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International Phenomenological Society

Pains and Other Secondary Mental EntitiesAuthor(s): Laird AddisSource: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 47, No. 1 (Sep., 1986), pp. 59-74Published by: International Phenomenological Society

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Philosophy

nd

Phenomenologicalesearch

Vol.

XLVII,

No.

i,

September986

Pains ndOther

econdary

Mental ntities

LAIRD ADDIS

Universityf

owa

There

are,

or

very

much

ppear

to

be,

a

number fthings

n

theuniverse

with

he

following

haracteristics:

hey re "private"

o

anyperson

who s

aware

of them

n

a

certain

way; they

eem

very

ossibly

o

exist

only

f

someone

s aware

of

them

n a

certain

way; they

re

not

iterally

onstitu-

entsof

states f

consciousness;

hey

re not

composed

of

atoms

and

mol-

eculesbutmayhavesome"physical" haracteristicsuch s shape, patial

location, and color; and they re

commonly eferred o as

something

mental.Anythinghatmore r

ess satisfies hese

onditions

call a

secon-

dary

mental

ntity.

Secondary

mental ntities all nto

hree

moderately

istinct

ubcatego-

ries.

They are i) sensations

roper

uch as

pains,

tickles, nd itches; 2)

emotions

roper

uch s

anger, ear,

nd

exhilaration;

nd

3)

perception-

related ntitiesuch as sensedata, images, nd afterimages.hoseof the

third

ategory

re

obviously

more

heory-dependent

otions

han

hose

f

the

other

wo;

and

my alling

he

members

f all

three

ategories

ntities

shouldbe taken

nitially

s

only

convenient

ay

of

speaking

nd not as

an

endorsement

r

denial

of

any particular heory

s to

theirnatureor

existence.

In

the

mpiricistradition

n

the

philosophy

f

mind, econdarymental

entities ave

usuallybeen

taken o be

the

very ssence,

r

at least

paradig-

matic, ftherealm f thementalwhile tates fconsciousness ave been

largelygnored. Or, perhaps

t

would

be

more

nearly

ccurate

o

say

that

many

have supposed

hat

tates

f

consciousness an be

exhaustivelyna-

lyzed bysecondary

mental

ntities.)

or

this

amentable

tate

of affairs

there re

very ood

historical nd

very oor philosophical

easons;

or so

at

least have

argued

n

detail

lsewhere.'

But

for

good

or

ill,

t s

easy

to

understand ow

taking

mind o consist

nly,

r

paradigmatically,f sec-

I

See"Behaviorism

nd the

Philosophy

f

the

Act,"

specially

p.

410-14.

PAINS AND

OTHER SECONDARY

MENTAL

ENTITIES 59

8/20/2019 2107724


ondarymental ntities ould facilitate

he

lide

ntomaterialism hathas

largelybefallen ur tradition. or secondarymentalentities re much

moreplausibly, fyetwrongly, nalyzed s "identical o" physical hings

than are statesof consciousness.

States f consciousness re theprimarymental ntities. y this mean,

in part, hata beingof any kind thathas no statesof consciousness s a

being withno

mind

at all however ubtleor sophisticated by external

description)

ts behavior

may

be.

According

o the

analysis

of statesof

consciousness

hat and others

have

defended lsewhere,2

very

tateof

consciousness onsistsminimallyf

a

particular whethermomentary

r

continuant oes

not matter

ere)exemplifyingnstances

f two kindsof

properties: n intentional roperty hich ndicateswhatthe wareness s

of orabout, nda modeproperty hich s the ort fawarenesst s an

imagining, perceiving, suddenremembering,

r

whatever.

he

inten-

tionalityfthesituations captured rimarily

n

thenotionof the nten-

tionalproperty hich, t least

on

myview, ntrinsicallyepresents hat,

preanalytically,hethoughts said to be about.3While shall presentmy

account of

secondary

mental

entities

hrough

his

analysis

of statesof

consciousness,

most fwhat shall

ay

does not

depend

on itsdetails ven

as just brieflyketched.

Dispositionalmental tates uch s belief nd hope are the ertiary en-

tal entities.

hey

will be

entirelygnored

n

this

essay.

So much then for

argely lassificatory

nd

terminologicalmatters.

Now to

theory.

t s

widely

elieved

hat

he xistence

f

econdary

mental

entities

hows thatBrentanowas mistaken

n

maintaining

hat ntention-

ality s the

"mark" of themental

ecause,

t

s

said,

such

entities

re men-

tal but

they

re not

ntentional;

hat

s, they

re not

about anything.4he

truth fthematter,shall rgue, ies omewhere etween, utmorenearly

withBrentano han his critics. ndeed,the account thatfollowsmay be

taken s

a

partialdefense

f the

ctlobject nalysis

f

states f conscious-

ness

in

particular

nd of mental

ife

n

general.

z

See

especially Acts" by GustavBergmann,

he

Structure f

Mind

by Reinhardt

ross-

mann, nd my "Behaviorism nd the Philosophy f the Act."

3

See "Natural Signs" for an extended

defense

f

the

thesis hat the universe ontains

intrinsicallyepresentingntities.

4

For just one recent xample of this rgument, ee RichardRorty's hilosophy nd the

Mirror fNature,p. 22. Brentano's wn treatmentf pain n the ontext f hisviewthat

themental

s the

ntentional

s

not,

o

be

sure, ransparently

lear.Some crucial

passages

can

be

found

n

his

Psychology rom

n

Empirical tandpoint

n

pp.

89-go

and in his

Sensorynd NoeticConsciousnessn p.

i6

andp. 59.

