Borromeo Neri

8/12/2019 Borromeo Neri

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G.R. No. 96032 July 31, 1991

JESUS N. BORROMEO, petitioner,vs.

THE HON. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION and SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT,respondents.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:p

Should the terminal leave pay of petitioner Borromeo, Chairman of the Civil Service Commission(CSC) until his retirement on April 1, 1986, be computed on the basis of the highest monthly salaryplus cost of living allowance (COLA) and representation and transportation allowance (RATA) orsolely on the basis of highest monthly salary without said allowances? This is the issue thatconfronts the Court.

On August 18, 1988, the petitioner wrote a letter to the Commission on Audit (COA) Chairman,coursed through the CSC Chairman, requesting an opinion on whether or not the money value of theterminal leave of retired Constitutional Commission members should include the allowancesreceived at the time of retirement. The petitioner, in his letter, further stated that while retiredmembers of other Constitutional Commissions received terminal leave pay computed on the basisof highest monthly salary including allowances, the former's terminal leave was computed solely onthe basis of highest monthly salary.

In a First Indorsement to the COA Chairman on September 1, 1988, the CSC Chairmanrecommended the approval of the petitioner's request for payment of the money value of histerminal leave based on salary plus allowances.

On September 28, 1989, the COA rendered Decision No. 992 (hereinafter referred to as the COAdecision) stating that "in line with the action taken by this Commission in the previous similar casesof former COA Commissioners Hermogenes P. Pobre and Silvestre D. Sarmiento," the COA "willinterpose no objection" to the petitioner's claim.

Upon the petitioner's request for payment of terminal leave differential representing the unpaidCOLA and RATA amounting to P111,229.04, the CSC Chairman informed the petitioner that therelease of the corresponding advice of allotment and cash outlay to cover the payment of his


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terminal leave differential had already been requested from the Department of Budget andManagement (DBM).

On January 25,1990, in a letter addressed to the CSC Chairman, the DBM denied the petitioner'srequest for payment of terminal leave differential for the following reasons, among others:

1) Computation of the money value of vacation and sick leave is based on "basic pay" or "basicsalary" pursuant to the provisions of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended by R.A. No.1081.

2) Under Section 2(1) of P.D. No. 1146, the term salary refers to the basic pay or salary received by

an employee, excluding per diems, bonuses, overtime pay and allowance.

3) The cases of former COA Commissioners Pobre and Sarmiento cannot be validly invoked asprecedents for purposes of DBM Budgetary action since said claims were processed without priorinvolvement of the DBM.

Faced with the DBM refusal to release the corresponding allotment, the CSC yielded to DBM insteadof asserting its initial determination. It issued Resolution No. 90-514 dated May 30, 1990 whereinthe Commission deemed it proper not to rule on the issue on "ethical considerations" and

"compulsions of delicadeza" and advised the petitioner to file an action for declaratory relief (sic)on the issue with the Supreme Court.

Petitioner Borromeo sought reconsideration of CSC Resolution No. 90-514, reasoning that neitherthe CSC Resolution nor the opinion of the DBM Secretary could prevail over the COA decision whichhad become final and executory.

On October 18, 1990, the CSC issued Resolution No. 90-945 denying reconsideration of thepetitioner's case. Inspite of the CSC Chairman's earlier approval of the claim for payment, the CSCruled that the COA decision "has no sufficient legal mooring and therefore cannot be the basis forallowing payment of the claims." The Resolution likewise cited a June 13, 1990 letter from formerCourt Administrator Meynardo A. Tiro informing the CSC that "the money value of the terminalleave credits of the Justices of the Supreme Court and other members of the Judiciary is based onlyon the highest basic salary (plus longevity pay) but excluding RATA as certified to by our Director ofFiscal Management and Budget Office."

Hence, this petition.


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The Secretary of Budget and Management was ordered impleaded by the Court in a resolutiondated January 31, 1991.

The petitioner seeks the nullification of CSC Resolution Nos. 90-514 and 90-945. He urges that theCOA decision which interposed no objection to the computation of his terminal leave pay based onsalary plus allowances had already become final and executory since no timely appeal had beentaken therefrom.

Respondent CSC, on the other hand, maintains that the COA decision is not final and conclusivesince said decision merely stated that the COA will not interpose any objection to the payment ofthe petitioners claim. More importantly, respondent CSC adds, the determination of the legality ofclaims on leave matters is within the province of the CSC.

On this preliminary issue, the Court rules against the petitioner's assertion that the COA decisionhas become final and executory and, therefore, beyond review; that the DBM has no alternative butto obey it. Article IX-A Section 7 of the 1987 Constitution provides:

. . . Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law, any decision, order or ruling of eachCommission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party withinthirty (30) days from receipt of a copy thereof.

The above-cited article refers to an aggrieved party raising a decision to this Court. Unfortunatelyfor the petitioner, neither the Civil Service Commission nor the Secretary of Budget andManagement may be viewed as an aggrieved party. The CSC is not an aggrieved party because itrecommended the approval of the petitioner's request for payment of terminal leave computed onthe basis of his monthly salary plus allowances and likewise interceded in behalf of the petitionerfor the release of funds from the DBM. The COA upheld this initial position. Nor is the DBM anaggrieved party because it was not privy to the case before the COA. Moreover, even if the DBM waseventually apprised of the COA decision, the DBM's recourse was not to bring the matter on apetition for certiorari before the Court. As the agency tasked to release government funds, it simplyignored the COA ruling with which it disagreed. It refused to approve the release of allotment and

outlay for terminal leave differential since in its opinion, payment thereof had no legal basis. Therecords do not show any authority of COA to compel acceptance of its ruling in this particular case.

The respondent CSC's stance, however, that it is the body empowered to determine the legality ofclaims on leave matters, to the exclusion of COA, is not well-taken. While the implementation andenforcement of leave benefits are matters within the functions of the CSC as the central personnelagency of the government, the duty to examine accounts and expenditures relating to leave benefitsproperly pertains to the COA. Where government expenditures or use of funds is involved, the CSCcannot claims an exclusive domain simply because leave matters are also involved.


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The COA, the CSC, and the Commission on Elections are equally pre-eminent in their respectivespheres. Neither one may claim dominance over the others. In case of conflicting rulings, it is theJudiciary which interprets the meaning of the law and ascertains which view shall prevail.

The basic question for the Court's consideration is whether or not RATA and COLA should be addedto the highest monthly salary in computing the petitioner's terminal leave pay.

The petitioner anchors his claim on the Memorandum Order issued by President Marcos onNovember 20, 1980. Apparently, this Memorandum Order was also the basis for the COA decision,invoked by the petitioner as final and executory, interposing no objection to his claim for terminalleave differential. The Memorandum Order reads:

TO: The Chairman

Commission on Audit

Quezon City

With reference to the request of that Office for clarification on the accumulated leave credits ofretired Chairman Perez and Commissioners Duque and Bayot, I hereby direct that:

1. The computation of the terminal leave in question shall be computed on the basis of the totalnumber of days of leave credits each accumulated by Chairman Perez and Commissioners Duqueand Bayot on the day of their retirement, not on the basis of 300 days as provided in Sec. 1014 ofP.D. 1587.

2. The money value of the terminal leave shall be paid as computed on the basis of the highestmonthly salary including allowance received at the time of the retirement.

(Sgd.) FERDINAND E. MARCOS

President of the Philippines

November 20, 1980. (p. 27, Rollo)


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The above Order was the former President's response to a July 7, 1980 query initiated by formerCOA Chairman Francisco A. Tantuico, Jr. seeking clarification from the Office of the Presidentrespecting the claim of retired Chairman Leonardo B. Perez and Commissioners Venancio S. Duqueand Flores A. Bayot of the Commission on Elections for the payment of the money value of theiraccumulated leaves. Since the Memorandum order specifically applies to these three officials, thensaid Order cannot automatically benefit others not mentioned therein. While it has persuasive valueas a matter of contemporaneous interpretation especially as regards Presidential Decrees or otherpresidential acts, we cannot confer upon this Order the status of a law of general application.

The petitioner also invokes Administrative Order No. 44 dated December 13, 1979, extending to theChairman and members of the Constitutional Commissions the same benefits enjoyed by retiringmembers of the Judiciary in the matter of rationalized rate of allowances and liberalizedcomputation of retirement benefits and accumulated leave credits.

The Solicitor General, acting on behalf of the CSC and Secretary of Budget and Management,advances the argument that there is no provision in Administrative Order No. 444, or in any otherlaw, which expressly authorizes the inclusion of allowances in the computation of the money valueof the petitioner's accumulated leaves.

The pertinent portions of Administrative Order No. 444 provide:

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3. The accumulated leave credit of a Chairman/Commissioner of a Constitutional Commission shallbe computed under the same rules as those applicable to members of the Judiciary.

4. Upon retirement, the lump sum of five years gratuity as provided under R.A. 3595 for theChairman/Commissioner shall be computed on the basis of the highest monthly salary plus the dulyauthorized transportation, living and representation allowances in the last month prior toretirement or expiration of term.

