证据与法律推理主讲人：熊明辉教授

2

我的联系方式 办公地点 南校区文科三楼逻辑与认知研究所 304C 室 联系电话 办公室： 84113340 手机： 13678924906 电子邮箱 hssxmh@mail.sysu.edu.cn xiongminghui@foxmail.com 即时通号 QQ: 1164157358 飞信： 798283253 个人主页 http://logic.sysu.edu.cn/faculty/xiongminghui

第 3 讲 法律逻辑 共 70 页

3

教学纪律

第 1 讲 导论 共 124 页

作业 1. 完成 PPT 上每讲之后课外作业，通过电子邮件提交，过

期补交不予认可。2. 作业提交电子专业用邮箱： legalreasoning09@gmail.com.

考试1. 本门课程不安排期中考试。2. 期末考试为课程论文，第 17 周星期三之前提交论文电子

版到专用邮箱，并且星期三上课时间提交打印稿，过期提交一律不予认可。

3. 期末成绩 = 平时成绩 (40%)+ 考试成绩 (60%) 。其中，平时成绩根据课堂表现和课外作业完成情况与质量评定。

期末课程论文题目（选做一题，论文不少于 6000 字）

1. 我国当前证据法中存在的问题及其对策

2. 试论法律与逻辑的关系

4

目录

第 1 讲 导 论 第 2 讲 法律证据 第 3 讲 法律推理 第 4 讲 法律逻辑 第 5 讲 法律分析 第 6 讲 法律论证 第 7 讲 法律解释 第 8 讲 侦查推理

第 3 讲 法律逻辑 共 70 页

经典逻辑道义逻辑行动逻辑与规范逻辑可废止逻辑法律逻辑

5

教学计划

第 3 讲 法律逻辑 共 70 页

周次 日期 内容 周次 日期 内容1 9.14 第 01 次 导 论 10 11.16 第 09 次 法律分析2 9.21 第 02 次 导 论 11 11.23 第 10 次 法律论证3 9.28 第 03 次 导 论 12 11.30 第 11 次 法律论证 4 10.5 国庆放假 13 12.7 第 12 次 法律论证 5 10.12 第 04 次 法律证

据

14 12.14 第 13 次 法律解释

6 10.19 第 05 次 法律证据

15 12.21 第 14 次 法律解释

7 10.26 第 06 次 法律推理

16 12.28 第 15 次 侦查推理

8 11.2 第 07 次 法律推理

17 1.4 第 16 次 侦查推理 提交课程论文

9 11.9 第 08 次 法律逻辑

18 期末考试时间

6

经典逻辑

1 Controversy over Legal Method in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries

1.1 Three Stances

1.1.1 The Rejection of Method

1.1.2 Methodological Heteronomy

1.1.3 Methodological Autonomy

1.2 Methods of Legal Reasoning

1.3 Logic – Analysis – Argumentation – Hermeneutics

第 3 讲 法律逻辑 共 70 页

7

目录

第 1 讲 导 论 第 2 讲 法律证据 第 3 讲 法律推理 第 4 讲 法律逻辑 第 5 讲 法律分析 第 6 讲 法律论证 第 7 讲 法律解释 第 8 讲 侦查推理

第 3 讲 法律逻辑 共 70 页

经典逻辑道义逻辑行动逻辑与规范逻辑可废止逻辑法律逻辑

8

INTRODUCTION

• Logical studies have a very long and rich tradition that dates back to antiquity.

• Despite this it is not easy to define logic. A consensus exists, however, on the fact that logic is about reasoning: it helps us to evaluate the validity of arguments.

• The question “which arguments are valid?” is usually, however, answered in the following way: “the ones in which the conclusion follows logically from the premises”.

• In this way we come back to the question of the nature of logic, or – more precisely – of logical consequence.

第 3 讲 法律逻辑 共 70 页

9

INTRODUCTION

• A famous analysis of the notion of logical consequence was presented by A. Tarski. Disregarding the details, one may summarize Tarski’s findings in the following sentence:

A sentence A follows logically from the set of premises Γ if

and only if in every case in which the premises of Γ are true,

A is also true.

第 3 讲 法律逻辑 共 70 页

• Alfred Tarski (January 14, 1901 – October 26, 1983) was a Polish logician and mathematician. Educated at the University of Warsaw and a member of the Lwow-Warsaw School of Logic and the Warsaw School of Mathematics and philosophy, he emigrated to the USA in 1939, and taught and carried out research in mathematics at the University of California, Berkeley, from 1942 until his death.

• A prolific author best known for his work on model theory, metamathematics, and algebraic logic, he also contributed to abstract algebra, topology, geometry, measure theory, mathematical logic, set theory, and analytic philosophy.

