The International Radiation Protection Paradigm...Radiological Protection Volume 37, Issue 1-3, 2008 平成21年9月16日 13 zJustification of any endeavor or action that entails a

Third Part:

The International Radiation Protection Paradigm

The conceptual model for keeping people safe from radiation exposure

Third Part:

The International Radiation Protection Paradigm

The conceptual model for keeping people safe from radiation exposure

平成21年9月16日 1

In paradigm choice there is no standard higher

than the assent of the relevant community

Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, p. 93 (1960).

In paradigm choice there is no standard higher

than the assent of the relevant community

Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, p. 93 (1960).

2009 WNU-Summer Institute 3

Doses Doses

Certainty(100%)

Likelihood

0.005%/mSv for cancer0.0002%/mSv for hereditable

0.005%/mSv for cancer0.0002%/mSv for hereditable

Uncertainty!Uncertainty!

平成21年9月16日

Dealing with uncertainties

Is it plausible that there is a risk at low doses?

Dealing with uncertainties

Is it plausible that there is a risk at low doses?

PlausibilityApparently reasonable or probable,

without necessarily being so.from L. plausibilis, from plaus-, plaudere ‘applaud’.

PlausibilityApparently reasonable or probable,

without necessarily being so.from L. plausibilis, from plaus-, plaudere ‘applaud’.

平成21年9月16日 42009 WNU-Summer Institute

52009 WNU-Summer Institute

ICRP Publication 99

Low - Dose Extrapolation

of Radiation Related

Cancer Risk

2006

ICRP Publication 99

Low - Dose Extrapolation

of Radiation Related

Cancer Risk

2006


Charles E Land; Uncertainty, lowCharles E Land; Uncertainty, low--dose extrapolation and the threshold hypothesis; dose extrapolation and the threshold hypothesis; J. J. RadiolRadiol. Prot. . Prot. 22 22 (2002) 1(2002) 1––77

2009 WNU-Summer Institute6

Nominal statistical uncertainty distribution for excess lifetimerisk of solid cancer mortality among atomic-bomb survivors

Confidence limits 7.5–12.5% Sv-1



Uncertainty distribution for excess lifetime risk(taking into account extrapolation to another population)

confidence limits 1.2–8.8% Sv-1

approximately approximately loglog--normal normal

15 M a y , 2004 IR P A11: S ie vert L ecture 134

1 .0 -

0 .8 -

0 .6 -

0 .4 -

0 .2 -

‘2

‘4

‘6

‘8

‘10

‘12

‘14

R isk (% )/S v

C u m u la tivep ro b ab ility

95 % u p per lim it

5%



1.0-

0.8-

0.6-

0.4-

0.2-

‘2

‘4

‘6

‘8

‘10

‘12

‘14

Risk (%)/Sv

Cumulativeprobability

95% upper limit

5%

Assuming a 20%

probability of threshold8.8%/Sv



1.0-

0.8-

0.6-

0.4-

0.2-

‘2

‘4

‘6

‘8

‘10

‘12

‘14

Risk (%)/Sv


95% upper limit

5%

Assuming a 50%

probability of threshold

7%/Sv

8.8%/Sv



1.0-

0.8-

0.6-

0.4-

0.2-

‘2

‘4

‘6

‘8

‘10

‘12

‘14

Risk (%)/Sv


95% upper limit

5%

Assuming a 80%

probability of threshold

5%/Sv

8.8%/Sv



…ICRP considers that due to the

uncertainties in the radiation risk estimates,

it should presume a nominal radiation risk at low

doses and recommends to limit such nominal risk

with radiation protection measures.

…ICRP considers that due to the

uncertainties in the radiation risk estimates,uncertainties in the radiation risk estimates,

it should presume a nominal radiation risk at low

doses and recommends to limit such nominal risk

with radiation protection measures.平成21年9月16日

… Namely …

ICRP’s 2008 Recommendations

2008 Recommendations of the International Commission on

Radiological Protection

Volume 37, Issue 1-3, 2008

平成21年9月16日 13

Justification of any endeavor or action that entails a

change in the level of radiation exposure.

Optimization of radiation protection and safety.

Restriction of individual doses attributable to a given

situation and also of the probability of incurring doses.

Justification of any endeavor or action that entails a

change in the level of radiation exposure.

Optimization of radiation protection and safety.

Restriction of individual doses attributable to a given

situation and also of the probability of incurring doses.


