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THE EUROPEAN NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICY TOWARDS LEBANON:EXPANSION WITHOUT FURTHER ENLARGEMENT

A THESIS SUBMITTED TO

THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCESOF

MIDDLE EAST TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY

BYALMULA TRED

IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS

FORTHE DEGREE OF MASTER OF SCIENCE

INEUROPEAN STUDIES

JUNE 2008


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Approval of the Graduate School of Social Science

Prof. Dr. Sencer Ayata

Director

I certify that this thesis satisfies all the requirements as a thesis for the degree of

Master of Science.

Assist. Prof. Dr. Galip YALMAN

Head of Department

This is to certify that we have read this thesis and that in our opinion it is fully

adequate, in scope and quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Science.

Prof. Dr.Mustafa Trke

Supervisor

Examining Committee Members

Prof. Dr. Mustafa Trke (METU)

Assoc. Prof. Dr.lhan Uzgel (Ankara Univ.)

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Ayegl Kibarolu (METU)


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I hereby declare that all information in this document has been obtained andpresented in accordance with academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declarethat, as required by these rules and conduct, I have fully cited and referenced

all material and results that are not original to this work.

Name, Last name :Almula Tredi

Signature :


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ABSTRACT

THE EUROPEAN NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICY TOWARDS LEBANON:

EXPANSION WITHOUT FURTHER ENLARGEMENT

Tredi, Almula

Master of Science, Graduate School of Social ScienceDepartment of European Studies

Supervisor : Prof. Dr. Mustafa Trke

June 2008, 99 pages

This thesis analyzes the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) towards

Lebanon. The thesis looks into early European initiatives to demonstrate growingEU ambitions towards the Mediterranean region. Lebanon is examined with its

specificities in historic context and EUs sending troops to UNIFIL army after

the July 2006 war. As the 2004 enlargement brought the EU closer to Lebanon,

and as the EU tends to play a growing international role, particularly in the

Mediterranean region, the EU saw the Israeli attack on Lebanon as an

opportunity to increase its engagement in Lebanon, thereby increasing its

influence in the region.

The thesis argues that the ENP is the newest foreign policy tool both to answer

the concerns of EU in the Mediterranean region and to raise the EUs profile in

the region.

Keywords: ENP, Lebanon, Action Plans, Taif Accord, UNIFIL.

Z


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AVRUPA KOMULUK POLTKASI VE LBNAN:DAHA FAZLA GENLEMEDEN YAYILMA

Tredi, Almula

Yksek Lisans, Sosyal Bilimler Enstits, Avrupa almalar

BlmTez Yneticisi : Prof. Dr. Mustafa Trke

Haziran 2008, 99 sayfa

Bu tez, Lbnana ynelik Avrupa Komuluk Politikasn (AKP) incelemektedir.

Tez, Akdeniz blgesine ynelik olarak artan AB isteklerini ortaya koymak

amacyla, ilk Avrupa giriimlerini incelemektedir. Lbnan kendine zg tarihi

koullar iinde aratrlmakta ve Haziran 2006 sava sonras ABnin UNIFIL

ordusuna gnderdii asker, ABnin lkede etkisini arttrmaya ynelik bir eylemi

olarak deerlendirilmektedir. AB, 2004 genilemesiyle Lbnana daha

yaklamakta ve uluslararas arenada ve zellikle Akdeniz blgesinde glenen

bir rol oynama eilimindeyken, srailin Lbnana saldrsn, lkeye

mdahalesini kolaylatracak ve bu sayede blgede etkisini arttracak bir frsat

olarak alglamaktadr. Tez, AKPyi ABnin, hem 2004 genilemesinden doan

endielerine yant veren, hem de blgede varln glendiren en yeni d

politika arac olarak ortaya koymaktadr.

Anahtar Kelimeler: AKP, Lbnan, Eylem Planlar, Taif Anlamas, UNIFIL.


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To My Parents, Bedri-Belgin Tredi

and to Asena


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TABLE OF CONTENTSPLAGIARISM.iii

ABSTRACT................ivZ........v

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS. vii

TABLE OF CONTENTS..viii

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS.x

CHAPTER

1. INTRODUCTION........1

2. THE EUS INITIATIVES TOWARDS THE MEDITERRANEANREGION..............................................................................................................6

2.1. A Trade Oriented Initiative:GMP......6

2.2. Renovated Mediterranean Policy:RMP............................11

2.3. A Turning Point in Euro-Mediterranean Relations:EMP.13

2.4. Lessons Learnt For a New Policy, ENP...21

3. LEBANON BETWEEN SYRIAN STRANGLEHOLD AND NASCENT

EUROPEAN PRESSURE..23

3.1. Internal dynamics shaping the countrys profile..23

3.1.1. A Pivotal Part of Constitution and the Lebanese Political System:

Meaning of National Pact...23

3.1.2. Other Crucial Developments:Palestine Presence, 1975 Civil War

and Taif Accord..27

3.2. Stranglehold of External Dynamics: Syria and Iran.35

3.3. Lebanon After Israels 2006 Intervention: Cycles of Instabilities41

3.4. The EUs involvement in the UNIFIL: Eager to demonstrate presence

in Lebanon46

4. EUROPEAN NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICY:

THE ESSENCE OF THE ENP TOWARDS LEBANON ...............56

4.1. The Formation of European Neighbourhood Policy.56

4.1.1. The Main Operational Framework of the ENP:

Action Plans62


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4.1.2. Alignment with EU Acquis by Enhanced Relations:

Lebanon Action Plan..............64

4.2. Assessing the ENP Towards Lebanon...71

5.CONCLUSION...85 BIBLIOGRAPHY..90


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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

CFSP Common Foreign and Security Policy

EC European Community

EEC European Economic Community

EMP Euro-Mediterranean Partnership

ENP European Neighbourhood Policy

ENPI European Neighbourhood and Partnership Initiative

ESDP European Security and Defence Policy

ESSP European Security Strategy Paper

EU European Union

FTA Free Trade Area

GDP Gross Domestic Product

GMP Global Mediterranean Policy

MEDA Mediterranean Economic Development Area

MEPP Middle East Peace Process

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization


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PLO Palestine Liberation Organization

RMP Renovated Mediterranean Policy

TACIS Technical Aid to the Commonwealth of Independent States

UN United Nations

UNIFIL United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon

USA United States of America


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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTIONThe end of the Cold War and the disintegration of the Soviet Union created such

circumstances that international sytem lost its bipolar character and turned into a

unipolar structure, thus the US emerged as the only hegemon disseminating Western

values such as democracy, liberal economy and human rights as its own values to the

whole world. This period also presented a historic opportunity to reintegrate Europe

culturally, politically, and economically.1

In addition to the new international conjucture, some observers have cast aroundfor a counter-hegemonic alternative and found the European Union.2 In fact, utilizing

the opportunities of the new conjucture, the EU enlarged into Central and Eastern

Europe and began to help neighbouring countries develop economically and

democratically while promoting stability and security throughout the continent and

fostering a genuinely pan-European integration.3

As the EU differs in important respects from other international actors, its

uniqueness emerges from its set-up and character of goals and values, configuration

of political instruments used and its peculiar institutional construction.4 Besides the

EU recognizes its global responsibilities, but accepts a greater burden only in its

neighbourhood.5

This thesis examines that the EU, as an ambitious international actor, endeavours

to enhance its efficacy and manipulate the immediate environment to its advantage

with its latest foreign policy tool, the European Neigbourhood Policy (ENP).

1 Desmond Dinan, Ever Closer Union:An Introduction to European Integration,(Macmillan:NewYork, 2005), p. 185.

2 Charlotte Bretherton and John Vogler,The European Union As a Global Actor,(Routledge:Londonand New York, 2006), p. 223.

3 Dinan,op.cit., p. 184.

4 Ole Egstrm and Michael Smith,The European Unions Roles in International Politics:Concepts

and Analysis,(Routledge:Oxford, 2006), p. 2.5 Ibid., p. 52.


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After the 2004 enlargement, approximating geographically to the EUs borders, the

Mediterranean region and the EUs rising interest towards it will be analyzed through

historical perspective. As the regions deep economic relations with Europe, colonialpast, inherent unresolved conflicts, social unrest and poor economic conditions are

believed to pose risks and threats to European security, they will be assessed with

their overall impact on EuropesMediterranean perception. This perception seems

inseparable from the European Security Strategy Paper (ESSP), the EUs declaration

of global challenges and key threats emerged in the post cold-war environment.