60 LAIRD

ADDIS






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Ignoring umerous

mportant ifferencesmong

the variouskindsof

secondary

mental ntitiesincluding

he fundamental

uestion

of

their

very xistence), shall

proceedbytaking bodily)

ain

as

representative

f

all sensations roper

nd

more

broadly

f all

secondary

mental ntities.

SomeofwhatI saywould have to be modifiedmutatismutandis o be

true, ven

n

my pinion,

f themembers

f the

econd

nd third

ubcate-

gories

f

secondary

mental

ntities,

utsuch

requirements

ill

ordinarily

be obvious.

On the

theory

shall

defend,

here

s a

special

dialectical

advantage

o

taking

ain

as

representative,

or

pain

has a

nearly nique

feature

hatmakes tmore esistant

n the urface o that

heory. hus,

f

can make the

account

plausible

n

the case of

pain,

I

shall

have

made

it

even more so

for he other

econdary

mental ntities.

I propose simply o present succinct ummary f my account at the

outset,

hen

laborate t

and

defend

t

by

considering

nd

replying

o a

series

of

likely bjections.

A

pain (or

a

fear,

r an image) s

an

intentional bject.

To

feel pain

s

to be

n a

certain

onscious tate

hat ntends

pain.

Thus,

f

feel

pain

n

my ight oe,theres

on

the ide

ofthe ct the onscious tate

f

feeling

he

pain,and on

the ide ofthe

object

he

pain

n

myright

oe. Like all act/ob-

ject situations,his ne involves n the ide of the act theoccurrence f a

particular xemplifying

n intentional

roperty

nd a

mode

property.

he

intentional ropertymay reasonably

e referredo as the-thought-that-

my-right-toe-hurts

nd

the

mode

property s

simply eing-a-feeling.It

does

not

matter

articularly

hat find

xactly

he

right

ordor even less

ambiguous

word

than

feeling'

or

his

mode

property;

t am

right,

e all

can

discover y

ntrospection

hatthe

propertys.)

Thus the

pain as

such

is never omethinghat ntends

but

only

something hat s intended.5

Generalizingrom he ase ofpain, maintain hat very occurrent)tate

of

mind nvolves

mental ct even

though

ome

mental

hings

secon-

dary

mental ntities

are notthemselvestates f consciousness r even

constituents

f states of consciousness.

Thus,

Brentano

was

essentially

though

not

literally

orrect

n

maintaining

hat

intentionality

s

the

"mark"

of the mental.

Apart

from

general

uspicion

of mental cts,

whichare not hereat

issue,why houldanyoneresist his ccountofpainandother ensations

as well as

the

other econdary

mental ntities?

Even

though some)

emotions

re

sometimes

aid to

be

"object-directed"

r

even to

"intend"

omething,

t s not correct o

say

that

hey,

n the

primaryense, re

or contain

intentional

ntities.

When fear

omething,

here

s,

of

course,

n me

a mental tate

hat

intendswhatI fear,but tis not thefear tself hatdoes the ntending.

PAINS AND OTHER

SECONDARY

MENTAL

ENTITIES 6i






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First bjection:

If

youare correct,

t

hould

be

possible

n principle or

a pain

to

exist

unfelt. or

f

pain

is

merely

n

object

of

some mental ct,

then ike all intentional

bjects tshouldbe able to be,

f

t can be at all,

without eing ntended.

ut t s absurd osupposethat here re or could

be painsthat re notfelt; urvery oncept fpain precludes hepossibility

of

unfelt

ains by

dentifying pain

withthe feeling

f

pain."

I reply:Claims about

"our very oncept" of anything

hatsoever re

verydifficulto

evaluate both for heir

ccuracy

nd

for

heir

elevance

since

hey re,

take

t,

ssentiallynthropological

heses. cannot peak,

perhaps, or nyone lse's"concept"ofpain

or

anything

lse,very trictly

speaking;

but

I, for

my

part,

do

not

have

the

conceptual pparatusmy

objector

would ascribe o

all of us. That however

goesonly

to the

esser

part oftheobjection.For the rest, havemuch more to say.

If

a pain, considered

part from omeone's feeling t or otherwise

intendingt, ust s a particular hatexemplifiesertain

roperties, hen

there

an be

no denying

he

ontologicalpossibility

f theexistence f a

pain

that

no

one s aware of.6

or,

when onsidered ot

imply

s

a

partic-

ular but as one exemplifying

ertain

roperties, pain

is an

ontological

fact where fact,

t least

n

the

implest ases,

s a

complex onsisting

f

the xemplificationf a property y particularrof a relation ytwoor

moreparticulars); nd facts,

f

not

facts

lone,

are ontologically apable

of

independent

xistence.7

But s it causallypossiblefor pain to existunfelt?

nd s this eally ll

the

ssue of

the

possibility

f unfelt ainscomes down to? Or is there ot

some strongerense

n

which t s

impossible

or here o be unfelt ains?

shall

try

o

do

justice

o the

phenomenology

f the situation

again,

the

anthropology

f

t

find f ittle nterest) hilenevertheless

reserving

6

So

I

am one of thosepeople of whom Rorty omplains nPhilosophyndthe

Mirrorf

Nature,

.

30, who make pains into particulars. ut then, hrough line

of reasoning

whose cogency scapes me,Rorty aysthat hese articulars re "really"universals

fter

all because,presumably ccording o thesemistaken hilosophers, heseparticulars

re

ones whoseessespercipi.hat Descartes, erkeley, ume, maybeRussell, nd certainly

manyotherswere confused n thinking f "ideas" or "impressions" r "sense data"

sometimes s particulars nd sometimes s properties nd onlyrarely s whattheymust

be, if there re any such things, amely, articulars s exemplifyingertain

roperties,

does

not ustify orcing

uch theoristnto

holding

uch

things

o

be

Platonic)

niversals

andthen evenmoredubious offeringhis s anexplanationwhy omephilosophers

think fsuchthings s "immaterial."

