Wake Camp 1ac - Cuba

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BGLF 13-14 Greg Zoda, Team 2012

Plan

Plan: The United States federal government should remove the economicembargo against Cuba.

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Relations

Contention 1 is Cuba Relations

The plan restores them now is key to prevent isolationTisdall 13 (Simon, Death of Hugo Chvez brings chance of fresh start for US and Latin America,3/5/13,http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/mar/05/hugo-chavez-dead-us-latin-america/print)Hugo Chvez's departure furnishes Barack Obama with an opportunity to repair US ties withVenezuela, but also with other Latin American states whose relations with Washington were adverselyaffected by Chvez's politics of polarisation and the Bush administration's viscerally unintelligent reaction.In particular, the change of leadership in Caracas could unlock the deadlock over Cuba, if the WhiteHouse can summon the requisite political will. Possibly anticipating a transition, Washington quietlyengineered a diplomatic opening with Caracas last November after a lengthy standoff during whichambassadors were withdrawn. Roberta Jacobson, assistant secretary of state for western hemisphereaffairs, telephoned Nicols Maduro, Venezuela's vice-president and Chvez's preferred successor, anddiscussed, among other things, the restoration of full diplomatic relations. "According to US officials, theVenezuelan vice-president offered to exchange ambassadors on the occasion of the beginning ofPresident Barack Obama's second term. Jacobson, in turn, is said to have proposed a step-by-step

approach to improve bilateral relations, starting with greater co-operation in counter-narcotics, counter-terrorism and energy issues," Andres Oppenheimer reported in the Miami Herald. There is much groundto make up. "Relations between the United States and Venezuela have ranged from difficult to hostilesince Chvez took office in 1999 and began to implement what he calls 21st-century socialism," wrote aformer US ambassador to Caracas, Charles Shapiro. "Chvez blamed a failed 2002 coup against him onthe United States (not true), nationalised US companies, insulted the president of the United States andblamed 'the empire' his term for the United States for every ill In foreign affairs, the governmentactively supports the Assad regime in Syria, rejects sanctions on Iran and generally opposes the US atevery turn." Despite such strains, economic self-interest always prevented a complete rupture. The USremained Venezuela's most important trading partner throughout Chvez's presidency, buying nearly halfits oil exports. Caracas is the fourth largest supplier of oil to the US. In fact, the US imports more crude oilannually from Mexico and Venezuela than from the entire Persian Gulf. This shared commerce nowprovides a formidable incentive and a launch platform for a fresh start. Whether the opportunity is

grasped depends partly on Maduro, a Chvez loyalist but a reputed pragmatist with close ties to RalCastro in Cuba. Yet it depends even more on Obama,whose first term, after a promising start, endedup perpetuating Washington's historical neglect of Latin America. He now has a chance to do better.The political climate seems propitious. Economic and cultural ties are also strengthening dramatically.Trade between the US and Latin America grew by 82% between 1998 and 2009. In 2011 alone, exportsand imports rose by a massive 20% in both directions. "We do three times more business with Latin

America than with China and twice as much business with Colombia [as] with Russia," an Obama officialtold Julia Sweig of the US Council on Foreign Relations. Latinos now comprise 15% of the US population;the US is the world's second largest Spanish-speaking country (after Mexico). Despite this convergence,high-level US strategic thinking about the region has continued to lag, Sweig argued. "For the last twodecades, US domestic politics have too often driven Washington's Latin America agenda whether onissues of trade, immigration, drugs, guns or that perennial political albatross, Cuba, long driven by thesupposedly crucial 'Cuban vote' in Florida," she said. Obama could change this dynamic if he tried

and one way to do it would be to unpick the Cuban problem, which continues to colour the way LatinAmericans view Washington. "Having won nearly half of the Cuban American vote in Florida in 2012, again of 15 percentage points over 2008, Obama can move quickly on Cuba. If he were to do so, hewould find a cautious but willing partner in Ral Castro, who needs rapprochement with Washington toadvance his own reform agenda," Sweig said. A move by Obama to end travel restrictions and thetrade embargo on Cuba would be applauded across the region, explode old stereotypes about gringooppressors, and help build confidence with Venezuela , the Castro regime's key backer, she suggested.

Easing restrictions sets the stage but the plan is a key catalyst

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Creamer 11 (Robert, political organizer and strategist for four decades, Changes in U.S. Cuba PolicyGood First Step -- But It's Time to Normalize Relations, 1/18/11, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/robert-creamer/changes-in-us-cuba-policy_b_810161.html)The changes in U.S. Cuba policy announced Friday by the Obama administration represent a welcomefirst step in changing the failed half-century old policy that has sought to bring change in Cuba byisolating the island nation from the United States. The administration announced that within the next two

weeks it would make it easier for religious and academic organizations to send delegations to Cuba;return regulations governing people-to-people trips to Cuba to those that pertained during the ClintonAdministration; and expand the number of airports that can be used by tour operators as embarkationpoints to the island. In addition, it expanded the amount of money that can be sent by Americans toordinary Cuban citizens. Administration spokespeople explained that all of these steps were taken tostrengthen Cuban civil society. They will certainly have that effect. In fact, the time has come tocompletely normalize relations with Cuba, end our economic embargo. Here's why: 1). Our policy ofisolating Cuba has failed to bring change to Cuba. Fidel Castro and his successor Raul Castro, haveoutlasted presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon, Ford, Carter, Reagan, Bush I, Clinton, BushII and two years of the Obama Administration. The definition of insanity is continuing to do the same thingand expecting to get a different result. By that definition, the past policy of attempting to isolate Cuba was,to put it charitably, daft. This failed approach to Cuba was originally justified as part of the Cold War policyof "containment" of the Soviet Union. That policy has now outlasted the Soviet Union by over twodecades. A shooting war in Vietnam in which almost 50,000 Americans were killed has come and gone.Vietnam is now a reliable U.S. trading partner and favorite tourist destination, but the policy of isolatingCuba -- with which we have never had a violent conflict -- remains. Richard Nixon long ago made peacewith China which, though still an officially Communist country, is now one of our most crucial tradingpartners and holds much of our country's debt. But our policy of isolating relatively tiny Cuba -- just 90miles from our shore -- continues. Of course one of the reasons for the failure of this ancient policy is thatit was long ago abandoned by every other country in the world. Canadians vacation at Cuban resorts.South Americans sell Cuban agricultural products. Our European allies all have friendly relations, but ourpolicy of isolating Cuba persists. 2). The only real accomplishment of past isolationist policies towardCuba was to restrict the rights of U.S. citizens. Even after the changes announced Friday, most ordinary

Americans are still prevented from traveling to Cuba. It is the only place on earth to which our owngovernment prevents us from traveling. It is the freedom of Americans that is being abridged -- and weshould be just as outraged by that limitation on our freedom as we are by a gag order on our freedom ofspeech or an abridgment of our freedom of religion. What is particularly galling is that past restrictions on

our freedom to travel to Cuba have actually helped limit the opening of Cuban society that is its allegedrationale. Want to open up Cuban society ? Then engage them in travel and trade. Invite their students tothe United States and encourage our students to study in their universities. Encourage culturalexchanges, baseball games, soccer tournaments. The new policy begins to do those things, and it'sabout time. But to the extent it persists, the policy of isolating Cuba and limiting American travel there notonly limits our freedom -- it actually prevents the presumed goal of our policy -- to open up Cuba. 3). Bymaintaining our economic embargo we penalize the American economy and cost Americanjobs . Oureconomic "boycott" does not so much prevent Cuba from getting the things its needs (though it definitelymakes the lives of ordinary Cubans more difficult), as it prevents American companies and farmers fromselling them American products. Creating American jobs should be our government's number one priorityyet the Cuban embargo prevents the sales of American-made products to a customer that would be readyand willing to buy. The result? Other countries sell Cuba the same products and benefit by the creation of

jobs in their countries rather than the U nited States. 4). Our failure to normalize relations with Cuba

undermines American interests throughout the world -- and particular in Latin America. U.S. policytowards Cuba has been a major sore point with othercountries in Latin America , who view it as a vestigeofYankee paternalism toward the entire region. And it is used by those who want to harm America asanother piece of anti-American propaganda. Far from isolating Cuba, we have isolated ourselves.Virtually all of America's major allies have normal economic and political relationships with Cuba. Lastyear, the United Nations General Assembly voted for the seventeenth time -- in seventeen years -- tocondemn our economic embargo of Cuba -- this time by a vote of 185 to 3. In December the thirty-threeCaribbean and Latin American nations that are members of the Rio Group voted to give Cuba fullmembership and called on the U.S. to end the embargo. 5). Domestic political support for the embargo --especially among Cuban Americans in Florida -- has crumbled. The proximate political reason for our past