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The law pertaining to retirement benefits respecting members of the Judiciary is Republic Act (R.A.)No. 910, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1438, which reads:

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Sec. 3. Upon retirement, a justice of the Supreme Court or of the Court of Appeals, or a judge of theCourt of First Instance, Circuit Criminal Court, Agrarian Relations, Tax Appeals, Juvenile andDomestic Relations, city or municipal court, or any other court hereafter established shall beautomatically entitled to a lump sum of five years gratuity computed on the basis of the highestmonthly salary plus the highest monthly aggregate of transportation, living and representationallowances he was receiving on the date of his retirement; . . . .

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It is clear from RA 91 0 as amended that the five-year gratuity is based on highest monthly salaryplus transportation, living and representation allowance. Should the computation of terminal leavepay, which is given on the same occasion of retirement and which arises from the sameconsiderations of government gratitude that for most retirees is based on a lifetime of service, beaccorded similar treatment?

The Solicitor General stresses that under Section 286 of the Revised Administrative Code, asamended by Republic Act No. 1081 and Executive Order No. 1077, the computation of the moneyvalue of the terminal leave pay is based only on monthly basic salary.

Section 286 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended by RA No. 1081, states:

Section 286. When vacation leave and sick leave may be taken. Vacation leave and sick leaveshall be cumulative and any part thereof which may not be taken within the calendar year in whichearned may be carried over to the succeeding years, but whenever any officer, employee, or laborerof the Government of the Philippines shall voluntarily resign or be separated from the servicethrough no fault of his own, he shall be entitled to the commutation of all accumulated vacationand/or sick leaves to his credit: Provided, That the total vacation leave and sick leave that canaccumulate to the credit of any officer of employee shall, in no case, exceed ten months: Provided,further, That the proper Department Head may in his discretion authorize the commutation of thesalary that would be received during the period of vacation and sick leave of any appointed officeror employee or teacher or laborer of the Philippine Government and direct its payment on or before

the beginning of such leave from the fund out of which the salary would have been paid: Provided,furthermore, That no person whose leave has been commuted following his separation from theservice shall be reappointed or reemployed under the Government of the Philippines before theexpiration of the leave commuted unless he first refunds the money value of the unexpired portionof the leave commuted. (Emphasis supplied)

(Executive Order No. 1077 later amended Section 286 by removing the limitation on the number ofdays of vacation and sick leaves that a retiree may accumulate, although all employees are requiredto go on a minimum of five days vacation leave annually.)


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The only provision in Section 286 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended, which couldseemingly support the Solicitor General's view is the above underlined clause which allows the"commutation of salary" of a government officer, employee or laborer.

"Commutation of salary" as used in Section 286 is, however, not the same as "commutation of leavecredits." The former is applied for by an employee during employment when he goes on ordinaryleave. Thus, if his Department Head allows it, the employee may receive his salary for the period ofthe vacation or sick leave before the beginning of such leave; otherwise, he gets his salary only onthe pay days covered by the vacation or sick leave period or upon returning to work. In contrast,commutation of leave credits, more commonly known as terminal leave, is applied for by an officeror employee who retires, resigns or is separated from the service through no fault of his own.(Manual on Leave Administration Course for Effectiveness published by the Civil ServiceCommission, pages 16-17). In the exercise of sound personnel policy, the Government encouragesunused leaves to be accumulated. The Government recognizes that for most public servants,retirement pay is always less than generous if not meager and scrimpy. A modest nest egg whichthe senior citizen may look forward to is thus provided. Terminal leave payments are given not onlyat the same time but also for the same policy considerations governing retirement benefits.

Since terminal leave is applied for by an officer or employee who has already severed hisconnection with his employer and who is no longer working, then it follows that the terminal leavepay, which is the cash value of his accumulated leave credits, should not be treated as compensationfor services rendered at that time. (Re: Request of Atty. Bernardo Zialcita, 190 SCRA 851 [1990]) Itcan not be viewed as salary for purposes which would reduce it. (supra) There can thus be no"commutation of salary" when a government retiree applies for terminal leave because he is notreceiving it as salary. What he applies for is a "commutation of leave credits." It is an accumulationof credits intended for old age or separation from the service. Hence, Section 286 of the RevisedAdministrative Code is not applicable. It cannot be construed as limiting the basis of thecomputation of terminal leave pay to monthly salary only.

In the light of the reasons which impelled the law to include COLA and RATA in computingretirement benefits of certain officials, we rule that terminal leave payments must also be governedby the same principle. COLA and RATA should be included in computing the terminal leave creditswhen the officials retire or the official relationship is lawfully terminated.

The Solicitor General cites our ruling in Paredes v. Acting Chairman, 116 SCRA 176 [1982] tosupport his position.

Commonwealth Act (CA) No. 186, as amended, provides for the retirement of governmentemployees, other than members of the Judiciary, Constitutional Commissions and those whoseretirement is not covered by special law. Section 12(c) of CA 186 reads:


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(c) Retirement is likewise allowed to any official or employee, appointive or elective, regardless ofage and employment status, who has rendered a total of at least twenty years of service, the lastthree years of which are continuous. The benefit shall, in additional to the return of his personalcontributions with interest compounded monthly and the payment of corresponding employer'spremiums described in subsection (a) of Section five hereof, without interest, be only a gratuityequivalent to one month's salary for every year of the first twenty years of service, plus one andone-half month's salary for every year of service over twenty but below thirty years and twomonth's salary for every year of service over thirty years in case of employees based on the highestrate received and in case of elected officials on the rates of pay as provided by law. . . . Officials andemployees retired under this Act shall be entitled to the commutation of the unused vacation andsick leave, based on the highest rate receiver, which they may have to their credit at the time ofretirement.

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Under the last sentence, officials and employees retired under CA 186, as amended, shall be entitledto the commutation of the vacation and sick leave credits based on the highest rate received.

In Paredes v. Acting Chairman, supra, the Court construed the phrase "highest rate received" asreferring to the retiree's "highest monthly salary":

The foregoing legal provision [Section 12(c)] of CA 186 requires the computation of the moneyvalue of the terminal leave to be based on the retiree's highest rate received. And a reading of theentire provision shows that the highest rate received refers to the retiree's highest monthly salary.

The petitioner in that case was a former Assistant City Auditor of Manila who sought to have hisRATA included in the computation of his terminal leave pay. The Court therein held that it"allowances are not considered part of salary for purposes of retirement and payment of the moneyvalue of terminal leave."

It must be noted, however, that the Court, in that case, construed "highest rate received" as highestmonthly salary mainly because the retirement gratuity received by employees under Section 12(c)of CA 186 is based only on monthly salary. Thus, under the aforementioned provision, the benefitfor employees shall be "a gratuity equivalent to one month's salary for every year of the first twentyyears of service, plus one and one-half month's salary for every years of service over 20 but below30 years and two month's salary for every year of service over thirty years . . . based on the highestrate received . . . Officials and employees retired under this act shall be entitled to the commutationof the unused vacation and sick leave, based on the highest rate received . . . ." (Emphasis supplied.)


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A reading of Section 12(c) of CA 186 therefore reveals an intent on the part of the legislature toprovide a uniform basis in computing both the retirement gratuity and the terminal leave pay. In CA186, that uniform basis is salary.

A different law, R.A. 910 as amended, governs the petitioner. In the case of members of the Judiciaryand Constitutional Commissions, the basis in computing the retirement gratuity is the highestmonthly salary plus the highest monthly aggregate of transportation, living and representationallowance (COLA and RATA). The same rule of uniformity which we applied in Paredes v. ActingChairman for those retiring under CA 186 as amended should also apply for those who retire underR.A. 910 as amended. The rate used in computing retirement gratuities also applies in thecomputation of terminal leave credits.

It is axiomatic that retirement laws are liberally construed and administered in favor of the personsintended to be benefited. All doubts as to the intent of the law should be resolved in favor of theretiree to achieve its humanitarian purposes. (In Re: Amount of the Monthly Pension of Judges andJustices starting from the Sixth year of their Retirement and after the Expiration of the Initial Five-Year Period of Retirement, 190 SCRA 315 [1990]; Ortiz v. Commission on Elections, 162 SCRA 812[1988]; Bautista v. Auditor General, 104 Phil. 428 [1958])

Although terminal leave pay is not synonymous with, and is not a part of, the five-year lump sumgratuity provided under RA 910 as amended and Administrative Order No. 444, the former may, ina broad sense, partake of the nature of a gratuity rather than actual salary. A gratuity is that paid to

the beneficiary for past services rendered purely out of generosity of the giver or grantor. (Peraltav. Auditor General, 100 Phil 1051 [1957]) It is a mere bounty given by the government inconsideration or in recognition of meritorious services and springs from the appreciation andgraciousness of the government. (Pirovano v. De La Rama Steamship Co., 96 Phil. 335, 357 [1954])While it is true that vacation and sick leave credits are earned during one's period of employment,they are, by their very nature and purpose, supposed to be enjoyed or exhausted duringemployment. When these accumulated leave benefits are allowed to be accumulated, not to be paidwhile one is working but to be reserved for old age, then this constitutes the gratuity.

