Crim Pro Digests 2015

7/25/2019 Crim Pro Digests 2015

1/65

[RULE 126, SEC. 13] Rule 126, Section 13 of the Rules of Court allows for searches incidental to a

lawful arrest. For there to e a lawful arrest, there should e either a warrant of arrest or a lawful

warrantless arrest as enu!erated in Rule 113, Section " of the Rules of Court.

PEOPLE VS. COGAEDJune 30, 2014, G.R. No. 200334

LE#$E$, %.

FACTS: Victor Cogaed was riding a jeepney with a bag from Barangay Lun-Oy and during acheckpoint, the driver of the jeepney he rode made a signal to the police telling that Cogaed was

carrying marijuana inside Cogaeds bag! the police officer then approached Cogaed and asked the

accused about the contents of his bags" Cogaed replied that he did not know what was inside and that

he was just transporting the bag in favor of #arvin, a barriomate" Cogaed subse$uently opened the bag

revealing the bricks of marijuana inside" %e was then arrested by the police officers"

ISSUE: &hether there was a valid search and sei'ure! and, whether the marijuana confiscated isadmissible as evidence"

HELD: (O" )here is no valid search and sei'ure! thus, the marijuana confiscated shall not beadmissible as evidence"

*s a general rule, searches conducted with a warrant that meets all the re$uirements of *rticle +++,

ection of the Constitution are reasonable" )his warrant re$uires the e.istence of probable cause thatcan only be determined by a judge"

%owever, there are instances when searches are reasonable even when warrantless" )he known

jurisprudential instances of reasonable warrantless searches and sei'ures are/

012 &arrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest

02 ei'ure of evidence in 3plain view,4

052 earch of a moving vehicle!062 Consented warrantless search!072 Customs search!

082 top and frisk! and

092 :.igent and emergency circumstances"

)he search involved in this case was initially a 3stop and frisk4 search, but it did not comply with all

the re$uirements of reasonability re$uired by the Constitution"

3top and frisk4 searches 0sometimes referred to as )erry searches2 are necessary for law enforcement"

)hat is, law enforcers should be given the legal arsenal to prevent the commission of offenses"

%owever, this should be balanced with the need to protect the privacy of citi'ens in accordance with

*rticle +++, ection of the Constitution" )he balance lies in the concept of 3suspiciousness4 present inthe situation where the police officer finds himself or herself in" )his may be undoubtedly based on the

e.perience of the police officer" +t does not have to be probable cause, but it cannot be mere suspicion"

+t has to be a 3genuine reason to serve the purposes of the 3stop and frisk4 e.ception"

)he 3stop and frisk4 search was originally limited to outer clothing and for the purpose of detecting

dangerous weapons"

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)here was not a single suspicious circumstance in this case, and there was no appro.imation for the

probable cause re$uirement for warrantless arrest" )he person searched was not even the person

mentioned by the informant" )he informant gave the name of #arvin Buya, and the person searched

was Victor Cogaed" :ven if it was true that Cogaed responded by saying that he was transporting the

bag to #arvin Buya, this still remained only as one circumstance" )his should not have been enoughreason to search Cogaed and his belongings without a valid search warrant"

Likewise, the facts of the case do not $ualify as a search incidental to a lawful arrest" )he apprehension

of Cogaed was not effected with a warrant of arrest" (one of the instances enumerated in ;ule 115,

ection 7 of the ;ules of Court were present when the arrest was made" *t the time of his

apprehension, Cogaed has not committed, was not committing, or was about to commit a crime" )here

were no overt acts within plain view of the police officers that suggested that Cogaed was in

possession of drugs at that time" *lso, Cogaed was not an escapee prisoner that time! hence, he could

not have $ualified for the last allowable warrantless arrest"

)here can be no valid waiver of Cogaeds constitutional rights even if we assume that he did not object

when the police asked him to open his bags" *ppellants silence should not be lightly taken as consent

to such search" )he implied ac$uiescence to the search, if there was any, could not have been more

than mere passive conformity given under intimidating or coercive circumstances and is thusconsidered no consent at all within the purview of the constitutional guarantee"

)he Constitution provides that any evidence obtained in violation of the right against unreasonable

searches and sei'ures shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding" Otherwise known as thee.clusionary rule or the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine, this rule prohibits the issuance of general

warrants that encourage law enforcers to go on fishing e.peditions" :vidence obtained through

unlawful sei'ures should be e.cluded as evidence because it is 3the only practical means of enforcing

the constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and sei'ures"4 +t ensures that the

fundamental rights to ones person, houses, papers, and effects are not lightly infringed upon and are

upheld"

Considering that the prosecution and conviction of Cogaed were founded on the search of his bags, apronouncement of the illegality of that search means that there is no evidence left to convict Cogaed"

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[RULE 11&, SEC. '] (n a cri!inal case, an a))eal throws o)en the entire case wide o)en for re*iew,

and the a))ellate court can correct errors, thou+h unassi+ned, that !a e found in the a))ealed

-ud+!ent.

PEOPLE VS. DIONALDO, ET AL.

Ju! 23, 2014, G.R. No. 20"#4#ERL/S0ER$/E, %.

FACTS: :dwin (avarro, had been kidnapped by four men from %ealth +s &ealth 11?,???" %owever, the payment of the ransom and

subse$uent rescue operations with the police failed" )he dead body of :dwin was later on found by the

police and the kidnappers was later on identified and arrested by the police"

)hus, accused-appellants as well as Virgilio were charged in an +nformation which reads/

)hat on or about the 18th day of #ay, ??5 in Caloocan City, #etro #anila and within the

jurisdiction of this %onorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring together andmutually helping one another, being then private persons, did then and there by force and

intimidation willfully, unlawfully and feloniously with the use of motor vehicle and superior

strength take, carry and deprive :=&+( (*V*;;O @ O(*, of his liberty against his will,

for the purpose of e.torting ransom as in fact a demand of >17,???,???"?? was made as acondition of the victims release and on the occasion thereof, the death of the victim resulted"

)he ;)C and C* convicted the four kidnappers of the crime of Aidnapping and erious +llegal

=etention sentencing each of them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua"

ISSUE: &hether the ;)C and C* erred in convicting the kidnappers with the crime of Aidnappingand erious +llegal =etention

HELD: @:" )he court held that it was constrained to modify the ruling of the ;)C and the C*, asthe crime does not, as the records obviously bear, merely constitute Aidnapping and erious +llegal

=etention, but that of the special comple. crime of Aidnapping for ;ansom with %omicide" )his is in

view of the victims 0i"e", :dwins2 death, which was 0a2 specifically charged in the +nformation, and

0b2 clearly established during the trial of this case" (otably, while this matter was not among the issues

raised before the Court, the same should nonetheless be considered in accordance with the settled rulethat in a criminal case, an appeal, as in this case, throws open the entire case wide open for review, and

the appellate court can correct errors, though unassigned, that may be found in the appealed judgment"

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[RULE 11&, SEC. "] /s a +eneral rule, the Court does not interfere with the #ffice of the

#!uds!ans eercise of its in*esti+ati*e and )rosecutorial )owers, and res)ects the initiati*e and

inde)endence inherent in the #ffice of the #!uds!an.

ARAULLO VS. OFFICE OF THE O$%UDS$ANJu! 30, 2014, G.R. No. 1#41&"

RE4ES, %.

FACTS: *raullo, who was illegally dismissed by the Club ilipino, filed a criminal complaint with theOffice of the Ombudsman for the issuance of unjust interlocutory order under *rt" ?8 of the ;evised

>enal Code against Labor *rbiter *rden " *nni"

)he Office of the Ombudsman found no probable cause for the complaint given *raullos failure to

establish that the L* *nni and the other labor arbiters gave undue advantage to Club ilipino, or that

they acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross and ine.cusable negligence"

*raullo then filed a petition for certiorari to assail the Office of the Ombudsmans dismissal of hiscriminal complaint"

ISSUES: &hether the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion when it dismissed thecriminal complaint of *raullo"

HELD:(O" )he upreme Court ruled that there was no probable cause in the unjust interlocutoryorder complaint of *raullo" Dpon review, the Court has determined that the Office of the Ombudsman

did not commit grave abuse of discretion because e.plained clearly in the assailed resolution were the

grounds that supported its finding of lack of probable cause, and which then justified the dismissal of

the criminal complaints filed by *raullo"

*s a general rule, the Court does not interfere with the Office of the Ombudsmans e.ercise of itsinvestigative and prosecutorial powers, and respects the initiative and independence inherent in the

Office of the Ombudsman which, 3beholden to no one, acts as the champion of the people and the

preserver of the integrity of the public service"4 0Casing v" Ombudsman, ?12

>robable cause is defined as such facts as are sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a crime

has been committed, and that the persons being charged are probably guilty thereof" EF+tG can only findsupport in facts and circumstances that would lead a reasonable mind to believe that the person being

charged warrants a prosecution"E )o establish probable cause, *raullo, being the complainant, then

should have proved the elements of the crimes alleged to have been committed" +n addition, there

should have been a clear showing of the respective participation of the respondents, to at least supporta ruling that would call for their further prosecution"

pecifically for the charge of violation of *rticle ?8 of the ;>C which penali'es the issuance of

unjust interlocutory orders, it was necessary to show that, first, the orders issued by the respondents to

his complaint were unjust, and second, the said orders were knowingly rendered or rendered through

ine.cusable negligence or ignorance"

On this matter, the Office of the Ombudsman correctly held that L* *nnis order for the $uashal of the

writ of e.ecution, and the (L;Cs resolution affirming it, were not unjust"

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[RULE 116, SEC. 11] 5he sus)ension of arrai+n!ent of an accused, while authoried under

Section 11, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court, is onl for a )eriod of 6& das rec7oned fro! the filin+

of the )etition with the re*iewin+ office. (ts own failure to act for se*en 89: !onths without

arrai+nin+ the accused cannot e an ecuse to dis!iss the case.