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Cuba policy has been the large Cuban American voter block in southern Florida. Many Cuban Americansemigrated here immediately after the Cuban Revolution half a century ago and were virulently anti-Castro.In fact, with the Republican takeover of the House, hard line anti-Cuba Congresswoman Illeana Ros-Lehtinen is now the Chair of the House Committee on International Relations. She works with a wellorganized hard-line lobby, that has raised a large financial war chest to punish Members of Congress whosupport changing our relations with Cuba. But Ros-Lehtinen and her hard line allies are increasinglyisolated in the Cuban American community itself. Polls now show that 67 percent of Cuban Americanssupport allowing all Americans to travel to Cuba (Bendixen poll: Conducted April 14-16, 2009 -- Cuban

Americans only). The Obama Administration's recent announcement of limited changes in Cuban travelpolicy is overwhelmingly supported by Cuban Americans. A December poll showed a strong majority ofFlorida voters (67 percent) and Florida's Cuban American voters (59 percent) support permitting

Americans to visit Cuba for limited purposes such as academic exchanges, travel by religious and culturalgroups, athletic events and research missions. The same poll showed that Cuba policy is far from themost important issue affecting the votes of Cuban Americans today. In an open-ended question askingFlorida Cuban Americans which issues would be most important in determining their vote for President in2012, the economy was first (45 percent) and jobs was second (13 percent). Less than one percent ofCuban voters mentioned Cuba in any way. When asked if they would be more or less likely to supportPresident Obama if he restored full diplomatic relations, 28 percent of Florida Cuban Americans said itwould make them more likely and 29 percent said less likely. In other words, the Cuba issue has ceasedto be a factor in determining the votes of the majority of Florida Cuban Americans. In fact, another poll of

Cuban Americans taken last November showed 55 percent of Cuban Americans favored lifting theembargo. A massive array of organizations has welcomed the Administration's new initiatives and supportfurther change. The Catholic Church, both in Cuba and the United States has repeatedly called for an endto the economic embargo. Friday, the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops (USCCB) praised the

Administration's actions. The Chairman of the USCCB, Bishop Howard J. Hubbard of Albany, New York,issued a statement that said: These needed new policies are modest but important steps towardsadvancing our hopes for a better relationship between our people and the people of Cuba, a relationshipwhich holds great promise of fostering positive and real change in Cuba. Amen to that.

Relations contain Russian expansionStratfor 8 [The Russian Resurgence and the New-Old Front,http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20080915_russian_resurgence_and_new_old_front]Containment requires that U nited S tates counter Russian expansionism at every turn , crafting a newcoalition wherever Russia attempts to break out of the strategic ring, and if necessary committing direct U.S. forcesto the effort. The Korean and Vietnam wars both traumatic periods in American history weremanifestations of this effort, as were the Berlin airlift and the backing of Islamist militants in Afghanistan (who incidentallywent on to form al Qaeda). The Georgian war in August was simply the first effort by a resurging Russia topulse out, expand its security buffer and, ideally, in the Kremlins plans, break out of the post-Cold War noose that other powershave tied. The Americans (and others) will react as they did during the Cold War: by building coalitions to constrain Russianexpansion. In Europe, the challenges will be to keep the Germans on board and to keep NATO cohesive. In the Caucasus, theUnited States will need to deftly manage its Turkish alliance and find a means of engaging Iran. In China and Japan, economicconflicts will undoubtedly take a backseat to security cooperation. Russia and the United States will struggle in all of these areas,consisting as they do the Russian borderlands. Most of the locations will feel familiar, as Russias near abroad has been Russiasnear abroad for nearly 300 years. Those locations the Baltics, Austria, Ukraine, Serbia, Turkey, Central Asia and Mongolia thatdefined Russias conflicts in times gone by will surface again. Such is the tapestry of history: the major powers seeking advantage inthe same places over and over again. The New Old-Front But not all of those fronts are in Eurasia. So long as U.S. powerprojection puts the Russians on the defensive, it is only a matter of time before something along the cordon cracks and the Russians

are either fighting a land war or facing a local insurrection. Russia must keep U.S. efforts dispersed and captured by

events as far away from the Russian periphery as possible preferably where Russian strengths canexploit American weakness. So where is that? Geography dictates that U.S. strength involves coalition building based onmutual interest and long-range force projection, and internal U.S. harmony is such that Americas intelligence and security agencieshave no need to shine. Unlike Russia, the United States does not have large, unruly, resentful, conquered populations to keep in

line. In contrast, recall that the multiethnic nature of the Russian state requires a powerful security and intelligence apparatus. Noplace better reflects Russias intelligence strengths and Americas intelligence weakness than Latin

America. The United States faces no traditional security threats in its backyard. South America is in essence a hollow continent,populated only on the edges and thus lacking a deep enough hinterland to ever coalesce into a single hegemonic power. CentralAmerica and southern Mexico are similarly fractured, primarily due to rugged terrain. Northern Mexico (like Canada) is tooeconomically dependent upon the United States to seriously consider anything more vibrant than ideological hostility toward

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Washington. Faced with this kind of local competition, the United States simply does not worry too much about the rest of theWestern Hemisphere except when someone comes to visit. Stretching back to the time of the Monroe Doctrine, WashingtonsLatin American policy has been very simple. The United States does not feel threatened by any local power, but it feels inordinatelythreatened by any Eastern Hemispheric power that could ally with a local entity. Latin American entities cannot greatly harmAmerican interests themselves, but they can be used as fulcrums by hostile states further abroad to strike at the core of the UnitedStates power: its undisputed command of North America. It is a fairly straightforward exercise to predict where Russian activity willreach its deepest. One only needs to revisit Cold War history. Future Russian efforts can be broken down into three broad

categories: naval interdiction, drug facilitation and direct territorial challenge. Naval InterdictionNaval interdiction

represents the longest sustained fear of American policymakers. Among the earliest U.S. foreign effortsafter securing the mainland was asserting control over the various waterways used for approaching North

America. Key in this American geopolitical imperative is the neutralization of Cuba. All the navalpower-projection capabilities in the world mean very little if Cuba is both hostile and serving as a basingground for an extra-hemispheric power. The U.S. Gulf Coast is not only the heart of the countrysenergy industry, butthe body of water that allows the United States to function as a unified polity andeconomy . The Ohio, Missouri, and Mississippi river basins all drain to New Orleans and the Gulf of Mexico. The economicstrength of these basins depends upon access to oceanic shipping.A hostile power in Cuba could fairlyeasily seal both the Straits of Florida and the Yucatan Channel, reducing the Gulf of Mexico to little morethan a lake. Building on the idea of naval interdiction, there is another key asset the Soviets targeted atwhich the Russians are sure to attempt a reprise: the Panama Canal. For both economic and militaryreasons, it is enormously convenient to not have to sail around the Americas, especially because U.S. economic andmilitary power is based on maritime power and access. In the Cold War, the Soviets established friendly relations

with Nicaragua and arranged for a favorable political evolution on the Caribbean island of Grenada. Like Cuba, these two locationsare of dubious importance by themselves. But take them together and add in a Soviet air base at each location as well as inCuba and there is a triangle of Soviet airpower that can threaten access to the Panama Canal. DrugFacilitation The next stage drug facilitation is somewhat trickier. South America is a wide and varying land with very litt leto offer Russian interests. Most of the states are commodity providers, much like the Soviet Union was and Russia is today, so theyare seen as economic competitors. Politically, they are useful as anti-American bastions, so the Kremlin encourages such behaviorwhenever possible. But even if every country in South America were run by anti-American governments, it would not overly concern

Washington; these states, alone or en masse, lack the ability to threaten American interests in all ways but one. The drugtrade undermines American society from within , generating massive costs for social stability, lawenforcement, the health system and trade. During the Cold War, the Soviets dabbled with narcotics producers andsmugglers, from the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) to the highland coca farmers of Bolivia. It is not so muchthat the Soviets encouraged the drug trade directly, but that they encouraged any group they saw asideologically useful. STRATFOR expects future Russian involvement in such activities to eclipse those ofthe past. After the Soviet fall, many FSB agents were forced to find new means to financially support themselves. (Remember itwas not until 1999 that Vladimir Putin took over the Russian government and began treating Russian intelligence like a bona fidestate asset again.) The Soviet fall led many FSB agents, who already possessed more than a passing familiarity with things such assmuggling and organized crime, directly into the heart of such activities. Most of those agents are formally or not back in theservice of the Russian government, now with a decade of gritty experience on the less savory side of intelligence under their belts.

