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Form-Particular Resemblance in Plato's "Phaedo"Author(s): David SedleySource: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, New Series, Vol. 106 (2006), pp. 311-327Published by: Wiley on behalf of The Aristotelian SocietyStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4545463 .Accessed: 15/05/2014 21:25

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XllIFORM-PARTICULAR RESEMBLANCEIN PLATO'SPHAEDO

by David Sedley

ABSTRACTThispaper sa critical e-examinationf he rgumentnPlato'sPhaedo or he hesis hat ll earningsrecollectionfprenatal nowledge.Plato's speaker ocrates oncentrates n the case of 'equal sticks ndstones', iewed s striving ithout omplete uccess o resemble Form,the Equal itself. he paper rgues hat a) this s a rather pecial ase,focused n geometry;b) Plato s at painsto emphasizehat he Form-particular elation eednotbeoneofresemblancet all, concession hichhe insists ould not, f made,damagehis theory f recollection;c) evenif resemblances assumed o be the correct ccount f that elationship,the striving o be like' gloss s not an integral omponent f Plato'smetaphysics.

Plato often peaks of particulars n the sensible world asgaining heir roperties nvirtue f an imperfect r unstable

resemblance othe ppropriate orms. Correspondingly, ormsthemselves re often reated s the paradigms hat particularsimperfectly imic. he beautiful hingswewitness re never sbeautiful s the Beautiful tself; hey re nevertheless eautifulprecisely n so far s they esemble t.

The Phaedo s a classicforum or hisparticularmetaphysicalthesis. For there, n his defence of the doctrine that learning srecollection f prenatal nowledge, ocratesmakes xtended seof the dmittedly uzzling deathat qualsticks nd stones hatwe perceive re striving o be like a Form, the Equal itself',but fall short of it. It is partly y noticing hat deficiency fresemblance, ccording o Socrates, hat we are led by the sightof equal sticks nd stones o recollect heEqual itself.

Before oming o the example f equality, ocrates' irst askhas been to establish hecriteria or what s to count s a caseof recollection: therwise e will have no guarantee hat theequality ase is such a case. At 73c5-d2 the criteria hat can

*Meeting f the Aristotelian ociety, held in Senate House, University f London,on Monday 8 May 2006at 4.15 pm.

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312 DAVID SEDLEY

enableus to recognize n authentic ase of recollection, r beingreminded', re established s follows:

(a) On perceiving you recognize and think f somethingdifferent, (especiallyf you had forgotten );

(b) x and y are objects f different nowledge.Socrates next (73d3-74a8) illustrates ow the appropriate'reminding' elations an be many nd various. You might ereminded f y by seeing regardless f whether is a possession

of y, a friend f y, likeness f y's possession r friend, r, moresimply, likeness f y. It is however he ast case that ttractsSocrates' pecial nterest, ith he xample hat eeing paintingof Simmiasmightmakeyou recollect immias.

At this point Socrates sks:

'Doesn't t turn ut, nthis ange f ases, hat ecollectionrisesfrom imilar hings, ut lso arises rom issimilar hings?''It does.' 74a2-4)

Whenrecollection rises rom imilar hings, s in the ase whereSimmias'portrait eminds ou of Simmias, t is the similarityrelation hatdoes the reminding. hen recollection risesfromdissimilar hings, t s of coursenot the dissimilarity elation hatdoes the eminding.1 ather, he ormulation eans hat whereassomereminding s done by similarity, ther emindings doneby connections ther han imilarity. his atter ind has alreadybeen exemplified y the ownership elation nd the friendshiprelation,2 nd no doubt here re plentiful thers.

Socrates oes not consider ases where is only ccidentallysimilar o y, as when, or xample, cloud formation emindsyou of a hippopotamus. here s no reason why hese houldbe excluded, ut the mportant oint s that when, s he now

does, he goeson to focus on similarity ases, the only ones he

1. Cf. J. L. Ackrill, Anamnesis n the Phaedo: Remarks on 73c-75c', in E. N. Lee,A. P. D. Mourelatos and R. Rorty eds), Exegesisand Argument: ssays in GreekPhilosophy resented o Gregory lastos,Amsterdam: an Gorcum, 1973,pp. 177-95,at pp. 188-9.2. The complex cases involving a combination of likeness and, for example,ownership 73e5-74al) also belong under this atter heading; see Ackrill, rt. cit.,pp. 189-90.