Through the years, laws pertaining to accumulation of leave credits show a liberal trend with a

view to favoring the retiring employee. Under Act 2711 (dated March 10, 1917), accumulatedleaves that may be commuted cannot exceed 5 months. Republic Act No. 1081 (dated June 15,1954) increased the limit from 5 to 10 months. With the passage of Executive Order No. 1077 onJanuary 9, 1986, the retiring employee became entitled to the commutation of all accumulatedvacation and sick leaves to his credit, without limitation as to the number of days of vacation andsick leave that he may accumulate.

Since terminal leave pay may also be considered a gratuity, then applying the rule on liberalinterpretation of retirement laws, the basis for its computation in the case of members of the


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Judiciary and Constitutional Commissions must be the same as that used in computing the 5-yearlump sum gratuity under RA 910 as amended and Administrative Order No. 444.

The Court is cognizant of the incongruity that may ensue if the terminal leave pay of members of theJudiciary and Constitutional Commissions is computed only on the basis of highest basic monthlysalary.

If, for example a member of the CSC has an accumulated leave credit of one month and, in the twomonths immediately prior to retiring, consumes his accumulated leaves by going on fifteen days'vacation leave twice, there is no dispute that he will be paid two months' salary plus COLA andRATA for this two-month period, although no work has been rendered by him. If, on the other hand,he chooses to work until the last day of employment and upon retirement, applies for thecommutation of his accumulated leave credit of one month, following the proposition of theSolicitor General, he will receive terminal leave pay equivalent only to one month's salary, withoutCOLA and RATA. In the latter case, why should he be penalized for faithfully working continuouslyand not consuming his leave credits until his last working day? Why should the basis for thecommutation of leave credits be different just because he chose to avail himself of his leave benefitsimmediately before and not immediately after retirement? Surely this disparity in consequencecould not have been intended by our lawmakers.

There is more reason now to include COLA in the computation of terminal leave pay. Section 12 ofRepublic Act 6758, known as the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989, mandated

the integration of COLA to the basic salary and, therefore, to the retirement pay of all employees.While it is true that RA 6758 took effect only on July 1, 1989, long after petitioner had alreadyretired on April 1, 1986, his COLA should nevertheless have been included in computing terminalleave pay for the same reasons stated above.

In Re: Request of Atty. Bernardo Zialcita, supra, the affected agency filed a motion for partialreconsideration stressing that the benefits of our ruling should not be open-ended and made toapply retroactively to all the unknown and uncomplaining persons who may have retired as farback as decades ago. We provided a cut-off date. The same practical considerations and budgetaryrestraints constrain the Court to impose a cut-off date for claims for terminal leave differentials.

The Court therefore, rules that the inclusion of COLA and RATA as basis in arriving at terminal leavepay shall apply only to those qualified members of the Judiciary and Constitutional Commissionswho retired or shall retire on or after the change of government in February, 1986.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. Resolutions 90-514 and 90-945 issued by the CivilService Commission are set aside. The Secretary of Budget and Management is ordered to releasethe corresponding allotment and cash outlay for the terminal leave differential claimed by thepetitioner. The terminal leave pay of qualified members of the Judiciary and ConstitutionalCommissions who retired or shall retire on or after the February, 1986 political upheaval shall bebased on highest monthly salary plus COLA and RATA.


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SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 101428 August 5, 1992

DR. ISABELITA VITAL-GOZON, in her official capacity as MEDICAL CENTER CHIEF OF THENATIONAL CHILDREN'S HOSPITAL, petitioner,

vs.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and DR. ALEJANDRO S. DE LA FUENTE, respondents.

Gregorio San Agustin for private respondent.

NARVASA, C.J.:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction, in a special civil action of mandamus against apublic officer, to take cognizance of the matter of damages sought to be recovered from the

defendant officer, is the chief issue raised in the certiorari action at bar. Also put the issue iswhether or not the Solicitor General may represent the defendant public officer in the mandamussuit, in so far as the claim for damages is concerned, in light of the Court's rulings in Urbano , et al. v.Chavez, et al., and Co v. Regional Trial Court of Pasig, et al. 1

There is no dispute about the facts from which these issues arise.

In the early months of 1987 and pursuant to Executive Order No. 119 issued on January 30, 1987by President Corazon Aquino reorganization of the various offices of the Ministry of Health

commenced; existing offices were abolished, transfers of personnel effected.

At the time of the reorganization, Dr. Alejandro S. de la Fuente was the Chief of the Clinics of theNational Children's Hospital, having been appointed to that position on December 20, 1978. Priorthereto, he occupied the post of Medical Specialist II, a position to which he was promoted in 1977after serving as Medical Specialist I of the same hospital for six (6) years (since 1971).

On February 4, 1988 Dr. de la Fuente received notice from the Department of Health that he wouldbe re-appointed "Medical Specialist II." Considering this is to be a demotion by no less than two


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ranks from his post as Chief of Clinics, Dr. de la Fuente filed a protest with the DOH ReorganizationBoard. When his protest was ignored, he brought his case to the Civil Service Commission where itwas docketed as CSC Case No. 4. In the meantime "the duties and responsibilities pertaining to theposition of Chief of Clinics were turned over to and were allowed to be exercised by Dr. Jose D.Merencilla,

Jr." 2

Dr. de la Fuente's case was decided by the Civil Service Commission in a Resolution dated August 9,1988. In that Resolution, the Commission made the following conclusion and disposition, to wit:

. . (The Commission) declares the demotion/transfer of appellant de la Fuente, Jr. from Chief ofClinics to Medical Specialists II as null and void: hence, illegal. Considering further that since theNational Children's Hospital was not abolished and the position therein remained intact althoughthe title or the position of Chief of Clinics was changed to "Chief of Medical Professional Staff" withsubstantially the same functions and responsibilities, the Commission hereby orders that:

1. Appellant de la Fuente, Jr. be retained or considering as never having relinquished his position ofChief of Clinics (now Chief of Medical Professional Staff) without loss of seniority rights; and

2. He be paid back salaries, transportation, representation and housing allowances and such otherbenefits withheld from him from the date of his illegal demotion/transfer.

No motion for reconsideration of this Resolution was ever submitted nor appeal therefrom essayedto the Supreme Court, within the thirty-day period prescribed therefor by the Constitution. 3Consequently, the resolution became final, on September 21, 1988.

De la Fuente thereupon sent two (2) letters to Dr. Vital-Gozon, the Medical Center Chief of NationalChildren's Hospital, 4 demanding the implementation of the Commission's decision. Dr. Vital-Gozonreferred "de la Fuente's claims to the Department of Health Assistant Secretary for Legal Affairs forappropriate advice and/or action . . (She did this allegedly because, according to the Solicitor

General, she was) unaware when and how a CSC Resolution becomes final and executory, whethersuch Resolution had in fact become final and executory and whether the DOH Legal Departmentwould officially assail the mentioned Resolution." 5 But she did not answer Dr. de la Fuente'sletters, not even to inform him of the referral thereof to the Assistant Secretary. She chose simply toawait "legal guidance from the DOH Legal Department." On the other hand, no one in the DOH LegalDepartment bothered to reply to Dr. de la Fuente, or to take steps to comply or otherwise advisecompliance, with the final and executory Resolution of the Civil Service Commission. In fact, de laFuente claims that Vital-Gozon had "actually threatened to stop paying . . . (his) salary andallowances on the pretext that he has as yet no 'approved' appointment even as 'Medical SpecialistII' . . . 6


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Three months having elapsed without any word from Vital-Gozon or anyone in her behalf, or any

indication whatever that the CSC Resolution of August 9, 1988 would be obeyed, and apprehensivethat the funds to cover the salaries and allowances otherwise due him would revert to the GeneralFund, Dr. de al Fuente repaired to the Civil Service Commission and asked it to enforce its judgment.He was however "told to file in court a petition

for mandamus because of the belief that the Commission had no coercive powers unlike a court to enforce its final decisions/resolutions. 7

So he instituted in the Court of Appeals on December 28, 1988 an action of "mandamus anddamages with preliminary injunction" to compel Vital-Gozon, and the Administrative Officer,Budget Officer and Cashier of the NCH to comply with the final and executory resolution of the CivilService Commission. He prayed for the following specific reliefs:

(1) (That) . . a temporary restraining order be issued immediately, ordering the principal and otherrespondents to revert the funds the of the NCH corresponding to the amounts necessary toimplement the final resolution of the CSC in CSC Case No. 4 in favor of herein petitioner, Dr.Alejandro S. de la Fuente, Jr., and to pay such sums which have accrued and due and payable as ofthe date of said order;

(2) After hearing on the prayer for preliminary injunction, that the restraining order be converted

to a writ of preliminary injunction; and that a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction be issuedordering principal respondent and the other respondents to implement in full the said finalresolution; and

(3) That, after hearing on the merits of the petition, that judgment be rendered seeking (sic)permanent writs issued and that principal respondent be ordered and commanded to comply withand implement the said final resolution without further delay; and, furthermore, that the principalrespondent be ordered to pay to the sums of P100,000.00 and P20,000.00 as moral and exemplarydamages, and P10,000.00 for litigation expenses and attorney's fees.