And they now have a deeply personal financial interest in the outcome of future operations. Drug groups do not need cashfrom the Russians, but they do need weaponry and a touch oftraining needs which dovetail perfectlywith the Russian s strengths . Obviously, Russian state involvement in such areas will be far from overt; it just does not do toship weapons to the FARC or to one side of the brewing Bolivian civil war with CNN watching. But this is a challenge the Russiansare good at meeting. One of Russias current deputy prime ministers, Igor Sechin, was the USSRs point man for weapons

smuggling to much of Latin America and the Middle East. This really is old hat for them. U.S. StabilityFinally, there is theissue of direct threats to U.S. stability, and this point rests solely on Mexico. With more than 100 million people, a growingeconomy and Atlantic and Pacific ports, Mexico is the only country in the WesternHemisphere that couldtheoretically (which is hardly to say inevitably) threaten U.S. dominance in North America. During the Cold War, Russianintelligence gave Mexico more than its share ofjolts in efforts to cause chronic problems for the U nitedS tates. In fact, the Mexico City KGB station was, and remains today, the biggest in the world. The Mexico City riots of 1968

were in part Soviet-inspired, and while ultimately unsuccessful at overthrowing the Mexican government, they remain atestament to the reach of Soviet intelligence. The security problems that would be created by the presence of a hostile state the sizeof Mexico on the southern U.S. border are as obvious as they would be dangerous. As with involvement in drug activities, which

incidentally are likely to overlap in Mexico, STRATFOR expects Russia to be particularly active in destabilizing Mexicoin the years ahead. But while an anti-American state is still a Russian goal, it is not their only option. The Mexican drug cartelshave reached such strength that the Mexican governments control over large portions of the country is an open question. Failure ofthe Mexican state is something that must be considered even before the Russians get involved. And simply doing with the Mexicancartels what the Soviets once did with anti-American militant groups the world over could suffice to tip the balance. In many

regards, Mexico as a failed state would be a worse result for Washington than a hostile united Mexico. Ahostile Mexico could be intimidated, sanctioned or even invaded, effectively browbeaten into submission. But a failed Mexico

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would not restrict the drug trade at all. The border would be chaos, and the implications of that go wellbeyond drugs. One of the United States largest trading partners could well devolve into a seethinganarchy that could not help but leak into the U.S. proper. Whether Mexico becomes staunchly anti-

American or devolves into the violent chaos of a failed state does not matter much to the Russians. Eitherone would threaten the United States with a staggering problem that no amount of resources could quickly or easily fix. And theRussians right now are shopping around for staggering problems with which to threaten the United States. In terms of cost-benefit

analysis, all of these options are no-brainers. Threatening naval interdiction simply requires a few jets.

Encouraging the drug trade can be done with a few weapons shipments. Destabilizing a country justrequires some creativity. However, countering such activities requires a massive outlay of intelligence andmilitary assets often into areas that are politically and militarily hostile, if not outright inaccessible. Inmany ways, this is containment in reverse.

Otherwise, Russian unilateralism guarantees war with the USBlank 7(Stephen Blank , Research Professor of National Security Affairs at the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. ArmyWar College, Russian Democracy, Revisited Spring, http://www.securityaffairs.org/issues/2007/12/blank.php)

Gvosdev defends his brand of realism as a moral policy based on prudential calculations that seek tomaximize benefits and minimize losses. In other words, while Russia is admittedly far from an ideal state,we can live with it as it is. But is this policy towards Russia realistic in Gvosdevs own terms? In fact,Russias foreign policy is fundamentally adversarial to America and to Western interests and ideals.Moreover, thanks to Russias domestic political structure, not only will this foreign policy trend expand if

unchecked, it will almost certainly lead Russia into another war. Russias conduct in 2006 serves as amicrocosm of this problem. Last year, Russia gratuitously provoked international crises by threateningUkraine, Moldova, Belarus and Georgia over energy. It showed neither the will nor the capacity to arrestor reverse proliferation in Iran or North Korea. It displayed its readiness to amputate Georgia by force andannex its former territories to Russia. It attempted to undermine the OSCE and block it from fulfilling itstreaty-mandated functions of monitoring elections. It refused to negotiate seriously over energy andeconomics with the European Union. It recognized Hamas as a legitimate government, gave it aid, andsold it weapons. And it sold weapons to Iran, Venezuela, China and Syria, knowing full well that many ofthese arms will be transferred to terrorists. At home, meanwhile, Russian President Vladimir Putin iswidening state control over ever more sectors of the economy, including defense, metals, and theautomotive industry. Foreign equity investment in energy and many other fields is increasingly excludedfrom Russia in favor of Kremlin-dominated monopoly. Russia is even seeking to convert theCommonwealth of Independent States (CIS) into an oil and gas cartel that supports its own interests,rather than those of other producers. Possibly, the United States can abide such a Russia. But it is clearthat Americas partners and allies , particularly those in Eastern Europe and the post-Soviet space,cannot long live with a government whose policies seem essentially driven by a unilateralist quest forunchecked power. Russias current objectives seem to be incompatible with any notion of world orderbased on the principles accepted by it and its partners in 1989-91. Russia evidently covets recognition asa great power or energy superpower free from all international constraints and obligations andanswerable to nobody. As the political scientist Robert Legvold wrote back in 1997, Russia craves status,not responsibility.1 It should come as no surprise that this irresponsibility still characterizes Russiandiplomacy. After all, it is the hallmark of the Russian autocracy which Putin has restored with avengeance. Autocracy logically entails empire, an autarchic and patrimonial concept of the Russian statethat is owned by the Tsar, controlled by his servitors, and which survives only by expansion. Just asautocracy means that the Tsar is not bound by or responsible to any domestic institution or principle, italso means that in foreign policy, Russia does not feel obligated to honor its own prior treaties andagreements. The struggle to get Moscow to adhere to the 1999 OSCE Summit accords it itself signed

as well as its conduct during the Russo-Ukrainian energy crisis of 2006fully confirms that point;whatever else happened in both cases, Moscow broke its own contract with the OSCE and with Kyiv.These are far from anomalies. Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov himself said not long ago that Russiarefuses to be bound by foreign standards, or conform to them.2 He has also insisted that the Westrespect Russian interests in the CIS, but shows no reciprocal respect for the treaties Russia has signedand since violated. Nor does he say that Russia must respect the interests of CIS governmentsthemselves.3 By doing so, Lavrov has confirmed the warnings of analysts like Dmitry Trenin of theCarnegie Endowment for International Peace, who caution that Russia does not want to belong to a largerinstitutional grouping.4 Under these conditions, as both Western and Russian firms are learning all too

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well, property rights are conditionalif not entirely absent. Property is the Tsars to control, and he or hisagents grant rents to their subordinates in return for service, which tragically is generally inefficient, self-and rent-seeking, and utterly corrupt. Today, this formula is visible in Russias pervasive officialcorruption, widespread criminality, and the absence of any sense of national interests among thecountrys new boyar class. Such a system also entails an autarchic economy hostile to foreigninvestment and influence . Democratic and civilian control of Russias multiple militaries likewise is absent,and critics of the regime or reformers are routinely killed or threatened by those forces. The most recentexamples of this tragic phenomenon are the assassinations of former FSB agent Alexander Litvinenkoand journalist Anna Politkovskaya, and the attempted poisoning of former Prime Minister Yegor Gaidar.Russian and Western observers both recognize that the Tsarist model is back, albeit with some Sovietaccretions. And true to this model, the Kremlin today operates largely by fiat and fear. Much of VladimirPutins popularity clearly derives from the state monopoly over a large swath of the national media,growing fear of the police among ordinary Russians, and the sense of prosperity provided by seven yearsof (largely energy-based) economic growth. Absent the official cult of personality and with a free media,undoubtedly things would be rather different. All of which is to say that it is clear that, while the UnitedStates must engage with Russia, America cannot simply accept these deformities as the necessary pricefor doing business with Moscow. It is not simply a matter of lecturing Russia, as its elites have accusedWashington of doing for decades. Genuine realism requires an engagement with Russia that respects itsinterests but which tells the truth and responds to its numerous violations of international obligations.Such realism also requires understanding that the reversion to Russian autocracy is not merely a matter

