The Consequences of Incorporation:

Reform and Heightened Coup Risk in Bolivia

Erica Rhodin Undergraduate Honors Thesis Department of Government

Advisor: Gustavo Flores-Macías April 16, 2012

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Table of Contents

1. Introduction ………………………………………………………………………..........2

2. Reform, Then and Now…………………………………………………………………16 A Comparison of the MNR (1952-1964) and the MAS (2006-Present)

3. Economic Crash and Resource Wealth…………………………………………………37 Political Implications in an Atypical Rentier State

4. Praetorian Politics Revisited…………………………………………………………….49 The Role of the Military

5. Conclusion……………………………………………………………………………….59

Appendices……………………………………………………………………………….65

References………………………………………………………………………………..67

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Introduction

On the night of April 8, 1952, 2,000 policeman joined forces with workers and followers

of the Movimiento Nacional Revolucionario (MNR) and occupied La Paz. After Radio Illimani

proclaimed the victory of revolutionary forces at dawn, the army mustered a counterattack.

When it seemed that the insurrection had failed, armed miners confronted the army north of the

city and severed the military’s supply lines with the help of party supporters. By April 11, the

military had surrendered amid institutional crisis and miners and MNR militants had overtaken

La Paz. Four days later, exiled party leader and winner of the 1951 election Víctor Paz

Estenssoro returned to Bolivia to accept the presidency.1 Riding the wave of popular zeal, the

revolutionary government promised sweeping reforms on behalf of peasants, labor, and the

middle class and the complete destruction of the powerful mine-owning oligarchy, La Rosca.

During his first term (1952-1956), Paz followed through on these promises to radically transform

the status quo, promulgating universal suffrage (1952), nationalization of the tin mines (1952),

agrarian reform (1953), and education reform (1955). Yet, revolutionary euphoria soon gave

way into intense political, economic, and social conflict.

On November 4, 1964, Paz fled to Peru with his closest advisors. The night before, a

civil-military coalition led by Generals René Barrientos Ortuño and Alfredo Ovando Candia

removed Paz from power. Despite efforts to muster the support of army units, Paz and his

ministers were unable to overcome the insurrection.2 As quickly as it started, Bolivia’s

revolutionary experiment came to a close. The 1964 military coup inaugurated two decades of

                                                        1 Merilee Grindle, “1952 and All That: The Bolivian Revolution in Comparative Perspective,” in Proclaiming Revolution: Bolivia in Comparative Perspective, ed. Merilee Grindle and Pilar Domingo (London: Institution of Latin American Studies, 2003), 5. 2 Christopher Mitchell, The Legacy of Populism in Bolivia: From the MNR to Military Rule (New York: Praeger, 1977), 96.

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authoritarianism in Bolivia. Over the course of the next fifty years, ideologically ambivalent

military rule, economic recession upon the return to democracy, and a “Crisis of Representation”

compromised the changes of the early 1950s.3

This is the story of the Movimiento Nacional Revolucionario in Bolivia. With slight

modifications, it could be told about all but three Latin American countries during the 1950s and

1960s.4 Before 1978, competitive regimes were 20 times more likely to break down than after.5

In countries with diverse histories, levels of modernization, and social structure, militaries

intervened to check presidential power, protect their institutional interests, preserve public order,

manage the economy, and/or combat real or imagined communist threats.6 Writing in 1974,

Abraham A. Lowenthal was resigned to the pervasive presence of the military in politics: “The

faith of a decade ago—that military involvement in Latin American politics would decline as a

result of economic development, social modernization, military professionalization, and

American influence—can no longer be sustained.…it appears that the military’s significant role

in Latin American politics is here to stay.”7

In a revised edition of the same volume, published a decade later, Samuel Fitch wrote,

“The political map of Latin America has changed remarkably in the period since Abraham

Lowenthal’s 1974 essay on armies and policies…The tide of military takeovers that swept Latin

America in the 1960s and early 70s has been followed by an equally strong tide of military

                                                        3 Scott Mainwaring, “The Crisis of Representation in the Andes,” Journal of Democracy 17, no. 3 (2006).; Waltraud Q. Morales, "From Revolution to Revolution: Bolivia's National Revolution and the “Re-founding” Revolution of Evo Morales," Latin Americanist 55, no.1 (2011): 135. 4 Arturo Valenzuela, "Latin American Presidencies Interrupted," Journal of Democracy 15, n. 4 (2004): 5. Only democratic regimes in Colombia, Costa Rica, and Venezuela endured during this period. 5 Scott Mainwaring and Aníbal Pérez-Liñan, “Latin American Democratization since 1978: Democratic Transitions, Breakdowns, and Erosions,” in The Third Wave of Democratization in Latin America: Advances and Setbacks, ed. Frances Hagopian and Scott Mainwaring (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 20. 6 J. Samuel Fitch, “Armies and Politics in Latin America: 1975-1985,” in Armies & Politics in Latin America, ed. Abraham Lowenthal and J. Samuel Fitch (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1986), 27-28. 7 Abraham Lowenthal, “Armies and Politics in Latin America: Introduction to the First Edition,” in Armies & Politics in Latin America, ed. Abraham Lowenthal and J. Samuel Fitch (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1986), 9.

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failures. Slowly but steadily military regimes have given way to civilian replacements.”8 The

transformation of the regional political context meant that transitions to democratic rule were

more frequent and that these regimes were more durable.9 As Figure 1 demonstrates, there is an

observable downward trend in the incidence of coup events in Latin America and globally. With

the “Third Wave of Democratization” entering its fourth decade, scholars agree that the

probability of military intervention is much lower than in the past.10 Theories based on regional

economic integration, the enforcement of democratic norms, and a decrease in polarization after

the fall of the Berlin Wall have been advanced to explain this decline.11

Figure 1: Coup Events in the World and Latin America, 1946-201012

                                                        8 Fitch, Armies and Politics, 26. 9 Mainwaring and Pérez Liñan, Latin American Democratization, 19. 10 Samuel Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century, (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991); David Pion-Berlin, “Introduction,” in Civil-Military Relations in Latin America: New Analytical Perspectives, ed. David Pion-Berlin (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2001), 10.; Valenzuela, Latin American Presidencies, 6.; Aníbal Pérez-Liñan, Presidential Impeachment and the New Political Instability in Latin America (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 43. Kent Eaton, “Backlash in Bolivia: Regional Autonomy as a Reaction against Indigenous Mobilization,” Politics & Society 35, no. 1 (2007), 43. 10 Fitch, Armies and Politics, 26. 11 Eric Rittinger and Matt Cleary, "Confronting Coup Risk in the Latin American Left," unpublished manuscript (Syracuse University, 2012); Valenzuela, Latin American Presidencies; Mainwaring and Pérez Liñan, Latin American Democratization, 38-40. 12 Monty G. Marshall and Donna Ramsey Marshall, “Coup d’État Events, 1946-2010”, Dataset. Center for Systemic Peace, University of Maryland. http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/inscr.htm. (accessed April 14, 2012). Author elaboration.

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Coups Worldwide Coups in Latin America

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It was in this permissive context that Juan Evo Morales Ayma assumed the Bolivian

presidency in 2006. As the country’s first indigenous president and a leader of the social

movements that brought down the established order, Morales’ election symbolized the triumph

of historically marginalized Bolivians. Once in office, Morales transformed Bolivian democracy

by incorporating the indigenous population into decision-making structures, changes embodied

in the progressive 2009 constitution.13 He also fulfilled campaign promises to nationalize

hydrocarbons and enact agrarian reform, remaking the state as the protagonist of economic

development. In their depth and the extent to which they challenged dominant elites, these

reforms are commensurate to those pursued by the MNR fifty years earlier. Perhaps surprisingly,

not only is Morales still in office, but the military has not staged a coup in the past six years. This

is all the more puzzling because theories that account for the general trend of decreased coups

hold little sway in the Bolivian case. The constraints of financial liberalization and integration

have not prevented Morales from pursuing controversial redistributive policies, the commitment

of the United States to democracy promotion in Bolivia is uncertain, and Bolivian politics are

highly polarized along intersecting ethnic, regional, and economic dimensions. Yet, a military

coup has not occurred in Bolivia since Morales’ election. What explains this unexpected

outcome?

The paper will use the definition of a military coup put forth by Monty G. Marshall and

Donna Ramsey Marshall: “A forceful seizure of executive authority and office by a

dissident/opposition faction within the country’s ruling or political elites that results in a

                                                        13 Clayton Mendonca Cunha, Filho and Rodrigo Santaella Goncalves, "The National Development Plan as a Political Economic Strategy in Evo Morales’ Bolivia: Accomplishments and Limitations," Latin American Perspectives 37, no 4 (2010): 182.

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substantial change in the executive leadership and the policies of the prior regime.”14 This

definition has two advantages. First, it allows for consistency. The data used in Figure 1 and in

compiling a list of Bolivian coups were assembled using this criterion. Second, it captures the

implications of a military coup for the quality of democracy. Significantly, this definition does

not require that the military take power for itself or that regime type change. Rittinger and Cleary

do incorporate this requirement into their definition, but stipulate that instances classified within

the broader category of military intervention serve as reminders that military rule falls within the

realm of possibility.15 Although Rittinger and Cleary propose a narrower definition, their

categories of “military coup” and “military intervention” carry similar implications. Regardless

of the outcome, military coups are inherently undemocratic. According to the democratic rules of

the game, power is allocated through electoral channels, not violence. A military coup clearly

violates these rules: officers are not elected, and the military is the coercive arm of the state.16

Not only does a military coup undermine democratic procedures, it compromises or reverses

democratic outcomes. Policy changes resulting from a military coup signify that the military and

its allies dictate policymaking rather than popular will expressed through representative

institutions. For the purpose of this paper, the key component of a military coup is the use of

military power to change government policy.

As a country in which the pressures leading to coups are especially strong, Bolivia should

be a deviant case. Although Figure 1 illustrates a general downward trend in coup events, it also

shows that coups and coup plotting did occur in a significant number of countries. Between 1990

and 2010, 133 coups occurred worldwide, 33 of which were successful. 12 of the attempted

                                                        14 Marshall and Marshall, Coup d’État Events, 1946-2010. 15 Rittinger and Cleary, Confronting Coup Risk. “Military interventions” include Fujimori’s autogolpe (Peru, 1992), the alliance of social movements and the military to oust Jamil Mahuad (2000, Ecuador), and the removal of Manuel Zelaya (2009, Honduras). 16 Pérez-Liñan, Presidential Impeachment, 210-11.

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coups and two successful coups occurred in Latin America, not including the 2009 removal of

Manuel Zelaya in Honduras.17 One instance of coup plotting and four alleged coups also

occurred in the region.18 Many Latin American countries still deal with frequent institutional

crises, politicized militaries, economic recessions, and demands for redistribution, all of which

have been associated with military coups.19 Bolivia is an extreme in all of these respects, and

poor or negative economic growth, poverty, inequality, and a history of exploitation of the ethnic

indigenous minority bodes poorly for stable democracy.20 Surprisingly, Bolivia conformed to the

global trend with flying colors. As Figure 2 demonstrates, Bolivia had the greatest incidence of

coup events in the region during the observed period (19). This conclusion holds even when

examining only successful coups and attempted coups. This figure is also exceptionally high

worldwide, following only Sudan (31) and Iraq (24).21 However, despite this history of severe

political instability and military intervention, a difficult transition to democracy led to 27 coup-

free years.

                                                        17 Rittinger and Cleary (2011) suggest that this case was miscoded. 18 Marshall and Marshall, Coup d’État Events, 1946-2010. Does not include plotted or alleged coups. 19 Rittinger and Cleary, Confronting Coup Risk, 3. 20 Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñan, Latin American Democratization, 11. 21 Marshall and Marshall, Coup d’État Events, 1946-2010.

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Figure 2: Incidence of Coup Events in Latin American Countries, 1946-201022

In addition to the greater structural challenges facing Bolivian democracy, theories put

forth to describe the macro trend of decreased coup incidence do not adequately explain the

Bolivian case. As Rittinger and Cleary note, these explanations fall into two categories: regional

economic integration and international norms of democracy, with the corollary of decreased

polarization with the end of the Cold War.23 The liberalization of economies throughout the

region poses constraints on redistributive policies, limiting the ability of leftists to challenge elite

interests to the point of provoking a coup.24 In addition, international organizations and the

United States have demonstrated a stronger commitment to democracy both rhetorically and

                                                        22 Marshall and Marshall, Coup d’État Events. Author elaboration. 23 Rittinger and Cleary, Confronting Coup Risk. 24 Daniela Campello, “The Politics of Redistribution in Less Developed Democracies: Evidence from Brazil, Ecuador, and Venezuela,” in The Great Gap: Inequality and the Politics of Redistribution in Latin America, ed. Merike Blofield (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University, 2011), 9. 24 Fitch, Armies and Politics, 26. Campello, The Politics of Redistribution, 185-188.; Rittinger and Cleary, Confronting Coup Risk.

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Bolivia 

Argentina 

Haiti  

Panama 

Guatem

ala 

Peru 

Paraguay 

Honduras 

El Salvador 

Ecuador 

Venezuela 

Dominican Republic 

Nicaragua 

Chile 

Brazil 

Costa Rica 

Columbia 

Cuba 

Uruguay 

Mexico 

Alleged Coup Plots

Coup Plots

Attempted Coups

Successful Coups

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behaviorally.25 The likelihood of sanctions or other punitive measures rarely determines military

coups, but it does alter the cost-benefit calculation of actors.26 Moreover, during the 1950s, 60s,

and 70s, norms of democracy were subsumed in the Cold War dichotomy. The 1959 Cuban

Revolution exacerbated this polarization, radicalizing the left and the right.27 After 1990, the fall

of the Soviet Union gave way to the hegemony of US-based liberal democracy and capitalism,

discrediting leftist projects. When leftist political parties reemerged, they respected democratic

institutions and left private property intact, making leftism substantially less threatening to

elites.28 Morales has challenged elite economic interests more than theories based on regional

economic integration would expect, suggesting that a reactionary coup is possible. Explanations

based on regional democratic norms are compelling, and the threat of punitive actions by

regional organizations is likely to shape the behavior of domestic actors. However, this may be

insufficient to discourage coup-plotting given the high levels of polarization in contemporary

Bolivian politics.