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The Court of Appeals required the respondents to answer. It also issued a temporary restrainingorder as prayed for, and required the respondent to show cause why it should not be converted to awrit of preliminary injunction. The record shows that the respondents prayed for and were grantedan extension of fifteen (15) days to file their answer "through counsel, who," as the Court of Appealswas later to point out, 8 "did not bother to indicate his address, thus notice was sent to him throughthe individual respondents. . . . (However, no) answer was filed; neither was there any show cause


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(sic) against a writ of preliminary injunction." It was a certain Atty. Jose Fabia who appeared inVital-Gozon's behalf. 9

About a month afterwards, de la Fuente filed with the same Court a "Supplemental/AmendedPetition" dated February 2, 1989. The second petition described as one for "quo warranto" asidefrom "mandamus", added three respondents including Dr. Jose Merencilla, Jr.; and alleged inter aliathat he (de la Fuente) had "clear title" to the position in question in virtue of the final and executoryjudgment of the Civil Service Commission; that even after the Commission's judgment had becomefinal and executory and been communicated to Vital-Gozon, the latter allowed "Dr. Merencilla, Jr. as'OIC Professional Service' to further usurp, intrude into and unlawfully hold and exercise the publicoffice/position of petitioner, (under a duly approved permanent appointment as 'Chief of Clinics'since 1978). De la Fuente thus prayed, additionally, for judgment:

(a) Declaring that principal respondent Dr. Jose D. Merencilla, Jr. is not legally entitled to the officeof "Chief of Clinics" (now retitled/known as "Chief of Medical Professional Staff," NCH), ousting himtherefrom and ordering said respondent to immediately cease and desist from further performingas "OIC Professional Service" any and all duties and responsibilities of the said office; (and)

(b) Declaring that the petitioner, Dr. Alejandro S. de la Fuente, Jr., is the lawful or de jure Chief ofClinics (now known as "Chief of the Medical Professional Staff") and placing him in the possessionof said office/position, without the need of reappointment or new appointment as held by the CivilService Commission in its resolution of August 9, 1988, in CSC Case No. 4.

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Copy of the "Supplemental/Amended Petition" was sent to Atty. Jose A. Fabia, Counsel forRespondents c/o Dr. Ma. Isabelita Vital-Gozon, etc., National Children's Hospital, E. Rodriguez Ave.,Quezon City (Atty. Fabia's address not being indicated or mentioned in his motion for Extension of

Time). 10

Again the Court of Appeals required answer of the respondents. Again, none was filed. The petitionswere consequently "resolved on the basis of their allegations and the annexes." The Appellate Courtpromulgated its judgment on June 9, 1989. 11 It held that

The question of whether petitioner may be divested of his position as Chief of Clinics by theexpedient of having him appointed to another, lower position is no longer an issue. It ceased to besuch when the resolution in CSC Case No. 4 became final. The said resolution is explicit in itsmandate; petitioner was declared the lawful and de jure Chief of Clinics (Chief of the MedicalProfessional Staff) of the National Children's Hospital, and by this token, respondent Dr. Jose D.Merencilla, Jr. is not legally entitled to the office. Respondents, particularly Dr. Isabelita Vital-Gozon,


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had no discretion or choice on the matter; the resolution had to be complied with. It was ill-advisedof principal respondent, and violative of the rule of law, that the resolution has not been obeyed orimplemented.

and accordingly ordered

. . . respondents, particularly Dr. Isabelita Vital-Gozon, . . . to forthwith comply with, obey andimplement the resolution CSC Case No. 4 (and) . . . Dr. Jose D. Merencilla, Jr., who is not entitled tothe office, . . . to immediately cease and desist from further performing and acting as OICProfessional Service.

But de la Fuente's prayer for damages founded essentially on the refusal of Gozon, et al. to obeythe final and executory judgment of the Civil Service Commission, which thus compelled him tolitigate anew in a different forum was denied by the Court of Appeals on the ground that the"petitions (for mandamus) are not the vehicle nor is the Court the forum for . . . (said) claim ofdamages."

Gozon acknowledged in writing that she received a copy of the Appellate Tribunal's Decision ofJune 9, 1989 on June 15, 1989. 12 Respondent de la Fuente acknowledged receipt of his own copyon June 15, 1989. 13 Neither Vital-Gozon nor her co-party, Dr. Merencilla, Jr., moved forreconsideration of, or attempted to appeal the decision.

It was de la Fuente who sought reconsideration of the judgment, by motion filed through newcounsel, Atty. Ceferino Gaddi. 14 He insisted that the Appellate Court had competence to awarddamages in a mandamus action. He argued that while such a claim for damages might not have beenproper in a mandamus proceeding in the Appellate Court "before the enactment of B.P. Blg. 129because the Court of Appeals had authority to issue such writs only 'in aid of its appellatejurisdiction,'" the situation was changed by said BP 129 in virtue of which three levels of courts the Supreme Court, the Regional Trial Court, and the Court of Appeals were conferredconcurrent original jurisdiction to issue said writs, and the Court of Appeals was given power toconduct hearings and receive evidence to resolve factual issues. To require him to separately

litigate the matter of damages he continued, would lead to that multiplicity of suits which isabhorred by the law.

While his motion for reconsideration was pending, de la Fuente sought to enforce the judgment ofthe Court of Appeals of June 9, 1989 directing his reinstatement pursuant to the Civil ServiceCommission's Resolution of August 9, 1988, supra. He filed on July 4, 1989 a "Motion for Execution,"alleging that the judgment of June 9, 1989 had become final and executory for failure of Gozon, et al. served with notice thereof on June 16, 1989 to move for its reconsideration or elevate the sameto the Supreme Court. 15 His motion was granted by the Court of Appeals in a Resolution dated July7, 1989, 16 reading as follows:


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The decision of June 9, 1989 having become final and executory, as prayed for, let the writ of

execution issue forthwith.

The corresponding writ of execution issued on July 13, 1989, 17 on the invoked authority of Section9, Rule 39. 18 The writ quoted the dispositive portion of the judgment of June 9, 1989, including, asthe Solicitor General's Office points out, the second paragraph to the effect that the petitions "arenot the vehicle nor is the Court the forum for the claim of damages; (hence,) the prayer therefor isdenied."

The writ of execution notwithstanding, compliance with the June 9, 1989 judgment was noteffected. Consequently, de la Fuente filed, on July 20, 1989, an "Urgent Ex Parte Manifestation withPrayer to Cite Respondents for Contempt," complaining that although Gozon and her co-parties hadbeen served with the writ of execution on July 14, they had not complied therewith. By Resolutiondated July 26, 1989, the Court required Gozon and Merencilla to appear before it on August 3, 1989to answer the charge and show cause "why they should not be adjudged in contempt for disobeyingand/or resisting the judgment." 19

At the hearing Gozon and Merencilla duly presented themselves, accompanied by their individualprivate lawyers one for Gozon (Felipe Hidalgo, Jr.), two for Merencilla (Bernardo S. Nera andMoises S. Rimando). One other lawyer appeared in their behalf, from the Health Department,Artemio Manalo, who stated that he was there "in behalf of Jose A. Fabia." 20 They explained thatthey had no intention to defy the Court, they had simply referred the matter to their superiors ingood faith; and they were perfectly willing to comply with the judgment, undertaking to do so "evenin the afternoon" of that same day. The Court consequently ordered them "to comply with theirundertaking . . . without any further delay," and report the action taken towards this end, within five(5) days.

On August 9, 1989, Gozon as "Medical Center Chief," sent a letter to Associate Justice Pedro A.Ramirez, advising that under Hospital Special Order No. 31 dated August 3, 1989, de la Fuente hadbeen directed to assume the position of Chief of the Medical Professional Staff, and that a voucherfor the payment of his allowances had been prepared and was being processed. 21

More than a month later, or more precisely on September 27, 1989, the Court of Appealspromulgated another Resolution, this time resolving de la Fuente's motion for reconsideration ofJune 29, 1989. 22 It modified the Decision of June 9, 1989 by (a) deleting its last paragraph(disallowing the claim of damages, supra), (b) consequently describing and treating it as a"PARTIAL DECISION," and (c) scheduling "further proceedings for the purpose of receivingevidence (of damages)," since said question "cannot be resolved by mere reference to thepleadings." 23 This was done in reliance on Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, invoked by de laFuente, which reads as follows: 24


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Sec. 3. Mandamus. When any tribunal, corporation, board, or person unlawfully neglects the

performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, orstation, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to whichsuch other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinarycourse of law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court allegingthe facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the defendant,immediately or at some other specified time, to do the act required to be done to protect the rightsof the petitioner, and to pay the damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the wrongful actsof the defendant.

