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International Phenomenological Society

Happiness and PleasureAuthor(s): Daniel M. HaybronSource: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 62, No. 3 (May, 2001), pp. 501-528Published by: International Phenomenological Society

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Philosophy and Phenomenological ResearchVol. LXII,No. 3, May2001

HappinessandPleasure1

DANIELM. HAYBRON

Rutgers University

This paper argues against hedonistic theories of happiness. First, hedonism is too inclu-

sive: many pleasures cannotplausiblybe construedas constitutive of happiness. Second,

any credible theory must count either attitudes of life satisfaction, affective states such

as mood, or both as constituentsof happiness; yet neithersort of state reduces to plea-

sure. Hedonism errs in its attemptto reduce happiness,which is at least partly disposi-

tional, to purely episodic experiential states. The dispositionality of happiness also

underminesweakened nonreductive forms of hedonism, as some happiness-constitutive

states are not pleasures in any sense. Moreover, these states can apparently fail to

exhibit the usual hedonic properties;sadness, for instance, can sometimes be pleasant.

Finally, the nonhedonistic accounts are adequate f not superioron groundsof practical

and theoretical utility, quite apartfrom their superior conformity to the folk notion of

happiness.

"Anddoes his philosophymakeyou happy?"

"Ihave neversearched for happiness. Who wants happiness?

I have searchedfor pleasure."

OscarWilde, The Picture of Dorian Gray (p. 209)

1. Introduction

Some unlucky soul might, over a period of time, be depressed, despondent,

beset with anxiety, "stressedout," seething with rage, overwhelmedby fear,

worriedsick, heartbroken, rief-stricken, onely, in low spirits,burdenedwith

shame, overcome with boredom,deeply dissatisfied with life, hauntedby a

sense of dreador by feelings of emptiness,or simply be melancholy.A more

fortunatecounterpartmight be in high spirits, joyful, exhilarated, elated,jubilant, carefree, deeply contented, at peace, delighted with her life, or

blessed with a profoundsense of fulfillment or well-being. Persons of the

For helpfuldiscussionand commentson earlierdraftsof this paper,I wish to thankBengt

Brulde,IrwinGoldstein, Douglas Husak, BarryLoewer, Colin McGinn, BrianMcLaugh-

lin, Alex Michalos, JonathanSchaffer, George Sher, T. L. S. Sprigge, Stephen Stich, L.

W. Sumner, Barry Ward, and RobertWoolfolk, as well as audiences at the April 2000

Pacific Division conference of the'AmericanPhilosophicalAssociation andthe May 1999

conference of the New Jersey Regional Philosophy Association, where I presented

excerpts from this paper.

HAPPINESSAND PLEASURE 501

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former sort we naturallydeem unhappy.Those of the latterwe call happy.

Indeed, these would seem to be prototypicalcases of unhappinessand happi-

ness, at least in one important ense of these expressions. Concernedparents

probably have circumstances like these in mind when they inquire as to

whether their childrenare happy. Likewise for young job seekers who worry

that they may not be happyif they choose the wrongvocation.

Let 'hedonism' denote the venerabledoctrinethathappiness,so construed,reduces completelyto a subject's balance of pleasureoverdispleasure:happi-

ness is merely the condition of having a favorable balance of pleasure over

displeasure. I wish to argue that this theory is false. Indeed, it never had a

chance of being true, for it fundamentallymisconstrues the nature of the

mental states that could constitute anything plausibly called happiness. I

shall not defend a particular onceptionof happiness,but I will suggest that

there are two basic candidates for such a theory:the affective state andlife

satisfaction views. As we shall see, these accounts appear to share key

featuresthatthe hedonistictheorylacks. There are otherproblemswith hedo-

nism as well.

2. Preliminaries

2.1 The different hingscalled happiness

We can mean any number of things by 'happiness'.2In such cases as the

foregoing-henceforth the "paradigm ases"-we typically intendto denote

nothing more profound than a state of mind. In our more lyrical moments,

we might refer to it as a condition of the soul or spirit. Though such talk

bears unfortunate onnotationsof cheapNew Age sentimentality, hese terms

are here used in a common secular and naturalisticsense, and are meant to

suggest something psychologically deep, intimate and importantto us. To

distinguish our subject from other things commonly called happiness, we

may call this stateof mindpsychological happiness.So construed,happiness

is a purelypsychological,nonevaluativekind.3

Philosophersoften use 'happiness'with othermeanings,most frequently

to denote a particularlyenviable condition in life: a type of well-being or

flourishing.Thus we commonlysee the patentlyevaluative Greekexpression

'eudaimonia' translatedas 'happiness'. This evaluative kind I refer to as

2 To simplify matters I shall generally refer only to happiness, assuming that whatever is

said of happinessalso applies, mutatismutandis,

ounhappiness.3 Philosophers who appearto accept hedonism about psychological happiness include,

among many others, such historicalthinkersas Bentham,Locke, and Sidgwick; and more

recently, Brandt (1959; 1979; 1989; 1992); Campbell (1973); Carson (1978a; 1978b;

1979; 1981); Davis (1981b; 1981a); Ebenstein (1991); Griffin (1979; 1986); Mayerfeld

(1996; 1999); Sen (1987); Sprigge (1987; 1991); and Wilson (1968). Casual references to

happinessin the philosophicalliterature requentlyassumeit to be hedonistic. Hedonism

has adherents n psychology as well, such as Allen Parducci (1995) and Daniel Kahne-

man (1999).

502 DANIEL M. HAYBRON





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prudential happiness. Whereas a correct theory of prudential happiness is

determined by asking what sorts of lives make us better off, the task of

providing a theoryof psychological happiness-our task-is to determine he

nature of a certain type of psychological state.4 We can distinguish other

senses of 'happiness', but the foregoing remarks should suffice for our

purposes.'

Of more immediateconcernis the possibility that theremay be no singlepsychological kind answeringto the psychological sense of 'happiness'. Or

maybe the vernacularnotion is so ill-defined that it admits of no satisfactory

analysis. Maybe there is no well-defined folk notion to analyze. No doubt

such worries have led many philosophersto conclude thathappinessis not a

worthwhile object of study. Let us suppose, for the sake of argument, that

these concerns are well-founded. It hardly follows that there is no subject

matter worth studying. There are clearly aspects of our psychology that we

denote, however imprecisely or confusedly, under the guise of happiness.

These aspects are almost universally taken to be immensely valuable-

indeed, to comprise a central element of human well-being. We have no

reason to doubt this belief. We thereforeought to learn something about

these phenomena.Even if they simply reduce to familiarpsychological cate-

gories, we shall have discovered something important;and then we can

determine ust how valuablehappinessis. Maybe, when all is said anddone,

we will find that happiness is not so valuable after all. And if the resultingkind or kinds do not correspondneatlyto our vernacularnotion of happiness,

we may need to revise ourconceptsomewhat.If more than one kindanswers

to the name, then we may wish to distinguishfurthersenses of 'happiness',

restrict its proper use to just one of the kinds, or dispense with the term

altogether. But the idea that such weighty mattersdo not deserve serious

philosophical scrutinyat all is simply obtuse.

I shall employ some intuitional evidence in making my case. This may

make some readersnervousin light of the foregoing concerns.However, the

intuitionsexploited appearto be both firm and widely held if any are in this

realm. Should anyone's intuitions differ nonetheless,or should worries arise

I use terms like 'kind' and 'category' very loosely here, with no particularmetaphysical

commitments in mind. For instance, the relevant psychological kinds may have no place

in scientific, versus folk, psychology. I talk of psychological kinds only to distinguish the

present concept from evaluative notions such as that of prudentialhappiness.

To illustrate: one might wish to argue that psychological happiness is the proper

measure of well-being-and many have done so (mistakenly, in my view). But this is

different from makingan a priori stipulationthathappiness-whatever it is-must char-

acterize what it is to have an especially enviable life. The theorists who do so are not

involved in the same business that engages us here. Thus even if well-being consists

solely in the psychological state of pleasure, well-being is still an evaluative, and not

psychological,kind.

i For more on the uses of 'happiness'and cognates, see my (2000; unpublished ms-c), as

well as Davis (1981b), Goldstein (1973), and Thomas (1968).