of Russias sovereign choice, as Putins ideologues pretend. It is a threat to all of Russias neighborsbecause it inherently involves a quest for empire, since Moscow understands its full sovereignty to beattainable only if that of its neighbors is diminished. It is deeply ironic that Russia can pursue suchpolicies today largely because of the West. In order to maintain its empire, Russia must offer all kinds ofhidden and overt subsidies in energy, weapons, or other forms of economic and political currency. It canonly afford to do so by charging its European energy customers full market price, even as it refuses to dothe same at home. Likewise, for all its benefits, U.S. funding for Cooperative Threat Reduction enablesRussia to spend ever more on its armed forces, which it otherwise could not afford to do. By itself, Russiacannot pay for the rising outlays on its armed forces, its ambitious goals for re-equipping them andconverting them into a power projection force beyond its borders, or their current, bloated size. Under thecircumstances, a realistic Western policy cannot abandon the borderlands to Moscow. If it has reason tobelieve that it enjoys freedom of action there, Moscow will promptly extend its dysfunctional politicalsystem to those lands, either directly or indirectly. In either case, it will create security vacuums which are

ripe for conflict and which threaten both its own and European security. Russias inability to quell theChechen uprising despite twelve years of utterly brutal warfare illustrates this quite clearly. Indeed, bothwars with Chechnya (in 1994 and again in 1999) were launched to secure the domestic base of first theYeltsin and then the incoming Putin regimes.5 Since then, the fighting has engulfed the entire NorthCaucasus, putting Russia, thanks to its own misguided policies, at greater actual risk of terrorism. It isprecisely to avoid Russian expansionism and support for rogue regimes and proliferation that it isnecessary to press Russia to return to the spirit and letter of the treaties it has signed and which make upthe constitutional basis of Europes and Eurasias legitimate order. We should not pressure Russiabecause it is insufficiently democratic, but rather because it has freely given its word to treaties andconventions that must be upheld if any kind of international order is to be preserved. Admittedly, thismeans that America must reorient its policies to stop seeking to extend or impose democracy. No matterhow deeply held, the ideas of the current Administration enjoy no special legitimacy abroad, whereasinternational obligations do. Likewise, we must make clear that while the interests of the kleptocracy that

passes for government in Russia are advanced by lawlessness and imperial predation, neither theinterests of the Russian people nor the security of Eurasia is advanced by such policies. Quite thecontrary; those policies entail long-term stagnation and war, not progress, peace, or security. Thus arealistic policy towards Russia necessarily means realigning the values which we promote. They shouldbe those of international law and of enhanced security for both peoples and states, not untrammeledunilateralism or that might makes right. But such realism also means fearlessly proclaiming and actingupon the truth that Russian scholars themselves know and admit: Russia today remains a risk factor inworld politics.6 This is largely because its domestic political arrangements oblige Moscow to pursue aunilateral and neo-imperial policy fundamentally antithetical to the security of Eurasian states, including its

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own. Accountability is an important virtue for all states, but for Russia it is indispensable. Without it, theKremlin could very well succumb to imperial temptation, at the cost of international catastrophe.

ExtInctIo

nBostrum 2(Nick, PhD and Professor of Philosophy @ Oxford, Existential Risks: Analyzing Human Extinction Scenarios andRelated Hazards, The Journal of Evolution and Technology, March)


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between neighbors would have the effect of improv ing national security concerns related toterrorist activity , illicit weapons transfers and the like. Ultimately, a successful normalization ofrelations between the U.S. and Cuba in these areas may well enhance and stabilize regionalrelations that could possibly lessen (or at a minimum, balancing) fears of a Chinese incursion inhemispheric affairs. To lessen those fears it may be useful to review the present structure of joint-venture projects in the energysector in Cuba to ascertain the feasibility and possible success of such an undertaking become available to American firms.Moreover, it is interesting to note that U.S. firms in the agriculture sector have successfully negotiated and consummated sales to

Cuba totaling more than $1 billion dollars over the past four years under conditions that are less than optimal circumstances buthave well-served the commercial interests of all parties involved.

Only US regional influence solves China and prevents miscalculationDowd 12(Alan, Senior Fellow with the American Security Council Foundation, Crisis in the

America's, http://www.ascfusa.org/content_pages/view/crisisinamericas)Focused on military operations in the Middle East, nuclear threats in Iran and North Korea, and the global threat of

terrorism, U.S. policymakers have neglected a growing challenge right here in the Western Hemisphere:the expanding influence and reach of China . Eyeing energy resources to keep its economy humming,China is engaged in a flurry of investing and spending in Latin America . In Costa Rica, China is funding a$1.24-billion upgrade of the countrys oil refinery; bankrolling an $83-million soccer stadium; backing infrastructureand telecommunications improvements; and pouring millions into a new police academy. In Colombia, China isplanning a massive dry canal to link the countrys Pacific and Atlantic coasts by rail. At either terminus, there will beChinese ports; in between, there will be Chinese assembly facilities, logistics operations and distribution plants; and

on the Pacific side, there will be dedicated berths to ship Colombian coal outbound to China. In mid-January, aChinese-built oil rig arrived in Cuba to begin drilling in Cubas swath of the Gulf of Mexico. Reuters reports thatSpanish, Russian, Malaysian and Norwegian firms will use the rig to extract Cuban oil. For now, China is focusing ononshore oil extraction in Cuba. New offshore discoveries will soon catapult Brazil into a top-five global oil producer.With some 38 billion barrels of recoverable oil off its coast, Brazil expects to pump 4.9 million barrels per day by2020, as the Washington Times reports, and China has used generous loans to position itself as the primebeneficiary of Brazilian oil. Chinas state-run oil and banking giants have inked technology-transfer, chemical, energyand real-estate deals with Brazil. Plus, as the Times details, China came to the rescue of Brazils main oil companywhen it sought financing for its massive drilling plans, pouring $10 billion into the project. A study in Joint ForceQuarterly (JFQ) adds that Beijing plunked down $3.1 billion for a slice of Brazils vast offshore oil fields. The JFQstudy reveals just how deep and wide Beijing is spreading its financial influence in Latin America: $28 billion in loansto Venezuela; a $16.3-billion commitment to develop Venezuelan oil reserves; $1 billion for Ecuadoran oil; $4.4 billionto develop Peruvian mines; $10 billion to help Argentina modernize its rail system; $3.1 billion to purchaseArgentinas petroleum company outright. The New York Times adds that Beijing has lent Ecuador $1 billion to build ahydroelectric plant. There is good and bad to Beijings increased interest and investment in the WesternHemisphere. Investment fuels development, and much of Latin America is happily accelerating development in the

economic, trade, technology and infrastructure spheres. But Chinas riches come with strings. For instance, inexchange for Chinese development funds and loans, Venezuela agreed to increase oil shipments toChina from 380,000 barrels per day to one million barrels per day. Its worth noting that the CongressionalResearch Service has reported concerns in Washington that Hugo Chavez might try to supplant his U.S.market with China. Given that Venezuela pumps an average of 1.5 million barrels of oil per day for theU.S.or about 11 percent of net oil importsthe results would be devastating for the U.S. That bringsus to the security dimension of Chinas checkbook diplomacy in the Western Hemisphere. Officials withthe U.S. Southern Command conceded as early as 2006 that Beijing had approached every country inour area of responsibility and provided military exchanges, aid or training to Ecuador, Jamaica, Bolivia,Cuba, Chile and Venezuela. The JFQ study adds that China has a n important and growing presence inthe regions military institutions. Most Latin American nations, including Mexico, send officers toprofessional military education courses in the PRC. In Ecuador, Venezuela and Bolivia, Beijing has

begun to sell sophisticated hardwaresuch as radars and K-8 and MA-60 aircraft. The JFQ reportconcludes, ominously, that Chinese defense firms are likely to leverage their experience and a growingtrack record for their goods to expand their market share in the region, with the secondary consequencebeing that those purchasers will become more reliant on the associated Chinese logistics, maintenance,and training infrastructures that support those products. Put it all together, and the southern flank of theUnited States is exposed to a range of new security challenges. To be sure, much of this is a function ofChinas desire to secure oil markets. But theres more at work here than Chinas thirst for oil. Like a globalchess match, China is probing Latin America and sending a message that just as Washington has tradeand military ties in Chinas neighborhood, China is developing trade and military ties in Americas