By way

of

contrast,

either

articulars

s

such nor

properties

s such are ontologically

capable of ndependentxistence. particularmusthavepropertiesndpropertiesmust

be exemplified

n

order o be. For a recent, horough, nd incisive reatment

f the ssues

of

facts, ndependence, nd ontologicalpossibilities,

ee ReinhardtGrossmann's

The

CategorialtructureftheWorld,

hapter .

62

LAIRD ADDIS






8/20/2019 2107724


view that s bothtrue

n my udgment

nd also of some substantial,

on-

troversialontent.

I contend hat not only

s

it ontologically ossible

for

pains

to exist

unfelt, ot

only

s it

causally

possible

forpainsto existunfelt,

ut even

more: there are unfeltpains This theory, believe, is the best

explanation

f certain henomenological

nd otherobservational ata,

buthasthe

dditional

irtue

fmaking

ntelligible

n the ct/objectnaly-

sis of

pain

here

defended

ertain hings

hat n

most

lternativeccounts

are not intelligible.

he

relevant henomenological

nd

otherobserva-

tional

data maybe represented

ythefollowing

ind

f ituation: friend

has a moderately

evereheadache

of whichhe

complains

when

you meet

himon the street.As you

talk, heconversation

urns o

philosophy

nd

soon becomesquiteanimated.Throughouthispartofthe conversation

your

friend,

ncharacteristically,ubshis

head

and

furrows is

brow

as

if

in

pain.

As thephilosophical

alk

abates

a fewminutes ater,your

friend

again

complains

f

his

headache but

adds thathe

completely

forgot"

t

during

he

philosophical

xchange.

Thus the

phenomenological

ata as

reported yyour

friend

re thathe first elt

is

pain,

for

whiledid

notfeel

any pain,

then

gain

felt

n

exactly

imilar

ain.

The

observational ata

availabletoyouare

i)

the verbalreports f thephenomenological ata

which,

et us

assume,

you

have no reason

to

doubt as to their

ccuracy,

and

(z)

the fact

that

your

friend

xhibited

headache-pain

behavior

throughout

he meeting. submit

hat the

best way

to understand his

situation s

to

suppose

that he

friend

ontinued

o "have" his headache

throughout

he meeting ven though

t was not feltby

him

part

of

the

time.8

Butwhat

then s itto "have"

a headache hat s not felt? s itsome

kind

of ntentionaltate?Perhaps ome furtheristinctions eedtobedrawn.

In

orderto do so, however,

omething

must be said first,

n a longish

digression,

bout

the

very mportant

otion

of

attending-to,

notion

almost entirelygnored

by philosophers

f

mind.9

Let

us

considerfor

a

moment

he case of visual

perception r, more

properly,f what does

and

maygo

on withrespect

o vision.

n

a typical

visualsituation

ne

maydistinguish

i)

thatwhich

s

in

one's visual field,

8

David

Armstrong olds

a similarview

in

his

A

Materialist

Theory

f Mind, p.

14.

9

One canfind omeoblique

comments bout

attending-ton two ofthe

lassics n philoso-

phyof

mind,C. D. Broad's

The Mindand Its Place in

Nature and H.

H. Price'sThink-

ing and

Experience.AndDavid Palmer

n his usefulpaper

"Unfelt ains" draws some

distinctionshat nvolve omething

ike

this

notion.

Butthere s little

lse,

at least

n

the

analytic

radition, nownto thiswriter.

Alan R. White

has a book

with he promising

title

f

Attention,

ut t

turns

ut

to be about how

people

speak

rather hanwhat

they

speak about.

PAINS AND OTHER SECONDARY

MENTAL ENTITIES 63






8/20/2019 2107724


(z)

thatupon

which

one is

focusing,

nd

(3)

that o whichone is paying

attention.

ometimes ne is not attending articularly

o anything

n the

visual

field

whether r not one

is

focusing

n anything;

nd sometimes

one is

attendingo something

n the visual

field

ther

han whatone is

focusingn. (Furthermore,ithrespect o eachof these hree spects ne

maydistinguish

hatwhich

s given

from hatwhich s

perceived,

roperly

speaking;

but herewe may gnore

his

omplication.)

s thatwhich s

in

the

visual

field

utuponwhich

ne is neither ocusing

or attending ev-

ertheless

ntended y

some

mental ct? This

s one

question

nemay

ask

with respect

to these

distinctions.

nother s: what is this

matter f

attending o something?

or we all know that under

exactly

he same

external

onditions

that

s,

what

light

rays

strikemy eyes I may

attend o thisand then o thatand again to this.

Before attempt

ome

answer o these uestions,

we may ake

notice f

thefact

hat hephenomenon

f

attending-to

s

peculiar

neither o visual

perception

or to

human

beings.

Among

a

cacophony

of voices

we are

able to attend oonly

one,

notnecessarily

he

oudest;

mong

everal

is-

tinguishable

eatures

n

thetasteof

a delicate

wine,

we

can attend irst o

itsbodiness,

hen o ts

dryness,nd so on.

Obviously,

nimals

an and do

makesimilar istinctions;hevery urvival fanyanimal dependson its

being

ble to attend electively

o some

aspects

of what t

perceives

nd

simultaneously

o

ignore

others.One

may

reasonably uspect

that

the

phenomenon

f attending-to

s

a feature f

all

states

f consciousness

n

all

beings.

But

what s attending-to,

ntologically

peaking?

s it some

additional

mental

ct, or some additional

mentalpropertyf some

mental

cts,or

just

heightened

intensity"

f

certain

roperties

hatmental cts

already

have,orsomethinglsealtogether?What,to concentraten a particular

case,happens

when s

I

sit

here

focusing

n the

paper

allow

my

ttention

momentarilyo

fall on the cupboard

on which

am

not

focusing nd

which s at the

edge

of

my

visual

field?