10

INTRODUCTION

• The idea behind this analysis is that logic is a theory that describes the “transmission of truth”.

• The “transmission” begins with the premises of an argument, and ends with the conclusion.

• The aim of logic, therefore, is to identify forms of argument that guarantee the transmission of truth:

if the premises of those arguments are

true, their conclusions will also be true.

第 3 讲 法律逻辑 共 70 页

前提

结论

11

四种逻辑

Four logics:

1. Classical Logic: Propositional Logic and First Order Predicate Logic

2. Deontic Logic

3. Logic of Action and Logic of Norms

4. Defeasible Logic

第 3 讲 法律逻辑 共 70 页

12

经典逻辑

• The alphabet of propositional logic consists of propositional variables that are usually denoted by small letters p, q, r, etc. A propositional variable denotes an arbitrary elementary sentence. In the alphabet of propositional calculus one can also find symbols denoting the truth-functional functors (sentential connectives): negation (), implication (→), conjunction() and disjunction ().

• In order to provide a full syntactic characterization of propositional calculus it is necessary to recall the rules of forming formulas, the rules of inference and axioms.

第 3 讲 法律逻辑 共 70 页

13

经典逻辑

• According to the rules of forming formulas, all propositional variables are well formed formulas of propositional calculus. Additionally, if A and B are (arbitrary) well formed formulas of propositional logic, A, A B, A B, and A B are also well formed formulas of propositional calculus.

• We will not present here the axioms of propositional logic, for the meta-logical features of this logical system will not be analyzed. We will limit ourselves to mentioning only one rule of inference that plays an important role in the considerations below. The rule is modus ponens, according to which an implication (A → B) and its antecedent (A) logically imply its consequent (B).

第 3 讲 法律逻辑 共 70 页

14

经典逻辑

• Schematically, this rule may be depicted in the following way:

pq

p

∴ q

第 3 讲 法律逻辑 共 70 页

15

经典逻辑

Aristotle’s example

All men are mortal.

Socrates is a man.

Therefore, Socrates is mortal.

第 3 讲 法律逻辑 共 70 页

(x) (x)(x) Ax∴Aa

(x) Ax∴Aa

(x) (SxPx)

Sa∴ Pa

16

经典逻辑

First order predicate logic

1. Rule 1: 　 pq, p, ∴q

2. Rule 2: (x)Ax, ∴ Aa

3. Rule 3: (x)Ax, ∴ Aa

第 3 讲 法律逻辑 共 70 页

17

经典逻辑

Paradoxes of Material Implication

1. (pp)q

2. p(qp)

3. p(pq)

4. p(qq)

Example

1. 如果 1+1=3 ，那么熊明辉是中山大学教授。

2. 1+1 在什么情况下不等于 2 ？

第 3 讲 法律逻辑 共 70 页

p q情形1 1(1)

1 0(2)

0 1(3)

0 0(4)

pq

1

0

1

1

18

经典逻辑

《中华人民共和国刑法》第 29 条规定：• 如果被教唆的人没有犯被教唆的罪，对于教唆犯，可以从

轻或者减轻处罚。

pq

(x)(SxPx)

(x)(Sx(PxQx))

第 3 讲 法律逻辑 共 70 页

Neil MacCormick

Robert Alexy

19

经典逻辑

《中华人民共和国刑法》第 68 条：犯罪后自首又有重大立功表现的，应当减轻或者免除处罚。

(x)((SxFx)(PxQx))

第 3 讲 法律逻辑 共 70 页

20

经典逻辑

《中华人民共和国刑法》第 29 条规定：• 如果被教唆的人没有犯被教唆的罪，对于教唆犯，可以从

轻或者减轻处罚。

pq

(x)(SxPx)

(x)(Sx(PxQx))

第 3 讲 法律逻辑 共 70 页

Neil MacCormick

Rober Alexy

21

经典逻辑

《中华人民共和国刑法》第 68 条：犯罪后自首又有重大立功表现的，应当减轻或者免除处罚。

(x)((SxFx)(PxQx))

第 3 讲 法律逻辑 共 70 页

22

目录

第 1 讲 导 论 第 2 讲 法律证据 第 3 讲 法律推理 第 4 讲 法律逻辑 第 5 讲 法律分析 第 6 讲 法律论证 第 7 讲 法律解释 第 8 讲 侦查推理

第 3 讲 法律逻辑 共 70 页

经典逻辑道义逻辑行动逻辑与规范逻辑可废止逻辑法律逻辑

23

道义逻辑

Deontic Logic( 道义逻辑 )• S. Kripke developed possible world semantics with the aim of

analyzing the concepts of necessity and possibility. Rather quickly, however, it turned out that Kripke’s mathematical tool could serve perfectly well the analysis of other notions, such as “to know” and “to believe” or – important for us – “obligatory”, “forbidden” and “permitted”.