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neighborhood. This is a direct challenge to U.S. primacy in the regiona challenge that must beanswered. First, Washington needs to relearn an obvious truththat Chinas rulers do not share Americas valuesand needs to shape and conduct its China policy in that context. Beijing has no respect for human rights. Recall thatin China, an estimated 3-5 million people are rotting away in laogai slave-labor camps, many of them guilty ofpolitical dissent or religious activity; democracy activists are rounded up and imprisoned; freedom of speech andreligion and assembly do not exist; and internal security forces are given shoot-to-kill orders in dealing with unarmedcitizens. Indeed, Beijing viewed the Arab Spring uprisings not as an impetus for political reform, but as reason to

launch its harshest crackdown on dissent in at least a decade, according to Director of National Intelligence JamesClapper. In short, the ends always justify the means in Beijing. And that makes all the difference when it comes toforeign and defense policy. As Reagan counseled during the Cold War, There is no true international security without

respect for human rights. Second, the U.S. must stop taking the Western Hemisphere for granted, andinstead must reengage in its own neighborhood economically , politically and militarily. That means nomore allowing trade dealsand the partners counting on themto languish. Plans for a hemispheric freetrade zone have faltered and foundered. The trade-expansion agreements with Panama and Colombiawere left in limbo for years, before President Obama finally signed them into law in 2011.Reengagement means reviving U.S. diplomacy. The Wall Street Journal reports that due to politicalwrangling in Washington, the State Department position focused on the Western Hemisphere has been staffed by aninterim for nearly a year, while six Western Hemisphere ambassadorial posts (Uruguay, Venezuela, Ecuador, ElSalvador, Nicaragua and Barbados) remain empty. Reengagement means reversing plans to slash defensespending. The Joint Forces Command noted in 2008 that China has a deep respect for U.S. military power. Wecannot overstate how important this has been to keeping the peace. But with the United States in the midst of

massive military retrenchment, one wonders how long that reservoir of respect will last. Reengagement also meansrevitalizing security ties. A good model to follow might be whats happening in Chinas backyard. To deter Chinaand prevent an accidental war, the U.S. is reviving its security partnerships all across the Asia-Pacificregion. Perhaps its time to do the same in Latin America. We should remember that many Latin

American countriesfrom Mexico and Panama to Colombia and Chileborder the Pacific. GivenBeijings actions, it makes sense to bring these Latin American partners on the Pacific Rim into thealliance of alliances that is already stabilizing the Asia-Pacific region. Finally, all of this needs to be partof a revived Monroe Doctrine. Focusing on Chinese encroachment in the Americas , this MonroeDoctrine 2.0 would make it clear to Beijing that the United States welcomes Chinas efforts to conducttrade in the Americas but discourages any claims ofcontrolimplied or explicitby China over territories,properties or facilities in the Americas . In addition, Washington should make it clear to Beijing that the Americanpeople would look unfavorably upon the sale of Chinese arms or the basing of Chinese advisors or military assets inthe Western Hemisphere. In short, what it was true in the 19th and 20th centuries must remain true in the 21st:There is room for only one great power in the Western Hemisphere.

Chinese influence in Latin America sparks war over TaiwanFergusson 12(Robbie, Researcher at Royal Society for the Arts, Featured Contributor atInternational Business Times, Former Conference & Research Assistant at Security Watch, FormerResearcher at University College London, Master of Science, China in the International Arena, TheUniversity of Glasgow, The Chinese Challenge to the Monroe Doctrine, http://www.e-ir.info/2012/07/23/does-chinese-growth-in-latin-america-threaten-american-interests/)

Taiwan domestic, or foreign policy?Chinas goals in the region amount to more than the capture of naturalresources. Although the Peoples Republic ofChina considers resolution of the Taiwan issue to be a domesticissue, it is with some irony that one of Chinas main foreign policy goals is to isolate Taipeiinternationally . The PRC and the ROC compete directly for international recognition among all the states inthe world. . Nowhere is this more evident than in Latin America, where 12 of the 23 nations that still have

official diplomatic relations with the ROC reside. The historical background Following the mainland Communist victoryin the Chinese Civil War in 1949, the nationalist Kuomintang retreated to the island of Formosa (Taiwan) where it continued to claimto be the legitimate government of all of China. In June 1950 the United States intervened by placing its 7th fleet in the Taiwanstraits to stop a conclusive military resolution to the civil war and slowly the battlefield became primarily political, concerned withlegitimacy. When the United Nations was formed in 1945, the Republic of China (ROC) became one of the five permanentmembers of the Security Council. This gave the ROC a de facto advantage over the PRC in attaining recognition from other nationstates; particularly as the diplomatic clout of the hegemonic United States supported its position as the true representative of theChinese people, until the rapprochement of the 1970s, when the Nixon administration wished to improve ties with the de facto rulersof China in order to exploit the Sino-Soviet split. UN Resolution 2758 granted the China seat to the PRC at the expense of the ROCwho were in effect exiled from the organization, and the famous 1972 visit of President Nixon to China further added legitimacy tothe communist regime. All this resulted in a thawing of world opinion, and gradually as the durability and permanence of the PRC

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regime became ingrained, countries began switching their diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Beijing. The economics ofinternational recognition In the Americas, the PRC had international recognition and longstanding support from ideological allies

such as Cuba. However, the ROC has maintained more diplomatic support in the Americas than any otherregion , mainly due to the small nature of the states involved and the importance of Taiwanese aid to theireconomies. Li notes that from the late 1980s to the early 1990s, roughly 10 percent of Taiwans direct foreign investment (FDI)went to Latin America and the Caribbean, [51] highlighting the concerted effort made in the region. Economic solidarity isincreasingly important to the formation of the Taiwan-Latin America relationship, for two reasons. The first

is that for Latin American states, the decision of which China to support is less ideological and political than it ever has been; which makes the decision a straight up economic zero-sum choice. The second is thatLatin America is home to natural resources which are of great significance to the hungry growingeconomies of the PRC and the ROC regardless of international recognition. However, while the decision is not political forLatin American countries, for Taiwan, every country which switches its recognition to the PRC damages itslegitimacy as a nation state in the international arena. The Table below shows the designation of diplomatic recognitionin the region in 2008. Countries Recognising the PRC (China)Countries Recognising the ROC (Taiwan)Central AmericaMexico,Costa RicaEl Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, PanamaCaribbeanAntigua & Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Cuba,Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, Suriname, Trinidad & TobagoBelize, Dominican Republic, Haiti, St Kitts & Nevis, St. Lucia,St. Vincent & the GrenadinesSouth AmericaArgentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Uruguay,

VenezuelaParaguay On the other hand, for the PRC, every state which withdraws its support for the ROC takesit one step closer to being in a position where it can resolve the Taiwan issue unilaterally. Subsequently,undermining Taiwan is of the utmost importance to China, and it has taken to outbidding Taiwan in offersof foreign aid, a strategy made possible by the decline in aid from the defunct Soviet Union, and the West, which is pre occupied

with terrorism and the Middle East. Li notes that the regions leaders have turned to Asia for help to promote trade and financialassistance, and consequently played the PRC and Taiwan against each other. [53] Despite its smaller size, Taiwan has faredremarkably well in this bidding war; focusing its aid investments on infrastructure such as stadiums in St Kitts & Nevis for the CricketWorld Cup in 2007. However, even Taiwans economy can be put under strain by the seemingly relentless stream of foreign aid

which has brought only debateable and mild gains to the Taiwanese cause. This has contributed to the PRC picking offthe few remaining supporters of the ROC take for example, the Dominican case. In early 2004, Commonwealth ofDominica asked Taipei for a $58 million aid, which is unrelated to public welfare. The Caribbean nation had relied on Taiwan todevelop its agriculture-based economy since 1983. Diplomatic relationship was soon broken after Taipei turned down the request.[54] This incident showcased the fact that in economic terms, the PRC is winning the battle for Latin America. Political strategies

of the PRCIn political terms too; the PRC is in an advantageous position, thanks in part again to its position withinthe UN. While it can be argued that China provides incentives but does not threaten harm to induce countries to defect fromrecognizing Taiwan, [55] the reality is that the use of force and direct harm are not the only means available to an economic entity

as powerful as China. It refuses to maintain official relations with any state that recognises the ROC; an actionwhich can be quite prohibitive to the country being able to take advantage of the growing Chinese market.Although Domnguez suggests that the PRC has not been punitive toward those states that still recognize the Republic of China(Taiwan), [56] the legitimacy of this claim has to be brought into question for example in June 1996, China fought the extensionof the UN mission in Haiti, to punish the Caribbean nation for its appeal for UN acceptance of Taiwan. [57] This incident showed

that China is prepared to use its global clout to play spoiler and apply indirect pressure on countries to adopt its position. Similarly,Chinas experience with one-party rule has taught it the importance of party-to-party relations in additionto state-to-state relations, further cementing the PRC by establishing a relationship based on goodwill andcommon understanding. Indeed by the start of 1998 the CCP had established relations with almost all major political partiesin the countries that were Taiwans diplomatic allies in Latin America, [58] further isolating the ROC. The effect on American

interestsWere the ROC to be deserted by its remaining allies in Latin America, the US A would bedisadvantaged in attempting to maintain the status quo across the Taiwan Strait. A Taiwan that was notrecognised by any state from the Americas, or Europe (with the exception of the Vatican) would not be seen as a genuine sovereign

entity whose defence would be more important than the upkeep of good relations between China and the West.As Chinaseconomic and political position in the world improves vis--vis both America and Taiwan, so might itsambitions.The U.S.A might find itself in a position where it could no longer withstand the diplomatic pressureto allow the PRC to conclude a settlement on Taiwan, perhaps by force.