My "sensory nput"

remains

unchanging y

assumption,

nd

I

surely

ontinue o focus

on and to

per-

ceive the paper

to

which was

a moment arlieralso attending.

he

answer,

believe,

s

either

i)

that o

every

r

nearly

very

mode of aware-

nessthere orresponds "heightened" orm f t call it the upermode

-

which,

when

it occurs

in

a

given

awareness,

makes

impossible

he

simultaneous

ccurrence

f the

upermode

f

any

other

wareness,

r

(z)

that here

s

a

separate

mode of

attending-to,

hich ct of

awareness an

intend

only

what is simultaneously

ntendedby

some other

mode of

awareness

nd

which an at

a moment

ccompany

nly

ne other

mode

to

the ame

ntentional

bject.

Assuming

hat he

upermode

as

a

very

lose

64

LAIRD

ADDIS






8/20/2019 2107724


similarity

o

its correspondingmode,

I

find

no

way

to

choose

between

these

ossibilities

n

phenomenological rounds;

nd no other s relevant

in this ase. (I reject s being oo "external" he dea of simply "third"

propertyin addition o the ntentional ropertynd themode property

-

ofsomemental ct, ustas I reject ll other ossibilitiescan think f.)

But,finally,o return o the ase ofpain: we are now

n

a position o see

the

possibility

f

maintaining

hat

n

unfelt

ain

is not

necessarily ne

of

which

person

s

totally naware, lthough

hat

emains possibilityoo.

In

factwe now have

three

possibilities o

consider

n

accounting or he

data

of

the

situation imagined

arlier:

i)

the

pain

itselfhas

simply

ceased

to

existduring

he ime hat he onversation

as animated, ossi-

bly

ustbecause the

person

was

not

attending

o it

but nstead o the ub-

jectofthe onversation,utthe ssential hysiological round fthepain

continued o exist

nd

continued o

produce

he

pain behavior;

r

(z)

the

pain continued

o exist

hroughout

heconversation

lthough

he

person

was in no

sense

aware

of

it;

or

(3)

the

person

continued o "have" the

pain, that s,

in

some

sense

continued o be aware of it much ike

some-

thing'smerely eing

n

one's visual

field,

ut

was not

attending

o

it.

This

last possibility uggests hatto feel

a

pain may best be

characterized

s

both"having"a pain and attendingo it,the atter fwhich,depending

on

the ircumstances, ay

or

may

not be "forced" n one.

(Having pain

and

attending o

it

are,

both

separately

nd

jointly,

o be

distinguished

fromdisliking he pain. Some people enjoy certain ven rather evere

pains,

nd all of us seemto welcome ertain

light

nes

especially

n

over-

coming

severe

tches,

for

example;

some

people

find

hat

even rather

intensepains

do not bother

hem,

nd other

bodily

sensations uch as

itches, or xample, re morediscomfortinghanmanypains.These facts

provide additional grounds for distinguishing ain fromthe various

modes of awareness

f t nsofar

s

one

mayhave or feel r attend o or

dislike

one's

pains

in

various

degrees

nd

combinations.

And of

course

these

same

facts

make

ridiculous hose

crude

pleasure/painalculi so

beloved of some earlier

thicists.)

Having brought

matters

o this

point,

nd

understandinglearly

hat

there s no ontological r otherpurely hilosophical easonwhya pain

should not existwithout nyawareness f twhatsoever,,'tmaynot be

very mportant

o choose

from

mong

these

possibilities

nsofar

s very

little lse seems

to

depend

on which

one

of

them,

f

any, s true. am

extremely

ubious about

the

first

ossibility ccording

o

which

there

Could

pain

xist

f

here ere

o consciousnesst all?

Despite

he

robably

niversal

inclination

obelieve

ot,

can

hink

f

no

good

eason

n

upport

f

hat elief hen he

modal ermsontologicalatherhan ausal.

PAINS AND OTHER SECONDARY MENTAL ENTITIES

65






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may

be pain

behavior

without ain (except

of

coursewhen t s faked

r

otherwise

imulated).

As

betweenthe

second and the third,

findno

ground

for choosing,

the onlyrelevant

kind being

phenomenological,

because

byassumption,

ne could

not

possibly

ntrospects

to thenature

ofan hypothesizedwareness hat s at the outer dgeofconsciousness,

just

as one

cannot ntrospect

irectly

s to thenatureofmerely

aving

something

n one's visual

field.And with

this I take myself

o

have

answered he

first bjection.

Second objection:

If

pains

are to bedistinguished

rom he wareness

of them,

hen ither

ains

are where hey

re

experienced

s being r, ike

some

other

forms f awareness

n the

act/object

nalysis

f

mental

ife,

being

ware ofa

pain

does

notensure hat given ain

actually xists.

he

firstossibilityntails hatpainsmay xistwhereno partof a body s as in

the

familiar ase

of the

amputee

who

experiences

ain

in' his no

longer

existingimb,

n

implication

which

s

absurd;

and

the

other

ossibility

s

absurd on its

face:

existing

ut unfelt

ains

are

already

bad

enough

for

your

heory;

ow

you

must

dmit lso

the

possibility

f

nonexisting

elt

pains."

I

reply:Before

tackle thisobjection

directly,t is worth bsorbing

morefullyhecrucialfact hatpains, ike someother ensations ndsec-

ondary

mental ntities,

re

usually xperienced

s

being

f a definite

pa-

tial

location,

as being

n a certain

place.