Whereas the Mediterranean carries such importance for the EU, what kind of

strategies or policies did the EC/EU develop to involve concerning the region? Howdid historical events affect its concerns and interests? What did former initiatives

towards Mediterranean teach the EC/EU to fill the gaps in its new policies ? Do these

policies prove the increasing European interest? What is the importance of Venice

Declaration of June 1980? In the second chapter, the EUs increasing interest

towards the region will be analysed through the answers to these questions. To

answer these questions and make sense of this long-term question, it is beneficial to

observe the EUs interest through its continuities, transformations and tendencies

over different historical periods.

This thesis analyzes the ENP towards Lebanon while taking into account

Lebanons complex society divided by different sects. Lebanon, as the main subject

of this thesis, is chosen especially because of the fact that she presents a small

portion of Middle Eastern states sample and is geographically situated in a strategic

conjuncture where she is bordered by the Mediterranean Sea. Thus in terms of

relations with the EU, Lebanon is a sensational country with its complex structure.

Lebanon and its conflictual history is one of the most studied subjects. However

most analyses are based on assumptions centering on its weak state structure and

relations with Syria. Because of the EUs relatively weak structure and the US

dominant power over the region, there is an important gap in studies on EC/EU-

Lebanon relations in general. After the 2004 enlargement approximating

geographically to the EUs borders, Lebanon is regarded as a centre for destabilizing

factors to the EUs security more so than before and in this context transforming it to

a stable state and eliminating the sources of risk with the ENP tools emerge as an


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important objective. In the present era, security relates not only to the military aspect

but also to cultural, immigrational and economic factors that impinge on security.

Moreover, as the stable neighbourhood is a necessity for Europes own security and2004 enlargement brings Lebanon closer to EU, a conflictual Lebanon gains

importance in this respect. What kind of destabilizing factors from Lebanon are

expected for the EU, and what policies does the EU develop to manipulate or

transform Lebanon to a secure state? When examining Lebanon, it is found

beneficial to dwell upon the 2006 Israel attack which resulted in terrible loss of

human life and massive physical destruction in Lebanon and how this event reflected

on EU agenda. Since Europes wealth, stability and security depend to a considerabledegree, on what is happening in neighbouring areas such as the Middle East, the

2006 Israel attack on Lebanon represents a challenge and an opportunity to which the

EU gave an immediate and eager response under the United Nations Interim Force in

Lebanon (UNIFIL). In the context of extended meaning of security, what is the

importance of the 2006 Israel attack on Lebanon? What was the reaction of the EU?

Can this war be regarded as an opportunity to raise EUs profile and presence in the

region? In the third chapter of the thesis, as a significant case in the region, Lebanon

and its internal/external dynamics affecting the state structure will be analysed.

When one examines Lebanons conflictual history, destabilizing factors emerge

clearly and what Europe perceives as a threat to its security is well understood. To

answer the above-mentioned questions, a historical perspective presenting todays

difficulties in Lebanon will be conducted.

The formation of the ENP and motives behind this initiative with diverging

opinions of scholars will be presented in the fourth chapter. As different and more

extensive than the early initiatives towards Mediterranean, the ENP and its expected

objectives will be highlighted. Besides, the main operational framework of the ENP,

the action plans in general and Lebanon action plan particularly will be examined. At

present, the degree of the ENPs success is not clear. Moreover, it is not this thesis

aim to measure or determine the success of the ENP. What is important for the thesis

is to demonstrate the willingness of the EU to reshape its neighbourhood.

Furthermore, action plans will be essential to present the ENPs agenda of


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transforming neighbours. What do the action plans include? Do they reflect a rather

ample dose of EU self-interest?

In 2002, the President of the European Commission Romano Prodi offered to shareeverything but institutions aiming to extend to the neighbouring region a set of

principles, values and standards which define the very essence of the European

Union.6 As the EUs ability to exert influence over its neighbours is diminished since

EU membership is not offered to partners, the EU, however, still aims to transform

the immediate environment to its advantage, since the European Security Strategy

Paper represents the importance of neighbouring areas stability for the EUs own

security. As mentioned above, security relates not only to the military aspect but alsoto factors of culture, immigration and economy that impinge on security. Lebanon

poses great potential risks to EUs security not only in political and military areas,

but also in terms of immigration. Lebanon, also providing an appropriate case to

create destabilizing factors with the 2006 Israel war, is one of the best countries to

introduce the transformative agenda of ENP in the region.

Moreover, through the fourth chapter, the question of whether action plans are

representatives of the EUs external governance capability over the neighbours will

be asked. Lebanon, one of the centres for illegal immigration especially after 2006

war, a hot-bed for terrorism and having both pro-Western and pro-Syrian inclinations

inside will be investigated through the offers of the ENP. More than questioning the

ENPs further success, the thesis aims to examine the EUs willingness for an

extended role as a potential competitor in Lebanon with its newest foreign policy

tool, the ENP. Is the ENP a substantiation of growing EU interest in the region?

Furthermore, can it be regarded as a tool for further enhancing its relations with

Lebanon in the long term? As 2006 Israel attack on Lebanon increased the

importance of the EUs military engagement in the region, reshaping the countrys

legislative and administrative structures in line with ENP action plans and actively

engaging in military operations in line with European Security Strategy are woven

together in a strong web of linkages.

6A Wider Europe-A Proximity Policy As the Key to Stability, Speech by Romano Prodi, President of the EC, Brussels, 5-6 December 2002, SPEECH/02/619, available at

http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/news/prodi/sp02_619.htm (accessed on 12.06.2006)


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Primary resources on the EU, its Mediterranean strategies, Lebanon and ENP

were compiled during the preparation of the thesis. EU Council Presidency

Conclusions, Commission Communications, Lebanon Action Plan and other relevantofficial EU declarations were widely used. Moreover, relevant literature such as

books, articles, newspapers, and journals were all used as other resources. Because

the thesis examines recent developments, it was extensively benefited from internet

research.


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CHAPTER 2THE EUS INITIATIVES TOWARDS THE MEDITERRANEAN REGION

2.1. A Trade-Oriented Initiative: Global Mediterranean Policy

The Second World War and its aftermath caused dramatic effects not only on

world politics but also on the European dominance in the Middle East where the US

influence gradually began. However, as the US represented itself as the onlyde-facto power for preserving Western interests in the region, the creation of the European

Economic Community (EEC) emerged as an alternative opportunity for developing a

peacefully business climate and economy as to developing Mediterranean countries.

Encouraged by aspirant non-member Mediterranean countries, the EC actively began

establishing external economic policy links with most of its Mediterranean non-

member neighbours during the 1960s. The resulting string of agreements were

initially confined to trade: the EC provided unilateral free access to the European

market for industrial goods and limited concessions for specific agricultural products

originating from the Mediterranean non-member countries (MNC).7

This period consisted of partly arbitrary ad hoc responses to local trade problems,

and reflected different economic and political interests of the EC members vis--vis

Mediterranean countries. This initial generation of contractual links was further

expanded in the 1970s to include economic and financial cooperation intended to

back economic development and stimulate cooperation between the two shores of the

Mediterranean.

In this sense, Lebanon and the European Community first established contractual

relations in 1977 by signing a Co-operation Agreement between the European

Economic Community and the Lebanese Republic , which entered into force in

November 1978.8

7 A Survey of Europes Mediterranean Policy, Dr. G. Vanhaeverbeke,Trans European Policy Studies

Association, Brussels, March 1997, available at http://www.euromed-seminars.org.mt/seminar02/papers/vanhaeverbeke.htm, (accessed on 3rd January 2008).


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Generally speaking, the EC's relations with Mediterranean region followed a

traditional pattern of combining trade concessions with financial cooperation and

conventional aid arrangements.The rationale of the relations was not only rooted in economic but also in political

considerations typical for the prevailing cold war preoccupations: every available

policy instrument was also conceived as a way to neutralize Soviet influence in the

area.9 Thus, Europe's relations with the Mediterranean region was designed as a

mean to stabilize political regimes against possible Soviet infiltrations or take-overs.

