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Economic Management during Political Transition: Five Lessons for Malaysia Pengurusan Ekonomi Semasa Peralihan Politik: Lima Pengajaran buat Malaysia Woo Wing Thye (胡永泰) Penang Institute, George Town University of California, Davis Fudan University, Shanghai [email protected] April 17, 2013

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Page 1: Lessons for malaysia economic management during political transition (eng-bm)

Economic Management during Political

Transition: Five Lessons for Malaysia

Pengurusan Ekonomi Semasa Peralihan

Politik: Lima Pengajaran buat Malaysia

Woo Wing Thye (胡永泰) Penang Institute, George Town University of California, Davis

Fudan University, Shanghai [email protected]

April 17, 2013

Page 2: Lessons for malaysia economic management during political transition (eng-bm)

•Outcome 1: Patient leaves clinic, laughing, clapping and dancing. He came in slightly depressed but left in high spirits. •Hasil 1: Pesakit meninggalkan klinik sambil ketawa, bertepuk tangan dan menari. Pada asalnya dia tiba dalam keadaan agak murung tetapi bersemangat tinggi semasa pulang.

•Outcome 2: Patient is put under heavy sedation, put on a stretcher, rushed to the operating room of the General Hospital, and confined to intensive-care unit (ICU) for a week before being discharged in wheel chair. He had walked into the clinic but was carried out. •Hasil 2: Pesakit diberi ubat pelali yang kuat, diletakkan di atas pengusung dan langsung dibawa ke bilik bedah di Hospital Besar. Kemudiannya ditempatkan di unit rawatan intensif (ICU) selama seminggu sebelum dilepaskan tetapi menggunakan kerusi roda. Pada asalnya, dia berjalan masuk ke dalam klinik tetapi apabila dilepaskan, terpaksa diusung.

Getting the Analogy Right:

A Patient Complains of General Fatigue (1/5)

Menggunakan Analogi yang Tepat: Pesakit Mengeluh

tentang kelesuan badan yang dialami (1/5)

Page 3: Lessons for malaysia economic management during political transition (eng-bm)

•Question: Is the clinic’s doctor competent if it is Outcome 1 but incompetent if it is Outcome 2?

•Soalan: Adakah doktor klinik tersebut cekap kalau menyebabkan Hasil 1 dan tidak cekap kalau menyebabkan Hasil 2?

Getting the Analogy Right:

A Patient Complains of General Fatigue (2/5)

Menggunakan Analogi yang Tepat: Pesakit Mengeluh

tentang kelesuan badan yang dialami (2/5)

Page 4: Lessons for malaysia economic management during political transition (eng-bm)

• Question was stupid question. Not enough information to decide competence, we need to know:

- What’s long-run consequence in each Outcome?

- What’s the ailment of the patient?

• Soalan asal adalah soalan bodoh. Tidak cukup maklumat untuk menentukan kecekapan. Kita perlu maklumat yang lebih:

- Apakah kesan jangka panjang setiap Hasil?

- Apakah penyakit yang dialami pesakit?

Getting the Analogy Right:

A Patient Complains of General Fatigue (3/5)

Menggunakan Analogi yang Tepat: Pesakit Mengeluh

tentang kelesuan badan yang dialami (3/5)

Page 5: Lessons for malaysia economic management during political transition (eng-bm)

•Long-run consequence for Outcome 1, patient died after 2 hours. Doctor treated symptoms

(and not root cause) by giving large dosage of adrenaline-LSD mixture, which exacerbated heart condition and caused death.

Outcome 2, patient lived to see BA graduation of grand-daughter because doctor had recognised a blocked artery.

•Kesan jangka panjang: Hasil 1, pesakit meninggal dunia selepas 2 jam. Doktor merawat

gejala (bukan punca) dengan memberikan dos besar campuran adrenalin-LSD yang memburukkan lagi keadaan jantung dan menyebabkan kematian.

Hasil 2, pesakit hidup untuk melihat pengijazahan cucuya kerana doktor telah menyedari yang arterinya tersekat.