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FORM-PARTICULARRESEMBLANCE N PLATO'SPHAEDO313

is interested n are those wherex is not merely ike y, but isa likeness f y, that s, where stands o y as copyto original.For the Form-particular elationship n which is rgument illconcentrate s of ust this kind.

Socratesnow continues s follows:

'But when t's from imilar hings hat someone s reminded fsomething, ustn't he following urther hing ecessarily appento him, namely hat he think bout whether his thing does ordoes not fall

short,n

respectf its

similarity,f that

thing fwhich he has been reminded?''It must.' 74a5-8)

What motivates his further pecification? ncontroversially,Socrates is looking forward o the equal-sticks-and-stonesexample hatwillfollow,where t salleged hatwe do inevitablynotice uch objects o be deficient ikenesses f the Equal itself(74d4-75b3).But precisely hat epistemological oint s beingconveyed?

One possible pproach s to say that what matters s simplynoticing hat , the reminding tem, s differentrom , the objectrecollected. or otherwise t would not be a case of x remindingyou of y, but of your mistaking for y. If so, in the exampleof Simmias nd his portrait, he falling hort need not consistin representational hortcomings uch as inaccurate olour orcontours. t will ie more fundamentallyn the recognition hatthe portrait s two-dimensional nd inanimate, hileSimmiashimself s three-dimensional nd animate. And this radicaldifference etween opy and originalwillhave its counterpart,when t comes to the sticks-and-stones ase, in the fact thatsensible quals are of a quite different rder f beingfrom heEqual itself sensible s opposed to intelligible.3

There re difficultiesbout this pproach, owever. What weare said inevitably o notice s whether falls hort f y in itssimilarity r does not. By clear mplication, here ould be anauthentic ase of reminding n which the subject noticed noshortfall f resemblance hatsoever. iven, further, hat the

3. Cf. J. C. B. Gosling, Similarity n Phaedo 73B seq.', Phronesis, 0, 1965, pp.151-61.


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example n the reader's mind at this point s that of Simmiasand his portrait, he most natural reading eems to be oneappropriate o the way portrait esemblests ubject: portraitmight r might ot fall hort f ts original n terms f similarity.One that did not fall short f its originalwould not have tobe a hologram r perfect ouble as in Plato's celebrated twoCratyluses' rgument),4 ut simply n entirely ccurate two-dimensional epresentation, ith irtual hotographic ualities.The mplication or hemetaphysicalase to follow s that, n the

one hand, heequal sticks nd stones o fall hort f the Equalitself n terms f likeness, ecause, whereas he Equal itself s amodelof pure unadulterated quality, hey re only mperfectlyor unstably qual; but that, n the other hand, there might nprinciple e a participant n the Form which nno wayfell hortof it in terms f likeness-just s there might n principle e aperfect albeit wo-dimensional) ortrait f Simmias.

That Plato acknowledged uch cases of perfect ikeness o

Forms should not, I think, be in doubt. Since both god(Theaetetus 76b8-cl) and the deal city RepublicV 427e7)areperfectlyust, neither alls hort f the Form of Justice n termsof resemblance o it.' Yet neither s plausibly eld to be itselfa Form. The ideal city s rather perfect because idealized)exemplar f the Form of Justice, s indeed t is of the Formsof the other irtues. lato undoubtedly olds hat noperceptiblecity, ccupying ime nd space, ouldever ossess usticewithoutthe ompresence f njustice, ut he mposes o suchrestrictionson an idealized, ntelligible ity. here sno reasonwhy hinkingabout god, or about an ideal city, houldnot be said to remindyou of Justice indeed, n Plato's eyes,what better way to bereminded f it?), and these would be cases where, fter duereflection, ou would conclude hat he reminding tems o notfall hort f the Form n their esemblance o it.

