THE 12TH PARTTHE 12TH PART

BERKELEY : BERKELEY :

THE FOURTH REPRESENT THE FOURTH REPRESENT OF EMPIRICISMOF EMPIRICISM

英国主观唯心主义哲学家、主教。英国主观唯心主义哲学家、主教。16851685 年年 33 月月 1212 日出生于爱尔兰日出生于爱尔兰基尔肯尼郡，基尔肯尼郡， 17531753 年年 11 月月 1414 日日卒于牛津。少年早熟，卒于牛津。少年早熟， 1515 岁考进岁考进都柏林三一学院，都柏林三一学院， 17041704 年获学年获学士学位，士学位， 17071707 年获硕士学位年获硕士学位 ,, 留留校担任讲师、初级研究员。校担任讲师、初级研究员。

17091709 年刊行《视觉新论》年刊行《视觉新论》 ,1710,1710年发表《人类知识原理》年发表《人类知识原理》 ,1713,1713 年年出版《海拉斯和斐洛诺斯的三篇对出版《海拉斯和斐洛诺斯的三篇对话》，均成为当时英国各大学热烈话》，均成为当时英国各大学热烈讨论的问题。讨论的问题。 17341734 年被任命为爱年被任命为爱尔兰基尔肯尼地区主教尔兰基尔肯尼地区主教 ,, 任职任职 1818 年年 ,,仍致力于哲学的思辨。仍致力于哲学的思辨。 17521752 年移年移居牛津附近的新学院。居牛津附近的新学院。

贝克莱对于哲学心理学的贡献，主要贝克莱对于哲学心理学的贡献，主要是他的《视觉新论》，断定经验来自是他的《视觉新论》，断定经验来自视觉、触觉的客体、方位、大小和形视觉、触觉的客体、方位、大小和形状。这本书主要企图证明人们的视觉状。这本书主要企图证明人们的视觉经由什么途径来知觉客体的距离、体经由什么途径来知觉客体的距离、体积和位置；并探讨视觉的观念和触觉积和位置；并探讨视觉的观念和触觉的观念有什么差异，是否有共同的观的观念有什么差异，是否有共同的观念。念。

他认为由空间知觉来判断距离的远他认为由空间知觉来判断距离的远近和物体的大小，全凭人们的知觉近和物体的大小，全凭人们的知觉经验。物体投射到眼睛网膜的视象经验。物体投射到眼睛网膜的视象受方位、空气透视和相对大小的影受方位、空气透视和相对大小的影响，这已是人所共知的常识。还提响，这已是人所共知的常识。还提出眼的辐合作用，眼的投射域和眼出眼的辐合作用，眼的投射域和眼的调节作用（紧张度）。这些都符的调节作用（紧张度）。这些都符合现代眼科生理的事实。合现代眼科生理的事实。

洛克的经验论确认物产生了心，而贝克洛克的经验论确认物产生了心，而贝克莱的经验论却颠倒过来，误认心产生了莱的经验论却颠倒过来，误认心产生了物。他的有名公式：“存在就是被感物。他的有名公式：“存在就是被感知”，意思是感官所印入的各种感觉或知”，意思是感官所印入的各种感觉或观念，不论如何组合，如何混杂，离开观念，不论如何组合，如何混杂，离开了感知它们的心灵，就不能存在。譬如了感知它们的心灵，就不能存在。譬如一张写字台的存在，除了自己看见它、一张写字台的存在，除了自己看见它、摸过它、嗅过它，有过它的颜色、形状、摸过它、嗅过它，有过它的颜色、形状、气味，离开了感觉，或者许多感觉的复气味，离开了感觉，或者许多感觉的复合、组合，什么也没有了。 合、组合，什么也没有了。

George Berkeley was born in Ireland in 1865. George Berkeley was born in Ireland in 1865. At the age of 15 he entered Trinity College, DAt the age of 15 he entered Trinity College, Dublin, where he studied mathematics, logic, laublin, where he studied mathematics, logic, languages, and philosophy. He became a fellow nguages, and philosophy. He became a fellow of the College a few years after he took his B.of the College a few years after he took his B.A. degree and was also ordained a clergyman A. degree and was also ordained a clergyman in the Church of England, becoming a bishop in the Church of England, becoming a bishop in 1734. in 1734.

Beginning his famous literary career in his eaBeginning his famous literary career in his early 20s, his most important philosophical worrly 20s, his most important philosophical works include, among others, his ks include, among others, his Essay towards a Essay towards a New Theory of VisionNew Theory of Vision (1709), (1709), A Treatise ConcA Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledgeerning the Principles of Human Knowledge (1 (1710), and 710), and Three Dialogues between Hylas and Three Dialogues between Hylas and PhilonousPhilonous (1713). (1713).