Getting the Analogy Right:

A Patient Complains of General Fatigue (4/5)

Menggunakan Analogi yang Tepat: Pesakit Mengeluh

tentang kelesuan badan yang dialami (4/5)

Page 6: Lessons for malaysia economic management during political transition (eng-bm)

•My message: Higher growth of GDP in 2012: 4Q is Outcome 1 because it is not sustainable. •Mesej saya: Pertumbuhan KDNK lebih tinggi pada tahun 2012: Suku ke-4 adalah Hasil 1 kerana ia tidak lestari.

Getting the Analogy Right:

A Patient Complains of General Fatigue (5/5)

Menggunakan Analogi yang Tepat: Pesakit

Mengeluh tentang Kelelahan Umum (5/5)

Page 7: Lessons for malaysia economic management during political transition (eng-bm)

3 Questions I Want to Discuss Today …

3 Persoalan yang Saya Ingin Bincangkan Hari Ini…

1.Is the Malaysian Economy Sick? Adakah Ekonomi Malaysia Sedang Sakit?

2.What is Making the Malaysian Economy Sick? Apakah yang Menyebabkan Ekonomi Malaysia Sakit?

3.What is the international experience in curing the type of economic sickness that Malaysia is suffering from? What general principles to guide reform? Pengalaman antarabangsa dalam merawat penyakit ekonomi yang sedang dihidapi oleh Malaysia? Apakah prinsip-prinsip umum yang dapat menjadi panduan bagi reformasi?

Page 8: Lessons for malaysia economic management during political transition (eng-bm)

We Cannot Blame the Global Financial Crisis for Present

Economic Stagnation Tidak Wajar Mempersalahkan Krisis

Kewangan Global untuk Genangan Ekonomi Semasa

12.6% 55.7% 66.8%

10.7%

13.6%

49.9%

30.7% 31.9%

61.4%

COUNTRY’S INCOME AS % OF US INCOME (Income in GDP per capita in PPP$, data from Angus Maddison) Pendapatan Negara sebagai % Pendapatan AS (Pendapatan dalam KDNK per kapita dalam $ Pariti Kuala Beli, data daripada Angus Maddison)

1963 1996 2007

Page 9: Lessons for malaysia economic management during political transition (eng-bm)

Great shortage of human talent Kekurangan besar bakat manusia

Highly unequal geographical distribution of development Sebaran pembangunan yang tidak sama rata dari segi geografi

Severe shortfall in domestic investment Kekurangan yang tinggi dalam pelaburan dalam negeri

Drastic deterioration in performance of governance institutions. PEMANDU & KPIs to the rescue! Kemerosotan prestasi institusi pentadbiran yang drastik. PEMANDU & KPI kononnya akan selamatkan semua!

What do the Federal programs reveal? Apakah yang dapat

diperlihatkan melalui program-program Kerajaan Persekutuan?

Most of the post-Mahathir “reforms” are in essence scaling up of existing initiatives (palliatives) Kebanyakan “reformasi” pasca-Mahathir pada dasarnya merupakan penambahbaikan inisiatif yang sedia ada (paliatif)

Page 10: Lessons for malaysia economic management during political transition (eng-bm)

Abuse of socio-economic policies and ignoring ability as criteria in order to benefit cronies e.g. selection based on relationship not performance Penyalahgunaan dasar sosio-ekonomi dan pengabaian kebolehan sebagai kriteria agar kroni meraih keuntungan, contohnya, pemilihan berdasarkan pertalian bukan prestasi

Brain drain occurs in every ethnic group

Perhijrahan cendikiawan berlaku bagi semua kumpulan etnik

Shortage of human talent Kekurangan tenaga manusia berbakat

Tax on growth of firms, i.e. mandated sale of proportion of equities at discount to govt-selected individuals upon listing

Cukai dikenakan ke atas pertumbuhan syarikat, yakni, penjualan wajib sebahagian ekuiti dengan diskaun semasa penyenaraian kepada individu yang dipilih kerajaan