This seemed particularly to be the rationale behind ECs Mediterranean policies

including signing the association agreements with Turkey and Greece in 1962-64.However relations between the EC and the Mediterranean non-member countries

possessed a disorderly character, and the EC was criticized for following an

incoherent approach to the region. Thus, the EC launched its Global Mediterranean

Policy (GMP) at the Paris Summit of October 1972. The GMP aimed to promote

closer trade and financial relations between the EU and non-member Mediterranean

countries more systematically. In fact, the EC raised the GMP concept from the

Association Clauses of the Treaty of Rome and it was quite naturally targeted at the

peace between Israel and the Arab World. The Israeli-Arab conflict was indeed, seen

to be at the heart of the new threat perception, which was no longer of a military but

of an economic nature (energy security). Between 1974-78, Europe's Mediterranean

policy was directed at quite a different security perception: the threat of the "oil"

weapon", of oil supplies being cut off.10 The 1973 war and the subsequent Arab use

of the oil weapon had heightened a deep sense of vulnerability, particularly as

Europe depended for 80 per cent of its energy supplies on the region as compared to

only 12 per cent for the United States.11 Besides this energy crisis, the fall of

dictatorships in Portugal and Greece and death of Franco in Spain opened up the

prospect of a further enlargement of the Community towards the south and therefore

8 http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/lebanon/intro/index.htm#1. (accessed on 2nd January2005).

9 Ibid.

10 Ibid.

11 Roland Dannreuther (ed.), European Union Foreign and Security Policy: Towards a Neighbourhood Strategy, (Routledge:London, 2004), p. 154.


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maintain close ties with former colonies in the aftermath of de-colonisation. 20 But

during the times of the GMP, the area was politically and strategically dominated by

the two-superpowers, as the former colonialists play a secondary role. This is acrucial factor reducing effectiveness of the GMP. Another factor affecting the

GMPs success was the concessions for Mediterranean agricultural exports. When

the Community further enlarged to its southern flank, it considerably reduced its

requirements for some of the similar Mediterranean import products, thus harmed the

trade balances of non-member Mediterranean countries. Loukas Tsoukalis stresses

that the GMP is only about trade and aid. He underlined that the EEC started with

rather unrealistic assumptions about the globality of its approach and the actualcontents of its policy.21 In addition to Tsoukalis critics, Wood and Yeilada further

commented that the economies of the EC and non-member Mediterranean countries

were not yet sufficiently compatible to promote the desired level of trade.22

Conventional wisdom suggests that the question of migrant workers from non-

member Mediterranean countries were another problem remaining after the GMP.

Actually, flow of workers reached its peak in 1980 and there were over 6 million

guest workers23who were willing to work in manual-labor jobs that citizens of EC

did not want to do, and their families in the EC. Being welcomed at one time before

in the EC, migrant workers began to face serious problems after economic recessions

in the EC. As a measure for these huge number of immigrant workers, governments

of the member states adopted strict controls on the influx of guest workers and

refugees. People of member states began to get restless with these growing number

foreigners and militant right-wing extremists in the recipient countries began to

attack these workers and their families, causing many deaths and injuries.

Despite roundly made critics, it is clear that from the beginning both the EEC

and the Mediterranean countries had conflicting interests with respect to establishing

20Daniel Enonnchoung Egbe, The Global Mediterranean Policy: Transformation of EU-MediterraneanCountries Relations During 1976-1998,University of Missouri Unpublished PhD Dissertation,December 2000, p. 18.

21 Tsoukalis,op.cit.,p. 435.

22Wood and Yeilada,op.cit., p. 202.

23 Ibid.


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closer economic cooperation.24 Although lacking of satisfying results for each party,

the GMP can be regarded as the beginning stage of the future European-

Mediterranean relations in the Cold War years and it is an important step to be takenby further EU initiatives to Mediterranean region. It is also worth remembering that

the GMP added an institutional dimension to the growing awareness in the EC of

the need for protecting West European security interests in the Mediterranean

region.25

2.2. Renovated Mediterranean Policy

Whereas Second World War and its aftermath had engendered the US influence

in the Middle East, the end of the Cold War gave birth to Europes willingness to re-

establish its dominance and desire for an extended role in the Middle East region. As

Arab-Israeli conflict was the indissoluble matter of this region, the Venice

Declaration of June 1980 was to represent the high point in European attempts to

promote a distinct and common European stance towards the Arab-Israeli conflict.26

The declaration asserted that just solution must finally be found to the Palestinian

problem, which is not simply one of refugees. The Palestinian people, which is

conscious of existing as such, must be placed in a position, by an appropriate process

defined within the framework of the comprehensive peace settlement, to exercise

fully its right to self-determination.27 Though the Venice Declaration of 1980 still

constitutes the basic principles of European Foreign Policy towards the peace

process28, in terms of securing an immediate opening for a more assertive European

role in the peace process, it was to prove a failure.

Contrary to the superpower identity of the US, European Community was

following a different course. Throughout the early 1990s, the EC continued to signal

24 Egbe, op.cit., p. 25.

25 Ibid., p. 40.

26 Dannreuther,op.cit.,p. 154.

27http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/mepp/decl/index.htm#10 , (accessed on 28.12.2007).



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the importance of human rights and democracy in its foreign policy29, and stressed

their vitality in its issues. As a result of Europes priorities to human rights and

democracy issues and Venice Declaration of June 1980 reflecting its stance towardsArab-Israeli conflict, the Arab states were gratified by the support given to them by

the Europeans and were keen to have a counterweight to the United States perceived

uncritical support of Israel.30

However the ECs southern enlargement increased the self-sufficiency of the EC

in typically Mediterranean agricultural products, such as olive oil, fresh vegetables,

and citrus fruits, thus reducing the trade preferences of Maghreb and Mashreq

countries in exporting these goods to the EC.31

This economic marginalization pavedthe way for declining in real per capita income of any developing region, along with

a widening trade deficit in Maghreb and Mashreq countries. Besides, on the

economic level, the Mashriq and Maghreb states did not enjoy complete freedom of

access to the Community market for their industrial goods and agricultural

products32.

After the end of the Cold War, due to the growing economic and political

considerations not only for non-member Mediterranean countries but also for the EC

states, the GMP was revised and led to the Renovated Mediterranean Policy (RMP)

in 1990.

As a Communication from the Commission to the Council, Redirecting the

Communitys Mediterranean Policy, namely Renovated Mediterrenean Policy

firstly reaffirmed the importance that the Community attaches to its longstanding

ties with non-member Mediterranean countries and reiterated the view that owing to

geographical proximity and the closeness of all types of relations, stability and

prosperity in the Mediterranean non-member countries are key factors in the stability

29 Duygu Dersan, Dynamics and Evolution of European Unions Middle East Policy,Unpublished MSc Thesis, The Gradute School of Social Sciences of Middle East Technical University, June 2006,p. 39.


31Tsoukalis,op.cit ., p. 58.

32 Dersan,op.cit.,p. 42.


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and prosperity of the Community itself.33 In the Communication it is also strongly

pointed out that the Commission considers in general that relations between the

Community and non-member Mediterranean countries must make a qualitative andquantitative leap which is to commensurate with the political, economic and social

issues at stake in the region, the regions expectations of the Community, and the

Communitys responsibilities in that part of the world.34 Emphasizing the

Communitys responsibility in that part of the world is a differing and an ambitious

statement of Europe in the region after the Cold War. However to what extent the EU

fullfilled its commitments in this Communication needs to be examined.

What remains as a deficiency in the Global Mediterranean Policy seems similarto those of the Renovated Mediterranean Policy. It is widely accepted that the RMP

failed to support and encourage regional cooperation and closer integration. Besides

historical animosities among the states in the region, never-ending political tensions,

the unwillingness of the states to share their resources with the neighbours within the

framework of development assistance programs35 are leading causes for the RMPs

failure in fulfilling the expectations. However, this policy is important in

demonstrating the increasing European interest towards the region in an era that

political developments in the Soviet Union under Mikhail Gorbachev further

hastened the transformation of the international system.

2.3. A Turning Point In Euro-Mediterranean Relations:Euro-Mediterranean

Partnership (EMP)The Euro-Mediterranean Conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, held in

Barcelona on 27 and 28 November 1995, marked the starting point of the Euro-

Mediterranean Partnership (the Barcelona Process), a wide framework of political,

economic and social relations between the 15 member states of the European Union

33 Commission Document, COM (90) 812, 1 June 1990, p. 2.

34 Ibid.

35 Dersan , op.cit.,p. 42.


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and 12 partners in the Mediterranean region (Algeria, Cyprus, Egypt, Israel, Jordan,

Lebanon, Malta, Morocco, the Palestinian Authority, Syria, Tunisia and Turkey).36

Following the launch of the Barcelona Process in 1995, the main action consisted of negotiating a new set of bilateral agreements with the partner states, replacing the

prior generation of cooperation agreements with the much more extensive and

ambitious Euro-Med Association Agreements.37 One of the accomplishments of the

Euro-Mediterranean Partnership is the allocation of substantial funds, amounting

EUR 9 billion, to the Mediterranean region called the MEDA programme which is

the most important financial tool of the Barcelona Process.38 Regarding the economic

and financial area, this financial tool was aimed to facilitate economic transition andthe development of open, competitive markets and foster political and social reforms

in the Mediterranean partners.