This factseems

to be

entirely

unaccountable

n theories

hat

deny ny

distinction etween

ain

and the

awareness

f t. s

my

wareness f

a

pain

n

my

ight

oe tself

upposed

o

be

in

myright

oe? Or

is the

pain

itself,

ike awareness

generally,

ot

n

space

at all but

merely

aused

by

a

physical

disorder

n

my right

oe or

somewhere

lse?

And

f

he

physical

ause is

elsewhere,

hen

ust

what,

n

these heories, oes myright oe haveto do withwhat spreanalytically

described s

a

pain

in

myright

oe? For

I

experience

he

pain

as

being

n

*my

ight

oe and do

not

which

s all

that

ppears

to be left or hese

heo-

ries)merely

elieve hat hepainhas

itscause there.

With his aid, etme

turn

directly

o the

objection.

It

is

truethaton

thegeneralanalysis

of intentionality

ere defended

there s no

requirement

hat he ntentional

bject

existor

that,

f t

does

exist,tbe nevery espectust s it s ntended.Thisdistinction,aisings

it does

the non-issue

f when an intended

bject

s

the

"same"

object

as

some

real

one,

s

not bsolute

but

only

he

wo

ends

ofa

continuum.)

With

respect

o pains

and other ensations,

here

re commonsense

resump-

tions hat

hey

renot

lways

where

hey

re

experienced

s

being

s

in

the

case of

the

mputee,

hat

f

omeone

xperiences

pain

then here

s

a

pain

that he

experiences,

nd that neverthelessome

pains

are not "real."

66

LAIRD ADDIS






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Accommodating

ll of

thesepresumptionsimultaneously

s it were

s,

believe,

neither

possible

nor

necessary

nsofar as

ordinary

discourse

sometimes istinguishes,

ometimes

enies

any

distinction

etween,

nd

sometimes imply onfuses, ain

as

something xperienced

n the one

sidewith he xperiencingf t on theother. o I canproceedonlybyset-

ting

ut the matter s

I

see it

and

then

determining,

f

there emains

ny

impulse o do so,

how it

fits hesecommonsense resumptions.

Once more,however, setout only lternativeshat re consistent ith

the

ct/objectnalysis

f

pain

here

dvocated.

With

respect

o thecase of

the

amputee,

at

any

rate

have no

difficulty

n

believing

hat

the

pain

exists

ust

where

t

s

experienced

s

being

ven

hough

o

part

f

anyone's

body s

in that

place,

and thiswhatever he

physical ause

of

thepain is

(which eemsto me here, s in all other ases, to be entirelyrrelevanto

thephilosophical nalysis f the ituation nsofar s thephysical ause of

a

given xperience

f

pain might

e

anything hatsoever).

here can be

no

basic ontological easonfor enying

his

ossibility,

hich

n

fact s the

one

I

prefer

n the

ground

hat t is

always preferable

o assume and to

believe

hat heworld s as it

s

experienced

s

being

unless

here

s

some

compelling

eason

for

believing

therwise., for

ne, simply

o

not

grasp

thewidely-assumedbsurditynthispossibility;ndinmy nswer othe

nextobjection may make

t sound

somewhat

ess

absurd

to

those

who

think

hey

do so

grasp.

It s also consistent ithmygeneral nalysis o allow thatpains are not

always ust

where

they

re

experienced

s

being.My specific

eason

as

contrasted

with

the

generalprinciple

ust

adumbrated)

for

finding

his

alternative

ossibility

omewhat

ess

appealing

han

he

heory

hat

pains

are

ust

where

hey

re

experienced

s

being

s that here hen eems o be

no criteriont all fordecidingwhere pain really s.A pain surelys not

always

where ts

physical

ause

is,

if

only

because

some

pains

have no

direct hysical auses. Of course, he awareness

of a

pain always has,

in

humans,

a

lawfully orresponding

nd

temporally

imultaneous

rain

state

which,

f

there s no

direct

hysical ause, may

be

regarded

s the

indirectause of thepain itself. ut thehypochondriac'securrenttom-

achaches

are

surely

not

in

his brain.

As for he matter fhow,on theact/object nalysisofpain,one can

guarantee hata pain genuinelyxists

when

a person s aware ofit,the

answer an

only

be

that

here

s no

such

guarantee

f

thatmeans

that

he

analysis

s

supposed

to

show

that t

s

ontologicallympossible

or ome-

one

to be aware of

a

pain

and the

pain

not

exist.

But

this ack of

a

guaran-

tee

applies, believe,

o awarenessof

any

kind and

thus

to all forms f

direct

wareness

ncluding

he

ntrospection

f one's own

statesof

con-

PAINS

AND

OTHER

SECONDARY

MENTAL

ENTITIES

67






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sciousness.

t

is

the

case,

I

emphatically

elieve, ontrary

o

Rorty

nd

others,

hat here re

certain inds f awarenesses hat re suchthat

noth-

ing else one could discover t

the

time could or would override ne's

belief

n

the

existence

f their bjects.

Thus

the

existence

f a

pain

in

my

right oe, towhich stand ntheform f awarenesswe call feeling,s as

"certain" t the

ime s isthat f

a

suddenremembering

hich am aware

of by ntrospection.

ore

precisely,

my knowledge"

hat

pain

exists

n

my ight

oe derives rom he

facts hat feel

pain

n

my ight

oe

and

that

I introspecthat

feeling. he dog

who is

in

pain

never knows" that t s

feeling pain

since

tneverntrospectstsfeeling

f

pain,

and

so

is neither

certainnor uncertain

hatthepain

it

feelsreally xists.

Thus

in

the ense

n which he

objector

aisedthis omplaint,

o

guar-

anteeexists nd none s called for.Or, toturn hequestion round,how

on

any

lternative

ccount s

t

guaranteed

hat

ne

actually

s

n

a

state

f

pain, however

nalyzed

and whether aken to be physical r mental r

some combination?