Capital flight & SMEs leave Malaysia to grow elsewhere or choose NOT to grow

Perpindahan modal dan IKS meninggalkan Malaysia untuk membangun di tempat lain atau memilih untuk TIDAK berkembang

Large shortfall in domestic investment Pengurangan ketara dalam pelaburan domestik

Root Causes of the Malaysian Economic Malaise (1/2)

Punca-punca Kelembapan Ekonomi Malaysia (1/2)

Private Sector Adjustment Penyelarasan oleh Sektor

Swasta

Outcome

Kesan Outcome

Kesan

Government Policy

Dasar Kerajaan

Page 11: Lessons for malaysia economic management during political transition (eng-bm)

Private Sector Adjustment Penyelarasan oleh Sektor

Swasta

Outcome

Kesan

Over-centralisation at Federal level, suppressive of local development initiatives Pemusatan berlebihan di peringkat Persekutuan, menindas inisiatif pembangunan setempat

Highly unequal geographical distribution of development Agihan pembangunan amat tidak sama rata dari segi geografi

No transparency in Federal operations Tiada ketelusan dalam tindakan Kerajaan Pusat

Deterioration in governance

Kemerosotan tadbir urus

Inadequate infrastructure (production bottlenecks) outside of KL-Putrajaya Infrastruktur tidak memadai (kesesakan lorong menyempit) di luar KL-Putrajaya

Public unable to monitor performance

Orang awam tak berupaya mengesan prestasi

Outcome

Kesan

Root Causes of the Malaysian Economic Malaise (2/2)

Punca-punca Kelembapan Ekonomi Malaysia (2/2)

Government Policy

Dasar Kerajaan

Page 12: Lessons for malaysia economic management during political transition (eng-bm)

YEAR 2000

TAHUN 2000

BEFORE

SEBELUM

AFTER SELEPAS

Negative effects from brain drain, capital flight, insufficient hard infrastructure, and sub-standard soft infrastructure not clearly seen before 2000 because Kesan negatif perhijrahan cendikiawan, perpindahan modal, kekurangan infrastruktur keras, dan infrastruktur sub-standard tidak jelas kelihatan sebelum 2000 disebabkan

Negative growth aspects were outweighed by:

• Massive inward FDI;

• Big investments by GLCs;

• Large infrastructure projects financed by oil

and gas revenue.

Aspek pertumbuhan negative telah diatasi

oleh:

• Kemasukan pelaburan besar FDI;

• Pelaburan besar oleh syarikat berkaitan

kerajaan (GLC);

• Projek infrastruktur besar dibiayai oleh

hasil minyak dan gas.

Post-1990 external trends and pre-2000

extended period of mismanagement have

greatly reduced the magnitudes of

offsetting factors, resulting in significant

slowdown in growth Malaysia in the

middle-income trap

Trend luaran pasca-1990 dan tempoh lanjut

salah urus pra-2000 telah mengurangkan

keseriusan faktor yang mengimbangkan,

menyebabkan kelembapan pembangunan

yang ketara --> Malaysia terperangkap di

tahap pendapatan sederhana

Page 13: Lessons for malaysia economic management during political transition (eng-bm)

Affirmative action policies

Dasar tindakan afirmatif

To quickly reduce the socio-

economic gap between

ethnic groups

Untuk cepat mengurangkan

jurang sosio-ekonomi antara

kumpulan etnik

Large, well-educated Malay middle

class created; but use of

relationship rather than

performance in govt and economic

stagnation are causing Malay brain

drain.

Pewujudan kelas menengah Melayu

yang besar; tetapi penggunaan

pertalian dan bukan prestasi oleh

kerajaan menyebabkan perhijrahan

cendikiawan Melayu.

