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What are the prospects for a diplomaticresolution of the Iranian nuclear issue?The answer is shaping up as a contest ofwills. On the one hand, the five permanentmembers of the United Nations SecurityCouncil (UNSC – China, France, Russia,the United Kingdom and the UnitedStates) have agreed gradually to increasemandatory economic and politicalsanctions against Iran until it agreesto suspend its uranium-enrichmentprogramme. Suspension is a condition

for beginning multilateral talks with theP-5 plus Germany (so-called ‘Seven PartyTalks’), aimed at negotiating a permanentdiplomatic solution. On the other hand,Iran appears determined to press aheadwith the enrichment programme, whileexpressing its willingness to beginnuclear negotiations without conditions,which the P-5 have rejected. Efforts toengineer a compromise to get to the

 bargaining table have failed and neitherside is showing signs of backing down.Further escalation of the dispute seemscertain. Recognising that militaryoptions have serious drawbacks andrisks, Washington is prepared to followthe diplomatic route for now, hopingthat Iran will eventually succumb tointernational pressure. Ultimately,however, if diplomacy fails – and Iranovercomes the technical problemshampering its enrichment programme –the US will consider the military optionsmore seriously.

A key condition of talksThe dispute between the UNSC and

Iran over the suspension of uranium-enrichment activities as a condition fornegotiation is based on the precedent setduring the negotiations between the EU-3 (the UK, France and Germany) and Iranin 2003–05. As a condition for holdingnegotiations, the Europeans insisted thatIran suspend its enrichment programmeduring talks to achieve a diplomaticsolution. Tehran eventually accepted thiscondition despite its initial resistance.In return, the Europeans agreed not torefer Iran to the UNSC for numeroussafeguards violations uncovered by theInternational Atomic Energy Agency(IAEA) in connection with Iran’s secretenrichment programme dating backnearly 20 years. The EU-3 talks with Iranmade little progress, however, towards

resolving the central issue of whetherIran would be allowed to develop afull-blown enrichment programme.The Europeans demanded that Iranaccept a permanent suspension of itsenrichment programme (or at least aten-year moratorium), but Iran insisted

on its right to develop an industrialenrichment capability, while offering toaccept various technical constraints andprovide political assurances intendedto build confidence that the enrichmentplant would not be used for militarypurposes. The Europeans rejected theseproposals as insufficient. As the talksdragged on, Tehran complained that theEuropeans were stalling simply to keepits enrichment activities frozen.

By the summer of 2005, as PresidentMahmoud Ahmadinejad took office, Irandecided to end the suspension and itsnegotiations with the EU-3. With the US

 bogged down in Iraq and the big powersdivided over the threat of sanctions,Tehran calculated that it could resumeits enrichment activities with a lowrisk of serious international retaliation.Indeed, international pressure was slowto mount. After months of proceduraldelays and negotiations, the IAEA Boardof Governors finally referred Iran to theUNSC in February 2006, after Tehranrejected a Russian proposal for Iran toparticipate in a multilateral enrichment

programme located in Russia. The UNSCissued a toothless presidential statementin March 2006 calling on Iran to suspendenrichment within 30 days. WhenIran ignored this request, the UNSCunanimously approved Resolution 1696on 31 July 2006, demanding that Iran‘suspend all enrichment-related andreprocessing activities’ by 31 August2006 and threatening economic sanctionsunder Article 41 of Chapter VII of theUN Charter if Iran did not comply. Thekey to P-5 consensus on this resolutionwas Washington’s willingness to omitreference to Article 42, which authorisesmilitary action, and its offer to joinmultilateral negotiations with Iranif it agreed to suspend enrichment. Inaddition, Washington hoped that the

Israeli offensive against Hizbullah insouth Lebanon, launched in mid-July2006, would weaken Iran’s resolve bydamaging one of its most importantallies in the region.