At about this time, yet another lawyer, Atty. Pedro F. Martinez entered his appearance for Isabelita

Gozon. 25 At his instance, the Court gave him an "opportunity to . . . file a motion forreconsideration" of the Resolution of September 27, 1989. 26 That motion he filed by registeredmail on November 10, 1989. 27 His basic contentions were (a) that the decision of June 9, 1989could no longer be altered, having become final and executory and having in fact been executed, and(b) that under BP 129, the Appellate Court had no jurisdiction over the question of damages in amandamus action.

The Office of the Solicitor General also put in an appearance in Gozon's behalf at this juncture,saying that the case had been referred to it only on November 14, 1989. It, too, soughtreconsideration of the Resolution of September 27, 1989. It filed on November 16, 1989 an"Omnibus Motion; I. For Reconsideration of Resolution dated September 27, 1989; and II. To deferhearing on petitioner's claims for damages." 28

Both motions were denied by the Court of Appeals in a Resolution dated January 11, 1991. In thatResolution, the Court

1) declared that the amended decision had already become final and could no longer be re-openedbecause, although "a copy of the amendatory resolution was received by counsel who wasrepresenting Gozon on October 3, 1989," the first motion for reconsideration was not mailed untilNovember 10, 1989 and the Solicitor General's "Omnibus Motion" was not filed until November 16,1989; and

2) prohibited the Solicitor General from representing Gozon "in connection with . . . (de la Fuente's)claim for damages," on the authority of this Court's ruling promulgated on March 19, 1990 in G.R.No. 87977 (Urbano, et al. v. Chavez, et al.) and G.R. No. 88578 (Co v. Regional Trial Court of Pasig).29

Notice of this Resolution of January 11, 1991 was served on the Solicitor General's Office on January18, 1991. 30 Again the Solicitor General sought reconsideration, by motion dated January 25, 1991


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and filed on January 30, 1991. 31 Again it was rebuffed. In a Resolution rendered on August 7, 1991,32 served on the Solicitor General's Office on August 20, 1991, 33 the Court of Appeals denied themotion. It ruled that the "question of the authority of the Solicitor General to appear as counsel forrespondent Gozon . . . (had already) been extensively discussed," and that its "jurisdiction . . . to hearand determine issues on damages proceeds from Sec. 9, Batas Pambansa 129 as amended."

In an attempt to nullify the adverse dispositions of the Court of

Appeals and obtain "the ultimate and corollary relief of dismissing respondent de la Fuente'sclaim for damages" the Solicitor General's Office had instituted the special civil action ofcertiorari at bar. It contends that the Court of Appeals is not legally competent to take cognizance ofand decide the question of damages in a mandamus suit. It argues that

1) B.P. Blg. 129 does not confer jurisdiction upon the Court of Appeals to hear, as a trial court,claims for moral and exemplary damages;

2) assuming that the Court of Appeals does have jurisdiction over the claims for damages, it lost thepower to take cognizance thereof after the Decision of June 9, 1989 had, by its own pronouncement,become final and executory; and

3) the Urbano and Co doctrines cited by the Appellate Tribunal do not disqualify the SolicitorGeneral's Office from representing government officials sued in their official capacities and indamage claims not arising from a felony.

It is in light of these facts, just narrated, that this Court will now proceed to deal with the legalissues raised in this action. But first, a few brief observations respecting the proceedings in the CivilService Commission.

I

The record demonstrates that Vital-Gozon was fully aware of the following acts and events: 34

1) the proceedings commenced by de la Fuente in the Civil Service Commission in protest againsthis demotion;

2) the Commission's Resolution of August 9, 1988 as well, particularly, as the direction therein thatde la Fuente be reinstated and paid all his back salaries and other monetary benefits otherwise duehim, this being couched in fairly simple language obviously understandable to persons of ordinaryor normal intelligence;


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3) no less than two (2) written demands of de la Fuente for implementation of the CSC's aforesaid

Resolution of August 9, 1988;

4) the petition filed by de la Fuente in the Court of Appeals for enforcement of the CSC Resolution ofAugust 9, 1988;

5) the extension granted by said Court of Appeals within which to file answer, notice thereof havingbeen sent directly to her and her co-respondents since the attorney who sought the extension intheir behalf (Atty. Fabia) did not set out his address in his motion for extension;

6) the "supplemental/amended petition" subsequently presented by de la Fuente, copy of whichwas sent to Atty. Fabia, c/o Dr. Vital-Gozon; and

7) the Decision and Amendatory Decision sent to her counsel on October 3, 1989.

To all these, her reaction, and that of the officials of the Department of Health concerned, was aregrettably cavalier one, to say the least. Neither she nor the Health officials concerned accordedsaid acts and events any importance. She never bothered to find out what was being done to contestor negate de la Fuente's petitions and actions, notwithstanding that as time went by, de la Fuente'sefforts were being met with success.

Nothing in the record even remotely suggests that Vital-Gozon merits relief from the final andexecutory Resolution of the Civil Service Commission. This Court will not disturb that Resolution. Itis satisfied that no procedural or substantive errors taint that Resolution, or its becoming final andexecutory.

II

Now, final and executory judgments are enforced by writ of execution and not by another, separateaction, whether of mandamus or otherwise. Hence, execution of the Civil Service Commission'sdecision of August 9, 1988 should have been ordered and effected by the Commission itself, whende la Fuente filed a motion therefor. It declined to do so, however, on the alleged ground, as de laFuente claims he was told, that it "had no coercive powers unlike a court to enforce its finaldecisions/resolutions." 35 That proposition, communicated to de la Fuente, of the Commission'ssupposed lack of coercive power to enforce its final judgments, is incorrect. It is inconsistent withprevious acts of the Commission of actually directing execution of its decisions and resolutions,which this Court has sanctioned in several cases; 36 and it is not in truth a correct assessment of itspowers under the Constitution and the relevant laws.


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In an En Banc Decision promulgated on October 15, 1991 in G.R. No. 96938 entitled "Government

Service Insurance System (GSIS) versus Civil Service Commission, et al.," 37 this Court declared thatin light of the pertinent provisions of the Constitution and relevant statutes

. . . it would appear absurd to deny to the Civil Service Commission the power or authority toenforce or order execution of its decisions, resolutions or orders which, it should be stressed, it hasbeen exercising through the years. It would seem quite obvious that the authority to decide cases ininutile unless accompanied by the authority to see that what has been decided is carried out. Hence,the grant to a tribunal or agency of adjudicatory power, or the authority to hear and adjudge cases,should normally and logically be deemed to include the grant of authority to enforce or execute thejudgments it thus renders, unless the law otherwise provides.

In any event, the Commission's exercise of that power of execution has been sanctioned by thisCourt in several cases.

Be this as it may, the fact is that by reason of the Commission's mistaken refusal to execute its finaland executory Resolution of August 9, 1988, extended proceedings have taken place in the Court ofAppeals and certain issues have been expressly raised in relation thereto, supra. Those issuesappear to the Court to be important enough to deserve serious treatment and resolution, instead ofsimply being given short shrift by a terse ruling that the proceedings in the Court ServiceCommission actually had the power to execute its final and executory Resolution.

III

The first such issue is whether or not the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to take cognizance of thematter of damages in a special civil action of mandamus. The Solicitor General's Office argues thatsince jurisdiction is conferred only by law, not by agreement of the parties, or acquiescence of thecourt, and since the law conferring jurisdiction on the Court of Appeals, Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 129,makes no reference to "actions for moral and exemplary damages, as those claimed by . . . (de laFuente)," it follows that the Court of Appeals has no competence to act on said claim of damages.And Section 3 of Rule 65, which authorizes the petitioner in a mandamus suit to pray for judgmentcommanding the defendant inter alia "to pay the damages sustained by the petitioner by reason ofthe wrongful acts of the defendant," is "nothing more than a procedural rule allowing joinder ofcauses of action, i.e., mandamus and damages," and such an award of damages is allowable only inactions commenced in Regional Trial Courts but not in the Court of Appeals or this Court.

The argument is specious. It cannot be sustained.


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The Solicitor General's Office correctly identifies Section 9, B.P. 129 as the legal provision specifyingthe original and appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals. The section pertinently declares thatthe "Intermediate Appellate Court (now the Court of Appeals) shall exercise . .," among others:

. . . Original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, and quowarranto, and auxiliary writs or processes, whether or not in aid of its appellate jurisdiction . . . 38

The Solicitor General's Office evidently searched said Section 9 for an explicit and specificstatement regarding "actions for moral and exemplary damages," and finding none, concluded thatthe Court of Appeals had not been granted competence to assume cognizance of claims for suchdamages. The conclusion is incorrect. Section 19, governing the exclusive original jurisdiction ofRegional Trial Courts in civil cases, contains no reference whatever to claims "for moral andexemplary damages," and indeed does not use the word "damages" at all; yet it is indisputable thatsaid courts have power to try and decide claims for moral, exemplary and other classes of damagesaccompanying any of the types or kinds of cases falling within their specified jurisdiction. TheSolicitor General's theory that the rule in question is a mere procedural one allowing joinder of anaction of mandamus and another for damages, is untenable, for it implies that a claim for damagesarising from the omission or failure to do an act subject of a mandamus suit may be litigatedseparately from the latter, the matter of damages not being inextricably linked to the cause of actionfor mandamus, which is certainly not the case.