Contrary to predictions about the moderating influence of neoliberalism, Morales has

significantly challenged regional elites with redistributive policies, suggesting that the risk of a

coup in Bolivia is higher than in other leftist countries. Because of the ease with which investors

can remove capital from a domestic economy, governments must be wary of the tradeoff

between attracting investment and meeting voters’ demands for redistribution. In her analysis of

                                                        25 Domingo E. Acevedo and Claudio Grossman, “The Organization of American States and the Protection of Democracy,” in Beyond Sovereignty: Collectively Defending Democracy in the Americas, ed. Tom Farer (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996); Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñan, Democratization in Latin America, 40-42; Rittinger and Cleary, Confronting Coup Risk. 26 Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñan, Democratization in Latin America, 39-40. 27 James M. Malloy, Authoritarianism and Corporatism in Latin America (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1977), 16.; Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñan, Democratization in Latin America, 43; Guillermo O’Donnell, Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism: Studies in South American Politics (Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of California, 1973), 72. 28 Steven Levitsky and Kenneth Roberts, “Introduction: Latin America’s “Left Turn”: A Framework for Analysis,” in The Resurgence of the Latin American Left, ed. Steven Levitsky and Kenneth Roberts (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2011), 2-5.

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the presidencies of Luis Ignacio da Silva (Lula) (Brazil, 2002), Lucio Gutiérrez (Ecuador, 2002),

Rafael Correa (Ecuador, 2006), and Hugo Chávez (Venezuela, 1998), Daniela Campello

demonstrates that the mere possibility of a leftist president induces investor panic and capital

flight. Reacting to this tension, leftist incumbents that campaign on redistributive programs

frequently tone down or renege on their promises.29 Due largely to hydrocarbon windfalls,

Morales has escaped this constraint.30 However, the resource boom did not, as Levitsky and

Roberts conclude for the region generally, allow Morales to “offer material benefits to popular

constituencies…without challenging property rights or adopting highly polarizing redistributive

measures.”31 Natural resources themselves are contentious in Bolivia, with political implications

that are often adverse to democracy.32 By nationalizing the hydrocarbons industry to fund social

programs and extending agrarian reform to the eastern lowlands, Morales has significantly

challenged elite interests.33 This deviation does not mean that Morales has diverged from

neoliberalism entirely. In fact, he has maintained the market-led model and adopted only targeted

forms of state intervention.34 The important point is that Morales intervened in the most

contentious sectors of the economy, the hydrocarbon industry and land tenure system,

significantly challenging elite economic interests. Simply put, Morales is radical where it counts.

Predictions about the impact of the United States and regional organizations on coup risk

in Bolivia are mixed. Both the US and the Organization of American States (OAS) have

demonstrated a marked increase in their commitment to sustaining democracy in the region,

                                                        29 Campello, The Politics of Redistribution, 186-210. 30 Campello, The Politics of Redistribution, 190-1.; Levitsky and Roberts, Introduction, 11.; Kurt Weyland, “The Rise of Latin America’s Two Lefts: Insights from Rentier State Theory,” Comparative Politics 41, no 2 (2009): 153-157. 31 Levitsky and Roberts, Introduction, 11. 32 Thad Dunning, Crude Democracy: Natural Resource Wealth and Political Regimes (Cambridge, N.Y.: Cambridge University Press, 2008). 33 Rittinger and Cleary, Confronting Coup Risk, 36. 34 Levitsky and Roberts, Introduction, 22. Levitsky and Roberts label this approach “heterodox.”

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intervening in countries like Haiti (1991), Peru (1992), Guatemala (1993), and Paraguay (1996),

and Honduras (2009). Actors considering military intervention in Bolivia have many precedents

demonstrating that they can expect punitive measures, raising the cost of a coup.35 In terms of

intervention in Bolivia specifically, regional organizations would be likely to respond to a coup

while the US would be less likely to do so. During the 2008 crisis in the lowland department of

Pando, which Morales alleged to be a civilian coup, Unasur intervened to express support for

Morales.36 By contrast, the US ambassador was expelled from Bolivia amid allegations of coup-

mongering.37 Although the truth in these claims is unknowable, the incident illustrates the poor

bilateral relations between Bolivia and the US and its implications for anti-coup solidarity. US

aid to Bolivia has declined by more than $50 million per year between 2002-2004 and 2008-

2009, and remaining aid goes mostly to departmental governments, the stronghold of the

opposition. The direction of aid to territorial units controlled primarily by the opposition is an

effort to counterbalance the power of Morales, most likely not intended to provoke a coup.38

However, it demonstrates the strains of US-Bolivian relations, suggesting that in the event of a

coup the United States may respond similarly to the Venezuelan coup of 2002.39 Coup actors

will anticipate the intervention of regional organizations with certainty, but will be unsure about

the American stance. While assurance of at least regional condemnation will figure into coup

plans, it will not operate as strongly as in other countries.

                                                        35 Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñan, Democratization in Latin America, 40-42.; Rittinger and Cleary, Confronting Coup Risk. 36 “Move to Tackle Bolivian Turmoil,” BBC News, September 14, 2008. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/7614784.stm (accessed April 14, 2012). 37 “Washington Expels Bolivian Envoy,” BBC News, September 11, 2008. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/7610915.stm (accessed April 14, 2008). 38 Jonas Wolff, Challenges to Democracy Promotion in the Case of Bolivia (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2011), 10-11. http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/democracy_bolivia.pdf.10-11. 39 Steven Barracca, "Military Coups in the Post-Cold War Era: Pakistan, Ecuador and Venezuela," Peace Research Abstracts Journal 44, no 4 (2007): 150. Despite knowledge of the coup plot, the US did not act.

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Although the regional political environment is markedly less polarized, the intersection of

ethnic, class, and regional distinctions shapes Bolivian politics. The rise of ethnic politics in the

1980s and 1990s added a new dimension to the regional political landscape. However, due to the

inclusive nature of the MAS and the fluidity of ethnicity in Bolivia, ethnicity alone does not

polarize society.40 Rather, ethnicity intersects with regional distinctions to increase their

potency. Regional autonomy movements in lowland departments center on the conflict between

lowland economic liberalism and Morales’ redistributive goals, a distinction of economic

interests that is demarcated territorially.41 In addition, in the lowlands, or media luna, the

majority of the population is mestizo or European, whereas the five highland departments are

majority Aymara or Quechua.42 This ethnic distribution corresponds to economic differences,

adding a racial dimension to the autonomy debate. Conducting interviews in Santa Cruz, Kent

Eaton found that ethnic politics increased the threat perceived by elites: “Movement leaders

routinely voiced fears of ethnic domination by the highlands, whereas their counterparts in

Guayas [Ecuador] rarely did.”43 Autonomy movement leaders take great pains to portray their

struggle in territorial rather than ethnic terms, but ethnic differences clearly impact the level of

threat regional elites perceive.44 Despite the intricacies of ethnic, class, and regional identities, to

support the MAS signifies indigenous, poor, highlander, and part of the “masses”; to oppose,

white, affluent, lowlander, and “elite.” Although this type of polarization eludes empirical

                                                        40 See Madrid 2005 and Madrid 2008 for discussions of multiethnic support of the MAS; See Albó 2008, Roca 2008, and Reyes 2008 for different opinions regarding ethnicity in Bolivia. 41 Denise Humphreys Bebbington and Anthony Bebbington, “Anatomy of a Regional Conflict: Tarija and Resource Grievances in Morales’ Bolivia,” Latin American Perspectives 37, no 4 (2010); Kent Eaton, “Conservative Autonomy Movements: Territorial Dimensions of Ideological Conflict in Bolivia and Ecuador,” Comparative Politics 43, no 3 (2011). 42 Eaton, Conservative Autonomy Movements, 300.; José Luis Roca, “Regionalism Revisted,” in Unresolved Tensions: Bolivia Past and Present, ed. John Crabtree and Laurence Whitehead (Pittsburg, PA: University of Pittsburg Press, 2008), 74. 43 Eaton, Conservative Autonomy Movements, 301. 44 Eaton, Backlash in Bolivia, 91.

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measure, the following statement by Miss Bolivia at the 2004 Miss Universe pageant illustrates

the point: “Unfortunately, people who don’t know Bolivia very much think that we are all just

Indians from the west side of the country, that is, La Paz—poor people and very short people and

Indian people. I’m from the other side of the country, the east side, and it’s not cold, it’s very hot

and we are tall and we are white people and we know English.”45 Although the Cold War is

over, polarization unique to Bolivia imbues politics with the qualities of a zero-sum game

reminiscent of the 1950s and 1960s.

Against all odds, Bolivia fulfills the predictions of theories based on regional economic

integration and the end of Cold War polarization. However, as the preceding discussion shows,

the mechanisms detailed by these theories do not explain this outcome. Neoliberal constraints

have not encouraged Morales to moderate on the most controversial economic issues. Although

regional organizations would be likely to intervene on behalf of Morales in the event of a coup,

the US reaction is not so certain. Finally, intense polarization along intersecting ethnic,

economic, and regional divisions poses a serious challenge to compromise through institutional

means, the primary aim of democracy. Bolivia is not “deviant country,” but the very theories

that explain this outcome suggest that it should be.46

To understand this discrepancy, I will take a comparative approach. As Eaton notes, the

current political and economic incorporation of social movements evokes the transformations

unleashed by the 1952 Revolution: “Not unlike the incorporation of labor, which proved to be

the crucial political juncture of the twentieth century, the mobilization of indigenous Latin

Americans represents what could be for many countries the most pivotal political event of the

                                                        45 Nicole Fabricant, “Performative Politics: The Camba Countermovement in Eastern Bolivia,” American Ethnologist 36, no 4 (2009): 775 46 Todd Landman, Issues and Methods in Comparative Politics: An Introduction (London: Routledge, 2000), 33.

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century.”47 The MNR and the Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS) rely on similar support bases

and pursued comparable reforms in content and depth. Thus, a comparison between the

governing experiences of the two parties will elucidate the pressures that lead to military coup.

This comparison is also advantageous because the choice of two “cases” within one country

controls for cultural and social factors.48 This control is especially useful because Bolivia stands

out in the region as an extreme case of poverty, inequality, extreme political instability, and

ethnic heterogeneity, all variables that could confound analysis.

In chapter one, I will highlight the major reforms pursued by the MNR and the MAS and

analyze their implications for popular and elite power. By “popular,” I refer to historically

marginalized sectors, such as labor, the peasantry, and the informal sector. Although the “middle

classes” often ally or share interests with the popular sectors, they will be referred to as a distinct

entity. By “elite,” I mean those who control economic resources and enjoy preferential access to

political institutions. The analysis will focus on the extent to which reforms undermined elites

and empowered popular sectors both politically and economically. Because the MNR pursued

its most influential reforms during its first four years, this chapter will focus only on the first

term of Víctor Paz Estenssoro (1952-1956). Morales’ ideology has remained consistent into his

second term, so I do not limit the analysis to his first term.

Chapter two addresses the role of natural resource wealth, specifically land, tin, and

hydrocarbons, in shaping political outcomes. Relying on the theoretical frameworks developed

by Guillermo O’Donnell and Thad Dunning, I will analyze the impact of economic policy and

changing economic conditions on support for and opposition to a regime among the popular

sectors and elites.                                                         47 Eaton, Backlash in Bolivia, 71-72. 48 Guy Peters, Comparative Politics: Theory and Methods (New York: New York University Press, 1998), 23.

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Using Samuel Huntington’s model of “mass praetorianism” as a starting point, chapter

three analyzes the factors that encourage or preclude military intervention in politics. Based on

the works of David Pion-Berlin and Eric Rittinger and Matt Cleary, I focus on the role of

corporate interests, the strength and design of institutions governing civilian-military relations,

and presidential strategies that aim to secure military allegiance.

Finally, I conclude that the ability of Morales and the MAS to implement radical reforms

without provoking a military coup is primarily due to the territorial distribution of resources in

Bolivia and favorable economic circumstances. While successive MNR governments struggled

with severe economic crisis and a unified elite opposition, Morales came to power during a

commodity boom and his policies targeted only regional elites. However, the vulnerability of

export-based economies to resource boom and busts question the sustainability of these reforms.

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Chapter 1

Reform, Then and Now:

A Comparison of the MNR (1952-1964) and the MAS (2006-Present)

The similarities between the changes occurring in Bolivia today and during the 1950s are

striking. Both the MNR and the MAS came to power with the support of sectors marginalized by

the established political and economic system. Once in power, they governed on behalf of these

sectors, challenging elites that previously wielded disproportionate influence. Expanding and

deepening political participation formed a central part of the MNR and MAS agendas, and both

parties expanded the franchise and created new models of governance to incorporate these

groups. In both cases, the integration of previously excluded sectors into the political system

diminished the influence elites historically wielded through institutional channels. Moreover,

both parties responded to the policy preferences of their constituents, pursuing redistributive

economic policy. The MNR inaugurated a four-decade process of land reform by decree in 1953,

which Morales revitalized and extended to include commercial agriculture in the eastern

lowlands. In addition, the MNR and MAS nationalized key export commodities (tin and

hydrocarbons, respectively) immediately upon gaining power. With “revolutionary” agendas that

similarly expanded political participation and redistributed natural resource wealth, the MNR and

the MAS significantly undermined elite interests (See Table 1).

