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The Noema as Intentional Entity: A Critique of FøllesdalAuthor(s): Lenore LangsdorfSource: The Review of Metaphysics, Vol. 37, No. 4 (Jun., 1984), pp. 757-784Published by: Philosophy Education Society Inc.

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THE NOEMA AS INTENTIONAL NTITY:A CRITIQUEOF F0LLESDAL

LENORE LANGSDORF

Uagfinn Fj#llesdal's essay in defense of twelve theses on the

nature of the noema could be thought of as a spring from which a

series of papers continues to flow.1 The paper's portrayal of the

noema as "an intensional entity" has, as F0llesdal notes, "conse

quences [which] go against the usual interpretation."2 His "unusual"

interpretation has been explored, and continues to be developed, in

the flow of papers mentioned as well as in a recent collection that

presents itself as a "new approach to Husserl [which] provides an

ideal introduction to phenomenology for analytic philosophers."3

In this essay I examine the source of this interpretation: F0I

lesdal's theses themselves. I propose that his analysis of the noema

1In this paper I have quoted from the original essay: Dagfinn Fellesdal,

"Husserl's Notion of Noema," The Journal of Philosophy 66 (1969): 680

687. The series of papers mentioned includes Hubert Dreyfus, "The Per

ceptual Noema: Gurwitsch's Crucial Contribution," inLife-World and Con

sciousness: Essays for Aron Gurwitsch, ed. Lester Embree, (Evanston:Northwestern University Press, 1972), pp. 135-169; J. N. Mohanty, "On

Husserl's Theory of Meaning," Southwestern Journal of Philosophy 5 (1974):

229-244; Ronald Mclntyre and David W. Smith, "Husserl's Identification

of Meaning and Noema," The Monist 59 (1975), pp. 115-132, and "Husserl's

Concept

of

Intentionality" (paper

delivered at

EighteenthAnnual

Meetingof the Society for Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy, Purdue

University, 1979); Robert Solomon, "Husserl's Concept of the Noema," in

Husserl: Expositions and Appraisals, ed. F. Elliston and P. McCormick,

(Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1977), pp. 168-181; and

Donn Welton, "Husserl's Concept of Intentionality" (paper delivered at

the Eighteenth Annual Meeting of the Society for Phenomenology and

Existential Philosophy, Purdue University, 1979).2F0llesdal, p. 681.

3The quotation is from the book's jacket: Husserl, Intentionality, and

Cognitive Science, ed. Hubert L. Dreyfus, (Cambridge: The MIT Press,

1982). This book reprints the F0llesdal, Dreyfus, and earlier Mclntyreand Smith papers listed in Footnote 1, as well as the Gurwitsch paper

referred to in footnotes 47 and 62.

Review of Metaphysics 37 (June 1984): 757-784. Copyright ? 1984 by the Review of

Metaphysics





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758 LENORE LANGSDORF

rests upon a misunderstanding of the role the noema plays in Hus

serl's theory of intentionality, exacerbated by inconsistencies in

differentiating "the noema" from "noematic sense." The result is

a confused conception which is neither "as accurate and complete

as is permitted by the evidence" nor an advance in understanding

how "phenomenology [might] overcome the difficulties that are be

setting so many ancient and recent theories of meaning."4

In order to support those contentions, I identify, in the first

section of this paper, an implicit thesis at the start of Follesdal's

argument. I then discuss the differences between that thesis and

Husserl's theory of intentionality, as well as its importance for

Follesdal's line of argument. In the second part of the paper, I

consider Follesdal's explicit (numbered) theses in turn.

In the last section, I pursue my own conviction that the dispute

as to whether the noema is a conceptual entity (Follesdal's "unusual"

interpretation) or a perceptual entity (the more "usual" interpre

tation which Follesdal does not formulate explicitly) requires a

more precise conception of the noema than Follesdal supplies. As

a contribution toward that goal, I propose an interpretation of Hus

serl's theory that analyzes the structure of the noema as responding

to particular features of intentionality.

I

Klaus Hedwig's study of the historical development of the con

cept of intentionality stresses the ontological character of Brentano'sformulation of that concept.5 Brentano altered traditional usage

of the concept by appropriating it for the characterization of psychic

phenomena. The most concise indication of this use is in Brentano's

characterization of "coldness":

Materially, as a physical characteristic, coldness is in that which is

cold. As object, that is as sensed, it is in that which feels coldness.6

4F0llesdal, pp. 681, 687.

5Klans Hedwig, "Intentionality: Outlines for the History of a Phe

nomenological Concept," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 39

(1979): 326-340.6Franz Brentano, Psychologie des Aristoteles (Mainz, 1867), p. 80, as

quoted by Hedwig, p. 328 (my translation).





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THE NOEMA AS INTENTIONALENTITY 759

The presence of this sort of "object" in the "subject" (who "feels

cold," and is thereby directed towards the coldness which is ma

terially present) is then used by Brentano as the defining charac

teristic of psychic phenomena, and this usage was adopted by Husserl

early in his career.

However, Husserl did not adopt the ontology of real and fic

titious objects which Brentano developed in order to provide a ref

erent for each "intentional object." Accordingly, he was spared

the notorious difficulties which plagued Brentano (and others, e.g.,

Meinong) when they soughtto elucidate the "inexistence" of

objects.Brentano's concept lent itself to two distinct research directions;

he took one, while Husserl took the other. Both are suggested in

the oft-quoted passage from Brentano:

Every mental phenomenon is characterized by what the medieval

schoolmen called the intentional (or mental) inexistence of an object,and by what we, not without ambiguity, call the relation to a content,the direction to an object (by which a reality is not to be understood)or an immanent objectivity.7

Two features of Brentano's development of this concept were not

shared by Husserl. First, Brentano assumed that the relation be

tween real, non-mental objects and inexistent, immanent objects

was a causal one.8 Husserl did not adopt that assumption. (Indeed,

he could not do so, for reasons central to the phenomenological

endeavor; I will return to this point.)

The causal presumption leads quite directly to the second dif

ference. Brentano concentrated upon one aspect of the intention

ality thesis?the "inexistence of an object"?while Husserl was con

cerned with another aspect which has very different implications:

"direction to an object." Husserl's theory of intentionality evolved

as an answer to a problem: how could the subject be "directed to"?

i.e., engaged with?what was not intrinsic to that subject? (In

other words: how could consciousness be involved with objects?)

7Franz Brentano, Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt (Leipzig,

1874) as quoted in Edmund Husserl, Logical Investigations, trans. J. N.

Findlay, (New York: Humanities Press, 1970), p. 554.8For discussions of Brentano's reliance upon a natural science model,

at least in his earlier work, see Hedwig and Theodorus de Boer, "The

Descriptive Method of Franz Brentano," in The Philosophy of Brentano,

ed. L. McAlister, (Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press, 1976), pp.

101-107.





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Brentano had an answer to that question: external objects cause

"immanent objects"; the having of those immanent objects is con

sciousness's basic characteristic.