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about the significanceof the folk notionof happiness,I shall discuss the rela-

tive meritsof the various theories on practicalandtheoreticalgrounds, quite

apart rom their credibilityas conceptionsof happiness.

2.2 What s a hedonistic theory of happiness?

The doctrine thatinterestsus is not to be confusedwith other, perhapsbetter-

known, varietiesof hedonism-ethical, psychological, andso forth. We must

take special care not to confuse this view with hedonism about prudential

happiness. (Cf., for instance, the Epicureans, who took eudaimonia or

prudentialhappiness-roughly, well-being-to consist solely in the pleasures

of tranquillity.)Theoristsof these sorts may be hedonists about psychologi-

cal happinessas well, butmay have no explicit views on the matterat all.

As to the nature of pleasure and displeasure, hedonism comes in two

varietiesworthnoting, which L. W. Sumnerhas called internalistandexter-nalist (1996, chapter4). The former dentifiespleasures n termsof a uniform

qualityintrinsic to all pleasurableexperiences.On this sort of view, pleasure

is a kind of sensation, feeling, or quality of experience. For instance, what

makes a given experience pleasant or unpleasantis a simple, unanalysable

feeling tone thatit shares with all othersuch experiences.Noting the extreme

variety of pleasures,externalistsdeny the existence of any intrinsicproperty

that identifiesthem as such. Rather,whatmakes a given experience pleasant

is just the subject's attitude towards it-whether she likes, welcomes, orotherwisehas the rightkind of pro-attitude owards it. (Presumably,notjust

any pro-attitudewill do; for starters, t shouldbe basedentirelyon the experi-

ence's intrinsicor felt properties,andnot, say, the consequencesone expects

to follow from it. Moreover,it should be a fairly primitive,low-level "now-

for-now"6 eactionandnot some sortof detached,reflectiveevaluation.)Thus

any experiencecan in principlebe pleasantor unpleasant,dependingon how

one reacts to it.

I shall, with some reservations, follow Sumner in calling the intrinsic

view the sensation model of pleasure,and the latterthe attitudemodel.7Since

the attitudemodel is widely accepted amongrecenttheorists,I shall assume it

for the most part (though little should hang on this).8 Sumner notes,

6 Cf. Hare (1989).

7 My reservations concern the use of 'sensation' for a view that also encompasses feel-

ings. But probablyno termis withoutproblems.

8 For a noteworthydissent, see Goldstein(1980; 1989). It is not entirelyclear what view of

pleasureis standardlyheld among psychologists. A version of the attitudemodel appears

to have broad acceptance, but writers often seem to talk of pleasure interchangeably

with positive affect-which soundsa lot like a sensation(specifically,feeling) theory. For

advocates of the attitudeview typically maintainthat one can have a pleasantor enjoy-

able experience that is not affective (e.g., readinga book)-though perhapsthe attitude

had towards the experience is affective. But some pleasant affects (e.g., those of some

moods) are not part of an attitude towards some experience-they are the experiences






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however, that 'pleasure' and 'pain' do at times refer to sensations or feelings.

He cites the case of a loose tooth that one enjoys probing with one's tongue,

simply because one likes the painful sensation it produces (p. 101). He uses

'enjoyment' and 'suffering' to denote the states involved in the attitude

model, and which are presumably the ones that directly make our lives go

betteror worse for us. 'Pleasure'and 'pain' conformto the sensation model

in his usage.9

3. Why hedonism is false

3.1 Superficialpleasures

The most obvious problem with existing hedonistic theories is that they are

too inclusive: all sorts of shallow, fleeting pleasures are made to count

towardshappiness.Yet such pleasuresmanifestly play no constitutiverole in

determininghow happya person s. One's enjoymentof eating crackers,hear-ing a good song, sexual intercourse, scratching an itch, solving a puzzle,

playing football, and so forth need not have the slightest impact on one's

level of happiness (though,of course, they may). I enjoy, get pleasure from,

a cheeseburger, yet I am patently not happier thereby."' Conversely for

superficialdispleasures.The problemdoes not concern the intensity of such

pleasures:an orgasm may well be intenselypleasurable,yet still fail to move

one, to make one any happier (consider anonymoussex or masturbation)."

Might the brief durationof the event be misleading our intuitions here? Not

likely: it is not just thatany particular uperficialpleasureseems irrelevant.

Even the whole patternof such pleasuresover time appears o be. We would

certainly expect that someone who underwentan unrelentingsuccession of

minor irritationswould not be very happyat the end of it all. But this expec-

tation is based noton the aggregationof particularpleasuresbut ratheron the

likely effect of these pleasureson some deeper aspect of one's psychology:

towards which one has the attitude. So it is doubtful that pleasure can be identified with

positive affect (absent a technical definition of this term) on an attitude model. I suspect

that this may be loose, or simply confused, talk stemming from the extremely close

connection between affective and hedonic state. One goal of the current paper is to

reducejust this sort of confusion.9 For more extensive philosophical commentaryon theories of pleasure, see Alston (1967);

Cowan (1968); Edwards (1979); Feldman (1997); Gosling (1969; 1992); Marshall (1998);

McCloskey (1992); Perry (1967); Sprigge (1987); and Sumner (1996). An excellent

overview ofcurrent

scientific work on pleasureand related matters

appearsin Kahne-

man, Diener and Schwarz (1999).10 Though perhaps soul food is so-called for a putative capacity to produce just such an

impact!

Note also that hedonism typically counts intense physical pleasures as more important or

happiness thanless pleasantbutnonethelesspositive moods or othermoreintuitivelyrele-

vant states. (But cf. Mill's qualitativehedonism.Perhapssuch cases partlymotivatedthis

doctrine. However, he may not use 'happiness'in its psychological sense, as I explain in

(unpublished ms-c).)






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one's mood, perhaps nter alia. Intuitively,the trouble seems to be that such

pleasuresdon't reach"deeply"enough, so to speak. They just don't get to us;

they flit throughconsciousness and that'sthe end of it.

This considerationalone appears o undermineany hedonistic account of

which I am aware. It also demonstrates he errorof equating talk of hedonic

states with talk of happiness, as many commentators are wont to do. The

pleasures of happinessare not the only pleasuresto be had, though perhapsthey are the most desirable.Perhapssome restricted orm of hedonismcould

suffice: happiness is a matter of pleasure, but only a certain kind of

pleasure-"deep" pleasure,maybe,or the Epicureanpleasuresof tranquillity.

This sort of proposal also has serious problems. To show why, I shall

discuss a couple of alternative heories and explain what distinguishes them

from hedonism. Doing so will clarify the errors hat beset all forms of hedo-

nism.

3.2 Whyhappinessis not reducible topleasure

3.2.1 Thealternative theories

Recall the paradigmcases cited at the beginningof this paper-e.g., profound

depressionand anxiety on the one hand,and a deep sense of well-being and

joy on the other. What is it that makes them examples of happiness and

unhappiness? Right away, it seems more than a bit odd to say that these

people arehappyor unhappysimply by virtue of experiencinga greatdeal of

pleasureor displeasure.They certainlyareexperiencingthose. But that is not

what constitutestheirbeing happy. If it were, then we might as well add to

our list of prototypicallyunhappypeople someone who is experiencingseri-

ous chronicpain. No doubt,we should expect such a person to be unhappy.

But his pain is not his unhappiness, f he is indeedunhappy (perhapshe is a

highly disciplined Buddhistmonk). It is, rather,the source of his unhappi-

ness.Instead, we would suppose that-him most likely not being a Buddhist

monk-his pain gets him down. It makes him depressedand irritable,not to

mention highly dissatisfied with his lot in life. And it is far more plausible

to suppose thathe is unhappy n virtue of these underlyingstates, caused by

the physical pain. One who is depressed, irritable,and dissatisfied with his

life, then, is thereby unhappy.In light of such considerations,one natural

proposal is that happinessconsists in a person' emotional state: insofar as

one's emotional state is basically positive, one is happy.Thus such positiveemotional conditions as a predominanceof joyfulness, high-spiritedness,

peace of mind,etc. would exemplify happiness,while a predominance f their

negative counterparts-depression,anxiety, fear, anger,feelings of discontent,

etc.-would typify unhappiness. To be happy on this sort of view is not

necessarily tofeel happy.A generalized ow-level positive mood or sense of






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tranquillity might suffice for being happy without predominantly, or ever,

involving the acute emotion of feeling happy. Happiness thus conceived is

not a particular emotion or mood at all, but consists rather in a subject's

overall emotionalor mood state(or some broadaspect thereof).