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Table 1: Structural Turning Points

Political Reforms: From Exclusion to Inclusion

The MNR and the MAS under Evo Morales expanded quantitative and qualitative

participation in political systems that previously excluded or ignored large portions of the

population. These reforms marked an important shift in the source of political power from a

narrow elite to popular groups, including labor, the peasantry, and the informal sector. This

transformation threatened the established influence of elites in politics, resulting in policies that

privileged popular over elite interests.

The landed oligarchy and mine owners dominated the politics and economy of pre-

revolutionary Bolivia, a system that excluded the peasantry and labor from participation in the

Period Level of Political Participation

Redistributive? Challenged Elites?

Oligarchic Rule (1900-1952)

Weak/non-existent state: patronage system dependent on export sector, limited suffrage, linguistic and geographic boundaries to participation

No: tin mines owned by domestic elite, semi-feudal land tenure system

No

MNR (1952-1964)

Weak corporatist state: universal suffrage, education reform

Yes: state nationalized tin mines, land reform

Yes

Democratization and the Washington Consensus (1978-2000)

Elite-driven, middle-class based parties with few connections to labor, peasantry, or the informal sector

No: mine and hydrocarbon ownership partly privatized, land reform unevenly implemented

No

Morales (2006-Present)

“Plurinational” state: inclusive ideology, governing strategies incorporate social movements, electoral reforms

Yes: hydrocarbons nationalized and revenues used for redistributive programs, land reform extended to eastern lowlands

Yes

  18 

political process. A literacy requirement barred 80 percent of the population from voting, and

less than five percent of the population actually voted.49 Economic and political power were

virtually synonymous, and the former was concentrated in a small elite. The Patiño, Hoschchild,

and Aramayo families owned 80 percent of the tin industry, which in turn accounted for 80

percent of Bolivian exports.50 The impressive economic power of these three families percolated

to the political process, making the infamous La Rosca “the most powerful interest combination

in the country, dwarfing all potential competitors including the state.”51 The urban middle

classes, dependent on jobs in the public and service sectors, were beholden to the tin barons for

employment, contracts, and other essential resources. Patronage permeated political institutions

and parties were mere “personalistic factions.”52 As James Malloy concluded, “By all odds

Bolivia was saddled with one of the weakest, least autonomous, and most dependent state

structures in the entire region.”53 Nor could the 70 percent of the population living in the

countryside participate politically, separated from urban centers economically, linguistically, and

geographically.54 A small group of individuals owned most of the country’s land, creating a

semi-feudal agrarian structure. Two thirds of the population spoke either Aymara or Quechua,

and very few spoke Spanish. Exacerbating these divisions, the jungles and savannas in the

northern and eastern parts of the country, respectively, were virtually inaccessible. Although the

decades leading up to revolution saw limited political participation by miners, urban workers,

                                                        49Mitchell, The Legacy of Populism, 12. 50 Dunning, Crude Democracy, 233. 51Malloy, Authoritarianism and Corporatism, 459. The political power of tin interests is widely observed in the literature (Dunning 2008, Malloy 1977, Mitchell 1977, Zondag 1969). For an alternative interpretation, see Dunkerley 2003 in Proclaiming Revolution. 52 Malloy, Authoritarianism and Corporatism, 460. 53 Ibid., 459-462. 54 Ibid., 461.

  19 

and some peasants, the majority of the Bolivian population remained on the periphery of, or

entirely excluded from, national life.55

The victory of MNR leaders, the military, and armed peasant and labor groups in 1952

inverted the logic of the previous system, empowering popular sectors with the goal of

destabilizing elite power. In its origins and ideology the MNR was beholden to discontented

popular sectors. MNR leaders considered cooperation among social classes essential to reform,

and envisioned the party as the forum for such cohesion.56 The resulting partido policlasista

incorporated unions, urban middle classes, lower middle classes, and the peasantry as interest

groups.57 This strategy of inclusion was an instrument of social confrontation, not harmony:

MNR leaders intended the multiclass coalition to overwhelm the power of the traditional

oligarchy. The party explicitly proclaimed the oligarchy an agent of foreign imperialism and the

enemy of the state.58 A 1948 MNR pamphlet illustrates the party’s view of domestic elites: “The

MNR…is a democratic party which considers that Bolivia can carry out a National Revolution

which will liberate the country from the great mining consortia and monopolies which,

dominating the economic life of the nation, affect its political life as well, keeping Bolivia in

backwardness, isolation, and poverty.”59 The MNR portrayed its strategy as one of confrontation

rather than accommodation, making its program a radical deviation from established power

relations. The MNR mobilized sectors disadvantaged during the preceding period of oligarchic

rule to dismantle elite political power, which the party considered the primary obstacle to

progress.

                                                        55 Mitchell, The Legacy of Populism, 12-33. 56 Ibid., 6. 57 Ibid., 27-28. 58 Malloy, Authoritarianism and Corporatism, 10-12. 59 Mitchell, The Legacy of Populism, 31.

  20 

The MNR expanded political participation by enacting universal suffrage, incorporating

sectoral interests into the state through corporatist structures, and socializing the peasantry into

the national project through expanded rural education. By giving its supporters greater access to

the state, the MNR counterbalanced elite influence in political institutions. In a decree with

consequences that would resonate for decades, the MNR eliminated the literacy requirement to

vote, increasing the voting population by 1200% from 200,000 to 1 million.60 Although

enfranchisement did not lead to the articulation of an autonomous political voice for the

indigenous peasantry until the 1990s, electoral participation provided an unprecedented

connection between rural Bolivia and the centers of political power.61 In addition, the corporatist

structure created new institutional channels for participation. In an effort to create a hegemonic

party akin to Mexico’s PRI, the MNR granted party membership to middle class sectors and

incorporated pre-existing sectoral organizations into the party structure. Represented by the

Central Obrera Boliviana (COB), labor wielded significant power through an autonomous

structure of governance parallel to that of the state. Under cogobierno, labor leaders enjoyed the

right to name government ministers, veto power in COMIBOL (the state mining company), and

six channels of recourse to address grievances.62 Finally, the MNR expanded rural education to

facilitate indigenous peasant participation as a homogenous, Spanish-speaking class.63

The important point is that the MNR organized politically mobilized and inactive groups

into a coalition powerful enough to check the dominance of traditional elites for the first time in

                                                        60 Jane Benton, Agrarian Reform in Theory and Practice: A Study of the Lake Titicaca Region of Bolivia (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1999), 45. 61 Herbert S. Klein, “Social Change in Bolivia since 1952,” in Proclaiming Revolution: Bolivia in Comparative Perspective, ed. Merilee Grindle and Pilar Domingo (London: Institution of Latin American Studies, 2003), 237. 62 Malloy, Authoritarianism and Corporatism, 467-468; Cornelius H. Zondag, The Bolivian Economy, 1952-65: The Revolution and Its Aftermath (New York: Praeger, 1966), 90. 63 Xavier Albó, “The ‘Long Memory’ of Ethnicity in Bolivia and Some Temporary Oscillations,” in Unresolved Tensions: Bolivia Past and Present, ed. John Crabtree and Laurence Whitehead (Pittsburg, PA: University of Pittsburg Press, 2008), 19.

  21 

Bolivian history. To be sure, the large gains in political participation under the MNR did not

imply a transition to democracy. The MNR did not aim to create a competitive democracy,

instead seeking to institutionalize societal control through a hegemonic party. The party operated

with the top-down logic of a single-party regime, striving to control its supporters behind the

trappings of democratic institutions. Nor did the importance of patronage diminish under MNR

rule. In fact, clientelism rather than policy-driven representation shaped the election to

government offices or positions.64 However, the MNR’s approach was a radical break with the

past in its assertion of the state’s alliance with popular sectors rather than elites. The MNR’s

corporatist structure provided new recourse for popular demands, leveraging mass power over

elite influence to push substantive reform forward. MNR ideology and reforms dramatically

expanded political participation and challenged elite hegemony.

Political reforms during Paz Estenssoro’s presidency (1952-1956) went far to weaken

elite influence by expanding popular participation. However, renewed discontent emerged after

two decades of military rule followed by two decades of governance by elite pact. Along with

Colombia, Bolivia, Venezuela, and Peru, Bolivia suffers from a “Crisis of Representation,” with

much of society expressing disillusionment with democratic institutions and low support for

democracy as a system of government.65 Political parties, widely considered crucial to a

functioning democracy, were hierarchical, undemocratic organizations that facilitated

governance through behind-the-scenes dealings rather than coherent policy programs.66 Reforms

of the 1990s, like municipal decentralization, land reform, and increased access to education,                                                         64Eduardo Gamarra and James Malloy, “The Patrimonial Dynamics of Party Politics in Bolivia,” in Building Democratic Institutions: Party Systems in Latin America, ed. Scott Mainwaring and Timothy Scully (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1995), 402-404. 65 Mainwaring, Crisis of Representation, 13-27. 66Malloy and Gamarra, Patrimonial Dynamics, 415-420.; Scott Mainwaring and Timothy Scully, Building Democratic Institutions: Party Systems in Latin America, (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1995).; Gustavo Flores-Macías, "Statist vs. Pro-Market: Explaining Leftist Governments' Economic Policies in Latin America," Comparative Politics 42 no. 4 (2010).

  22 

failed to increase authentic representation on the national level.67 Despite almost two decades of

democratic rule, by 2000 governing institutions were out of touch with most of society. A

demonstration of successive governments’ inability to meet societal demands, nationwide

protests articulated widespread grievances outside of institutional channels, removing presidents

Gonzálo Sánchez de Lozada (2003) and Carlos Mesa (2005) (citation). Five years of upheaval

culminated in the election of Evo Morales in December 2005, who promised to remake the

Bolivian state in the mold of a plurinational, inclusionary democracy. Just as the MNR increased

political participation of previously excluded sectors in political life, Morales focused on

revitalizing democratic participation of a multitude of interests discontented with neoliberal

economic and political ideology.

The unprecedented electoral success of Morales and the MAS corresponded to a decline

in the performance of traditional parties, increasing the influence of popular sectors while

undermining that of elites. From 1985 to 2000, dominant parties ruled through a series of pacts

between political elites, ensuring the fair distribution of state patronage, rotation of the

presidency, and a firm commitment to neoliberalism.68 After ensuring elite dominance for

almost two decades, these parties performed poorly in the 2002 elections. The MNR, ADN, and

MIR secured a combined 42 percent of the vote, compared to 57 percent in 1997.69 This decline

was juxtaposed against the impressive electoral success of the MAS and Morales, a party and

leader with origins in the cocaleros of Chaparé. The MAS secured 20 percent of the vote in the

congressional election and Morales finished a close second to Sánchez de Lozada in the

                                                        67 See Gustafson 2002 for a discussion of reforms under neoliberal governments. 68 Eduardo Gamarra, “Hybrid Presidentialism and Democratization: The Case of Bolivia,” in Presidentialism and Democracy in Latin America, ed. Scott Mainwaring and Matthew Soberg Shugart (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1995), 373-379. 69 The MNR shifted to the right in the 1980s.

  23 

presidential contest.70 In 2005, Morales won the presidency with a majority of the vote (53.7

percent), the first candidate to do so since the return to democracy.71 The rise of an indigenous,

social movement leader who campaigned on a staunch anti-neoliberal platform to the highest

political office was heavily symbolic in a country plagued by endemic inequality and racism.

Prior to Morales, elites enjoyed favorable relationships with politicians like Sánchez de Lozada,

the American-educated architect of Bolivian neoliberalism, or ex-dictator Hugo Banzer. As a

result of the change, “the executive [was] no longer the plaything of the business leaders who,

during the 1980s and 1990s, exercised strong influence over past leadership and government

appointments. Instead, we have a government made up of trade union leaders and workers from

different sectors, which responds to the leadership of a party with peasant origins.”72 Similar to

the 1952 revolution, Morales’ election replaced the influence of elites with that of popular

sectors like indigenous peasants, cocaleros, labor unions, and urban intellectuals. In both cases,

elites faced a significant decline in influence: political institutions no longer provided the access

to power that they once did.

While the MNR integrated existing trade unions into the state through corporatist ties,

Morales has absorbed social movements into political institutions and the policymaking process.

The MAS operates as the political arm of social movements alongside the official, hierarchical

structure defined by party statues, ensuring grassroots participation in the decision-making

process.73 In addition, popular demands contribute heavily to the government’s agenda, the

government relies on grassroots mobilization to implement changes, and movement members

                                                        70 Kent Eaton, Backlash in Bolivia, 82. 71 Sven Harten, “Towards a ‘Traditional Party’? International Organisation and Change in the MAS in Bolivia,” in Evo Morales and the Movimiento al Socialismo in Bolivia: The First Term in Context, ed. Adrian J. Pearce (London: Institute for the Study of the Americas, University of London, School of Advanced Study, 2011), 69. 72 Luis Tapia, “Constitution and Constitutional Reform in Bolivia,” in Unresolved Tensions: Bolivia Past and Present, ed. John Crabtree and Laurence Whitehead (Pittsburg, PA: University of Pittsburg Press, 2008), 169. 73 Harten, Towards a ‘Traditional Party’?, 75-76.

  24 

must approve government officials.74 This collaboration is not just rhetorical: mobilization at the

base both enables and prevents the implementation of government policy. In 2011, opposition

erupted over Morales’ plan to construct a road through the TIPNIS indigenous territory,

ultimately forcing him to back down.75 Morales used referenda three times in his first term to

resolve controversial political questions, first in 2006 on regional autonomies, second in 2008

concerning his presidency, and third in 2009 on the draft constitution.76 Although the opposition

retained control of the lower house of the legislature in 2005 elections, Morales’ reliance on

plebiscitary mechanisms like mass mobilization and referenda has weakened this check on the

MAS agenda. Elites clearly consider this threatening, spearheading regional opposition

movements that utilize similar strategies, like demonstrations, strikes, and unilateral autonomy

referenda.77 The rise of the MAS at the expense of traditional parties compromised elite

influence within institutional channels, and Morales’ reliance on direct appeals to his base

circumvents remaining institutional checks.

