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The Normative Foundations of Institutions and Institutional
Change
Avner Greif
Definitions
• Norms are normative standards (rules)– About outcomes and processes– The Good/Bad, Right/Wrong, …
• Values– internalized norms – internal system of sanctions
Norms matter
• Focal point, coordination
• E.g., social norms, preferences’ falsifications, cultural beliefs, conventions
• Analytic restrictions – game theoretic eq.
• Kuran, Greif, Young, Binmore
Do values matter?
But they possibly matter…
• Experiments – altruism, equality-aversion, conditional
reciprocity.
• Retrospection– military service, voluntary donations, the Peace
Corps, …
In institutional economics?
• Consensus is that values are important
• A black box
• Exogenous constraints → higher enforcement cost.
Objective: open the black box
Objective:
• A conceptual framework for integrating values in NIE
• Sociology?– Parsons: Order, normative automata– Wrong: functionalist, conformity,
behavior– Current: Social networks cognition
In Economics
• Separable utilities–Propensity perspective
• Inter-dependent utilities–Societal perspective
Propensity perspective:Separable utilities
• Evolutionary GT: ‘self-regarding’ traits
• Classical GT: internalizing eq. behavior
• Experimental economics: social preferences
Societal perspective: Inter-dependent utilities
• Evolutionary game theory– Evolutionary stability of pro-social traits
• Psychological game theory: – Beliefs dependent utility functions
• Sugden, Binmore, Frank, Bowles, Gintis, Fehr, Greif, …
Societal perspective: Inter-dependent utilities
• Game theory– Agents: capacity to internalize norms – Socialization Horizontal (peer), Vertical
– Equilibrium: values and behavior
– Analysis: welfare, inheritanceCS on a policy (direct democracy)
– Andreoni, Bowles and Gintis, Tabellini, …
A promising venue for NIE?
• Socializing agents
• Socialized agents
• Policy-makers
Socializing agents
• Choice of socializing behavior – benefit (own+ socialized agent), cost
• Exogenous: – Others’ values (altruism, revenge)– ‘Formal’ institution
• Equilibrium values & soc. Beh.
Socialized agents
• Behavioral choices – Trade-off between values and other sources of
motivation– Exogenous: values, formal institutions, …
• Equilibrium: behavior
• Special case: socializing agents = socialized
Policy-maker
• Choosing economic policies/institutions – Preferences over outcomes – Values (ignore for simplicity)
• Exogenous: others’ values, etc..
• Policy/institutions can influence values– Indirectly: impact socialization processes– Directly: socializing organizations, force
Systemic analysis (eq.)
• Values, behavior, eco. institutions, policy
• Politics - the process of achieving a pol. goal– Values imply constraints and opportunities
• Political institutions (endogenous policy-maker)– equilibria in the relations between the policy-
makers and economic agents, given values
Concerns
• The right or important origin of values?
• Analytically tractable?– Too complicated?
Concerns
• Unobserved?
• But so is the invisible hand, transaction costs, opportunity costs, shadow prices, preferences, …
Is it useful?
• Even using informal partial eq. analyses → new insights
– ‘Formal, informal’ relations, inst. change– institutional foundations of markets,
optimal property rights, politics, institutional change as a moral crisis, ….
• What follows provides some examples
Values and market failure• Fail w/o ‘anti-trade’ norms • Even if reciprocators• Imperfect monitoring →
disputes may occur → revenge (lawlessness)
• If expected cost from revenge > gain from exchange → market failure
Implications?• Code of conduct (‘law’)– Reducing uncertainty in interpretation
• Conduct-certifying organizations (‘legal system’)– Improves monitoring– Justifying non-violence
• Legal system– Punishing: satisfy the ‘revenge constraint’ /allow trade– Deterring ‘private justice.’– History: from revenge to legal compensation.
• Policy? Interests of the policy-maker?
Value-based market failure: limited commitment
• Some agents are reciprocators, some are not
• Unraveling → market failure
• Legal sanction → preventing unraveling – Direct and indirect impact (on socializations)– If indirect, time consuming transition– Higher return from concentrated legal invest.?
Property Rights Allocations
• Example: – Homeless newspapers
• Altruism → identity matters for non-economic reasons
• Wedge between the socially optimal and the economically efficient property rights
• Higher contribution and higher eq. value.• Value to policy to values/static-dynamic eff.
Values constrain policy
• Legitimacy meta-norms:whose rules are normatively binding,and with respect to what.
• Examples–65mph rule–Prohibition (1920-1933) – Muslim world
• Either case, two equilibria
Values provide opportunities:Politics
• Framing– ‘Your seatbelt is their security’ (1970)– Social Security: Insurance or welfare?
• Leadership• ‘Path of least normative resistance’– Luther King Jr. versus Malcolm X
• Beyond the model.
Values influence on politics
• Distinct legitimacy norms– West: Representation & Corporations– Muslim ME: Religious authorities
• The essence of politics– Interest groups representing corporate entities– Co-opting the religious authorities
Institutional change ?
• Comparative Statics
• Institutions have normative foundations• Manifestation: investment in institutional
‘moral basis’– Seatbelt laws, don’t drink and drive laws, …– The Dissolution of the Monasteries (1534)
Institutional change as a moral crisis
• Incompatibility between institutions and their normative foundations → changes
• Institutional change? Either – Same outcomes (behavior), but followed for
reasons other than values • Social security: values, elderly voters
– Same motivation (value), another outcome (no 65mph speed limit)
• Power matters
Why incompatibility?• Power corrupts → ‘immoral’ behavior/rules– The Reformation, 1517-1648 and its essence– Power? Nobles & the power of the print
• Abuse of the system– UK‘s ‘rotten borough,’ 1832 Reform Act– Power of the rising cities
• Exogenous normative change– Slavery. Power: Parliamentary legislation.– Endogenous? parametric shift influencing socialization
Concluding comments
• A conceptual framework / issues
• Some examples of how it can contribute to integrating values in institutional analysis
• At the least, food for thought.
• Is it a promising way to proceed? • The way forward?