Euro-Mediterranean association agreement for Lebanon and an interim

agreement were signed in 2002 and the agreement was ratified by the Lebanese

Parliament on 2 December 2002. Without any specific differentiation, agreement

provided an agenda to promote political dialogue, democracy, and human rights. It

includes commitments on judicial cooperation and the respect for the rule of law, and

requires the parties to fulfill international rules on money laundering, on combating

organised crime and drugs, and on migration and re-admission issues. On the

economic and trade front, it commits both sides to further liberalise bilateral trade

and also enhances economic and financial cooperation.39

The historic importance of the Mediterranean was tremendous, either as an early

cradle for the Western culture or for the exchange of goods, but at the same time it

was an area of constant struggle for superiority. The region witnessed seven

thousands years of human and cultural development from ancient Egypt all the way

36 Euro-Mediterranean Partnership/Barcelona Process, available athttp://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/euromed, (accessed on 3.01.2008).

37 Michael Emerson and Gergana Noutcheva, From Barcelona Process to Neighbourhood Policy:Assessments and Open Issues,CEPS Working Documents, No.220, March 2005, p. 1.

38The Barcelona Process, Five Years On, available athttp://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/euromed/brochures/barcelona-5yrs_en.pdf (accessed on

3.01.2008).39 http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/lebanon/intro/index.htm, (accessed on 3.01.2008).


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to current times.40 The Mediterranean was a centre for strategic opportunities due to

the rather short lines of communication, which were connecting not only traders and

markets, but also nations, states and cultures.41

Besides Mediterraneans importance,the post-Cold War period was the initial period of a new area which was full of

unknown threats, new implications and a strong need to improve new strategies for

crucial regions like the Mediterranean.

A widespread cognitive uncertainty about new international challenges and an

interest in championing a European initiative for the Mediterranean gave birth to the

Euro-Mediterranean Partnerships political and security base. Thanks to these two

political motivating factors, member states were involved in a process of interaction,exploring and debating different interpretations and possible solutions to the

perceived problems. In this process they converged towards a common

understanding of Euro-Mediterranean relations, which also resonated with their

domestic debates. Such an understanding constituted a new common European

interest. On that basis, they agreed to launch a new common European Foreign

Policy initiative.42

Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, Barcelona laid the foundations of a new

regional relationship and thus represented a turning point in Euro-Mediterranean

relations.43

The motivation for the Barcelona Process came from several directions

concurrently. Roland Dannreuther claims that in relation to the Middle East Peace

Proces (MEPP), the EUs attempts to gain a substantive role go back to the 1970s

and there has since then been a consistent resolve and determination for Europes

distinctive voice and policy preferences to be included in any process towards a

peace settlement.44 Dannreuther adds that the EUs more coherent and strategic

40 Andrea K.Riemer, Yannis A.Stivachtis (eds.),Understanding EUs Mediterranean Enlargement:The English School and The Expansion of Regional International Studies, (Peter Lang: New York,2002), p. 13.

41 Ibid.

42http://repositories.cdlib.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1044&context=ies, (accessed on28.12.2007).

43 http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/euromed/index.htm , (accessed on 28.12.2007).


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actorness in the MEPP was strenghtened by the adoption of a comprehensive

regional strategy, named EMP or Barcelona Process. The Barcelona Process

included security concerns, but approached them through a comprehensive securityparadigm which saw the roots of conflict as primarily due to the failure of economic

development, regional economic integration and the lack of respect for human rights

and democracy.45

Richard Youngs assesses that the Barcelona Process was predicated on the

expectation that economic liberalization, political reform, cultural understanding and

strategic stability would be mutually reinforcing and political liberalization,

combined with deeper economic interaction and social cooperation, would enhancewell-being, stability and Europes own security.46

Sheila Carapico looks for the motivation firstly in the formation of the World

Trade Organization (WTO), after which the European Community hoped to enhance

markets and investments in foreign countries close to home. Secondly, Carapico

claims that French and British colonial legacies and Italian, Spanish and Greek

Merchant empires underlie particular interests that those countries hoped to advance

via Euro-Med engagement.47 Moreover, the willingness of Northern European

companies to provide direct outlets to the Mediterranean region is another motivating

factor behind the EMP.

Apart from economic motives, George Joffe agrees that the unspoken primary

purpose of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership was to stem migration by fostering

economic development.48

For the Barcelona Process, Emerson claims that relations between the EU and its

partners were relatively cordial and constructive, thus provided a plausible

foundation for a deepened relationship.49 He also adds that the EMP displayed

44Dannreuther , op.cit.,p.153.

45 Ibid., p.157.

46Richard Youngs, The European Union and Democracy Promotion in the Mediterranean: A new orDisingenious Strategy?, EWC , 2002/10, p. 42.

47Sheila Carapico, Euro-Med:European Ambitions in the Mediterranean, Middle East Report, No.220, Autumn, 2001, p.25.

48http://www.europe.canterbury.ac.nz/publications/pdf/ncre0105_lister.pdf , (accessed on 24.12.2007).


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relatively good institutional performance by comparison with alternative schemes in

the region and elsewhere. It has reduced uncertainity and lenghtnened the shadow of

the future.50

There are three main fields of activity within the Barcelona Process: the political

and security partnership, the economic and financial partnership, and the partnership

in social, cultural and human affairs. Heart of the merit is that the EU combined all

three chapters into one comprehensive policy acknowledging that financial,

economic, cultural, and security issues can not be effectively tackled seperately.51

The most noticeable chapter of the three were economic and financial partnership. As

states, at the heart of the EUs gradualist approach was the overwhelmingly pre-eminent emphasis on economic reform.52 With the prospective free trade area

constituting by far the most significant substantive element of the EMP, there was

clearly considerable hope and expectation invested in a spillover from market

reforms to political liberalization.53 Rather than challenging the US policies in the

Middle East and North Africa, EMP is seen as a complementary European policy for

the south and east of the Mediterranean. Ultimate goal of this partnership is creating

a large regional free trade zone open to imports and foreign investment that is totally

coherent with US interests. Nevertheless, the EU was almost universally berated for

its insistance on a process of trade liberalization strongly skewed to its own

advantage and the friction that emerged in relation to the EUs lack of generosity in

opening up its agricultural and textile markets was well documented.54

While the expressions of internationalism, feminism, environmentalism, human

rights activism and sympathy for Palestinian victims of Israeli occupation are

inherently embedded in European foreign policy, Europeans are contented to see and

present themselves as possessing a moral leadership that disdains US militarism and

49 Emerson and Noutcheva,op.cit., p. 15.

50 Ibid., p. 4.

51http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/euromed/brochures/barcelona-5yrs_en.pdf, (accessed on24.12.2007).

52 Youngs, op.cit., p. 52.

53 Ibid.

54 Ibid.


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imperialism.55 Partnership in social, cultural and human affairs which is the third

component of Barcelona Process gains importance in this sense. However, the

partnership in social, cultural and human affairs among the two others were not verywell-organized and had little potential for joint actions, demonstrating instead the

EU members lack of unity and lack of political will towards the region.56 It is also

accepted that this kind of spirit for social, cultural and human affairs was

insufficiently frank in political dialogue on human rights, terrorism and migration.57

Furthermore, both shores lacked a common purpose, and the relationship primarily

rested on fear. Europe, especially, was afraid of terrorism, weapons proliferation and

migration from North Africa.58

The EMP, comprising of two complementary dimensions as bilateral and

regional is especially important for providing a common forum bringing different

cultures together. However, most observers and scholars would agree that the EMP

did not live up to expectations the initiative raised when it was launched in

November 1995.59 One failure is mentioned for the persisting economic challenges

with which Mediterranean countries struggle : underdeveloped infrastructures, low

incomes, state-controlled economies, small FDI, low competitiveness, falling

percentages of EU imports, weak economic growth, high population growth, deficits

in basic social services etc.

Beside economic challenges, another factor related to economy has been the

absence of an economic elite in this region who can push for the opening up of

domestic markets to competition and pressure the predominantly introspective and

security obsessed regimes.

55 Carapico,op.cit.,p.27.

56 Reinvigorating Europe's Mediterranean Partnership: Priorities and Policies, available athttp://www.europe.canterbury.ac.nz/publications/pdf/ncre0105_lister.pdf , (accessed on 03.01. 2008).