Economic Reforms: From Concentration to Redistribution

Both the MNR under Paz and the MAS under Morales immediately pursued policies

seeking to expanding political participation quantitatively and qualitatively, marking important

shifts from the previous systems. In both cases, large proportions of the population gained roles

of increasing importance in national political life, while traditional elites were ignored or

                                                        74 Benjamin Kohl, “Bolivia under Morales: A Work in Progress,” Latin American Perspectives 37, no 3 (2010): 115. 75 “Bolivia’s Evo Morales Scraps Amazon Road Project,” BBC News, October 21, 2011. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-15409447 (access April 14, 2012). 76 John Crabtree, “Electoral Validation for Morales and the MAS (1999-2010),” in Evo Morales and the Movimiento al Socialismo in Bolivia: The First Term in Context, ed. Adrian J. Pearce (London: Institute for the Study of the Americas, University of London, School of Advanced Study, 2011), 128-130. 77Fabricant, Performative Politics.; Bebbington and Bebbington, Anatomy of a Regional Conflict, 151-153.; Crabtree, Electoral Validation.

  25 

ostracized. These changes threatened elite interests by undermining established channels to state

power, like undemocratic parties or limited enfranchisement. Although the change in ideology

alone was frightening, more problematic for elites were the economic implications of these

changes. Like most countries in the region, Bolivia was and continues to be highly unequal.

However, Bolivia stands out as an extreme example of the social and economic stratification

common to the region. As has been previously noted, stark economic, linguistic, cultural, and

geographic distinctions plagued pre-revolutionary Bolivia. Although MNR reforms certainly

made inroads into the pervasive problems of poverty, especially in terms of health and education,

Morales inherited a highly unequal and impoverished society.78 In 2005, 59.9 percent of the

population lived under the national poverty line and 30.4 percent on less than two dollars per

day.79 In 2009, Bolivia was the ninth most unequal country in the world with a Gini coefficient

of 58.2. Given the bleak conditions for the majority of the population, elites fear expanded or

deepened political participation because it signifies greater government responsiveness to new

constituencies in terms of economic policy.

The ascendance of the MNR and Morales to power marked a shift toward redistributive

economic policy, threatening economic elites that had benefitted from minimal state

intervention. Prior to the MNR takeover, the Bolivian state was almost nonexistent,

overwhelmed by the political and economic power of La Rosca. In an effort to undermine the tin

barons and become “masters in their own house,” the MNR incorporated the mines into the

Corporación Minera de Bolivia (COMIBOL) by decree, effectively wresting control of tin rents

from a small, private elite.80 Similarly, the 1953 agrarian reform has been widely praised as one

of the largest land transfers in the region, transforming the influence of the rural, landed

                                                        78 Klein, Social Change, 238. 79 World Bank. 80 Zondag, The Bolivian Economy, 82-86.

  26 

oligarchy and guaranteeing peasant allegiance to the MNR for decades to come.81 Morales has

similarly emphasized redistributive economic policies, redefining the state as the protagonist

driving economic development, rather than market forces. Since taking office in 2006, Morales

has overseen the nationalization, restructuring, or creation of state enterprises in the

hydrocarbon, mining, telecommunications, electricity, food, and transportation industries.82

Perhaps the most important of these was the hydrocarbon industry, as rents would be used for

redistributive programs such as Renta Dignidad, leaving less for the departments in which the

gas is located. In addition, Morales ensured that a new land reform law would include the

lowlands, which had avoided implementation of past reforms.

That the MAS pursued land reform and the nationalization of the key export commodity,

central components of the MNR’s revolutionary platform, 50 years later illustrates the continuing

importance of Bolivian natural resource wealth in politics. Both the MNR and the MAS

approached these contentious issues from an anti-elite position, challenging dominant interests in

crucial economic sectors. In a largely rural country, land reform is a centerpiece of development

programs due to its potential to ameliorate rural poverty, decrease food prices, stimulate growth,

increase government revenue, and address environmental concerns.83 Autonomous control of

communal territory is also a key demand of indigenous peoples, a majority in Bolivia.84

However, changes in land tenure are politically challenging due to the threats they pose to                                                         81 John D. Cameron, “Hacia la Alcaldia: The Municipalization of Peasant Politics in the Andes,” Latin American Perspectives 36, no 4 (2009): 68; Klein, Social Change; Rosemary Thorp, Corinne Caumartin, and George Gray-Molina, “Inequality, Ethnicity, Political Mobilisation and Political Violence in Latin America: The Cases of Bolivia, Guatemala and Peru,” Bulletin of Latin American Research 25, no 4 (2006): 472. 82 “100 Logros del Gobierno para Bolivia (2006-2009),” Estado Plurinacional de Bolivia, http://www.presidencia.gob.bo/. (accessed April 14, 2012). 83William C. Thiesenhusen, Broken Promises: Agrarian Reform and the Latin American Campesino (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995), 10-13.; Annelies Zoomers and Gemma van der Haar, “Introduction: Regulating Land Tenure under Neo-liberalism,” in Current Land Policy in Latin America: Regulating Land Tenure under Neo-liberalism, ed. Annelies Zoomers and Gemma van der Haar (Amsterdam: KIT Publishers, 2000), 18-20. 84 Willem Assies, “Land, Territories, and Indigenous Peoples’ Rights,” in Current Land Policy in Latin America: Regulating Land Tenure under Neo-liberalism, ed. Annelies Zoomers and Gemma van der Haar (Amsterdam: KIT Publishers, 2000.

  27 

landowning elites, who find their land expropriated to landless or land-poor peasants.85

Allocation of natural resources is similarly contentious because of private ownership by a small

elite or the unequal geographic distribution of resources. The Bolivian economy is heavily

resource dependent, and redistributionist visions depend largely on rents generated by key export

commodities.86 As an economy based on resource wealth that is concentrated in the hands of the

few, the Bolivian case demonstrates the well-documented authoritarian consequences of natural

resources. The following analysis will focus first on the politics of land reform and second on the

politics of natural resources, demonstrating that both the MNR and the MAS significantly

challenged elite interests in these central economic sectors.

Land Reform

Many observers have heralded the 1953 decree mandating land reform as the

revolutionary government’s most important reform, responsible for widespread redistribution of

land from hacendados to peasants.87 In pre-revolutionary Bolivia, peasants were trapped in what

many considered to be the most regressive, unequal, and exploitative land tenure system in the

region, demonstrated by the widely cited 1950 agrarian census.88 Like the rest of the region, the

structure of land distribution juxtaposed few latifundios, or large haciendas or commercial

holdings, with many minifundios, or small plots insufficient for subsistence.89 In 1950, six

percent of landowners owned plots of 1,000 hectares or more, amounting to 92 percent of

                                                        85 Thiesenhusen, Broken Promises, 6-7. 86 Richard M. Auty, Sustaining Development in Mineral Economies: The Resource Curse Thesis (London, New York: Routledge, 1993); Dunning, Crude Democracy. 87Thorp, Caumartin, and Gray Molina, Inequality, Ethnicity, Political Mobilisation and Political Violence.; Cameron, Hacia la Alcaldia.; Klein, Social Change; Zoomers and van der Haar, Introduction, 17. 88 Benton, Agrarian Reform in Theory and Practice, 42-43.; Dwight B. Heath, Charles J. Erasmus, and Hans C. Buechler, Land Reform and Social Revolution in Bolivia (New York: Praeger, 1969), 34, 38.; Thiesenhusen, Broken Promises, 57. 89 Thiesenhusen, Broken Promises, 7-8.

  28 

cultivable land. By contrast, 60 percent of landowners owned plots of five hectares or less. While

large plots were minimally utilized, small farmers cultivated a majority of their land,

highlighting the poor economic viability of the minifundio.90 The reform sought to correct these

stark inequalities in land distribution, diversify agriculture, develop the eastern export economy,

and provide inexpensive food for urban areas. The law sanctioned five forms of legal land

tenure, deeming the latifundio illegal, and redistributed lands based on necessity for subsistence

of the farmer or landlord “inefficiency.” To encourage migration to the lowlands, the law set the

maximum amount of transferable land at 2,000 hectares in Santa Cruz, compared to .5 hectares

in the densely populated Cochabamba valley.91 Four decades after the MNR issued the decree,

44 million hectares of land had been distributed to 262,998 individuals.92

Despite later criticisms, land reform under the MNR was clearly antithetical to the

interests of landowning elites. Landowning elites opposed reform as early as the 1940s, a view

expressed by the landowner organization Sociedad Rural Boliviana (SRB) and the press. These

elites remained powerful even after the revolution, and MNR leaders demonstrated reluctance to

pursue the radical reform demanded by the peasantry. In addition, the government prioritized

nationalizing the mines, managing inflation, and consolidating power over land reform.

However, recently armed peasants overcame Paz’s ambivalence through land invasions, strikes,

and violence.93 The capacity of the peasantry to force the hand of the party vis-à-vis economic

policy demonstrated the considerable influence of popular sectors on the government’s agenda.

Elites had clearly opposed reform from its inception and no longer exercised the power necessary

to obstruct its passage. True to elite fears, the reform itself did challenge the hegemony of the

                                                        90 Klein, Social Change, 232-233.  91 Thiesenhusen, Broken Promises, 60-61. 92 Klein, Social Change, 237, 93 Thiesenhusen, Broken Promises, 57-59.

  29 

rural oligarchy. Especially in the densely populated altiplano and Cochabamba Valley,

redistribution undermined the dominance of landowners and created a new mestizo class.94

Antonio Garcia (1970) goes farther, concluding that the historical significance of land reform

exceeded that of independence:

“The revolution destroyed the hacienda as a social, economic and political structure, and destroyed it for good. And this fact has meant not only the abolition of compulsory unpaid services and other disguised types of servitude, but the disruption of a whole system of political and social hegemony. That is why the revolution is much more important than the Wars of Independence for the huge alienated mass of colonos, sharecroppers, pegujaleros, hutahuahuas, and farm laborers.”95 Although subsequent scholarship would debate the resurgence of neolatifundismo in Bolivia,

Garcia’s analysis captures the significance of the reform’s break with past social, economic, and

political relationships.96 Aware of its implications for rural social and economic structures, elites

opposed land reform from the start.

The 1953 law had far-reaching consequences in improving the livelihoods of poor rural

Bolivians and challenging elite dominance. However, due to the reform’s limitations, dilutions

over time, and the exemption of Santa Cruz from the 1953 law, land reform remained a divisive

issue in Bolivian politics at the time of Morales’ election. Landowners in the eastern lowland

department of Santa Cruz evaded reform due to the legal distinction between “commercial farm

enterprises” and latifundios. This exemption and state investment after 1953 created a stratified

system reminiscent of the pre-reform agrarian structure in the highlands. In 1984, six percent of

landowners owned almost 84 percent of land in Santa Cruz, and land dispossession and violation

of indigenous land rights were key grievances.97 In addition, the population and economic

                                                        94 Albó, The ‘Long Memory’ of Ethnicity, 19.; Klein, Social Change, 237.; Thiesenhusen, Broken Promises, 63. 95 Antonio Garcia, “Agrarian Reform and Social Development in Bolivia,” in Agrarian Problems and Peasant Movements in Latin America, ed. Rodolfo Stavenhagen (Garden City, NY: Anchor Books/Doubleday & Co, 1970), 309-310. 96 See Thiesenhusen 1995 for discussion of later critiques of the reform. 97 Gabriela Valdivia, “Agrarian Capitalism and Struggles over Hegemony in the Bolivian Lowlands,” Latin American Perspectives 37, no 4 (2010): 69-72.

  30 

dynamism of the region increased dramatically, transferring the locus of economic power to the

lowlands.98 Between 1950 and 2001, the population of Santa Cruz had increased from nine to 25

percent of the national population, and in 2007 Santa Cruz contributed 29 percent of GDP.99 The

political influence of Santa Cruz increased with its economic performance and population,

making the region the bastion of opposition to reform initiatives. Similar to the response of pre-

revolutionary elites to early MNR proposals for reform, Cruceño elites vehemently opposed the

1996 land reform law (INRA) promulgated by Sánchez de Lozada. After the approval of the law,

Santa Cruz responded with a two-day general strike to symbolize its future loss in income as a

result of reform.100 The level of elite opposition led Jane Benton (1999) to conclude that the law

was “an anathema to the empresarios (commercial farmers) and latifundistas of the eastern

lowland regions” and that “few laws in Bolivia’s history have aroused stronger feelings.”101 The

fierce elite opposition generated by INRA, a reform based on neoliberal principles crafted by a

fellow economic elite, highlights the threat posed by land distribution. Moreover, modifications

to the law under former dictator Hugo Banzer (1997-2001) undermined its ability to affect true

change in the eastern lowlands, softening the blow for elites.102 While Cruceño elites enjoyed

preferential treatment during Banzer’s dictatorship (1971-1978), Morales does not rely on Santa

Cruz for political support. Instead, he is accountable to indigenous peasants, who strongly

advocate land reform. Elites could no longer count on their power to offset the implementation of

reforms, increasing the threat posed by land reform under Morales.

