The Impact of Social Investment Funds on Social Capital and Violence

Evaluation of the Peace and Development Regional Programmes in Colombia

Luca PELLERANOOxford Policy Management, OxfordInstitute for Fiscal Studies, London

Perspectives on Impact Evaluation.Cairo, 1st April 2009

Introduction• There is an increasing need to evaluate the effects of social interventions on a broad

set of “socio-cultural” dimensions that exceed the traditional socioeconomic variables:

– values, aptitudes, perceptions, motivations, capabilities, empowerment– relationships, networks, social capital

• Impact evaluation in this domain is extremely challenging as:– Socio-cultural changes are often regarded at as unexpected effects– As the analysis moves in the domain of the “intangibles”, the evaluation must be driven my

a multi method and multidisciplinary approach.

• Social Investment Funds (SIFs) make of their potential effects on the community social structure one of their main points of strength.

– They are based on a bottom up participatory approach that is expected to strengthen and regenerate the social fabric within the community (Rao and Ibáñez, 2005).

– They have been introduced in the context of violence, particularly in Latin America (i.e Brazil, Jamaica), as a means to increase social cohesion and reduce social conflict (Luengas and Ruprah, 2008).

• In this work (Guarin et al, 2008; Attanasio et al, 2008):– We evaluate the effect of a Social-Fund-type intervention in Colombia on social capital and

conflict management– We explore innovative methodological options for the measurement and evaluation of

“socio cultural” dimensions.

Colombia. The Peace and Development Regional Programmes

• Colombia has been affected by a complex civil conflict along the whole course of its recent history. Internal displacement is one of the most evident consequences.

• While the drivers of the conflict have evolved with time (political violence, control over natural resources, coca), and the intensity seem to have lessened in recent years, violence still affects many rural areas of the country, in a very clustered way.

• The Peace and Development Regional Programmes (PRDPs):– Are networks of grassroots organizations that were formed under the

auspices of the civil society (labour unions, the church, private firms) in some of the most poor and violent areas of Colombia.

– Aim at building conditions of peace and development in these regions, claiming that peace is the result of equitable and inclusive models of development.

– Affirm the principle of protecting life and promoting human dignity before everything else.

– Support development processes informed by environmental sustainability, equity, solidarity and participatory democracy.

125 Municipalities, 9 Departments

The Peace and Development Regional Programmes

• Since 2002, 6 PRDPs have been supported by the National Government, the World Bank (Paz y Desarrollo) and the European Union (Laboratorios de Paz), with a total investment of around more than 80 million Euros.

• The PRDPs work basically as a Social Fund, financing a basket of projects along three main axes:

• Productive Projects • Institutional Development Projects• Human Rights Projects

• The PRDPs are developed around a bottom up approach. Projects are promoted, formulated and executed by grassroots organizations in a participatory way. They and express the own plans and priorities of the local communities.

• Projects have an average duration of 2 years and benefit on average 300 beneficiaries, who are normally members of the grassroots organizations.

Influence Strategy

• How can the PRDPs contribute to peace building, violence reduction and conflict alleviation?– The impact stategy of the PRPDs is integral and articulated.

…and identify Modes of Relationship

that correspond to them

The PRDPs identify Initial Conditions

in the regionsPRDP

New Conditions

Peace and Development

New Relationship

Modes

• With the illegal groups

• With public institutions

• With the community

Traditional Relationship

Modes

Initial Conditions

Poverty and Violence

Methodology

• ¿How to address the challenge of evaluating the effect of the PRDPs on peace and the “modes of relationship” from a rigorous perspective?

• Evaluation design– A sample of 1000 treated beneficiaries in 42 municipalities across

the 6 regions. Collected between 2006 and 2007.– Because of the roll out of the PRDPs both within and across

municipalities, the length of exposure to the project of the sampled beneficiaries ranges from 0 to 5 years.

– The identification strategy is based on the intensity of exposure Discrete approach. Comparing “high” exposed beneficiaries with “low” exposed

beneficiaries. The samples is divided evenly in 2 groups: more and less than 12 months of exposure.

Continuous approach. Comparing beneficiaries amongst themselves according to the dosage.

High Exposure Low Exposure Diff

Mujer 0.544 0.535 -0.009

Edad 36.74 41.359 4.619***

Mujer jefe de hogar 0.154 0.232 0.078**

Nivel educativo 2.511 2.63 0.119

Rural 0.545 0.44 -0.105**

Desplazado en el hogar 0.274 0.331 0.056

Meses desde el desplazamiento 236.81 240.087 3.277

Menores en el hogar 1.544 1.503 -0.042

Vivienda propia 0.671 0.646 -0.024

Número de cuartos 3.034 3.037 0.003

Servicios basicos en la vivienda 0.421 0.45 0.03

Tenencia de articulos "de lujo" 0.102 0.19 0.088**

Otros apoyos y/ o ayudas 0.282 0.282 0

Indice de desempeno municipal (Indemun) 34.377 36.62 2.243**

Cultivos Ilicitos 41.656 100.13 58.474**

Homicidios por 1000 habitantes 0.899 0.781 -0.117

Altitud 1156.594 669.078 -487.516***

*** diferencias significativas al 99%, ** diferencias significativas al 95%

Control Variables

Methodology

• A strength of the dosage intensity approach is that it overcomes by design the risk of incurring in a programme selection bias based on unobservables.

