Cases of Elvin 5

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Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaEN BANC

G.R. No. L-21723 November 26, 1970HILARION BERONILLA,petitioner,

vs.GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, its BOARDOF TRUSTEES, ET AL., respondents.

Hilarion Beronilla in his own behalf.

L. Monasterial and L. A. Diokno, Jr. for respondents GSIS, etc., et al.T. Besa and J. Jimenez for respondent Rafael S. Recto.Office of the Solicitor General for respondent Auditor General.

BARREDO, J.:A special civil action for prohibition seeking to declare Resolution No.1497 of the Board of Trustees of the respondent Government ServiceInsurance System of August 9, 1963 to the effect that petitioner "Mr.(Hilarion) Beronilla be considered compulsorily retired from the service(as Auditor of the Philippine National Bank) effective January 14, 1963"as null and void for having been issued, in the words of the petition, "in

excess of the powers granted to it by law, a wanton abuse of discretion,violation of contracts, removal or forced retirement without due processof law and to declare all acts heretofore taken in implementation thereofalso void, and to prohibit said respondent and its representatives fromcarrying out or implementing the aforesaid resolution." Acting on

petitioner's prayer for preliminary injunction, on August 26, 1963, thisCourt issued the writ prayed for upon petitioner's filing an injunction

bond in the amount of P1,000.00.At the time of the filing of the present petition on August 23, 1963,

petitioner was acting as and performing the duties of Auditor of thePhilippine National Bank. Before that, he had occupied many other

positions in the government and had been a member of the GSIS duringall times required by law.In his application for employment, his applications for life and retirementinsurance as well as his application to be allowed to take civil service

examinations, ten times from 1917 to 1925, petitioner uniformlyindicated that his date of birth is January 14, 1898. He also indicated thesame date of birth in his Member's Service Record which he submitted tothe GSIS on October 29, 1954 pursuant to the provisions of Section 13-A, Republic Act No. 660.On September 29, 1959, he requested the Commissioner of Civil Service,thru the Auditor General, that his date of birth indicated in the records bechanged to January 14, 1900. According to the petition, it was only in1955, before the demise of his mother that petitioner discovered that histrue date of birth is January 14, 1900; that his mother told him that in1916, his uncle, Alvaro Beronilla, purchased a cedula for him showing inthe same that he was already 18 years old for the reason that his unclewanted to take advantage of his being able to vote for him in La Paz,Abra in 1919, when he would be already twenty-one years of age and theuncle a candidate for vice-president of the municipality; that since thenhe had been looking for people who could attest to his true date of birthand it was only in September, 1959 that he came upon two old persons oftheir town, Felix Alberne and Ricardo Lalin who could do so; that theformer had been a member of the provincial board and the latter is aretired justice of the peace; and that his letter to the Civil ServiceCommissioner was supported by the affidavits of these two persons. Thisletter was endorsed by the Commission to the GSIS for action "withoutthe intervention of the Civil Service Commission."In the GSIS, petitioner's letter-request was referred to the Legal Counselwho, on October 22, 1959, denied the same since "all official records

point to January 14, 1898 as the birthday of Mr. Hilarion Beronilla."Upon learning of this denial, petitioner submitted additional evidence tosupport his request. This evidence consisted of photostat copies of theyearbooks of the Philippine Institute of Accountants in 1954 and 1958

wherein his date of birth is shown as January 14, 1900. This additionalevidence notwithstanding, on March 21, 1960 the Legal Counselreiterated his former denial. Whereupon, on May 21, 1960 petitionerappealed to the General Manager of the System who at that time was Mr.Rodolfo Andal. Upon favorable recommendation of the 2nd AssistantGeneral Manager, Mr. F. G. Araa in a memorandum dated May 30,1960, on June 2, 1960, Mr. Andal placed "OK." at the foot thereof overhis initials, thus indicating approval of the requested change.Based on this action of the General Manager, notes of the adjustment ofthe date of birth of petitioner to January 14, 1900 were sent to theAuditor General and the Commissioner of Civil Service and the proceedsof petitioner's policy was re-computed. The Legal Counsel whose titleand rank had been meanwhile changed to Assistant General Manager forLegal Affairs later communicated the aforesaid decision of the General

manager to the Philippine National Bank on November 2, 1962 and theDeputy Auditor General on November 12, 1962, by letter andindorsement, respectively. As emphasized by petitioner, in the letter tothe Philippine National Bank, it is stated that "his date of birth has beenadjusted by this office, after careful study and deliberation." On the otherhand, in the 2nd indorsement to the Deputy Auditor General, it was madeclear that relative to petitioner's life insurance policy No. N-2065 which

had matured on November 30, 1957, corresponding adjustment orrecomputation of the maturity value had been effected on the basis of hischanged date of birth. In the meantime, upon application of petitioner, onOctober 1, 1960, he was issued a new life policy No. 335778 indicatinghis date of birth as January 14, 1900. Regarding his above-mentioned