ICRP Basic Principles

平成21年9月16日 14

Planned

Emergency

Pre-Existing

Planned

Emergency

Pre-Existing

3 exposure situations

平成21年9月16日 15

Patients

Occupational

Public

Patients

Occupational

Public


3 systemshomogeneous, coherent and consistent….but distinct

Detriment-adjusted nominal risk coefficients for stochastic effects after exposure to radiation at low dose rate (10-2 Sv-1)

Population Cancer Heritable Total

Whole 5.5 0.2 5.7

Adult 4.3 0.1 4.2

平成21年9月16日 17

Patients(The exposure is voluntary, beneficial for the individual exposed and measurable)(The exposure is voluntary, beneficial for the individual exposed and measurable)

• Radiodiagnosis

• Radiotherapy

• Radiodiagnosis

• Radiotherapy


Doses in mSvDoses in mSv

100 100

~~ 10 10

~~ 11

TYPICALLY HIGHTYPICALLY HIGH

TYPICALTYPICAL

MINIMALMINIMAL

HIGHHIGHFluoroscopFluoroscopyy ⇒⇒

Vertebral Vertebral ⇒⇒

TTooraxrax ⇒⇒

Guidance for the Guidance for the protection of protection of patients in patients in

radioradio--diagnosisdiagnosis

平成21年9月16日 19

Occupational exposure:

ALL exposure of workers incurred in the course of

their work.

Occupational exposure:

ALL exposure of exposure of workers incurred workers incurred in the course of in the course of

their work.their work.

Workers(voluntary and individually monitored exposure)

Monitored workerMonitored worker


平成21年9月16日 20

A fraction could be A fraction could be unamenable to control

((e.g. cosmic rayse.g. cosmic rays) ) and may be and may be excluded..

Most of the Most of the exposure is exposure is

amenable to controland must be and must be

controlled by the controlled by the employer.employer.

Workers(voluntary and individually monitored exposure)

Monitored workerMonitored worker


平成21年9月16日 21

Maximum Maximum (except life saving)(except life saving)

mSv in a year

1000

500

100

50

20

OccupationalDose

Restrictions

OccupationalDose

Restrictions

OptimizationOptimizationofof

ProtectionProtection

Annual dose limitAnnual dose limit

Average dose limitAverage dose limit

EEvery effort novery effort nott to to exceedexceed itit

RREESSCCUUEE

All reasonable All reasonable efforteffortssnonot to t to exceedexceed itit

NNOORRMMAALL


The female worker:

protecting the

unborn and

the infant

The female worker:

protecting the

unborn and

the infant222009 WNU-Summer Institute

平成21年9月16日 23

Members of the Public(involuntary no-individually monitored exposure)

Planned exposure situations

(Practices)⇒ restrict

the expectedadditional doses

Planned exposure situations

(Practices)⇒ restrict

the expectedadditional doses

Existing & emergency exposure situations

(Interventions)⇒ reducethe extant

avertable doses

Existing & emergency exposure situations

(Interventions)⇒ reducethe extant

avertable doses

(planned)‘Practices’

(planned)‘Practices’

平成21年9月16日 25

Naturalbackground

radiation

ExpectedExpectedadditional additional

dose dose

Activity introducedActivity introduced

(planned) ‘Practices’

RestrictionsRestrictions: dose limits and constraints: dose limits and constraints


平成21年9月16日 26Wastes

Hospitals

IndustryTransport

Mining

Nuclear power

Industry

Dose limit


平成21年9月16日 27

Source constraint


Doses to be constrained arethose committed in a year

rather than those incurred in a year!

Doses to be constrained arethose committed in a year

rather than those incurred in a year!

平成21年9月16日 28

Doses after 1 year of practice

D

t1st year 2ndyear 3rd year …. … …. nth year

平成21年9月16日 29

Doses after 2 years of practice

D


2ndyear3rdyear

4thyear …. … ….

平成21年9月16日 30

Doses after 3 years of practice

D


2ndyear3rdyear

4thyear …. … ….

3rd year

4th year5th year

….…

CONTROL

EQUILIBRIUM: BUILDEQUILIBRIUM: BUILD--UPUP

mSv in a year

1

0.01

1

0.01

Restrictions on the dose

attributable to practices

(additional annual dose)

Restrictions on the dose

attributable to practices

(additional annual dose)

Optimization of protection↓

Optimization of protection↓

Source constraintSource constraint

Regulatory limitRegulatory limit

Regulatory exemptionRegulatory exemption2009 WNU-Summer Institute

What is controlled isthe authorized releaserather than the dose

What is controlled isthe authorized releaserather than the dose

‘Interventions’(in existing and emergency situations)


平成21年9月16日 35

AvertableDose

Howmuch?

