeworkforbuilding actual computerized systems. For brevitys sake, thissection will proceed from the broadest uses of the TCA tospecificprojects.

Habermasworkhasbeenconsideredalsoasa complementorcounter to modernist and postmodernist hypotheses. Forinstance,Foursconsidersthetheoryasmanyauthorsdoaspartof modernism and postmodernisms concern for reflexivity,since TCA is bound to formal pragmatics, communicative



rationality, reactivition of the criticaltheoretic program (seealsoHonneths(2004)),and,importantlycritiqueoflegitimation.Gimmer is an example of researchers who use the theory tobridge to longstanding complex philosophical concerns,cognitivism,moralvs.ethicalissues,anduniversalization.

If we consider universalization of technology then masscommunication comes to the fore. Skollerhorn (1998),Leydesorff (2001), among others, consider the TCA and itseffect on people. They examine howpeople arewatched, dataand information transmitted, the use of entertainment, andultimately,howallthesecometogetherasmobilization:turninginformation into action in the public sphere. Skollerhorn, forexample,appliesthetheorytounderstandtheconsequencesofpublic environmental policy Alvesson and Willmott (1992) tocritical management, and Van Every & Taylor (1998) tomodelingtheorganizationasacommunicativeactivity.

Abrieflistofotherapplicationsshouldsuggesttothereadertheflexibility both of the theory and of interpretation of the TCA.Wilson (1991) applies the theory to the concept of thecommons and the use of both hermeneutichistorical andempiricalanalyticmethods andhow the theory canbeused tounderstand the systemic forces on the commons, thereproductionofconservationnorms,andthemanagementofthecommunity in which these events occur. McDonald (2005)takesthesameideaofgovernmentpolicyandTCAandappliesittosport.

InHabermasearlywork,hestatesheismotivatedtoadegreeby systems theory. It follows that this interestwould resonatein systems design, management, information systems design,and the humaninformation systems that consume informationresources. Ng (2002) examines the applicability of universitypragmatics in IR interaction Benoit (1998 2002) alsoexamines, adopts, and tests the theory for IR. Themodel hasbeen applied in computerized information systems: theCoordinator (Winograd & Flores), Sampo (Auramki,Lehtinen, & Lyytinen, (1988), Milan conversational model (DeMichelis&Grasso (1994)), information systemsdesign (Jansonand Woo (1995) Benoit (2002) Lyytinen & Ngwenyama(1992)),doingandspeakingintheoffice(Flores&Ludlow).

For information retrieval and humancomputer interactionresearchers, the TCA is potentially a powerful model, but todatehasnotbeenfullycapitalized.Onereason,perhaps, isthelack of interest in education in theory in LIS (Fisher, et al.,2005Warner,Miksa,Blaire,Bonnici,&Miksa, 2005), the lackofinterest inphilosophical issues,orthedismissalofthattopicentirely. While recently some Library & Information Scienceauthors,suchasBudd(2004),tackletheeverdifficulttrinityoflanguage, semantics, and philosophy in the form of relevance,others, such as Dobson (2002), Wiegan (2003), and Andersen(2001) put their own fine points on the issue. Anderson asksinformation criticism: where is it? Dobson asks why oneshould even bother with philosophy. The reason is thecompelling insights social theory, philosophy, and systemsdesign have at their intersection, something Arnold (2003),Benoit(2002,2006),andothersconfirm.

It should go without saying that considering phenomena ofinterestfromdifferentperspectivesisverylikelytoexpandourknowledgeofthatphenomenon.Thedifficult lay inreadingandpublishingacrossthediscipline.Perhaps,withoutthebonafides



a second doctorate provides or evident mastery of jargon ofother domains, as well as a commitment to working difficultphilosophical intellectual content to comprehension, the TCA,andmosttheories,willremainoutsidethereachunless(a)thelegitimacy of the model is demonstrated in approachable,familiarforms(empiricism)and(b)anappreciationofthevalueoftheoryingeneralisencouraged.

Conclusions

The TCA is only part of a long developing, expansive, indeedmagisterial, view of society,ways of shaping understanding ofsocietyandofeachothers throughour communicativeactions.Unlike the skepticism of his colleague Adorno, and (for some)the excessive transcendentalism of Kant, critiquing bothexcessiverationalismandidealism,gatheringfrompragmatistsand Popper, Habermas has created a viablemodel of how theworldworks, treading amiddleway between extremes of anydoctrineandintheendcreatingahopefulpathforhumanity.

But the work is not done. Critique of established agents,workinginstrumentallyandstrategicallyfortheirowngoals,sosuccessfully that what appears natural is really the product ofinstrumental social agencies, is extremely difficult perhapsimpossible without a renting of the veil shielding educational,technical,commercial,andgovernmentalwork.

For those interested in information, the TCA is especiallyuseful. It serves as a framework and criterion for critique ofinformation systems (humanhuman, humanmachine, humanmachinehuman). The validity claims of Habermas conceptionof speech acts can be useful in information providing agenciesin understanding the relevancy of the claims, both of thehumanandcomputerizedinformationresourceprovidingagent.In other words, TCA serves to critique information workpractices. Finally, the TCA, derived from social theories, theordinarylanguagephilosophy,workandpoliticsofferslibrary&information science a store of concepts and descriptivelanguage to expand LIS efforts and establish bridges to otherdisciplines,profitingall.

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SeeAlso

Criticaltheory

EntryAdded:January29,2005LastUpdate:September22,2008

Documents

Summary of Habermas's TCA