To avoid confusion with anotherview to be discussed momentarily,and to

highlight the role of affect in this sort of account, I shall refer to it as an

affective state, or affectivist, account. In light of the recent discussion ofsuperficialpleasures,we can safely say that not just any affective states will

do. Rather,the relevant states, such as moods, are comparatively deep, or

central, aspects of a person's affective state. I shall not attemptto explicate

the notion of a central affective state here, but moods are paradigmatically

central.Among otherthings, centralaffective states tend to be phenomenally

profound,pervasive, and lasting, with far-reachingeffects on one's psychol-

ogy and behavior. Considerdeep sadness.)By contrast,one's mild annoyance

at dropping a letter while bringing in the mail is superficial, focused and

short-lived; ts effects arelimited.It is not centralbutperipheral.

I argue elsewhere that a credible affective state theory should probably

incorporate, n addition to central affective states such as moods, that aspect

of a subject's psychologythatdisposesherto experiencecertainmoods rather

than others-what I call a "moodbase."12When one is happy,badmoods can

still occur in response to negative events. But they are less likely and will

tend to yield quickly to positive ones. This sort of emotional resilience issurely one of the great benefits of being happy. Mood base is not to be

confused with temperament,which is a subject's more or less permanent

mood disposition. One's mood base improves when, for instance, serotonin

levels increase aftertakingProzac (if it works); such drugsdo not straight-

forwardlydetermineone's mood,butratheraffect one's tendency o experience

various moods. It is plausiblethat successful therapymakes one happiernot

just because of the better moods it yields, but also by virtue of one's

increasedpropensityto experience positive moods (anddecreasedpropensity

to experience negative ones)."3 n most cases, the happy persondoesn't just

happen to be experiencing predominantlypositive moods, as if it were an

accident. He is in a broader,perhapssyndromal,condition thatconsists partly

in those statesthat aresubstantiallyresponsiblefor the moods-those states,

that is, thatcomprise his mood base. (Compare depression,which does not

seem to be merely a succession of bad moods.) I tentatively suggest that we

refer to conditionsof this sort as thymicstates, from the Greekfor the aspectof the soul involved in emotion (thymos).

12 (Haybron unpublished ms-b). I suggest in that paper that central affective states are

exhaustedby moods and what I call mood-constitutingemotions (e.g., profound oy). For

simplicity I shall usually referto moods andcentral affective states interchangeably.13 Orrather,by virtue of being in an intrinsicstate that grounds his propensity.






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I hardly expect this crude sketch to be persuasive;suffice it to say that an

affective state view need not be susceptible to the objection from

superficiality.I now wish to mention briefly a differentsort of account that

one might glean from the paradigmcases. Perhaps what makes someone

happy or otherwise is simply her attitude towardsher life: is she satisfied

with it? This, the life satisfaction theory, takes its cue from the notion of

being happy with something:to be happy is to be satisfied or pleased withone's life. Though primarily cognitive, this state could be construed as an

emotional state (hence, in part, my use of 'affective state' for the first

theory). 4

This picture is, I submit, complete: thereare no clear-cutcases that fail to

conform to one or the other, or some combination, of these views. If one

finds affective state theories implausible,thiswill be because one's intuitions

favor the life satisfaction account, and vice-versa. We cannot, of course,

actually prove this sort of claim, but the foregoing and what follows should

suffice to make it highly credible. Even if the picture is not complete, we

need only grant that one might be happyor unhappyat least partly by virtue

of one's mood states and/or attitude towards one's life. For even if other

things, including pleasure, go into happiness, the hedonistic reduction of

happinessto pleasurewill fail if anyconstituentof happiness s not reducible

to pleasure.And it is difficult to imaginehow anyremotelycredibletheoryof

happiness could deny that one might be happy at least partly by virtue ofone's being satisfied with one's life, or being in a positive mood or thymic

state. Hedonists must either bite that bullet or insist that one or both states

reduce to pleasure.The formeroption seems preposterous.This leaves only

the latter.

3.2.2 Theirreducibilityof thealternatives

Interestingly,the life satisfaction accounthas plenty of philosophicaladher-

ents, whereas I am unaware of any philosophical theorists who have even

suggested, much less adopted,an affective state view.' Perhapsthis results

from a mistaken impression that the affective state view just is a form of

hedonism. Then what, one may ask, distinguishes the two? Recall that

pleasureis nothingmore thanhavingan experienceof a certainkind,defined

eitherin termsof its intrinsicqualitiesor one's attitude owards t. Hedonism

thus reduceshappinessto the having of such experiences.To say thatsome-

one is happy would, on this theory,be to say thathis experienceshave beenpredominantlypleasant. But affective states are not simply kinds of experi-

14 Cf., for instance,Nozick (1989), who calls it an emotion.15 Affective states such as mood figure prominently in most psychological accounts, and

indeed my own view is inspired by that literature.(However, I take a narrowerview of

the relevant affective states than psychologists generally do.) A helpful discussion

appearsin Diener and Larsen(1993); see also Kahneman,Diener and Schwarz (1999).

508 DANIELM. HAYBRON





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ences; nor are they just now-for-now reactions to experiences. Consider the

condition of being in a depressedmood: is a depressedmood merely a type of

experience?The questionitself is suspect, like asking whetherbelieving that

three is a prime number s merely a kind of experience. Moods are more or

less enduring states thatconsist at least partly in having certaindispositions.

Indeed, some of the most prominent accounts of moods take them to be

purely dispositional, though this probably goes too far.1 If I am irritable,Iam therebydisposedto grow angry, impatient,etc. atrelativelyminorannoy-

ances; that's just what it is to be irritable. Somebody who was not so

disposed could hardlybe said to be irritable.Similarly,an individualwho is

in a depressedmood will likely findlittle pleasure n whathappens,will tend

to look on the dark side of things, and may more likely be saddened by

negative events. Again, it is not clear what it could mean for someone to be

in a depressed mood if she lacked such propensities.This sort of disposition

is not just a type or quality of experience. Nor is it merely a kind of con-

attitude owardsone's presentexperience.It is also worthnotingthatpsycho-

logical accounts of moods and otheremotional statestypically incorporate he

various nonexperiential processes that subserve the phenomenology (inter

alia). Thoughmoods do typicallyhave phenomenalqualities,such properties

comprise just one aspect of what is surely a complex psychological state.

Moods do not reduce to pleasure, and so the affective state theory is not

equivalent to hedonism. This is even clearer if we incorporatemood bases,which aredefined n terms of theirdispositionalproperties.

Since it is eminently plausible that an irritableor depressed mood-as

such, andnot merely qua unpleasantexperience-does constitute a reduction

in happiness,we may concludethathappinessdoes not reduce to pleasure.If

one does not thinkthis plausible, thenperhapsone's intuitions favor the life

satisfactiontheory (I cannotimagine what otherreason there could be). All

the better:being satisfied with one's life is patently notjust a kind or quality

of experience.Neither is it an attitudeof the rightsort for a hedonistic reduc-

tion, for a couple of reasons. For one thing, life satisfaction is a global

attitude that concerns far more than one's present experience. Second, it

presumably ncludesappraisalsof a fairlydetachedandreflectivesort,such as

the belief that one is getting most of the important hings in life. Whatever

the attitudesconstitutiveof pleasure,they aresurelynot so intellectualizedas

this.

16 On the dispositionality of moods, see Lormand (1985; 1996) and Griffiths (1997). For

overviews of scientific work on moods, see Ekman and Davidson (1994), Frijda (1993),

and Morris(1999).