4. Cratylus 32b4-c6.5. The ideal city s never tself alled a Form. As Myles Burnyeat lluminatinglyobserves 'Utopia and Fantasy: The Practicability f Plato's Ideally Just City', nJ. Hopkins nd A. Savile eds), Psychoanalysis, ind nd Art. Perspectives n RichardWollheim, xford: Blackwell,1992,pp. 175-87;reprinted n G. Fine (ed.), Plato 2:Ethics, Politics, Religion, nd the Soul, Oxford: Oxford University ress, 1999, pp.297-308), in Plato's imagery he deal city s laid up in heaven, whereas he Formsare not in but beyond the heaven.


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Neither hese nor any other erfect articipants laya role nthe Recollection rgument, ut we might evertheless oint oPlato's background ommitment o them s accounting or hisinsistence hat at any rate the sensible articipants onsideredin the Recollection rgument re in fact mperfectikenesses fthe Form n which heyparticipate, nd that our noticing hisdeficiencys an integral art of the processwhereby hey emindus of thoseForms.For his project n the Recollection rgumentis specificallyo show how an embodied oul's use of the enses

can lead it to recollection f Forms.I do, however, oncede a weakness n the interpretationI am advocating.6 ocrates and Simmias gree that n casesof recollection rom imilars t is 'necessary' hat the subjectnotice whether here s a falling hort or not (74a6, 8). Theinterpretation hich have rejected id at least have the meritof explaining his necessity: oticing he qualitative ifferencebetween and y was according o that reading necessarycondition f being reminded y x of y rather han simplymistaking for y. On the more ommonsensical eadingwhichtheportrait nalogy tself avours, ccording owhich he ubjectmust hink bout howgooda likeness t s, t s not t all obviouswhy this component n the thought rocess hould be deemed'necessary'.Mightn't see a photograph f you and be led byit directly othinking bout you,without or moment ausingto ask myself ow good a likeness t s?

I cannot find convincing efence f Socrates' ssertion hatthis ntermediate hase s actually necessary'. or is the use of'necessary' ere a mere lip, because the same modality ecurslater.7 ut n mitigation t can be said that he remainder f theargument eed not depend on its being trictly ecessary. emight ave said no more han hat uchevaluations f ikenessare a typical eature f the xperience f being eminded hrough

resemblance, nd even that would have helped o confirm hatwhenwenotice qual sticks nd stones alling hort f the Equalitselfwe really re undergoing he xperience f being eminded

6. Cf. Lee Franklin, Recollection nd PhilosophicalReflection n Plato's Phaedo',Phronesis, 0, 2005, pp. 289-314, at pp. 298-303.7. 75al 1: we are obliged dei) to think ..' (for full ontext ee p. 321 below).


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by resemblance.8nstead, Socratesgoes one step further ndmakesthis ypical eature ompulsory. ut the argument s notgoing o be badlyweakened or eaderswhoprefer o substitute(for xample) normal' or necessary'.

We now move on to the main argument or Recollection,based on the example f seeing qual sticks r stones nd beingled by these to think of something istinct rom hem, heEqual itself. here has been much discussion f what kind ofexperience his s meant o be, and of whether t is in principlea universal uman

xperiencer one limited o an

intellectualelite.9 onstraints f spacepermitmeto do no more han ketchmy ownassumptions n these uestions.

When n the PhaedoSocratesmaintains hat earning s recol-lection 72e3-4,b4-5, 75e5-7, 6a6-7), hemeans xactly hathemeantwhen aying he ame thing n the arlier ialogueMeno.The entire pectrum f theoretical tudies onsists n recollectionof innate knowledge. his ranges from simple mathematicsat one extreme as illustrated y the experiment n the Menoof teaching eometry o a slave boy all the way up to theextremely are nd difficult iscipline f ethics, ounded n thedefinition f value Forms uch s those f goodness nd beauty.Maybeno one but handful f Platonic hilosophers as earnt,that s,recollected, hose orms hence immias' ater uggestionthat nobody t all apart from ocrates nows hem, 6b4-c3),`0but anyonewho has learnt ome basicmathematics asat leastto some extent esuscitated heir nnate nowledge f the Formsrelevant o it, and these atter, s we shall see, importantlyinclude heForm of a basicgeometrical oncept, quality.