                                                        98 Thiesenhusen, Broken Promises, 65-66. 99 See Appendix A, Tables 5 and 6.  100 Bret Gustafson, “Paradoxes of Liberal Indigenism: Indigenous Movements, State Processes, and Intercultural Reform in Bolivia,” in The Politics of Ethnicity: Indigenous Peoples in Latin American States, ed. David Maybury-Lewis (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, David Rockefeller Center for Latin American Studies, 2002), 282. 101 Benton, Agrarian Reform, 81, 91. 102 Valdivia, Agrarian Capitalism, 74.

  31 

With the unequal distribution of land in Santa Cruz in mind, Morales approached reform

with the central goal of rectifying the imbalances created by the 1953 decree and insufficiently

addressed by neoliberal agrarian reform (1996, INRA). Under the 2006 Ley de Reconducción

(Law 3545, Extension Law), Morales granted titles for 23.46 million hectares to 100,000 people

between 2006 and July of 2009, exceeding his initial goal by over 3 million hectares.103 As

demonstrated by Table 2, Morales distributed over half of the total hectares transferred by the

MNR in only three years, compared to four decades of implementation of the 1953 law. Critics

have called into question the efficacy of the MNR reform because of the slow titling process,

which allowed elites to manipulate distribution through bureaucratic channels.104 With respect to

speed, Morales has gone far beyond the MNR in challenging elite interests. Although the MNR

distributed land to a significantly greater number of individuals than Morales, the average

number of hectares per person transferred by Morales is 264, compared to 70 by the MNR.

Because of the poor economic performance of the minifundios created by the 1953 reform, the

greater quantity of land distributed to individuals under Morales may indicate more meaningful

benefits. Law 3545 also distributed almost three times as many hectares as INRA, a law that

triggered extensive elite opposition. In respect to the area of land transferred and the speed of

implementation, the reform pursued by the Morales administration significantly deepened the

change begun by the 1953 decree and continued by INRA. Because both reforms sparked fierce

elite reactions, the distribution of more land at higher rates would be expected to generate as

much or more opposition to Morales.

Table 2: Land Distributed

                                                        103 Raúl L. Madrid, “The Origins of the Two Lefts in Latin America,” Political Science Quarterly 125, No 4 (2010): 591. 104 Into A. Goudsmit, “Exploiting the 1953 Agrarian Reform: Landlord Persistence in Northern Potosí, Bolivia,” Journal of Latin American and Caribbean Anthropology 13, no 2 (2008): 377.

Reform Land Distributed (ha)

Titles Distributed Number of Beneficiaries

  32 

Unsurprisingly given the magnitude and speed of land redistribution, elites in Santa Cruz

perceived land reform as an economic and cultural threat. Regional landowning interests,

represented by the Cámara Agropecuaria del Oriente (CAO), consider agrarian reform, the

nationalization of hydrocarbons, and changes in export and import regulations for agricultural

products profoundly threatening to the lowland economy. In a 2008 speech, CAO president

Mauricio Roca argued that land reform had contributed to a decline in production by diminishing

investor confidence due to fears about the security of titles. Elites oppose land reform and other

signature Morales policies because, they argue, these policies diminish the region’s

competitiveness in domestic and international markets.105 Moreover, the regional narrative

considers the success of capitalist agroindustry the product of hard work, a value that is

threatened by a redistributionist model that encourages paternalistic welfare dependency. Land

reform is threatening because of its economic implications but also as part of a broader model

that compromises the foundation on which regional success was built. Thus, Santa Cruz has been

the bastion of the opposition since Morales’ election.

Natural Resources

Just as land distribution exposes deep economic, political, and cultural divisions within

Bolivian society, natural resource rents are a perennial feature of Bolivian politics. The MNR

asserted the role of the state in distributing rents, which it did for the benefit of its supporters and

at the expense of elites. Prior to the revolution, the Bolivian economy depended heavily on

                                                        105 Valdivia, Agrarian Capitalism, 76.

Decree Law No. 3464 (1953-1993)

44 million 831,000 626,998

INRA (1996-2005) 9.3 million n.a. n.a. Law 3545 (2006-2009) 23.46 million n.a. 100,000

  33 

mineral exports. Tin accounted for 80 percent of Bolivian exports and between 25 and 50 percent

of the world market until World War II.106 Dismantling the traditional influence of the tin

interests was essential to consolidating MNR power, and MNR leaders largely owed their rise to

power to highly mobilized and politically articulate miners.107 The decision to nationalize, made

due to a convergence of MNR and miner interests, confronted the mine-owning elite for the

benefit of previously exploited labor. Because La Rosca owned 80 percent of the tin industry,

nationalization equated redistribution, implying a substantial decrease in the elite share of tin

wealth. Indeed, during the 1940s the “tin barons in Bolivia exerted their substantial political

influence to oppose democratizing reforms that might lead to greater redistribution of tin wealth

itself,” demonstrating the extent to which nationalization challenged these interests.108 For

miners and other MNR supporters, nationalization meant greater access to tin wealth in the form

of state spending. Thus, nationalization juxtaposed the interests of elites and the popular sectors,

and the MNR acted on behalf of the popular sectors, against elites. The nationalization of the

mines successfully destroyed the political and economic influence of the mine-owning elite.

During the 50 years that followed the revolution, hydrocarbons comprised an increasing

proportion of Bolivian exports, replacing tin as the most contentious natural resource.109

Like the MNR distributed tin rents to its constituencies, Morales redistributed gas wealth

to poorer segments of society, ending elite control over hydrocarbons. In what Kurt Weyland

called an “ostentatious military occupation,” Morales nationalized hydrocarbons by transferring

operational control of the industry to the state-owned enterprise Yacimientos Petrolíferos

                                                        106 Dunning, Crude Democracy, 233. 107 Zondag, The Bolivian Economy, 80-82. 108 Dunning, Crude Democracy, 234-325. 109 See Appendix B, Table 7.

  34 

Fiscales Bolivianos (YPFB) by decree.110 The decree reversed the privatization enacted during

the first administration of Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada (1993-1997), a policy that favored foreign

investors and the extractive industry based in the lowland department of Tarija.111 This shift

away from policies favoring foreign investors and domestic elites gains significance when

contextualized in the heavily symbolic value of gas in Bolivia. In 2003, social movement protests

led by Morales and Felipe Quispe added the export of gas through Chile at rates lower than

market price, a policy that for the marginalized majority symbolized the historical privilege of

internal and external elites.112 Memories of the Gas War, which culminated in the exit of then-

president Sánchez de Lozada, still resonate, lending gas a central position in Morales’

presidential campaign. The decree was titled “Heroes del Chaco,” emphasizing the role played

by highland Indians in defending hydrocarbon reserves from Paraguay in the Chaco War (1932-

1935), the conflict from which the revolutionary fervor of the MNR base emerged.113 In this

context, the nationalization of hydrocarbons spurned elites while realizing a central demand of

social movements.

As a critical source of revenue, hydrocarbon rents are essential to funding contradicting

departmental and national visions of development. The lowland department of Tarija possesses

the majority of hydrocarbon reserves, of which the regional autonomy movement demands

greater control. As Kent Eaton notes, conflicts surrounding gas amount to a dispute over

economic models: “Beyond simply demanding to keep more of the tax revenues that are

collected in subnational regions, conservative autonomy movements are demanding deeper                                                         110 Clayton Mendonça Cunha, Filho and Rodrigo Santaella Gonçalves, “The National Development Plan as a Political Economic Strategy in Evo Morales’ Bolivia: Accomplishments and Limitations,” Latin American Perspectives 37, no 4 (2010): 184.; Weyland, Latin America’s Two Lefts, 157. 111 Bebbington and Bebbington, Anatomy of a Regional Conflict, 144. 112 Donna Lee Van Cott, From Movements to Parties in Latin America: The Evolution of Ethnic Politics (Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 97. 113 Bebbington and Bebbington, Anatomy of a Regional Conflict, 145; Benjamin Kohl and Linda Farthing, Impasse in Bolivia: Neoliberal Hegemony and Popular Resistance (London: Zed Books, 2006), 44.

  35 

changes that would allow subnational regions to deviate from national development models.”114

While Morales advocates redistribution and a move toward statism, lowland elites argue that

neoliberalism should be maintained in their regions.115 Given the country’s narrow tax base, gas

is essential to funding the social programs like Renta Dignidad and the Bono Juancito Pinto.

Funding for Renta Dignidad, which transfers a monthly stipend that totals US$340 per year to

Bolivians above the age of 60, amounts to 30 percent of total revenue from the direct

hydrocarbons tax. The benefit is universal, but in practice it amounts to redistribution of wealth

because of the concentration of hydrocarbon reserves in Tarija.116 Tarija also depends heavily on

hydrocarbon revenues, which have generated 89 percent of the department’s income since the

establishment of the direct hydrocarbons tax (2005). This income is invested in infrastructure,

free health care, programs supporting the development of small farms, and the university.117 The

regional concentration of natural resources in contemporary Bolivia is analogous to the private

ownership of the tin mines before 1952. In 1952, nationalization resulted in redistribution from

domestic elite to labor, the peasantry, and other popular sectors. In 2006, it resulted in

redistribution from a wealthy department to poorer departments, creating elite-led opposition

from within the region. Because of the cultural resonance of gas and the reliance of national and

departmental actors on revenues, control of revenues is a zero-sum game. On the question of

nationalization, social movement and popular sectors “won” and regional elites “lost.”

Both Morales and the MNR harnessed the discontent of sectors marginalized in national

economic and political life. Morales and MNR promised to create a more inclusive polity, and

                                                        114Eaton, Conservative Autonomy Movements, 307. 115 Ibid., 294. 116 The Global South-South Development Academy, “The Dignity Pension (Renta Dignidad): A Universal Old-Age Pension Scheme in Bolivia,” United Nations Development Program. http://tcdc2.undp.org/GSSDAcademy/SIE/SIEV1CH2/SIEV1CH2P1.aspx. (accessed April 14, 2012). 117 Bebbington and Bebbington, Anatomy of a Regional Conflict, 154.

  36 

they delivered with reforms that incorporated their support bases into the political process in

novel ways. While the MNR implemented a corporatist structure that organized access to the

state on the basis of economic sector, Morales and García Linera have integrated social

movements into policymaking through party structure and plebiscitary means, both formal and

informal. The creation of new channels for participation or the formalization of old ones

accompanied quantitative expansions in the electorate, including the beginning of universal

suffrage under the MNR and extension of the vote to Bolivians living abroad under Morales. In

both cases, political inclusion translated to economic inclusion, threatening elites with

redistribution of resources central to the Bolivian economy, politics, and society. The allocation

of land and natural resources is theme that resonates throughout Bolivian history. Both Morales

and the MNR asserted the sovereignty of all Bolivians, as conceived in their political ideologies,

over the country’s natural resource wealth. Despite the common approaches of MNR leaders and

Morales to highly conflictive issues, which empowered popular sectors at the expense of

powerful elites, Morales has so far avoided a military coup akin to the one that ended 12 years of

MNR rule. How did Morales overcome the acute challenges to meaningful reform in Bolivia,

one of the most socially and economically stratified countries in the world?

  37 

Chapter 3

Economic Crash and Resource Wealth:

Political Implications in an Atypical Rentier State

Morales’ redistributive economic policies have significantly challenged regional elite

interests, especially in the departments of Tarija and Santa Cruz, leading observers to attribute

his ability to implement such changes due to favorable export prices. Due to a commodities

boom beginning in 2002, the region has grown at an average of 5.5 percent. Steven Levitsky and

Kenneth Roberts partially attribute the longevity of leftist governments to increased rents, which

expand the possibilities of redistribution without seriously challenging elite interests.118 Daniela

Campello agrees with Levitsky and Roberts’ premise that high rents increase the policy options

available to leftists. Based on the model of Boix (2003), Campello argues that financial

liberalization constrains the possibilities of redistribution because investors can easily remove

capital from a domestic economy, leading many Latin American leftists to moderate once in

office. Her analysis of the presidencies of Lula in Brazil, Gutierrez and Correa in Ecuador, and

Chávez in Venezuela demonstrates that exogenous shocks can mediate this tension.119 Kurt

Weyland takes this proposition farther, concluding that resource rents actually “stimulate

radicalism and voluntarist attacks on the established socioeconomic and political order.”120

Resource rents have clear political implications, warranting further analysis in the Bolivian case.

If greater resource rents enable or induce redistributionist economic programs, a decline

in prices should constrain them. What would be the political consequences if Morales’

                                                        118Levitsky and Roberts, Introduction, 10-11. 119 Campello, The Politics of Redistribution, 190-1, 195-210. 120 Weyland, Latin America’s Two Lefts, 146.

  38 

redistributive programs became unsustainable? How would the termination or continuation of

these programs in adverse economic conditions affect Morales’ support among domestic actors?

The theoretical frameworks proposed by Guillermo O’Donnell and Thad Dunning offer insight

into this problem. Applying the concepts elaborated by these two authors to the Bolivian case

will help analyze the shifting dynamics of support for two social categories, “popular sectors”

and “elites.” O’Donnell’s concept of ISI exhaustion will be applied to the case of the MNR,

showing that while economic crash forced the party to make policy choices that alienated key

supporters, it lacks explanatory power for the timing of the coup. Analysis of the contemporary

case with this same framework demonstrates that an economic crash under Morales would

similarly create conditions conducive to a coup, removing a key source of protection from anti-

systemic actors. While O’Donnell’s model explains the dynamics that shape popular support for

or opposition to a regime, Dunning’s work provides a good starting point for analyzing elite

incentives.