Goes nuclearHunkovic 9 American Military University (Lee J., The Chinese-Taiwanese Conflict: Possible Futuresof a Confrontation between China, Taiwan and the United States of America, http://www.lamp-method.org/eCommons/Hunkovic.pdf)

A war between China , Taiwan and the U nited States has the potential to escalate into a nuclear conflictand a third world war, therefore, many countries other than the primary actors could be affected by sucha conflict, including Japan, both Koreas, Russia, Australia, India and Great Britain , if they were drawn into

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the war, as well as all other countries in the world that participate in the global economy, in which theUnited States and China are the two most dominant members.

Chinese regional influence decks hegDominguez 6. [Jorge, Professor @ Harvards Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, "China's Relations With LatinAmerica: Shared Gains, Asymmetric Hopes" Inter-American Dialogue Working Paper -- June --www.thedialogue.org/PublicationFiles/china.pdf]

There is, of course, a delicate triangular problem. To the extent that China may assist Latin America tocombat hegemonism, problems may develop in U.S.-Chinese relations. And, if Latin American states look at the world strategically from the perspective of self-interest, as Chinese academics claim, then Latin American officials mayin classic neorealist fashionseek Chinese support to provide a soft balance U.S. influence in Latin

America. Chinese academics are acutely aware that the United States considers Latin America to be its backyard(houyuan). Jiang Shixue, a scholar at the CASS, has put it as follows: The rapid development of China-Latin America relations

has not yet posed a security threat to the United States, but China is currently in the process ofbecoming apolitical competitor in Americas own backyard some Latin American countries may use Chinato challenge American hegemony.34 Jiang Shixue also avers that China and Latin America shareinterests in building a new economic order and opposing hegemonism . Xu Shicheng, also from the CASS,attributes left-wing election victories in Brazil, Venezuela, and Uruguay to Latin American anger at neoliberaleconomic policies and a desire to take a firmer stance against U.S. dominance in the region.35

The impact is everythingBrooks, Ikenberry, and Wohlforth 13(Stephen, Associate Professor of Government at Dartmouth College,John Ikenberry is the Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University in the Department ofPolitics and the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, William C. Wohlforth is the Daniel Webster Professor inthe Department of Government at Dartmouth College Dont Come Home America: The Case Against Retrenchment, InternationalSecurity, Vol. 37, No. 3 (Winter 2012/13), pp. 751)

A core premise ofdeep engagement is that it prevents the emergence of a far more dangerous globalsecurity environment. For one thing, as noted above, the U nited States overseas presence gives it theleverage to restrain partners from taking provocative action . Perhaps more important, its core alliancecommitments also deter states with aspirations to regional hegemony from contemplating expansion andmake its partners more secure, reducing their incentive to adopt solutions to their security problems thatthreaten others and thus stoke security dilemmas. The contention that engaged U.S. power dampens

the baleful effects of anarchy is consistent with influential variants of realist theory. Indeed, arguably thescariest portrayal of the war-prone world that would emerge absent the American Pacifier is provided inthe works of John Mearsheimer, who forecasts dangerous multipolar regions replete with securitycompetition, arms races , nuclear proliferation and associated preventive war temptations, regionalrivalries, and even runs at regional hegemony and full-scale great power war . 72 How do retrenchmentadvocates, the bulk of whom are realists, discount this benefit? Their arguments are complicated, but twocapture most of the variation: (1) U.S. security guarantees are not necessary to prevent dangerousrivalries and conflict in Eurasia; or (2) prevention of rivalry and conflict in Eurasia is not a U.S. interest.Each response is connected to a different theory or set of theories, which makes sense given that thewhole debate hinges on a complex future counterfactual (what would happen to Eurasias security settingif the United States truly disengaged?). Although a certain answer is impossible, each of these responsesis nonetheless a weaker argument for retrenchment than advocates acknowledge. The first responseflows from defensive realism as well as other international relations theories that discount the conflict-

generating potential of anarchy under contemporary conditions. 73 Defensive realists maintain that thehigh expected costs of territorial conquest, defense dominance, and an array of policies and practices thatcan be used credibly to signal benign intent, mean that Eurasias major states could manage regionalmultipolarity peacefully without the American pacifier. Retrenchment would be a bet on this scholarship,particularly in regions where the kinds of stabilizers that nonrealist theories point tosuch as democraticgovernance or dense institutional linkagesare either absent or weakly present. There are three othermajor bodies of scholarship, however, that might give decisionmakers pause before making this bet. Firstis regional expertise. Needless to say, there is no consensus on the net security effects of U.S.withdrawal. Regarding each region, there are optimists and pessimists. Few experts expect a return ofintense great power competition in a post-American Europe, but many doubt European governments will

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pay the political costs of increased EU defense cooperation and the budgetary costs of increasing militaryoutlays. 74 The result might be a Europe that is incapable of securing itself from various threats that couldbe destabilizing within the region and beyond (e.g., a regional conflict akin to the 1990s Balkan wars),lacks capacity for global security missions in which U.S. leaders might want European participation, and isvulnerable to the influence of outside rising powers. What about the other parts of Eurasia where theUnited States has a substantial military presence? Regarding the Middle East, the balance begins toswing toward pessimists concerned that states currently backed by Washington notably Israel, Egypt,and Saudi Arabiamight take actions upon U.S. retrenchment that would intensify security dilemmas.

And concerning East Asia, pessimism regarding the regions prospects without the American pacifier ispronounced. Arguably the principal concern expressed by area experts is that Japan and South Korea arelikely to obtain a nuclear capacity and increase their military commitments, which could stoke adestabilizing reaction from China. It is notable that during the Cold War, both South Korea and Taiwanmoved to obtain a nuclear weapons capacity and were only constrained from doing so by a still-engagedUnited States. 75 The second body of scholarship casting doubt on the bet on defensive realismssanguine portrayal is all of the research that undermines its conception of state preferences. Defensiverealisms optimism about what would happen if the United States retrenched is very much dependent onits particularand highly restrictiveassumption about state preferences; once we relax this assumption,then much of its basis for optimism vanishes. Specifically, the prediction of post-American tranquilitythroughout Eurasia rests on the assumption that security is the only relevant state preference, withsecurity defined narrowly in terms of protection from violent external attacks on the homeland. Under that

assumption, the security problem is largely solved as soon as offense and defense are clearlydistinguishable, and offense is extremely expensive relative to defense. Burgeoning research across thesocial and other sciences, however, undermines that core assumption: states have preferences not onlyfor security but also for prestige, status, and other aims, and they engage in trade-offs among the variousobjectives. 76 In addition, they define security not just in terms of territorial protection but in view of manyand varied milieu goals. It follows that even states that are relatively secure may nevertheless engage inhighly competitive behavior. Empirical studies show that this is indeed sometimes the case. 77 In sum, abet on a benign postretrenchment Eurasia is a bet that leaders of major countries will never allow thesenonsecurity preferences to influence their strategic choices. To the degree that these bodies of scholarlyknowledge have predictive leverage, U.S. retrenchment would result in a significant deterioration in thesecurity environment in at least some of the worlds key regions. We have already mentioned the third,even more alarming body of scholarship. Offensive realism predicts that the withdrawal ofthe Americanpacifierwill yield either a competitive regional multipolarity complete with associated insecurity, arms

racing, crisis instability, nuclear proliferation, and the like, or bids for regional hegemony, which maybe beyond the capacity of local great powers to contain (and which in any case would generate intenselycompetitive behavior, possibly including regional great power war). Hence it is unsurprising thatretrenchment advocates are prone to focus on the second argument noted above: that avoiding wars andsecurity dilemmas in the worlds core regions is not a U.S. national interest. Few doubt that the UnitedStates could survive the return of insecurity and conflict among Eurasian powers, but at what cost? Muchof the work in this area has focused on the economic externalities of a renewed threat of insecurity andwar, which we discuss below. Focusing on the pure security ramifications, there are two main reasonswhy decisionmakers may be rationally reluctant to run the retrenchment experiment. First, overall higherlevels of conflict make the world a more dangerous place. Were Eurasia to return to higher levels ofinterstate military competition, one would see overall higher levels of military spending and innovation anda higher likelihood of competitive regional proxy wars and arming of client statesall of which wouldbe concerning, in part because it would promote a faster diffusion of military power away from the United