RO%ERT 'UA, ET AL. VS. GREGORIO SACUPA(O, ET AL.Se)*e+e- 24, 2014, G.R. No. 1#123"

ERE;, %.

FACTS: F>etitionersG are members of the Board of =irectors and the officers of Vicmar =evelopmentCorporation" F;espondentsG


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>ursuant to the ;esolution of the ;> reversing the finding of probable cause by the City >rosecutor,

FpetitionersG filed a #otion to =ismiss dated ebruary 15, ??8 before FtheG ;)C" )he City >rosecutor

likewise filed a Comment manifesting agreement to the withdrawal of the criminal cases pending

resolution of the appeal with the =OJ"

;)C granted the #otion of FpetitionersG and ordered the withdrawal of the criminal cases"

;espondents filed a >etition for CertiorariandMandamusunder ;ule 87 of the ;ules of Court before

the appellate court to annul and set aside the trial courts withdrawal of Criminal Case (os" ??8-?9,

??8-?95 and ??8-?96 from its docket"

*s stated at the outset, the Court of *ppeals granted respondents petition, reversed and set aside the

;)Cs ruling, and reinstated the criminal cases against petitioners"

ISSUE: &hether or not the appellate court committed grave abuse of discretion when it reinstated the

criminal cases against the petitioners

HELD:(O")he upreme Court agreed with the findings of the Court of *ppeals 0C*2 that/ 012 thelapse of almost seven 092 months without any action taken by the =OJ! and, 02 the manifestation to

withdraw the case by the >ublic >rosecutor, were flawed and insufficient to effect a withdrawal of the

criminal cases" )he suspension of arraignment of an accused, while authori'ed under ection 11, ;ule

118 of the ;ules of Court, is only for a period of 8? days reckoned from the filing of the petition with

the reviewing office" +ts own failure to act for seven 092 months without arraigning the accused cannot

be an e.cuse to dismiss the case, especially when the rules dictate that the deferment of arraignment in

such case may only be done for a period of 8? days" )he controlling case of Crespo v" #ogul teaches

us that, while the prosecution of criminal actions is under the discretion and control of the publicprosecutor, once a complaint or information is filed, any disposition of the case, be it a dismissal or a

conviction or ac$uittal of an accused, rests in the sound discretion of the court" &ell-settled in

jurisprudence is the principle that trial judges ought to make its own independent assessment of the

merits of the case and not abdicate its judicial power and act as a mere surrogate of the ecretary of

Justice"

+n any event, there e.ists probable cause to indict petitioners for violation of ections 0a2 and 0d2, in

relation to ection H 0e2, of the Law" ;"*" (o" HH, a special law, re$uires employers to/ 0a2

register its employees with the ! 0b2 deduct employee contributions from their salaries! and 052

remit these contributions to the within a given period"

)he case in point is Tan, et al. v. Ballena, et al. where good faith and absence of malicious intent of the

accused and the subse$uent remittance of the contributions and loan amorti'ations, held no sway

over the accuseds criminal liability under the Law for failure to remit contributions and loan

amorti'ations of accuseds employees"

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[RULE 11&, SEC. 16] Section 16 of Rule 11& of the Re*ised Rules of Cri!inal roceduree)ressl

allows an offended )art to inter*ene counsel in the )rosecution of the offense for the reco*er of

ci*il liailit where the ci*il action for the reco*er of ci*il liailit arisin+ fro! the offense char+ed

is instituted with the cri!inal action.

LEONARDO A. VILLALON, ET AL. VS. A$ELIA CHAN

Se)*e+e- 24, 2014, G.R. No. 1#&0/R(#$, %.

FACTS:)he respondent *melia Chan married Leon Basilio Chua" )he respondent claimed that herhusband Leon Basilio Chua and the present petitioner, Leonardo *" Villalon, are one and the same

person"

=uring the subsistence of his marriage to *melia, Leon Basilio Chua, this time under the name of

Leonardo *" Villalon, allegedly contracted a second marriage with :rlinda )alde that took place on

June , 1II5"

*melia, who was then living in the Dnited tates and could not personally file a case for bigamy in the

>hilippines, re$uested Benito @ao Chua and &ilson


8/65

C* found no such waiver from *melia and held that *tty" *tencias appearance as private prosecutor

was proof enough of *melias determination to enforce her claim for damages in the bigamy case

ISSUE: &hether or not *tty" *tencias is dis$ualified to intervene in the bigamy case as private

prosecutor"

HELD:(O"ection 18 of ;ule 11? of the ;evised ;ules of Criminal >rocedure e.pressly allows anoffended party to intervene by counsel in the prosecution of the offense for the recovery of civil

liability where the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged is

instituted with the criminal action" )he civil action shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action,

e.cept when the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately or

institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action"

)he petitioners argue that the C* gravely erred when it ruled that/ the ;)C committed grave abuse of

discretion in issuing its #arch 5, ??8 resolution dis$ualifying *tty" *tencia as private prosecutor, and

that *tty" *tencias dis$ualification violated the respondents rights to intervene and be heard in thebigamy case" )hey contend that, even with *tty" *tencias dis$ualification, the respondent was never

denied her right to participate in the proceedings and was even called to stand as a witness but the

respondent never appeared before the court because she was out of the country during the whole

proceedings on the bigamy case"

+n this case, the C* found no such waiver from or reservation made by the respondent" )he fact that

the respondent, who was already based abroad, had secured the services of an attorney in the

>hilippines reveals her willingness and interest to participate in the prosecution of the bigamy case and

to recover civil liability from the petitioners" )hus, the ;)C should have allowed, and should not have

dis$ualified, *tty" *tencia from intervening in the bigamy case as the respondent, being the offended

party, is afforded by law the right to participate through counsel in the prosecution of the offense with

respect to the civil aspect of the case"

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[RULE 113, SEC. "] E*en if Co!erciante and his co!)anion were showin+ O5 Bienvy Calag ++ 0>O5 Calag2 were aboard a

motorcycle, patrolling the area while on their way to visit a friend at >rivate ;oad, Barangay %ulo,

#andaluyong City" Cruising at a speed of 5? kilometers per hour along >rivate ;oad, they spotted, at a

distance of about 1? meters, two 02 men - later identified as Comerciante and a certain :rick =asilla"

tanding and showing Eimproper and unpleasant movements,E with one of them handing plastic

sachets to the other" )hinking that the sachets may contain shabu, they immediately stopped andapproached Comerciante and =asilla" *t a distance ofaround five 072 meters, >O5 Calag introduced

himself as a police officer, arrested Comerciante and =asilla, and confiscated two 02 plastic sachets

containing white crystalline substance from them" * laboratory e.amination later confirmed that said

sachets contained methamphetamine hydrochloride orshabu.

*fter the prosecution rested its case, =asilla filed a demurrer to evidence, which was granted by the

;)C, thus his ac$uittal" %owever, due to Comerciantes failure to file his own demurrer to evidence,

the ;)C considered his right to do so waived and ordered him to present his evidence"

+n his defense, Comerciante averred that >?5 Calag was looking for a certain EBarokE, who was a

notorious drug pusher in the area, when suddenly, he and =asilla, who were just standing in front of a

jeepney along >rivate ;oad, were arrested and taken to a police station" )here, the police officers

claimed to have confiscated illegal drugs from them and were asked money in e.change for their

release" &hen they failed to accede to the demand, they were brought to another police station to

undergo in$uest proceedings, and thereafter, were charged with illegal possession of dangerous drugs"

ISSUE: &hether or not the C* correctly affirmed Comerciantes conviction for violation of ection11, *rticle ++ of ;* I187"

HELD:(O")he petition is meritorious" )he Court finds it highly implausible that >O5 Calag, evenassuming that he has perfect vision, would be able to identify with reasonable accuracy - especially

from a distance of around 1? meters, and while aboard a motorcycle cruising at a speed of 5?

kilometers per hour - miniscule amounts of white crystalline substance inside two 02 very smallplastic sachets held by Comerciante" )he Court also notes that no other overt act could be properly

attributed to Comerciante as to rouse suspicion in the mind of >O5 Calag that the former had just

committed, was committing, or was about to commit a crime" Verily, the acts of standing around with a

companion and handing over something to the latter cannot in any way be considered criminal acts" +n

fact, even if Comerciante and his companion were showing Eimproper and unpleasant movementsE as

put by >O5 Calag, the same would not have been sufficient in order to effect a lawful warrantless

arrest under ection 7 0a2, ;ule 115 of the ;evised ;ules on Criminal >rocedure"

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10/65

ection , *rticle +++

of the Constitution mandates that a search and sei'ure must be carried out

through or on the strength of a judicial warrant predicated upon the e.istence of probable cause! in the

absence of such warrant, such search and sei'ure becomes, as a general rule, EunreasonableE within the

meaning of said constitutional provision"