第 3 讲 法律逻辑 共 70 页

• Saul Aaron Kripke (born November 13, 1940) is an American philosopher and logician. He is a professor emeritus at Princeton and teaches as a Distinguished Professor of Philosophy at the CUNY Graduate Center. Since the 1960s Kripke has been a central figure in a number of fields related to mathematical logic, philosophy of language, philosophy of mathematics, metaphysics, epistemology, and set theory. Much of his work remains unpublished or exists only as tape-recordings and privately circulated manuscripts. Kripke was the recipient of the 2001 Schock Prize in Logic and Philosophy. A recent poll conducted among philosophers ranked Kripke among the top ten most important philosophers of the past 200 years.

• Kripke has made influential and original contributions to logic, especially modal logic, since he was a teenager. Unusually for a professional philosopher, his only degree is an undergraduate degree from Harvard, in mathematics. His work has profoundly influenced analytic philosophy, with his principal contribution being a metaphysical description of modality, involving possible worlds as described in a system now called Kripke semantics.[2] Another of his most important contributions is his argument that there are necessary a posteriori truths, such as "Water is H2O." He has also contributed an original reading of Wittgenstein, referred to as "Kripkenstein." His most famous work is Naming and Necessity (1980).

24

道义逻辑

Deontic Logic( 道义逻辑 )• In deontic logic, in addition to the functor of obligation O,

there are also two other functors: the functor of prohibition F (forbidden) and the functor of permission P (permitted). Those functors can be defined in a natural way with the use of functor O. If p is forbidden, i.e., Fp, then it is obligatory that p:

FpOp• Furthermore, if p is permitted, Pp, then it is not true that it is

obligatory that p:

PpOp

第 3 讲 法律逻辑 共 70 页

(x)(TxORx)Ta

∴ ORa

Robert Alexy

(x)(TxRx)Ta

∴ Ra

• Robert Alexy (born September 9, 1945 in Oldenburg, Germany) is a jurist and a legal philosopher.

• Alexy studied law and philosophy at the University of Göttingen. He received his PhD in 1976 with the dissertation A Theory of Legal Argumentation, and he achieved his Habilitation in 1984 with a Theory of Constitutional Rights).

• He is a professor at the University of Kiel and in 2002 he was appointed to the Academy of Sciences and Humanities at the University of Göttingen. In 2010 he was awarded the Order of Merit of the Federal Republic of Germany.

• Alexy's definition of law looks like a mix of Kelsen's normativism (which was an influential version of legal positivism) and Radbruch's legal naturalism (Alexy, 2002), but Alexy's theory of argumentation (Alexy, 1983) puts him very close to legal interpretivism.

25

道义逻辑

• Deontic logic is the field of logic that is concerned with obligation, permission, and related concepts.

• Alternatively, a deontic logic is a formal system that attempts to capture the essential logical features of these concepts.

• Typically, a deontic logic uses OA to mean it is obligatory that A, (or it ought to be (the case) that A), and PA to mean it is permitted (or permissible) that A.

• The term deontic is derived from the ancient Greek déon - δέον (gen.: δέοντος), meaning, roughly, that which is binding or proper.

第 3 讲 法律逻辑 共 70 页

26

道义逻辑

Early Deontic Logic• Philosophers from the Indian Mimamsa school

to those of Ancient Greece have remarked on the formal logical relations of deontic concepts and philosophers from the late Middle Ages compared deontic concepts with alethic ones.

• In his Elementa juris naturalis, Leibniz notes the logical relations between the licitum, illicitum, debitum, and indifferens are equivalent to those between the possible, impossible, necessarium, and contingens respectively.

第 3 讲 法律逻辑 共 70 页

Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (July 1, 1646 – November 14, 1716) was a German philosopher and mathematician. He wrote in multiple languages, primarily in Latin (~40%), French (~30%) and German (~15%).3

Leibniz occupies a prominent place in the history of mathematics and the history of philosophy. He developed the infinitesimal calculus independently of Isaac Newton, and Leibniz's mathematical notation has been widely used ever since it was published. He became one of the most prolific inventors in the field of mechanical calculators. He was the first to describe a pinwheel calculator in 1685 and invented the Leibniz wheel, used in the arithmometer, the first mass-produced mechanical calculator. He also refined the binary number system, which is at the foundation of virtually all digital computers

Leibniz wheel or stepped drum

27

道义逻辑• In 1666, (at age 20), Leibniz published his first book,

On the Art of Combinations, the first part of which was also his habilitation thesis in philosophy. His next goal was to earn his license and doctorate in Law, which normally required three years of study then. Older students in the law school blocked his early graduation plans, prompting Leibniz to leave Leipzig in disgust in September of 1666.