Since causal effect provided him with an answer to what would

become Husserl's question, Brentano's inquiries were focused upon

the aspect of intentionality that did present difficulties for him: the

ontological status of those "objects" that were causally connected

to the external, physical world, but did not share many of the char

acteristics of that world?e.g., externality and physicality. The

"inexistence"theory

evolved in response to thatquestion. Despite

the substantial changes in his later understanding of "inexistent

objects," this basic ontological focus remained.9

Two factors in the evolution of phenomenology prevented Hus

serl from adopting causal effect as the explanation for objects'

availability to a subject. The first factor is suggested by his repeated

acknowledgement of Hume's influence upon his thought.10 Hume's

capacity for awakening philosophers is well documented. In Hus

serl's case, I would argue, Hume's denial of the possibility of any

claim to knowledge based upon the causal principle is continued in

Husserl's critique of psychologism. On the basis of that critique,

Husserl turned away from a philosophy that would be psychology,

which would in turn be one of the natural sciences.11 In other

words, Husserl's refutation of psychologism in the Logical Inves

tigations was already an implicit departure from his characterization

of phenomenology as "descriptive psychology" (in Brentano's sense),

in that same work.12

9See Mohanty and Hedwig for discussions of this focus.

10See, as examples, Edmund Husserl, "Reminiscences of Franz Bren

tano," in The Philosophy of Brentano, ed. L. McAlister, pp. 47-55 and Ideen

zu einer reinen Ph?nomenologie und ph?nomenologischen Philosophie,Drittes Buch (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1952), pp. 155-159. See also Richard

Zaner, "Hume and the Discipline of Phenomenology," inPhenomenological

Perspectives: Historical and Systematic Essays in Honor of Herbert Spie

gelberg, ed. P. J. Bossert, (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1975) pp. 14-30.11

DeBoer stresses that this change also occurred in Brentano's later

work. For Husserl's turn from causal explanation (and correlative interest

in teleological explanation) see Edmund Husserl, Phenomenological Psy

chology, trans. John Scanlon, (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1977), pp. 26-27, 103

106. See also footnote 8.12

See Edmund Husserl, Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenologyand to a Phenomenological Philosophy, First Book, trans. F. Kersten, (The

Hague: Nijhoff, 1982), p. 206; and Logical Investigations, trans. J. N. Findlay,

(New York: Humanities Press, 1970), pp. 261-263. Findlay's translation





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The second factor is Husserl's conception of the epoche and

reduction.13 As the basic methodological principle of phenome

nology, the reduction institutes an attitude towards natural science

(including Brentano's psychology), its principles (including causal

lawfulness), and its objects (whether "external" or "immanent")

which is fundamentally divergent from that of Brentano. Within

this new attitude, Husserl could no longer simply accept any dis

cipline, principle, or object as a "given." Nor could he simply reject

any of these as lacking importance or existence. Rather, he was

bound by this basic methodological precept to an examination of

the sense of all that was "given."

The implicit thesis that I find at the start of Follesdal's ar

gument can now be formulated and criticized. After sketching

Brentano's conception of intentionality as leading to difficulties in

accounting for "unreal" objects, Follesdal introduces Husserl as

having "resolved this dilemma" in the theory which he "had taken

over from his teacher, Brentano":

According to

Husserl,there is associated with each act a noema, in

virtue of which the act is directed toward its object, if it has any.When we think of a centaur, our act of thinking has a noema, but it

has no object; there exists no object of which we think. Because of

its noema, however, even such an act is directed. To be directed

simply is to have a noema.14

The implicit thesis I find here is one that occurs as Follesdal in

troduces the term, "noema": prior to the explicit argument given

is based upon the Second Edition of Husserl's Logische Untersuchungen.

Note 3 (on p. 261) translates a note in that edition explaining that phe

nomenology is no "ordinary descriptive psychology'." Findlay also in

cludes (on p. 262) the First Edition note that was replaced. It gives Hus

serl's original characterization: "Phenomenology is descriptive psychology,"followed by an explanation of what that term means.

13Since the differences are not relevant to the discussion of the re

duction that follows, I use the term "reduction" as inclusive of the various

stages (e.g., phenomenological, transcendental, eidetic) which are often

distinguished by commentators. Husserl did not use this method in the

First Edition of Logische Untersuchungen (Halle, 1900-1901). The generalconsensus places its discovery during the years 1906-1907. (Lectures de

livered in 1907 and now published as The Idea of Phenomenology, trans.W. P. Alston and G. Nakhnikian, [The Hague: Nijhoff, 1973] provide a

detailed introduction to the method.) It is used explicitly and consistentlyin Ideas: First Book and all later work. The imposition of the reduction,Iwould argue, is the decisive factor in Husserl's turn from causal explanation. (See also footnote 11.)

14F0llesdal, pp. 680-681; my emphasis replacing F0llesdal's.





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in the 12 theses, he explicates it as a replacement for the object.

He thus suggests that, for Husserl, intentional acts need not have

objects, since their directional character is attributed solely to pos

session of a noema.

This thesis may be given succinctly, after the style of Follesdal's

explicit theses:

(0.) The noema, in Husserl's theory of intentionality, replaces the

object by serving the function that the object serves in Brentano's

theory.

It isimportant

todistinguish

between twoclosely

connected

possible views before dealing with the position to which Follesdal

is committed, by virtue of this implicit thesis. The noema can be

misunderstood as (a) the same as the object; or (b) the replacement

(by virtue of replacing its function) for the object. A close readingof Follesdal's argument does not find the first claim, although it

can be found in or inferred from other discussions stemming from

Follesdal's work.15

In order to understand why thesis (0.) is incorrect, we need to

attend to the function of the reduction. As I noted above, this step

in phenomenological method redirects our attention from the object

as "given"; as the focus of our interest within the "natural attitude."

It institutes an analytic, and thus, so to speak, "unnatural" attitude

concerned with the meaningfulness of experiencing that object. The

reduction introduces a new sphere of inquiry: the sense of those

entities that were the focus of attention before the reduction. We

have, then, an additional interest, rather than a replacement of en

tities; an epistemic, rather than ontological, alteration.An example may help to make this crucial point clear. As a

human being engaged in a variety of interests, Imight express one

such interest by saying "I am looking forward to seeing my distant

friend." Further expression of that interest occurs as I engage in

appropriate acts designed to fulfill my anticipation (e.g., making

travel arrangements). However, as a phenomenological philosopher

analyzing that interest, I am also concerned to understand, e.g., the

phenomenonof

friendship (in general,

or as

exemplifiedin this

15Dreyfus, and Mclntyre and Smith (within the group listed in foot

note 1), do adopt the former possibility; i.e., they understand the noema

as the same as the object, rather than as the object's functional re

placement.





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particular friendship), or that of anticipation, or of "seeing" (i.e.,

fact-to-face interaction with) a friend?perhaps, in contrast to

"seeing" a monument, drama, landscape, or public figure. In all of

this, my friend does not cease to exist; nor does my anticipatory

interest fade (or at least, neither occurs by virtue of my reduced

attitude; Husserl is not Berkeley). My act of anticipation is still

directed toward the same object.

It is not the case, then, that "To be directed simply is to have

a noema."16 Rather, to be directed is?for Husserl as well as for

me?to be directed upon an object; to be engaged with an environment

that transcends my sense-giving acts. To elucidate, within the re

duction, the sense of that directedness is to explore the meaning

fulness of the noema that we "have," just as we "have" a noesis

(the "subjective" pole or correlate within any intentional act). These

are distinguishable aspects of the experience which my new, phe

nomenologically "reduced" attitude now takes as its (so to speak)

direct object.