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3.2.3 Diagnosis

At the root of the problemis the fact that hedonistic happiness consists of

nothing but a series of conscious events: to know that someone is happy on

this view is only to know that his recent experience has been mostly posi-

tive. So construed, ascriptions of happiness are little more than capsule

summariesor histories of subjects'conscious episodes. They purportonly to

characterizethe general tenor of a sequence of almost purely experiential

events-namely, experiencings and likings (or, on the sensation model of

pleasure, just the former)."7Hedonistic happinessis an essentially episodic

and backward-lookingphenomenon. But happinessis obviously notjust the

having of a certain kind of experience, or even lots of them. It is rather a

deeper psychologicalconditionincorporatinghe moreor less stableunderly-

ing mental states thatdetermine, n partandamong other things, the kinds of

experiencesthatwill occur.It is a substantiallydispositional phenomenon.Ittells us not just aboutsubjects' histories, but also about their currentcondi-

tion and propensities for the near future.It is forward-looking.Being in a

certain sort of mood state or thymic state is such a condition. So, it would

seem, is havinga certainattitude owardsone's life. Experiencingpleasureis

not. Hedonism is thus fundamentallywrong about the kind of mental state

thathappiness s. It appears o commit somethingof a categorymistake.18

An importantaspect of hedonism's erroris that pleasure lacks what we

may call causal depth.All appearances re thathappinesshas deep, far-reach-ing, and typically lasting consequences for a person's state of mind and

behavior.Theoriesoughtto respectthis appearance, rexplain why they need

not if they do not. Causaldepthhas threeaspects. First, causally deep states

or conditions areproductive.Thatis, they areprolificin their causal effects.

Second, they arewide-ranging n theireffects;theireffects are not limited to a

narrow class of states. Third and most importantly, hey are in some sense

psychologically deep: they affect one's psychological condition at a very

profound and basic level, in typically lasting ways, and not simply in

superficial and transientways. This is partly a matter of disposing one to

have certain mental states ratherthan others. Pleasure does not have causal

depthto anythinglike the extentthat, say, thymic states do. Hedonism does

little more than skimthe phenomenalsurface off of our emotionalstates and

call it happiness. But happinessruns much deeper than that. This fact will

prove significant ater.

17 "Almost," ecause he attitudinalomponent f pleasure,f there s one, is not purelyphenomenal. owever, hedifferences pretty mall or current urposes.

18 However,t is not clearpreciselywhat hecategoriesn questionare. I amtempted oaccusehedonism f confusinghenotionsof eventandstate or perhapsondition), utthesenotionsarethemselveso difficult o get clearabout hat t is hard o tell what, fanything,uchanaccusationmountso.






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3.3 Present-anchoring nd the temporal cope of happinessascriptions

The hedonist might objectthat any credible conceptionof happiness s bound

to be backward-looking.Forascriptionsof happinesstypically do not simply

reporton subjects' current tates, but mostly characterize he general tenorof

their statesin the recent past. A subject's presentcondition, one might argue,

will comprise only a small part of what's described,making happiness only

marginallyforward-lookingat best. Hedonistswho raise this concern will be

sorry they asked, since it not only fails, its manner of failure reveals another

of hedonism's shortcomings.To understandwhy the objection misfires we

should considerthe time frame relativeto which happiness s definedin ordi-

nary ascriptive practice.Is it a week, a month,a lifetime? In fact the appro-

priate periodof time depends on the context, andis often somewhat indeter-

minate;a person may be happywith respectto the present year, yet unhappy

today. Is there a minimum? For all intents and purposes, no: asked if I amhappy, I might sensibly reply that, while I'm generally very happy these

days, I'm nonetheless pretty unhappyat the moment.(ForI am momentarily

upsetover a flattire.)Also, one's level of happinessmay changedramatically

in a very short time frame: nformedof a child's suddendeath,for example, a

parentwill immediatelyundergoprofoundandthoroughgoingchanges in her

state of mind-will pass, that is, from a state in which she may be quite

happy to a state of extremeunhappiness.But this statemay not continue for

long if she quicklylearns thatshe was misinformed,and that her child is justfine. (Doubtless it will take her a while to recover from the shock, but this

probablyneedn't be more thana few hours.)So thereappears o be enormous

flexibility in the temporalreach of happinessascriptions.

That said, happiness is normallyascribed over the long term. When the

context fails to supplyspecific temporalcues, we tend to fall back on certain

defaults,and these areinvariably engthyones. So if I simply reportthatI am

happy, that will generally be taken to apply to some extended period of

time-probably whateverI see as the currentperiodof my life, which itself is

likely to be fairly indefinite and context-sensitive. Despite their predomi-

nantly long-termcharacter,happiness ascriptionspossess an interestingand

important onnection to thepresent:unqualified rue attributions f happiness

strongly suggest, andappear o entail,that the subjectis happynow. They do

not merely summarize the subject's recentpsychological history, but tell us

something aboutthe subject's presentcondition.Thus if a person's state of

mind has been consistently favorablefor the last month, but plummetedinjust the last hour on hearingterriblenews concerningherchild, we would not

want to describe her simply as happy. We would instead rate her as very

unhappy, though we may well wish to point out that she had until recently

been quite the opposite. Contrast this with the earlierexample involving a

flat-tire-inducedbad mood. There also we refer specifically to the subject's






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present state. But notice that the emphasis is reversed, and rests on the

subject's broadercondition. Thus we say thatI am happy "generally,"but not

at the moment.

Is this a problem for my claim about (what we may call) the present-

anchored focus of happiness ascriptions? No, but it is a problem for hedo-

nism. For what anchors our ascriptions is not the quality of our immediate

experience, which may be anomalous.The anchoring s performed,rather,bysome deeper aspectof ourpsychology thatbetterreflectsourgeneral disposi-

tion. On the affective statetheory,thejob is performedby mood base:where

the mood base and currentmood are incongruous,as in the flat tire case, we

discount the present mood as anomalous. Where the mood base departs

substantiallyfrom that of the recentpast-as in the aggrieved parentcase-

we discount the past, which is no longer representative of the subject's

currentcondition.Hedonism, by contrast,would seem to treatthe flat tire and

aggrieved parentcases more or less identically: in each case the subject's

experience has been pleasantuntil now. There is in these examples a differ-

ence in intensity,but it would not be hardto constructparallelcases in which

the intensity orderingis different. That's not the problem. The problem is

that something psychologically deep and (typically) lasting has happened n

one case butnot the other.Hedonismfails to distinguishdeeperand shallower

aspectsof happinessandtherefore acks thepowerto handle suchcases. Now

it may be possible for the hedonistto explain such examples by referencetoexpectationsregarding uturehedonicstates(since whateverdoes the anchor-

ing also seems to license such expectations).But such a move would be ad

hoc, and would make ascriptions of happiness parasitic on ascriptions of

mood base (or whateverunderwrites hese expectations).This is arguablyto

abandonhedonism.9

In short, happiness is not backward-looking n the extreme manner that

hedonism takes it to be, for ascriptionsare anchoredfirmlyin the present.It

is doubtfulwhether hedonism can respect this propertyof happiness ascrip-

tions at all. If it does-thus handling cases like the aggrieved parent-it

appearsto do so only at the cost of gettingcases like the flat tirewrong. (We

would not want to say simply that this individual is unhappy,for his bad

mood is anomalousand highly misleading about his generalframe of mind,

which is typically what interests us with respect to happiness. Yet the

hedonist who takes this course essentially reduces happiness ascriptionsto

claims about the pleasantness of one's immediate experience.) Even if

hedonism can anchorhappiness n the present, ts characterization f subjects'

present conditions is so superficialas to license little in the way of predic-

19 Itis also unclearwhetherhe life satisfactionheory,whichalsoseemsnot to distinguishbetween hallower nddeeperaspectsof happiness,an handle uch casesadequately.As shouldbe fairlyevident, he considerationsiscussedhereprovide dditionaleasonsforpositingmoodbasesand ncludinghem nthetheory f happiness.






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tion. That my experience is now pleasant says next to nothing about my

propensities for the future-maybe I just like the ice cream I am eating-

whereas the fact that my mood or attitude owardsmy life (or betteryet mood

base) is positive would certainlyseem to say rathermore. This is yet another

problem.I shall return o it in ? 4.2.

3.4 Summing up

Some might blanch at the use of paradigmcases to reach my conclusion.But

the foregoing is not a paradigmcase argument.My strategy is not to infer,

fallaciously, that all instances of happinessmust be just like the paradigm

cases. It is rather o underminehedonism by showing thatit cannot even get

the easy cases right. LaterI shall argue that,whatever the practicaland theo-

retical utility of the hedonistic notion-which is substantialeven if it is not

plausible as a happiness concept-it is not obviously superior on thosegroundsto an affective state or life satisfactionconcept, andmay be inferior

for the relevantpurposes.But firstI wish to cut off a possible line of retreat

for the hedonist. For even if hedonistsgrant hathappinessdoes not reduce to

pleasure, they might insist that the happiness-constitutive tates are a species

of pleasure in a looser sense: though not merely pleasures-though not

reducible o experiencingsandlikings-they arenecessarilypleasant,andthus

conform to what is in some sense a hedonistic account. Call this nonreduc-

tive hedonism.I wantto arguethat even this is false: the relevant states neednot be pleasant.This raises furtherdifficulties for reductivehedonism as well.