Such a conviction, hat virtually verybody ither does orcould do some recollection hrough tudy, s important oSocrates' rgument, ecausethe soul's ability o recollect s his

8. Cf. C. J. Rowe, Plato. Phaedo, Cambridge: Cambridge University ress, 1993,p. 167: all the argument will require s that we can do so'.9. I have been much nfluenced ereby Dominic Scott, Recollection nd Experience:Plato's Theory f Learning nd Its Successors,Cambridge: Cambridge UniversityPress, 1995, Ch. 2, although he argues for a considerably arrower estriction-toan elite of Platonic philosophers than favour.10. Since some Forms, such as Equality, have been recollected y Simmiashimselfand others 74a9-d3), I agreewith cott, op. cit. pp. 67-8, that the more pessimisticremarks t 76b4-c3 are occasioned by the ntervening ddition of Good, Beautifuland Just o the ist of Forms 76clO-d4).


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FORM-PARTICULAR RESEMBLANCE IN PLATO' SPHAEDO 317

key evidence or ts capacity o exist outside he body, nd ifonly a tiny handful f philosophical ouls had that ability hisconclusionwould be severelyeopardized: t would remain otonly possiblebut even plausible hat he vast majority f soulsdid not exist before heir resent ncarnation, nd that that swhy hey annot recollect.11o the necessity hat he learning'in question e universally ttainable y human beings s one ofthe keys o the rgument.

That basic geometry s a universally ttainable iscipline n

Plato's eyes is well attested by the Meno experiment. ndequality, s I have already ndicated, s itself geometricalconcept. say this because n Plato equality tandardly unc-tions as a size relation, ntermediate etween arge and small(cf. Phaedo75c9,12Sophist 57b6-7),rather han,for xample,as a numerical elation ntermediate etween many' nd 'few'.It is therefore rimarily ermane o geometry, nd its choice sa sampleobjectof recollection trengthens he mpression hatrecollection s once again, as in the Meno, being presented suniversally ttainable.

The following onsideration ends further onfirmation.Largeness, mallness nd Equality re an interdependent riadof Formswhich lato considers o be easilymastered much ikeanother asicmathematical oncept, speed', at Laches 192al-b4): argeness nd smallness re, respectively,hepower o exceedand the power o be exceeded.13 hese assumeddefinitions reapparently t work n the background t Phaedo 102b3-d4, ndare moreor less formally et out at Parmenides 50c6-el.Theirstatus s familiar nd simple ruths s wellevidenced t HippiasMajor 294a8-b4,where ven an interlocutor s dim as Hippiasis expected o acceptwithout rgument virtual efinition f'large' along these ame ines, ne which s then, ollowing hefamiliar latonic attern, eant o serve s a model for defining

the elusive nd highly roblematic alueterm beautiful'.11. At 107c8-d5 and likewise t 72d1O,read without he arbitrary xcision ditorshave imposed), heprimary moral consequences f the soul's immortality ependonthe bad souls as well as good ones being mmortal.12. Here the comparatives Larger' and 'Smaller' must be read as mere variantson 'Large' and 'Small', Plato rightly eeingno difference etween large in relationto x)' and 'larger than x)'.13. Cf. my Platonic Causes', Phronesis, 3, 1998,pp. 114-32, at pp. 127-8.


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318 DAVIDSEDLEY

Sincelargeness s the capacity o exceed, nd smallness hecapacity o be exceeded, qualitymust ethe apacity oneither-exceed-nor-be-exceeded.hus equality s as easyand accessiblea concept s largeness. his consideration might uggest hatat 74b2-3,where ocrates ecures immias' greement hat we'know of the Equal what t is, we' means all rational beings.However, hepronoun's ange slikely o be somewhat arrowerthan hat, ince ocrates' nsuing eries f questions, bout howwe acquiredour knowledge f equality, mplies hat we have