Husserl is very clear about the importance of this step. This

remark, in a section entitled "The phenomenological reduction as

a method of disclosing the immanent," is a typical one: "The un

derstanding of all of phenomenology depends upon the understand

ing of this method; we acquire phenomena in the sense of phenom

enology only by it."17 Follesdal, however, never mentions the re

duction.18 The result of that neglect, I believe, is the incorrect

replacement of the object by the noema in his implicit thesis (0.).He is correct in holding that a replacement occurs when we analyze

the noema rather than simply direct ourselves toward an object.Husserl's method, however, requires a replacement in attitudes and

interests, rather than objects. In other words, an interest in the

meaningfulness of the experience replaces the more usual attitude

of interest in the object toward which the experience is directed.

In the following consideration of Follesdal's theses, we must re

member, then, that he is analyzing texts written within a particular

context, without any apparent recognition of the significance of that

context for the meaning of those texts.

16F0llesdal, p. 681; quoted above in context.

17Husserl, Phenomenological Psychology, p. 144.

18F0llesdal's discussion of theses 10 and 11 suggests that he identifies

the reduction with (phenomenological) reflection.





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II

F0llesdal's theses fall into five groups. Theses 1, 2, and 3 givea general characterization of the composition and function of the

noema. Theses 4, 5, and 6 deal with its relation to the object, while

7 speaks to its relation to the act. Theses 8 and 9 focus upon a

particular characteristic. Correlatively, 10 and 11 deal with the

mode of access necessitated by that characteristic. Thesis 12 returns

to the issue of the noema's composition. In this section, I will cite

and comment upon the theses in those groupings.

1. The noema is an intensional entity, a generalization of the notion

of meaning (Sinn, Bedeutung).2. A noema has two components: (1) one which is common to all

acts that have the same object, with exactly the same properties,oriented in the same way, etc., regardless of the 'thetic' character of

the act, i.e., whether it be perception, remembering, imaging, etc. and

(2) one which is different in acts with different thetic character.

3. The noematic Sinn is that in virtue of which consciousness relates

to the object.19

F0llesdal's intention in juxtaposing Sinn and

Bedeutung

in the

first thesis is unclear. He may mean to suggest certain correlations

between the two terms in Husserl; or, in Husserl in relation to

Frege. If he means that they are synonymous, he is violating Hus

serl's practice in relation to the noema. If Follesdal is instead

simply indicating a close correlation of the two, he is still neglecting

Husserl's position as to their difference: "Sinn" (hereafter: "sense")

is meaningfulness in general, as present in a variety of acts. "Be

deutung" (hereafter: "meaning") is restricted to the meaningfulness

of linguistic acts.20

The basic difficulty in these three theses, however, is suggested

by Follesdal's own cautionary comment:

One should be aware of an ambiguity in Husserl's use of the word

'Sinn' as applied to the noema. Sometimes he means the full noema,

other times just a part of it, a part which may be the same in acts

of many different kinds. . . .21

19F0llesdal, pp. 681-682.

20These are not distinguished in Logical Investigations. (See, e.g., p.

292). However, in Ideas: First Book (p. 294) Husserl explicitly limits Be

deutung (in this paper: meaning; in Kersten's translation: signification)to linguistic meaning, while retaining Sinn for more general use (e.g.,

perceptual sense).21

F0llesdal, pp. 681-682.





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We have here an explicit recognition of the noema's complexity.

F0llesdal delineates thisas two

componentsin thesis

2,and identifies

the function of one component ("noematic Sinn") in thesis 3. How

ever, Follesdal uses "noema" (the "whole") and "noematic Sinn" (a

part, or more precisely, "moment" of that "whole") interchangably

throughout his essay. Furthermore, in his discussion of theses 8

and 9, he concludes that anything Husserl says about noematic Sinn

"presumably applies to . . . the whole noema."22

In relation to this first group of theses, then (and as preparation

for considering later theses), we need to understand why Follesdal

cannot retain his clear, and correct, distinction between sense and

noema. The basic problem is his neglect of the context within

which Husserl's descriptions are given. This context is set by the

phenomenological reduction, which affects an author's usage just

as surely as medical, literary, and legal contexts restrict and even

stipulate the usage of words within those fields. Phenomenologists

sometimes remind readers of the need to attach special usages to

words by speaking of the phenomenological method (instituted by

the reduction, which is itself instituted by the epoche) as an "un

natural attitude" of restriction to the sense (meaningfulness, in

more everyday language) of our experiences. That designation im

plicitly refers to the phenomenological context as contrasting to a

"natural attitude," reflected in our ordinary descriptions, and con

cerned with the objects of our experiences. Phenomenologically

speaking, then, any focus of attention is a "sense"?an "intensional

entity"?in contrast to an event or thing. However, "noema" ("full

noema,""whole

noema")is the name for the "reduced"

experiencedobject. As suggested by the synonymous term "noematic correlate,"

it is correlated to the "noesis" (or, "noetic correlate"). These two

terms refer, respectively, to the "x as experienced" and "experiencing

of x" in terms of which all our acts may be analyzed.

A phenomenological analysis of any experience begins, typically,

with an analysis of a particular, spatiotemporally characterizable

occurrence. The noematic portion of that analysis will consist of

a description of the experienced subject matter. In other words, a

noematic analysis gives a delimited portrayal of what that experience

22Ibid., p. 684.





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is concerned with; of what it is directed upon. This subject matter

will beanalyzed

in terms of variousdeterminations,

or senses.

"Noema" will not be among these?although "friend," "empathetic,"

and "distant" may well be. (These are determinations relevant to

my example, in section I, of seeing a friend.) The noema itself (the

noematic aspect of the act), however, is not "distant." The im

portance of this division among "senses" cannot be overstressed, if

we are to understand and use Husserl's method. Briefly stated: the

noema is not a property, sense, determination, or predicate of the

object (subject matter) undergoing phenomenological analysis. It

is, rather, the name for one component in the experiencing of that

subject matter: the component that portrays an intended object for

an intending subject. (The noesis is, correlatively, the name for

the contribution of an intending subject in the experiencing.)

Rather than a whole-part relationship between noema (or noe

matic sense) and object, we have two radically different levels of

"sense," rather confusedly applied to (a) components of intentional

experiences as well as (b) determinations of their (reduced) objective

correlates. Follesdal's speaking of the sense as "just a part" of the

noema is then a misleading but almost unavoidable locution.

Strictly speaking, the "parts" of the noema are the moments of the

noematic correlate. Follesdal discusses two such moments: "noe

matischer Sinn" (noematic sense) and "gegebenheitsweise" (manner

of givenness)?which is in turn analyzable into "thetic character"

and "filling." Each of these components of the noema present (but

are not themselves) determinations of the subject matter (objective

correlate)

of an act.

Ordinary philosophical language fails us?and Husserl?when

pursuing this detailed analysis of the many senses (levels) of "sense."