30% of shares be sold at

discount to govt-selected

individuals. 30% daripada

saham dijual pada harga

diskaun kepada individu

pilihan kerajaan

To quickly increase Malay

ownership of capital

Untuk cepat meningkatkan

hak milik modal orang

Melayu

Required share lowered to 12.5%,

but rest of world has 0%

requirement. Bahagian hak milik

dikurangkan kepada 12.5%, tetapi

bagi keseluruhan dunia ialah 0%

Over-Use of Emergency Room Procedures (1/2)

Penggunaan Prosedur Bilik Kecemasan yang Keterlaluan (1/2)

Government Policy

Dasar Kerajaan Situation Today

Keadaan Masa Kini

Circumstances at

that time

Keadaan di masa itu

Page 14: Lessons for malaysia economic management during political transition (eng-bm)

Circumstances at

that time

Keadaan di masa itu

Over-centralisation of

power at Federal level

Pemusatan kuasa yang

keterlaluan di peringkat

Persekutuan

Existential crisis in 1957

(Emergency) and in 1963

(Konfrontasi)

Krisis eksistensial pada 1957

(Darurat) dan pada 1963

(Konfrontasi)

Chin Peng and Soekarno

have long disappeared

Chin Peng dan Soekarno

sudah lama tak ada

No transparency in Federal

operations

Tiada ketelusan dalam tindakan

pihak Persekutuan

Until 1980, population

inadequately educated and

would not understand

explanations

Sehingga 1980, penduduk

kurang berpelajaran dan

tidak akan memahami

penerangan

Incompetent, unresponsive

governance that is below

aspirations of educated,

confident public

Tadbir urus yang tidak

cekap dan tak responsif

tidak lagi memenuhi

aspirasi orang awam yang

berpendidikan dan

berkeyakinan diri

Over-Use of Emergency Room Procedures (2/2)

Penggunaan Keterlaluan Prosedur Bilik Kecemasan (2/2)

Government Policy

Dasar Kerajaan Situation Today

Keadaan Masa Kini

Page 15: Lessons for malaysia economic management during political transition (eng-bm)

Reform the policies that are making the

Malaysian economy sick

Tukarkan dasar yang membuatkan

ekonomi Malaysia sakit

OR ATAU

Continue scaling up existing programs

to try to offset the ill-effects caused by

existing policies

Terus meningkatkan program sedia ada

untuk mengimbangkan kesan buruk

disebabkan dasar sedia ada

Malaysia’s Fork in the Road

Malaysia di Persimpangan Jalan

Principle #1: Treat the Root Causes of the Disease not Its Symptoms. Diagnosis determines the Direction of Reform

Prinsip #1: Rawat Punca Penyebab Penyakit bukan Gejalanya. Diagnosis akan menunjukkan Hala Tuju Pembaharuan

Page 16: Lessons for malaysia economic management during political transition (eng-bm)

History made a big turn coming into the 21st century (1/2)

Sejarah berpusing alih ketika masuk ke abad ke-21 (1/2)

• 1991: implosion of the Soviet Union established in 1917 <74 years>; Soviet bloc 1945-92 <47 years>

• 1991: letupan Kesatuan Soviet yang ditubuhkan pada 1917 <74 tahun>; blok Soviet 1945-92 <47 tahun>

• 1997: defeat in Korean presidential election of the Grand National Party (GNP), the successor to the military-backed regime that took power in 1961 <36 years>

• 1997: kekalahan Grand National Party (GNP) dalam pilihan raya presiden Korea, rejim yang telah disokong oleh pihak tentera dan berkuasa sejak 1961 <36 tahun>

Page 17: Lessons for malaysia economic management during political transition (eng-bm)

• 1998: Soeharto resigned, he had ruled since 1965 <33 years>

• 1998: Soeharto meletak jawatan, setelah memerintah sejak 1965 <33 tahun>

• 2000: defeat in Taiwan’s presidential election of the Nationalist Party (KMT) that had ruled since 1945 <55 years>

• 2000: kekalahan Nationalist Party (KMT) dalam pilihan raya presiden Taiwan yang telah memerintah sejak 1945 <55 tahun>

• 2000: defeat in Mexican presidential election of the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) that had ruled since 1929 <71 years>