policy No. N-2065, on July 7, 1960, demand was made upon petitioner topay the System additionally the sum of P131.09, due to the adjustment ofhis date of birth, which demand, petitioner promptly complied with.Almost three years after Mr. Andal approved the change of petitioner'sdate of birth, more specifically, on May 6, 1963, Mr. Ismael Mathay,then Auditor of the Central Bank detailed to the Philippine NationalBank, wrote the Board of Trustees of the GSIS about the service of

petitioner and stated that "in the course of the audit of the transactions ofthe Philippine National Bank, it was found that Mr. Hilarion Beronillahas been continuously paid since January 15, 1963, his salary allowances

and other fringe benefits as Auditor of said Bank notwithstanding the factthat Mr. Beronilla has attained his sixty-fifth (65th) birthday last January14, 1963, the date of his automatic and compulsory retirement from thegovernment service as fixed under Republic Act No. 3096 approved June16, 1961." Acting on this letter, the Board referred the same to AssistantGeneral Manager and Actuary, Dr. Manuel Hizon, then in charge of theClaims Department. The latter submitted a memorandum on August 6,1963 stating the facts and evidence in the GSIS records concerning thedetermination of the date of birth of petitioner, including the actionsaforementioned taken thereon by Mr. Andal and the Legal Counsel. OnAugust 9, 1963, the Board adopted the disputed resolution without evennotifying petitioner of Mr. Mathay's letter and without giving him anyopportunity to be heard regarding the same.Upon these facts, it is the theory of petitioner that the approval byGeneral Manager Andal of his request for the change of the date of his

birth in the official records of the GSIS from January 14, 1898 to January14, 1900, after the same had been previously denied by the LegalCounsel, could not be legally altered or modified by the Board ofTrustees, not only because the power to decide such matter finally islegally lodged in the General Manager and not in the Legal Counsel, norin the Board, but also because even if the Board were assumed to haveauthority to review the acts of the General Manager, it was either guiltyof laches or estopped from revising the same; and, furthermore, inapproving the resolution in dispute, the Board of Trustees had denied due

process to petitioner and impaired the obligations of the contract betweenpetitioner and the GSIS regarding his retirement. In other words, themain issue before Us in this case is one of power and does not call forOur determination of whether petitioner's real date of birth is January 14,1898 or January 14, 1900. Accordingly, all We have to decide is whetheror not the GSIS Board of Trustees acted within its powers when itreversed the approval by General Manager Andal of petitioner's requestfor the change of his date of birth, taking all circumstances into accountincluding petitioner's allegations of res adjudicata, laches, estoppel,denial of due process and unconstitutional impairment of contractualobligations. After carefully going over the facts on record andconsidering all pertinent legal principles and statutory provisions,

particularly Commonwealth Act 186, the Charter of the GSIS, asamended, together with the relevant resolutions of the Board of Trustees,We have decided to uphold the superior authority of the Board over theGeneral Manager and to dismiss this petition.We do not deem it necessary to pass upon petitioner's initial proposition,

pressed vigorously, to be sure, to the effect that as between the previousdenial by the Legal Counsel and the subsequent approval by GeneralManager Andal of his request for the change of his date of birth in the

records, the latter, which was precisely the action on his appeal from theLegal Counsel's denial, should prevail. Even granting it to be true that,pursuant to what is generally the practice and the rule, applications forretirement annuities in the GSIS are subject to final approval by theGeneral Manager after its being approved by one of the AssistantGeneral Managers and/or one or two Department Managers, 1it is clearto Us that under the GSIS charter, the General Manager's approval is not

beyond review and reprobation by the Board of Trustees. It must beborne in mind that under Section 16 of said charter, the System "shall bemanaged by the Board of Trustees ... " and Section 17 adds that theBoard "shall have the following powers and authority: (a) to adopt by-laws, rules and regulations for the administration of the System and thetransaction of its business." On the other hand, the extent of the functionsand powers of the General Manager are defined in Section 18 as follows:


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SEC. 18. Personnel. The Board shall have the power to appoint ageneral manager, who shall be a person of recognized experience andcapacity in the subject of life and social insurance, and who shall be thechief executive officer of the System, one or more assistant generalmanagers, one or more managers, a medical director, and an actuary, andfix their compensation. The general manager shall, subject to theapproval of the Board, appoint additional personnel whenever and

wherever they may be necessary to the effective execution of theprovisions of this Act, fix their compensation, remove, suspend, orotherwise discipline them, for cause. He shall have the power to

prescribe their duties, grant leave, prescribe certain qualifications to theend that only competent persons may be employed, and appointcommittees: Provided, however, That said additional personnel shall besubject to existing Civil Service laws, rules and regulations.xxx xxx xxxIt is thus obvious that by express statutory authority, the Board ofTrustees directly manages the System and the General Manager is onlythe chief executive officer of the Board. In the exercise of its power toadopt rules and regulations for the administration of the System and thetransaction of its business, the Board may lodge in the General Managerthe authority to act on any matter the Board may deem proper, but in nowise can such conferment of authority be considered as a full and