57 Ibid.

58 Ibid.

59Raffaella A. Del Sarto and Tobias Schumacher, From EMP to ENP: Whats at Stake with theEuropean Neighbourhood Policy Towards the Southern Mediterranean, European Foreign Affairs

Review,Vol. 10, March 2005, p. 23.


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Not only economic challenges, but also historically rooted undemocratic

political systems, poor governance, bad human rights records, regional conflicts and

political violence remained as political challenges even though they were intended tobe diminished and eliminated totally by the 1995 Barcelona Declaration. The EMP

has also suffered from high-level political problems such as the Arab-Israeli conflict

and the Algerian civil war and the frailty of the EUs common foreign and security

policy. The European Commission explains the failure of the EMP owing to the

obstacles raised by the deadlock of MEPP. Deadlock and slow advances in the

Middle East Peace Process, albeit seperate from the Barcelona Process, have had a

retarding effect on regional cooperation in general.60

Youngs also stresses that theEUs leverage over democratic change was significantly diminished by its own

reluctance to agree to Mediterranean states demands on other issues-trade, migrants

rights, a reduction of EU pressure for southern states to readmit migrants, co-

operation on terrorism, the presence in European countries of exiles accused of

violent acts.61 It is generally accepted that the EUs reluctance generated lack of trust

and mutual compromise among the Mediterranean partners. Moreover, reluctance of

southern partners in negotiation and ratification of the foundational agreements and

implementation the reforms adversely affected the effectiveness of the process.

Pursuing economic integration, enlargement and common foreign policy initiatives,

the EU tried to carve out a new sphere of potentially vast influence in what it calls

the Euro-Mediterranean basin.62 Furthermore clearly, the relationship between the

15 EU members and their 12 Mediterranean partners was based on a hierarchical

North-South or core-periphery dynamic.63 Cultural and social prejudices (Arabs

generalize about the West as much as Westerners generalize about Islam.)64

remained and with the exception of Israel, there are vast disparities in wealth

between the parties. The EMPs political intentions were vague and tentative

60 European Commission, The Barcelona Process: Five Years On 1995-2000, Luxembourg:Office for Official Publications of the European Communities,2000, p. 15.


62 Carapico,op.cit.,p. 25.

63 Ibid., p. 26.

64 Ibid.


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alongside the extensive and detailed timetables for economic liberalization; the

substance of the democratic principles to be encouraged was not specified beyond a

list of fundamental freedoms; and, sitting uneasily with the common commitment topolitical liberalization, the principles of non-intervention were affirmed, according

each partner the right to choose and freely develop its own political, socio-cultural,

economic and judicial system.65 Heller points out that the EMP reflected neither a

common identity nor common values and its members do not share a cultural

tradition, language, religion or even history of administrative unity66. Actually, this

criticism is oriented to the EMPs inherent feature stemming from its extensive scope

of geographical area.In June 2000 the European Commission argued that after its first five years the

Barcelona process was basically correct in its conception and policies, but needed

reinvigorating (European Commission 2000)67 and issued a report, The Barcelona

Process, Five Years On:1995-2000. In this report, even the EU Commissioner for

External Relations, Chris Patten, was forced to acknowledge, with some

underestatement, that problems exist68 for the EMP. Strategic deficiencies, the lack

of a compelling vision for the region, the political disunity and institutional

weaknesses of the EU69 were noted as the basic reasons for the failure of EMP.

Moreover, economic objectives envisioning the establishment of a free trade zone by

2010 have not developed a significant momentum. Consequently, as a means for a

more coherent and strategic role of the EU towards the MEPP, the EMP was not

successful.

Even though the EUs latest foreign policy tool, the European Neighbourhood Policy

(ENP) is regarded as only complementary to the EMP, it is actually more of an

ambitious and long-term project and must be dwelled upon with its extensive agenda

in this context.


66 Mark A.Heller, Prospects for Creating a Regional Security Structure in the Middle East, Journalof Strategic Studies, Vol.26, 2003, p.131.

67 http://www.europe.canterbury.ac.nz/publications/pdf/ncre0105_lister.pdf, (accessed on 03.01.2008)

68Heller,op.cit.,p. 129.

69 Dannreuther , op.cit., p. 153.


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2.4. Lessons Learnt For A New Policy, ENP

From the mid-1970s to the beginning of the 1990s, Europes objective forestablishing relations with Mediterranean region was simply to forge bilateral trade

agreements. As a series of bilateral trade agreements were signed, these provided for

one-way trade concessions, notably access to the EC for agricultural products from

Mediterranean countries, and established their eligibility for EC economic aid. As the

term global may not have been the most appropriate label, the GMP nevertheless

sought to address the Mediterranean more systematically and can be regarded as the

beginning stage of the future European-Mediterranean relations. Despite its merelytrade-oriented structure, the GMP is important for it stimulated cooperation between

the Europe and Mediterranean region for the first time systematically and it provided

a single and coordinated framework for the existing bilateral trade and cooperation

agreements.

In December 1990 the EC adopted a New Mediterranean Policy, intended to

reinforce existing trade and aid agreements with support for economic reforms such

as liberalization and structural adjustment. However, the RMP failed to support and

encourage regional cooperation and closer integration. Besides historical animosities

among the states in the region, never-ending political tensions, the unwillingness of

the states to share their resources with the neighbours within the framework of

development assistance programs70 were existing matters for the failure of the RMP.

However, the GMP and the RMP are noteworthy developments to indicate Europes

increasing interest towards the region. As the GMP was reflecting the concerns of

bipolar world and Soviet threat, the RMP was motivated by the end of the Cold War.

Both of them have political considerations along with strong economic incentives.

The EMP is a more comprehensive and ambitious policy compared to previous

initiatives. With the EMP, the EU combined all three chapters into one

comprehensive policy acknowledging that financial, economic, cultural, and security

issues can not be effectively tackled seperately. Actually it was innovative with its

scope of three baskets; political, economic and social. EMP not only symbolized the

EUs strategic approach to the Mediterranean but also reflected the Unions

70 Dersan , op.cit.,p. 42.


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commitment to promotion of liberal values.71 The EMP has a bilateral and a

multilateral/regional dimension. While it aimed to promote development and reforms

through Association Agreements and financial aid with its bilateral dimension,regional dialogue and conflict resolution for the Arab-Israel dispute were on the

agenda with its multilateral dimension. These closely interrelated dimensions would

surely affect each other in terms of their success.

However, the EMP has suffered from high-level political problems such as the Arab-

Israeli conflict and the Algerian civil war and the frailty of the EUs common foreign

and security policy. Moreover political cooperation has been stymied by the lack of

progress in the Middle East Peace Process. Consequently, the EUs inadequatecapacity to contribute resolution to ongoing Arab-Israeli conflict and its lack of

effective instruments for enhancing peace and prosperity adversely affected each

other.

The ENP, which was developed after these above-mentioned initiatives, tries to

eliminate and reduce effects of the obstacles standing in front of the former policies.

Whereas to what extent these obstacles have been eliminated is another subject to be

enquired, it is found beneficial to add that each former European initiative towards

Mediterranean has contributed to extend the scope of the agenda and success of ENP.

The ENP focuses on the fact that the EU is pursuing separate but interrelated

logics in its new framework for relations with its neighbours. The first is the logic of

stabilization associated with the need for secured and properly managed external EU

borders, the second one is the logic of promotion and transition that might reduce the

socio-economic gap for the EUs outer frontiers.72 In this respect, the ENP supports

neighbouring countries transition with an integrative approach.

71 Sevilay Kahraman, The European Neighbourhood Policy: The European Unions New

Engagement Towards Wider Europe,Perceptions: Journal of International Affairs,Vol. 10, No. 4, p.10.72 Ibid., p. 26.