States. Greater regional insecurity could well feed proliferation cascades, as states such as Egypt, Japan,South Korea, Taiwan, and Saudi Arabia all might choose to create nuclear forces. 78 It is unlikely thatproliferation decisions by any of these actors would be the end of the game: they would likely generatepressure locally for more proliferation. Following Kenneth Waltz, many retrenchment advocates areproliferation optimists, assuming that nuclear deterrence solves the security problem. 79 Usually carriedout in dyadic terms, the debate over the stability of proliferation changes as the numbers go up.Proliferation optimism rests on assumptions of rationality and narrow security preferences. In socialscience, however, such assumptions are inevitably probabilistic. Optimists assume that most states areled by rational leaders, most will overcome organizational problems and resist the temptation to preemptbefore feared neighbors nuclearize, and most pursue only security and are risk averse. Confidence in

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such probabilistic assumptions declines if the world were to move from nine to twenty, thirty, or fortynuclear states. In addition, many of the other dangers noted by analysts who are concerned about thedestabilizing effects of nuclear proliferationincluding the risk of accidents and the prospects that somenew nuclear powers will not have truly survivable forcesseem prone to go up as the number of nuclearpowers grows. 80 Moreover, the risk of unforeseen crisis dynamics that could spin out of control isalso higher as the number of nuclear powers increases. Finally, add to these concerns the enhanceddanger of nuclear leakage, and a world with overall higher levels of security competition becomes yetmore worrisome. The argument that maintaining Eurasian peace is not a U.S. interest faces a secondproblem. On widely accepted realist assumptions, acknowledging that U.S. engagement preserves peacedramatically narrows the difference between retrenchment and deep engagement. For many supportersof retrenchment, the optimal strategy for a power such as the United States, which has attained regionalhegemony and is separated from other great powers by oceans, is offshore balancing: stay over thehorizon and pass the buck to local powers to do the dangerous work of counterbalancing any local risingpower. The United States should commit to onshore balancing only when local balancing is likely to failand a great power appears to be a credible contender for regional hegemony, as in the cases ofGermany, Japan, and the Soviet Union in the midtwentieth century. The problem is that Chinas rise putsthe possibility of its attaining regional hegemony on the table, at least in the medium to long term. AsMearsheimer notes, The United States will have to play a key role in countering China, because its Asianneighbors are not strong enough to do it by themselves. 81 Therefore, unless Chinas rise stalls, theUnited States is likely to act toward China similar to the way it behaved toward the Soviet Union during

the Cold War. 82 It follows that the United States should take no action that would compromise itscapacity to move to onshore balancing in the future. It will need to maintain key alliance relationships in

Asia as well as the formidably expensive military capacity to intervene there. The implication is to get outof Iraq and Afghanistan, reduce the presence in Europe, and pivot to Asia just what the United States isdoing. 83 In sum, the argument that U.S.security commitments are unnecessary for peace iscountered by a lot of scholarship, including highly influential realist scholarship. In addition, theargument that Eurasian peace is unnecessary for U.S. security is weakened by the potential for a largenumber of nasty security consequences as well as the need to retain a latent onshore balancing capacitythat dramatically reduces the savings retrenchment might bring. Moreover, switching between offshoreand onshore balancing could well be difcult. Bringing together the thrust of many of the argumentsdiscussed so far underlines the degree to which the case for retrenchment misses the underlying logicofthe deep engagement strategy. By supplying reassurance, deterrence, and active management, theUnited States lowers security competition in the worlds key regions, thereby preventing the emergence of

a hothouse atmosphere for growing new military capabilities . Alliance ties dissuade partners from rampingup and also provide leverage to prevent military transfers to potential rivals. On top of all this, the UnitedStates formidable military machine may deter entry by potential rivals. Current great power militaryexpenditures as a percentage of GDP are at historical lows, and thus far other major powers have shiedaway from seeking to match top-end U.S. military capabilities. In addition, they have so far been careful toavoid attracting the focused enmity of the United States. 84 All of the worlds most modern militaries areU.S. allies (Americas alliance system of more than sixty countries now accounts for some 80 percent ofglobal military spending), and the gap between the U.S. military capability and that of potential rivals is bymany measures growing rather than shrinking. 85

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Cuban Economy

Contention 2 is the Cuban Economy

Status quo transition risks collapseMorris 11 (Emily, London Metropolitan University UK, FORECASTING CUBAS ECONOMY: 2, 5,

AND 20 YEARS, Presented at the international symposium Cuba Futures: Past and Present, organizedby The Cuba Project Bildner Center for Western Hemisphere Studies at The Graduate Center/CUNY,http://web.gc.cuny.edu/dept/bildn/cuba/cubaforecasting.pdf)

Risks in the short term Political risks arise from the process of transferring leadership from the old guardto a new generation. Evidently conscious of the hazards, the old guard are seeking to closely manage thegenerational handover, but their control will diminish. So far signs of dissent within the government have been rare andweak, but in 2011 the situation will begin to change radically. At the special conference of the PCC that will take place after the sixthPCC congress in April 2011, it seems likely that a new set of leaders will take up their posts. None of them will have the authority ofthe Castro brothers, and so for the first time for fifty years there is a possibility of the emergence of factionalism. In the TABLE 5.Two year forecast 2010 2011 2012 Real GDP (% growth) 2.1 3.5 4.2 Inflation (year-end, %)a a. This inflation figure is based on anestimated average household cost of living index that takes into account a reduction in the amount of basic goods available atheavily subsidised prices on the ration. The impact of the shift from subsidised consumption to market prices will vary widelybetween households, with the percentage rise in the cost of living being greater for those at the lower end of the income scale, who

spend a higher proportion of their income on basic goods. 6.3 7.2 5.5 Average labour productivity (% growth) 4.2 5.9 4.5Government spending/GDP ratio (%) 66.5 63.8 60.4 Investment/GDP ratio (%) 10.5 11.1 12.5Forecasting Cubas Economy: 2, 5,

and 20 Years 13 context of the rapid changes taking place in the economic sphere, 2012 is likely to be a testing year. Despite itsefforts to dampen expectations, there is a sense among the Cuban public that they should see materialbenefits from the economic reforms. If these hopes are dashed, the government could face a seriouscrisis of public confidence. In the economic sphere, there are many hazards arising from the process oftransformation. There are risks that monetary growth will outstrip that ofsupply so that inflationarypressures could build, at a time when the government is losing its power to directly control prices. Theextent to which the government will be able to manage the fiscal challenge it has set itselfto achievesufficient savings and raise sufficient tax revenue to maintain welfare provision whilst phasing out theexisting apparatus of social protectionwill depend on its ability to respond quickly to difficulties as theyarise. A majorfiscal crisis would jeopardise the reform process, and hamper the government'sability to respond to social pressures created by the extensive realignment of relative incomes that willresult from the changes. External risks are heightened by Cubas lack of access to emergency financing

in the case of unanticipated shocks. The largest single risk comes from Cubas high degree ofdependency on Venezuela, and in particular on earnings from the export of professional services.Hugo Chvez, on whom the relationship rests, does not face re-election until 2012 but if anything were tobefall him before then, the Cuban economy would suffer. The high degree of uncertainty about the global economyalso presents risks, with the recovery in OECD countries fragile and signs of strain within the economies of the growth leaders,China and India. 14 C

Even if the current transition is survivable, Cubas economy is terminallyunsustainable absent the planMorris 11 (Emily, London Metropolitan University UK, FORECASTING CUBAS ECONOMY: 2, 5,

AND 20 YEARS, Presented at the international symposium Cuba Futures: Past and Present, organizedby The Cuba Project Bildner Center for Western Hemisphere Studies at The Graduate Center/CUNY,http://web.gc.cuny.edu/dept/bildn/cuba/cubaforecasting.pdf)

Risks in the medium term Five years is a very long time in politics, and with the near certainty of both agenerational transition and a deep and disruptive overhaul of the system of economic management andstructure of relative prices, forecasting is particularly hazardous. The one-party political system will beseverely tested. If the government were to collapse, the range of possible scenarios would be huge: theeconomy might collapse in to chaos and hyperinflation amidst violent conflict, or enjoy a USfinanced boom, depending on the circumstances. However, It is worth noting that, as ever, theprobability of government collapse remains smaller than is estimated by those hoping for a politicaltransition. If it were not, the exercise of forecasting a survival scenario would perhaps be a futile one.