We do have some terminology that at least suggests the crucial

distinctions: we can speak of analytically distinguished components

or moments of the experience (e.g., noematic sense; manner of giv

enness), in contrast to determinations?whether properties or re

lations?of that experience's objective correlate. Husserl does a

far better job of keeping these contents distinct than is usually

acknowledged?perhaps, because his adeptness in recognizing dis

tinctions and applying designations far surpasses what might be

called his narrative-descriptive skill.

The only remedy for this is to take up his oft-repeated invitation





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(i.e., demand) that we carry out ("live through," erleben) the analyses

themselves, rather than simply ingest (experience, erfahren) his

reports. If we do so, the confusion between components of the

analyzed experience and determinations of the experienced object,

which occurs in thesis 3, will be avoided. Husserl stresses the

importance of maintaining precise distinctions as we perform such

analyses. "First of all," he warns,

it must be carefully noted that any transition from a phenomenoninto the reflection which itself is an analysis of the really inherent

[i.e.,of the

noesis]

or into the quite differently articulated reflection

which dissects the noema, generates new phenomena, and that we

would fall into error were we to confuse the new phenomena?which,in a certain way, are recastings of the old?with the old phe

nomena. . .P

Without this error, a whole school of criticism of Husserl's method

of reduction?one that evaluates it as a move to metaphysical ide

alism?falls.24 In regard to Follesdal's analysis, I find that he con

fuses the several usages of "sense" in Husserl's analysis, and thus

commits the error described by Husserl as confusing "new" (ana

lytically generated) phenomena with "old" (pre-reduction) phenom

ena. In order to remove that confusion, some account of the struc

ture of the noema as given in Husserl's work is necessary at this

point. (In section III, I return to the structure sketched here in

order to argue for a more precise delineation of noematic sense, in

its narrowest sense.)

When I follow Husserl's model in analyzing my own experience

of directedness toward an object, I find within my intending a mo

ment of directedness toward an "object as such"?i.e., an object

registering itself solely as "object of my intending," and without

any delineation (characterization) whatsoever. This sense is quite

distinct from the other senses within the noema. As it is itself not

determined, it is not describable by predicates?although it functions

as the determina&te "central point of unity" within the complex of

23Husserl, Ideas: First Book, p. 240.

24Although I argue here that F0llesdal commits this error, he is not

the only one to do so. For another example, see Roman Ingarden, On the

Motives Which Led Husserl to Transcendental Idealism (The Hague: Nijhoff,

1975).





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predicates describing the object's delineations, and comprising its

noematicsense

(in the "extended" sense).25

Contrary to thesis 3, then, I find that consciousness relates to

an object by virtue of the determinations ofthat object (more pre

cisely: by virtue of a selection thereof, governed by my particular

interests). For example: by virtue of the determination, "friend,"

I relate to the person in my example in ways Iwould not, were that

determination "foe." Analysis may then go on to consider that

determination itself, as it characterizes this particular objective

correlate, or as an instance of the concept, "friendship."

The "what" of my intending must be "located" or "fixed," how

ever, in order that Imay go on to characterize the objective correlate

by determinations that relate me to that object, and perhaps also

go on to investigate any of those determinations in abstraction from

its instantiation in that object. Characterizations of various kinds

(such as "distant," "philosopher," "lively," and "remembered") thus

"extend" the prior and absolutely basic noematic sense, "directness

to this object," by "filling out" a description of the "what."

In Husserl's terminology, predicates combine to give us a "core"

description of the object by conveying its "determining content" in

contrast to the "something." The latter is "noematic sense" in

Husserl's strict sense, which designates the "what" toward which

I am directed as a "determinable X in [i.e., within] the noematic

sense":

this 'something' also belongs, and obviously inseparably, to the core

in question [i.e., to the extended noematic sense]: it is the central

point of unityof which we

spokeabove. It is the central

pointof

connection or the 'bearer' of the predicates, but in no way is it a

unity of them in the sense in which any complex, any combination

of the predicates would be called a unity. It is necessarily to be

distinguished from them. ... It becomes separated as central noe

matic moment: the. . . 'determinable subject of its possible predicates'. . . separated from those predicates or, more precisely, from the

predicate-noemas.26

25

The interpretation of "noematic sense" developed here and in sectionIII is especially dependent upon Husserl's discussion in section 131 of

Ideas: First Book. There certainly is textual justification for other, and

divergent, interpretations. I advocate this one as congruous with the text,

as well as with the evidence given in my own analysis of experience.26

Husserl, Ideas: First Book, p. 313.





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Husserl is quite aware of the difficulties of expressing these struc

tural moments. "Let it benoted,"

he writes in the middle of this

description,

that now we cautiously said 'sense,' not 'core'. ... In order to gainthe actual, concretely complete core of the noema, we must take into

account yet another dimension of differences which finds no expressionin the characterized description but which defines the sense for us.27

The sense, "something," thus emerges in Husserl's analysis as a

"dimension" quite distinct from the "characterized description" that

presents the "core" ofa noema.

In considering the theses that follow, then, I will be comparing

Follesdal's portrayal of the noema with this interpretation of Hus

serl's tripartite structure:

(a) "sense": noematic sense in the narrow or strict usage of

the term; the conceptually distinct, necessary, determina&te (al

though not itself determined, and thus, not describable) "some

thing";

(b) "core": noematic sense in the broad or extended usage of

the term; the complex of predicates that descriptively characterizes

the "determining content" of any noematic correlate;

(c) "noema": the full noematic correlate presenting, in any and

every intentional experience, an "object as such"; i.e., an objective

correlate structurally analyzable in terms of its "moment of unity,"

"predicate-noema," and "manner of givenness."28

We can now turn to Follesdal's second group of theses, which deal

with the noema's relation to act and object.

4. The noema of an act is not the object of the act (i.e., the objecttoward which the act is directed).

5. To one and the same noema, there corresponds only one object.6. To one and the same object there may correspond several different

noemata.

27Ibid., p. 315; brackets in original deleted. The "but" in the last

phrase of this quotation is a translator's emendation (i.e., addition; the

editors of both German editions added an "and" at that point). I believe

that themeaning

is bestconveyed by eliminating any conjunction

at that

place.28

Two points are relevant here. The full noema also is called, at

times, "sense ... in a very extended signification" (Ibid., p. 214). In

section III of this paper, I suggest that an additional component is needed

in order to convey the identity of the objective correlate.





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6*. To one and the same object there may correspond several dif

ferent noematic Sinne.

7. Each act has one and only one noema.29

Thesis 4 relates to the two closely connected views (sameness

vs. replacement) discussed in section I of this paper, and is the basis

for my observation that Follesdal is not committed to the first view:

i.e., he does not hold that the noema is the object. His comment

upon that thesis, on the other hand, confirms my claim (made earlier

in this section) that he does confuse determinations (of the object)

with theoretical components(of

the noema under

analysis).F0I

lesdal says, in this comment, that Husserl differs from Brentano

in that the latter

held that the object that gives the act its directedness is the objecttoward which the act is directed.30

Follesdal does not say just how he understands Husserl to have

avoided the resultant "dilemma." The implication, however, is that

Husserl replaced Brentano's "object toward which" with the

noema?or, with the noematic sense, since Follesdal claims that

(for Husserl), the "object of an act is a function of the act's noematic

Sinn."31 I have argued, in opposition to this claim, that for Husserl:

(a) the object of an act is a function of the determinations which

comprise that act's objective correlate (e.g., "lively," "philosopher,"

etc.), and (b) the "noematic Sinn" is Husserl's designation for either

(1) the complex of senses that are "generated" as phenomenological

analysis "dissects the noema," or (2) the determinable "something"

characterized by those senses. It would be more accurate to the

structure of the noema as Husserl portrays it, then, to say that the

noematic sense is a function of the object of an act?rather than

vice versa, as Follesdal holds.