complete delegation resulting in the diminution, much less exhaustion, ofthe Board's own statutorily-based prerogative and responsibility tomanage the affairs of the System and, accordingly, to decide with finalityany matter affecting its transactions or business. In other words, even ifthe Board may entrust to the General Manager the power to give finalapproval to applications for retirement annuities, the finality of suchapproval cannot be understood to divest the Board, in appropriate casesand upon its attention being called to a flaw, mistake or irregularity in theGeneral Manager's action, of the authority to exercise its power ofsupervision and control which flows naturally from the ultimate and finalresponsibility for the proper management of the System imposed upon it

by the charter. Incidentally, it may be added that the force of thisprinciple is even more true insofar as the GSIS is concerned, for thefiduciary character of the management of the System is rendered morestrict by the fact that the funds under its administration are partly

contributed by the thousands upon thousands of employees and workersin all the branches and instrumentalities of the government. It is indeedwell to remember at all times that the System and, particularly, its fundsdo not belong to the government, much less to any administration whichmay happen to be temporarily on the saddle, and that the interests of themass of its members can only be duly safeguarded if the administratorsof the System act with utmost fidelity and care. Not for nothing is itscontrolling and managing board called the Board of Trustees. It results,therefore, that the first contention of petitioner cannot be sustained andWe hold that any authority conferred upon the General Manager by theBoard of Trustees notwithstanding, the said Board may in appropriatecases and in the exercise of its own sound discretion review the actionsand decisions of the General Manager. The mere fact that the resolutiongranting the authority expressly gives the character of finality to theGeneral Manager's acts does not constitute such a representation to third

persons dealing with the System that such finality is definite even vis-a-vis the Board as to create any estoppel, for the simple reason that it is notlegally possible for the Board to divest itself of an authority which thecharter of the System places under its direct responsibility. From another

point of view, since the law clearly vests the management in the Boardand makes the General Manager only its chief executive officer, all

parties dealing with the System must be deemed to be on guard regardingthe ultimate authority of the Board to modify or reverse any action of theGeneral Manager and they cannot complain should the Board exercise its

powers in the premises.Petitioner posits, however, that even assuming that the Board may havethe power to reverse or modify any action of the General Manager in theexercise of his authority, because of the failure of the Board to act fromJune 2, 1960, when General Manager Andal acted favorably on his

request to August 9, 1963, when the Board approved the hereinimpugned Resolution No. 1497, or for more than three years, duringwhich time corresponding adjustments were made in his GSIS records,

payment and life insurance policies and due notices were served by theGSIS itself on all parties concerned on the basis of his changed date of

birth, respondent should be considered as guilty of laches or held inestoppel to change or alter the action of Mr. Andal. While petitioner's

posture is not entirely without logic, it falls short of the requirements forthe successful invocation of the pleas of laches and estoppel. We havecarefully considered the lengthy and rather impressive discussion by

petitioner of these points in his petition, memorandum and reply torespondent's memorandum as well as the equally detailed and authority-supported contrary arguments in the answer and memorandum of the

respondent, and We have arrived at the conclusion that petitioner'sposition cannot be sustained.It may be stated at the outset that petitioner's twin points of laches andestoppel actually boil down in this particular case to nothing more thanestoppel by silence. With this clarification, it is meet to recall that "mereinnocent silence will not work estoppel. There must also be someelement of turpitude or negligence connected with the silence by which

another is misled to his injury" (Civil Code of the Philippines byTolentino, Vol. IV, p. 600) and that "the doctrine of estoppel having itsorigin in equity and therefore being based on moral and natural justice,its applicability to any particular case depends, to a very large extent,upon the special circumstances of the case." (Mirasol v. Municipality ofTabaco, 43 Phil. 610, 614.) Important also it is not to overlook that asregards the actuations of government officials, the general rule is thattheir mistakes and omissions do not create estoppel. (Republic vs.Philippine Long Distance Telephone Co., L-18841, January 27, 1969,citing Pineda vs. Court of First Instance of Tayabas, 52 Phil. 803, 807;and Benguet Consolidated Mining Co. vs. Pineda, 98 Phil. 711, 724. Seealso: Republic vs. Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc., L-26862, March 30,1970, and the cases therein cited.)Moreover, in computing the period of alleged silence or inaction of theBoard, what is relevant is not the actual or, what petitioner calls,

imputable knowledge of said Board of the favorable action of Mr. Andal.Even if such knowledge had come earlier than May 6, 1963, the date ofMr. Mathay's letter, what is decisive is that it was only thru Mr. Mathay'sletter that the Board got notice of the error in Mr. Andal's action.Precisely because it was not incumbent upon the Board, as petitionerhimself alleges, to spontaneously or in the ordinary course review theaction of the General Manager, any knowledge thereof by the Board,whether actual or imputable, could not, in logic and conscience, have

placed the Board on notice of any error or irregularity therein.Consequently, the immediate steps taken by the Board to have the factsalleged in Mr. Mathay's letter verified are inconsistent with the charge ofunreasonable delay, much more of laches.The compulsory retirement of government officials and employees upontheir reaching the age of 65 years is founded on public policy which aims

by it to maintain efficiency in the government service and at the same

time give to the retiring public servants the opportunity to enjoy duringthe remainder of their lives the recompense, inadequate perhaps for theirlong service and devotion to. the government, in the form of acomparatively easier life, freed from the rigors of civil service disciplineand the exacting demands that the nature of their work and their relationswith their superiors as well as the public would impose upon them.