)he e.clusionary rule is not, however, an absolute and rigid proscription" One of the recogni'ed

e.ceptions established by jurisprudence is a search incident to a lawful arrest" +n this instance, the law

re$uires that there first be a lawful arrest before a search can be made - the process cannot be reversed"

ection 7, ;ule 115 of the ;evised ;ules on Criminal >rocedure lays down the rules on lawful

warrantless arrests, as follows/

5en, 6n 567 )-e7en8e, *5e )e-7on *o e --e7*e9 57 8o++6**e9, 67 8*u! 8o++6**6n,o- 67 **e+)*6n *o 8o++6* n o;;en7e<

or a warrantless arrest under ection 7 0a2 to operate, two 02 elements must concur, namely/ 0a2 the

person to be arrested must e.ecute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually

committing, or is attempting to commit a crime! and 0b2 such overt act is done in the presence orwithin the view of the arresting officer"

On the other hand, ection 7 0b2 re$uires for its application that

at the time of the arrest, an offense had in fact just been committed and the arresting officer had

personal knowledge of facts indicating that the accused had committed it"

+n both instances, the officers personal knowledge of the fact of the commission of an offense is

absolutely re$uired" Dnder ection 7 0a2, the officer himself witnesses the crime! while in ection 7

0b2, he knows for a fact that a crime has just been committed"

)he factual backdrop of the instant case failed to show that >O5 Calag had personal knowledge that a

crime had been indisputably committed by Comerciante" Verily, it is not enough that the arresting

officer had reasonable ground to believe that the accused had just committed a crime! a crime must, in

fact, have been committed first, which does not obtain in this case"


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[RULE 119, SEC. 9] /s a +eneral rule, an order +rantin+ the accuseds de!urrer to e*idence

a!ounts to an ac>uittal. 5here are certain ece)tions, howe*er, as when the +rant would not *iolate

the constitutional )roscri)tion on doule -eo)ard. For instance, this Court ruled that when there is

a findin+ that there was +ra*e ause of discretion on the )art of the trial court in dis!issin+ a

cri!inal case +rantin+ the accuseds de!urrer to e*idence, its -ud+!ent is considered *oid? and

the ri+ht of the accused a+ainst doule -eo)ard is not *iolated.

PEOPLE VS. GOAuu7* , 2014, "32 SCRA 21

@EL C/S5(LL#, %.

FACTS: Orient Commercial Banking Corporation 0OCBC2 was placed under the receivership of the>hilippine =eposit +nsurance Corporation 0>=+C2" >=+C began collecting on OCBCs past due loans

receivable by sending demand letters to its borrowers for the immediate settlement of their outstanding

loans" *llegedly among these borrowers of OCBC are )immys, +nc" and *sia )e.tile #ills, +nc" *

representative of )immys, +nc" denied being granted any loan by OCBC and insisted that the

signatures on the loan documents were falsified" * representative of *sia )e.tile #ills, +nc" denied

having applied, much less being granted, a loan by OCBC" )he >=+C conducted an investigation and

allegedly came out with a finding that the loans purportedly in the names of )immys, +nc" and *sia)e.tile #ills, +nc" were released in the form of managers checks in the name of >hilippine ;ecyclers

and Keta +nternational, +nc" )hese managers checks were then allegedly deposited to the savings

account of the private respondent Jose C" etition,

the appellate court held that the trial court has already become final since the prosecution failed to

move for the reconsideration thereof, and thus double jeopardy attached"

ISSUE: &hether or not the granting of the =emurrer to :vidence was proper"

HELD:(O" * demurrer to the evidence is an objection by one of the parties in an action, to the effectthat the evidence which his adversary produced is insufficient in point of law, whether true or not, to

make out a case or sustain the issue" )he party demurring challenges the sufficiency of the whole

evidence to sustain a verdict" )he grant or denial of a demurrer to evidence is left to the sound

discretion of the trial court, and its ruling on the matter shall not be disturbed in the absence of a grave

abuse of such discretion"E *s to effect, Ethe grant of a demurrer to evidence amounts to, as a generalrule, an ac$uittal and cannot be appealed because it would place the accused in double jeopardy" )he

order is reviewable only by certiorari if it was issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack

or e.cess of jurisdiction"E &hen grave abuse of discretion is present, an order granting a demurrer

becomes null and void"

)here are certain e.ceptions, however, as when the grant would not violate the constitutionalproscription on double jeopardy" or instance, the Court ruled that when there is a finding that there

was grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in dismissing a criminal case by granting the

accuseds demurrer to evidence, its judgment is considered void" +n this case, the prosecution has

presented competent evidence to sustain the indictment for the crime of estafa through falsification of

commercial documents, and that respondents appear to be the perpetrators thereof" +n evaluating the

evidence, the trial court effectively failed andor refused to weigh the prosecutions evidence against

the respondents"

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[RULE 11&, SEC. 6] 5he trial court was )recluded fro! considerin+ the attendance of such

>ualifin+ or a++ra*atin+ circu!stances, i.e., !inorit of the *icti!, in the -ud+!ent ecause of the

failure to )ro)erl alle+e the!? 5he date or the ti!e of the co!!ission of the ra)e need not e

stated in the co!)laint or infor!ation with asolute accurac.

PEOPLE VS. RUD( NU(O'

June 1&, 201&, G.R. No. 1#&424ERS/A($, %.

FACTS: )he accused in this case is the paternal uncle of the victim who filed rape cases against him"+t was alleged that the crimes were committed last June, July, *ugust and eptember of ??7" )he

accused overpowered the victim while raping her and he also threatened to kill the victim and her

family if she reveals the incident to anyone" )he victim was only 15 years old when the crimes were

committed"

ISSUES:12&hether or not the C* gravely erred in not appreciating the minority of the offended party 0whenthe same was not indicated in the information2

02 &hether or not the ;)C erred in finding him guilty of rape despite the fatal defects of theinformation which did not specify the dates of commission of the rapesM

HELD:012(O" *ccording to the upreme Court, the ;)C correctly convicted the accused with only 6 countsof simple rape instead of $ualified rape 0which the C* affirmed2" *lthough the minority under 1H years

of *** at the time of the rapes, and the fact that the accused was her paternal uncle were established

during the trial, the ;)C nonetheless correctly convicted him only of four counts of simple rape

instead of $ualified rape because the special $ualifying circumstance of minority was not alleged in the

informations" )he circumstances of minority of the victim and her relationship to the offender must

concur to $ualify the crime of rape, but only her relationship to the accused was alleged and proved"

)he trial court was precluded from considering the attendance of such $ualifying or aggravating

circumstances in the judgment because of the failure to properly allege them" )his conforms to ectionH and ection I, ;ule 11? of the ;ules of Court"

02 (O" +t is not necessary for the information to allege the date and time of the commission of the

crime with e.actitude unless such date and time are essential ingredients of the offenses charged" +t is

sufficient that the information states that the crime was committed at any time as near as possible to

the date of its actual commission, pursuant to ection 11, ;ule 11? of ;ules of Court" +n this case, thefailure to specify the e.act date or time when the rapes were committed did not ipso facto render the

informations defective" (either the date nor the time of the commission of rape is a material ingredient

of the crime, for the essence of the crime is carnal knowledge of a female against her will through

force or intimidation" >recision as to the time when the rape is committed has no bearing on itscommission" Conse$uently, the date or the time of the commission of the rape need not be stated in the

complaint or information with absolute accuracy, for it is sufficient that the complaint or informationstates that the crime was committed at any time as near as possible to the date of its actual

commission"

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13/65

[RULE 112, SEC. 3] 5he trial court is not ound to ado)t the resolution of the Secretar of %ustice

to withdraw the infor!ations for lac7 of )roale cause since it is !andated to inde)endentl

e*aluate or assess the !erits of the case? in the eercise of its discretion, it !a a+ree or disa+ree

with the reco!!endation of the Secretar of %ustice.

SR. RE$( ANGELA JUNIO, ET AL. VS. JUDGE $ARIVIC A. CACATIAN%ELTRANJnu-! 13, 2014 A.$. No. RTJ=14=23"

R(#$, %.

FACTS:Claire *nn Campos, a 19-year old student, filed an affidavit complaint for violation of;epublic *ct (o" 981? 0the Child *buse Law2 and ;"*" (o" 999 0the #agna Carta for the =isabled2

before the )uguegarao City >rosecution Office against r" ;emy *ngela Junio and =r" Josephine ="

Lorica, the >resident and the =ean of the chool of %ealth ervices, respectively, of t" >aul

Dniversity of the >hilippines (SPUP).