3.5 Whyeven nonreductivehedonism is false

3.5.1 Introduction

Reductionisthedonismbeing false, I shall henceforthassume that the correct

accountof happiness ncorporates o some extent one or both of the affective

state and life satisfactionviews. The firstthingto notice is thatsuch a theorymight more properlybe called an affective state or life satisfactionaccount.

Be that as it may, a mental statecan only be a kind of pleasurein any sense

if one's being in thatstateentails that one is having some sort of characteris-

tic experience, and that thatexperience is pleasant.Neither life satisfaction

nor affective state satisfies these criteria. This ought to be self-evident as

regards ife satisfaction: hat I am satisfiedwith my life entails nothingat all

aboutmy current xperience.Life satisfactioncan no more be a pleasurethan

believing that three is a prime number can. Perhapsit does requireone to

have pleasant experiences at some point-a feeling of well-being, for

instance. But this is clearly not sufficient for life satisfaction to yield any-

thingplausiblycalled hedonism.






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3.5.2 The dispositional characterof moods

Suppose that affective states such as mood arehappiness-constitutive.Might

these states be construedas a species of pleasure n our looser sense? This is

considerablymore plausiblethan a hedonisticreadingof life satisfaction.For

one thing, we might reasonably suppose thatbeing in a positive, as opposed

to a negative, mood just is to be in a pleasantversus unpleasantmood.20Yet

it fails, for two reasons. First, mood is substantiallydispositional, and may

occasionally be nonconscious. (Indeed, it is never experientialaccordingto

the "pure dispositionalists," as we may call them.) Consider irritability,

which is presumably un)happiness-constitutive. he problemis that my irri-

tabilityneed not at every moment impingeon my experience.Sometimes we

only discover our disagreeablemoods when we find ourselves inexplicably

lashing out over some trivial offense. No doubt this is often due to inatten-

tionor other failures to notice certain

aspectsof consciousness. But that is

not always the case, and at times one experiences nothing untowarduntil

some provocationcomes along and generatesa disproportionateeaction.

This seems plain enough as an everyday occurrence,but for our purposes

it suffices to note the logical possibility. And surely it is logically possible

for a bad mood to recede completely from consciousness: a being who

becomes temporarilydisposed to experience unusually frequentand intense

emotions of angeror sadness is therebyin a negative mood, even if some of

that time its consciousness remainsunaffected. (This is particularlyclear ifwe suppose thatthis stateusuallydoes have the phenomenalcharacter ypical

of such moods, and that the underlyingpsychological processes arethe same

in either case.) Irritability-inter alia-does not entail the continuous having

of certainexperiences, nor the having of now-for-now attitudestowardsmy

experiences. Since it is not a type of experience, it is a fortiori not a type of

unpleasantt experience.Nor, of course,are mood bases.

3.5.3 Hedonic inversion:affectivestates withatypicalhedonicproperties

Even where therelevantaffective states do manifest themselvesin conscious-

ness, it seems that they need not exhibit the usual hedonic properties: a

happiness-constitutive affective state (such as feeling cheerful) need not

always be pleasant, and may even be unpleasant. This is clearest on the

attitudinalmodel of pleasure.But is likely to hold as well for any plausible

version of the sensation view. Given its overwhelmingdominance in recent

theorizing, I will focus mainly on the former. A major attraction of thisaccountis thatwe seem unable to identify anyfeaturethat all pleasantexperi-

ences share, save the fact that we like or welcome them. In principle, it

2() This is the standarduse of 'positive' and 'negative' in the psychological literature.For

want of a better alternative,I will use these terms differently,so that they do not entail

anythingaboutactualpleasantness.I explain later.






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seems, any sensationor feeling can be eitherpleasantor unpleasantdepending

on how the subject reacts to it. The sensation one gets when firmly slapped,

for instance, is notoriously liable to be taken as a form of enjoyment or

suffering depending on one's predilections and frame of mind. If this is

correct, then presumablyaffective states such as sadness and cheery feelings

would be among those feelings that can, at least theoretically,be either pleas-

ant or unpleasant.Yet these states are happiness-constitutive n any credibleaffectivist account;a sad person is unhappywhether or not she likes how it

feels, whether or not it feels good to her. We would thus be mistaken to

classify these statesas pleasuresof anykind.

We need only the logical possibility of, say, sadness being pleasant to

sustain the presentcontention.Perhapshumanpsychology rules out certain

attitudes to certain sorts of experiences. While the painful sensation of a

loose tooth might be perceived as pleasantor unpleasant n differentpeople

and at differenttimes, it is doubtfulwhetherany ordinaryhumancould find

much joy in intense nausea. So even if we cannot feel sad without finding it

unpleasant, he fact remains that its unpleasantness s only an extrinsicprop-

erty of the feeling, anddependson whetherthe subjectdislikes it in the rele-

vant manner.21 There is thus no inconsistency in supposing someone to be

sad-hence to that extentunhappy-yet enjoyingit.

Perhapsthis will be easier to see if we consider a few cases, some of

which are not only logically possible but actually rathercommon. At leasttwo sorts of example present themselves. First, some people have strange

tastes: they like, find pleasant, many of the things that ordinarypeople find

disagreeable.For instance, a melancholy person-a Keats, perhaps-might

seek comfort in his sorrow, and enjoy wallowing in his own grief. For this

sort of individual, his unhappinessis his pleasure (so to speak). No doubt

this is somewhat less rapturousa pleasurethan that available to a normally

constitutedhappy person,but it is a pleasurefor him nonetheless.

One might come to enjoy sadness not as an adaptive response to an

unlucky disposition,butratheras a consequenceof aneccentric valuesystem.

A zealous Puritanor Nietzschean,for instance,or betteryet a torturedartist,

may well see virtuein unhappiness, hinking happinessfit only for mindless

sheep, an inappropriate esponse to a rottenworld, or simply a sign of poor

character.In itself this need not affect one's hedonic dispositions, since one

might only disvalue cheery feelings for, say, moral reasons. But it seems a

trulycommitted ndividualcould, with time, come to like, at a very primitivelevel, feelings of melancholy,while disliking-finding unpleasant-feelings

of contentmentand cheer. The tortured rtist, orexample,need not deriveany

21 As I noted earlier, the relevant likings or dislikings should be, among other things,

relatively primitive, low-level responses. Many people like the Bill of Rights, but this is a

ratherdifferentsort of liking.






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pleasureat all from the cheerful affects that so disgust her (feelings brought

on, say, by a shamefullymaudlinyet inexplicably moving episode of Barney

the purpledinosaur).

One need not be an eccentric to enjoy negative affects or dislike positive

ones. Probablyall of us have such proclivities to some extent. For instance,

many of us like the feelings broughton by readinga sad novel. Likewise, we

may take considerable pleasure in the fear and anxiety generated by asuspenseful or scary movie. And sometimes a poignant but particularly

fitting episode in one's life-or perhapsa Billie Holiday record-can leave

one feeling blue, yet not unpleasantlyso. In anothersortof case, one may be

seething with righteous fury when the object of that anger manages to do

something to make one laugh, thereby causing an infuriatingbreakdownof

one's resolve. At that moment one's own laughter becomes a source of

torment,and a return o anger might be substantiallymore pleasant. Indeed,

anger itself can be pleasant underthe right circumstances,a fact no doubt

exploited by many demagoguesovertheages. Frequently uchexperiencesare

bittersweet-pleasant in one respect, unpleasant n another-but often they

seem to be pleasantor unpleasantwithoutqualification.Just as with physical

pleasures and pains, it appearsthat any given affective state is eligible for

eitherenjoymentor suffering.Its hedonic character s not writteninto it, but

dependson how it strikesus. If any of the sorts of affective statesin question

are happiness-constitutive,then nothing plausibly called hedonism can betrue.22

Perhapsit will be objected that the affective states involved in the non-

eccentric cases, being short-lived, are consequentlynot happiness-constitu-

tive. My happiness does not depend even a little on whether I am briefly

22 Jonathan Schaffer and T. L. S. Sprigge have independently suggested to me that such

cases need not be incompatible with subtler forms of hedonism. If I understand them

correctly, the general idea is that pleasures and displeasures might be happiness-

constituting by virtue of their contribution to, or role in, a larger pleasure (cf., for

instance, Sprigge (1987, pp. 190-97)). Thus angeris unhappiness-constituting ecause it

detracts,or tends to detract,from the overall or long-term quality of one's hedonic state,

however pleasant it may be in itself. Alternatively, it is only the global or long-term

character of one's hedonic state that matters. I cannot fully address these interesting

proposals here,but it is worthsaying a few things.