He traveled in France and Italy, and in LonHe traveled in France and Italy, and in London became friends with Steele,don became friends with Steele, 斯蒂尔斯蒂尔AddisoAddison, and Swift. While in London he sought to n, and Swift. While in London he sought to interest Parliament in his project of creatininterest Parliament in his project of creating a college in Bermuda, whose purpose woug a college in Bermuda, whose purpose would be "the reformation of manners among tld be "the reformation of manners among the English in our western plantations, and the English in our western plantations, and the propagation of the Gospel among the Ahe propagation of the Gospel among the American savages."merican savages."

With his new bride, he sailed inWith his new bride, he sailed in1728 for America and for three years 1728 for America and for three years stayed in Newport, Rhode Island, stayed in Newport, Rhode Island, making plans for his college. As the making plans for his college. As the money for his college was never money for his college was never raised, Berkeley returned to London, raised, Berkeley returned to London, leaving his influence upon American leaving his influence upon American philosophy through frequent philosophy through frequent associations with Jonathan Edwards.associations with Jonathan Edwards.

Shortly thereafter he returned to IreShortly thereafter he returned to Ireland, where for 18 years he was Bishland, where for 18 years he was Bishop of Cloyne. At the age ofop of Cloyne. At the age of67, he settled down in Oxford with hi67, he settled down in Oxford with his wife and family; a year later, in 175s wife and family; a year later, in 1753, he died and was buried in Christ 3, he died and was buried in Christ Church Chapel in Oxford.Church Chapel in Oxford.

It is ironic that Locke's common-sense appIt is ironic that Locke's common-sense approach to philosophy should have: influenced roach to philosophy should have: influenced Berkeley to formulate a philosophical positioBerkeley to formulate a philosophical position that at first seems so much at variance with n that at first seems so much at variance with common sense. He became the object of severcommon sense. He became the object of severe criticisme criticismand ridicule for denying what seemed most oand ridicule for denying what seemed most obvious to anyone. Berkeley had set out to denbvious to anyone. Berkeley had set out to deny the existence of matter. Samuel Johnson muy the existence of matter. Samuel Johnson must have expressed the reaction of many when st have expressed the reaction of many when he kicked a large stone and said about Berkelhe kicked a large stone and said about Berkeley, "I refute him thus."ey, "I refute him thus."

Berkeley‘s startling and provocative forBerkeley‘s startling and provocative formula was that “to be is to be per-mula was that “to be is to be per-ceived,” ceived,” esse est percipi. Clearly this wou. Clearly this would mean that if something were notld mean that if something were notperceived, it would not exist. Berkeley wperceived, it would not exist. Berkeley was perfectly aware of the potentialas perfectly aware of the potentialnonsense involved in this formula, for he nonsense involved in this formula, for he says, “Let it not be said that I takesays, “Let it not be said that I takeaway Existence. I only declare the meaniaway Existence. I only declare the meaning of the word so far as I comprehend itng of the word so far as I comprehend it ..

(( 我只是宣示了我所理解的这个词的意义我只是宣示了我所理解的这个词的意义 ))

StillStill((不管怎么说不管怎么说 ),), to say that the existence of to say that the existence of something depends upon its beingsomething depends upon its beingperceived perceived doesdoes raise for us the questi raise for us the question whether it exists when it is not beion whether it exists when it is not being perceived. For Berkeley the wholng perceived. For Berkeley the whole problem turned on how we interpre problem turned on how we interpret or understand the word exists:et or understand the word exists:

"The table I write on I say exists; th"The table I write on I say exists; that is, I see and feel it: and if I were oat is, I see and feel it: and if I were out of my study I should say it existed;ut of my study I should say it existed; meaning thereby that if I were in m meaning thereby that if I were in my study I might perceive it, or that sy study I might perceive it, or that some other spirit actually does perceiome other spirit actually does perceive it."ve it."