Claire alleged that she was refused enrolment by >D> for the B"" (ursing course in her sophomore

year because of her cleft palate! she alleged that the refusal was made despite her completion of

>D>s College reshmen >rogram Curriculum"

)he prosecutors office in its resolution found probable cause to indict Junio and Lorica of the crimes

charged, and recommended the filing of the corresponding informations against them" Junio and

Lorica appealed the resolution of the prosecutors office, but Dndersecretary Jose Vicente ala'ar of

the =epartment of Justice 0DO2 denied their petition for review"

*fterward, =OJ ecretary Leila de Lima granted Junio and Loricas motion for reconsideration and set

aside the resolution of Dndersecretary ala'ar" *ccordingly, in her resolution dated *ugust H, ?11,

she directed the Cagayan >rovincial >rosecutor to immediately cause the withdrawal of the

informations for violations of ;"*" (os" 981? and 999 against Junio and Lorica for lack of probable

cause"

ubse$uently, the prosecutors office still filed two informations against Junio and Lorica for

violations of ection 1?0a2, *rticle V+, in relation with *rticle 50a2 and 0b2 of ;"*" (o" 981?, and

ection 1 of ;"*" (o" 999 before the ;egional )rial Court 0!TC2 in )uguegarao City presided by

Judge #arivic *" Cacatian-Beltran"

)his prompted the accused to file a joint motion to withdraw informations in view of ecretary =e

Limas resolution" )hey also filed an administrative complaint before the Office of the Court

*dministrator 0OC*2 alleging that Judge Beltran Earrogated unto herself the role of a prosecutor and a

judgeE when she insisted that they stand for trial although she did not find any grave abuse of

discretion on the part of Justice ecretary =e Lima"

ISSUE:

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14/65

012 &hether the respondent arbitrarily denied the joint motion to withdraw informations"

02 &hether the respondent arrogated unto herself the role of a prosecutor and a judge"

HELD:012 (O" )he trial court is not bound to adopt the resolution of the ecretary of Justice since it ismandated to independently evaluate or assess the merits of the case! in the e.ercise of its discretion, it

may agree or disagree with the recommendation of the ecretary of Justice" ;eliance on the resolution

of the ecretary of Justice alone would be an abdication of the trial courts duty and jurisdiction to

determine a"rima #acie case" &e stress that once a criminal complaint or information is filed in court,

any disposition of the case 0whether it be a dismissal, an ac$uittal or a conviction of the accused2 rests

within the e.clusive jurisdiction, competence, and discretion of the trial court! it is the best and sole

judge of what to do with the case before it"

+n the present case, the evidence provides that the respondent judge does not appear to have arbitrarily

denied the joint motion to withdraw informations" he e.plained the basis of her denial" (o proof

whatsoever e.ists in all these, showing that bad faith, malice or any corrupt purpose attended the

issuance of her order" +t is also important to note in this regard that the issue of whether Judge

Cacatian-Beltran correctly denied the joint motion to withdraw informations, despite the finding of

ecretary =e Lima of lack of probable cause, is judicial in nature/ Junio and Loricas remedy under the

circumstances should have been made with the proper court for the appropriate judicial action, not

with the OC* by means of an administrative complaint"

02 (O" )he court find unmeritorious Junio and Loricas argument that Judge Cacatian-Beltran

3arrogated unto herself the role of a prosecutor and a judge4 when she insisted that the accused stand

trial although she did not find any grave abuse of discretion on the part of Justice ecretary de Lima"

&hen a court acts, whether its action is consistent or inconsistent with a prosecutors recommendation,

it rules on the prosecutors action and does not thereby assume the role of a prosecutor"

[RULE 126, SEC. 2] /n a))lication for a search warrant is not a cri!inal action? thus, confor!it

Page | 14


15/65

of the )ulic )rosecutor 8under Rule 11&, Sect. ": is not necessar to +i*e the a++rie*ed )art

)ersonalit to >uestion an order >uashin+ search warrants.

[RULE 126, SEC. B] 5he re>uire!ent of )articularit in the descri)tion of thin+s to e seied is

fulfilled when the ite!s descried in the search warrant ear a direct relation to the offense for

which the warrant is sou+ht. (t need not descrie the ite!s to e seied in )recise and !inute detail.

ORLDIDE E% CORPORATION, ET AL. VS. PEOPLE AND PHILIPPINE LONGDISTANCE TELEPHONE PLDT CO$PAN(

Jnu-! 13, 2014, G.R. No. 1110SERE$#, C.%.

FACTS:>olice Chief +nspector (apoleon Villegas of the ;egional +ntelligence pecial OperationsOffice 0;+OO2 of the >hilippine (ational >olice filed applications for warrants5 before the ;)C of

Nue'on City, Branch 9H, to search the office premises of petitioner &orldwide &eb Corporation

0&&C26 located at the 11th floor, +B# >la'a Building, (o" 1HH :astwood City, Libis, Nue'on City, as

well as the office premises of petitioner >lanet +nternet Corporation 0>lanet +nternet2 located at D(

1?5, 1 Orient $uare Building, :merald *venue, Baran$ay an *ntonio, >asig City" )heapplications alleged that petitioners were conducting illegal toll bypass operations, which amounted to

theft and violation of >residential =ecree (o" 6?1 0>enali'ing the Dnauthori'ed +nstallation of &ater,

:lectrical or )elephone Connections, the Dse of )ampered &ater or :lectrical #eters and Other *cts2,

to the damage and prejudice of the >hilippine Long =istance )elephone Company 0>L=)2" On 7

eptember ??1, the trial court conducted a hearing on the applications for search warrants" )he

applicant and Jose :nrico ;ivera 0;ivera2 and ;aymund L=) testified as witnesses"

Over a hundred items were sei'ed, including 17 central processing units 0C>Ds2, 1? monitors,

numerous wires, cables, diskettes and files, and a laptop computer" >lanet +nternet notes that even

personal diskettes of its employees were confiscated! and areas not devoted to the transmission of

international calls, such as the >residents Office and the +nformation =esk, were searched" Voltageregulators, as well as reserve and broken computers, were also sei'ed"

ISSUES:012 &hether the C* erred in giving due course to >L=)s appeal to $uestion the $uashal of the

search warrants without the conformity of the public prosecutor had no personality to $uestion

the $uashal of the search warrants 0(O2

02 &hether the assailed search warrants were issued upon probable cause 0considering that the acts

complained of allegedly do not constitute theft2 0@:2

052 &hether the C* seriously erred in holding that the assailed search warrants were not general

warrant 0(O2

HELD:

012 (O" >etitioners contend that >L=) had no personality to $uestion the $uashal of the search

warrants without the conformity of the public prosecutor" )hey argue that it violated ection 7,

;ule 11? of the ;ules of Criminal >rocedure, to wit/ :C" 7" %ho must "rosecute criminal

actions.*ll criminal actions commenced by a complaint or information shall be prosecuted

Page | 15


16/65

under the direction and control of the prosecutor" )he provision states the general rule that the

public prosecutor has direction and control of the prosecution of 3all criminal actions

commenced by a complaint or information"4 %owever, a search warrant is obtained, not by the

filing of a complaint or an information, but by the filing of an application therefor" Clearly then,

an application for a search warrant is not a criminal action! thus, conformity of the public

prosecutor is not necessary to give the aggrieved party personality to $uestion an order $uashing

search warrants"

02 @:" * trial judges finding of probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant is accorded

respect by reviewing courts when the finding has substantial basis" +n the issuance of a search

warrant, probable cause re$uires Esuch facts and circumstances that would lead a reasonably

prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and the objects sought in connection

with that offense are in the place to be searched"E )here is no e.act test for the determination of

probable cause in the issuance of search warrants" +t is a matter wholly dependent on the finding

of trial judges in the process of e.ercising their judicial function" %ere, the applications for

search warrants were instituted as principal proceedings and not as incidents to pending criminal

actions" &hen the search warrants issued were subse$uently $uashed by the ;)C, there was

nothing left to be done by the trial court" )hus, the $uashal of the search warrants were finalorders, not interlocutory, and an appeal may be properly taken therefrom"

052 (O" )he re$uirement of particularity in the description of things to be sei'ed is fulfilled when

the items described in the search warrant bear a direct relation to the offense for which the

warrant is sought" +t need not describe the items to be sei'ed in precise and minute detail" )he

warrant is valid when it enables the police officers to readily identify the properties to be sei'ed

and leaves them with no discretion regarding the articles to be sei'ed"

* general warrant is defined as 30a2 search or arrest warrant that is not particular as to the person

to be arrested or the property to be sei'ed"4 +t is one that allows the 3sei'ure of one thing under a

warrant describing another4 and gives the officer e.ecuting the warrant the discretion over

which items to take" uch discretion is abhorrent, as it makes the person, against whom the

warrant is issued, vulnerable to abuses" Our Constitution guarantees our right against

unreasonable searches and sei'ures, and safeguards have been put in place to ensure that people

and their properties are searched only for the most compelling and lawful reasons" +n furtherance

of this constitutional provision, ections 5 and 6, ;ule 18 of the ;ules of Court, amplify the

rules regarding the following places and items to be searched under a search warrant"

+n this case, >L=) was able to establish the connection between the items to be searched as

identified in the warrants and the crime of theft of its telephone services and business" >rior to

the application for the search warrants, ;ivera conducted ocular inspection of the premises of

petitioners and was then able to confirm that they had Eutili'ed various telecommunications

e$uipment consisting of computers, lines, cables, antennas, modems, or routers, multiple.ers,>*BP or switching e$uipment, and support e$uipment such as software, diskettes, tapes,

manuals and other documentary records to support the illegal toll bypass operations"4

[RULE 111, SEC. 1] (t is well settled that in cri!inal cases where the offended )art is the State, the

interest of the )ri*ate co!)lainant or the )ri*ate offended )art is li!ited to the ci*il liailit

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17/65

[RULE 122, SEC. 1] 5he -ud+!ent that !a e a))ealed the a++rie*ed )art en*isa+ed in the

Rule is a -ud+!ent con*ictin+ the accused, and not a -ud+!ent of ac>uittal. 8Rule B", Section 1

!ust e read to+ether with Rule 122, Section 1:

DENNIS T. VILLAREAL VS. CONSUELO C. ALIGAJnu-! 12, 2014 G.R. No 1##&

ER/L5/, %.