I discuss a version of the alternative ormulation n the next paragraph.With respect

to the first, I would begin by noting that it may not handle all the cases I mentioned.

Novel-induced (pleasant) sadness seems unhappiness-constituting ven though it may bean unalloyed good with respect to one's overall or long-term hedonic state. (Though it

may renderone temporarilyvulnerable to increased displeasure at any irritations that

may arise.) Second, the proposal yields what strikesme as a ratherunnaturalkind: happi-

ness consists solely in non-pleasure-thwartingpleasures (or something like that). This

notion may hold some theoretical interest, but it is questionable whether the ordinary

notion is, or should be, like this. Bear in mind thathedonic inversion is just a partof the

problem with hedonism; any theory that gets around it still faces the other difficulties

noted in this chapter.






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saddenedby a film. As noted earlier,we have considerable eeway in specify-

ing the relevant interval over which a person's happiness is to be appraised.

A question such as "How happy is she at this very moment?" looks to

invoke the same happiness concept as do the more typical long-term uses.

And here it is perfectly legitimate to answer,"Notvery happy at all; she just

saw Romeo and Juliet." This seems compatiblewith herenjoying the experi-

ence in its entirety. Even if we insist on a minimum length that rules outsuch cases, one wonderswhy this should affect the basic point. That sadness

is only happiness-constitutivewhen drawn out over days, say, is orthogonal

to the question of whether that state is necessarily unpleasant. That the

vagaries of humanpsychology ensure thatprolongedsadness is unpleasant-

if they do-should not affect the conceptualpoint, viz. that sadness is not,

even inter alia, a kind of pleasure or unpleasure. Or shall we insist that

prolonged sadness is notjust a drawn-outversion of the passing kind, but is

rathera differentsort of state altogether?

Perhapssome will deny thatthe affective states in questionarehappiness-

constituting, or they are somehow different n the cases of hedonicinversion.

We might suppose that the relevant difference lies in their hedonic quality

itself, or maybe it is some otherproperty,too subtle to be readily noticed.

The latterproposal needs a lot more flesh to pose any realchallenge, andit is

not at all clear what flesh there could be to add. The formersuggestion, on

the otherhand,could involve either a commitmentto the sensationmodel ofpleasureor an insistence thatonly pleasant affective states can be happiness-

constituting.But even the sensation theorist should grant my point: in cases

of hedonic inversion, it seems to matter ittle whether a pleasantinstance of

sadness differs from an unpleasantone only in terms of an intrinsic hedonic

quality,or whether hey differonly in an extrinsic hedonicquality. Quaaffec-

tive state-qua sadness-there is no reason to posit any difference at all. Yet

this is the only respect thatmatterson the affective state view. The issue is

not whetherthe hedonic qualityof an affective state like sadness is intrinsic

or extrinsic,but whetheraffective states of a given typecan be eitherpleasant

or unpleasant.

One might simply reject the affective state view, embracing instead a

mixed accountaccordingto which a given affective state can only be happi-

ness-constitutiveif it has the usual hedonic quality.But what is the point of

doing so? Intuitively,the sadness felt at readinga tear-jerkerwould, if suit-

ably extended, yield an unhappyperson whether or not she enjoyed feelingthatway. She might just like being unhappy.Intuitive considerationsaside,

the mixed account ust seems unmotivated:what do we gain by insistingon a

pleasant-affective-state heory?On the face of it, it looks to be an arbitrary

conjunction of two different psychological kinds. Moreover, if happiness

consists in pleasantaffective states, then what are we to say when affect and

hedonic quality diverge? Is sadness actually happiness-constitutingwhen






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pleasant?This seems incoherent.Yet there seem to be no principled grounds

for holding otherwise. One might distinguishthe relevant states in the same

manner as the affective state theorist (see the next paragraph),and then add

that these must actuallybe pleasant.But why?

If the happiness-constitutiveaffective states need not be pleasant, what

distinguishesthose that contribute o happinessfrom those that detractfrom

it? I suggest, tentatively,that it is whetherthey are of a sort that unctions torespond to favorable, versus unfavorable,circumstancesor events. Whereas

feelings of good cheer function to respondto favorablesituations andevents,

sadness functions to respond to negative ones. But these states need not

always do what they were designed to do. Sometimesthey work differently,

as when we enjoy the harmlessfrightsof a scarymovie. Thus we get hedonic

inversion.

Perhaps something else distinguishes the states that contribute to, and

detract rom, happiness.Buthappinesson anycredible view of happinesswill

turnout to be a highly pleasantstate in virtuallyall cases, and certainlyall

normalones. Thereis no need to buildpleasantness nto the concept itself.

4. Is hedonism preferable on practical and theoreticalgrounds?

4.1 An objection

The hedonistmay grantthat the folk notion of happiness is not in any credi-ble sense hedonistic,andyet deny thatthis is a realproblemfor her: for who

cares what the folk concept of happiness is? The notion that that does the

important heoreticalandpracticalworkis thehedonistic one. Utilitarians, or

instance, seem to have little use for an affective state or life satisfaction

theory of happiness,since either view will omit many pleasuresthatplainly

contributeto welfare and aremorally significant.Moreover,one might think

that any value these states have for us is largely if not wholly a matterof

theirpleasantness.Given all this, why botherwith them?Indeed,one might

supposethat such views fail to accountfor the obvious andprofoundvalue of

happiness, certainlyin comparisonwith a hedonistictheory.Hedonismdoes

the heavy lifting that its alternatives annot,and is thus the preferredaccount

despite its counterintuitive onsequences.The folk are ust wrong.

This objection fails, for several reasons. First of all, hedonism does not

simply violate a few intuitionsabout exotic cases: it gets the basic ontologi-

cal statusof happinesswrong. It is not even in the rightballpark.So even ifthe folk notion of happiness turns out to have no theoretical or practical

value at all, we would still have no basis-save a long andinglorious history

of error-for calling the hedonisticstate happiness.We can call it happiness

if we like, but then we can call it platformshoes or silly string or anything

else for thatmatter.We will still have failed to give an account of whatever t






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is that ordinarypeople are talking about. Perhaps it is not much worth talk-

ing about. But we can only know this if we actually know what happiness is.

4.2 Thepredictive and explanatorycosts of the category mistake

More importantly,the hedonistic notion does not appear to be more useful

for the relevant practical and theoreticalpurposes. For one thing, hedonistic

happiness cannot fulfill anything ike the predictive and explanatoryrole that

happiness intuitively appears o play, and which both the life satisfaction and

affective state theories seem to allow. As my discussion of hedonism's

"categorymistake"and the forward-looking haracterof happiness n sections

3.2 and 3.3 suggested, one would have thoughtthat knowing that someone is

happy would enable us to predict all sorts of things about her future states

and behavior.If I know thatGertrudes happy,then I can reasonablyexpect

her to be a more pleasant and agreeable companionthanwere she otherwisedisposed. Such predictions seem to carry well into the future, so that

Gertrude' presenthappinessmay warrant xpectationsof faircompanionship

a week from now, perhapseven later.23Hence, in part, my incorporationof

mood base into the affective state theory of happiness.)It certainly looks to

predict such a status for the next few hours. Notice that the predictions

licensed are very broad-based: hey do not depend on the continuationof her

present activity or other experience, but cover just about any activity we care

to propose.Does Gertrude'shedonistic happiness-the fact that her experience has

been mostly pleasant,thatshe has mostly been enjoying things-underwrite

such expectations?No: at best, it mightenable us to reliably predictthat she

will enjoy the continuationof whatevershe has been experiencing-and even

then only inasmuchas it is the sort of experiencethat would not soon grow

tiresome. Similarly, the fact that she has been liking, versus disliking, what

she has been doing or otherwise experiencing says little about whether she

will prove a more or less agreeable partnerat a game of tennis. Yet the fact

that she is presently in, or has been in, a very good mood does tell us some-

thing about her desirability as a tennis partnerfor the near future: since

moods tend to persistfor a while, and since they dispose us to reactto situa-

tions in characteristicways, we can expect her to react more favorablyto the

game than were she now in a bad mood. The predictions become more

reliable and far-reachingif we consider mood base as well. Likewise, her

being pleased with her life as a whole would seem to license similarpredic-tions about her futureemotionsand behavior.