Whatevermeasure

f

certainty

omes fromwhatever

form f awareness

n

any

alternative

ccount an

justas

well come from

the wareness f pain

and the wareness

f that

wareness,

n

my naly-

sis.

With

this

take

myself

o have answered

he second

objection.

Third bjection: But whatthen, nthe ct/objectnalysis fpain,and

especialy

n yourversion

f it thatallows forthe

possibility

hatpains

may exist

whereno

body s,

makes pains

mental

s they

re

commonly

supposed

o

be?

And

f

hey

re not mental fter

ll, why

re

they

othby

commonsense

nd

by

mostof

the

relevant hilosophical

iteratureaken

to be,

and

often

aradigmatically

o

be,

mental?Are

they

not

ust

objects

in

space

and time

n

yourview,

nti s

thatnot a

sufficientondition

or

being

omething hysical?"

I reply: t s important o seefirsthat t s not, t leastnot directly,he

dualism/materialism

ispute

hat s at

ssuehere.

For,exceptfor he limi-

native

materialists hose views

may afely

e ignored, veryonemakes a

distinction

mong existents

etween he

physical

nd

the

mental ven

f

some

regard

he atter

s a

subset

r a

"part"

or n

some sense

n

aspect

of

the

former. he objection

before s then

s,

take t,

hat

ains

ought o be

mental

n the

minimal

ense

n

whichboth

thedualist nd the

non-elimi-

native)materialist ountenancementalthings,but thatmyact/object

analysis ppears

to make

pains

physical

n a

sense

n which

hey

re not

also

mental.

My

answer

o this

bjection

s

argely

ontained

n

what said earlier

n

the characterization

f

secondary

mental ntities.

irst,

ven on

the

act/

objectanalysis

f

feeling ain

that have

given,

ains

are

"private."

That

is,

forme to

feel

pain

s for

t

to be

"mine",

nd

no one else can

(as

a mat-

68 LAIRD ADDIS






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terof empirical

act)

be

aware

of

that

particular ain

in

that

way.The

"privacy" huspreserved

s,

n

a sense,

nly ausal

rather han ntological

(or "conceptual"

or

"logical"

as some

wouldsay);

but

that,

believe,

s as

it should be

insofar s, to speak very

oughly,

t

s

a broadly ausal

fact

that tates f consciousness endto cohere n a waythat llowsfor heir

groupings

nto "selves."

These groupings

ccur

partly

hrough he

xclu-

sive ntrospections

f certain

onscious

mental

tates, artly hrough

he

exclusive bjects

of certain onsciousmental tates,

nd

partly

hrough

otherprocesses.

But

to

the

degree

that

pains

are

"private"

and to the

degree

hatwhat s

"private"

s

also

mental,

ne has hereone

ground

or

saying

hat

even

on the

act/object

nalysispains

are

mental.

The reverse

ide ofthe

"privacy"

f pains s thefact hat hey

annotbe

perceivedhroughheouter enses: hey an be neither eennorheardnor

smelled

nor tasted." Nor

can

they

e felt n the ame sense n which

one

feels bug

n

one's bed or

a chair

hat

ne sits

n.

Furthermore,ains

can-

not be analyzedphysically

nto toms

nd

molecules.These

facts

oo pro-

vide reasonsfor

aying

hat

pains

are mental

f

onlybecause,

while

they

are

in

space

and

time,

hey

re

not

physical.

n

saying

his

however

and

nowthedualism/materialism

ssue

does obtrude),

am

assuming

hat he

(simple)propertyfbeing-a-pain-of-such-and-such-characters notthe

same property

s

anyphysical

roperty.

n

that

ense,

because

that

prop-

erty s

one that s knownneither y

ntrospection

irectly orbytheouter

senses,

t

is

not

strictly

peaking

ither

hysical

r mental.

t

is

known

through

eingfelt,

form

f direct

wareness;

and while

t is

entirely

proper nd natural o characterize

he mentalformallyo as to

include

secondary

mental

ntities,

t

s

important

lso to

stress

hat hese ntities

fall

n

thefar ide, o tospeak,of

theontological ivide

hat s thedeepest

amongthings t this evel: thosethatare intentionalnd thosethatare

not.

ntentionalitys the

mark

of the

mental n theprimary nd

preana-

lytic

notion of the mentalwhich

s that of states

of consciousness.But

pains

and

other

econdarymental ntities re notconstitutents

f

tates

f

consciousness.

It

will

be

seen

oo that his ccount

pparentlyssumes hat he

particu-

lar that

exemplifies

he

property

hat makes t a

pain,while

ocated

in

spaceandtime ndsometimes venbeing f a certain hape, s notphysi-

cal. For

if

t

were

a

physical

articular,

hat

s,

f

t also

exemplified

ome

properties

nownby heouter ense,

hen here s

no reasonwhy t hould

Can

any

econdary

ental

ntitiese

perceived

hrough

he

uter

enses?

think

ot,

n

the

trict

ense,

ven

gnoring

he

act

hat

more

r ess efinedhemo theyannot.

ut

it s

by

no

means

tterly

bvious hat

eithermotions or

ense

ata anever e per-

ceived.

PAINS AND OTHER SECONDARY MENTAL ENTITIES

69






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notadmit fphysical nalysis.

or

some

the dea of a non-physical

artic-

ular s alone grounds

or

deep suspicion;

nd othersmay oin themwhen

these articulars

reclaimed lso

notto

be minds

r

iteral

onstituents

f

minds. or others

he pparent ecessity

fthis ct/object

nalysis fpain

willonlyreinforceheirwillingnessobelieve nnon-physicalarticulars

and

therefore

o imagine

hat hoseparticulars

hat

xemplifyntentional

properties nd

mode properties

may also be non-physical.

ut that s

anothermatter eyondthe scope

of

this

paper.