• Leibniz then enrolled in the University of Altdorf, and almost immediately he submitted a thesis, which he had probably been working on earlier in Leipzig. The title of his thesis was Disputatio Inauguralis de Casibus perplexis in Jure. Leibniz earned his license to practice law and his Doctorate in Law in November of 1666.

• He next declined the offer of an academic appointment at Altdorf, and he spent the rest of his life in the paid service of two main German noble families.第 3 讲 法律逻辑 共 70 页

1. 论法学中的难题2. 论法学的困境

28

道义逻辑• Ernst Mally(11 October 1879 - 8 March 1944) was an Austrian

philosopher affiliated with the so-called Graz School of phenomenology, a pupil of Alexius Meinong, was the first to propose a formal system of deontic logic in his Grundgesetze des Sollens and he founded it on the syntax of Whitehead's and Russell's propositional calculus.

• Mally's deontic vocabulary consisted of the logical constants U and ∩, unary connective !, and binary connectives f and ∞.

• * Mally read !A as "A ought to be the case".• * He read A f B as "A requires B" .• * He read A ∞ B as "A and B require each other.“• * He read U as "the unconditionally obligatory" .• * He read ∩ as "the unconditionally forbidden".第 3 讲 法律逻辑 共 70 页

29

道义逻辑 Standard deontic logic• In von Wright's first system, obligatoriness and permissibility

were treated as features of acts. • It was found not much later that a deontic logic of propositions

could be given a simple and elegant Kripke-style semantics, and von Wright himself joined this movement.

• The deontic logic so specified came to be known as "standard deontic logic," often referred to as SDL, KD, or simply D.

• It can be axiomatized by adding the following axioms to a standard axiomatization of classical propositional logic:

1. O(AB)(OAOB)

2. PAOA

第 3 讲 法律逻辑 共 70 页

Georg Henrik von Wright (Swedish pronunciation: , 14 June 1916, Helsinki – 16 June 2003) was a Finnish philosopher, who succeeded Ludwig Wittgenstein as professor at the University of Cambridge. He published in English, Finnish, German, and in Swedish. Belonging to the Swedish-speaking minority of Finland, von Wright also had Finnish and 17th-century Scottish ancestors.

30

道义逻辑 Standard deontic logic• In English, these axioms say, respectively:• 1. O(AB)(OAOB)• If it ought to be that A implies B, then if it ought to be that A, it

ought to be that B;• 2. PAOA• If A is permissible, then it is not the case that it ought not to be

that A.• 3. FA, meaning it is forbidden that A, can be defined

(equivalently) as OA or PA.

第 3 讲 法律逻辑 共 70 页

31

道义逻辑 Standard deontic logic• There are two main extensions of SDL that are usually

considered.

I. The first results by adding an alethic modal operator in order to express the Kantian claim that "ought implies can": OAA

• where . It is generally assumed that is at least a KT operator, but most commonly it is taken to be an S5 operator.

第 3 讲 法律逻辑 共 70 页

32

道义逻辑 Standard deontic logic• There are two main extensions of SDL that are usually considered. II. The other main extension results by adding a "conditional

obligation" operator O(A/B) read "It is obligatory that A given (or conditional on) B". Motivation for a conditional operator is given by considering the following ("Good Samaritan") case. It seems true that the starving and poor ought to be fed. But that the starving and poor are fed implies that there are starving and poor. By basic principles of SDL we can infer that there ought to be starving and poor! The argument is due to the basic K axiom of SDL together with the following principle valid in any normal modal logic:

• ABOAOB

第 3 讲 法律逻辑 共 70 页

33

道义逻辑 Dyadic deontic logic• An important problem of deontic logic is that of how to properly

represent conditional obligations, e.g. If you smoke (s), then you ought to use an ashtray (a). It is not clear that either of the following representations is adequate:

• O(Smokeashtray)• SmokeO(ashtray)• Under the first representation it is vacuously true that if you

commit a forbidden act, then you ought to commit any other act, regardless of whether that second act was obligatory, permitted or forbidden (Von Wright 1956, cited in Aqvist 1994).