• 2000: kekalahan Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) dalam pilihan raya Mexico yang memerintah sejak 1929 <71 tahun>

History made a big turn coming into the 21st century (2/2)

Sejarah beralih arah ketika masuk ke abad ke-21 (2/2)

Page 18: Lessons for malaysia economic management during political transition (eng-bm)

Political Reversal in Korea, Mexico and Taiwan (1/2)

Pembalikkan Politik di Korea, Mexico dan Taiwan (1/2)

• 2013: GNP (Park Geun-hye), KMT (Ma Ying Jeou) and PRI (Enrique Pena Nieto) are now back in power

• 2013: GNP (Park Geun-hye), KMT (Ma Ying Jeou) dan PRI (Enrique Pena Nieto) kini kembali berkuasa

• However, the new Mode of Governance has endured. GNP, KMT and PRI are NOT restoring the state-backed crony capitalism that had characterized their previous reign, e.g. chaebol groups in Korea no longer as influential in government policies

• Walau bagaimanapun, Model Tadbir Urus baharu masih kekal. GNP, KMT dan PRI TIDAK memulihkan kapitalisme kroni yang mencirikan pemerintahan mereka dahulu, contohnya, kumpulan chaebol di Korea tidak lagi begitu berpengaruh dalam menentukan dasar kerajaan

Page 19: Lessons for malaysia economic management during political transition (eng-bm)

• Instead, the KMT, GNP and PRI are now committed to the continuation and broadening of the equitable and sustainable economic growth strategies of their immediate predecessors in the same way that the successive post-1998 Indonesian ruling parties have done.

• Sebaliknya, KMT, GNP dan PRI kini komited untuk menerus dan meluaskan strategi pembangunan ekonomi saksama dan lestari yang mencirikan pemerintahan yang terdekat dan terdahulu daripadanya, sama seperti parti-parti Indonesia pasca-1998 telah berturut-turut melakukan.

Political Reversal in Korea, Mexico and Taiwan (2/2)

Pembalikan Politik di Korea, Mexico dan Taiwan (2/2)

Page 20: Lessons for malaysia economic management during political transition (eng-bm)

Principle #2: New broom sweeps clean (1/2)

Prinsip #2: Penyapu baru menyapu bersih (1/2) •New political leaders, not encumbered by inherited vested interests, are more likely to initiate turning points in economic management. •Pemimpin politik baharu, tidak terkongkong oleh kepentingan yang diwarisi, lebih cenderung untuk melaksanakan titik perubahan dalam pengurusan ekonomi

•Their successors (even if from competing party) will follow the new direction until external conditions and internal situation have changed substantially. Different direction when new person is less beholden to past: •Pengganti (walapun daripada parti lawan) akan mengikuti hala tuju baharu sehingga keadaan luaran dan situasi dalaman bertukar dengan ketara. Hala tuju berbeza apabila orang baharu itu kurang terikat kepada masa lampau:

Page 21: Lessons for malaysia economic management during political transition (eng-bm)

- Chernenko’s heir Mikhail Gorbachev versus Boris Yeltsin (Putin is continuing Yeltsin’s line)

- Mao’s heir Hua Guofeng versus Deng Xiaoping (Xi Jinping is continuing Deng’s line)

- Mikhail Gorbachev pengganti Chernenko lawan Boris Yeltsin (Putin meneruskan warisan Yeltsin)

- Hua Guofeng pengganti Mao lawan Deng Xiaoping (Xi Jinping meneruskan warisan Deng)

•Immediate economic response to reform: Growth for Deng versus collapse for Yeltsin. Speed was the culprit?

•Respon ekonomi yang serta merta terhadap pembaharuan: Pembangunan bagi Deng vs kejatuhan bagi Yeltsin. Bolehkah “kepantasan” dipersalahkan?