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CHAPTER IIILEBANON BETWEEN SYRIAN STRANGLEHOLD AND NASCENT

EUROPEAN PRESSURE

3.1. Internal Dynamics Shaping the Countrys Profile

3.1.1 A Pivotal Part Of Constitution and the Lebanese Political System:Meaning Of National Pact 1943

The area including modern Lebanon has been, for thousands of years, a meltingpot of various civilizations and cultures. Originally home to the Phoenicians, and

then subsequently conquered and occupied by the Assyrians, the Persians, the

Greeks, the Romans, the Arabs, the Ottoman Turks and most recently the French,

Lebanese culture has over the millennia evolved by borrowing from all of these

groups. However, mostly the French domination is examined as the last and most

penetrating power in the Lebanon. As Fred Halliday claims, imperialism, conceived

of as a system of external domination, formal or informal, certainly played a part

whether it be understood as the historic legacy of colonial rule and capitalist

penetration, with all its disruptive impact , or as the subsequent exercise of Western

power in the region, both directly and through local allies.73

In 1920, as Lebanon was free of Ottoman rule, the League of Nations gave

France a mandate over Lebanon and the era of French rule which lasted for the next

several decades was introduced. It was also a period of two world wars paving the

way for basic developments that have a lasting effect on Lebanese system. Firstly,

expansion of the countrys borders brought mainly Sunni and Shiite Muslims into a

system that had been dominated by Maronites and Druze. The Christian

Communities that coexisted on Mount Lebanon have sought to preserve their ethnic

difference, both in the past, from the Sunni-dominated empires, and in the present,

73 Fred Halliday, Islam and the Myth of Confrontation: Religion and Politics in the Middle East ,(I.B.Tauris Publishers, 1996), p. 17.


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through Maronite rejection of Arab nationalism.74 Secondly, the 1926 Constitution

was adopted and it has remained partly intact up to the present.

Lebanons population is the most religiously diverse in the region. 17 sects orconfessions are recognized, although the exact composition of the current population

is not known because no national census has been conducted since 1932. The first

Lebanese president after independence was Bishara al-Khoury, elected in the

summer of 1943. Khoury was Maronite and had good relations with the Sunni

Muslim Community, including the renowned Sidon-Beirut based Sulh family. Riad

Sulh was choosen by Khoury to be his first Prime Minister, and he had proposed a

new Christian-Muslim governing formula in 1942. The National Pact-accordingvarious sects politically- proposed by Sulh, although unwritten and unofficial, has

become a pivotal part of the constitution and the Lebanese political system.75 It was a

kind of system for power sharing agreed on in the 1943 National Pact.

It is claimed that the Lebanese Civil War that sparked in 1975 arose from the

long and unresolved crisis within the country that had been developing ever since

independence from France in 1943.

The 1943 arrangement allocated public offices among confessional groups

according to demographic and political weight.76 The presidency was always

reserved for a Maronite, the prime ministership for a Sunni, and the parliamentary

speakership for a Shii. This tradition still continues in todays Lebanon. Maronites

monopolized sensitive military and internal security posts however; on balance, they

were by far the most powerful group. Still Lebanon succeeded in avoiding conflict

by freezing differences over identity and by neutralising foreign intervention in

Lebanese politics. The Christians agreed not to tie Lebanon too closely to France and

the West and the Muslims not to seek Lebanons unity with other Arab states,

especially Syria.

74 Michael Kerr, Imposing Power-Sharing:Conflict and Coexistence in Northern Ireland and Lebanon, (Irish Academic Press: Dublin, 2005), p. 18.

75 Ibid., p. 20.

76 Simon Haddad, Cultural Diversity and Sectarian Attitudes in Post-War Lebanon, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, Vol. 28, No:2, April 2002, p. 210.


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There are many rival interpretations of the meaning, causes and consequences of

Lebanons National Pact.77 Many scholars assess the National Pact as temporary and

see it as the result of a Muslim-Christian cooperation for independence from Frenchrule. This assessment also shows the weakness of this agreement. Because those who

brokered the Pact and their successors became completely reliant on its

consociational framework for the fullfilment of their economic interests and

positions of power, though the Pact was meant to be only a temporary mechanism.78

Due to the fact that Lebanon is a precarious republic, regional and communal

identifications are often stronger than national ones. Primacy is given to the family,

village, and espacially sects. The religious community is also often a geographic,social, cultural, political and even economic unit. National identity understanding is

weak. The central government has always adopted an extreme non-interventionist

laissez-faire approach, providing minimal services and offering little direction. As a

result, in many basic areas various sects provided their own system, especially in

economic and educational areas.

However, before the outbreak of the civil war, Lebanon was the only Arab state

with an enduring democratic experience compared with other countries in the Middle

East.79 The political and judicial system permitted Lebanons confessional groups to

coexist, but that system also kept them apart by legitimizing sectarian differences.

While the various sects meant geographic seperation, regional inequalities had

secterian dimensions, for example the Shii community has been the poorest because

it was concentrated in southern Lebanon, the most underdeveloped part of the

country. According to the surveys, the Christians constituted a majority of the

population, and it was on this basis that they obtained the offices of the presidency

and the commander of the armed forces, and the largest share of posts in government

services. However, over time some of their leaders began to fear for their

ascendancy, observing the growing power of Arab nationalism beyond their borders

77 Kerr, op.cit.,p. 20.

78 Ibid., p. 21.

79Simon Haddad, The Relavance of Political Trust in Postwar Lebanon,Citizenship Studies, Vol. 6,No. 2, 2002, p. 203.


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and then, after 1967, the even more menacing increase of Palestinian power within.80

After Christians observed that it was ineffective to try to contain PLO activities by

Lebanese army, they began to place greater reliance on their own sectarian counter-power in the shape of Christian-based militias. The main problem with this 1943

system was that it took inadequate account of change, internal or external. It could

not escape from being the independence days temporary agreement.

Besides, Kerr stressess that consociational tensions became exacerbated when

external events altered the equilibrium, events such as the creation of the state of

Israel, which had posed a challenge to Lebanons foreign policy symmetry. The

National Pact stipulated that the Christians of Lebanon would forego Europeanprotection and all military pacts with Western powers, while the Muslims agreed to

set aside any pan-Arab desires and accept Lebanons existing geographical

boundaries.81 The problem arose in 1948 as to whether Lebanon should remain

neutral in Arab-Israeli conflicts. While Christians viewed neutrality as being

inclusive of Arab-Israeli conflicts, Muslims took the opposite view.82 In addition,

Muslims were frustrated by the Republics second president, Chaumons -another

French schooled Maronite politician- approach to the Baghdad Pact of 1955, his

refusal to break off diplomatic relations with Britain and France in 1956, and, most

importantly his signing up to the Eisenhower Doctrine in 1957.83 Those attempts

were clearly inconsistent with the spirit of the unwritten National Pact and

constitution giving priority to the neutrality of Lebanese state.

The acceleration of the Arab-Israeli conflict after 1967-particularly its

Palestinian dimension-and the launch of the Arab-Israeli peace process in the 1970s

increased the load on the Lebanese political system, which divided its masses and

subsequently destroyed the elite consensus and Lebanons proclaimed ideological

neutrality.84

80 Roger Owen,State, Power and Politics in the Making of the Modern Middle East , Third Edition,(Routledge:London, 2004), p. 175.

81 Haddad, The Relevance , p. 203.


83 Ibid., p. 126.


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Furthermore, the National Pact failed to foster and produce national leaders

whom are needed in a country as divided as Lebanon. It prevented the emergence of

national leaders and stunted any nation-building programme, as it merged andpapered over so many different national aspirations.85 It also ignored demographic

changes, and disproportionately favoured the Maronite and Sunni communities. As

time went by, due to different birth rates and other socio-economic factors, the

governing coalitions grew increasingly unrepresentative of the changing Lebanese

population.86

In 1975, the National Pact finally collapsed with the outbreak of civil war in

Lebanon owing to the fact that it was a result of the unhappy sectarian groups as aconsequence of the inflexibility of National Pact towards social and economic

developments in the early 1970s. The argument that looking for a common pattern or

cause in the conflicts that ravaged the Middle East in recent decades is futile87 is also

valid for the Lebanon case. Because Lebanon has different societies and a distinct

political character, it would be misleading to show a single external or internal factor

affecting Lebanon. Moreover, the external factors must be incorporated into the

regional picture so that it would be clearer to understand the dynamics underlying the

structure of Lebanon.

3.1.2. Other Crucial Developments:Palestine Presence, 1975 Civil War and

Taif AccordAt the end of the 19th century, large numbers of people living in the Middle East

had claims to be called Arabs, for linguistic, cultural and historical reasons. They

were also heirs to a common culture and a common historical experience based on

memories of the Arab and Ottoman Empires.88 Although the Arab identity was just


85 Ibid., p. 134.

86 Kerr , op.cit.,p. 136.

87Halliday, op.cit., p. 15.

88 Owen, op.cit.,p. 57.


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one of a number of possible identities at this time, and usually much less important

than that of a belonging to a particular family or tribe or region, it managed to create

the notions of patriotism, national rights when encountered the state of Israel. Whenthe neighboring Arab states moved against Israel in 1948, they claimed to be fighting

in concert, to uphold their brotherly commitment to the Arabs of Palestine.89 Besides

this support for the Palestinians in their struggle against both the British and the

Jewish settlers, growing importance of newspapers, films, foreign travel to other

Arab countries were the other contributors for the increasing Arab consciousness.