Rents enable governments to meet the demands of the “masses” and avoid the

catastrophic “demands-performance gap” detailed by Guillermo O’Donnell. In his seminal study

of Bureaucratic-Authoritarian regimes in Brazil and Argentina, O’Donnell explains the

relationship between economic crisis and the disintegration of the populist coalition. State-led

development initially fostered economic growth, sustaining a political alliance based on

increased consumption capacity and anti-oligarchic nationalism. However, unstable export prices

resulted in balance of payment problems and high inflation. The decreased ability of the popular

sectors to consume created a gap between demands and regime performance. The necessity of

orthodox economic measures became clear to many sectors, but popular sector mobilization

made liberalization politically impossible. “Salient social problems remained unsolved,

  39 

competition was increasingly zero-sum, gains were precarious, and praetorianism undermined

the problem-solving capabilities of existing institutions. The threshold for a definitive crisis in

the political system was reached when most of the political actors focused on changing the rules

of the ‘political game’ altogether.”121 Those sectors that advocate austerity measures coalesce in

a coup coalition that considers “severe constraints” on political participation the only way to

overcome the chaos of mass praetorianism.122

With some slight modifications, O’Donnell’s model describes the challenges faced by the

MNR that set the stage for the 1964 coup. Unlike in Argentina and Brazil, the Bolivian state did

not rely on a powerful oligarchy to supply foreign exchange: the nationalization of tin removed

industry ownership from a domestic oligarchy to the state. However, in economic terms this

distinction was irrelevant, and the political effects of the resulting downturn were strikingly

similar in the Bolivian case. Indeed, the fate of the MNR intertwined with that of the tin industry,

as expected rents from the mines were essential to meeting the demands of mobilized

supporters.123 However, in the coming years the tin industry rapidly deteriorated. Production

sharply declined from 26,034 to 14,829 metric tons between 1953 and 1961 and the gross value

of tin exports decreased from $84.8 to $57.3 million between 1952 and 1963.124 The collapse

limited the ability of the MNR to meet the demands of its followers and the still-influential

landowning oligarchy.125 The lack of foreign exchange from tin revenues led to hyperinflation,

and the loose clientelist system under the auspices of the party transformed into a competition for

state resources. In 1956, President Hernán Siles Zuazo was forced to adopt a political

challenging IMF stabilization plan to retain American aid, which imposed suffering largely on

                                                        121 O’Donnell, Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism, 77. 122 Ibid., 56-77. 123 Dunning, Crude Democracy, 241. 124 Zondag, The Bolivian Economy, 83-84. 125 Dunning, Crude Democracy, 241.

  40 

MNR supporters: “The regime had to confront the choice of which of its multiplicity of support

groups would gain and which would lose; in short, the early phase of inclusion gave way to the

perceived need to shift to a politics of exclusion.”126

The “demands-performance gap” model accurately describes the Bolivian case up to

1956. When faced with polarizing circumstances, the MNR reversed its advocacy of the popular

sectors during its first four years. These “politics of exclusion” alienated the MNR from its

support base, which provided the necessary force to counter dominant sectors in society.

However, the MNR clung to power for another eight years: Bolivia clearly descended into

praetorianism as early as 1956, and the anticipated backlash only occurred in 1964. Beginning in

1956, the MNR successfully implemented austerity measures, relying on the military to oppress

labor. The economic stabilization under Siles and the Alliance for Progress Triangular Plan

under Paz succeeded at restoring growth by 1960 (see Table 3). It seemed that the MNR had

“place[d] severe constraints on the political activities of those who are outside the winning

coalition” to pursue the economic policies deemed necessary by key sectors.127 Because the

MNR had already done what an authoritarian intervention would be expected to achieve, the

state’s decision-making paralysis in the face of high polarization does not explain the turn to

authoritarianism in 1964. As will be seen, power politics within the MNR and the military

provided the trigger point that led to the coup in 1964.128 The model posed by O’Donnell

accurately describes the disintegration of the MNR coalition, which critically undermined

popular support. However, this model only set the stage for a coup, stopping short of a complete

explanation.

                                                        126 Malloy, Authoritarianism and Corporatism, 472. 127 O’Donnell, Modernization and Bureaucratic Authoritarianism, 78. 128 Charles D. Corbett, The Latin American Military as a Socio-Political Force: Case Studies of Bolivia and Argentina (Coral Gables, Florida: Center for Advanced International Studies, University of Miami, 1972), 41-42.; Mitchell, The Legacy of Populism, 92-96.

  41 

Morales has benefitted from continuously high export prices, making it impossible to

definitively apply the demands-performance gap to the contemporary case. In sharp contrast to

the almost immediate collapse of the tin industry, Morales has enjoyed a general upward trend in

the prices of hydrocarbons, minerals, and soybeans. Although the prices of these exports all

dipped in 2008, they remained substantially higher than 2006 levels, the start of Morales’ term.

In addition, tin, which still comprises a significant share of exports, has remained at high prices

despite a small dip in 2011.129 Short-term fluctuations are typical, and short dips are unlikely to

trigger the widespread defections necessary to support a coup, a risky endeavor. While the

decline of tin led to chronic foreign exchange shortage under the MNR, Morales has run fiscal

surpluses.130 Perhaps the most important difference is the absence of hyperinflation, the thorn in

the MNR’s side, under Morales. Between 1952 and 1957 the money supply increased by 371

billion Bs, severe hyperinflation.131 Even including spikes to double digits in 2008 and 2011,

Morales has kept inflation in check when compared to the 1950s.132 A comparison of growth

rates in the 1950s and between 2006-2012 demonstrates the economic big picture: Morales has

sustained growth while also pursuing redistributive policies, while for the MNR redistribution

and growth were mutually exclusive. During the first four years of his administration, the

economy grew at an average rate of 4.7 percent, which includes a drop during the 2008

recession. The first four years of the MNR provide a large contrast, in which average growth

reached a striking -6.6 percent (See Table 3). The favorable economic circumstances during

                                                        129 34 percent of merchandise exports in 2010 (See Appendix X) 130 Mark Weisbrot and Luis Sandoval, “Bolivia’s Economy—An Update,” International Journal of Health Services 38, no. 2 (2008): 400. 131 Zondag, The Bolivian Economy, 55-56.

132 The World Factbook, “Bolivia,” Central Intelligence Agency, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/bl.html. (accessed April 14, 2012).; Data, “Bolivia,” The World Bank, http://data.worldbank.org/country/bolivia. (accessed April 14, 2012).

  42 

Morales’ presidency diminished Bolivian dependence on the United States and international

monetary institutions, a stark difference from the circumstances of the MNR. The MNR was

beholden to the United States, which financed Bolivia’s external debt and provided $392.1

million of aid between 1946 and 1964.133 Contrary to the close bilateral relations between

Bolivia and the United States during this period, this relationship deteriorated since the election

of Morales. The worsening of relations corresponded to a decrease in aid, and what remained

went largely to departmental governments.134 However, Morales can continue his policy

program because of decreased dependence on US assistance. The evolution of Bolivia’s

relationship with the United STates from the 1950s to the present elucidates the starkly different

economic contexts and allows Morales much more policy latitude and retain his support base.

Table 3: Annual Growth Rates, GDP135

MNR Morales Year GDP % Growth Year GDP % Growth

1953-1954 -10.7 2006 4.8 1955-1956 2.5 2007 4.6

1957 -3.4 2008 6.1 1958 2.4 2009 3.4 1959 3.0 2010 4.1 1960 2.1 2011 5.0 1961 3.4 1962 4.2 1963 6.2 1964 6.2

Morales, who hails from a social movement background and encourages the mobilization

of his supporters, would likely face similar choices as the MNR in the event of a prolonged

economic crash. One study noted a significant increase in conflicts per month (40.4) in 2006,                                                         133 Zondag, The Bolivian Economy, 188, 192. 134 Wolff, Challenges to Democracy Promotion, 10-11. 135 Author elaboration based on GDP estimates in Zondag, The Bolivian Economy, 202; the World Bank; CIA World FactBook.

  43 

putting conflict levels during the Morales administration at the third highest in the last 40

years.136 Morales’ supporters continue to take to the streets in pursuit of salary raises, subsidies,

and other forms of state spending. Two examples, the Gasolinazo of December 2010 and the

nationwide protests of April 2011, illustrate these dynamics. In the Gasolinazo, the government

announced the end of fuel subsidies in December 2010, citing high costs and smuggling,

prompting trade unions to march extensively and transportation workers to declare an indefinite

strike. Morales ultimately backed down under the pressure, withdrawing the decree.137 A few

months later, discontent over rising food and transport prices coalesced into COB-led protests

demanding a 15 percent pay increase in La Paz, Cochabamba, Santa Cruz, and Tarija. The

protests, the worst faced by Morales since coming to office, turned violent, with police using tear

gas and protesters responding with stones and slingshots. Although Morales argued that an

increase of greater than 10 percent was unaffordable and emphasized his support of open

dialogue, protests continued.138 These two instances of mobilization to maintain or increase

government spending resulting in clashes with police are reminiscent of the reaction to MNR-era

IMF stabilization. Although the cutback in gas subsidies and refusal to raise wages more than 10

percent certainly do not impose the same level of suffering as full-scale orthodox stabilization,

the reaction was immediate and violent. Both events occurred when natural gas and petroleum

prices were still above 2006 levels, suggesting that the reaction would be much greater in the

event of full economic crisis (See Figure 3). A decline in export prices would trigger an

                                                        136 Roberto Laserna and Miguel Villarroel Nikitenko, 38 Años de Conflictos Sociales en Bolivia: Enero de 1970-Enero de 2008: Descripción General y por Periodos Gubernamentales (Cochabamba, Bolivia: CERES, Centro de Estudios de la Realidad Económica y Social, 2008), 26. The greatest number of protests per month (54.0) occurred under Hernán Siles Zuazo of the UDP (December 1982-August 1985), followed by the period leading to the removal of Carlos Mesa (October 2003-June 2005) (52.4) 137“Bolivia’s Morales Drops Planned Food Price Hike,” BBC News, January 1, 2011. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-12101199 (accessed April 14, 2012). 138 “Bolivia Protests Challenge Evo Morales,” BBC News, April 15, 2011. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-13099827 (accessed April 14, 2012).

  44 

economic downturn, which would likely have similar political effects as the recession of the

early 1950s. While this does not determine the incidence of a coup, Morales would be

increasingly constrained in his ability pursue redistributive economic policy, undermining a

critical source of support.

Figure 2: Natural Gas and Petroleum Prices, January 2006-February 2012139

Dunning addresses the role of natural resources in shaping elite support for or opposition

to democratic regimes. In his model of anti-democratic coups, he postulates two conflicting

incentives for elites. Resource wealth has a “direct authoritarian effect” because it increases the

benefits of controlling the state, which encompasses control of the distribution of rents.

However, elites are also concerned with redistributive taxation, that is, the taxation of non-

resource income with the goal of ameliorating inequality. By providing additional revenue that

does not come directly out of elite pockets, resource booms decrease the necessity for taxation of

                                                        139 Author elaboration based on World Bank data.

  45 

non-resource income, increasing the cost of a coup relative to the cost of living under

democracy. In an economy with high inequality of non-resource income, elites would fear

redistributive taxation more than they desire control of the state, and mitigation will have a

stronger influence.140 When applied to the Bolivian case, this model suggests that when resource

rents are high, highland and lowland elites have diverging interests, and when resource rents are

low these interests converge in opposition to the Morales government.

As Dunning notes, Bolivia does not consistently operate as a classic rentier state.141

Private ownership of the tin mines before 1952 meant that nationalization signified

redistribution. Although the mine-owning elite wielded its considerable influence to oppose the

MNR prior to 1952, the revolution provided the popular momentum to nationalize the mines and

therefore destroy La Rosca’s power. Similarly, agrarian reform redistributed land, definitively

severing the party’s ties with a substantial portion of the landed oligarchy. The interests of

lowland elites, primarily in Santa Cruz and Tarija, are analogous to those of the highland landed

and mine-owning oligarchies during the 1950s and 60s. Like La Rosca, Tarijeño elites dislike

Morales because revenues generated by gas found in the department fund nationwide social

programs, essentially redistributing wealth from one department to the rest. Cruceño elites

similarly oppose Morales due to land reform, a redistributive program, and other policies that

regulate the liberalized eastern economy. Notably, the leader of the CAO also considered the

nationalization of hydrocarbons a contributor to the “crisis of production” in Santa Cruz,

providing an alliance with the gas industry in Tarija based on opposition to a specific policy

rather than a convenient convergence of interests.142 Facing reallocation of their primary source

of income, lowland elites pursued secession to gain control of land and rent distribution: “It is

                                                        140 Dunning, Crude Democracy, 8-11. 141 Ibid., 232, 252. 142 Valdivia, Agrarian Capitalism, 76.

  46 

quite possible that the effect of rents on the incentives for secession is analogous to the effect of

rents on incentives of elites for coups against democracy.”143 An alliance of elites located in

lowland departments has been threatened by Morales’ redistributive economic program, and

these elites remain powerful.

The locus of opposition to Morales is in the lowlands, and highland elites have not

demonstrated comparable resistance to the government. The impending election of Morales

exposed this divide, spurring a fracture in the national business organization, the Confederation

of Private Entrepreneurs of Bolivia (CEPB). While the regional branch of the organization in

Santa Cruz, the Santa Cruz Federation of Private Entrepreneurs of Bolivia (FEPB-SC),

advocated a combative approach concerning Morales, the national federation supported a more

conciliatory stance.144 The reluctance of highland elites makes sense when considering the

historical relationship between the regions. In her analysis of the origins and distribution of fiscal

resources, Rossana Barragán concludes that “if there was a single state policy that was constant,

sustained, and enduring, it was the policy that favored Santa Cruz, a policy that came at the cost

of serious internal imbalances.”145 Historically, revenues from taxation flowed from East to

West, derived from the indigenous tax (a vestige of colonialism) or mining. Although

departments with high proportions of indigenous peoples or where the mining industry was

concentrated produced the most revenue, expenditure was distributed evenly among the regions,

implying higher per capita state spending in the sparsely populated lowlands.146 Thus, highland

                                                        143 Dunning, Crude Democracy, 252. 144 Eaton, Conservative Autonomy Movements, 303. 145 Rossana Barragán, “Oppressed or Privileged Regions? Some Historical Reflections on the Use of State Resources,” in Unresolved Tensions: Bolivia Past and Present, ed. John Crabtree and Laurence Whitehead (Pittsburg, PA: University of Pittsburg Press, 2008), 83. 146 Ibid., 86.