If theses 5, 6, and 7 are read in keeping with this distinction

between moments of the noema and determinations of the object,

they are simply numerical specifications of the object-noema and

act-noema correlation. However, thesis 6* is not merely a

"strengthening"of 6. Follesdal takes these to be

essentiallythe

same thesis because of his tendency (discussed in section I) to con


30Ibid.; emphasis added.

31Ibid., p. 683.





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flate the distinction between noema and noematic sense. When he

does so, he neglects Husserl's "strict" usage of "noematic sense"as the abstractly conceived "object as such" which, when specified

by predicates, forms the "extended" sense or "core." Thus, contrary

to 6*, to "one and the same object" there must correspond only one

noematic sense?since that noematic sense iswhat specifies an object

as "one and the same"?although there may correspond several

different manners of givenness, or a variety of noematic senses (in

the "extended" sense) and thus, several different noemata. (This

is

preciselywhat thesis 6

states.)8. Noemata are abstract entities.

9. Noemata are not perceived through our senses.32

Discussion of these theses must be prefaced by an admission

that I am baffled by the meaning of the former and find nothingso obviously true as the latter. Yet, given Follesdal's remark that

9 "is an immediate consequence of thesis 8," my bafflement should

extend to 9.33 Furthermore, since that remark continues: "and if

it should turn to be false [sic], thesis 8 and several of our other

theses would fall with it," the importance of 9 cannot be overes

timated. Perhaps the best way to approach this pair of theses is

by exploring the feature of 8 that resists comprehension.

The significance of "abstract" is the basic difficulty. One or

dinary meaning is "not perceived through the senses," but Follesdal

cannot mean that?for if he did, 8 and 9 would be equivalent, and

he stresses that 9 is a consequence of 8. Robert Solomon offers

this elucidation:

'Abstract' does not mean, as it often means, 'conceptual'; neither does

it mean, as it has often meant in German idealism, 'separable in

thought but not in Reality.' 'Abstract' means, at least, 'not perceived'.34

32Ibid., p. 684.

33Ibid.

34Solomon, p. 175. In order to limit the scope of this paper, I have

not discussed the group of papers listed in footnote 1. This reference to

Solomon is an exception, made for two reasons. First: although Solomon's

remarks do not increase my comprehension of what (more) F0llesdal mightmean by "abstract," they do indicate that this vital thesis is also less than

clear to another reader (who is generally sympathetic to F0llesdal's po

sition). Also, I would like to acknowledge that, although there is much

in Solomon's argument that I would dispute, the central criticism in his

Section 5, and especially in relation to theses 8 and 9, is parallel to myown approach.





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The question, however, is: what more does "abstract" mean? So

lomon does not say, nor does F0llesdal. Yet, itmust mean something

more, or thesis 9 would be just a restatement of 8, rather than a

"consequence."

Indeed (as Solomon also notes) Follesdal's own remarks in sup

port of this thesis quote Husserl (primarily in an unpublished

manuscript) on the character of noematic sense, rather than noe

mata. As mentioned in my remarks on thesis 6, the noematic sense

is an "abstract entity" for Husserl, in that it signifies an abstractly

conceived"object

as

such,"bereft of all

specification. (Itis also

"abstract" in that it?but not the full noema?is "ideal," i.e., bereft

of any spatiotemporal delineation.) F0llesdal is able to cite Husserl

on noematic sense, in support of his own claim(s) about noemata,

only because he sometimes conflates the two terms. More precisely,

he holds that any characterization of noematic sense "presumably"

applies to the full, "whole" noema.35 The only basis given for this

presumption is Husserl's mention that both the noematic sense and

noema "belongs to one and the same species."36 In the passage

F0llesdal cites, however, Husserl is simply distinguishing noetic

from noematic aspects of acts, not equating all entities in either

"species."

In proposing thesis 8, Follesdal says that it is a "consequence

of thesis 1," and that "noemata are like linguistic Sinne in most

respects."37 These remarks provide a clue to what I take to be

F0llesdal's unstated, long-range endeavor: the equation of inten

tionality and intensionality. Without entering into the merits of

limiting all meaningfulness (forHusserl: both Sinn and Bedeutung;"sense" and [linguistic] "meaning") to linguistic meaning, there is

no question but that Husserl's theory of the noema does not give

any foothold for such an interpretation. (The move to genetic phe

nomenology?in particular, the concentration on sense constitu

tion?is necessitated by his refusal to construe [perceptual] sense

as [linguistic] meaning.) None of this, however, is of any help to

me in understanding the significance of "abstract." Thesis 8, insofar

as it is notequivalent

to9,

remainsunintelligible.

The evidence offered for thesis 9 is primarily negative. Since


36Ibid., p. 684.

37Ibid.





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all sensorially accessible objects (e.g., spatial objects) are perceived

perspectivally, and noemata are not so perceived, noemata are not

sensorially accessible. This does not tell us much about their (pos

itive) character or mode of access, however. F0llesdal turns to

those issues on the basis of a clue he quotes from a manuscript

discussion of noematic sense. (Thus, the objection raised earlier?

what is true of noematic sense is not necessarily true of the "full"

noema?is again applicable.) In the manuscript, Husserl elucidates

the "perception" of sense as somehow different from the perception

of, e.g.,a house: "The

perception'has' the

Sinn,but the Sinn is not

perceived."38 Follesdal relies upon this remark about sense in order

to respond to the question of access to the noema in theses 10 and

11, before offering a positive characterization of the noema in his

last thesis.

10. Noemata are known through a special reflection, the phenom

enological reflection.

11. The phenomenological reflection can be iterated.39

As they stand, these are correct. However, Follesdal's elab

oration upon thesis 11 returns us to the crucial contextual lack

discussed in part I. This reflection "is a grasping of a Sinn"; yet

"the whole noema and not just the noematic Sinn is reflected upon."40

The uncertainty as to just what is involved in phenomenological

reflection is traceable to the need to have it accomplish both its own

function, and that of the reduction. The "peculiar" character of

this reflection cannot be appreciated (or exploited) unless it is un

derstood as subsidiary to the reduction. That process (re-) directs

us toward the noema?the"experience

of x asexperienced"?as

well as the noesis. Any reflection within this context must then be

upon some noetic or noematic component: e.g., a particular sense,

as it presents to us some particular determination of the ("reduced")

object. Without an explicit awareness?perhaps, even an empha

sis?upon the context established by the reduction as a determining

factor in every procedure (e.g., reflection) and result (e.g., noematic

sense) of a phenomenological analysis, these procedures and results,

and even entire analyses, may be equated all too easily with similar

features of the pre-reductive "natural" attitude.

38Ibid., p. 685.

39Ibid.

40Ibid.