AvertableDose

HowHowmuch?much?

Referencelevel

Extant Dose

Should Should it be it be

reduced?reduced?



INTERVENTIONINTERVENTIONALMOST ALWAYS ALMOST ALWAYS

JUSTIFIABLE JUSTIFIABLE

mSv in a year100

10

1

CRITERIA FOR INTERVENING (Extant Annual Dose)

INTERVENTIONINTERVENTIONIS NOT LIKELY TO BE IS NOT LIKELY TO BE

JUSTIFIABLEJUSTIFIABLE

INTERVENTIONINTERVENTIONMAY BEMAY BE

JUSTIFIABLEJUSTIFIABLE


The use of a reference

level in an existing

exposure situation and

the evolution of the

distribution of

individual doses with

time as a result of the

optimization process

The use of a reference

level in an existing

exposure situation and

the evolution of the

distribution of

individual doses with

time as a result of the

optimization process

平成21年9月16日平成21年9月16日 3838

Very high 100 mSv/yVery high

100 mSv/y

Typically high 10 mSv/y

Typically high 10 mSv/y

INTERVENTION ALWAYS

JUSTIFIABLE ↓

INTERVENTION ALWAYS

JUSTIFIABLE ↓

↑INTERVENTION

MAY BE JUSTIFIABLE

↓

↑INTERVENTION

MAY BE JUSTIFIABLE

↓↑

INTERVENTION RARELY

JUSTIFIABLE ↓

↑INTERVENTION

RARELY JUSTIFIABLE

↓

Restrictions on the additional dose

Regulatory Dose limit (1 mSv/y)

Optimization↓

Source Constraint

Regulatory Exemption (0.01 mSv/y)

Restrictions on the additional dose

Regulatory Dose limit Regulatory Dose limit (1 (1 mSv/ymSv/y))

Optimization↓

Source Constraint

Regulatory Exemption Regulatory Exemption (0.01 (0.01 mSv/ymSv/y))

sourcesource

Extantindividual

dose

Extantindividual

dose

Average 2.4 mSv/y

Average 2.4 mSv/y

Background

Background

New ICRP recommendation:

Simplified system of

maximum dose constraints

and reference levels

(in mSv in a year)

New ICRP recommendation:

Simplified system of

maximum dose constraints

and reference levels

(in mSv in a year)

NO INDIVIDUAL/SOCIETAL BENEFIT ABOVE THIS Emergency workers Emergency workers Evacuation/relocation in emergenciesEvacuation/relocation in emergenciesHigh levels of existing controllable exposuresHigh levels of existing controllable exposuresInformation, training, monitoringInformation, training, monitoring

DIRECT OR INDIRECT BENEFIT TO THE INDIVIDUALOccupational exposureSheltering, stable iodine, in emergenciesExisting exposures such as radon Comforters and carers to patients Information, training, monitoring or assessment

SOCIETAL, BUT NO INDIVIDUAL DIRECT BENEFITNormal situations No information or training, No individual dose assessment

Exclusion, exemption, clearance

100100

2020

11

0.010.01

平成21年9月16日 40

In paradigm choice there is no standard higher than the assent of the relevant community

DecisionDecision--aiding Processaiding Processbased on radiation protection consideration

DecisionDecision--making Processmaking Process

involving relevant ‘stakeholders’

searching for their informed consent

Take away points

1. Additional doses to members of the public should not exceed 1 millisievert in a year

2. Total doses to workers should not exceed 20 millisievert in a year, except for emergency workers (↑) and pregnant workers (↓)

3. Existing doses to members of the public of several tens of millisieverts, e.g. following an accident, will justify intervention with special protective measures, but if the doses are around 1 millisievert intervention may not be justifiable.

1.1. Additional doses to members of the public Additional doses to members of the public should not exceed should not exceed 1 millisievert in a year

2.2. Total doses to workers should not exceed Total doses to workers should not exceed 20 millisievert in a year, except for , except for emergency workers (emergency workers (↑↑) and pregnant workers () and pregnant workers (↓↓))

3.3. Existing doses to members of the public of Existing doses to members of the public of several tens of millisieverts, e.g. following an , e.g. following an accident, will justify intervention with special accident, will justify intervention with special protective measures, but if the doses are around protective measures, but if the doses are around 1 1 millisievertmillisievert intervention may not be justifiable.intervention may not be justifiable.