第 3 讲 法律逻辑 共 70 页

34

道义逻辑 Dyadic deontic logic• An important problem of deontic logic is that of how to properly

represent conditional obligations, e.g. If you smoke (s), then you ought to use an ashtray (a). It is not clear that either of the following representations is adequate:

• O(Smokeashtray)• SmokeO(ashtray)• Under the second representation, we are vulnerable to the gentle

murder paradox, where the plausible statements (1) if you murder, you ought to murder gently, (2) you do commit murder, and (3) to murder gently you must murder imply the less plausible statement: you ought to murder.

第 3 讲 法律逻辑 共 70 页

35

道义逻辑 Dyadic deontic logic• Some deontic logicians have responded to this problem by

developing dyadic deontic logics, which contain binary deontic operators:

• O(AB) means it is obligatory that A, given B • P(AB) means it is permissible that A, given B. • (The notation is modeled on that used to represent

conditional probability.)• Dyadic deontic logic escapes some of the problems of standard

(unary) deontic logic, but it is subject to some problems of its own.• Many other varieties of deontic logic have been developed,

including non-monotonic deontic logics, paraconsistent deontic logics, and dynamic deontic logics.

第 3 讲 法律逻辑 共 70 页

36

道义逻辑 Dyadic deontic logic• Deontic logic faces Jørgensen's Dilemma. Norms cannot be true or

false, but truth and truth values seem essential to logic. There are two possible answers:

• Deontic logic handles norm propositions, not norms;• There might be alternative concepts to truth, e.g. validity or

success, as it is defined in speech act theory.

第 3 讲 法律逻辑 共 70 页

37

道义逻辑

Paradoxes of Deontic Logic (Ross Paradox)• There are numerous deontic logics that differ to greater or

lesser degrees. There are various reasons for the search for new logics of obligation, one of the most important being the paradoxes of deontic logic. Amongst those paradoxes one can list the Ross paradox. This has to do with the fact that, in Standard Deontic Logic (SDL), the argument from

Op

to

O(pq)

is valid.

第 3 讲 法律逻辑 共 70 页

p∴ pq

38

道义逻辑 Paradoxes of Deontic Logic (Ross Paradox)• Let us substitute p with “send the letter” and q with “burn it”.

Thus, a paradoxical reasoning is constructed: “if it is obligatory to send the letter, it is obligatory to send it or burn it”.

• There is no consensus as to whether the Ross Paradox can be called a real problem. Some adhere to the thesis that there is a problem in the reasoning, since the acceptance of the second norm seems counter-intuitive.

• Others deny this, saying that the mere fact that one norm (O(p q)) follows logically from another norm (Op) does not mean that the latter ceases to be binding. Therefore, if the norm “it is obligatory to send the letter or to burn it” is fulfilled by burning the letter, the norm “it is obligatory to send the letter” is broken.

第 3 讲 法律逻辑 共 70 页

Op∴ O(pq)

39

道义逻辑

Paradoxes of Deontic Logic • It is usually held that the most difficult problems facing

deontic logicians are contrary-to-duty (CTD) paradoxes. Those paradoxes arise in connection with CTD-norms, i.e., norms that require the breaking of another norm as a condition of their application.

第 3 讲 法律逻辑 共 70 页

40

道义逻辑

Chisholm Paradox• Let us look more closely at a famous example

known as the. This paradox is connected with the following four sentences:

(1) It is obligatory for a certain man to help his neighbors.

(2) It is obligatory that if he helps them, he tells them about it.

(3) If he does not help them, he should not tell them he helps them.

(4) The man does not help his neighbors.

第 3 讲 法律逻辑 共 70 页

Op

O(pq)

pOq

p

Roderick Chisholm1916-1999

41

道义逻辑

1. Op p.

2. O(pq) p.

3. pOq p.

4. p p.

5. Oq 1,2 MP

6. Oq 3,4 MP

7. OqOq 5,6 CI

第 3 讲 法律逻辑 共 70 页

Roderick Chisholm1916-1999

42

目录

第 1 讲 导 论 第 2 讲 法律证据 第 3 讲 法律推理 第 4 讲 法律逻辑 第 5 讲 法律分析 第 6 讲 法律论证 第 7 讲 法律解释 第 8 讲 侦查推理

第 3 讲 法律逻辑 共 70 页

经典逻辑道义逻辑行动逻辑与规范逻辑可废止逻辑法律逻辑

43

行动逻辑与规范逻辑

Four logics:

1. Classical Logic: Propositional Logic and First Order Predicate Logic

2. Deontic Logic

3. Logic of Action and Logic of Norms

4. Defeasible Logic

第 3 讲 法律逻辑 共 70 页

44

行动逻辑与规范逻辑

Two Types of Obligation• Amongst objections against deontic logics, in addition to the

problem of paradoxes, there are several problematic questions of a more general, philosophical nature. We will try to look more closely at two such objections:

I. the thesis that deontic logic formalizes the notion of ought-to-be, and does not take into account the notion of ought-to-do;

II. the thesis that deontic logic is not a logic of norms because we cannot say that norms are either true or false.

• The former problem will serve as a pretext for discussion of the logic of action. The latter, in turn, will allow us to comment on the Jørgensen Dilemma.