Here Berkeley is saying that the worHere Berkeley is saying that the word d exists has no other meaning than th has no other meaning than the one contained in his formula, for we one contained in his formula, for we can know no instance where the tere can know no instance where the term m existsexists is used without at the same t is used without at the same time assuming that a mind is perceiviime assuming that a mind is perceiving something.ng something. 因为我们找不到任何一个场合，其中我们使用“存因为我们找不到任何一个场合，其中我们使用“存

在”这个词，而同时又不设定有一个心灵感知着某物。在”这个词，而同时又不设定有一个心灵感知着某物。

To those who argued that material things haTo those who argued that material things have some kind of ve some kind of absolute existence without an existence without any relation to their being perceived, Berkeley y relation to their being perceived, Berkeley replied, "that is to me unintelligible." To be sreplied, "that is to me unintelligible." To be sure, he said, "the horse is in the stable, the boure, he said, "the horse is in the stable, the books in the study as before, even if I am not thoks in the study as before, even if I am not there. But since we know of no instance of anytere. But since we know of no instance of anything's existing without being perceived, the thing's existing without being perceived, the table, horse, and books able, horse, and books exist even when I do n even when I do not perceive them because someone does perceot perceive them because someone does perceive them."ive them."

How did Berkeley come upon this novel vHow did Berkeley come upon this novel view? In his iew? In his New Theory of Visionhe argued that all our knowledge dependhe argued that all our knowledge depends upon actual vision and other s upon actual vision and other sensory experiences. In particular Berkelsensory experiences. In particular Berkeley argued that we never senseey argued that we never sense space or or magnitude; we only have different visions o; we only have different visions or perceptions of things when we see them r perceptions of things when we see them from different perspectives. Nor do we from different perspectives. Nor do we see distance; the distance of objects is sugg distance; the distance of objects is suggested by our experience.ested by our experience.

All that we ever see are the qualities All that we ever see are the qualities of an object that our faculty of vision of an object that our faculty of vision is capable of sensing. We do not see tis capable of sensing. We do not see the he closeness of an object; we only hav of an object; we only have a different vision of it when we move a different vision of it when we move toward or away from it. e toward or away from it. 他绝对不可能发现任何不他绝对不可能发现任何不依赖于他的观念的对象依赖于他的观念的对象

The more Berkeley considered the wThe more Berkeley considered the workings of his own mind and wonderorkings of his own mind and wondered how his ideas were related to objeed how his ideas were related to objects outside of his mind, the more certcts outside of his mind, the more certain he was that he could never discovain he was that he could never discover any object independent of his ideaer any object independent of his ideas.s.

“ “When we do our utmost to conceive the When we do our utmost to conceive the existence of external bodies,” he said, “wexistence of external bodies,” he said, “we are all the while e are all the while contemplatingcontemplating our own our own ideas.” Nothing seems easier for us than tideas.” Nothing seems easier for us than to imagine trees in a park or books in a clo imagine trees in a park or books in a closet without anyone‘s looking for them. oset without anyone‘s looking for them. But what is all this, Berkeley says, except But what is all this, Berkeley says, except “framing in your mind certain ideas whi“framing in your mind certain ideas which you call ch you call books and and trees. . . . But do no. . . . But do not you yourself perceive or think of them at you yourself perceive or think of them all the while?”ll the while?” 但这时不正是你在感知他们思考它们吗？但这时不正是你在感知他们思考它们吗？

It is impossible, he concluded, ever to It is impossible, he concluded, ever to think of anything except as related to think of anything except as related to a mind. We never experience a mind. We never experience somethisomething ng that exists outside of us and separthat exists outside of us and separate from us ate from us as our ideas ofas our ideas ofclose and far might suggestclose and far might suggest. There is . There is nothing out there of which we do not nothing out there of which we do not have some perception.have some perception.

THE SECOND PARTTHE SECOND PARTHIS PHILOSOPHY IDEA HIS PHILOSOPHY IDEA

Matter: a Meaningless TermMatter: a Meaningless Term

Locke had said that substance, or matter, sup-Locke had said that substance, or matter, sup-

ports or acts as a substitute to the qualities we seports or acts as a substitute to the qualities we sense. In Berkeley's nse. In Berkeley's First DialogueFirst Dialogue

betweenbetween Hylas and PhilonusHylas and Philonus, , HylasHylas expresses L expresses Locke's view: “I find it necessaryocke's view: “I find it necessary

to suppose a material substratum, without which to suppose a material substratum, without which [qualities] cannot be conceived to exist."[qualities] cannot be conceived to exist."

Philonous replies that the word substPhilonous replies that the word substratum has no clear meaning for him ratum has no clear meaning for him and that he would want to "know anand that he would want to "know any sense, literal or not literal, that you y sense, literal or not literal, that you understand in it." But Hylas admits understand in it." But Hylas admits that he cannot assign any definite methat he cannot assign any definite meaning to the term substratum, saying,aning to the term substratum, saying, “I declare I know not what to say." “I declare I know not what to say."