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Forecasting Cubas Economy: 2, 5, and 20 Years 21 Even in the absence of political collapse, thereremain substantial risks of economic instability and weakness. The reform process , which includes theremoval of subsidies and extensive realignment of relative prices and incomes, will create inflationarypressures that will be hard to contain. The forecast of a steady rise in average productivity is derived froman expectation that the positive impact of the introduction of market signals and improvement inincentives will outweigh the disruption costs. The slow rate of average real income growth would implycontinued pressure on the government to maintain subsidies for basic goods and extend welfare provisionto households struggling to adapt to the new conditions, draining fiscal resources and increasing thetemptation to raise taxes on productive activity to levels that discourage innovation and enterprise, orpush activity back from the formal economy to the informal sector. If Cubas reform wave were to coincidewith deteriorating external conditions, rather than the relatively benign scenario presented in the EIUsglobal assumptions, the political and economic risks would be greater. The danger of upsets in the globaleconomy remains heightened by concerns about high debt levels and sluggish growth in the EU andEurope, and inflated asset prices among the rapidly-growing economies of the developing world. Adeterioration in global conditions might feed through to Cuban economic performance through collapse inthe nickel price or surge in oil or food prices, or a sudden contraction in tourist arrivals. The single eventthat would have the greatest negative impact on Cubas economic prospects, however, would be thereplacement of Hugo Chvez with a hostile regime in Venezuela, particularly if this were to coincide withhigh international oil prices. A similar degree ofshock, but on the positive side, would arise from thelifting of the US travel ban, opening of the US market to Cuban exports or removal of restrictions

on US and multilateral financial flows to Cuba.

Cuban instability spills over to broader Latin America, which spurs terrorism andinflames hotspots in Africa, Korea, Taiwan, and Central AsiaGorrell 5(Tim, Lieutenant Colonel, CUBA: THE NEXT UNANTICIPATED ANTICIPATEDSTRATEGIC CRISIS? 3/18/5, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA433074)Regardless of the succession, under the current U.S. policy, Cubas problems of a post Castro transformation onlyworsen. In addition to Cubans on the island, there will be those in exile who will return claiming authority. Andthere are remnants of the dissident community within Cuba who will attempt to exercise similar authority.Apower vacuum or absence of orderwill create the conditions forinstability and civil war.Whether Raulor another successorfrom within the current government can hold power is debatable. However, that individual willnonetheless extend the current policies for an indefinite period, which will only compound the Cuban situation. WhenCuba finally collapses anarchy is a strong possibility if the U.S. maintains the wait and see approach. The U.S. thenmust deal with an unstable country 90 miles off its coast. In the midst of this chaos, thousands will flee theisland. During the Mariel boatlift in 1980 125,000 fled the island.26 Many were criminals; this time the number could be severalhundred thousand fleeing to the U.S., creating a refugee crisis. Equally important, by adhering to a negative containmentpolicy, the U.S. may be creating its next series of transnational criminal problems. Cuba is along the axis of the drug-trafficking flow into the U.S. from Columbia. The Castro government as a matter of policy does not support the drug trade. In fact, Cubas actionshave shown that its stance on drugs is more than hollow rhetoric as indicated by its increasing seizure ofdrugs 7.5 tons in 1995, 8.8 tons in 1999, and 13 tons in 2000.27 While there may be individuals within the government and outside who engage indrug trafficking and a percentage of drugs entering the U.S. may pass through Cuba, the Cuban government is not the path of leastresistance for the flow of drugs. If there were no Cuban restraints, the flow of drugs to the U.S. could begreatly facilitated by a Cuba base of operation and accelerate considerably. In the midst of an unstableCuba, the opportunity for radical fundamentalist groups to operate in the region increases. If these groupscan export terrorist activity from Cuba to the U.S. or throughout the hemisphere then the waragainst this extremism gets more complicated. Such activity could increase direct attacks and disrupt

the economies, threaten ing the stability of the fragile democracies that are budding throughout theregion. In light of a failed state in the region, the U.S. may be forced to deploy military forces to Cuba,creating the conditions for another insurgency. The ramifications of this action could very well fuel greater anti-

American sentiment throughout the Americas. A proactive policy now can mitigate these potential future problems. U.S. domesticpolitical support is also turning against the current negative policy. The Cuban American population in the U.S. totals 1,241,685 or 3.5% of thepopulation.28 Most of these exiles reside in Florida; their influence has been a factor in determining the margin of victory in the past two presidentialelections. But this election strategy may be flawed, because recent polls of Cuban Americans reflect a decline for President Bush based on his policycrackdown. There is a clear softening in the Cuban-American community with regard to sanctions. Younger Cuban Americans do not necessarilysubscribe to the hard-line approach. These changes signal an opportunity for a new approach to U.S.-Cuban relations. (Table 1) The time has come

to look realistically at the Cuban issue. Castro will rule until he dies. The only issue is what happens then? The U.S. can little afford to bedistracted by a failed state 90 miles off its coast.The administration, given the present state of world affairs, does not

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have the luxury or the resources to pursue the traditional American model of crisis management. ThePresident and other government and military leaders have warned that the GWOT will be long and protracted. These warnings weresounded when the administration did not anticipate operations in Iraq consuming so many military, diplomatic and economic resources. There is

justifiable concern that Africa and the Caucasus region are potential hot spots for terrorist activity, so these areasshould be secure. North Korea will continue to be a n unpredictable crisis in waiting . We also cannot ignoreChina. What if China resorts to aggression to resolve the Taiwan situation? Will the U.S. go to war over Taiwan?

Additionally, Iran could conceivably be the next target for U.S. pre-emptive action. These are known and

potential situations that could easily require all or many of the elements of national power to resolve. In viewof such global issues, can the U.S. afford to sustain the status quo and simply let the Cuban situation play out ?The U.S. is at a crossroads: should the policies of the past 40 years remain in effect with vigor? Or should the U.S. pursue a new approach to Cuba inan effort to facilitate a manageable transition to post-Castro Cuba?

Africa goes globalGlick 7Caroline Glick 7, deputy managing editor of The Jerusalem Post, Senior Fellow for Middle East Affairs ofthe Center for Security Policy, Condi's African holiday, December 11,http://www.rightsidenews.com/20071211309/editorial/us-opinion-and-editorial/our-world-condis-african-holiday.html

The Horn of Africa is a dangerous and strategically vital place. Small wars, which rage continuously, can

easily escalate into big wars. Local conflicts have regional and global aspects. All of the conflicts in thistinderbox, which controls shipping lanes from the Indian Ocean into the Red Sea, can potentially give riseto regional, and indeed global conflagrations between competing regional actors and global powers.

So does Central AsiaF. William Engdhal, Global Research Associate, 10/11/08, The Caucasus Washington Risksnuclear war by miscalculation http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=9790So far, each step in the Caucasus drama has put the conflict on a yet higher plane of danger. The nextstep will no longer be just about the Caucasus, or even Europe. In 1914 it was the "Guns of August" thatinitiated the Great War. This time the Guns of August 2008 could be the detonator of World War III and anuclear holocaust of unspeakable horror. Nuclear Primacy: the larger strategic danger Most in the Westare unaware how dangerous the conflict over two tiny provinces in a remote part of Eurasia has become.What is left out of most all media coverage is the strategic military security context of the Caucasus

dispute. Since the end of the Cold War in the beginning of the 1990s NATO and most directlyWashington have systematically pursued what military strategists call Nuclear Primacy. Put simply, if oneof two opposing nuclear powers is able to first develop an operational anti-missile defense, even primitive,that can dramatically weaken a potential counter-strike by the opposing sides nuclear arsenal, the sidewith missile defense has "won" the nuclear war. As mad as this sounds, it has been explicit Pentagonpolicy through the last three Presidents from father Bush in 1990, to Clinton and most aggressively,George W. Bush. This is the issue where Russia has drawn a deep line in the sand, understandably so.The forceful US effort to push Georgia as well as Ukraine into NATO would present Russia with thespectre ofNATO literally coming to its doorstep , a military threat that is aggressive in the extreme, anduntenable for Russian national security. This is what gives the seemingly obscure fight over two provincesthe size of Luxemburg the potential to become the 1914 Sarajevo trigger to a new nuclear war bymiscalculation. The trigger for such a war is not Georgias right to annex South Ossetia and Abkhazia.Rather, it is US insistence on pushing NATO and its missile defense right up to Russias door.

And KoreaSTRATFOR 10 (International Think Tank, North Korea, South Korea: The Military Balance on thePeninsula,http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20100526_north_korea_south_korea_military_balance_peninsula, May26, 2010)So the real issue is the potential for escalation or an accident that could precipitate escalation thatwould be beyond the control of Pyongyang or Seoul. With both sides on high alert, both adhering to theirown national (and contradictory) definitions of where disputed boundaries lie and w

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