FACTS:*n +nformation was filed against respondent *liga for the crime of Nualified )heft thrualsification of Commercial =ocument" =uring arraignment, respondent *liga pleaded not guilty"

*fter the ;)C resolved to deny petitioners motion for issuance of a hold departure order against

respondent *liga and the latters motion to suspend proceedings, trial on the merits ensued" Both the

prosecution and the defense were able to present the testimonies of their witnesses and their respective

documentary e.hibits" Challenged in this petition for review on certiorari under ;ule 67 is the ac$uittal

of the C* of the accused which reversed and set aside the decision of the ;)C"

ISSUE:

012 &hether the petitioner took a procedural misstep when he filed the present petition without therepresentation of the Office of the olicitor


18/65

[RULE 11&, SEC. ', ] 5he a*er!ents in the two 82: sets of (nfor!ation a+ainst )etitioner and

Rusillon clearl stated facts and circu!stances constitutin+ the ele!ents of the cri!e of estafa as to

dul infor! the! of the nature and cause of the accusation, sufficient to )re)are their res)ecti*e

defenses.

SILVERINA E. CONSIGNA VS PEOPLEA)-6 2, 2014, GR No. 1"&"&0=&1

ERE;, %.

FACTS: >etitioner, the #unicipal )reasurer of 5?,???"??, to pay

for the salaries of the employees of the municipality and to construct the municipal gymnasium as the

municipalitys +nternal ;evenue *llotment 0+;*2 had not yet arrived" *s payment, petitioner issued 5

Land Bank of the >hilippines 0LB>2 checks signed by Jaime ;usillon 0;usillon2, the incumbent mayor

of the #unicipality of checks to her account in #etrobank-urigao Branch" Dpon

presentation for payment, #etrobank returned the checks to #oleta as the checks had no funds" )he

following day, #oleta again deposited the checks" )his time, however, she deposited the checks to her

LB> account" Dpon presentation for payment, the checks were again returned for the reason,

Eignature (ot on ile"E Dpon verification, LB> informed #oleta that the municipalitys account was

already closed and transferred to =evelopment Bank of the >hilippines, and that petitioner, the

municipal treasurer, has been relieved from her position"

%ence, #oleta filed with the andiganbayan sets of +nformation against petitioner, in the latters

capacity as #unicipal )reasurer and ;usillon, in his capacity as #unicipal #ayor of


19/65

or complaint or information to be sufficient, it must state the name of the accused! the

designation of the offense given by the statute! the acts or omissions complained of as

constituting the offense! the name of the offended party! the appro.imate time of the commission

of the offense, and the place wherein the offense was committed" &hat is controlling is not thetitle of the complaint, nor the designation of the offense charge or the particular law or part

thereof allegedly violated, these being mere conclusions of law made by the prosecutor, but the

description of the crime charged and the particular facts therein recited" :very element of the

offense must be stated in the information"

*s early in Dnited tates v" Lim an, this Court has determined that/

rom a legal point of view, and in a very real sense, it is of no concern to the accused what is the

technical name of the crime of which he stands charged" +t in no way aids him in a defense on

the merits" . . ." )hat to which his attention should be directed, and in which he, above all

things else, should be most interested, are the facts alleged" )he real $uestion is not did he

commit a crime given in the law some technical and specific name, but did he perform the acts

alleged in the body of the information in the manner therein set forth" )he designation of the

crime by name in the caption of the information from the facts alleged in the body of that

pleading is a conclusion of law made by the fiscal" +n the designation of the crime the accusednever has a real interest until the trial has ended"""4

>etitioners argument is as outdated as it is erroneous" )he averments in the two 02 sets of +nformation

against petitioner and ;usillon clearly stated facts and circumstances constituting the elements of the

crime of estafa as to duly inform them of the nature and cause of the accusation, sufficient to prepare

their respective defenses"

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[RULE 11', SEC. 2] /ll a+ree!ents or ad!issions !ade or entered durin+ the )re0trial conference

shall e reduced in writin+ and si+ned the accused and counsel. (n this case, while it a))ears

that the )re0trial a+ree!ent was si+ned onl the )rosecution and defense counsel, the sa!e !a

e ad!itted +i*en that the defense failed to o-ect to its ad!ission.

PEOPLE VS. LI'IRANJune 4, 2014, "2& SCRA 21"

RE4ES, %.

FACTS: Jenny Likiran 0accused-appellant2 was convicted of the crime of #urder for the death of;olando areno, r" 0areno2" +t was the eve of the town #iestaand a dance was being held at the

basketball court" *fter a few hours, while >rescado #ercado 0#ercado2 and Constancio rosecution witness =agangons positive identification of the accused-appellant was held sufficient by

the ;)C to convict the latter of the crime of murder" )he ;)C also rejected the accusedQappellants

defense of denial as it was not supported by evidence" +t also ruled that alibicannot favor the accused-

appellant since he failed to prove that it was impossible for him be at the scene of the crime" )he C*

sustained the findings of the ;)C" )he accused-appellant asserted that the information charged him ofmurder committed by attacking, assaulting, stabbing and shooting areno, thereby causing his

instantaneous death" )he accused-appellant argued that the evidence on record established that areno

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21/65

was in fact shot by some other person" )he C* disregarded the accused-appellants contention and

ruled that 3the cause of death was not made an issue in the court a &uo'and the Certificate of =eath

was admitted during the pre-trial conference as proof of the fact and cause of death"

ISSUE: &hether or not there is sufficient basis for the C*s disregard of the accused-appellantsargument

HELD: @:" )he pre-trial agreement issued by the ;)C states that one of the matters stipulated uponand admitted by the prosecution and the defense was that the Certificate of =eath issued by =r" =ael of

Bukidnon >rovincial %ospital and reviewed by the ;ural %ealth >hysician of #alaybalay City 3is

admitted as proof of fact and cause of death due to multiple stab wound scapular area"4 tipulation of

facts during pre-trial is allowed by ;ule 11H of the ;evised ;ules of Criminal >rocedure" ection of

;ule 11H, meanwhile, prescribes that all agreements or admissions made or entered during the pre-trial

conference shall be reduced in writing and signed by the accused and counsel! otherwise, they cannot

be used against the accused" +n this case, while it appears that the pre-trial agreement was signed only

by the prosecution and defense counsel, the same may nevertheless be admitted given that the defense

failed to object to its admission" #oreover, a death certificate issued by a municipal health officer in

the regular performance of his duty is "rima #acie evidence of the cause of death of the victim" )he

accused-appellant, therefore, is bound by his admission of arenos cause of death" )he Court of*ppeals decision is *+;#:="

[RULE 113, SEC. "] 5ancinco was arrested while atte!)tin+ to conceal a firear! and could not

)roduce a license to carr thereof when as7ed the )olice officers. (!!ediatel thereafter, as an

incident to a lawful warrantless arrest, 5ancinco was searched and found to ha*e three 83: sachets

of shau in his )ossession. 5he search was lawful under Section ", Rule 113 of the Rules of Court.

PEOPLE VS. DENNIS TANCINCOJune 1/, 2014, "2 SCRA

ERE;, %.

FACTS: * team of police officers was on roving patrol along #"J" Cuenco *venue, Cebu City when>O1 #endranos received a call from a member of the Baran$ay +ntelligence (etwork 0B+(2 who

gave information of an ongoing pot session by an unidentified alleged armed man and his companion"

)hey proceeded to the location of where the armed person and his companions were supposedly

holding their pot session" )hey did not find the alleged armed man" )he B+( informant approached

>O1 #endranos and told him that the alleged armed man had been spotted playing a bin$omachineat a nearby house" )he alleged armed man turned out to be accused-appellant )ancinco" ince

)ancinco was unable to produce a license to carry a firearm, >O *batayo consfiscated the firearm and

arrested )ancinco without a warrant" +ncident to the warrantless arrest, >O1 #endranos instructed

>O =io to make a body search of )ancinco" )he body search of )ancinco produced three 052 mediumplastic sachets, which were positive to be shabu.ubse$uently, separate +nformations for violation of

;"*" (o" I187, specifically illegal possession of dangerous drugs, and for illegal possession of firearmwere filed by the arresting police officers against )ancinco" )he trial court found )ancinco guilty

beyond reasonable doubt of violation of ection 11, *rticle ++ of ;"*" (o" I187, specifically illegal

possession of a dangerous drug" On appeal, the appellate court rejected )ancincos claim of frame-up

as against the straightforward, direct and positive testimony of the police officers"

ISSUE: &hether or not there was a valid search"

Page | 21


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HELD: @:")ancinco was searched as an incident to a lawful warrantless arrest" ection 7, ;ule 115of the ;ules of Court provides/

SEC. &" rrest ithout arrant* hen la#ul. +* peace officer or a private person may, without awarrant, arrest a person"

0a2 &hen, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, oris attempting to commit an offense!

0b2 &hen an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on

personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed

it! and ...