actively houghtbout it and

consciously istinguishedt

fromsensible quality.This narrows the field, no doubt, but still for reasons

that will becomeclearer oon-allows it potentially o includeanybody who has studied geometry. hese may in turn betaken to represent he group ater n the passage described sundergoing ecollection:thosewespeakof s learning ' 76a6).It certainly eednot exclude hosewhohappennot to subscribe

to the heory f Forms. ndeed, t potentially ncludes ll humanbeings, laves ncluded.14These learners re said to become aware on the one hand

that the equality f the sticks r stonesbefore hem esemblesthe Equal itself, ut on the other that this is a defectiveresemblance. heir experience hus closelyfits he previouslyestablished rofile f being eminded by similars', llustrated ythe Simmias-portrait xample.But the precision f the analogybetween he two cases is not, unfortunately, atchedby theclarity f thenewdescriptionn ts ownright. ow any uch wayof thinking bout equal sticks nd stones ould be presented sa commonhuman xperience emains paque. I shall return othe problem nly owards heend.

Before that we must consider he topic of resemblance.have not so far questioned heequationbetween particular's

participation n a Form nd its being resemblance r copy ofit. But how wedded s Plato to this nterpretation f the Form-particular elationship? ot nearly nough as been made of thefact hat, n the Recollection rgument, ocrates nd Simmiasemphatically nd repeatedly gree that it makes no difference

14. Cf. Catherine sborne, Perceiving articulars nd Recollecting he Forms n thePhaedo', Proceedings f the Aristotelian ociety, 5, 1995,pp. 211-33, at p. 230.


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FORM-PARTICULARRESEMBLANCE NPLATO'SPHAEDO 319

whether , which reminds s, and y, which we recollect, resimilar r dissimilar:

'But from hese quals, lthough hey re different rom hatEqual, you nevertheless ave thought f and acquiredknowledgeof t?''That's uite rue,' e replied.'It being ither imilar o them r dissimilar?''Absolutely.''It makes no difference,' e said. So longas, upon seeing ne

thing, rom hat eeing ou come o think f another, hether tbe similar r dissimilar, hathas happenedmust ecessarilyerecollection.'74c7-d2)'5'For this urned ut to be possible-upon erceiving omething,whether y sight, y hearing r by some ther ense, rom histhing o think f somethinglse which ne had forgotten, ndwithwhich he first hing asconnected, eing ither imilar rdissimilar ..' (76al-4)

Commentators ometimes uggest that being reminded bydissimilars ere s meant o allow for hefact hat he qualsticksand stones to some extent ail to resemble he Equal itself.16But I do not think hat can be right. he distinction etweenbeing eminded y imilars nd being eminded ydissimilars asalready een ired t 74a2-4, nd, s I noted arlier, t amountedto the distinction etween eingreminded y x of y becausexresembles , s in the ase of Simmias nd his portrait, nd beingreminded y x of y becausex has some connection ith y otherthan ne of similarity, or xample, hat of being y's possessionor friend. t was there dmitted hat n the imilarity ases theremay also be some dissimilarity, ut this was catered orby the'falling hort' provisionwhich was said to apply only n thesimilarity ases(74a5-8). Thus the equals case, which nvolvessome imilarity nd some falling hort, s located quarely nderthe heading f being eminded y similars, nd not dissimilars.

15. 74c11-d3 (the last three components of this exchange) has been excised bymany editors, ncludingmost recently heodor Ebert, Platon: Phaidon,Gottingen:Vandenhoeck nd Ruprecht, 004, pp. 213-15, to whom refer or full tatement fthe case. I agree with him that he ines fit mperfectly nto the run of the argument,but remain n no doubt that they re by Plato.16. Kenneth Dorter, Plato's Phaedo: An Interpretation, oronto: University fToronto Press, 1982,pp. 60-1; Rowe, op. cit. pp. 170-1;Osborne, rt. cit. pp. 226-8.