Principle #2: New broom sweeps clean (2/2)

Prinsip #2: Penyapu baru menyapu bersih (2/2)

Page 22: Lessons for malaysia economic management during political transition (eng-bm)

Principle #3: Reform Speed depends on the task (1/3)

Prinsip #3: Kelajuan Pembaharuan bergantung kepada

tugas (1/3)

•Debate on “fast, comprehensive (shock therapy) reform” versus “gradual, piecemeal reform” is too simple-minded. The particular aspect of economy being reformed sets the optimum technical speed, e.g. the optimum speed for price deregulation and enterprise privatization are different.

•Perbahasan tentang “pembaharuan pantas, lengkap (terapi kejutan)” lawan “pembaharuan perlahan, sedikit demi sedikit” tidak boleh diterima. Aspek ekonomi yang diperbaharui menentukan kelajuan optimum, contohnya, kelajuan optimum untuk penyahkawalseliaan harga dan penswastaan enterpris adalah berbeza.

Page 23: Lessons for malaysia economic management during political transition (eng-bm)

•No relationship between immediate economic response and reform speed. East Asia vs Eastern Europe. Differences in national initial conditions. Economic Development vs Economic Restructuring. •Tiada hubungan antara respon ekonomi yang serta-merta dan kelajuan pembaharuan. Asia Timur lawan Eropah Timur. Perbezaan dalam keadaan kebangsaan pada permulaan. Pembangunan-Ekonomi lawan Penyusunan Semula-Ekonomi.

•Same reform direction in Russia and China. Direction is more important than speed (speed doesn’t matter when the direction is wrong), but desirability of speed must be kept in mind

•Hala tuju pembaharuan yang sama di Rusia dan China. Hala tuju lebih penting daripada kelajuan (kelajuan tidak bermakna jika hala tuju salah), tetapi kelajuan mesti diberi pertimbangan juga.

Principle #3: Reform Speed depends on the task (2/3)

Prinsip #3: Kelajuan Pembaharuan bergantung kepada

tugas (2/3)

Page 24: Lessons for malaysia economic management during political transition (eng-bm)

•Slow reform is susceptible to being paralysed after honeymoon period and to being captured by vested interest groups. Cannot justify slow elimination of poverty when it could be faster! •Pembaharuan yang perlahan lebih mudah menjadi lumpuh sebaik saja tempoh bulan madu berakhir dan cenderung untuk dikuasai oleh kumpulan yang berkepentingan sendiri. Penghapusan kemiskinan yang perlahan tidak boleh dipertahankan sekira ianya boleh dilakukan dengan lebih cepat!

•China’s slow speed due to political not economic factors. •Kadar kelajuan China yang perlahan disebabkan faktor politik bukan ekonomi.

Principle #3: Reform Speed depends on the task (3/3)

Prinsip #3: Kelajuan Pembaharuan bergantung kepada

tugas (3/3)

Page 25: Lessons for malaysia economic management during political transition (eng-bm)

Principle #4: Look at global

experience for policy

instruments (1/3)

Prinsip #4: Kaji pengalaman

global untuk alat bagi dasar (1/3)

•The adoption of best international practice sets the direction of reform, but this has to be tempered by adaptation of the international procedures to local circumstances. Adopt and Adapt is the key. •Pengambilan amalan terbaik antarabangsa boleh menentukan hala tuju pembaharuan, tetapi ia perlu diserasikan dengan keadaan tempatan. Ambil dan ubahsuai adalah penting.

Page 26: Lessons for malaysia economic management during political transition (eng-bm)

• Debate on “do not reinvent the wheel” versus “indigenous institutional innovation” is caused by confusion between “institutional innovation in the global sense” versus “institutional innovation in the local sense” e.g. replacing central planning with market mechanisms is global-type innovation while changing the sequence of steps to deregulate the financial market to suit local conditions is local-type innovation.

• Perbahasan antara “jangan cipta yang baharu bagi apa yang telah wujud” lawan “inovasi institusi asli” berlaku disebabkan kekeliruan antara “inovasi institusi dalam erti kata global” lawan “inovasi institusi dalam erti kata lokal” contohnya, menggantikan perancangan pusat dengan mekanisme pasaran ialah inovasi bercorak global manakala menukarkan prosedur ke arah penghapusan kawalan undang-undang atas pasaran kewangan untuk menyesuaikannya dengan keadaan tempatan adalah inovasi bercorak lokal.