第 3 讲 法律逻辑 共 70 页

45

行动逻辑与规范逻辑

Two Types of Obligation• Philosophers sometimes distinguish between two concepts of

obligation: the first stating what ought to be the case and the second stating what ought to be done.

• The importance of this distinction is questioned by those who claim that the latter can be reduced to the former. They insist that the sentence “person α ought to do p” is equivalent to the sentence “it ought to be the case that person α does p”.

第 3 讲 法律逻辑 共 70 页

46

行动逻辑与规范逻辑

Two Types of Obligation• If one approves of this reduction then deontic logic, which is a

logic of the ought-to-be operator, is adequate. There are, however, strong objections against reducing ought-to-do to ought-to-be.

• Let us present one of them. P. Geach suggested analyzing the following sentence: “Fred ought to dance with Ginger”. According to the reductionist conception, that sentence is equivalent to this: “it ought to be the case that Fred dances with Ginger”. The sentence “Fred dances with Ginger” is, however, equivalent to “Ginger dances with Fred” (for the relations of dancing are symmetrical).

第 3 讲 法律逻辑 共 70 页

47

行动逻辑与规范逻辑

Two Types of Obligation• Instead of saying “it ought to be the case that Fred dances

with Ginger” we could also say: “it ought to be the case that Ginger dances with Fred”.

• But now, reversing the direction of the first transformation, we can write that “Ginger ought to dance with Fred”.

• This seems counter-intuitive. From the sentence that Fred ought to dance with Ginger it does not necessarily follow that Ginger ought to dance with Fred.

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48

行动逻辑与规范逻辑

Logic of Action• We would like to analyze now some formalizations

of ought-to-do. It is interesting that the first attempts at constructing deontic logic aimed to capture the ought-to-do.

• G.H. von Wright in 1951 proposed a system equipped with symbols A, B, C,. . . to which deontic operators, like O (“it is obligatory that. . .”) were added. A, B, C,. . . stood for “general actions”, e.g., theft, sale, etc.

• Contemporarily, various strategies of constructing deontic logics of action are employed. We will look more closely at two of them.

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Johan van Benthem1949.12-

49

行动逻辑与规范逻辑

Logic of Action• The following intuition is behind the first of the strategies.

Human actions bring about changes in the world. • For instance, if the action is building a bridge, the change in

the world consists in the appearance of a bridge. • In describing the state of the world prior to the action, the

sentence “there is a bridge here” is false, whereas after the action it is true.

• Human actions lead us, therefore, from one state of the world to another. Or, in other words, they constitute a move from one possible world to another.

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50

行动逻辑与规范逻辑

Jørgensen Dilemma( 约根森困境）• Up to now the focus has been on when sentences which take

the form “it ought to be the case that p”, can be labeled true. • But can such sentences be true or false at all? It seems that one

can ascribe truth or falsehood to descriptive sentences that inform us about facts. Questions, orders and norms, on the other hand, do not seem to fall into categories possessing truth values.

• One may maintain that this is not an important problem; but the fact is that contemporary logic – or at least the commonly accepted part of it – concerns expressions that are true or false.

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51

行动逻辑与规范逻辑

Jørgensen Dilemma( 约根森困境）• If we reflect on these two observations, i.e., that:

(1) Only true or false sentences can serve as premises or conclusions in logically valid arguments.• and

(2) Norms cannot be ascribed truth values.• then we should conclude that:

(3) Norms cannot serve as premises or conclusions in logically valid arguments.• Our conclusion (3) puts into doubt the possibility of

developing any logic of legal reasoning.

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• However, we do put forward many legal arguments every day, and they seem intuitively correct. Therefore, we can note:(4) Intuitively correct normative arguments do exist.

• Theses (1) – (4) constitute a dilemma that was first described by Jørgen Jørgensen in a paper published in 1938.