• However, a potential (self)selection bias may arise from the fact that some beneficiaries /municipalities enter the programme first.

• We implement a multivariate analysis in order to control for observable characteristics (at the individual an municipality level) that may determine the programme expansion pattern

Methodology

• ¿How to address the challenge of evaluating the effect of the PRDPs on peace and the “modes of relationship” from a rigorous perspective?

• Instruments for data collection– Traditional household survey (includes a question on human rights

violation)– Additionally: 2 innovative instruments to explore impacts in the

domain of the “intangibles”:

1. Experimental Games

2. Social Dilemma

Modes of Relationship with the Community (Social Capital)

Modes of Relationship with the Conflict (Conflict Management)

MethodologySocial Dilemma

• Beneficiaries are invited to express their views on a tale that is read to them in third person

“Juana’s tale”• “una señora de su casa, una campesina común y corriente, hasta el día en que los violentos le

mataron a Jacinto, su esposo...”• “... la vecina y el esposo, que eran cultivadores de fique, convencieron a Juana de que también

se metiera en se negocio...”• “... su prestigio fue creciendo cada vez más, hasta el punto que Pedraza, un concejal y político

muy conocido, le propuso que se lanzara como candidata al Concejo...”• “... sin embargo, antes de la posesión comenzaron a llegar mensajes anónimos con amenazas

de muerte, dirigidas a Juana, provenientes del mismo grupo armado que había asesinado a su marido...”

• Juana faces a dilemma. How should she manage a threat from an illegal group?

• Beneficiaries are expected to identify with Juana. The instrument explores the processes of moral judgement (what is right) on decisions (like conflict management) that can be hardly assessed through direct survey questions.

Individual conflict management

Community conflict management

Institutional conflict management

Life danger associated to community leadership

Immediate Displacement

MethodologySocial Dilemma

ExposureSimple

difference

Impact (discrete)

Impact (continuous)Low High

t=5 months t=29 months

Displacement 25,5 % 20,3% -5,2 pp -8,4 pp ** -0,4 pp*Individual conflict management 17,3 % 21,2% 3,9 pp 6,7 pp ** -

Community conflict management 56,9% 67,7% 10,8 pp ** 13,0 pp*** -

Institutional conflict management (Justice) 88,4% 87,9% -3,3 pp - - 0,9 pp**

Institutional conflict management (Army) 88,6% 93,4% 4,8pp 3,10 pp** -

Institutional conflict management (Local Institutions) 96,8% 97,6% 0,8 pp - 0,1 pp **Danger associated to leadership 67,4% 66,3% -1,0 pp - -1,57 pp***

Results. Conflict ManagementSocial Dilemma

MethodologyExperimental Games

• Simulated decision scenarios where the beneficiaries face alternative on the use of a monetary endowments.

• Based on the theoretical framework of the experimental economics: players’ decisions should reveal their preferences.

• As the decisions imply a real monetary payoff (on average the equivalent of 5 USD) participants are expected to reveal their preferences more similarly to how they would behave in a real life situation. This doesn’t necessarily happen if questions on preferences are asked in a traditional survey.

• The “controlled” experiments are designed in such a way that decisions only have economic consequences (no reputation effects).

1. Trust Game (trust, reciprocity and philanthropy)2. Voluntary Contribution Mechanism (aptitude to contribute to

the public good)

MethodologyExperimental Games

Ejercicio 2. Voluntary Contribution Mechanism (VCM)

• Played in group.• The experiment is a simple public good game in which subjects decide to

invest in a ‘public’ or a ‘private’ project (public or private account).• Every token invested in the public account yields benefits for the whole

group, while the token inverted in the private account only yields benefits to the owner of the account.

• The dilemma consists in that there is a conflict between the self interest and the optimum social outcome.

• If everyone invests in the public project the total earnings for the group are bigger than if everyone invests in the private account. However an individual is always better off by investing in the private account (Nash Equilibrium).

Results: Contribution to the Public GoodExperimental Games

• There is no significant difference in the contribution rates between beneficiaries with high and low exposure the to the programme.

• The level of contribution to the public good is much higher in municipalities where the PRDPs operate, than in other municipalities in the country with comparable characteristics (Attanasio et al, 2007).

• Social capital effects seem to propagate within the municipality through a spill-over mechanism.

Control

Treatment

Simple Difference (TTO-CTRL)

Simple difference (contaminated-

pure)“Pure” “Contaminated”

Contribution to the public good. 59,3% 68,0% 63,5% -0,8 pp 8,7 pp**

Conclusions

• The work of the PRDPs is purposefully directed to strengthening the social fabric in the community. In facts, the PRDPs centre their efforts on the promotion of civic participation, leadership and active citizenship.

• Indeed, the PRDPs contribute to building social capital and creating new aptitudes/abilities for conflict management in communities affected by violence.

• Does this lead to a reduction in the violation of human rights? No, or not yet?

• These results shall not be generalized to all SIFs because of the peculiarity of the PRDPs influence strategy.

• More research should be undertaken on strength and limitations of Experimental Games and Social Dilemmas as instruments for the evaluation of the effect of social interventions on “socio cultural” dimensions.

• A follow-up study, for the impact evaluation of the PRDPs is currently undergoing, with new expanded data collection and improved instruments.

The Impact of Social Investment Funds on Social Capital and Violence

Evaluation of the Peace and Development Regional Programmes in Colombia

THANKS

Perspectives on Impact Evaluation.Cairo, 1st April 2009