Fourth bjection:

When

look insidemyself cannotdistinguish he-

nomenologically,

s you say,between

mypain and my eeling fpain. The

act/object nalysis ocates mypains

at too

great

'distance'

from

me. In

very

evere

ain

when ll else s blotted

ut,

am

mypain;

and

your naly-

sis cannotaccount forwhat s therebyxpressed."

I

reply:

n manyrespects

his

objection whichgoes

to the special fea-

ture f

pain

referred

o nearthe

beginning)

as

already

een

answered.

have pointed

to

a

number

of

facts

that

lend support

to

a

distinction

between

what s

experienced

nd the

xperiencing

f

t;

for

xample,

hat

thepain

is

experienced

s spatially

ocated. But

do

not wish

to

deny

he

initialforceof

otherphenomenological ata which seem

to tend

to

the

oppositeconclusion.For when "am" mypain,all distinction etween

me

as

one

who

experiences

nd thatwhich

experiencemay

eem

to

have

disappeared.

And no

doubt

many

otherkinds

of

experiences

ccur

in

mystics,

n

schizophrenics,

n

users

of certain rugs,

nd inothers that

can

be

and

are described

s

ones

in

whichthe

subject/object

istinction

simply vaporates.

While

not

the

ubject

f

any

such

experiencesmyself,

nevertheless

o

not

believe

that

n

fact nyone

has ever

had a

state of consciousness

n

whichwhat s magined o be the omplete isappearance fthesedistinc-

tions

ccurs;

nd

believe

urtherhat areful

henomenological

crutiny,

when

t is

possible

at

all,

would show

that to

be

so.

Certainly,when

"am"

my pain,

I stillhave

no

troubledistinguishing

y pain frommy

awareness

of

it.

But

even

discounting eligious

nd

other deological

motives

or

wanting

o believe

or

beingdisposed

to say that he selfhas

disappeared

nto

ts

object

n

some states

of

mind,

here

emains,

also

believe, distinctly hilosophicalmotive, specially n thecase ofpain

and other

ensations,

or

hinking

nd

beingdisposed

to

say

that

heact/

object analysis

s

wrong.

This

motive

has to

do

with remnant

f

the

old

active/passive

istinc-

tion

ccording

o

which hemind

s

passive

n

sensation ut

active

n

cog-

nition.

n

general,

nd

especially

n

the

case of severe ain,

we cannothelp

but feel

t;

it forces tself

pon

us

and we

are

powerless

o

resist. ike the

70

LAIRD ADDIS






8/20/2019 2107724


culturally-determinedistinction etween ssential

nd

accidental rop-

erties, he ctive/passiveistinction as

no

fundamentalntological asis;

butthatdoes not mean that t has no natural oundation.

n

particular,f

the act is somehow dentified ithor simply ssociatedwiththe active,

one has an apparentreason, even with phenomenological upport, or

denying n act/object istinctionn the case of pain. But it is merely

causal fact

hat

we cannot

begin

nd end

our

pains

at

will;

and

"I

am

my

pain" is a poetic way of describing hat unfortunate ircumstancen

whichone seems unable to attend o anything ther han one's pain,

in

whichnothing

eems

to

matter

xcept

one's

pain,

and in

whichone feels

helpless

efore heforces fnature.

uch

situations re

not, submit, nes

in which ne cannot tilldistinguish hat s experienced rom he xperi-

encing f teven f tdoes nsome senseoverwhelm neand,as itwere, ry

to force union with one.

I

do notclaim

to

have answered

ll

possibleobjections

o the

ct/object

analysis

f sensations

nd

other

econdary

mental ntities. or do

I

claim

thatno loose ends remain r that t accords

n

every

detail

with

all

the

waysofthinkingndspeaking boutpainand other ensations hat ccur

in

multifariousrdinary ontexts.

utas a

unitary

ccount t does a

better

of

ob

of

explaining

he facts han

any

alternative know of. Behaviorist

and

functionalistccounts,

s

philosophical

heories f thenature f

pain

and other

ensations,

re

patently nadequate by simply gnoring

what

everybody

nows

to be their ssential haracteristicsnd the ones

by

which, eventually,

we

identify

uch sensations to

ourselves."1Other

materialistccounts central tateor eliminative

in

addition o their

generaldefects eem unable to accommodate he fact f theexperienced

spatiality

f some

secondary

mental ntities. nd on adverbial

ccounts

according

o

which

a

pain,

for

example,

s

just

a

property

f the

mind,

there eemsto be no

distinguishing

hat s

experienced

rom he

experi-

encing

f t.Butthese re

very eneral

nd

roughly

tated

omplaints,

nd

I

do not

pretend

o

have refuted

ny

alternative ccount to the one

defended ere.

On

thesematterst s useful o

compare

heviewsof a

leadingfunctionalist,

aniel Den-

nett,who, despairing f findingnycoherent ccount fwhatevenhe seems o recognize

as something

hat s

there, ells

us in his

Brainstorms, .

zz8: "I

recommend

iving p

incorrigibilityithregard o pain altogether,n factgiving p all 'essential'featuresf

pain, and letting ain statesbe whatevernaturalkind' states hebrain cientists ind

if

they

ver

do find

ny)

that

normally roduce

ll thenormal ffects."

ould

there e a bet-

ter

xample

of the

fundamental ihilism

t the

heart f functionalist

heories f mental

life?

PAINS AND OTHER

SECONDARY

MENTAL

ENTITIES 71






8/20/2019 2107724


Three general ommentswill serve s a conclusion.