Fourth Part

The International

Radiation Safety Regime

Fourth Part

The International

Radiation Safety Regime


平成21年9月16日 43

It is the international system…

…which determines the totality of life on this planet.

Paddy Chayefsky (1923–1981)

It is the international system…

…which determines the totality of life on this planet.

Paddy Chayefsky (1923–1981)


平成21年9月16日 44

The IAEA is the only organ within the UN system with specific statutory responsibilities

on radiation protection and safety

The IAEA is the only organ within the UN system with specific statutory responsibilities

on radiation protection and safety2009 WNU-Summer Institute

平成21年9月16日 45

Verification of Peaceful Uses

Providing Protection and Safety

Transferring Technology

Verification of Peaceful Uses

Providing Protection and Safety

Transferring Technology


IAEA Functions

平成21年9月16日 46

“For their efforts

[i] to prevent nuclear energy from being used for military purposes and

[ii] to ensure that nuclear energy for peaceful purposes is

used in the safest possible way“

“For their efforts

[i] to prevent nuclear energy from being used for military purposes and

[ii] to ensure that nuclear energy for peaceful purposes is

used in the safest possible way“

The Nobel Peace Prize2005

TheThe NobelNobel PeacePeace PrizePrize20052005


平成21年9月16日 47

S

A

F

E

T

Y

SS

AA

FF

EE

TT

YY

TRANSFERENCE

TTRRAANNSSFFEERREENNCCEE

VERIFICATION

VVEERRIIFFIICCAATTIIOONN

International Atomic Energy AgencyInternational Atomic Energy Agency

Nobel PrizeNobel Prize

MediaMedia

平成21年9月16日 48

to establishstandards

to establishstandards

to provide for their applicationto provide for

their application

to service international conventionsto service international conventions

IAEAstatutory functions in

radiation protection

IAEAstatutory functions in

radiation protection


Legally Binding

ConventionsLegally Binding

Conventions

Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident

Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency

Convention on Nuclear Safety

Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the

Safety of Radioactive Waste Management

Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material

平成21年9月16日 55

International

Radiation Safety

Standards

International

Radiation Safety

Standards


平成21年9月16日 56

Commissionon Safety Standards

(CSS)

Nuclear Safety StandardsCommittee(NUSSC)

Radiation Safety StandardsCommittee(RASSC)

Waste Safety StandardsCommittee(WASSC)

Transport Safety StandardsCommittee(TRANSSC)

Expert Groups Expert Groups Expert Groups Expert Groups

IAEA Board of Governors

The process for developing a new safety standard or revising an

existing one

The process for developing a new safety standard or revising an

existing one

平成21年9月16日 58

Long experience

1962: first

international

standards.

Long experience

1962: first

international

standards.

平成21年9月16日 59

Safety Standards Hierarchy

Safety GuidesSafety Guides

Safety RequirementsSafety Requirements

Safety FundamentalsSafety Fundamentals


平成21年9月16日 60

FUNDAMENTALSFUNDAMENTALS

REQUIREMENTSREQUIREMENTS

GUIDESGUIDES2009 WNU-Summer Institute

http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1273c_web.pdf

Safety Principles1: Responsibility for safety 2: Role of government 3: Leadership and management for safety 4: Justification of facilities and activities 5: Optimization of protection 6: Limitation of risks to individuals 7: Protection of present and future generations8: Prevention of accidents 9: Emergency preparedness and response 10: Protective actions to reduce existing or unregulated radiation risks

1: Responsibility for safety 2: Role of government 3: Leadership and management for safety 4: Justification of facilities and activities 5: Optimization of protection 6: Limitation of risks to individuals 7: Protection of present and future generations8: Prevention of accidents 9: Emergency preparedness and response 10: Protective actions to reduce existing or unregulated radiation risks

平成21年9月16日 63WNU Course, Tsinghua University, Daejon, July 2007S

http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/SS-115-Web/Pub996_web-1a.pdfhttp://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/SS-115-Web/Pub996_web-1a.pdf

http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/SS-115-Web/Pub996_web-1a.pdf

http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/SS-115-Web/Pub996_web-1a.pdf

The forthcoming international issue: the revision of the BSS

平成21年9月16日 64WNU Course, Tsinghua University, Daejon, July 2007S

http://www-ns.iaea.org/standards/http://www-ns.iaea.org/standards/

平成21年9月16日 67

Example on how the system for

establishing standards works:Example on how the system for

establishing standards works:

The Regulations for Safe TransportThe Regulations for Safe Transport



平成21年9月16日 69

to Geneva




平成21年9月16日 72

rendering APPRAISAL SERVICES

coordinating RESEARCH & DEVELOPMENT

fostering INFORMATION EXCHANGE

providing TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE

Provisionsfor the

application of the

standards:IAEA

mechanisms

promoting EDUCATION & TRAINING

Take away points

1.1. There is a growing international safety regimeThere is a growing international safety regime

2.2. Obey the international conventionsObey the international conventions

3.3. Comply with the international requirementsComply with the international requirements

4.4. Follow the international guidesFollow the international guides

5.5. Use the IAEA application mechanismsUse the IAEA application mechanisms

平成21年9月16日 2009 WNU-Summer Institute73

Epilogue

Policy Implications:

plausibility of effects at low dosesversus

their attributability

Policy Implications:Policy Implications:

plausibility of effects at low dosesversus

their attributability

平成21年9月16日 742009 WNU-Summer InstituteS

Policy Implications on effects at low doses :The effects are

probable and, therefore,plausible

but, they are notprovable!

Policy Implications Policy Implications on effects at low doses ::The effects areThe effects are

probable and, therefore,plausible

but, they are notprovable!

S

Low-dose effects cannot be attributed

to radiation exposure!平成21年9月16日 75

Low-dose effects cannot be attributed

to radiation exposure!

76WNU, Daejon, July 2008

Dose (mSv)

Certainty(100%)

Likelihood of Health Effect

epidemiology pathology

Limit of epidemiology

Limit of epidemiology

Limit ofpathologyLimit of

pathology



Dose (mSv)

Certainty(100%)

Epidemiology Pathology

PlausiblePlausible Collective estimate

Collective estimate

Individual diagnosisIndividual diagnosis



78

Dose (mSv)

Certainty(100%)

Epidemiology Pathology

No attribution

No attribution

Collective attributionCollective attribution

Individual attributionIndividual attribution



Issues for discussion

at the

Group-working Session

Issues for discussion

at the

Group-working Session

(1) (1) Search the latest UNSCEAR data on occupational radiation exposures inhttp://www.unscear.org/docs/reports/annexe.pdf.

Simply glance throughout tables and graphs and analyze what are the global average radiation doses that workers in the nuclear industry are typically incurring.

Compare doses from various steps in the nuclear fuel cycle; e.g., uranium mining vis-à-vis reactor operations.

Discuss your own conclusions within the working group.

(1) (1) Search the latest UNSCEAR data on occupational radiation exposures inhttp://www.unscear.org/docs/reports/annexe.pdf.

Simply glance throughout tables and graphs and analyze what are the global average radiation doses that workers in the nuclear industry are typically incurring.

Compare doses from various steps in the nuclear fuel cycle; e.g., uranium mining vis-à-vis reactor operations.

Discuss your own conclusions within the working group.

(1) (2) Glance at the current requirements on occupational protection established in the International Basic Safety Standards (BSS) (http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/SS-115-Web/Pub996_web-1b.pdf) and particularly on the occupational dose limits established in the BSS (http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/SS-115-Web/Pub996_web-3.pdf).

Compare the levels in (1) versus your assessment in (2). Discuss your own conclusions within the working group.

(1) (2) Glance at the current requirements on occupational protection established in the International Basic Safety Standards (BSS) (http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/SS-115-Web/Pub996_web-1b.pdf) and particularly on the occupational dose limits established in the BSS (http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/SS-115-Web/Pub996_web-3.pdf).

Compare the levels in (1) versus your assessment in (2). Discuss your own conclusions within the working group.

(3) Discuss the apparent dilemma of plausibility versus attributability of radiation effects at low doses taking into account the epistemological uncertainties associated with the LNT model.

This important issue will be fully discussed at in the “Plenary session” at 16:30 – 17:30!

(3) Discuss the apparent dilemma of plausibility versus attributability of radiation effects at low doses taking into account the epistemological uncertainties associated with the LNT model.

This important issue will be fully discussed at in the “Plenary session” at 16:30 – 17:30!


[email protected]@arn.gob.ar

+541163231758

Av. del Libertador 8250Buenos Aires

Argentina

Thank you!Thank you!


Documents

The International Radiation Protection Paradigm...Radiological Protection Volume 37, Issue 1-3, 2008 平成21年9月16日 13 zJustification of any endeavor or action that entails a