52

目录

第 1 讲 导 论 第 2 讲 法律证据 第 3 讲 法律推理 第 4 讲 法律逻辑 第 5 讲 法律分析 第 6 讲 法律论证 第 7 讲 法律解释 第 8 讲 侦查推理

第 3 讲 法律逻辑 共 70 页

经典逻辑道义逻辑行动逻辑与规范逻辑可废止逻辑法律逻辑

53

可废止逻辑

Four logics:

1. Classical Logic: Propositional Logic and First Order Predicate Logic

2. Deontic Logic

3. Logic of Action and Logic of Norms

4. Defeasible Logic

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54

可废止逻辑

The Concept of Defeasibility( 可废止性 )• We would like to turn now to a discussion of

defeasible logic. Research on this type of logical system began in the 1970s. The concept of defeasibility, however, was introduced much earlier. It appeared in H.L.A. Hart’s paper “The Ascription of Responsibility and Rights”, published in 1948. Hart writes:

第 3 讲 法律逻辑 共 70 页

1907-1992

When the student has learnt that in English law there are positive conditions required for the existence of a valid contract, (. . .) his understanding of the legal concept of a contract is still incomplete (. . .). For these conditions, although necessary, are not alwayssufficient and he has still to learn what can defeat a claim that there is a valid contract, even though all these conditions are satisfied. The student has still to learn what can follow on the word “unless”, which should accompany the statement of these conditions. This characteristic of legal concepts is one for which no word exists in ordinary English. The words “conditional” and “negative” have the wrong implications, but the law has a word which with some hesitation I borrow and extend: this is the word “defeasible”, usedof a legal interest in property which is subject to termination or defeat in a number of different contingencies but remains intact if no such contingencies mature. In this sense, then, contract is a defeasible concept.

於兴中• Defeasible= 可辩驳的• 因为 feasible 是“可行的”，

“ de” 是降低的意思。• 但 defeasible 来源于 defeat, 而

defeat 即失败、战胜、作废等之意，因此，我译为“可废止的”。

颜厥安陈弘毅

55

可废止逻辑

The Concept of Defeasibility( 可废止性 )• Defeasibility thus defined leads to some logical problems. If

we reconstruct a legal norm, as we did above, with the use of material implication:

h→d• (h stands for the norm’s antecedent, and d for the consequent),

we will not be able to say that the norm is defeasible. This is because in the case of defeasible norms, it is possible that h → d is valid, h obtains, but we cannot deduce d. In classical logic (including deontic logic based on classical calculi) this cannot be the case, since if we have h→d together with h, d follows on the basis of modus ponens.

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Neil MacCormick

56

可废止逻辑

The Concept of Defeasibility( 可废止性 )• It is clear from the above that acceptance of the thesis that

legal rules are defeasible forces us to look for an alternative logic of legal discourse.

• Such logic has been developed, not in the field of legal theory, but within research on artificial intelligence.

• It turns out that the problem of defeasibility is important not only for legal or normative reasoning, but also in theoretical discourse.

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57

可废止逻辑

The Concept of Defeasibility( 可废止性 )• Defeasible logic constitutes such a nonclassical system. It is

an example of nonmonotonic logic.It is instructive to expand here on the meaning of “nonmonotonic”.

• Classical logic is monotonic. This means that if a sentence p follows from a set of premises A, then p follows also from a set B, which is a superset of A. Every logic which lacks this feature is nonmonotonic.

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58

可废止逻辑

The Concept of Defeasibility( 可废止性 )• A famous example:

Birds can fly,

Tweety is a bird,

So Tweety can fly.• Raymond Reiter (June 12, 1939 – September 16, 2002), was

a Canadian computer scientist and logician. He was one of the founders of the field of non-monotonic reasoning with his work on default logic, model-based diagnosis, closed world reasoning, and truth maintenance systems. A logic for default reasoning. Artificial Intelligence, 13:81-132, 1980.

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MAP

SAM

∴SAP

(x)(MxPx)

Ma

∴ Pa

59

可废止逻辑

Defeasible logic( 可废止逻辑 )• There are many defeasible logics. Here we would like to

present one of them, concentrating on its main ideas and omitting technical details. Our defeasible logic (in short: DL) operates on two levels:

I. On the first level arguments are built from a given set of premises;

II. on the second level the arguments are compared in order to decide which of them prevails.

• The conclusion of which argument is “best” becomes the conclusion of the given set of premises.

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60

可废止逻辑

Defeasible logic( 可废止逻辑 )• The language of DL is the language of first order predicate

logic, extended by the addition of a new functor, the defeasible implication, for which we will use the symbol . For defeasible implication there exists a defeasible modus ponens, analogous to that of the material implication:

pq

p

∴q• The difference between material and defeasible implications is

visible only on the second level of DL.

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pqp∴ q

I. Arguments are built from a given set of premises; II. The arguments are compared in order to decide which

of them prevails.