Now, at the time of the enactment of B.P. 129, the issuance of the extraordinary writs above

mentioned was controlled by the Rules of Court of 1964, as they continue to date to be socontrolled. More particularly, the principal writs of mandamus, prohibition and certiorari were(and continue to be) governed by Rule 65; the writ of habeas corpus, by Rule 102; and the writ ofquo warranto, by Rule 66. The so-called auxiliary writs were (and continue to be) also governed bythe same code e.g., preliminary attachment, by Rule 57; preliminary injunction, by Rule 58,receivership, by Rule 59; writ of seizure or delivery in a replevin suit, by Rule 60.

At that time, Section 3 of Rule 65 authorized (as it continues to authorize to date) rendition ofjudgment in a mandamus action "commanding the defendant, immediately or at some otherspecified time, to do the act required to be done to protect the rights of the petitioner, and to pay

the damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of the defendant." 39 Theprovision makes plain that the damages are an incident, or the result of, the defendant's wrongfulact in failing and refusing to do the act required to be done. It is noteworthy that the Rules of 1940had an identical counterpart provision. 40

Moreover, Section 4 of the same Rule 65 authorized, as it continues to authorize to date, the filing ofthe petition "in the Supreme Court, or, if it relates to the acts or omissions of an inferior court, or ofa corporation, board, officer or person, in a Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court)having jurisdiction thereof," as well as "in the Court of Appeals (whether or not) 41 in aid of itsappellate jurisdiction."


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Worthy of note, too, is that Rule 66 of the Rules of Court similarly authorizes the recovery of

damages in a quo warranto action against a corporate officer an action within the concurrentjurisdiction of the Court of Appeals as follows: 42

Sec. 14. Liability of officer neglecting to deliver property of corporation to receiver. An officer ofsuch corporation who refuses or neglects, upon demand, to deliver over to the receiver all money,property, books, deeds, notes, bills, obligations, and papers of every description within his power orcontrol, belonging to the corporation, or in any wise necessary for the settlement of its affairs, orthe discharge of its debts and liabilities, may be punished for contempt as having disobeyed a lawfulorder of the court, and shall be liable to the receiver for the value of all money or other things sorefused or neglected to be surrendered, together with all damages that may have been sustained by

the stockholders and creditors of the corporation, or any of them, in consequence of such neglect orrefusal.

An award of damages was and is also allowed in connection with the auxiliary writ of preliminaryattachment, preliminary injunction or receivership which the Court of Appeals has the power toissue in common with the Supreme Court and the Regional Trial Courts, 43 payable by the suretiesof the bond given in support of the writ, upon seasonable application and summary hearing. 44

Since it cannot but be assumed that in formulating, and incorporating in BP 129, the provisiongoverning the jurisdiction of the Intermediate Appellate Court, now Court of Appeals, the BatasangPambansa was fully cognizant of the relevant provisions of the Rules of Court just cited, as well asthe rule against multiplicity of actions, it follows that in conferring on the Court of Appeals originaljurisdiction over the special civil action of mandamus, among others, as well as over the issuance ofauxiliary writs or processes, the Batasang Pambansa clearly intended that said Court shouldexercise all the powers then possessed by it under the Rules of Court in relation to said action ofmandamus and auxiliary writs, including the adjudication of damages to the petitioner in the actionin appropriate cases.

IV

The next issue is whether or not the Solicitor General may properly represent a public official likeDr. Vital-Gozon, who is sued for damages for allegedly refusing to comply with a lawful andexecutory judgment of competent authority. The doctrine laid down in the Urbano and Co casesalready adverted to, 45 is quite clear:

. . . (T)he Office of the Solicitor General is not authorized to represent a public official at any stage ofa criminal case. . . .


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This observation should apply as well to a public official who is haled to court on a civil suit fordamages arising from a felony allegedly committed by him (Article 100, Revised Penal Code). Anypecuniary liability he may be held to account for on the occasion of such civil suit is for his ownaccount. The State is not liable for the same. A fortiori, the Office of the Solicitor General likewisehas no authority to represent him in such a civil suit for damages.

It being quite evident that Dr. Vital-Gozon is not here charged with a crime, or civilly prosecuted fordamages arising from a crime, there is no legal obstacle to her being represented by the Office of theSolicitor General.

V

The last issue is whether or not the decision of the Court of Appeals of June 9, 1989 could still bemodified after it was pronounced final and executory and was in fact executed with respect to de laFuente's reinstatement to his position and the payment of the salaries and allowances due him.

There would seem to be no question about the timeliness of de la Fuente's motion forreconsideration of the June 9, 1989 decision. As already narrated, notice of said decision was servedon him on the 15th of June, and his motion for reconsideration was presented on June 29, 1989, orfourteen (14) days after receiving a copy of the judgment, i.e., within the fifteen-day periodprescribed by Section 1, Rule 37 of the Rules of Court for filing a motion for new trial

reconsideration.

This being so, it would certainly have been entirely within the authority of the Court of Appeals,under normal circumstances, to rule on that motion for reconsideration and, in its discretion, actfavorably on it, as it did through its Resolution of September 27, 1991 by amending the decisionof June 9, 1989, declaring it a partial judgment, and setting a date for reception of evidence on the laFuente's claim for damages.

It would also appear that the motions for reconsideration of said Resolution of September 27, 1991separately submitted in Gozon's behalf, by her own private attorney and by the Solicitor General'sOffice, were filed way out of time. As also already pointed out, notice of that Resolution ofSeptember 27, 1991 was served on Gozon's counsel on October 3, 1989 and on Gozon herself onOctober 4, 1989; but the motion for reconsideration of Atty. Martinez (Gozon's private lawyer) wasnot filed until November 10, 1989, thirty-eight (38) days afterwards, and that of the SolicitorGeneral, until November 16, 1989, or forty-four (44) days later. What is worse is that, its motion forreconsideration of November 16, 1989 having been denied by a Resolution dated January 11, 1991,notice of which it received on January 18, 1991, the Solicitor General's Office filed still anothermotion for reconsideration on January 30, 1991, ostensibly directed against that Resolution ofJanuary 11, 1991 but actually seeking the setting aside of the Resolution of September 17, 1989. Ineffect it filed a second motion for reconsideration which, of course, is prohibited by law. 46


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However, disposition of the question simply and solely on the foregoing premises is precluded by

the fact that prior to the promulgation by the Appellate Court of its Resolution of September 27,1989. granting de la Fuente's motion for reconsideration of June 29, 1989 de la Fuente hadasked for and been granted by the Court of Appeals, authority to execute the decision of June 9,1989 and had in fact succeeded in bringing about satisfaction thereof, in so far as concerned hisreinstatement to the position from which he had been illegally ousted and the payment to him hissalaries and allowances.

It has therefore become essential to determine the effect of the execution of said decision of June 9,1989 at de la Fuente's instance, on the power of the Court of Appeals to modify that judgment asearlier prayed for by de la Fuente in such a way as to concede the latter's capacity to claim damages

in his mandamus action, and consequently authorize him to present evidence on the matter.

The general rule is that when a judgment has been satisfied, it passes beyond review, satisfactionbeing the last act and end of the proceedings, and payment of satisfaction of the obligation therebyestablished produces permanent and irrevocable discharge; 47 hence, a judgment debtor whoacquiesces in and voluntarily complies with the judgment, is estopped from taking an appealtherefrom. 48

On the other hand the question of whether or not a judgment creditor is estopped from appealingor seeking modification of a judgment which has been executed at his instance, is one dependentupon the nature of the judgment as being indivisible or not. This is the doctrine laid down by thisCourt in a case decided as early as 1925, Verches v. Rios. 49 In that case this Court held thatalthough "there are cases holding the contrary view," where the judgment is indivisible, "the weightof authority is to the effect that an acceptance of full satisfaction of the judgment annihilates theright to further prosecute the appeal; . . . that a party who has recovered judgment on a claim whichcannot be split up and made the basis of several causes of action, and afterwards coerced fullsatisfaction by writ of execution or authority of the court, cannot maintain an appeal from thejudgment against the objections of the judgment debtor;" and that even partial execution bycompulsory legal process at the instance of a party in whose favor a judgment appealed from wasrendered, places said party in estoppel to ask that the judgment be amended, either "by appeal oranswer to his adversary's appeal, or otherwise." 50

A converso, where the judgment is divisible, estoppel should not operate against the judgmentcreditor who causes implementation of a part of the decision by writ of execution. This is the clearimport of Verches and the precedents therein invoked. It is an aspect of the principle abovementioned that is fully consistent not only with the dissenting opinion that "(a)cceptance ofpayment of . . . only the uncontroverted part of the claim . . . should not preclude the plaintiff fromprosecuting his appeal, to determine whether he should not have been allowed more," 51 but alsowith logic and common sense.