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This iswhat happens here. Specifically, Follesdal conflates the

determinations of the object?partially, perhaps perspectivally, but

always incompletely given?with the components of the noema.41

A close reading of the example which precedes thesis 12 demon

strates the conflation of "provinces of meaning" which results:42

Take seeing as an example. That seeing is intentional, object-directed,means that the near side of the thing ... is regarded only as a side

of a thing, and that the thing we are seeing has other sides and

determinations which are co-intended to the extent that the full thingis regarded as something more than one side. These determinations

are not perceptually filled; they are more or less vaguely represented,and lead us on to further perceptual process, which make the invisible

visible. The noema is a complex system of such determinations.. . .43

The last remark, slightly rephrased and expanded to include the

manner in which we are aware of objects (the "gegebenheitsweise"),

forms Follesdal's last thesis.

Two very different?although surely inseparable?processes are

mentioned in this passage: the "regarding as" (a conceptual or judg

mentalaspect

ofexperience)

and the"perceiving

that"(a

sensorial

aspect of experience.) The "sides" are perceptually accessible. The

status of the "determinations" is arguable; I would contend that

the most plausible reading will understand them as sensorially ac

cessible. I have been using this term throughout this paper to

designate characteristic aspects of the object (e.g., friend, thin)?

in contrast to noematic sense, which is a component of the noema.

Follesdal, however, does not use the term at any point prior to the

three appearances just quoted, and does not give any definition for

it. His usage suggests that he associates "determinations" with

"perceptual data," "appearance," and "perspectives," which cohere

into a "system"; a "vaguely predelineated pattern":

41The qualification, "perhaps perspectivally," is needed since (for

Husserl) ideal objects?which are not perspectivally given?can be inten

tional objects.421 refer to "provinces of meaning" rather than "contexts" or "different

realms of discourse" in order to suggest (a) that more than language is

involved in the change from "regarding as" to "perceiving that"; and (b)that Alfred Schutz's elucidation of diverse contexts as multiple "provinces

of meaning" is a promising approach for understanding the interconnected

diversity provided by these sensorial and perceptual factors. See, for

example, his "On Multiple Realities" in Collected Papers, vol. 1, ed. Maurice

Natanson, (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1962), pp. 207-259.43

F0llesdal, p. 686; emphases added.





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we continue to perceive the same object and get an ever more 'manysided'

experienceof

it,without ever

exhaustingthe

pattern,which

develops with our experience of the object to include ever new, still

unexperienced [sic] determinations.^

The last appearance of the term is in the twelfth, and last, thesis:

12. This pattern of determinations, together with the "Gegeben

heitsweise," is the noema.45

Again, we have an important problem in interpreting the text.

If by "pattern" we are to understand nothing more than the "complex

system" mentioned earlier as presented to us by the

object

of (per

ceptual) experience, and if by "determinations" we are to understand

sensorially accessible aspects (as I proposed in the previous para

graph), the "pattern of determinations" must be a sensorial (e.g.,

perceptual) entity.

An intentional element may be added to the noema by the

"manner of givenness" (Gegebenheitsweise).46 Follesdal's brief dis

cussion of this difficult notion suggests a partially intensional (con

ceptual) and partially sensorial character. Citing Husserl, he finds

both 'thetic character' and 'filling' are included in the Gegeben

heitsweise.41 (I will return to this problem in section III.) At most,

44Ibid., p. 686-687; emphasis added.

45Ibid., p. 687.

46F0llesdal gives no English rendering of Gegebenheitsweise. I have

used Dorion Cairns' suggestion in his Guide For Translating Husserl (The

Hague: Nijhoff, 1973), p. 57.47

Precise identification of F0llesdal's references to Husserl eludes me

in several cases. One result of this problem is difficulty in understandinghis use of "determinations." If my understanding of this term?as well

as "system" and "pattern"?is correct, there would seem to be an unex

pected convergence between F0llesdal's "unusual" interpretation of the

noema and one of the more traditional interpretations?that developed

by Aron Gurwitsch. In Gurwitsch's (or, the "New School") analysis, "the

thing perceived proves to be the group or, more precisely put, the system

atically organized totality of adumbrational presentations." ("Husserl's

Theory of the Intentionality of Consciousness," in Life-World and Con

sciousness, ed. Lester Embree, [Evanston: Northwestern University Press

1974], p. 237). An object, then, is a totality of noematic correlates, in

trinsically ("authochthonously") organized?i.e., its unity and self-identitydo not depend upon noetic or environmental factors. I find that Husserl's,

Gurwitsch's, and F0llesdal's analyses actually give three rather different

proposals as to how the objects of our experience are organized: inten

tionally, authochthonously, and intensionally (respectively). Briefly sum

marized: Gurwitsch diverges from Husserl in giving a strongly noematic

account of the object. F0llesdal diverges from Husserl and Gurwitsch in





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then, we can conclude from Follesdal's analysis that one of the

components of the noema, noematic sense, is "an intentional entity,"

and a second component may be partially intentional. Therefore,

I find that the nature of the noema, as developed in Follesdal's

analysis and summarized in thesis 12, contradicts the nature of the

noema as posited in thesis l.48

Ill

In this section, I sketch an interpretation of the noema that

retains Husserl's distinctions between aspects of the object and

components of the noema, as well as differences in context ("natural"

or "reduced") that are neglected in Follesdal's analysis. I recognize

that this brief a portrayal may well raise more questions than it

answers. Nevertheless, my criticism of Follesdal's endeavor seems

to demand an effort to respond in a positive manner. In other

words, rejecting his analysis obliges me to propose an alternative.

All that follows, then, should be read as carrying the prefatory

phrase, "I propose that. . . ." It should also be read as further

elaboration upon the structure of the noema in Husserl's analysis,

as summarized in section II.

Noemata are not perceived through our senses (sensory ap

paratus), but what they designate may be described in terms of our

senses. In other words: if an object presents itself (within the

replacing the object with a concept. He converges with Gurwitsch, how

ever, in neglecting the subject's constitutive role in experiencing either

object (in Gurwitsch's case) or concept (in his own case). Cf. Solomon,

pp. 168-169.48

This contradiction follows from F0llesdal's intermittant conflation

of noematic sense and full noema, together with the replacement thesis

discussed earlier in this paper. For Husserl, in contrast, the noematic

sense is differentiated as an intentional (sense-giving) moment, within an

experience that is noetically and noematically structured. The term des

ignates, therefore, a conceptually supplied identification of directedness

toward a coherently and consistently present intentional object. For Hus

serl, then, it is as incorrect to hold that "whatever applies to the noematic

Sinn also holds for the full noema"?and, by the replacement thesis, for

the object?as it would be to hold that a deductive sub-argument within

an inductive argument requires us to evaluate the entire argument as a

deductive structure.





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reduction) as "sensory," components of that experience's noema the

matize sensorially-accessible determinations of that object The

structure and function of the noema is not affected when a non

sensorial objective correlate is the subject matter of a particular

act, although particular components may well be more, or less,

delineated or relevant in such cases. For instance, the sub-groupings

of a pile of peas on a dinner plate are rather inconsequential de

terminations of that object, but highly consequential in delineatinga mathematical equation or linguistic expression (proposition).