Needless to say, therefore, the officials charged with the duty ofimplementing this policy cannot be too careful in insuring andsafeguarding the correctness and integrity of the records they prepare andkeep. In this case, all that the Board has done is to set aside what it foundto be an erroneous decision of the General Manager in approving thechange of date of petitioner's birth, because from the evidence before it,the Board was convinced that the originally recorded date of birth shouldnot be disturbed. We cannot see where the charged inequity of suchaction of the Board could lie.Above all, it is a must consideration whenever principles of equity areinvoked that for such invocation to succeed, it must appear that if the

plea is not heeded the party making the plea will suffer, in truth and infact, inequity and injury, whether pecuniary or moral or, at least, in a

juridical sense. Such is not the case with petitioner. Examining thecircumstances of this case, We see nothing inequitous to petitioner in thequestioned resolution of the Board of Trustees. For decades back,repeatedly and uniformly, petitioner made it appear in all materialgovernment and public records and in all his representations torespondent System that his date of birth is January 14, 1898. His rather

belated request for a change of said date to January 14, 1900 whichwould unquestionably favor his interests, pecuniarily or otherwise, andcorrespondingly adversely affect those of the System and, of course, itsmembers, was duly investigated and found not to be sufficiently

grounded to merit favorable action by the Legal Counsel in whom islodged the authority to evaluate such request. True this negative actionwas reversed by the General Manager, albeit by virtue of a procedure notstrictly in accordance with the established one as outlined in footnote 1 ofthis opinion, but on the other hand, the favorable action of the GeneralManager was in turn reversed by the Board of Trustees, the final legalauthority in the System, upon its being informed of the error thereof. It isto be noted that, after all, it was always the petitioner who maderepresentations to the respondent System as to his date of birth, and notthe other way around. All that the System did was to take hisrepresentations for what they were worth. He was not believed by theLegal Counsel, but the General Manager did; on the other hand, theauthority higher than the General Manager found the action of theGeneral Manager erroneous. Under these circumstances, how could the


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System be in estoppel where the conflicting representations are of thepetitioner rather than of the System?Anent petitioner's contention that he was denied due process when theBoard of Trustees acted on the letter of Mr. Mathay, without notifyinghim thereof or hearing him thereon, suffice it to say that since there is noshowing that under the procedure established in the GSIS, such noticeand hearing are required, considering that the System operates as a

business corporation and generally notice and hearing are notindispensable for due process in corporations, and in any event, inasmuchas what was considered by the Board was nothing more than petitioner'sown conflicting representations, and if petitioner really believed heshould have been heard, he could have filed a motion for reconsiderationor reopening, it cannot be said that indeed he had not had due opportunityto present his side.Finally, as regards petitioner's argument that the Board's resolution inquestion constitutes an impairment of the obligations of his contract ofinsurance, it is obvious that the constitutional injunction that is evidentlythe basis of such argument refers to the legislature and not to resolutionseven of government corporations. Besides, petitioner's life insurance

policy, apart from not having any real relevance in this case, what isinvolved being his retirement, contains specific provisions contemplatingthe correction of any error or mistake in the date of birth of the insured.

On the other hand, the retirement of government employees is imposedby law and is not the result of any contractual stipulation.WHEREFORE, the petition in this case is dismissed, with costs against

petitioner, and the writ of preliminary injunction issued herein is herebydissolved.

Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Teehankee and Villamor, JJ.,concur.Concepcion, C.J., and Fernando, J., concur in the result.Castro, J., reserves his vote.

Dizon and Makasiar, JJ., are on leave.

# Footnotes1 With respect to the procedure for approval of applications forretirement, the Board of Trustees has from time to time approved thefollowing resolutions:

1. On January 15, 1952, Resolution No. 15 providing:"In order to expedite action on applications for retirement annuities, theBoard resolved to authorize the Manager of the AdministrativeDepartment of the System to process and approve such applications,subject to final approval of the General Manager and Actuary."(Emphasis supplied)2. On March 24, 1954, Resolution No. 145 as follows:"2.Retirement Applications"Retirement applications shall be approved by the General Manager,Administrative Department, the Assistant General Manager, and theAssociate Actuary and Acting Manager, Production Department."In the following cases, approval of the following officials shall also berequired in addition to those named hereinabove:a. No beneficiary or where there is legal problem involved By theLegal Officer.