Principle #4: Look at global experience for policy instruments (2/3)

Prinsip #4: Kaji pengalaman global untuk alat bagi dasar (2/3)

Page 27: Lessons for malaysia economic management during political transition (eng-bm)

• Convergence in economic institutions to international norms is generally more efficient in accelerating the catch-up process than experimentation to discover new alternative economic institutions, e.g. the debate on the efficiency and durability of the collective form of ownership (versus private ownership) for small-medium enterprises in rural China in 1984-1995.

• Pertumpuan institusi ekonomi kepada norma antarabangsa adalah lebih cekap dalam mempercepatkan proses mengejar kemajuan daripada menjalankan kajian untuk mendapatkan model institusi ekonomi alternatif yang baharu, contoh, perbahasan mengenai kecekapan dan ketahanan pemilikan bercorak kolektif (berbanding pemilikan persendirian) untuk enterpris kecil dan sederhana di kawasan luar bandar di China pada masa 1984-1995.

Principle #4: Look at global experience for policy instruments (3/3)

Prinsip #4: Kaji pengalaman global untuk alat bagi dasar (3/3)

Page 28: Lessons for malaysia economic management during political transition (eng-bm)

Principle #5: Be aware that a MESS will be inherited (1/2) Prinsip #5: Awasi bahawa KEADAAN CELARU akan diwarisi (1/2)

•Political transition occurs generally because of mismanagement by the incumbent; the most common feature being a large hidden budget deficit that is destabilizing the economy. •Peralihan politik biasanya berlaku disebabkan salah urus oleh penjawat kini; apa yang selalunya berlaku ialah defisit bajet yang besar yang tersembunyi yang menggugat kestabilan ekonomi.

•The aspiring govt must hence be ready to start governing immediately upon election victory, i.e. must have a detailed election manifesto that is operational in tackling the identified root causes of the economic crisis. •Justeru itu, pihak berharapan menerajui kerajaan mestilah bersedia untuk terus mengambil alih sebaik sahaja berjaya dalam pilihan raya, iaitu, mesti mempunyai manifesto pilihan raya yang terperinci untuk menangani punca penyebab krisis ekonomi.

Page 29: Lessons for malaysia economic management during political transition (eng-bm)

•The resulting economic rehabilitation program has the legitimacy to be implemented quickly because it had been scrutinized by the electorate. •Program pemulihan ekonomi yang terhasil akan menjadi sah untuk dilaksanakan dengan segera sebab ia telah diperiksa dengan teliti oleh para pengundi.

•In the absence of generous foreign aid, orderly resolution of the budget deficit requires low-cost access to commercial loans, which is possible only if the new govt presents credible new mechanisms to restore control of budget, and to raise the private investment rate (hence increase GDP growth). •Sebab tiada bantuan asing yang lumayan, resolusi teratur bagi defisit bajet memerlukan akses yang kosnya rendah kepada pinjaman komersil, yang hanya boleh diperoleh jika kerajaan baharu mengemukakan mekanisme baharu yang boleh diyakini untuk memulihkan kawalan ke atas bajet, dan bagi meningkatkan kadar pelaburan swasta (dan oleh itu, meningkatkan pembangunan KDNK).

Principle #5: Be aware that a MESS will be inherited (2/2) Prinsip #5: Awasi bahawa KEADAAN CELARU akan diwarisi (2/2)

Page 30: Lessons for malaysia economic management during political transition (eng-bm)

We have applied these 5 principles in drawing up the

Penang Paradigm, a 10-year development plan for

Penang (and Malaysia). We are seeking PUBLIC

GUIDANCE to improve the report which is available online.

Kami telah mengguna pakai 5 prinsip ini dalam merangka

Paradigma Pulau Pinang, satu pelan pembangunan untuk

Pulau Pinang (dan Malaysia). Kami mahu mendapatkan

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