  47 

elites benefitted from the nationalization, which reversed the historical relationship between the

regions as one in which the East subsidized growth in the West.

In an event of a prolonged recession, the incentives of highland and lowland elites would

converge to produce an “authoritarian effect.” With a sustained drop in hydrocarbon prices, the

tension between redistributive demands and high capital mobility would reemerge, a threat to

highland elites that likely depend on foreign investment and a strong economy. In open

economies, investors unhappy with present or the threat of future redistribution are free to

remove capital from the domestic economy. Resource booms can mitigate this tension by

compensating for foreign investment, decreasing dependence on international lending

institutions, and raising investor profits enough to compensate for higher taxation.147 A collapse

in prices and probable mass mobilization would encourage capital flight, threatening economic

growth and with it elite economic interests. Morales would be forced to choose between

discontinuing popular programs, like the Renta Dignidad and bono Juancito Pinto stipends, or

continuing the programs without compensating for decreased rents. The former would alienate

supporters and likely require repression, critically undermining Morales’ legitimacy. The latter

would result in inflation and slowed growth, making it politically problematic vis-à-vis most

sectors. Morales’ choices diametrically oppose the interests of his supporters and elites, creating

a zero-sum game similar to conditions during the 1950s and 1960s. Highland elites would see

Morales’ redistributive programs as the culprit, making them less likely to advocate for him in

the event of a coup.

If the Bolivian economy entered a prolonged recession, Morales would lose support

among key sectors. Currently, high natural resource prices and good economic performance have

ensured (at least tacit) support for Morales among highland elites and the middle classes. The                                                         147 Campello, The Politics of Redistribution, 188-191.

  48 

only actors likely to support a coup are lowland elites, who have chosen autonomy as an

alternative probably due to the lack of national support for military intervention. As the

preceding analysis has shown, a prolonged economic recession could derail this equilibrium.

Morales’ support base would mobilize to retain economic benefits, and some sectors would

defect to support a coup. The interests of highland and lowland elites would converge, creating a

unified and powerful opposition. In absence of natural resource rents, Morales would face further

polarizing policy options. These circumstances bear striking resemblance to those confronted by

the MNR in the 1950s and 1960s, which led to a military coup supported by the middle class and

civilian elites. However, they do not explain the occurrence of a coup in isolation. The MNR

confronted mass praetorianism as early as 1956, and was not ousted until 1964. The outcome of

this zero-sum game would likely depend on the propensity of the military to intervene or the

strength of institutional channels that aim to prevent such intervention.

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Chapter Four

Praetorian Politics Revisited:

The Role of the Military

As Samuel Huntington (1968) remarked, “While all social groups engage in their own

forms of direct action, clearly the military form is the most dramatic and the most effective.”148

In Huntington’s radical praetorian society, the military intervenes as a response to the disruptive

tactics used by other social groups, like students, the clergy, labor, or the middle class, that are

also politicized. Military intervention cannot be understood outside of a larger context of “the

general politicization of social forces and institutions.”149 Because the military’s method of

contention is decisive, military solidarity with the government or lack thereof determines

whether the tactics pursued by other politicized sectors expel the government. Strikes,

demonstrations, and other “insurrectionary activities” polarize politics, forcing the military to

intervene on one side or the other.150 In 1964, the Bolivian military overthrew Paz’s government

to quell widespread and violent labor strikes, which the civilian government proved incapable of

controlling. The government faced a zero-sum choice between alienating labor or discontinuing

orthodox economic policy, and the military intervened to resolve a conflict that political

institutions could not mediate.151

The military is clearly the pivotal actor in determining the outcome of praetorian politics.

However, Huntington does not address why the military chooses to ally with the government or

its opponents: “If the military…are strongly identified with the government or staunchly loyal to

                                                        148 Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), 212. 149 Ibid., 194. 150 Ibid., 213. 151 Ibid., 215.

  50 

it, insurrectionary activities…will not threaten the existence of the government.”152 What

determines identification of the military with a civilian government? In the event of a prolonged

economic crisis and resulting praetorianism of politics, on whose side would the Bolivian

military intervene? Three possible explanations arise out of the literature: the corporate interests

of the military determine its allegiance, strong institutions govern civil-military relations, and/or

Morales has successful “coup-proofed” the military.153

An explanation based on the institutional interests of the military posits that the military

supports a government favorable to its interests and opposes a government unfavorable to its

interests.154 Under a government favorable to military interests, the military may enjoy a large

portion of the national budget, a substantial supply of arms, and control of its organizational

mission.155 Conversely, the military may become dissatisfied if the government were to assert

control over military ideology or decrease the institution’s share of the budget. Although this

hypothesis makes intuitive sense, it finds little empirical support in the Bolivian case. The 1952

revolution destroyed the military, decreasing its size by 75 percent, purging senior officers, and

changing its name to the “Army of the National Revolution.” Funding was lacking, and the

military clearly did not consider itself a privileged institution under Paz’s government:

“Commanders grumbled incessantly about their lack of resources—even uniforms and shoes

were frequently lacking for the annual crop of conscripts—but they grumbled within military

channels and their complaints were absorbed by the thoroughly loyal top leadership.”156

However, the military intervened in 1964, eight years after Paz’s term. By this point, the military

                                                        152 Ibid., 213. 153 Rittinger and Cleary, Confronting Coup Risk. 154 Fitch, Armies and Politics, 27-28. 155 Alfred Stepan, Rethinking military politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988), 68-86. 156 Corbett, The Latin American Military, 29-32.

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enjoyed a considerably elevated status in terms of resources and prestige due to its gradual

reconstruction beginning in 1956 to repress armed labor.157 In Bolivia, the opposite of

expectations based on corporate interest occurred: after eight years of increasing advantage vis-à-

vis the civilian government, the military engineered a coup. Morales has similarly increased

spending on officer salaries and weapon purchases, part of a broader “coup-proofing” strategy.158

Based on lessons from the MNR, this approach is unlikely to be successful. If corporate and

personal interests have an effect on coup-plotting, it is minimal.

The military may also be unable to intervene due to constraints posed by strong

institutions of civilian control. For the purpose of this analysis, the author concurs with the

definition of civilian control proposed by J. Samuel Fitch: the political, legal, and policymaking

subordination of the military to civilian authorities.159 This definition precludes the military

calling the political shots, exercising immunity from civilian legal systems, and determining

policy outcomes. The military in a democratic regime, not itself a representative institution,

ideally serves as a tool to execute defense policy crafted by legitimately elected officials. In

analyzing the degree of civilian control, institutions matter. Although informal civil-military

relations exist, they are influenced by formal regulations. The strength and design of institutions

can increase the costs of and barriers to political involvement of the military, making a coup

difficult to plan or execute.160 Institutionalization of civilian supremacy is also crucial to

                                                        157 Malloy, Authoritarianism and Corporatism, 477. 158 Rittinger and Cleary, Confronting Coup Risk. 159 J. Samuel Fitch, “Military Attitudes toward Democracy in Latin America: How Do We Know If Anything Has Changed?,” in Civil-Military Relations in Latin America: New Analytical Perspectives, ed. David Pion-Berlin (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2001), 62-63. 160 David Pion-Berlin, “Defense Organization and Civil-Military Relations in Latin America,” Armed Forces & Society 35, no 3 (2009): 563-565.

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durability: “Governments need a longer-term, structured relation that induces stable, supportive

encounters between political officials and military personnel.”161

Based on the typology put forth by David Pion-Berlin, the institutions governing civil-

military relations under Morales would not be expected to enhance civilian control, suggesting

that the strength and design of these institutions does not adequately explain the durability of the

Morales regime. Pion-Berlin cites four guidelines for strengthening civilian control: increasing

the civilian presence in the defense sector, strengthening defense ministries, moving the military

lower in the chain of command, and dividing the power of the military. Ideally, these institutions

encourage civil-military communication but preclude inordinate political influence of the armed

forces.162 The MNR structure of civil-military relations clearly lacked these characteristics. The

célula militar, like other corporatist sectoral organizations, served as an interest group within the

party rather than a mediator through which civilian leaders asserted control.163 Given the failure

of the MNR at operationalizing its vision of a hegemonic party that effectively controlled

supporters, the célula militar did not control the military any better than the party could control

labor or the peasantry. Although contemporary institutions are considerably more developed,

they still exhibit weakness vis-à-vis Pion-Berlin’s framework. The Bolivian defense sector

follows the “dual command” ideal type, which involves two channels of authority between

civilians and the military. The president utilizes two chains of command, one led by the

Command in Chief of the Armed Forces and the second by the Ministry of Defense.

Administrative tasks go through the Ministry of Defense, and operational tasks go through the

Command in Chief (See Figure 4). Pion-Berlin concludes that this structure is of “dubious

merit” for avoiding military intervention in politics, permitting the military a high position in the

                                                        161 Ibid., 563 162 Ibid., 536-565. 163 Mitchell, The Legacy of Populism, 567.

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vertical hierarchy and relegating the Ministry of Defense to less important tasks.164 In this

structure, the military enjoys close proximity to pivotal civilian decision-makers, opening up

significant channels of influence on national policy. In addition, the Ministry of Defense, lauded

by many as the most important institution for asserting civilian control, performs only

administrative functions, rather than the central tasks of organization of forces and preparation of

goals, strategies, and institutional doctrine.165 The position of the military in the chain of

command and the locus of operational functions in a military rather than civilian institution

encourages participation in politics. Institutions governing civil-military relations were weak and

poorly designed during the 1950s and 1960s. At present, these institutions are stronger but still

poorly designed, demonstrating that institutional constraints would not preclude military

intervention.

Figure 4: Bolivian Military Command Structure166

                                                        164 Pion-Berlin, Defense Organization, 578-583. 165 Pion-Berlin, Defense Organization, 567. 166 Author synthesis of figures in Pion-Berlin, Defense Organization, 578; Escobar, Documento de Análisis, 140.

advisory relation

administrative command

operational command

General Staff of the Armed Forces

Supreme Council of National Defense

Ministry of Defense Command in Chief of the Armed Forces

President

General Command of the Air Force

General Joint Chief of Staff of the Navy

General Command of the Army

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It is clear that the poor design of Bolivian institutions governing civil-military relations

does not provide robust insurance against military incursion into the political realm. However,

organizational characteristics of the military itself, especially ideology, can play an important

role. Although Samuel Huntington later diverged from the importance he placed on explanations

of military intervention internal to the organization in The Soldier and the State (1957), the

theoretical distinction he draws between subjective and objective civilian control illuminates the

importance of military ideology and leads to an understanding of politicization. While subjective

civilian control signifies the control of the military by one governmental institution (i.e. the

executive or legislative branch), social class (i.e. masses or elites), or regime type (i.e.

democracy or authoritarianism), objective civilian control entails political neutrality and

commitment to any legitimately constituted authority. The military under subjective control is a

mirror, rather than a tool, of the state. The idea of politicization arises out of this distinction:

“The antithesis of objective civilian control is military participation in politics: civilian control

decreases as the military becomes progressively involved in institutional, class, and

constitutional politics. Subjective civilian control, on the other hand, presupposes this

involvement.”167 Actions to socialize the military into the national political project, such as

purging officers, expanding its institutional role beyond defense, or symbolic efforts to shape the

institutional doctrine, convert civilian control from objective to subjective. Although subjective

civilian control may ensure military support of the government, it does not provide the same

security for the regime.

                                                        167 Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1957), 81-84.

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Morales’ efforts to gain the allegiance of the armed forces may have established

subjective civilian control, explaining military reluctance to maintain its traditional alliance with

conservative elites. Latin American militaries have traditionally moved to restore order in the

face of mobilization of the popular sectors. In Bolivia, the military oscillated between reformist

and reactionary tendencies during its two decades of power.168 Not taking the ideological

ambiguity of the military as assurance, Morales has zealously incorporated the military into his

vision for the state by promoting supporters, removing opponents, and transforming the

institutional ideology in an effort to sever this link. Morales’ avid “coup-proofing” amounts to

the politicization of the military, or a move into the realm of subjective civilian control.

Although this strategy may protect Morales’ government from military intervention in the event

of an economic downturn or other catastrophe, it will do little to protect the democratic regime in

the future.

Rotating, appointing, and dismissing military personnel serves as valuable insurance

against the organization’s willingness and capacity to stage a coup. Eric Rittinger and Matt

Cleary point out that replacing military authorities with loyalists has the dual advantage of

avoiding a coup from the top echelons of the establishment and securing support within the

institution in the event of a coup attempt. In addition, officers are preoccupied with job security

and lack the trust and interpersonal networks to marshal organizational support for a coup.169

Both the MNR and Morales sought this security immediately upon gaining power. The MNR

shrunk the size of the military from 18,000-20,000 to 5,000, what amounted to an institutional

crisis. The revolutionary government also purged senior officers, leaving only two out of the 26

                                                        168 Malloy, Authoritarianism and Corporatism, 477-480. 169 Rittinger and Cleary, Confronting Coup Risk.

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promoted in 1949 to perform a significant role.170 Similarly, Morales appointed political allies to

top military positions over career generals associated with U.S.-supported antinarcotics

campaigns and implemented a program enabling fast advancement of indigenous recruits.