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Why then does Socrates repeatedly emark hat, o far asconcerns ts being case of recollection, t makes no differencewhether hereminding s from imilars r dissimilars? can findonly one credible xplanation. lthough heequalsexample sin fact beingpresented s a case of being eminded y similars,Socrates s at pains to stress hat his argument orrecollectionof Forms n no way depends n the relevant orm-particularrelation urning ut to be one of resemblance. ny evidentconnection inking he reminding tem to the corresponding

Form will suffice much s any evident onnection etween nobject nd a person may nable he object o remind ouof thatperson.'7 ndeed, only when we recognize hisdo we begin oseewhy ocrates, n explaining hatrecollections, prefaced heSimmias-portrait xamplewith whole tring f caseswhere hereminding elationwasnot one of direct imilarity 73d3-e8).

Those everyday ases of being reminded pened with theexample:

You know, don't you, hat overs, when hey ee a lyre r cloak orsomething lse that heir eloved s in the habit of using,have thefollowing xperience? hey find hat they have both recognizedthe yre nd got in their minds he appearance of the boy whoselyre t is. And that s being reminded. 73d6-9)

Plato's decision here to make his first xampleone wherelover s reminded f his belovedupon seeing lyre endstoconfirm, f confirmation ereneeded, hat t s constructed ithForm-recollectionn mind. or the heme hat hephilosopher'srelation o Forms s fundamentally n erotic one is a threadrunning hrough uchdiverse ialogues s Symposium, epublicand Phaedrus, s well as putting n an appearance arly n thePhaedo tself 66d7-e4).'8Here then s a clear ndicator hat hevarious xamples f reminding y non-resemblanceonnectionsat 73d3-74al were, ust as much s the focal case of Simmiasand his portrait which oncluded he ist, meant o symbolizevariousversions f the Form-particular elation.

17. say any evident onnection' ather han imply any relation', ecause helattermight nclude, or xample, eing ifferent,o-existingn the ame universe,andother elations ith o power o remind.18.Mythanks o George oys-Stones or his oint.


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FORM-PARTICULAR RESEMBLANCEIN PLATO'S PHAEDO 321

The conclusion ooks inescapable hat, n emphasizing hatnon-resemblance elations an underlie ecollection, lato is atpains to avoid tying is whole argument o the choice of re-semblance s the correct ccount f the vexedForm-particularrelationship. emember his later dialogue the Parmenides,whose critique f the theory f Forms s, as has often beenremarked, ocused specially n the version f that heory oundin the Phaedo. There, s the young nd inexperienced ocratesmakes one retreat fter nother, esemblance urns ut to be

just one of the possible nterpretations f the Form-particularrelationship, nd a problematic ne at that.19 ere n the arlierPhaedo, then, Plato's caution may be judged far-sighted. tis often aid to be at IOOd5-6of the Phaedo, n the SecondVoyage passage, that Socrates displayshis agnosticism boutthe Form-particular elationship, ut there his point s I thinka rather different ne, that so far as the role of Forms ascausesis concerned t does not much matter ia what preciseForm-particular elationship ne supposes them to be doingthe causing.20t seemsto me to be the Recollection assagethat really displays o best effect lato's current voidanceofdogmatism n the Form-particular elationship.

In the remainder f the Recollection Argument ocrateswill nevertheless roceed to treat the equals case as one ofbeing reminded y similarity. hat will enable him to applyan extra heck n his findings, nvoking he dditional riterionestablished arlier hat n casesof beingreminded y similarityone must lso think bout whether hereminding tem alls hortof the original. or that s exactly he point that he goes onto develop-that n the learning xperience lready recountedwith the example of equality we do indeed notice how thesticks nd stones all hort n their mulation f the Equal itself(74d4-e8).He thus enriches he profile f his chosenexample

as an authenticated ase of recollection. he subtlety f thisargument llustrates hemerits hat lato found nhishypothesisthat sensibles are related to the corresponding orms by

19. 132cl2-133a7, to be read with the analysis of Malcolm Schofield, Likenessand Likenesses n the Parmenides', n C. Gill and M. M. McCabe (eds), Form andArgument n Late Plato, Oxford: Oxford University ress, 1996,pp. 49-77.20. 1argue this n art. cit., p. 116.