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In this case, the amended judgment of the Court of Appeals is clearly divisible, satisfaction of whichmay be "split up." One part has reference to the enforcement of the final and executory judgment ofthe Civil Service Commission, that de la Fuente should be reinstated to the position of Chief ofClinics (now Chief of Medical Professional Staff) without loss of seniority rights and that he be paidhis back salaries and all monetary benefits due him from the date of his illegal demotion. This partis no longer issuable, and has not in truth been controverted by Gozon herself. The other part hasreference to the damages which de la Fuente contends he suffered as a result of the unjustifiedrefusal of Gozon and her co-parties to comply with the final and executory judgment of the CivilService Commission, and which the Appellate Tribunal has allowed him to prove. Obviously, thesecond part cannot possibly affect the first. Whether de la Fuente succeeds or fails in his bid torecover damages against Gozon, et al. because of their refusal to obey the judgment of the CivilService Commission, is a contingency that cannot affect the unalterable enforceability of thatjudgment. Similarly, the enforcement of the Commission's judgment (already accomplished by writof execution of the Court of Appeals issued at de la Fuente's instance) cannot influence in anymanner the question whether or not there was culpable refusal on the part of Gozon, et al. tocomply with said judgment when first required so to do, and whether de la Fuente did in fact suffercompensable injury thereby.

It bears stressing that the juridical situation in which de la Fuente finds himself is not of his making.It is a consequence of circumstances not attributable to any fault on his part, i.e., the unwarrantedrefusal or neglect of his superiors to obey the executory judgment of the Civil Service Commission;the erroneous refusal of the Commission to execute its own decision which made necessary, in de laFuente's view, the filing of a mandamus action in the Court of Appeals; the initial refusal of thelatter Court to acknowledge his right to damages in connection with the mandamus suit; andultimately, the change of view by the Court of Appeals, on de la Fuente's motion, as regards itscompetence to take cognizance of the matter of damages in relation to the mandamus proceeding.

Under these circumstances, there was no reason whatsoever to defer concession to de la Fuente ofthe relief of reinstatement to which he

was indisputably already entitled in the meantime that issues arising after finality of the CivilService Commission's judgment were being ventilated and resolved these issues being, to repeat,whether or not the refusal by Gozon, et al. obey said judgment of the Commission could be justified,and whether or not, by reason of that refusal to obey, de la Fuente did in fact suffer compensableinjury.

It was therefore correct for the Court of Appeals, albeit by implication, to treat its judgment asdivisible, or capable of being enforced by parts, and to consider de la Fuente as not having beenplaced in estoppel to pursue his claim for damages by seeking and obtaining authority for a partialexecution of the judgment. De la Fuente not being in estoppel, it follows that his motion forreconsideration, timely filed, was not deemed abandoned or waived by the partial execution of thejudgment, and jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals to amend the judgment was retained and not lost.It follows, too, that since no motion for reconsideration was filed against, or appeal attempted to betaken from, the Resolution of the Court of Appeals amending its original judgment, within the time


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prescribed therefor by law, said amendatory resolution has long since become final and immutable,particularly in so far as it holds itself competent to take cognizance of the matter of damages andauthorizes the reception of evidence on de la Fuente's claim therefor.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, and the challenged Resolutions of September 27, 1989,January 11, 1991 and August 7, 1991 are AFFIRMED, without pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 118605. April 12, 2000]

EDGARDO MANCENIDO FOR HIMSELF AND OTHER TEACHERS OF CAMARINES NORTE HIGHSCHOOL, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, THE PROVINCIAL BOARD, PROVINCIAL SCHOOLBOARD, PROVINCIAL GOVERNOR, PROVINCIAL TREASURER AND PROVINCIAL AUDITOR, ALL OTHE PROVINCE OF CAMARINES NORTE, respondents.

R E S O L U T I O N

QUISUMBING, J.:

This is a petition for review of the decision dated October 17, 1994, by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 34331, enjoining the partial execution of the judgment dated December 20, 1993, of theRegional Trial Court (RTC) of Camarines Norte, Branch 38 in Civil Case No. 5864 entitled "EdgardoMancenido, et al. v. The Provincial Board, et al. for mandamus and damages.

The antecedent facts as summarized by the Court of Appeals are as follows: h Y

"On September 6, 1990 private respondent [herein petitioner] Eduardo Mancenido filed an actionfor mandamus and damages with the Regional Trial of Camarines Norte, Branch 38, Daet (docketedas Civil Case No. 5864), against the petitioners provincial board of Camarines Norte, the schoolboard, provincial governor, provincial treasurer, and provincial auditor to pay the teacher's claimfor unpaid salary increases.

"On December 19, 1990, petitioners [herein co-respondents] filed their answer to the complaint.

"On December 20, 1993, the lower court rendered a decision ordering the Provincial School Boardto appropriate and satisfy plaintiffs claim in the amount of P268,800.00, as unpaid salary increases.


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"On February 21, 1994, petitioners [herein co-respondents] filed a notice of appeal.

"On February 24, 1994, respondent judge issued an order giving due course to petitioners appeal.

"On March 1, 1994, private respondents filed a notice of appeal.

"On the same date, private respondents filed an opposition to petitioners notice of appeal and amotion for partial execution of judgment.

"On April 8, 1994, respondent judge issued an order (1) recalling the order of February 23, 1994,granting the appeal of petitioners; (2) approving the appeal of private respondents; and (3)granting their motion for partial execution Sda adsc

"On April 14, 1994, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the order of April 8, 1994

"On June 1, 1994, respondent judge denied the motion for reconsideration.".[1]

Dissatisfied with the denial, respondents herein filed a petition for mandamus, prohibition, andinjunction with the Court of Appeals with the prayer, among others, that their notice of appeal begiven due course and the trial court be prohibited from enforcing the partial execution of itsjudgment. Said petition was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 34331.

Subsequently, the appellate court rendered its decision of October 17, 1994, the dispositive portionof which reads:

"WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition for prohibition and mandamus and hereby orders

respondent judge: (1) to elevate the original record of Civil Case No. 5864 to the Court of Appeals indue course of appeal; and (2) to desist from the partial execution of the decision in the case.

"No costs.

"SO ORDERED.".[2]


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Petitioners then filed a motion to reconsider the appellate court's decision, which motion wasdenied by the Court of Appeals in its resolution dated December 21, 1994.

Hence, the instant petition anchored on the following assignment of errors:

"a. The Court of Appeals has erred in recognizing the authority of Atty. Jose Lapak to file the subjectNotice of Appeal.

"b. The Court of Appeals has erred in recognizing that the service of a copy of the subject Notice ofAppeal upon Petitioners themselves is valid.

"c. The Court of Appeals has erred in enjoining the partial execution of the Decision dated December20, 1993 rendered by the Trial Court.".[3]

For our resolution now are the following issues: (1) Whether a private counsel may representmunicipal officials sued in their official capacities; and (2) Whether a Notice of Appeal filed throughprivate counsel and with notice to petitioners and not to their counsel is valid. Scmis

Anent the first issue, petitioners contend that Atty. Jose Lapak could not represent the respondentsProvincial Treasurer and Provincial School Board, because both are instrumentalities of theNational Government and may be represented only by the Office of the Solicitor General pursuantto Section 35, Chapter 12, Title 3, Book 4 of the Administrative Code of 1987. Only the ProvincialProsecutor of Camarines Norte may represent the Provincial Governor and the Provincial Board inaccordance with Section 481 [1], par. B of the Local Government Code of 1991. Petitioners citeProvince of Cebu v. IAC, 147 SCRA 447 (1987), where we held that:

"The municipality's authority to employ a private lawyer is expressly limited only to situationswhere the provincial fiscal is disqualified to represent it (De Guia v. The Auditor General, 44 SCRA169; Municipality of Bocaue, et al. v. Manotok, 93 Phil. 173; Enriquez, Sr., v. Honorable Gimenez, 107Phil. 932) as when he represents the province against a municipality.

"The lawmaker, in requiring that the local government should be represented in its court cases by agovernment lawyer, like its municipal attorney and the provincial fiscal, intended that the localgovernment should not be burdened with the expenses of hiring a private lawyer. The lawmakeralso assumed that the interests of the municipal corporation would be best protected if agovernment lawyer handles its litigations.".[4]


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Petitioners also pray that the Notice of Appeal filed by respondents dated February 18, 1994, bedeemed a mere scrap of paper. They claim that it was filed by a lawyer not authorized to do so.Even granting that Atty. Lapak could represent respondents in filing the Notice of Appeal, they add,it was not properly served since its copy was sent to petitioners and not to their counsel of record.They conclude that this error is fatal to their appeal. For in Riego v. Riego, 18 SCRA 91 (1966), weheld:

"[W]here a party appears by attorney in an action or proceeding in a court of record, all noticesthereafter required to be given therein must be given to the attorney and not to the client, and anotice given to the client and not to his attorney is not a notice in law.".[5]

Finally, petitioners point out, since the questioned Notice of Appeal had fatal defects, its filing didnot toll the running of the period for the finality of judgment and petitioners could still file a motionfor partial execution of the judgment.