The state of Israel officially came into existence in May 1948, towards the end

of a bitter civil war between the Arab and Jewish populations of MandatoryPalestine, which in turn was triggered off by the precipitate British military

withdrawal.90 Israels Arab neighbours were unwilling either to sign a peace treaty

or to normalize relations and were thus left with the choice of preparing for war or

seeking some kind of unofficial modus vivendi. Lebanon which had a special interest

in securing its independence from Syria took the latter path, while Syria was in the

former path.

Conflict between Israel and Arab states was also responsible for a Middle

Eastern arms race, a series of wars, and the Israel occupation of the West Bank, Gaza

and Egypts Sinai peninsula in 1967, as well as numerous lesser clashes.91 The

shocking Arab defeat in 1967 prompted a rapid growth of Palestinian guerilla

organizations in Lebanon and Lebanons weak central government was powerless to

control them. The Palestinians and its increased number of guerilla activities also

directed Israeli raids to the bases established in Lebanon and Jordan. But for

Lebanon, problem was exacerbated after most of the Palestinian guerillas expelled

from Jordan in 1970 and came to Lebanon. When Muslims generally supported and

welcomed them as potential allies, Maronites were in deep anger and viewed them as

disruptive and likely to upset the countrys precarious balance. Besides Palestinian

presence, internally the demographic balance shifted in favour of the Muslim, while

89 http://www.geocities.com/martinkramerorg/ArabNationalism.htm , (accessed on 05.01. 2008).

90Owen, op.cit.,p. 73.

91 Ibid., p. 67.


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within each community new social forces emerged that did not accept the dominance

of their respective elites.92 Whereas the rise of the Shiite Muslim community

increased Arab nationalism in the country, uncontrolled social change creating classand confessional conflicts complicated and accompanied the presence of Palestinian

problem.

External forces often had done much to worsen divisions, by playing off one

group against another, by provoking forms of nationalism that exalted one groups

past and so antagonized anothers, and by stimulating the divisive search for

genuine national values.93

Palestinian presence was dangerous not only because it invited a harsh Israeliresponse, but also the twin appeal that the Palestinian leadership was willing and able

to make, both to the regimes and to their people.94 As a result, a number of Arab

regimes did their very best to split the movement, to marginalize its leadership or to

make their own political arrangements with the Israelis without reference to the PLO

(Palestine Liberation Organization), but the PLO made skillful use of the

disagreements between the various Arab states to find new allies for itself and to

avoid falling under the influence of any one potentially hostile regime.95

In Lebanon, the PLO was not merely a foreign factor, and it soon became an

extension of the Sunni community in the absence of a Lebanese-Sunni militia that

could match the Christian forces.96 Anyway, expedited by a massive Palestinian

military build-up in the country, Lebanons religious, social, economic and

ideological tensions ultimately exploded in a protracted civil war. (1975-90)97 No

one knows whether a Lebanese civil war would have broken out without the armed

presence of the Palestinians, but this variable undoubtedly pushed the National Pact

92 Halliday , op.cit.,p. 17.

93 Ibid., p. 38.

94 Owen, op.cit. , p. 67.

95 Ibid.

96Kerr,op.cit.,p. 142.

97 Haddad, Cultural Diversity , p. 292.


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to breaking point over the armys neutrality.98 As one can guess, the conflict was not

only a Christian-Muslim strife, but it had several dimensions. The Lebanese civil war

was a result of the long maturing of social contradictions within the country, as thepower bloc established in the 1940s came under increasing pressure from

underprivileged groups.99 The war in Lebanon was fought over a number of issues

including the balance of power in government, the role of the armed Palestinian

groups, the redistribution of wealth, and Lebanons foreign policy orientation,100 as

mentioned above. The conflict exposed the precariousness of the Lebanese political

system and the disintegration of the Lebanese population. In fact Lebanons

religiously and ideologically divided political system failed to cope with theconsequences of an armed Palestinian presence, Arab meddling in its internal affairs,

and overbearing Israeli punishment.101

The civil war was greatly complicated and prolonged by extensive outside

interference. Palestinian cross border attacks on Northern Israel prompted Israel to

invade Lebanon twice: in 1978 when the Israeli army launched a partial military

campaign in Southern Lebanon and held a piece of land which remained occupied

until May 2000, and in 1982 when the Jewish state launched a massive military

invasion to destroy PLO military and political power bases in Lebanon.102

Syria, the neighbour, has never fully accepted Frances division of the Levant

and harbors an irredentist claim to Lebanon. Because geographic, historic, cultural,

economic and even familial links between the two countries are close, Syria became

entangled in Lebanons problems. It has tried to stop the fighting and prevent the

countrys partition, and it also tried to prevent any other regional power from gaining

influence there.103


99 Halliday, op.cit.,p. 39.


101 Haddad, The Relevance, p. 204.

102 Ibid .



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With the collapse of the central governments authority and the rapid

disintegration of the Lebanese army, Lebanon became a regional battleground. In

1975, the country had plunged into complete chaos and civil war and during thefifteen years that followed, Lebanon would become an anarchic country that existed

by name only-dominated by Israeli and Syrian armies as well as local warlords and

their militias.104

During the war, some 60.000 to 100.000 out of a population of approximately 3

million lost their lives, an additional 200.000 were wounded and some 250.000 fled

the country. Large areas, including much of Beirut and the countrys infrastructure,

lay in ruins.On the other hand Israel, worried about the intensity of Palestinian activity

originating in Lebanon, retaliated by launching two large-scale military invasions in

1978 and 1982.105 In June 1982, Israel launched a massive invasion, occupying

virtually the entire southern half of the country . Israeli invasion of the country in

1982 was actually for a military defeat of the Palestinians and the brief attempt to

engineer the establishment of a friendly regime dominated by the Lebanese forces

and controlled by the newly elected president, Bashir Gemayel. Even though

politically unsuccessful, Israels invasion triggered off a series of changes in the

internal balance of power between Christian, Shii and Druze militias that were to

make their own major contribution to the further disintegration of Lebanons fragile

social system.106 A militant group named Hizbullah emerged from the radicalization

of the Shii population as a result of the Israel invasion. This group was supported by

Iran with a wide a range of welfare and educational activities and it adopted an

extreme form of revolutionary activism with the aim of converting Lebanon into an

Islamic state.

Before Israels invasion, the Egyptians had already signed a peace treaty with

Israel in 1979 and at the same time Lebanon was building up its military capacity to

confront Israel and to a degree Palestinian resistance movement in such a way that its

104 Ghassan Abdallah, Lebanons Political System: An Analysis of the Taif Accord,Unpublished Dissertation for the PhD Degree, University of Houston, December 2003, p. 13.

105Haddad, Cultural Diversity ,p. 292.

106 Owen, op.cit., p. 67.


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policies became subservient to the requirements of Syrian security. All of these made

it easier for Israel to affect Lebanese policies and exercise its power in Lebanon.

During the intervention, West Beirut, the capital, was heavily bombarded and tens of thousands killed or made homeless. The Lebanese governments authority did not

extend much beyond Beirut in early 1985. Actually, the official US antipathy to

Palestinian nationalism provided the conditions in which the invasion took place107.

Israel was encouraged by the attitude of the US, stemming from the fact that the US

fixed the Palestinian movement in the global context of its conflict with the Soviet

Union.

From September 30 to October 22, 1989 most of the remaining members of theLebanese parliament met in Taif, in Saudi Arabia to debate a political reform plan

drafted by the Arab League and produced the National Reconciliation Charter,

commonly known as the Taif Agreement.108 The Taif Agreement was also known as

the Document of National Understanding and it constituted a major onset in

Lebanons modern history. It ended the Lebanese civil war and established the

internal conditions of peace.

The Taif Agreement reaffirms that Lebanon is an independent, sovereign

country with an Arab identity and a parliamentary democracy where different

communities coexist.109 When it came to the institutions of government, it called for

equal representation among Christians and Muslims in parliament and essentially it

wrought a change in the political structure to take account of the new power balances

among the communities: the decline of the Maronites and the advance of the Sunnis

and the Shiites.110

The Taif Agreement attempted to reform the political system that had caused

several years of civil strife. Although abolishing the sectarian system had been

mentioned in the Lebanese constitution of 1926 and National Pact, it initiated more

107 Sheila Ryan, Israels Invasion of Lebanon: Background to the Crisis, Journal of PalestineStudies,Vol.11, No.4, Summer-Autumn 1982, p. 23.