Regardless of the true political leanings of high- and low-level military members, the

dependence of their career on loyalty encourages the appearance of allegiance.171

Moreover, both governments also endeavored to align the mission of the armed forces to

correspond to that of the state. Although the 2009 Constitution did not change the structure of the

defense sector, it drastically changed the military’s institutional doctrine and function to comply

with the pluricultural ideology of the state. The new incarnation of the Bolivian military is an

agent of the decolonization process, embodies a culture of peace, and responds to democratic

debate about what should constitute the institution. Alongside the established mission of defense,

the military supports development initiatives, participates in resource conservation, and

addresses rural insecurities with an increased presence in frontier regions.172 In a gesture

symbolic of this deep change, Morales ordered the use of a new Cuban-inspired slogan and the

recognition of the indigenous flag, just as the MNR changed the military’s name to the “army of

the National Revolution.”173 Army Commander in Chief General Tito Gandarillas affirmed

these principles in his proclamation that the military is “anti-imperialist, anti-capitalist, and

socialist,” meaning “vivir bien, that we are all equal, that there are not many dramatic

                                                        170 Corbett, The Latin American Military, 29-30. 171 Rittinger and Cleary, Confronting Coup Risk, 17. 172 Loreta Tellería Escobar, “Documento de Análisis: Estado Plurinacional y Fuerzas Armadas en Bolivia,” Atlas Comparativo de la Defensa en América Latina y Caribe (2010): 148-149. www.resdal.org/atlas/atlas-libro-10-espanol.html (accessed April 14, 2012). 173 “Bolivian Army Adopts Cuba’s Revolutionary Slogan,” BBC News, March 24, 2010. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/8584199.stm (accessed April 14, 2012); Corbett, The Latin American Military, 31.

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differences, that the poor are less poor and the rich less rich.”174 The incorporation of the values

of the state into military institutional doctrine demonstrates Morales’ efforts to transform the

military into Huntington’s “mirror of the state.”175

The preceding discussion demonstrates that the factors influencing civil-military relations

have not changed significantly since the 1950s and 60s. The military intervention at a time when

the MNR favored institutional interests calls into question the efficacy of increased military

spending to assure loyalty, a policy employed by Morales. Institutions of civilian control have

developed minimally since the time of the MNR, but not to standards that would be expected to

prevent a coup. Like Paz during his first term, Morales has relied heavily on “coup-proofing”

techniques to ensure loyalty. These techniques have socialized the military into the national

political and economic project in hopes that the military would intervene on the government’s

side if forced to make the choice. Of course, the extent to which Morales has succeeded is

unknowable short of in-depth interviews, and difficult to ascertain even then. Regardless, the

experience of Paz provides a cautionary tale. Paz’s measures to destroy the influence of the

military were so successful that one analyst concluded, “There is no doubt that Paz succeeded

completely in dominating the army during his first term.”176 Despite this apparent success, it

was Paz who the military ousted in 1964. When Paz’s intentions to run for reelection exacerbated

MNR factionalism, two enterprising military officers took advantage of the opportunity and

seized power.177 Loyalty to the party or revolutionary ideals clearly played no role. If Paz was in

fact successful at gaining military support, it eroded over a decade of social and political conflict.

                                                        174 “Las FFAA Se Declararan Anticapitalistas y Socialistas,” La Razon, January 11, 2012. http://www.la-razon.com/nacional/FFAA-declaran-anticapitalistas-socialistas_0_1539446088.html (accessed April 14, 2012). Author’s translation. 175 Huntington, The Soldier and the State, 1957. 176 Corbett, The Latin American Military, 32. 177 Ibid., 41-42.

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An analysis of power struggles within the upper echelons of the MAS is purely speculative and

beyond the scope of this paper. However, any political regime that rests purely on the give-and-

take of elite power relations, which are incredibly fickle throughout Bolivian history, is fragile.

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Chapter 5:

Conclusion

Nearly three decades have passed without a military coup in Bolivia. Given Bolivia’s

history of endemic political instability, poverty, and inequality, this outcome is a notable and

unexpected success for democracy. Theories seeking to account for the durability of the “Third

Wave of Democracy” do not adequately explain why a military intervention has not occurred in

Bolivia since 1985. Although other leftists in the region have moderated due to the constraints

posed by financial liberalization, Morales has deviated from this trend. With contentious

redistributive policies like the nationalization of hydrocarbons and agrarian reform, Morales

challenged elite economic interests that were left almost unchecked since the 1952 revolution.

Due to the multiple interventions of regional organizations to protect democracy, especially the

response of Unasur to the 2008 crisis in Pando, coup actors will consider democratic norms in

their cost-benefit calculation. However, US support for democracy in the region has been

decidedly mixed and US-Bolivian relations are poor, possibly undermining the pro-democracy

influence of regional organizations. Finally, contemporary Bolivian politics are polarized along

intersecting ethnic, economic, and regional lines, approximating the zero-sum game of the 1950s

and 1960s. This thesis has aimed to explain this puzzle.

A detailed comparison of the political and economic programs and policies implemented

by the MNR under Paz and the MAS under Morales demonstrated the extent to which both

governments challenged the interests of dominant elites. Both governments expanded the

franchise quantitatively and qualitatively. The MNR quintupled the size of the voting population

by declaring universal suffrage, and the MAS extended the vote to Bolivians living abroad. Each

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government incorporated its supporters into decision-making structures in novel ways, the MNR

in a corporatist, single-party state and the MAS in a “plurinational” democracy with roots in

social movements. These changes mobilized popular sectors like the middle class, labor, the

peasantry, and the informal sector to undermine the influence elites traditionally wielded through

political institutions. In both cases, the expansion and deepening of political participation

resulted in policy outcomes that favored newly incorporated sectors. Regarding two of the most

contentious issues within Bolivian politics, the allocation of land and resource rents, both

governments enacted policies that favored their support base at the expense of elites. The 1953

agrarian reform decree redistributed land from latifundistas to campesinos, challenging the

hegemony of the landed oligarchy. Over fifty years later, Morales promulgated a new law with

the goal of extending land reform to the eastern lowlands, a move that was met with significant

resistance. In addition, the MNR nationalized the tin mines with the goals of destroying the

political and economic power of La Rosca and utilizing revenues for national development.

Similarly, Morales considers hydrocarbon revenues essential to ameliorating chronic poverty, but

control of rents is also a central component of secessionist pressures in the eastern lowlands.

Despite the marked similarities between the depth of reforms under the MNR and the MAS and

the intensity of elite opposition, the military has not intervened since the election of Morales.

The analysis of the MNR and MAS experiences has indicated two crucial differences that

explain the difference in outcome. First, the territorial distribution of resources in contemporary

Bolivia enabled Morales to confront only regional elites, leaving highland elite economic

interests mostly intact. Conversely, the MNR challenged elites across the country, leading to

consistent opposition among all elites. Second, the economic circumstances during the 1950s and

early 1960s are markedly different than those today. Morales assumed the presidency amid a

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commodity boom that spurred growth and gave him more policy latitude. By contrast, the

collapse of the tin industry followed the 1952 revolution almost immediately, leading to

hyperinflation, negative growth, and heavy dependence on US aid. The combination of the

territorial distribution of resources and fortuitous economic circumstances enabled Morales to

enact reforms and consolidate power, while the MNR was forced to back down, critically

undermining its support.

The gradual shift of economic power to the eastern lowlands between 1952 and today has

significant political implications. When the MNR confronted the landed and mine-owning elites

with land reform and mine nationalization, there existed no countervailing force. Elites in the

most politically and economically powerful part of the country uniformly opposed the party from

its inception. Any actor plotting a coup would have been able to rely on opposition from these

sectors. However, the economic landscape had significantly changed by Morales’ election. The

population growth and development of agroindustry in Santa Cruz and discovery of natural gas

reserves in Tarija created a new center of economic power. Because of the unequal agrarian

structure in Santa Cruz and hydrocarbon wealth in Tarija, Morales’ redistributive economic

reforms targeted the interests of departmental elites, while leaving highland elites alone. This

division created contradictory incentives for highland and lowland elites. The former mobilized

to regain control of hydrocarbon revenues and prevent land distribution, primarily through

autonomy movements. The latter, however, refused to adopt a confrontational stance. Morales’

assertion of control over hydrocarbons reversed the historical flow of resources from East to

West, a policy that benefits highland elites. In addition, high hydrocarbon prices compensate for

a decrease in foreign investment, sustaining economic growth. Highland elites are not directly

threatened by Morales’ reforms, and may actually benefit from them. Thus, the territorial

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distribution of natural resources created conflicting economic interests between highland and

lowland elites, dividing the opposition. Lowland elites, probably aware of the futility of a coup in

the absence of national solidarity, pursued regional autonomy instead.

The strikingly different economic conditions from 1952-1964 and 2006-present strongly

shaped the ability of the MNR and the MAS to govern. The MNR’s patronage machine relied

almost exclusively on tin rents. Soon after the tin industry collapsed, society descended into mass

praetorianism and the party was forced to make difficult political choices. The decision to

implement orthodox stabilization and repress labor alienated a crucial source of government

support, setting the stage for a coup. By contrast, Morales came to power in the midst of a

resource boom, allowing him to pursue redistribution and increase state intervention in the

economy while maintaining growth. However, Bolivia is still a heavily resource-dependent

economy. A prolonged bust would undermine the current equilibrium enabled by the territorial

distribution of resources and sustained by high rents. As rents fail to generate growth, highland

elites would demand spending cuts, most likely to expensive redistributive programs funded by

hydrocarbons. Beneficiaries of these programs would mobilize to maintain them. In this zero-

sum context, Morales would have to choose between alienating his supporters, critically

undermining his legitimacy, or continuing programs amid ensuing economic crisis, intensifying

elite opposition. With either highly mobilized supporters or powerful elites moving to the

opposition, coup risk would be substantially heightened.

Because of favorable economic conditions, any actors considering a coup would likely be

deterred by Morales’ widespread popular support and the reluctance of highland elites to oppose

the government. However, a resource bust would derail this equilibrium, transforming Bolivian

society into the chaos of mass praetorianism. There is little assurance that the military would not

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intervene with its own decisive form of praetorian politics, a coup. The 1964 military coup

demonstrates that Morales’ strategy of increased spending will be ineffective. Although

institutions governing civil-military relations have developed since the 1950s, their poor design

still allows the military substantial access to top political decision-makers. Finally and most

troubling, Morales has embarked on a “coup-proofing” campaign, which offers only tenuous

assurance of military support and encourages military participation in politics.178 In the event of

an economic downturn, the intricacies of elite politics could trigger a military coup.

The continued risk of military coup is a significant threat to Bolivian democracy.

However, Morales’ strategies to push reform forward in a politically hostile environment also

undermine democratic institutions. Morales has directly or indirectly encouraged a multitude of

actors to make demands outside of institutional channels, therefore undermining democratic

institutions. His reliance on popular mobilization and direct appeals through plebiscites excludes

minority voices from the political process, contradicting the democratic norm of compromise.

Many have noted Morales’ authoritarian behavior, including circumventing the legislature and

court-packing, leading one scholar to express concerns that “Bolivia is at risk of becoming an

authoritarian ‘petro-left’ regime in the mold of Chávez’s Venezuela rather than the multicultural

democracy for which many had hoped.”179 The recent reformist experience in Bolivia raises the

question of whether the ends justify the means. Reform may not be possible without bending the

rules. Morales and the MAS took advantage of fortuitous circumstances, pushing the limits of

what was politically possible in a poor, unequal, and polarized country. However, his political

strategies often eroded the legitimacy of democratic institutions, counterbalancing what some

                                                        178 Rittinger and Cleary, Confronting Coup Risk. 179 Donna Lee Van Cott, “Latin America's Indigenous Peoples,” Journal of Democracy 18, no. 4 (2007): 137.

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call revolutionary gains with authoritarian leanings. Although Morales has overseen far-reaching

political and economic reforms, the future of the plurinational state remains uncertain.

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Appendix A

Table 5: Population Growth by Department, 1846-2001

Department 1846 1900 1950 1976 1992 2001 La Paz Population 412,867 426,930 854,079 1,465,078 1,900,786 2,350,466 % Total 30% 26% 32% 32% 30% 28% Cochabamba Population 279,048 326,123 425,145 720,952 1,110,205 1,455,711 % Total 20% 20% 16% 17% 17% 18% Oruro Population 95,324 86,081 192,356 310,409 340,114 391,870 % Total 7% 5% 7% 7% 5% 5% Potosí Population 243,269 325,615 509,087 657,743 645,889 709,013 % Total 18% 20% 19% 14% 10% 9% Chuquisaca Population 156,041 196,434 260,479 358,516 453,756 531,522 % Total 11% 12% 10% 8% 7% 6% Santa Cruz Population 78,581 171,592 244,658 710,724 1,364,389 2,033,739 % Total 6% 11% 9% 15% 21% 25% Tarija Population 63,800 67,887 103,441 187,204 291,407 391,226 % Total 5% 4% 4% 4% 5% 5% Beni Population 48,406 25,680 71,636 168,367 276,174 362,521 % Total 4% 2% 3% 4% 4% 4% Pando Population 1,560 7,228 16,284 34,493 38,072 52,525 % Total .1% .4% .6% .7% .6% .6% Total Population 1,378,896 1,633,610 2,704,165 4,613,486 6,420,792 8,274,325 Author Calculations based on census data found in Herbert Klein, A Concise History of Bolivia: Second Edition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 303.

Table 6: GDP by Department, 2007

Department % Total GDP Santa Cruz 28.92% La Paz 24.01% Cochabamba 16.8% Tarija 11.50% Potosi 4.95% Oruro 4.76% Chuquisaca 4.55% Beni 3.04% Pando .86%

Eaton, Conservative Autonomy Movements, 299.

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Appendix B

Table 7: Ores/Metals and Fuel, % of Merchandise Exports, 1962-2010

Author elaboration based on World Bank data.

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