+n cases falling under paragraphs 0a2 and 0b2 above, the person arrested without a warrant shall

be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded against in

accordance with ection 9 of ;ule 11"

)he testimony of the police officers, including >O =io, as to what went down when they arrested

)ancinco was direct, straightforward and positive" >O =ios statement that he did not clearly see

)ancinco holding the firearm does not detract from the prosecutions evidence and story that )ancincowas arrested while attempting to conceal a firearm and could not produce a license to carry thereof

when asked by the police officers" +mmediately thereafter, as an incident to a lawful warrantless arrest,

)ancinco was searched and found to have three 052 sachets ofshabuin his possession"

[RULE 11&, SEC. 1"] Dhile )etitioners raised this -urisdictional defect for the first ti!e in the

)resent )etition, the are not )recluded fro! >uestionin+ the sa!e. (ndeed, -urisdiction o*er the

su-ect !atter is conferred onl the Constitution or the law and cannot e ac>uired throu+h a

wai*er or enlar+ed the o!ission of the )arties or conferred the ac>uiescence of the court.

RICARDO L. ATIEN>A AND ALFREDO A. CASTRO VS. PEOPLEFe-u-! 12, 2014, G.R. No. 1//#4

ERL/SER$/E, %.

FACTS:;icardo *tien'a re$uested *tibula 0;ecords Officer + and Custodian of the C* Original=ecisions in the C* ;eporters =ivision2 to take out Volumes 8?, 87 and 89 which the latter

rejected even despite the offer of >7?,??? for Volume 8?"

ubse$uently, Volume 88 was subse$uently discovered to be missing and which access to the missing

volume appears to have been ac$uired by entering through an opening because the air conditioning

unit occupying the space thereat was taken out for repair earlier" * Clerk +V then handed to *tibula a

bag containing a giftQwrapped package which turned out to be the missing Volume 88" Volume 88

bore badges of tampering evidenced by the 3nonQcontinuity of the front and the back cover flaps . . .

and the pages of the bookvolume differences in the cutting marks on the sides of the volume and thepresence of artificial aging on FitsG sides4 and two 02 new documents which materially amended the

original decision and resolution in the ernando case were inserted in the said volume" *fter

investigation, the charges involving the pertinent provisions of ;*s 5?1I and 8915 were dismissed for

insufficiency of evidence, but it was contrarily determined that there e.isted probable cause to charge

*tien'a, et al" for the crimes of ;obbery under *rticle II0a2012 of the ;evised >enal Code and of

alsification of >ublic =ocument under *rticle 1901276 in relation to *rticle 19108277 of the same

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code" )hus, the corresponding +nformations were filed before the ;)C" )he ;)C found them guilty

which the C* affirmed in toto"

ISSUE:&hether there was lack of jurisdiction

HELD:@:" )he ;)C did not have jurisdiction to take cogni'ance of the falsification case since

alsi#ication o# Public Documentunder *rticle 19012I? of the ;>C, which is punishable by prisioncorreccional in its medium and ma.imum periods 0or imprisonment for years, 6 months and 1 day to

8 yearsI1 2 and a fine of not more than >7,???"??, falls within the e.clusive jurisdiction of the

#etropolitan )rial Courts, #unicipal )rial Courts and #unicipal Circuit )rial Courts pursuant to

ection 502 of the 3Judiciary ;eorgani'ation *ct of 1IH?,4 as amended by ;* 98I1" &hile

petitioners raised this jurisdictional defect for the first time in the present petition, they are not

precluded from $uestioning the same" +ndeed, jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred only by

the Constitution or the law and cannot be ac$uired through a waiver or enlarged by the omission of the

parties or conferred by the ac$uiescence of the court" )he rule is wellQsettled that lack of jurisdiction

over the subject matter may be raised at any stage of the proceedings" %ence, $uestions of jurisdiction

may be cogni'able even if raised for the first time on appeal" )he accused were subse$uently ac$uitted

for reasonable doubt"

[RULE 11&, SEC. 1"] /lthou+h the trial courts lac7 of -urisdiction was ne*er raised as an issue in

an )art of the )roceedin+s and e*en until it reached the Su)re!e Court, the SC a))lied the +eneral

rule that -urisdiction is *ested law and cannot e conferred or wai*ed the )arties.

[RULE 111, SEC. 1] 5he ci*il liailit e delicto is i!)liedl instituted with the cri!inal offense.

Dhen the trial courts decision was a))ealed as to its cri!inal as)ect in the )etition for certiorari

efore this court, the ci*il as)ect thereof is dee!ed included in the a))eal.

ANTONIO $. GARCIA VS. FERRO CHE$ICALS, INC.O8*oe- 1, 2014, "3" SCRA 2&2

LE#$E$, %.

FACTS: *ntonio olo Club, +nc"2" %owever, this were sold in public auction"

%e was charged with estafa under *rticle 51H 0Other =eceits2 of the ;evised >enal Code for allegedly

misrepresenting to erro Chemicals, +nc" that the shares subject of the contracts entered into were free

from all liens and encumbrances"

ISSUES:012 =oes the ;)C have jurisdictionM 0(O2

02 +s filing a separate case for civil action forum shoppingM 0(O2

HELD:012 (O" &hen the information was filed on eptember 5, 1II?, the law in force was Batas>ambansa Blg" 1I 0Judicial ;eorgani'ation *ct2 before it was amended by ;epublic *ct (o" 98I1"

Dnder ection 5 of Batas >ambansa Blg" 1I, the #etropolitan )rial Court had jurisdiction over the

Page | 23


24/65

case. )he ;)C did not have jurisdiction to hear and decide the case" )his lack of jurisdiction resulted

in voiding all of the trial courts proceedings and the judgment rendered" *lthough the trial courts lack

of jurisdiction was never raised as an issue in any part of the proceedings and even until it reached this

court, ?e ))! *5e ene- -ue *5* @u-67968*6on 67 e7*e9 ! ? n9 8nno* e 8on;e--e9 o-?6e9 ! *5e )-*6e7.:ven on appeal and even if the reviewing parties did not raise the issue ofjurisdiction, the reviewing court is not precluded from ruling that the lower court had no jurisdiction

over the case"

02 (O" )he appeal before the C* is purely on the civil aspect of the trial courts decision while the

petition for certiorari before this court is allegedly only on the criminal aspect of the case" erro

Chemicals, +nc" did not reserve the right to institute the civil action for the recovery of civil liability e.

delicto or institute a separate civil action prior to the filing of the criminal case" or this reason, the

civil liability e. delicto is impliedly instituted with the criminal offense" &hen the trial courts decision

was appealed as to its criminal aspect in the petition for certiorari before this court, the civil aspect

thereof is deemed included in the appeal"

%owever, that private complainants in criminal cases are not precluded from filing a motion for

reconsideration and subse$uently an appeal on the civil aspect of a decision ac$uitting the accused" *ne.ception to the rule that only the olicitor


25/65

[RULE 11&, SEC. 6] er last chance to )ose the challen+e was )rior to the ti!e she )leaded to the

infor!ation throu+h a !otion to >uash on the +round that the infor!ation did not confor!

sustantiall to the )rescried for!, or did not char+e an offense.

FELINA ROSALDES VS. PEOPLEO8*oe- /, 2014, "3" SCRA 2&2

FACTS: +n ebruary 1II8, 9 yo #ichael ;yan


26/65

thus complied with the re$uirements of ection 8, ;ule 11? of the ;ules of Court" #oreover, the Court

should no longer entertain the petitioners challenge against the sufficiency of the information in form

and substance" %er last chance to pose the challenge was prior to the time she pleaded to the

information through a motion to $uash on the ground that the information did not conform

substantially to the prescribed form, or did not charge an offense" he did not do so, resulting in her

waiver of the challenge"

02 @:" :ven without proof of the actual e.penses, or testimony on the victims feelings, the lower

courts still had the authority to define and allow civil liability arising from the offense and the means

to fi. their e.tent" )he child abuse surely inflicted on #ichael ;yan physical and emotional trauma as

well as moral injury" +t cannot also be denied that his parents necessarily spent for his treatment"

+ndeed, as the Court pointed out inBacolod v. Peo"le, it was Eimperative that the courts prescribe the

proper penalties when convicting the accused, and determine the civil liability to be imposed on the

accused, unless there has been a reservation of the action to recover civil liability or a waiver of its

recovery" )he victim was likewise entitled to e.emplary damages, considering that *rticle 5? of the

Civil Code authori'es such damages if at least one aggravating circumstance attended the commission

of the crime" )he child abuse committed by the petitioner was aggravated her being a public

schoolteacher, a factor in raising the penalty to its ma.imum period pursuant to ection 510e2 of;epublic *ct (o" 981?"

[RULE 11&, SEC. "] E*en +rantin+ that an irre+ularit had inter*ened in the aran+a Ca)tains

issuance of the Certification to File and /ction, we note that this irre+ularit is not a -urisdictional

flaw that warrants the dis!issal of the cri!inal cases efore the A5C.

FEDERICO SA%A( VS. PEOPLEO8*oe- 1, 2014, "3" SCRA 423

R(#$, %.