61

可废止逻辑

Defeasible logic( 可废止逻辑 )• The language of DL serves the building of arguments. In our

Tweety example we have two situations. In the first, three sentences belong to our set of premises: “if x is a bird then x flies”, “Tweety is a bird” and “if x is a penguin then x does not fly”. The first of the premises can be formalized in the following way:

bird(x) flies(x)• The second premise is, of course:

bird(tweety)• And the third:

penguin(x) ¬(flies(x))

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62

可废止逻辑

Defeasible logic( 可废止逻辑 )• This set of premises enables us to construct only one

argument. With the help of defeasible modus ponens we obtain:

bird(x) flies(x)

bird(tweety)

∴flies(tweety)• The addition of a fourth premise:

penguin(tweety)• enables us to build the following argument:

第 3 讲 法律逻辑 共 70 页

penguin(x)(flies(x))penguin(tweety)∴flies(tweety)

• Having those two arguments we can move to the second level of DL, in which the arguments are compared in order to decide which is better, and in consequence which of the sentences – flies(tweety) or flies(tweety) – should be regarded as the conclusion of our set of four premises.

63

可废止逻辑

Defeasible logic( 可废止逻辑 )• In the second level of DL two concepts play a crucial role:

attack and defeat. We shall say that an argument A attacks an argument B if the conclusions of both arguments are logically inconsistent. In our example that is the case since flies(tweety) and flies(tweety) are contradictory.

• If two arguments compete with one another, one must know how to decide which argument prevails, i.e., which defeats the other.

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64

可废止逻辑

Defeasible logic( 可废止逻辑 )

Birds can fly,

Tweety is a bird,

So Tweety can fly.

第 3 讲 法律逻辑 共 70 页

(x)(MxPx)

Ma

∴ Pa

All birds can fly.

Typically, birds can fly.

Every bird can fly.

Normally, birds can fly.

(nx)(MxPx)

65

可废止逻辑 Defeasible logic( 可废止逻辑 )• 但是，在审方做出司法裁决的诉讼论证中，总不可能使用

“一般情况下，凡触犯《 ××× 法》第 × 条第 × 款之规定应当受到 × 制裁，某甲的行为已触犯了《 ××× 法》第 × 条第× 款之规定，因此，某甲应当受到 × 制裁”之类的表达式吧。审方必须义正严词、斩钉截铁、信心百倍地进行宣判，看起来代表着法律的威严、理性和公正，因此，法律裁判书中法律论证的基本模式一般是“凡触犯《 ××× 法》第 ×条第 × 款之规定应当受到 × 制裁，某甲的行为已触犯了《 ××× 法》第 × 条第 × 款之规定，因此，某甲应当受到 ×制裁”。

• 熊明辉，论法律逻辑中的推论规则，中国社会科学， 2008年第 3 期。

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66

目录

第 1 讲 导 论 第 2 讲 法律证据 第 3 讲 法律推理 第 4 讲 法律逻辑 第 5 讲 法律分析 第 6 讲 法律论证 第 7 讲 法律解释 第 8 讲 侦查推理

第 3 讲 法律逻辑 共 70 页

经典逻辑道义逻辑行动逻辑与规范逻辑可废止逻辑法律逻辑

67

法律逻辑

Four logics:

1. Classical Logic: Propositional Logic and First Order Predicate Logic

2. Deontic Logic

3. Logic of Action and Logic of Norms

4. Defeasible Logic

5. 法律逻辑 (legal logic)

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68

法律逻辑

• 在证明责任规则中，“不利后果”有两种情形：一是负有证明责任方的主张不成立；二是不负有证明责任一方的主张成立。

• 例如：已知 P 和 O 分别代表诉讼博弈的起诉方和应诉方，根据证明责任分配规则，如果 P 负有证明责任但没有履行，那么 P 的主张不成立；如果 P 负有证明责任但没有履行，则 O 的主张成立。

• 民事诉讼中的“谁主张，谁举证（证明）”的证明责任分配原则体现的是第一种情形，

• 而刑事诉讼中对被告人所犯罪刑所采用的“控方举证”原则和行政诉讼中对行政裁定的合法性采取“举证 ( 证明 )责任倒置”原则体现的是第二种情形。

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69

法律逻辑

法律逻辑（ legal logic ）1. 严格分离规则：

(x)(SxPx)

Sa

∴ Pa

2. 证明责任规则（ Burden of Proof） 在诉讼博弈中，负有证明责任一方若无法履行符合法律要求的证明责任，那就要承担不利的法律后果。

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70

作 业

1. 约根森困境（ Jørgensen's Dilemma）及其解决方案主要有哪些？

2. 罗斯悖论及其解决方案？3. 如何理解法律逻辑？

第 3 讲 法律逻辑 共 70 页