Instead, the Lebanon war backfired.Iran emerged as the champion of

Arab resistance to Israeli occupation,embarrassing and alarming the SunniArab powers. In the aftermath of the war,Iran felt even more confident that it couldresist UNSC demands for the suspensionof its enrichment programme. Efforts byEU foreign policy chief Javier Solana andIranian National Security Adviser AliLarijani to craft a compromise that wouldallow suspension and negotiations to

  begin simultaneously were essentiallysubverted by Ahmadinejad. In New York,there was a six-month period of painfulnegotiations among the P-5, with Russia(quietly supported by China) opposingmost of the proposals put forward bythe US and Europeans to place sanctionson Iran. Gradually, in the interests ofmaintaining P-5 consensus, the resolutionwas whittled down to a bare minimum.Finally, on 23 December 2006, Resolution1737 was unanimously adopted, settinga 60-day deadline for Iran to suspend allenrichment and reprocessing activities asa basis for beginning negotiations with theP-5 plus Germany, and imposing largelysymbolic financial sanctions against a

small number of Iranian individuals andentities directly involved in ‘sensitivenuclear activities’.

Hopes of a breakthroughBy early 2007, however, officialsin Washington and Europe began togrow confident that their diplomaticstrategy was beginning to weardown Iran’s resistance. Weakened byIranian municipal elections in mid-December, Ahmadinejad was criticised

  by his ‘pragmatic conservative’ rivalsfor mishandling the nuclear portfolioand allowing a UNSC consensus toemerge against Tehran. Although theofficial sanctions were puny, there wasa significant indirect economic impactas private firms began to reduce their        I

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ISSN: 1356-7888

Iran’s nuclear programmeCan diplomacy succeed? 

President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad

announcing on Monday 9 April that Iran had

achieved a ‘commercial-scale’ enrichment

capacity at Natanz. Photo © AP

8/14/2019 CFR - Iran Diplomacy Samore

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© The International Institute for Strategic StudiesVolume 13 Issue 03 April 2007 Iran's nuclear programme

exposure in Iran in anticipation ofadditional UN-mandated sanctions.Supreme Leader Ayatollah Sayyid AliKhamenei reportedly empowered Larijanito resume his desultory talks with Solana

in February and April 2007. The latestcompromise under discussion wouldinvolve a two-step process, the first beinga 30-day moratorium in which Iran wouldnot install additional centrifuge machinesand the UNSC would not imposeadditional sanctions. During this periodthe two sides would negotiate terms for a'double suspension', in which, as a basisfor beginning multilateral negotiations,Iran would suspend enrichmentactivities and the UNSC would suspendsanctions. A key issue is whether Iranwould agree to halt all enrichment

activities or insist on continuing someresearch and development activitiesduring multilateral negotiations. Onthe ground, Saudi Arabia embarked ondiplomatic efforts to limit Iran’s influencein the region and maintained high oilproduction, which reduced Iranianoil revenues, while the US pursued amore aggressive strategy against Iranianagents in Iraq and sent additional navalassets into the Persian Gulf.

Despite this increased economic,political and military pressure, Iran

once again defied the UNSC deadlinein late February. This time the P-5 responded very quickly with a newresolution, in part because Moscowand Washington reached agreement

  bilaterally on its main elements beforepresenting it to the other permanentmembers. Adopted unanimously on 24March 2007, Resolution 1747 set a new60-day deadline for Iran to suspendits enrichment programme, expandedthe existing financial sanctions bytargeting the state-owned Bank Sepahand additional Revolutionary Guard

commanders, and hinted at additionalmandatory sanctions such as an armsembargo and a ban on export credits.It also endorsed the previous proposalto begin Seven Party negotiations withIran and implicitly offered to suspendsanctions during the talks if Iran agreedto halt its enrichment programme duringthe same period.

With Russia’s apparent shift inposition, Resolution 1747 represented amuch more cohesive P-5 stand aimed atfurther increasing international pressure

on Iran. In addition to immediatelyrejecting the resolution, however, Iranresponded by demonstrating thatit could also up the ante, seizing 15British military personnel operating inthe Persian Gulf. The outcome of the

episode also seemed to mark a comebackfor Ahmadinejad, who announced thereturn of the prisoners after 13 days asan ‘Easter gift’ to the British people. Afew days later, he declared that Iran had

achieved a ‘commercial-scale’ enrichmentcapacity at Natanz. In reality, Iran is stillexperiencing technical difficulties withits centrifuge machines and is at leastseveral years away from achieving a trulycommercial-scale enrichment capability.