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FORM-PARTICULAR RESEMBLANCEIN PLATO'S PHAEDO 323

thing hat there s, but is lacking nd incapable of being ike t,and is inferior, he person who thinks his must necessarily n

fact have previously nown he thing whichhe says t resemblesbut in relation o which t is lacking?''Necessarily.''Well have we, or have we not, ourselves had that kind ofexperience oncerning heequals and the Equal itself?''Certainly.''Then we must necessarily ave known heEqual before hat imewhen we first aw equal things nd thought All these hings restriving o be like the Equal, but are lacking n relation o it? '(74d9-75a3)

'Yet from ur perceptions we are obliged to think Everythingin our perceptions s striving or hat hing,what-Equal-is, ut slacking n relation o it. Or what s it we say?''Just hat.''Then before we started eeing nd hearing nd using the othersenseswe presumably must n fact have possessed knowledge f

what the Equal itself s, fwe were going orefer erceived qualsto it, thinking hat all such things re eager to be like t but areinferior o it.' (75al1-b8)

The talk of striving ere s extraordinarily mphatic. he equalsticks nd stones want', strive', nd 'are eager' to be like theForm of Equal. They also, at 75bl-2, 'strive for .. what-Equal-is'. This last formulation s no doubt functionally quivalentto the others, ut unlike them avoids any overt use of theresemblance odel-perhaps nce gain sign f Plato'skeepinghis options pen.

We cannot safely ismiss uch psychologizing alk as a setof more or less dead metaphors.24 hat the metaphors re, ifnothing lse, iveonesfollows rom hefact hat hey eliberatelyexploit hedominant ortrait-original odel f recollection. ustas Simmias' portrait s an attempted ikeness f him, whose

degreeof success can be evaluated only f it is recognized ssuch, o too the equal sticks nd stones re to be evaluated nterms f their uccess n a supposed ttempt o be likenesses fthe Form of Equal.

Nevertheless, hat the psychologizing alk requires somedeliteralizationan hardly e doubted ither. he sticks vidently

24. Cf. Rowe, op. cit., p. 172.


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324 DAVIDSEDLEY

haveno mental aculties hatwouldpermit hem o do any iteraldesiring. or is it easyto believe hat ome presumably ivineagent, nalogous to the painter, as made them s equal as itcould manage:to make sticks nd stones maximally qual toeach other r to somefurther hingwould be a bizarre rojectfor ither od or anyone lse to undertake.

Whenwe haveremoved he nimistic spect, rewe at east eftwith picture ccording o which articulars o somehow atu-rally nd systematically end owardsmaximal ikeness o Forms?Such an

interpretationas often een favoured

ythose who

consider he methodology f Socrates' SecondVoyage' Phaedo99c8-102a3) oretain, n tsuse of Forms s causes, he eleolog-ical aspiration manifested n his youthful lirtation ith hysicsthat has come to be known s his First Voyage' 96a4-99c8).5The interpretation n effect scribes o Plato an anticipation fthe Aristotelian odel,whereby orm, s actuality, s the objectfor which verything aturally trives cf. Aristotle, hysics 9).

But is such a model intelligible hen the range of 'forms'aspired to includesrelative roperties ike Large, Equal andSmall,the property ange most emphasized n the recollectionpassage?WhileGoodness,Beauty nd Health might lausiblybe thought f by Plato as ideals teleologically tructuring hedevelopment f those hings apable of participating n them, twillbe muchharder o believe he ame about these ize-Forms.Everything patially xtended articipates n both Largeness ndSmallness, nd (at least reflexively)n Equality oo. Even theidea that a stick spires o be (either bsolutely r in relationto something) s large s possible r as small s possible, r forthat matter o be as equal to something) s possible,wouldmakelittle bvious ense s a teleology. he further dea that he ticksimultaneously spires o all three f these goals would borderon nonsense.Nor, if we take nstead he nternal ize-relations

of a set of two or more ticks, s there ny reason o think hattheir quality o each other s a normative roperty, ne that ssomehow referable o mutual nequality.