b. No premium payments

By the Manager, Accounting Department."3. On November 3, 1954, Resolution No. 627 reading:"Retirement applications shall be approved by 3 officials as follows:Manager, Claims Department, either one of the Assistant GeneralManagers, and either the Actuary or Associate Actuary."In the following cases, approval of the following officials shall also berequired in addition to those named hereinabove:a. No beneficiary or where there is legal problem involved By theLegal Officer.

b. No premium paymentsBy the Manager, Accounting Department."4. On July 3, 1957, Resolution No. 1591 thus:"Where the records show conflicting dates of birth of an applicant forretirement and no birth or baptismal certificate can be submitted due toits loss or destruction, the matter is referred to the Corporate Counsel of

the System, together with all secondary evidence in relation to the date ofbirth of the applicant. The Corporate Counsel in turn determines thecorrect date of birth, for purposes of retirement and life insurance, afterevaluating the relative evidentiary value of the documents submitted, inaccordance with the Rules of Court." (Emphasis supplied)It is the theory of petitioner that Resolutions Nos. 627 and 1591 must beunderstood as subject to the condition in Resolution No. 15 that theapproval of the other subordinate managers or officials referred to thereinmust be approved by the General Manager whose action shall be final.Respondents deny this, specially as regards Resolution No. 1591 whichthey claim makes the Corporate Counsel of the System the final authorityon the matters therein mentioned, which include controversies ordiscrepancies as to the date of birth of any applicant for retirement. TheCourt sees no necessity, as stated in the above opinion, of passing on the

secondary issue, the same being subordinate, after all, to the mainproposition that the General Manager's decision is subject to the reviewand final action of the Board of Trustees.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURTManilaEN BANC

G.R. No. 97419 July 3, 1992

GAUDENCIO T. CENA,petitioner,vs.THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, and THE HON. PATRICIAA. STO. TOMAS, in her capacity as Chairman of the Civil ServiceCommission, respondents.

MEDIALDEA, J.:May a government employee who has reached the compulsory retirementage of 65 years, but who has rendered 11 years, 9 months and 6 days ofgovernment service, be allowed to continue in the service to complete the15-year service requirement to enable him to retire with the benefits of anold-age pension under Section 11 par. (b) of the Revised GovernmentService Insurance Act of 1977? This is the issue raised before this Court

by petitioner Gaudencio T. Cena, a Registrar of the Register of Deeds ofMalabon, Metro Manila.The facts are not disputed.Petitioner Gaudencio T. Cena entered the government service on

November 16, 1978 as Legal Officer II of the Law Department ofCaloocan City where he stayed for seven (7) years until his transfer on

November 16, 1986 to the Office of the Congressman of the First Districtof Caloocan City where he worked for only three (3) months, or untilFebruary 15, 1987, as Supervising Staff Officer.On July 16, 1987, he was appointed as Registrar of the Register of Deedsof Malabon, Metro Manila, the position he held at the time he reached

the compulsory retirement age of 65 years on January 22, 1991. By then,he would have rendered a total government service of 11 years, 9 monthsand 6 days. Before reaching his 65th birthday, he requested the Secretaryof Justice, through Administrator Teodoro G. Bonifacio of the LandRegistration Authority (LRA), that he be allowed to extend his service tocomplete the 15-year service requirement to enable him to retire with full

benefits of old-age pension under Section 11, par. (b) of P.D. 1146.The LRA Administrator, for his part, sought a ruling from the CivilService Commission whether or not to allow the extension of service of

petitioner Cena as he is covered by Civil Service Memorandum No. 27,series 1990. In his 2nd Indorsement dated August 6, 1990, the LRAAdministrator observed that if petitioner's service as of January 22, 1991of 10 years, 6 months and 6 days (should be 11 years, 9 months and 6days) would be extended to 15 years, he would have to retire on April 15,1994 at the age of 68 years.

On July 31, 1990, the Civil Service Commission denied petitioner Cena'srequest for extension of service in its CSC Resolution No. 90-681,declaring therein, that Mr. Cena shall be considered retired from theservice on January 22, 1991, the date when he shall reach the compulsoryretirement age ofsixty-five (65) years, unless his retention for another year is sought bythe head of office under Civil Service Memorandum Circular No. 27, s.1990.Petitioner Cena filed a motion for reconsideration. On October 17, 1990,the Civil Service Commission set aside its CSC Resolution No. 90-681and allowed Gaudencio Cena a one-year extension of his service fromJanuary 22, 1991 to January 22, 1992, citing CSC Memorandum Circular

No. 27, series of 1990, the pertinent of which reads:1. Any request for the extension of service of compulsory retirees tocomplete the fifteen (15) years service requirement for retirement shall

be allowed only to permanent appointees in the career service who areregular members of the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS),andshall be granted for a period not exceeding one (1) year.On January 22, 1991, petitioner's second motion for reconsideration wasdenied in its CSC Resolution No. 91-101.Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari alleging that the CivilService Commission committed a grave abuse of discretion when itgranted the extension of petitioner's service as Registrar of Deeds ofMalabon, Metro Manila, for a period of only one (1) year pursuant toCSC Memorandum Circular No. 27, Series of 1990, instead of three (3)years and three (3) months to complete the 15-year service requirementfor his retirement with full benefits as provided under Section 11, par. (b)