FACTS: +n June ??1, while the petitioner and his daughter were busy laying wood and water pipes inthe yard of hysical +njuries under two 02 +nformations for inflicting physical injuries upon


27/65

issue a Certification to ile an *ction, indicating that the disputing parties did not reach any

settlement" )he C* correctly observed and considered the situation/ the settlement of the case was

conditioned on the recommendation of the building inspector! with no recommendation, no resolution

of the conflict likewise took place" )he present case was indisputably referred to the Barangay Lupon

for conciliation prior to the institution of the criminal cases before the #)C"

:ven granting that an irregularity had intervened in the Barangay Captains issuance of the

Certification to ile and *ction, we note that this irregularity is not a jurisdictional flaw that warrants

the dismissal of the criminal cases before the #)C" *s we held in =iu v" Court of *ppeals/ lso, the

conciliation "rocedure under Presidential Decree 3o. 0415 is not a 6urisdictional re&uirement and

non7com"liance thereith cannot a##ect the 6urisdiction hich the loer courts had already ac&uired

over the sub6ect matter and "rivate res"ondents as de#endants therein.

#oreover, even though the Certification was not formally offered in evidence, it was marked as

:.hibit 314 and attached to the records of the case" ignificantly, the petitioner never objected to


28/65

crime" +t has been, in recent years, accepted as a valid and effective mode of apprehending drug

pushers" +n a buy-bust operation, the idea to commit a crime originates from the offender, without

anybody inducing or prodding him to commit the offense" +f carried out with due regard for

constitutional and legal safeguards, a buy-bust operation deserves judicial sanction"

[RULE 111] 5he ac>uittal of the accused does not auto!aticall )reclude a -ud+!ent a+ainst hi!on the ci*il as)ect of the case.

LEONORA %. RI$ANDO VS. SPOUSES ALDA%A n9 PEOPLEO8*oe- 13, 2014, "3/ SCRA 232

ERL/S0ER$/E, %.

FACTS: ;imando allegedly enticed ps" *ldaba to invest in her business under the assurance that it isstable and that their money would earn HS monthly interest" Convinced by ;imandos proposal and

taking into consideration their long friendship, ps" *ldaba gave ;imando a check in the amount of

>7??,??? as investment in her business and invested the same to #ulitel 0as evidenced by a signed

+nvestment Contract2" +n turn, ;imando gave ps" *ldaba three 052 postdated checks 0amounting to>76?,???2! but upon maturity of the checks, they were dishonored due to insufficient funds" )his

prompted ps" *ldaba to file a criminal complaint for estafa and B> against her" )he ;)C ac$uitted

;imando of the crime of estafa, but found her civilly liable to ps" *ldaba in the amount of >7??,???"

#eanwhile, in the B> case, she was ac$uitted on the ground of reasonable doubt, with a declaration

that the act or omission from which liability may arise does not e.ist"

ISSUE/ &hether or not the C* correctly upheld ;imandos civil liability in the estafa case despite herac$uittal and e.oneration from civil liability in the B> cases

HELD:@:" *t the outset, the Court notes that ;imandos ac$uittal in the estafa case does notnecessarily absolve her from any civil liability to private complainants, ps" *ldaba" +t is well-settled

that Ethe ac$uittal of the accused does not automatically preclude a judgment against him on the civil

aspect of the case" )he e.tinction of the penal action does not carry with it the e.tinction of the civil

liability where/ 0a2 the ac$uittal is based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence is

re$uired! 0b2 the court declares that the liability of the accused is only civil! and 0c2 the civil liability of

the accused does not arise from or is not based upon the crime of which the accused is ac$uitted"

+n this case, ;imandos civil liability did not arise from any purported act constituting the crime of

estafa as the ;)C clearly found that ;imando never employed any deceit on ps" *ldaba to induce

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29/65

them to invest money in #ultitel" ;ather, her civil liability was correctly traced from being an

accommodation party to one of the checks she issued to ps" *ldaba on behalf of #ultitel" +n lending

her name to #ultitel, she, in effect, acted as a surety to the latter, and assuch, she may be held directly

liable for the value of the issued check"

#oreover, while the filing of the two sets of +nformation under the provisions of B> (o" and under

the provisions of the ;evised >enal Code, as amended, on estafa, may refer to identical acts committed

by the petitioner, the prosecution thereof cannot be limited to one offense, because a single criminal

act may give rise to a multiplicity of offenses and where there is variance or differences between the

elements of an offense is one law and another law as in the case at bar there will be no double jeopardy

because what the rule on double jeopardy prohibits refers to identity of elements in the two 02

offenses" Otherwise stated, prosecution for the same act is not prohibited" &hat is forbidden is

prosecution for the same offense" :ssentially, while a B> case and an estafa case may be rooted

from an identical set of facts, they nevertheless present different causes of action" Both cases can

proceed to their final adjudication Q both as to their criminal and civil aspects Q subject to the

prohibition on double recovery"

[RULE 119, SEC. 3? RULE 11&, SEC. 6] 5he !otion to >uash is the !ode which an accused,

efore enterin+ his )lea, challen+es the co!)laint or infor!ation for insufficienc on its face in)oint of law, or for defects a))arent on its face. owe*er, the infor!ation in this case was alread

sufficient .

GODOFREDO ENRILE n9 DR. FREDERIC' ENRILE VS. HON. DANILO A.$ANALASTAS

O8*oe- 22, 2014, "3# SCRA 4#ERS/A($, %.

FACTS: >etitioners were charged with less serious physical injuries by the #)C after findingprobable cause against them and set their arraignment" >etitioners moved for the reconsideration of the

resolution, arguing that the complainants has not presented proof of their having been given medicalattention lasting 1? days or longer" )he #)C denied their #; because their case was governed by the

;ules of ummary >rocedure which prohibited #;s" )hereafter, the petitioners presented a

manifestation with motion to $uash and a motion for the deferment of the arraignment! but was again

denied" Dnsatisfied, the petitioners commenced a special civil action for certiorari assailing the denial

for both the #; and #otion to Nuash before the ;)C presided by private respondent" )his was also

denied" )he petitioners ne.t went to the C* via a petition for certiorari and prohibition to nullify the

orders issued by the ;)C, but was also dismissed for being the improper remedy"

ISSUE: &as the dismissal of the #otion to Nuash properM 0=espite an alleged clear and patentshowing of a lack of an essential element of the crime less serious physical injuries2

HELD:@:" )he motion to $uash is the mode by which an accused, before entering his plea,challenges the complaint or information for insufficiency on its face in point of law, or for defects

apparent on its face" 0ection 5, ;ule 119 of the ;ules of Court enumerates the grounds for the $uashal

of the complaint or information2" %owever, the information in this case was already sufficient 0ection

8, ;ule 11?2"

*s the #)C and ;)C rightly held, the presentation of the medical certificates to prove the duration of

the victims need for medical attendance or of their incapacity should take place only at the trial, not

Page | 29


30/65

before or during the preliminary investigation" *ccording to Cinco v" andiganbayan, the preliminary

investigation, which is the occasion for the submission of the parties respective affidavits, counter-

affidavits and evidence to buttress their separate allegations, is merely in$uisitorial, and is often the

only means of discovering whether a person may be reasonably charged with a crime, to enable the

prosecutor to prepare the information" +t is not yet a trial on the merits, for its only purpose is to

determine whether a crime has been committed and whether there is probable cause to believe that the

accused is guilty thereof" &hat is re$uired is only that the evidence be sufficient to establish probable

cause that the accused committed the crime charged, not that all reasonable doubt of the guilt of the

accused be removed"

)he Court also further agrees that 3the issues raised in the motion to $uash are matters of defense that

could only be threshed out in a full blown trial on the merits" +ndeed, proof of actual healing period of

the alleged injuries of the private complainant could only be established in the trial of the cases filed

against herein petitioners by means of competent evidence"

[RULE 111, SEC. B] U)on the death of the accused )endin+ a))eal of his con*iction, the cri!inal

action is etin+uished inas!uch as there is no lon+er a defendant to stand as the accused? the ci*il

action instituted therein for the reco*er of ci*il liailit e delicto is i)so facto etin+uished,

+rounded as it is on the cri!inal action.

PEOPLE VS. DE$OCRITO PARASO8*oe- 3, 2014, "3# SCRA 1"#

LE#$/R@#0@E C/S5R#, %.

FACTS: )he accused-appellant =emocrito >aras was charged with one count of rape before the ;)Cof )oledo City allegedly committed against *** who was 19 years old at the time of the incident in

#arch 1II8" +n ??7, the ;)C found the accused guilty of rape" )he C* affirmed but modified the

amount of indemnity damages" +n January ?15, the accused died at the (ew Bilibid >rison %ospital

in #untinlupa City due to pulmonary tuberculosis, during the pendency of his appeal before the

upreme Court"

ISSUE:&hether his death e.tinguished both criminal and civil liability"

HELD: @:" Dnder *rticle HI, paragraph 1 of the ;evised >enal Code, as amended, the death of anaccused pending his appeal e.tinguishes both his criminal and civil liability e. delicto" )hus, upon the

death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction, the criminal action is e.tinguished inasmuch as

there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused! the civil action instituted therein for the

recovery of civil liability e. delicto is ipso facto e.tinguished, grounded as it is on the criminal action"

+n this case, when the accused-appellant died on January 6, ?15, his appeal to this Court was still

pending" )he =ecision dated June 6, ?16 was thereafter promulgated as the Court was not

immediately informed of the accused-appellants death"

)he death of the accused-appellant herein, thus, e.tinguished his criminal liability, as well as his civil

liability directly arising from and based solely on the crime committed"

*ccordingly, the Courts =ecision dated June 6, ?16 had been rendered ineffectual and the same must

therefore be set aside" )he criminal case against the accused-appellant must also be dismissed"

Page | 30


31/65

[RULE 11&, SEC. 6] reason of the are*iated nature of )reli!inar in*esti+ations, a dis!issal

of the char+es as a result thereof is not e>ui*alent to a -udicial )ronounce!ent of ac>uittal. (n this

case, there is no >uestion that the (nfor!ation filed a+ainst the res)ondents was sufficient to hold

the! liale for the cri!e of 5heft ecause it was co!)liant with Section 6, Rule 11& of the Rules of

Court.