After considering petitioners' arguments, however, we find their contentions far from persuasive.x law

Section 481, Article 11, Title V of the Local Government Code (R.A. No. 7160) provides for theappointment of a legal officer, whose function is:

"(I) Represent the local government unit in all civil actions and special proceedings wherein thelocal government unit or any official thereof, in his official capacity, is a party: Provided, That, inactions or proceedings where a component city or municipality is a party adverse to the provincialgovernment or to another component city or municipality, a special legal officer may be employedto represent the adverse party;"

The Court has previously ruled on the representation of a local government unit by a privateattorney. In Municipality of Bocaue v. Manotok, 93 Phil, 173 (1953), and succeeding cases, we heldthat only when the provincial fiscal is disqualified may the municipal council be authorized to hirethe services of a special attorney. We reiterated this in De Guia v. Auditor General, 44 SCRA 169(1972)..[6] In Enriquez, Sr. v. Gimenez, 107 Phil 932 (1960), we enumerated the instances when theprovincial public prosecutor is disqualified from representing a particular municipality, i.e., whenthe jurisdiction of a case involving the municipality lies with the Supreme Court, when themunicipality is a party adverse to the provincial government or to some other municipality in thesame province, and when in a case involving the municipality, the provincial prosecutor, his spouse,or his child is involved as a creditor, heir, legatee, or otherwise.

But do these rulings equally apply to local government officials? In Alinsug v. RTC, Br. 58, San CarlosCity, Negros Occidental, 225 SCRA 559 (1993), we laid down the rule that, in resolving whether a


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local government official may secure the services of private counsel in an action filed against him inhis official capacity, the nature of the action and the relief sought are to be considered. In Albuera v.Torres, 102 Phil. 211 (1957), we approved the representation by private counsel of a provincialgovernor sued in his official capacity, where the complaint contained other allegations and a prayerfor moral damages, which, if due from the defendants, must be satisfied by them in their privatecapacity. In Province of Cebu v. Intermediate Appellate Court, supra, we declared that where rigidadherence to the law on representation would deprive a party of his right to redress for a validgrievance, the hiring of private counsel would be proper.

The present case had its origins in Civil Case No. 5864 filed before the RTC of Camarines Norte,Branch 38, for mandamus and damages. Notwithstanding the fact that the trial court grantedmandamus, petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals since the trial court did not awarddamages. In view of the damages sought which, if granted, could result in personal liability,respondents could not be deemed to have been improperly represented by private counsel. Noerror may thus be attributed to the appellate court when it recognized the right of respondents tobe represented by private counsel. Korte

On the second issue, petitioners argue that respondents failed to perfect their appeal sincerespondents served a copy of their Notice of Appeal upon petitioners, and not upon their counsel ofrecord. It is settled that the right to appeal is a mere statutory privilege and may be exercised onlyin accordance with the Rules of Court..[7]

Section 1, Rule 49 of the Rules of Court provides:

"Section 1. Pleadings, motions, service of papers and proof thereof. - Pleadings, motions, filing andservice of papers, and proof thereof, except as otherwise provided, shall be governed by Rules 7, 8,9, 13, and 15, in so far as they are not inconsistent with the provisions of this rule."

Section 2, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court states:

"Section 2. Papers to be filed and served. - Every order required by its terms to be served, everypleading subsequent to the complaint, every written motion other than one which may be heard exparte, and every written notice, appearance, demand, offer of judgment or similar papers shall befiled with the court, and served upon the parties affected thereby. If any of such parties hasappeared by an attorney or attorneys, service upon him shall be made upon his attorneys or one ofthem, unless service upon the party himself is ordered by the court. Where one attorney appearsfor several parties, he shall be entitled only to one copy of any paper served upon him by theopposite side." (Underscoring supplied).


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Pursuant to the aforecited Rules, service of notice when a party is represented by counsel should bemade upon counsel, and not upon the party. The purpose of the rule is to maintain a uniformprocedure calculated to place in competent hands the prosecution of a party's case..[8] We findpetitioners' reliance on Riego proper and to the point..[9]

We find, however, that no error was committed by the Court of Appeals when it ordered the trialcourt (a) to elevate the original record of Civil Case No. 5864 and (b) to desist from any furtherproceedings in said case. Petitioners did appeal the decision of the trial court to the appellate courtwithin the reglementary period to perfect an appeal. Once a written notice of appeal is filed, appealis perfected and the trial court loses jurisdiction over the case, both over the record and subject ofthe case..[10] Missdaa

With respect to the trial court's order of partial execution pending appeal, our view is that it wasproperly challenged by respondents in a special civil action..[11] We have held that the execution ofa judgment before becoming final by reason of appeal is allowed, but only in exceptional cases andonly if firmly founded upon good reasons for such execution..[12] In other words, a judge shouldstate in his special order granting a writ of execution pending appeal "good reasons" justifying theissuance of said writ..[13] The Court of Appeals found the order of the judge bereft of such "goodreasons." In the absence of good reasons which would justify execution pending appeal, it becameincumbent upon the reviewing court, to order the elevation of the records of the case in due course,for its appropriate consideration, otherwise failure to do so might constitute grave abuse ofdiscretion on its part..[14] To attribute error to the Court of Appeals when it rendered the assaileddecision is to misunderstand the rationale for the action it had taken.

ACCORDINGLY, the instant petition is hereby DENIED and the decision of the Court of Appeals inCA-G.R. SP No. 34331 AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 139792. November 22, 2000]

ANTONIO P. SANTOS, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, METROPOLITANAUTHORITY, now known as METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, and THE CIVILSERVICE COMMISSION, respondents.

D E C I S I O N

DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:


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In this petition for review on certiorari petitioner assails the decision of 19 August 1999 of theCourt of Appeals[1] in CA-G.R. SP No. 48301, which held that petitioners separation pay underSection 11 of R.A. No. 7924 should be limited to the number of years of his service in theMetropolitan Manila Authority (MMA) only, excluding his years of service as judge of theMetropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Quezon City for which he has already been given retirementgratuity and pension.

The undisputed facts are as follows:

On 18 January 1983, petitioner was appointed Judge of the MeTC of Quezon City, and he thereafterassumed office. After the military-backed EDSA revolt, petitioner was reappointed to the sameposition.

On 1 April 1992, petitioner optionally retired from the Judiciary under R.A. No. 910,[2] as amended,and received his retirement gratuity under the law for his entire years in the government service;and five years thereafter he has been regularly receiving a monthly pension.

On 2 December 1993, petitioner re-entered the government service. He was appointed Director IIIof the Traffic Operation Center of the MMA. His appointment was approved by the Civil ServiceCommission (CSC).

On 1 March 1995, Congress enacted R.A. No. 7924, which reorganized the MMA and renamed it asMetropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA). Section 11 thereof reads:

Section 11. Transitory Provisions. To prevent disruption in the delivery of basic urban servicespending the full implementation of the MMDAs organizational structure and staffing pattern, allofficials and employees of the interim MMA shall continue to exercise their duties and functions andreceive their salaries and allowances until they shall have been given notice of change of duties andfunctions, and of being transferred to another office or position.

. . .

The civil service laws, rules and regulations pertinent to the displacement of personnel affected bythis Act shall be strictly enforced. The national government shall provide such amounts as may benecessary to pay the benefits accruing to displaced employees at the rate of one and one-fourth(1) months salary for every year of service: Provided, That, if qualified for retirement underexisting retirement laws, said employees may opt to receive the benefits thereunder.


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On 16 May 1996, the President of the Philippines issued Memorandum Order No. 372 approving theRules and Regulations Implementing R.A. No. 7924. Pursuant thereto, the MMDA issued ResolutionNo. 16, series of 1996, which, inter alia, authorized the payment of separation benefits to theofficials and employees of the former MMA who would be separated as a result of theimplementation of R.A. No. 7924.

On 30 August 1996, the MMDA issued a Memorandum to petitioner informing him that in view ofhis voluntary option to be separated from the service his services would automatically ceaseeffective at the close of office hours on 15 September 1996, and that he would be entitled toseparation benefits equivalent to one and one-fourth (1) monthly salary for every year of serviceas provided under Section 11 of the MMDA Law.

In view of some doubt or confusion as to the extent of his separation benefits, petitioner submitteda Position Paper wherein he asserted that since the retirement gratuity he received under R.A. No.910, as amended, is not an additional or double compensation, all the years of his governmentservice, including those years in the Judiciary, should be credited in the computation of hisseparation benefits under R.A. No. 7924. The Assistant Manager for Finance of the MMDA referredthe Position Paper to the Regional Office of the CSC-NCR.

On 7 October 1996, Director IV Nelson Acebedo of the CSC-NCR handed down an opinion that thepayment of petitioners separation pay must be in accordance with Civil Service Resolution No.

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