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of Presidential Degree No. 1146, otherwise known as the RevisedGovernment Service Insurance Act of 1977.Petitioner contends that reliance of the Commission on par. (1) ofMemorandum Circular No. 27 allowing an extension of service of acompulsory retiree for a period not exceeding one (1) year is botherroneous and contrary to the "benevolent and munificent intentions" ofSection 11 of P.D. 1146. Petitioner points out that par. (b), Section 11 of

P.D. No. 1146 does not limit nor specify the maximum number of yearsthe retiree may avail of to complete the 15 years of service.The Solicitor-General agrees with petitioner Cena. He argues that thequestioned provision being generally worded, Section 11 par. (b), P.D.1146 has general application, thus respondent CSC has no authority tolimit through CSC Memorandum Circular No. 27 the privilege under saidsection to government employees who lack just one year to complete the15-year service requirement.The Civil Service Commission, however, contends that since publicrespondent CSC is the central personnel agency of the government, it isvested with the power and authority, among others, to grant or allowextension of service beyond retirement age pursuant to Section 14 par.(14), Chapter 3, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of Executive Order No. 292(Administrative Code of 1987). In interpreting Section 11 par. (b) of P.D.1146, public respondent CSC contends that the phrase "Provided, That if

he has less than fifteen years of service, he shall be allowed to continuein the service to complete the fifteen years", is qualified by the clause:"Unless the service is extended by appropriate authorities," which meansthat the extension of service must be first authorized by the Commission,as the appropriate authority referred to in Section 11, par. (b), P.D. 1146,

before the service of a compulsory retiree (one who has already reachedage of 65 years with at least 15 years of service) can be extended.We grant the petition.Section 12, par. (14), Chapter 3, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of theAdministrative Code of 1987 (November 24, 1987) cannot be interpretedto authorize the Civil Service Commission to limit to only one (1) yearthe extension of service of an employee who has reached the compulsoryretirement age of 65 without having completed 15 years of service, whensaid limitation his no relation to or connection with the provision of thelaw supposed to be carried into effect.

Section 12, par. (14), Chapter 3, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of theAdministrative Code of 1987 provides thus:Sec. 12. Powers and Functions. The Commission shall have thefollowing powers and functions:xxx xxx xxx(14) Take appropriate action on all appointments and other personnelmatters in the Civil Service including extension of service beyondretirement age;As a law of general application, the Administrative Code of 1987 cannotauthorize the modification of an express provision of a special law(Revised Government Service Insurance of 1977). Otherwise, the intentand purpose of the provisions on retirement and pension of the RevisedGovernment Service Insurance Act of 1977 (P.D. 1146) would berendered nugatory and meaningless.Section 11 paragraph (b) of the Revised Government Service InsuranceAct of 1977 expressly provides, thus:Sec. 11. Conditions for Old-Age Pension. (a) Old-age pension shall be

paid to a member who:xxx xxx xxx(b) Unless the service is extended by appropriate authorities, retirementshall be compulsory for an employee of sixty-five years of age with atleast fifteen years of service: Provided, That if he has less than fifteenyears of service, he shall be allowed to continue in the service tocomplete the fifteen years. (Emphasis supplied)Being remedial in character, a statute creating a pension or establishingretirement plan should be liberally construed and administered in favor ofthe persons intended to be benefited thereby. The liberal approach aimsto achieve the humanitarian purposes of the law in order that theefficiency, security and well-being of government employees may be

enhanced (Bautista vs. Auditor General, 104 Phil 428; Ortiz vs.Commission on Elections, G.R. No. L-78957, June 28, 1988, 162 SCRA812).The Court stated in Abad Santos vs. Auditor General, 79 Phil. 176, that a

pension partakes of the nature of "retained wages" of the retiree for adouble purpose: (1) to entice competent men and women to enter thegovernment service, and (2) permit them to retire from the service withrelative security, not only for those who have retained their vigor, butmore so for those who have been incapacitated by illness or accident.We have applied the liberal approach in interpreting statutes creating

pension or establishing retirement plans in cases involving officials of theJudiciary who lacked the age and service requirement for retirement. Wesee no cogent reason to rule otherwise in the case of ordinary employeesof the Executive Branch, as in the case of petitioner Cena, who has

reached 65 but opted to avail of the statutory privilege under Section 11par. (b) of P.D. 1146 to continue in the service to complete the 15-yearservice requirement in order to avail of old-age pension.In Re: Application for Gratuity Benefits of Associate Justice Efren I.Plana, Adm. Matter No. 5460, En Banc Resolution, March 24, 1988, theCourt, applying the liberal approach, ruled that Justice Plana, who at thetime of his courtesy resignation on March 25, 1986 lacked a few months