PEOPLE VS. ENGR. RODOLFO (EC(EC, ET AL.Noe+e- 12, 2014, "3# SCRA "1#

AE$@#;/, %.

FACTS: >ioneer *maresa, +nc" is a domestic corporation engaged in the buying and selling of rubber0in Bukidnon2" Cali.to ison was their supervisor" +n *ugust ??, ison was approached by several

officers of *;B:CO #ulti-purpose Cooperative 0*;B:CO2 and police officers" Dpon their

inspection, the group informed ison that si. tons of the rubber lumpscoagulum that were previously

sold to him were earlier stolen from them" ;odolfo @ecyec, manager of *;B:CO, arrived at his

place on board a Eweapons carrier truck"E @ecyec, together 57 men, demanded that ison give them the

rubber lumpscoagulum" But before @ecyec and his men could completely load all the rubber cuplumps inside the truck, ison arrived together with police officer and a barangay kagawad" %e

subse$uently charged @ecyec with ;obbery with +ntimidation of >ersons before the 1st #unicipal

Circuit )rial Court 0#C)C2" )he #C)C found probable cause! while the >rovincial >rosecutor

affirmed the finding of probable cause but change robbery to theft, and filed the information 0in

violation of *rticles 5?H and 5?I of the ;>C2" ubse$uently, the ;)C arrived at that they failed to

establish probable cause absent two 02 of the essential elements of the crime 03said property belongs

to another4 and 3intent to gain42 and so dismissed the case" )he C* affirmed the dismissal"

ISSUE: &hether or not the ;)C and the C* erred in dismissing the information against therespondents for the crime of )heft for want of probable cause

HELD: @:" )o determine whether probable cause e.ists and to charge those believed to havecommitted the crime as defined by law, is a function that belongs to the public prosecutor" +t is an

e.ecutive function" )hus, in the oft-cited case of Cres"o v. Mo$ul, it was stated that/ +t is a cardinal

principle that all criminal actions either commenced by complaint or by information shall be

prosecuted under the direction and control of the fiscal" )he institution of a criminal action depends

upon the sound discretion of the fiscal" %e may or may not file the complaint or information, follow or

not follow that presented by the offended party, according to whether the evidence, in his opinion, is

sufficient or not to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt" . . . )he primary

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objective of a preliminary investigation is to free respondent from the inconvenience, e.pense,

ignominy and stress of defending himselfherself in the course of a formal trial, until the reasonable

probability of his or her guilt"

uch investigation is not part of the trial" * full and e.haustive presentation of the parties evidence is

not re$uired, but only such as may engender a well-grounded belief than an offense has been

committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof" By reason of the abbreviated nature of

preliminary investigations, a dismissal of the charges as a result thereof is not e$uivalent to a judicial

pronouncement of ac$uittal" +n this case, there is no $uestion that the +nformation filed against the

respondents was sufficient to hold them liable for the crime of )heft because it was compliant with

ection 8, ;ule 11? of the ;ules of Court" )he information was thus reinstated and the case remanded

to the ;)C to proceed with the case"

[RULE 113, SEC. "] Under Rule 113, Sect. ", e*en thou+h the )olice officer has not seen so!eone

actuall fleein+, he could still !a7e a warrantless arrest if, ased on his )ersonal e*aluation of the

circu!stances at the scene of the cri!e, he could deter!ine the eistence of )roale cause that the

)erson sou+ht to e arrested has co!!itted the cri!e. owe*er, the deter!ination of )roale

cause and the +atherin+ of facts or circu!stances should e !ade i!!ediatel after the

co!!ission of the cri!e in order to co!)l with the ele!ent of i!!ediac.

JOE( $. PESTILOS VS. $ORENO GENEROSONoe+e- 10, 2014, "3# SCRA 33"

R(#$, %.

FACTS: On ebruary ??7, at around 5/17 in the morning, an altercation ensued between thepetitioners and *tty" #oreno olice tation"I *t the

in$uest proceeding, the City >rosecutor of Nue'on City found that the petitioners stabbed *tty"

reliminary +nvestigation on the ground that they had not been lawfully

arrested" )hey alleged that no valid warrantless arrest took place since the police officers had no

personal knowledge that they were the perpetrators of the crime" )hey also claimed that they were just

EinvitedE to the police station" )hus, the in$uest proceeding was improper, and a regular procedure for

preliminary investigation should have been performed pursuant to ;ule 11 of the ;ules of Court" )he

;)C denied the Drgent #otion and the C* also denied such"

ISSUES:012 &hether petitioners were validly arrested without a warrant 0@:2

02 &hether petitioners were lawfully arrested when they were merely invited to the police precinct

0@:2

052 &hether the order denying the motion for preliminary investigation is void for failure to state the

facts and the law upon which it was based 0@:2

HELD:012 @:" or purposes of this case, the Court shall focus on the history of ection 70b2" )he provision

has undergone changes through the years not just in its phraseology but also in its interpretation in our

jurisprudence" Dnder the 1I6? and the 1I86 ;ules of Court, the ;ules re$uired that there should be

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33/65

actual commission of an offense, thus, removing the element of the arresting officers Ereasonable

suspicion of the commission of an offense"E )he 1I6? and 1I86 ;ules of Court restricted the arresting

officers discretion in warrantless arrests under ection 80b2, ;ule 115 of the 1I86 ;ules of Court"

ection 8, ;ule 115 of the 1I86 ;ules of Court again underwent substantial changes and was re-

worded and re-numbered when it became ection 7, ;ule 115 of the 1IH7 ;ules of Criminal

>rocedure" *s amended, ection 70b2, ;ule 115 of the 1IH7 ;ules of Court retained the restrictions

introduced under the 1I86 ;ules of Court" #ore importantly, however, it added a $ualification that the

commission of the offense should not only have been EcommittedE but should have been Ejust

committed"E )his limited the arresting officers time frame for conducting an investigation for purposes

of gathering information indicating that the person sought to be arrested has committed the crime

ection 70b2, ;ule 115 of the 1IH7 ;ules of Criminal >rocedure was further amended with the

incorporation of the word Eprobable causeE as the basis of the arresting officers determination on

whether the person to be arrested has committed the crime" rom the current phraseology of the rules

on warrantless arrest, it appears that for purposes of ection 70b2, the following are the notable

changes/ first, the contemplated offense was $ualified by the word Ejust,E connoting immediacy! and

second, the warrantless arrest of a person sought to be arrested should be based on probable cause tobe determined by the arresting officer based on his personal knowledge of facts and circumstances that

the person to be arrested has committed it" +t is clear that the present rules have objectifiedE the

previously subjective determination of the arresting officer as to the 012 commission of the crime! and

02 whether the person sought to be arrested committed the crime" *s presently worded, the elements

under ection 70b2, ;ule 115 of the ;evised ;ules of Criminal >rocedure are/ first, an offense has just

been committed! and second, the arresting officer has probable cause to believe based on personal

knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it"

)he purpose of a preliminary investigation is to determine whether a crime has been committed and

whether there is probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty of the crime and should be held for

trial" On the other hand, probable cause in judicial proceedings for the issuance of a warrant of arrestis defined as the e.istence of such facts and circumstances that would lead a reasonably discreet and

prudent person to believe that an offense has been committed by the person sought to be arrested"

%ence, before issuing a warrant of arrest, the judge must be satisfied that based on the evidence

submitted, there is sufficient proof that a crime has been committed and that the person to be arrested

is probably guilty thereof" *t this stage of the criminal proceeding, the judge is not yet tasked to

review in detail the evidence submitted during the preliminary investigation"

+n contrast, the arresting officers determination of probable cause under ection 70b2, ;ule 115 of the

;evised ;ules of Criminal >rocedure is based on his personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that

the person sought to be arrested has committed the crime" )hese facts or circumstances pertain to

actual facts or raw evidence, i"e", supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to

create the probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested" * reasonable suspicion therefore must be

founded on probable cause, coupled with good faith on the part of the peace officers making the arrest

)he phrase covers facts or, in the alternative, circumstances" *ccording to the Blacks Law =ictionary,

Ecircumstances are attendant or accompanying facts, events or conditions"E Circumstances may pertain

to events or actions within the actual perception, personal evaluation or observation of the police

officer at the scene of the crime" )hus, even though the police officer has not seen someone actually

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fleeing, he could still make a warrantless arrest if, based on his personal evaluation of the

circumstances at the scene of the crime, he could determine the e.istence of probable cause that the

person sought to be arrested has committed the cri

Documents

Crim Pro Digests 2015