A dangerous stalemateNonetheless, with the new UNSC deadlinelooming in late May, neither side appearswilling to relent. While some outsideexperts have advocated unconditionalnuclear talks with Iran, the P-5 see littlevalue in negotiating the nuclear issue while

Iran continues to develop its enrichmentcapacity. Under these circumstances, Iranwould have every incentive to drag outthe talks while working to achieve itsnuclear objectives. For its part, Iran fearsthat if it does agree to halt its activities, theP-5 would have their own reason to dragout the talks, keeping Iran’s enrichmentprogramme on ice indefinitely whilethreatening to re-impose sanctions if Iranwere to re-start it. Various attempts to

  break this stalemate have failed. Iraniandiplomats have suggested that if the P-5

would accept in principle that Iran coulddevelop an industrial-scale enrichmentplant, then Iran could accept a temporarysuspension to work out details, such asinspection arrangements and possible

  joint ownership and operation. This ideahas been rejected by the P-5 because itwould concede the main issue beforethe negotiations had begun. Similarly,Iran has rejected various face-savingproposals put forward by the Europeansto hold a series of preliminary multilateralmeetings, culminating in a ministerial-level Seven Party meeting at which

suspension of enrichment and sanctionswould be simultaneously announced.Larijani apparently expressed interest inthis formula, only to be overruled byAhmadinejad.

With no diplomatic end in sight, thepressure on both sides is likely to mount.Assuming that Tehran ignores Resolution1747, the P-5 will have to consider moreserious sanctions in future resolutions,including a suspension of civil nuclearcooperation with Iran, imposition of anarms embargo, suspension of export

credits for companies trading with Iran,and limits on foreign investment inIran’s oil and gas sector. A key issue iswhether the P-5 will be able to maintainconsensus on tougher sanctions. Onthe one hand, the P-5 share an interest

in preventing Iran from acquiring anuclear-weapons capability and hopethat muscular multilateral diplomacywill avert the risk of war. On the otherhand, there are differences among the P-5

over the perceived utility of sanctions, theextent to which sanctions would damage  bilateral relations with Iran, the extentto which they would heighten tensions,and the prospects of managing threatsfrom a nuclear-armed Iran.

On the Iranian side, the key issueis whether escalating sanctionswill empower the opponents ofAhmadinejad, the so-called ‘pragmaticconservatives’, to convince theSupreme Leader to support a temporarysuspension, if only for tactical reasonsto relieve international pressure and

to create new opportunities to dividethe opposition. But, as the episodeof the British captives demonstrates,Ahmadinejad and the RevolutionaryGuard are also able to turn up the heatin response to UNSC sanctions in waysthat mobilise nationalist sentiment andmake it more difficult for Tehran tocompromise over its self-proclaimednuclear rights.

As long as the P-5 believe that theirdiplomatic strategy of incrementalsanctions has a good chance of working,

unity is likely to hold, but if it becomesclear that Iran is determined to proceedwith enrichment no matter whatsanctions are imposed, then underlyingP-5 differences are likely to emerge.In particular, only the US is preparedto consider the use of force againstIranian nuclear facilities if that becomesthe only way to prevent (or delay)Iran from achieving a nuclear-weaponscapability. At the same time, Washingtonrecognises that military options are veryunattractive. It is unclear how muchdamage air strikes could inflict on Iran’s

nuclear capabilities, and such attackswould run the risk of developing into ageneral conflict and are likely to disruptseriously US efforts in the region toform an Arab alliance to contain Iran.

For now, Washington is prepared tolet diplomacy ‘play out’ because Iranis not making rapid technical progresstowards acquiring a nuclear-weaponscapability and because Washington

  believes that its diplomatic strategyis having some effect. Ultimately,however, if Iran begins to reach critical

technical thresholds, and diplomaticmeans fail to persuade Iran to suspendits uranium-enrichment programme,then consideration of military optionswill come into play, despite all the risksand drawbacks.

Iran's nuclear programme page 2

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