It is possible to make similar sorts of predictionsusing hedonistichappi-

ness, but these will be much weaker and more indirect than those of its

23 For simplicity I focus mainly on prediction, but similar points should apply, mutatis

mutandis,for explanation.

HAPPINESS NDPLEASURE 519





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rivals. Thus a predominanceof pleasure might weakly predict future agree-

ability via the role of pleasurein causing positive moods or life satisfaction,

or via its statusas an indicatorof positivemoods and attitudesof life satisfac-

tion. But this is obviously inferior to more direct appeals to the states doing

the real work. Indeed, the intuitively correct thing to say about the role of

pleasure in this regard s that, in the former case, one's pleasant experience

explains why one is happy, and in the latter (and almost certainly morecommon) case, one's being happy explains why one's experience has been

pleasant. Happiness and pleasure appearto stand in a relationshipnot of

reduction, but of mutual explanation. Hedonism obscures this relationship

and thus obliterates two perfectly ordinaryand seemingly useful forms of

explanation.It is not at all clear what, if anything,we would gain in predic-

tive and explanatorypower by accepting hedonismover its rivals. By fixing

on a state without sufficient causal depth,hedonism is not only implausible

as a theoryof happiness; ts errorsrobthe notion of happinessof much of its

usefulness.

4.3 Other reasons or caringaboutlife satisfactionand thymicstate

Such considerations ndicate thathappinesswould be a theoretically nterest-

ing andpracticallyuseful kind on either the life satisfactionor affective state

theories. Indeed, they appearto be significantfor a variety of reasons other

than the explanatoryand predictiveroles just cited. Take life satisfaction:Ifwe know that someone is highly dissatisfied with her life, then we would

expect her to be farmore likely to pursue significant changes in her circum-

stances than were she morefavorablydisposedtowards hem. And politicians

may be well advised to attendto majortrends n life satisfactionamongtheir

constituents. Second, life satisfaction might be thoughtto play an important

role in determining subjects' hedonic states. Third, life satisfaction might

providea useful indicatorof subjects'actualwell-being moduleoerrordue to,

e.g., ignorance about one's situation). Finally, it constitutes an agent's

endorsement or repudiation)of her circumstances n life, which may in itself

be of great import.There are doubtless other reasonsfor takingan interestin

life satisfaction, but it should be clear enough thathappiness,so construed,

would seem at leastprima acie to be an importantkind.24

It is worthelaboratingon the significanceof affectivisthappinessas well.

As we saw to some extent earlier, knowing that someone's thymic state is

predominantlynegative-say, that he is depressed-enables us to predictand

24 There are actually a number of problems with life satisfaction.For one thing, it is ques-

tionable whethermost of us even have well-defined attitudes about our lives as a whole

(see, for instance, Schwarz and Strack (1999)). This and other difficulties-particularly

concerningthe extent to which ourjudgmentsarefaithfulto ourexperienceand values-

raise questions about whether life satisfaction can do the theoretical work often asked of

it. I addressthese questions in (unpublishedms-a).






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explain a variety of things: his hedonic state, his emotional responses to

particular vents, patterns n thepro- and con-attitudeshe expressesin various

situations, his decisions, the kind of information hat tends to grab his atten-

tion, the sortsof memoriesthat he tends to recall, his performanceon various

tasks, certain aspects of his physiology and health(e.g., hypertension,stom-

ach ulcer), andso forth.In short, our thymic states have extremelyfar-reach-

ing consequencesfor the characterof our lives. They appear o comprise the

single most importantdeterminantof our hedonic states, likely by a wide

margin. If someone's mood is generally positive and her frame of mind

relatively serene,then one wondershow her experiencecould fail to be largely

pleasant. Perhapsshe stoically endureschronic and serious pain, but to main-

tain a truly placid and sunny disposition under such circumstances would

requireemotional resourcesnot readily summoned or most people. And then

we might reasonablysupposethat her experience really is pleasantall things

considered:though she hardly likes the pain, she pays it little heed. (Notice

that we would in any event take her to be happy.) Knowledge of someone's

thymic state confers substantialwarrant or conclusions about the basic char-

acterof her hedonic state.And this is not basedsimply on the causalpowers

of mood states, but also on the fact thatthey are themselves deeply pleasant

(or unpleasant).Affectivist happinessthus looks to be a valuablekind, with

genuinepredictiveandexplanatory alue.

4.4 Areascriptions of hedonistichappiness informative?

Thereis good reason to think thatascriptionsof hedonistichappinesswould,

for lay purposes,be comparativelyuninformative.Suppose,for instance,that

an affective state theory is correct: then, in calling someone unhappy,we

would typicallybe (indirectly)attributingunpleasantness,butunpleasantness

of a specifically emotionalsort, such as sadness or anxiety.For the hedonist,

by contrast,such

ascriptionsrefer

indiscriminatelyo

anykindof

unpleasantexperience. As I noted earlier, this has the unsavory consequence that one

might accuratelycharacterize he discomfort of a bad toothache as a form of

unhappiness. Quite apartfrom such worries, such a descriptionis arguably

too vague to be of much practical use. Knowing that so-and-so has a

toothache, we would rarely if ever reporton his condition with a generic

ascription of unpleasantness. Rather, we would simply observe what we

know specifically to be the case: he has a bad toothache.Rarelyare we in a

position to know that someone's hedonic statehas a certaincharacterwithoutknowing whether t is emotional, physical, or otherwise.

Given this, it would often if not usually violate the Gricean maxim of

informativeness to describe someone simply as in a pleasant or unpleasant

state (particularly iven the ratherglaringdifferences between emotionaland

physical unpleasantness).Howeverhelpfulthe hedonisticnotionmight be for






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the theorist, it seems to be of comparatively ittle use for the layperson. This

is compoundedby the fact that we expect a person'semotional state to reflect

physical discomforts accordingto their importance o the individual. Ascrip-

tions of affectivist happinesswould thus be doubly informative, conveying

the specificallyemotionalcharacterof his displeasurewhile at the same time

tracking indirectlyandroughly)thephysical aspectsof his condition.25

4.5 Therole of happiness npractical deliberation

One might still consider hedonistichappinessmore important or purposes of

deliberation:what shouldconcernagentswhen makingdecisions is less how

various options will impact on their attitudes towards their lives, or their

affective states. What matters is how the options will affect their hedonic

states. From a deliberativestandpoint, t would appear hat hedonistichappi-

ness is still more importantthan happiness as construedby the alternativetheories. Perhaps this is true for some deliberative circumstances. When

deciding whether or not to springfor a massage, say, it seems odd to puzzle

over whether it will be fulfilling emotionally, or whether it will make me

more satisfied with my life. The realquestionis whetherit willfeel good, be

pleasant-or rather, pleasantenough to be worth the money. (On the other

hand, it seems more than a little eccentricto fret about whetherit will make

me happier. Which seems like yet anotherreason to doubt that hedonism

offers a crediblereconstruction f happiness.)It is questionable, however, whether the hedonistic notion is more useful

for all importantdeliberative situations, especially the ones in which it is

naturalto consider questions of happiness.These appearmostly to involve

issues with far-reaching mplications or the qualityof our lives. When decid-

ing on whether to take up or abandon a vocation, for instance, we often

considerwhether we will be happier n that vocation or some alternative.On

the hedonistic theory, this amountsto asking which profession would bring

the most favorablebalance of pleasureover displeasure.Relative to the alter-

native theories, is this the most sensible questionto ask? It isn't a bad ques-

tion, but there are reasons for thinkingthat one may actually be betteroff

asking the affective state question:which vocation would make me happier

according to the affective state theory?26For it is plausible that the better

option with respect to the affective state question will almost invariablybe

the betteroption with respect to the hedonic question, and vice-versa. If so,

then the real issue between them becomes: whichquestionis easier to answer

25 However, a possible tu quoque lurks: perhaps ascriptions of affectivist happiness also

violate Gricean maxims. This seems unlikely, but I shall not pursue the matterhere. In

any event, the problemis worse for the hedonist.26 It is not so clear that the life satisfactiontheoryfares so well on this count. If it does, this

might only be because of its connection with affective state. For brevity I shall consider

only the affective state theoryhere.