First, here s nothing

n

myview, or so

I

submit,

hat s inconsistent

with

either he

presuppositions

r

the

findings

f

empirical cience, s

might nitially e supposed. As to presuppositions:

he most mportant

and relevant ne is that hephysicalworld s causallyclosed.'3 Provided

that,

s I

do hold, here

s no

occurrence r

entity

ntherealm f econdary

mental entities (including the experiencing

of them) that is not

"parallelled" by some occurrencen the physicalworld in a way that

makes

t

lawfullympossible

or

ust

that

physical

tate o recurwithout

thatmental ne's

recurring,

he

presupposition

s preserved. o put t the

otherway around:

there

s

nothing

n

my

view thatrequires hat econ-

darymental ntities r theexperiencingf thembe interactinghings r

events

with

the

physical

realm n a

way

that

would make some occur-

rences

n

the physical

realm

not fully xplainable

except by appeal to

thosemental

hings

r

events.

As to

findings:

cannot hink

f

anyfinding

that

might lausibly

e

thought

o

pose

a

difficulty

or

my iew,

nd

have

already uggested

hat

ome of

those

findings

einforce hat anyone an

discover

or

neself

nyway

that

pain (or any

other ensation r sec-

ondarymental ntity)

nd

the

experiencing

f

t

are

always

two and

not

one (or none, as the eliminativematerialistsnd some otherswould

appear

to

hold).

Second, have alluded

n

myreference

o functionalismnd

elsewhere

and

otherwise

ssumed

that

we can

and do

know the

nature

f

at least

some

secondary

ntities

y experiencing

hem

n

a direct

way

that s

pri-

vate

to

each of

us.

This does

not

prevent

me from

olding

with

Wittgen-

stein

nd

so

many

others

hat,

n some

good

sense,

"the nner tands

n

need ofouter riteria."'4 ecause have statedmyviewson thismattern

some

detail

lsewhere'5

shall

here

nlyrepeat

he

point

hat ven

f,

s is

probably rue,we comefirst

o

dentifyin

the

ense

f

being

ble to

recog-

nize and

possibly

earn

the

words

for)

some mentalproperties y their

outer

criteria,

t

does

not

follow,

nor

s it

true,

hat

we are

not

directly

aware

of

ome

of

these

roperties

r

thatwe

are unable

eventually

o den-

tify

hem

by

such awareness.'6

This is, of course,the

simple

nd direct

way

of

saying

what

more

fashionable

hilosophers

hese

days expressby

13

For detailed iscussion f

thisnotion

ee

pp.

407-10

of

"Behaviorism nd thePhilosophy

of the

Act."

14

For

a 'Wittgensteinian"

ccount of

some of what call secondarymental ntities,

ee

Anthony enny's ction, motion

nd

Will.

'5 See "Natural Signs,"pp.

56o-68.

i6 For a

detailed nd

very

usefuldiscussion f the

epistemology

f

pain,

see KurtBaier's

article alled "Pains."

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8/20/2019 2107724


saying

hat

pain,

for

xample,

s

the "same"

in

all

possible

worlds

or

that

'pain' is

a

so-called "rigiddesignator."

Third and finally, have made use

in

my account of at least one and

probablymore ontologicalpresuppositions,nd it may be desirable o

makethem xplicit.Apainorother econdarymental ntity,f t s ndeed

an entityhat satisfies hetheory dvocated

n this

paper, s something

that

exists

n

time nd

in

some

cases also in

space.

Thus

itis

particular

thing

r

event. peaking

more

ontologically,

t s

a

particular

hat

xem-

plifies ertain roperties;

nd

whilethe ontology

f

neither articularity

nor universalitys at issue here, t s easy

to

see that his heory its spe-

cially omfortably

ith

n

ontology

f

momentary articulars

nd non-

Platonic niversals,

hat

s,particulars

hat annot

urvive hange

f

qual-

ity nd properties hat are literally hared by, but ncapable of existing

independent f, those particulars.Rejectingparticulars s substances,

that

s,

as

natured ontinuants,

akes

t

easier o

accept

henotion hat

pain might e where

no

part

of a

body

s and that

ome other econdary

mental ntities re

not

n

space

at all. Butthe

defense

f such n

ontology,

whileperhapssystematicallyequired,

annot

transpire ere.'7

'7

There

s,

s

everyonenows,

vast iterature

n this

opic.My

own

ontributions

o

the

dialectic an be

found

mainly

n

"Mind,Structure,

nd

Time,'

"Particularsnd

Acquaintance,"nd"Time, ubstance,ndAnalysis."

PAINS AND

OTHER SECONDARY

MENTAL

ENTITIES

73

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8/20/2019 2107724


REFERENCES

i.

Addis,L., "Behaviorism

nd the

Philosophy ftheAct,"

Nous, i6,

I983.

z.

Addis,L.,

"Mind,

Structure,nd

Time,"Philosophical

Topics,

X,

i98I.

3. Addis,L.,

"Natural

Signs,"

The

Review

f

Metaphysics,

6,

i983.

4.

Addis, L.,

"Particulars nd

Acquaintance,"

Philosophyf

Science,

34,

i967.

5.

Addis, L.,

"Time,

Substance,

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Analysis,"

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the

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Bergmann,dited yM. S.

Gram and E. D.

Klemke,

The

University

f Iowa

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974.

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A Materialistheory fMind,

Routledge and

Kegan

Paul,

968.

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"Pains,"

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Australasian

ournal

f Philosophy,

0,

i962.

8.

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., "Acts,"

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Logic

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rom

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ress,

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R.,

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.,

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he

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Wiscon-

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Kenny,A.,

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i6. Palmer,D., "Unfelt

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I7.

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74

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