To this onceptual ifficulty ne may add an argument romsilence.Nowhere lse in Plato's works, ven the Phaedo tself,

25. Notably David Wiggins, Teleology nd the Good in the Phaedo', Oxford tudiesin Ancient hilosophy, , 1986,pp. 1-18.


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FORM-PARTICULARRESEMBLANCE N PLATO'SPHAEDO 325

does the dea recur hat articulars articipate n Forms n virtueof triving o be like hem. t s to be found either ntheRepublicnor n the Timaeus, espite he fact hat both dialoguesheavilyemphasize he role of Forms as paradigms. mportantly, henotion of a paradigm oes not in itself ntail that ts copiesare trying o be like t: t s enough hat he paradigm f F-nessshould be the standard y whichwe udge which hings re Fand which re not, nd at whichwe aim when we are trying omake something .

These considerations hrow s back on the specific ontextof the Recollection rgument. he talk of particulars spiringto, but failing o achieve, omplete ikeness o the Forms isbest explained s a live metaphor ictated by the dominantmodel of recollection, ased on portraiture. ut why, f so,does Plato consider he metaphor ransferable rom he case ofportraiture o that of equality? s I have emphasized, ecauseequality functions or him as a size relation, eometry s themost bviousdisciplinen which t wouldbestudied.26ry, hen,imagining he equal objects n his example o be ones whosesides are selected y a geometry eacher r student o serve san approximate quare, sosceles riangle r other figurewithat least two equal sides, or as a pair of corresponding idesin two similar riangles.27hese might ound to us implausiblethoughts oentertain bout sticks nd stones, ut weshouldnotbe misled by the mere xpression.Sticks nd stones' regularlyserve lato as a cliche or mundane hysical bjects ngeneral cf.Alc. 1llbI2, c2, Gorg. 68a2, Euthyd. 00b4, Hipp. Ma. 292d2,Parm. 129d3,Tht. 156e6),and hence either ticks or stonesor other hings hat are equal' (Phaedo 74b5, cf. 74a1O-1 ) issimply is way of speaking enerally f physical nstances fequality.

Onlywhenwe assume geometrical ontext, t seems o me,

does the role of striving o be like' begin o make sense.Forin geometry e do indeed have to learn arly n that he size-relations mong the sides in drawn or otherwise onstructed

26. Cf. Socrates' opening uestions o the slave at Meno 82b-c2: ... do you knowthat a square area is like this .. with hese four ines equal?'27. Diagrams were mentioned t 73bl in the summary f the Meno argument, ndmay have remained ppermost n Plato's mind.


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326 DAVIDSEDLEY

or observed igures unction s no more than mperfect isualrepresentations f ideal size-relationscf. RepublicVI 51OdS-511 3), and that the visible quality we see exemplified n apair or set of such sides s on no account to be mistaken oractual mathematical quality, whose properties for example,its transitivity) e know quite independently f any sensoryevidence. he reason why striving o be like' makes sense na context ike geometry s well as in portrait-painting s thatin both alike the striving esidesn a purposive gent, workingwith r on a would-be ikeness f some

original.f the

trivings

attributable o the ikeness tself s well, hat s by transferencefrom he purposive gent's ntentions.

I am not suggesting hat the equality xample nvokedbySocrates s meant o be limited o geometry essons.He is fairlyexplicit hat, once we have arrived t the insight n question,we come with hindsight o think n the same way of all the'equals' we have ever perceived, amely s defective mitations

of the Form 74e6-75c3).That intended niversality o doubthelps xplainwhyhe choseat the outset o refer o equal sticksand stones', rather han simply o equal lines n a diagram:the mathematical mperfection f diagrams s extendible o theentire ontents f the ensibleworld.But t makes xcellent ensethat Plato should mean to assign o the context f geometricallearning ur first ealization hat sensible quality s no betterthan defective imicking f pure quality.

As soon as the portraiture odel, nd with t the primarilygeometrical equals' example, re left behind, he striving obe like' metaphor will disappear from Plato's ontology.therefore ubmit hat the teleological nterpretation f Plato'smetaphysicsn terms f particulars' triving or paradigm asbeenmisleadingly ncouraged y the examples iscussed n theRecollection rgument, nd shouldbe henceforth bandoned.28

Christ's ollegeCambridge B23BUUK

28. My thanks to audiences at Edinburgh, UC Davis and Oxford for helpfuldiscussion, nd to Gail Fine and Inna Kupreeva for valuable written omments.


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