The function of the noema inanalyzing

various sorts ofobjective

correlates (e.g., perceptual objects; linguistic expressions) remains

the same. (Strictly speaking, there is no "perceptual noema"; we

have only noemata of perceptual, linguistic, etc., acts.) "Noema"

simply designates that portion of the organized structure of our

experiencing that pertains to the experienced object, in contrast to

the "noesis," which pertains to the experiencing subject in that

structure. The use of both terms presupposes the unusual orien

tation toward the structure of experiencing?rather than the agent

or object of an experience?that is imposed by the phenomenological

technique of epoche and reduction.

The moments or components of the noema most discussed by

Husserl are its unified directedness?"noematic sense," in the strict

or narrow use of that term; its "core" of characteristics; and its

"manner of givenness." In this section, I will present William

McKenna's proposal that this last component is analyzable into two

distinct "manners," which he calls "ontic" and "appearential." I

then go on to propose that noematic sense allows of a correlated

differentiation between the unity and identity of the noema's locus

of directedness. Since this proposal deliberately?and, I hope, con

structively?diverges from Husserl's analysis, a summary of my

understanding of that analysis, as argued in sections I and II, may

be helpful.

The noematic sense is that aspect of the noema which indicates

that the intentional actor is related to an objective correlate; i.e.,

it locates a "mere what" as the locus upon which

intentionalityis

directed. This locus-and-delineations model is open to misinter

pretation along hub-and-spokes or pincushion-and-pins lines. In

order to avoid this, the indescribability of this locusmust be stressed.

We can say that the act is directed, and then go on to specify how

the locus of that direction is present. On the basis of that distinction





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(not a separation; the noematic sense is not an independent entity),

Husserl speaks of sense, in strict or narrow usage, as "the object

as such"; the mere locus which remains the same throughout a

series of intentional acts which are directed to the same object.

This component thus provides an answer to a question for which

causality or existential status is usually invoked: how do we know

that we have the same locus, despite describable changes? Husserl

responds: the acts in question present the sense, "same 'what'."

Thus, this component of the noema addresses the unity that cannot

be describedwithin,

or as a

part (or

even

feature)of the

object?but is, rather, a precondition of any description. Even when the

object at issue is a perceptually accessible one, there is no sensory

correlate to this conceptual moment. Husserl expresses this by

speaking of the noematic sense as "ideal" or "irreal": not specifiable

by spatiotemporal predicates.

The manner of givenness component of the noema does involve

spatiotemporal predicates. My friend is present ("given") as "thin,"

"serious," "distant," "blond," "anticipated," "enjoyable," "remem

bered," "philosophical"?the list is surely not endless in principle,

but is so in fact. Two differences appear in considering any such

list of predicates. Some?those I call "ontic"?clearly refer to the

nature of the object; e.g., "blond." Others?those I call "presen

tational"?just as clearly refer to the way in which that object is

present; e.g., "anticipated." Also, even in this example of a per

ceptually accessible object, some predicates have non-sensory cor

relates, although others are sensorially given. There is no direct

matching of these categories: ontic predicates designate non-sensoryas well as sensory characteristics and the same duality applies also

to presentational predicates.

This difference between ontic and presentational characteristics

is discussed in detail by McKenna.49 He argues that consideration

of the differences in these types of characterizations point toward

different types of inadequacy in "filling" the givenness of perceptual

49"Husserl's Theory of Perceptual Inadequacy" (Paper delivered atthe Twelfth Annual Meeting of the Husserl Circle, Ohio University, 1980);a revised version appears in Journal of the British Society for Phenome

nology 12 (1981): 125-139. I use "presentational" rather than McKenna's

term, "appearential," in order to stress the applicability of Husserl's con

ception, and McKenna's refinement, to all modes of intentionality?ratherthan suggesting any restriction to perceptual intending.





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objects. Ontic predicates, he points out, give us an intrinsically

inadequate presentation in relation to an ideal of total presence.

When we have one side or perspectival view of the object, certain

others are denied us. Attaining any of those others may well involve

surrendering the first. We cannot, by virtue of the very structure

of perception, simultaneously attain the totality of possible "ad

umbrations" sensorially. (Although McKenna does not explore the

applicability of his observation to cognitively accessible objects,

such as poems, I believe that extending his investigation into that

sphereof

experiencewould reveal a

comparable structure.)A very different sort of inadequacy is involved in those pred

icates I have called "presentational," and McKenna names "ap

pearential." Although we do have a conceptual ideal of total giv

enness in relation to which any set of ontic determinations will be

inadequate, we do not have a comparable ideal for presentational

predicates. Instead, we have norms, or averages: a violin tone sounds

"right," and a person approaching appears to be of "normal" height,

at particular distances.50 We have an ideal of complete ontic giv

enness; we lack any such ideal of a "privileged" or "absolute" pre

sentation?although we do set up certain "normal" determinations,

and consider the presentation as "fulfilled" when that norm is

achieved. These norms are directly related to particular interests,

however (e.g., the norm for the piano tuner vs. for the concert

goer), and so can claim no absolute status comparable to that which

is available for the ontic category of manners of givenness. (Again,

I believe that a comparable situation may be found relative to cog

nitively accessible objects.)

Correlative to McKenna's proposal that manner of givenness

is analyzable into two sorts of characteristics, I find that noematic

sense designates two functions of the intentional locus: unity (as

discussed by Husserl) and identity. However, a distinct moment

of identity is not proposed by Husserl.51 Rather, this function is

combined with the unity of the intentional locus (i.e., the noematic

50The tone and approaching person examples are from McKenna, pp.132-137.

51My stress upon a moment of identity as a crucial component of the

noema is suggested in Gurwitsch's discussion; see, e.g., pp. 221-225, 227,

234. To my knowledge, Gurwitsch does not go on to stress the distinction

between "identity" and "unity" moments that I have proposed here as

analogous to the distinctions recognized by McKenna.





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sense). At the beginning of this essay, I suggested that the very

presence and particular formulation of certain problems inHusserl'swork may be understood by attending to his remarkably persistent

involvement with Humean questions. The theory of the noema,

and especially the aspect of identity as a distinct moment of its

structure, can now be considered as an example of this suggested

appreciation of philosophical doctrines as responses to particular

questions.

In the Treatise Hume proposes that "the imagination" must

function so as to resolve the "uneasiness" which "arises from the

opposition of two contrary principles."52 My reading of Husserl on

the noema sees him as looking again at this contrariety, and pro

viding an epistemic, rather than psychological, resolution. To serve

this purpose, the full noema must include a moment of identity in

addition to those of unity (established by the noematic sense), "core"

of characteristics, and manner(s) of givenness. None of these can

be equated with the full noema, without surrendering the complexity

of Husserl's theory of intentionality in favor of another which is

less radical, and probably closer to a traditional idealism. In order

to support this contention, we must now give some consideration

to the problem (for which the noema is the answer), as it appears

in Hume.

Since all impressions are internal and perishing entities, and appearas such, the notion of their distinct and continued existence must

arise from a concurrence of some of their qualities with the qualitiesof the imagination.