to meet the age requirement for retirement under the law, is entitled tofull retirement benefits under R.A. 910 because his accrued leave creditswould have entitled him to go on leave until beyond the age requirementfor retirement.The above ruling of the Court was reiterated in Re: Application forRetirement under Rep. Act No. 910 of Associate Justice Ramon B.Britanico of the Intermediate Appellate Court, Adm. Matter No. 6484 Ret., May 15, 1989. By liberally interpreting Section 3 of R.A. 910, asamended, in favor of the persons intended to be benefited by them, theCourt also allowed the conversion of the application for disabilityretirement of Justice Ruperto Martin under said Section 3 of R.A. 910, asamended (10-year lump sum without the lifetime annuity) into anapplication for voluntary retirement under Section 1(5-year lump sum with lifetime annuity) eleven years after his disabilityretirement was approved on January 10, 1978 (In Re: Application for

Life Pension under Rep. Act 910. Ruperto G. Martin, applicant, 187SCRA 477). The ten-year lump sum which he had received wasconsidered by the Court as payment under Section 1 of the five-yearlump sum, to which he was entitled, and of his monthly pensions for thenext five years.However, the Court pointed out in Re: Gregorio G. Pineda, Adm. Matter

No. 2076-RET., July 13, 1990, and its six (6) companion cases, 187SCRA 469, that when the Court allows seeming exceptions to fixed rulesfor certain retired Judges or Justices, there are ample reasons behind eachgrant of an exception. The crediting of accumulated leaves to make upfor lack of required age or length of service is not done indiscriminately.It is always on case to case basis.There is thus no justifiable reason in not allowing ordinary employees inthe Executive Branch on a case to case basis, to continue in the service tocomplete the 15-year service requirement to avail of the old-age pension

under Section 11 of P.D. 1146. By limiting the extension of service toonly one (1) year would defeat the beneficial intendment of theretirement provisions of P.D. 1146.In resolving the question whether or not to allow a compulsory retiree tocontinue in the service to complete the 15-year service, there must be

present an essential factor before an application under Section 11 par. (b)of P.D. 1146 may be granted by the employer or government officeconcerned. In the case of officials of the Judiciary, the Court allows amaking up or compensating for lack of required age or service only ifsatisfied that the career of the retiree was marked by competence,integrity, and dedication to the public service (Re: GregorioPineda,supra). It must be so in the instant case.It is interesting to note that the phrase "he shall be allowed to continue inthe service to complete the fifteen years" found in Section 11 (b) of P.D.1146 is a reproduction of the phrase in the original text found in Section12 (e) of Commonwealth Act 186, as amended, otherwise known as the"Government Service Insurance Act" approved on November 14, 1936.There is nothing in the original text as well as in the revised versionwhich would serve as the basis for providing the allowable extension

period to only one (1) year. There is likewise no indication that Section11 par. (b) of P.D. 1146 contemplates a borderline situation where acompulsory retiree on his 65th birthday has completed more than 14, butless than 15 years of government service., i.e. only a few months short ofthe 15-year requirement which would enable him to collect an old-age

pension.While it is true that the Administrative Code of 1987 has given the CivilService Commission the authority "to take appropriate action on allappointments and other personnel matters in the Civil Service includingextension of service beyond retirement age", the said provision cannot be

extended to embrace matters not covered by the Revised GovernmentService Insurance Act of 1977 (Sto. Tomas vs. Board of Tax Appeals, 93Phil. 376, 382, "citing 12 C.J. 845-46). The authority referred to thereinis limited only to carrying into effect what the special law, RevisedGovernment Insurance Act of 1977, or any other retirement law beinginvoked provides. It cannot go beyond the terms and provisions of the

basic law.The Civil Service Commission Memorandum Circular No. 27 being inthe nature of an administrative regulation, must be governed by the

principle that administrative regulations adopted under legislativeauthority by a particular department must be in harmony with the

provisions of the law, and should be for the sole purpose of carrying intoeffect its general provisions (People vs. Maceren, G.R. No. L-32166,October 18, 1977, 79 SCRA 450; Teoxon v. Members of the Board of


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Administrators, L-25619, June 30, 1970, 33 SCRA 585; Manuel v.General Auditing Office, L-28952, December 29, 1971, 42 SCRA 660;Deluao v. Casteel, L-21906, August 29, 1969, 29 SCRA 350).The pronouncement of the Court in the case ofAugusta Toledo vs. CivilService Commission, et al., G.R. No. 92646-47, October 4, 1991,squarely applies in the instant case. We declared in the case of Toledothat the rule prohibiting 57-year old persons from employment,