From this the conclusion is drawn that From this the conclusion is drawn that "The absolute existence of unthinking "The absolute existence of unthinking things [matter] are words without things [matter] are words without meaning." This is not to say that meaning." This is not to say that sensible things do not possess reality sensible things do not possess reality but only that sensible things exist only but only that sensible things exist only insofar as they are perceived. This of insofar as they are perceived. This of course implies that only ideas exist, but course implies that only ideas exist, but Berkeley adds that “I hope that to call Berkeley adds that “I hope that to call a thing 'idea' makes it no less real."a thing 'idea' makes it no less real."

Aware that his idealism can be ridiculed, Aware that his idealism can be ridiculed, Berkeley writes: "What therefore Berkeley writes: "What therefore becomes of the sun, moon, and stars? becomes of the sun, moon, and stars? What must we think of houses, rivers, What must we think of houses, rivers, mountains, trees, stones; nay even of our mountains, trees, stones; nay even of our own bodies? Are all these so many own bodies? Are all these so many chimeras and illusions of fancy?"chimeras and illusions of fancy?"

By his principles, he says, "we are not By his principles, he says, "we are not deprived of any one thing in nature. deprived of any one thing in nature. Whatever we see, feel, hear, or any wise Whatever we see, feel, hear, or any wise conceive or understand, remains as conceive or understand, remains as secure as ever, and is as real as ever.secure as ever, and is as real as ever.

There is a There is a rerum naturarerum natura, and the distin, and the distinction between realities and chimeras rection between realities and chimeras retains its full force." If this is the case, wtains its full force." If this is the case, why say that only ideas, instead of things,hy say that only ideas, instead of things, exist? In order, Berkeley says, to elimi exist? In order, Berkeley says, to eliminate the useless concept of matter: "I dnate the useless concept of matter: "I do not argue against the existence of any o not argue against the existence of any one thing that we can apprehend, eitheone thing that we can apprehend, either by sense or reflection. . . . r by sense or reflection. . . .

The only thing whose existence we deny, The only thing whose existence we deny, is that which philosophers call matter or is that which philosophers call matter or corporeal substance. And in doing of corporeal substance. And in doing of this, there is no damage done to the rest this, there is no damage done to the rest of mankind, who, I dare say, will never of mankind, who, I dare say, will never miss it."miss it."

Science and Abstract IdeasScience and Abstract Ideas

Since it was the science of his day, particularlySince it was the science of his day, particularly

physics, that relied so heavily upon the notion ophysics, that relied so heavily upon the notion of matter, Berkeley had to come to terms with itf matter, Berkeley had to come to terms with its assumptions and methods. Science had assus assumptions and methods. Science had assumed that we can,and must, distinguish betweemed that we can,and must, distinguish between appearance and reality. The sea appears blue n appearance and reality. The sea appears blue but is really not.but is really not.

Berkeley challenged the scientist to show Berkeley challenged the scientist to show whether there is any other reality than thwhether there is any other reality than the sensible world. In this analysis Berkelee sensible world. In this analysis Berkeley was pursuing the principle of empiricisy was pursuing the principle of empiricism and was trying to refine it. Physicists, m and was trying to refine it. Physicists, he said, were obscuring science by includhe said, were obscuring science by including metaphysics in their theories. ing metaphysics in their theories.

They used such words as force, attraction, They used such words as force, attraction, gravity and thought they referred to some gravity and thought they referred to some real physical entity. real physical entity. Even to speak of minuEven to speak of minute particles, whose motions cause the qualitte particles, whose motions cause the quality of color, y of color, (( 甚至谈论那些以其运动引起了颜色性质的微粒甚至谈论那些以其运动引起了颜色性质的微粒 )) is to en is to engage in a rational and not empirical analysgage in a rational and not empirical analysis.is. （这就必须进行理性分析）（这就必须进行理性分析）

What disturbed Berkeley most was that What disturbed Berkeley most was that scientists used general or abstract terms scientists used general or abstract terms asas though these terms accurately referred though these terms accurately referred to real entities, particularly to an to real entities, particularly to an underlying material substance in nature. underlying material substance in nature.

Nowhere, Berkeley argues, do we ever come uNowhere, Berkeley argues, do we ever come upon such a substance, for substance is an abstpon such a substance, for substance is an abstract idea. Only sensed qualities really exist, aract idea. Only sensed qualities really exist, and the notion of substance is a misleading infend the notion of substance is a misleading inference drawn from observed qualities: rence drawn from observed qualities:

"As several of these [qualities] are observed "As several of these [qualities] are observed to accompany each other, they come to be to accompany each other, they come to be marked by one name, and so to be reputed as marked by one name, and so to be reputed as one thing. Thus, for example, a certain color, one thing. Thus, for example, a certain color, taste, smell, figure and consistence having taste, smell, figure and consistence having been observed to go together, are accounted been observed to go together, are accounted one distinct thing, signified by the name one distinct thing, signified by the name apple; other collections of ideas constitute a apple; other collections of ideas constitute a stone, a tree, a book and the like sensible stone, a tree, a book and the like sensible things." things."