108 Reine El-Achkar, Lebanon and Hezbollah: From Militia to Political Party, Dissertation for degreeof M.A., University of Massachusetts Lowell, 2006, p. 35.

109http://www.mideastinfo.com/documents/taif.htm , (accessed on 03.01.2008).

110 Haddad , The Relevance , p. 204.


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ambitious steps towards this goal. Farid el-Khazen claims that the Taif Agreement

has two components: political reforms and sovereignty, however it has not been fully

implemented and the component of sovereignty having to do with Syrian-Lebaneserelations and Syrian military presence in Lebanon has been completely ignored.111

While the agreement includes significant foreign policy and security provision, it

mandates the outlawing of militias and the confiscation of their arms112 except two

Lebanese parties (Hezbollah and, to a lesser extent, Amal, both Shia-based). Khazen

stresses that these exceptions were made because there were no political decisions

for the Lebanese army to enter Palestinian camps or disarm militia forces.

Gradual elimination of the sectarian system and the provisions calling for Syrianwithdrawal from the country were in fact difficult to implement since they were

constituting the main elements of Lebanon reality. G.Abdallah inquiries two main

challenges in the post-Taif period. First, internally, political legitimacy has to be

restored, and second, a supportive international environment has to be established to

promote reconstruction, economic development and security.113 Abdallah assesses

the latter challenge as formidable because he thinks that external actors such as the

US are reluctant to support Lebanon full-heartedly without certain conditions.

There are many scholars considering the Taif Agreement only partly successful.

The Taif Agreement is considered successful owing to its bringing peace to Lebanon.

However, this does not mean this agreement was fully successful. In his thesis,

Abdallah stresses that there has been no progress towards dismantling the system of

confessional representation and claims that the problems that caused the 1975 civil

war are yet to be resolved. S.Haddad explains that the Taif Agreement

acknowledged Syrias, who maintains an undisclosed number of troops, special

relations with Lebanon and it has in reality transformed the post-war Lebanese entity

into a Syrian satellite.114 Syria has imposed many bilateral treaties on Lebanon and

tried to integrate the two countries political and economic life. Haddad gives

111 Tore Bjrgo, Root Causes of Terrorism, (Routledge: London and New York, 2005), p. 183.

112 Abdallah,op.cit.,p. 24.

113 Ibid., p. 27.

114 Haddad, The Relevance ,p. 205.


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examples for Syrian control such as combining military and intelligence

ubiquitousness, economic penetration, a sizeable Syrian civilian presence, control of

the Lebanese military command, and meticulous screening of domestic officeaspirants in an essentially patronage system, where political appointments and

personal loyalties appear to coincide.115

According to another view, Taif failed because the Lebanese continued to be the

victims of their own divisions and competing geopolitical interests in the Middle

East116 Kerr agrees with Haddads view and claims that Taif ushered in a new era of

internationally legitimized and unfettered Syrian hegemonic control in Lebanon. In

the post-Taif period, the Syrian hegemonic control seems to be a consequence of theUS reluctancy to support Lebanon. The US encouraged Israels invasion of Lebanon

in 1982 because it fixed the Palestinian issue related with the USSR. This time,

owing to support given by Syria during the Gulf War, the US easily accepted

extensive Syrian hegemony over Lebanon.

After the Taif Agreement internal relations also changed. In particular, the Shia,

seen as the clear winners, gained a share of power that was more proportionate to

their demographic strength for the first time and in general, the Muslim community

as a whole benefited from Taif at the expense of the Christians, especially the Sunnis

vis-a-vis the Maronites.117 Actually, the Christians lost more with the Taif

Agreement not only in terms of political gains but also for the inextricable

dependence of Lebanon on Syria since the Taif Agreement left Lebanon underde

facto Syrian control. Although the agreement ended sectarian violence in Lebanon, it

failed to ensure the countrys independence and also disrupted the internal

equilibrium among communities and the most striking aspect of the implementation

of the agreement was that Christian grievances were continuously being ignored.118

115 Ibid.

116 Kerr, op.cit.,p.159.

117 Ibid ., p. 161.

118 Simon Haddad, A Survey of Maronite Christian Socio-Political Attitudes in Postwar Lebanon, Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations, Vol. 12, No.4, 2001, p. 467.


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3.2.Stranglehold of External Dynamics: Syria, Iran.

Since the French mandate period, Syrian Arab nationalists neither establisheddiplomatic ties with Lebanon nor accepted it as a seperate entity. It basically

perceived Lebanon artifically seperated from Syria by the external forces. Beside

this historic perception, Syria continuously regarded Lebanon as an indivisible part

of its national security concerns. This was related to the fact that activation of a

military front in Lebanon would divert Israeli forces that would have otherwise been

deployed in the Golan Heights. Syria also supported Palestinian militias which

caused chaos and instability of the vulnerable political system of Lebanon. GhassanAbdallah claims that one of the reasons for Syria's close support to the PLO was

linked to inter-Arab rivalries, with a particular intention to challenge Egypt's

ascendancy in the Arab world. Whereas Lebanon did not prefer to take an obvious

supportive stance to the PLO, but actually stay silent to its activities, Syria obviously

supported the PLO for its hegemonic concerns in Arab world. Despite the continued

differences on the Palestine issue continued absence of diplomatic ties between the

two countries, relations between Lebanon and Syria began to improve in the

1970s.119

There are many reasons explaining the improvements in relations. Among many

of them, many scholars attach great importance to the presence of relations between

Lebanons president Faranjiyyah and the Asad family in Syria. With the above-

mentioned security concerns of Syria, president Asad supplied the PLO with

weapons and helped them establish a stronghold in the southern part of the country

along the border with Israel. Drawing considerable leverage from his relations with

the PLO and the Shiis (as well as from pro-Syrian forces in Lebanon, like the Baath

Party), and gaining high prestige from his role in the 1973 war, Hafiz al-Asad

become the most influential external factor in Lebanese politics in 1974 and

1975.120 Moreover, after the civil war erupted in Lebanon in 1975, motivated by

119Abdallah,op.cit.,p. 83.

120 Ibid., p. 84.


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the common belief that Syria and Lebanon were indivisible in terms of security,

Syria did not retard to intervene politically and militarily to Lebanon.

Asad urged Lebanon to implement new reforms aiming to establish a moreequitable power sharing mechanism between Muslim and Christians. Nevertheless,

Patrick Seale claims that Asad destroyed the Lebanons political equation worse than

before. To rule Lebanon as he aspired to do, he had to smash the confessional

system, but smashing the system meant smashing the Christians.121

Indeed, the Taif Agreement which concluded the devastating civil war in

Lebanon and signed under the Syrian dominance was an effective political tool

smashing Christian effects in the country. As it has already been mentioned, one of the accomplishments which the Taif Agreement realized was the institutionalization

Syria's occupation of Lebanon. Simon Haddad claims that the implementation of the

Taif Agreement under close Syrian supervision turned out to be selective and

controversial, increasing discord in a highly segmented Lebanese society. As a result

of this supervision, he reiterates that parliamentary elections failed the task of

political normalization and prepared very badly for the envisaged national

reconciliation and integration.122

During Taif, the Syrians did not seek to either annex Lebanon or radically

transform its political, economic, and social systems, all that the Syrians did was to

define the political rules of the game for the Lebanese playersand, more precisely,

lay down the boundaries that could not be crossed.123

The Treaty of Brotherhood, Cooperation and Coordination which formalized

Syrias role in post-Taif Lebanon was signed on May 12, 1991. It stipulated that two

states agreed to work for the highest possible level of coordination in all matters of

political, economic, security and cultural policy and established a joint institutional

framework to achieve that end.124 According to Najem, this treaty was a critical

departure from the historic neutrality of Lebanese foreign policy vis--vis the West

121 Patrick Seale, Asad of Syria : The Struggle for the Middle East , (B. Taurus: London, 1988), p. 280.


123 Abdallah,op.cit.,p. 91.

124http://www.lebanonwire.com/prominent/historic_documents/1991_lebanon_syria_cooperation_treaty.asp , (accessed on 20.12.2007).


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and the Arab/Islamic world.125 A Defence and Security Pact (August 1991) followed

the Treaty of Brotherhood.

Over time, Syrias interest in Lebanon, quite independent of its desire forleverage in the Arab-Israeli dispute, have steadily increased. Najem explains that

Lebanese and Syrian economies have become increasingly tied to