. . .53

Hume finds two such "qualities" in perceptions: "coherence and

constancy" provide for the "distinct existence" and "continued ex

istence" of objects, respectively. Unlike "internal impressions,"

whose "existence depends upon our perception" and which exhibit

only a deficient type of coherence, "external objects" exhibit both

qualities.54

52David Hume, A Treatise on Human Nature, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge,

(Oxford, 1896), p. 206.53Hume, p. 194; emphasis added. As he explains in the first paragraph

and first footnote of the Treatise (pp. 1-2), Hume uses "impressions" to

designate "merely the perceptions themselves."54

Ibid., pp. 194-195. For the interchangeability of "impressions" and

"perceptions," see footnote 53. For "object" and "perception," see p. 202:

"There is only a single existence, which I shall call indifferently object or





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However, the mind's inference of continued existence (based

on the "constancy" quality) is "too weak to support alone so vastan edifice, as that of continued existence of all external bodies."55

Hume therefore sets out to give "a satisfactory account of that

opinion," but warns us that this involves the whole of his system.56

Within the limits of this paper, we cannot follow him even into the

synopsis which he then provides. However, a few further words

concerning the contradiction already mentioned are needed, before

returning to the noema as Husserl's response to Hume's account

of

identity.

The contradiction arises in this way:

One single object conveys the idea of unity, not that of identity. On

the other hand, a multiplicity of objects can never convey this idea,however resembling they may be supposed. The mind always pronounces the one not to be the other, and considers them as forming...

[a] number of objects, whose existences are entirely distinct and

independent.57

Hume's solution requires "a fiction of the imagination" that enables

the mind to construe the idea of identity.58 This idea is then applied

to situations in which a multitude of "resembling perceptions" of

either "related" or "identical" objects is presented to a mind that

is none too adept at distinguishing between those categories.59 Al

though he confesses that his reasoning here is "abstruse," he con

cludes:

The smooth passage of the imagination along the ideas of the resem

bling perceptions make us ascribe to them a perfect identity. The

interrupted manner of their appearance makes us consider them as

so many resembling, but still distinct beings, which appear after

certain intervals.60

Sensory experience, then, presents a situation of contradiction be

tween interruption of appearances and identity of perceptions, for

which Hume has only a psychological resolution.

perception." Hume notes that this usage follows "the generality of man

kind" rather than "a more philosophical way of speaking." The context

of the passage quoted from p. 194 suggests that this usage is in effect

there.?

Ibid., pp. 198-199.56

Ibid., p. 199.57

Ibid., p. 200; emphases added.58

Ibid., p. 201.59

Ibid., pp. 203-204.60

Ibid., p. 205.





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We can now consider Husserl's notion of the noema as a response

to this contradiction and its underlying problem: what relation, if

any, is there between the unity and identity of an object? Typically,

the phenomenologist's approach to this sort of question is through

consideration of an instance of the phenomenon in question. Within

this approach, Hume's formulation is revealed as descriptively in

accurate: seeing my friend after months of separation, I am cog

nizant of an identity (of the person) as well as a multiplicity (of

acts)?and perhaps, even, an identity by virtue of that multiplicity

and its associated alterations (e.g., absence of the friend as

"bodilypresent," but presence as "remembered" and "anticipated").

When I reflect upon any of these acts (within the strictures of

the reduction), I can specify the noematic correlate of that act by

identifying various characteristics (senses), while recognizing that

the "what" of each noema signifies that noema's unity, coherence,

and sense of "distinct existence"?without itself being character

izable at all. This last feature is emphasized in Husserl's talk of

the noematic sense as "the pure x in abstraction from all predicates";

the "determinable subject of its possible predicates." We have here

a conceptual moment that provides the "point of unification" for

characteristics comprising the "core" (as well as manners of giv

enness) of one noematic correlate, while remaining itself an "empty

'something'."61

Yet, there is no "place" within this (so to speak) cross-sectional

view of an intentional act, for any indication that a number of acts

can share one undeterminable "point of unification." Thus, the

analysis thus far gives no basis for the identity of several noemataas noemata of the same intentional focus; i.e., the identical or con

stant, in contrast to the unified or coherent, objective correlate.

Aron Gurwitsch also finds that identity involves an additional

dimension of experience:

the consciousness of the identity of the object arises not in spite of

but, on the contrary, in explicit reference to the multiple perceptionsof the object.62

Later in the same essay, he concludes that this "reference" toa

multiplicity of presentations, within one intending, is a condition

of directedness toward that object:

61Husserl, Ideas: First Book, p. 322.

62Gurwitsch, p. 223; emphases added. See also footnote 51.





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we are directed to an object insofar as, in the structure of the noema

corresponding to the act, there are inscribed

references

to further

noemata, to different manners of presentation of that object.63

Earlier, I briefly discussed McKenna's convincing argument for a

second dimension of "manner of givenness," so as to direct attention

to "presentational" features as distinct from "ontic" features. The

instigation for that proposal comes from his analysis of Husserl's

remarks concerning the intrinsically "horizonal" nature of percep

tion. McKenna finds that the resultant inadequacy of knowledge

of some features?those he calls "ontic"?isdifferent from inade

quacies which relate to its presentational (in his terminology, "ap

pearential") features.

The crucial point Iwould stress in that argument is the presence

of an ideal of complete givenness for ontic features in contrast to

the dimension of appearance (presentation). For the latter,

McKenna notes,

the same determination is necessarily given in different appearances,none of which can claim

priorityover the others as

givingthe de

termination in question in an 'absolute' form, as giving it as it reallyis itself.64

On the basis of his comparison of this feature with the comparablesituation for ontic determinations, he proposes the differentiation

of one of Husserl's structural aspects, "manner of givenness,"

into two.

Correlatively, I have proposed in this section that the "noematic

sense" must be differentiated into two moments.

One,"the

objectas such," pertains to the "what" of an intentional focus: its unity,

coherence, and "distinct existence." The other, which might be

called "the object as same," pertains to the persistence, throughout

multiple instances of intentional focus, of an identity, constancy,

and "continued existence." The parallelism between these analyses

of "givenness" and "sense" is further enhanced by noting that the

features which McKenna and Iwould distinguish by setting them

into new structural categories both fall outside of Husserl's broader

use of "noematic sense" to designate an "extended" nueleus. Both

presentational (in contrast to ontic) givenness and identity (in con

63Ibid., p. 234; emphasis added.

64McKenna, p. 130.





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trast to unity) require cognizance of successive multiplicities. These

function(in

Gurwitsch'sphrase)

as "inscribed references to further

noemata" within the structure of any one noematic correlate. Ac

cordingly, Husserl's analysis of the noema leads directly to a "Phe

nomenology of Reason" that considers fundamental issues raised

by Hume's reliance upon "the imagination" to assist "mind."65 More

generally, his analysis of the noema leads to a new field of inves

tigation: the genetic constitution of sense.66

University of Texas at Arlington

65This phrase is the title for the chapter immediately following "The

Noematic Sense and the Relation to the Object" chapter (from which I

have quoted extensively) in Ideas: First Book.66

An earlier version of this paper was presented to the Annual Meetingof the Husserl Circle inWaterloo, May 1981. I would like to thank Jose

Huertas-Jourda, William McKenna, Harry Reeder, and Thomas Seebohm

for their insightful and extensive comments on the original paper as well

asongoing

related efforts.

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