Similarly, when scientists observeSimilarly, when scientists observethe operations of things, they use such the operations of things, they use such abstract terms as force or gravity as abstract terms as force or gravity as though these were things or had some though these were things or had some real existence in things. But force is real existence in things. But force is simply a word describing our simply a word describing our sensation of the behavior of things and sensation of the behavior of things and gives us no more knowledge than our gives us no more knowledge than our senses and reflections give us.senses and reflections give us.

Berkeley did not mean to destroy science Berkeley did not mean to destroy science any more than he wanted to deny the existenany more than he wanted to deny the existence of the "nature of things." What he did wace of the "nature of things." What he did want to do was to clarify what scientific languagnt to do was to clarify what scientific language was all about. Terms such as force, grdvihf, e was all about. Terms such as force, grdvihf, and causality refer to nothing more than cluand causality refer to nothing more than clusters of ideas which our minds derivesters of ideas which our minds derive from sensation. from sensation.

We experience that heat melts wax, but We experience that heat melts wax, but all we know from this experience is that all we know from this experience is that what we call melting wax is always accowhat we call melting wax is always accompanied by what we call heat. We havmpanied by what we call heat. We have no knowledge of any single thing for e no knowledge of any single thing for which the word causewhich the word cause stands. stands.

Indeed, the only knowledge we have iIndeed, the only knowledge we have is of particular experiences. But even s of particular experiences. But even though we do not have firsthand knothough we do not have firsthand knowledge of the causes of all things,wledge of the causes of all things, we do know the order of things. We we do know the order of things. We experience order, that A is followed bexperience order, that A is followed by B, even though we have no experieny B, even though we have no experience of why this occurs. ce of why this occurs.

Science gives us a description of physical behScience gives us a description of physical behavior, and many mechanical principles can bavior, and many mechanical principles can be accurately formulated from our bservatione accurately formulated from our bservations that are useful for purposes of prediction. Ts that are useful for purposes of prediction. Thus Berkeley would leave science intact, but hus Berkeley would leave science intact, but he would clarify itshe would clarify itslanguage so that nobody would think that scilanguage so that nobody would think that science was giving us more knowl-ence was giving us more knowl- edge than we can derive from the sensible w edge than we can derive from the sensible world. And the sensible world shows us neither orld. And the sensible world shows us neither substance nor causality.substance nor causality.

God and the Existence of ThingsGod and the Existence of Things:: Since Berkeley did not deny the existence Since Berkeley did not deny the existence of things or their order in nature, it was of things or their order in nature, it was necessary for him to explain how things necessary for him to explain how things external to our minds exist-even when we external to our minds exist-even when we don't perceive them and how they achieve don't perceive them and how they achieve their order. their order.

Thus, elaborating his general thesis that Thus, elaborating his general thesis that to be is to be perceived, Berkeley says to be is to be perceived, Berkeley says that "When I deny sensible things an that "When I deny sensible things an existence out of the mind, I do not mean existence out of the mind, I do not mean my mind in particular, but all minds.my mind in particular, but all minds.

Now it is plain they have an existence exterior Now it is plain they have an existence exterior to my mind, since I find them by experience to my mind, since I find them by experience to be independent of it. There is therefore to be independent of it. There is therefore some other mind wherein they exist, during some other mind wherein they exist, during the intervals between the time of my the intervals between the time of my perceiving them."perceiving them."

And because all human minds are intermittenAnd because all human minds are intermittently tly ((间歇性间歇性 ))diverted from things “there is an odiverted from things “there is an omnipresentmnipresent （无所不在）（无所不在） eternal Mind, which knoeternal Mind, which knows and comprehends all things, and exhibits tws and comprehends all things, and exhibits them to our view in such a manner and accordhem to our view in such a manner and according to such rules as he himself has ordained, aing to such rules as he himself has ordained, and are by us termed the Laws of Nature."nd are by us termed the Laws of Nature."

The existence of things therefore The existence of things therefore depends upon the existence of God, and depends upon the existence of God, and God is the cause of the orderliness of God is the cause of the orderliness of things in nature.things in nature.