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correctly? I would suggest that the affective state question is. The range of

pleasures and displeasures hat might result from a careerchoice is extremely

broadand diverse, including nnumerable hysical, intellectual,and emotional

pleasures (both peripheral and central). Trying to get a grip on one's

prospects with respect to these all at once does not seem a simple task in the

least. It would hardly be surprising f we tended to overlook or incorrectly

weight many of the more importantpleasures.But if the affective state theorytakes somethinglike the form I discussed earlier,then the relevantstates in

its case are essentially the class of mood states, broadlyconstrued.Though

itself somewhat diverse,this is clearly a narrower nd moretractablerange of

concerns:how will I do with respectto emotionalfulfillment, peace of mind,

good cheer, high spirits,andperhapsa few otherthings (which are, I would

wager, mostly highly correlatedwith each other)?

The more limitedfocus is helpfulwhen the optionsbeforeus arecomplex

and affect our well-being in a broadvarietyof ways. This is likely to be the

case for any of the most importantdecisions we make in life, at least where

well-being-our own or that of others-is a significantconsideration. ndeed,

it is plausibly the case with respect to most or all of the circumstances in

which we ordinarilyappealto questionsof happiness. Affective state happi-

ness appears, n short,to be what we might call a relatively efficient good: it

packs a lot of value into a relatively compact, epistemically manageable

package.There are, then, good reasons for thinkingthat affectivist happiness may

actuallybe more important rom the standpointof practicaldeliberation han

hedonistichappiness.If so, thenthe affective state notionmay well deserve a

central place in deliberation, as well as ethical inquiry, whether or not it

deserves to be called happiness.27t certainly s not at all clear that the hedo-

nistic notion ought to occupy a more distinguished position in the pantheon

of deliberativegoals.

4.6 A final objection

The apparent act remains thatthe value of happinesson the affective state,

andperhaps ife satisfaction, heoriesderivesprimarily rom its impacton our

hedonic states. Specifically, the best explanation for the premium widely

placed on happiness,for eitherview, may be thatit would typically be pleas-

ant. Indeed, this would seem to be the case for any plausible account of

27 This need not be the case given what I have said thus far. Just as hedonic value may not

be best promoted by directly pursuing it, so might affectivist happiness not be best

promoted by seeking it directly. There is much wisdom in the old saw that one is most

likely to attain happiness by not making it the object of one's every choice. Yet it is

doubtfulthatwe oughtto ignore it. Quite the contrary: he personwho decides on a voca-

tion withoutany consideration or mattersof happinessis morelikely thannot to be delib-

erating poorly.






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happiness:ask any lay person why she values happiness so much, and one is

liable to receive an incredulous,uncomprehending tare-who could ask such

a stupid question?-and the impatientreply: "becauseit feels good." Given

all this, wouldn'ta hedonisticnotion be more useful?

Well, no. Happinesswould at least appearto be immensely valuable on

hedonicgrounds-indeed, crucial to a good life-given any of these theories.

Most people would expect that someone satisfied with his life, or whosethymic state is positive, would be in a pleasantcondition. An attributionof

either would seem to license an inferenceof this sort.28Fromthe standpoint

of prudentialvalue the differences between these accounts seem relatively

small. Indeed, a central lesson of this paperis thatseekers of hedonic value

cannot simply assume that the psychological kind thatrealizes this value is

the one that most warrants their attention. Pleasure seems too thin a

phenomenon,realized in too broada range of states, to serve many of our

predictive,deliberative nd otherneeds.

5. Conclusion, and a diagnosis

One wonders how so many theoristscould have gotten things so seriously

wrong. I suspect there are a variety of reasons for this. I will mention two.

Most importantly, the hedonistic notion is theoretically important. As I

noted earlier, hedonistic theories of well-being are far more plausible than

theories that take well-being to consist in affective state or life satisfaction.Perhapsepistemicand communicativeconstraints,as well as differing predic-

tive and explanatoryneeds, limit the utilityof directappealsto hedonic state

for some lay and theoretical purposes. But value theory need not be

constrained n the sameway. All three notions deserve close theoreticalatten-

tion. Given this, the hedonist's erroris in some ways ratherinnocuous. In

many cases, my arguments show only that theorists misuse the term

'happiness'in so describingtheirsubjectmatter.Hedonistic utilitariansneed

not change the substanceof theirtheories; they simply oughtto change their

terminology,or at least qualify theirmisleading usage.29Theirutilitarianism

is not about (psychological) happiness, but ratheraboutpleasure.Yet even

this "merelyverbal"error s not entirely benign.For as a consequence many

theoristshave misconstrued he natureof happiness.Moreover,we may well

have failed to develop a correcttheoryof happiness.I thinkthat we have, and

28 I think the inference is actually ratherweak in the case of life satisfaction, and I argue

elsewhere that the hedonic value of life satisfaction is insufficient to warranta life satis-

faction view of happiness (unpublished ms-a). But appearances are certainly to the

contrary,and I stick with them for presentpurposes.At any rate,I do not think the prob-

lem serious enough to give hedonism a leg up on the life satisfactiontheory.29 Similarly, Kahneman's hedonistic theory of "objective happiness" (1999), while not

plausible as a theory of happiness, may nonetheless have important implications for

empiricalresearch n the psychology of well-being.






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as a result we have yet to understandone of the most widely and strongly

desiredstates known.

Second, the attitudemodel of pleasure lends itself to confusion between

pleasure and satisfaction. Thus intuitions favoring a life satisfaction theory

might be thought to supporthedonism. Considerthat we may describe hedo-

nism as taking happinessto be the condition of finding one's experience of

life to be largely agreeable.This claim is susceptibleof a couple of differentreadings: it could mean that the majority of the time one's experience is

agreeable;or it might be taken to mean thatone now finds the majorityof

what one has experienced in life to be agreeable.The former interpretation

sees happinessas a function of many particularized,now-for-now attitudes,

whereas the latter sees it as a global assessmentof one's life. But this latter

reading amounts to a life satisfaction theory; only on the former does the

theorycount as hedonistic. I take it to be obvious that there is a substantial

differencehere.

The popularityof hedonism is quite understandable.But does it really

matterwhichtheorywe accept?Given the substantialdifferencesbetween the

different conceptions of happiness, yes. For if we conceive of happiness

differently,we are liable to pursuedifferent things in life to get it. Someone

seeking hedonistichappiness,for instance,will tend to focus on those things

thathe believes will give him the most pleasureand the least displeasure.If

he is sufficiently unenlightened-and many of us are-then he may pursuethe sorts of obvious sourcesof immediatepleasure,amusement,comfort and

convenience thathe thinkswill achieve this. As we have seen, seeking plea-

sure directly is not necessarily the best way to attain it. But if we think of

happinessas a matterof our thymic states, then we may tend to focus more

on subtle but importantaspects of our emotional life that tend to be over-

looked in everydaylife as much as in theory.Someoneconcerned to improve

her moods and reduce anxiety, for instance, might betterrecognize what it

takes to do so and hence be more effective at it than someone who seeks

pleasure directly.If such affective states have a sufficiently profound mpact

on our hedonic states, then she might be expected to beat the hedonistat his

own game. Likewise, those seeking life satisfaction will probably pursue

another kind of end. Perhaps they will be more concerned to successfully

execute some sort of life plan. Orthey might simply pursuewhatever condi-

tion they thinkideal, with matters affective and hedonic enteringthe picture

only insofar as they happento fit into that ideal. Perhapswith the result thatimportantpsychological states are overlooked. So yes, it matters what we

thinkhappiness s, andwe are well advisedto find an answer.






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