reinstatement, orre-employment in the government service provided under Section 22,Rule III of the Civil Service Rules on Personnel Actions and Policies(CSRPAP) cannot be accorded validity, because it is entirely a creationof the Civil Service Commission, having no basis in the law itself whichit was meant to implement and it cannot be related to or connected withany specific provision of the law which it is meant to carry into effect.The Court, speaking thru Justice Edgardo L. Paras, stated, thus:The power vested in the Civil Service Commission was to implement thelaw or put it into effect, not to add to it; to carry the law into effect orexecution, not to supply perceived omissions in it. "By its administrativeregulations, of course, the law itself can not be extended; said regulationscannot amend an act of Congress." (Teoxon v. Members of the Board ofAdministrators, Philippine Veterans Administration, 33 SCRA 585, 589[1970], citing Santos v. Estenzo, 109 Phil. 419 [1960]; see also, Animos

v. Philippine Veterans Affairs Office, 174 SCRA 214, 223-224 [1989] inturn citing Teoxon).The considerations just expounded also conduce to the conclusion of theinvalidity of Section 22, Rule III of the CSRPAP. The enactment of saidsection, relative to 57-year old persons, was also an act of supererogationon the part of the Civil Service Commission since the rule has no relationto or connection with any provision of the law supposed to be carriedinto effect. The section was an addition to or extension of the law, notmerely a mode of carrying it into effect. (Emphasis supplied)The governing retirement law in the instant case is P.D. 1146 otherwiseknown as the "Revised Government Service Insurance Act of 1977." Therule on limiting to only one (1) year the extension of service of anemployee who has reached the compulsory retirement age of 65 years,

but has less than 15 years of service under Civil Service MemorandumCircular No. 27 s. 1990, cannot likewise be accorded validity because it

has no relation to or connection with any provision of P.D. 1146supposed to be carried into effect. The rule was an addition to orextension of the law, not merely a mode of carrying it into effect. TheCivil Service Commission has no power to supply perceived omissions inP.D. 1146.As a matter of fact, We have liberally applied Section 11 par. (b) of P.D.1146 in two (2) recent cases where We allowed two employees in theJudiciary who have reached the age of 65 to continue in the governmentservice to complete the 15-year service requirement to be entitled to the

benefits under P.D. 1146.In a resolution dated January 23, 1990 in A.M. No. 87-7-1329-MTC, Weallowed Mrs. Florentina J. Bocade, Clerk of Court, Municipal TrialCourt, Dagami, Leyte, who at the time she reached the age of 65 years onOctober 16, 1987 had only 10 years of government service, to continueher services until October 10, 1992. Thus, she was given a period of 5years, to complete the15-year service requirement to be entitled to the retirement benefits underSection 11 par. (b) of P.D. 1146. The Court observed that Mrs. Bocade isstill performing her duties without any adverse complaints from hersuperior and that she is physically fit for work per report of the MedicalClinic.The Court, in a resolution dated April 18, 1991, in A.M. No. 91-3-003-SC.-Re: Request for the extension of service of Mrs. Crisanta T. Tiangco,allowed Mrs. Crisanta T. Tiangco, Budget Officer V, Budget Division,Fiscal Management and Budget Office of the Supreme Court to continueher services until February 10, 1995. She was granted a period of 3 years,10 months and 13 days because she has to her credit only 11 years, 1month and 17 days of government service at the time she reached the ageof 65 years on March 29, 1991 in order that she be entitled to the

retirement benefits under P.D. No. 1146.It is erroneous to apply to petitioner Cena who has rendered 11 years, 9months and 6 days of government service, Section 12, par. (b) of P.D.1146 which provides that "a member who has rendered at least three (3)years but less than 15 years of service at the time of separation shall, . . .upon separation after age sixty, receive a cash equivalent to 100% of hisaverage monthly compensation for every year of service."The applicable law should be Section 11 par. (b) of P.D. 1146 whichallows him to extend his 11 years, 9 months and 6 days to complete the15-year of service consistent with the beneficial intendment of P.D. 1146and which right is subject to the discretion of the government officeconcerned.Section 12 par. (b) of P.D. 1146 does not apply to the case of hereinCena, because he opted to continue in the service to complete the 15-year

service requirement pursuant to Section 11 par. (b) of P.D. 1146. Thecompletion of the 15-year service requirement under Section 11 par. (b)

partakes the nature of a privilege given to an employee who has reachedthe compulsory retirement age of 65 years, but has less than 15 years ofservice. If said employee opted to avail of said privilege, he is entitled tothe benefits of the old-age pension. On the other hand, if the saidemployee opted to retire upon reaching the compulsory retirement age of

65 years although he has less than 15 years of service, he is entitled to thebenefits provided for under Section 12 of P.D. 1146 i.e. a cash equivalentto 100% of his average monthly compensation for every year of service.The right under Section 11, par. (b) is open to all employees similarlysituated, so it does not offend the constitutional guarantee of equal

protection of the law. There is nothing absurd or inequitable in rewardingan employee for completion of the 15-year service beyond the retirementage. If he would be better off than the one who has served for 14 years

but who is separated from the service at the age of 64, it would be onlyjust and proper as he would have worked for the whole period of 15 yearsas required by law for entitlement of the old-age pension. Indeed, alonger service should merit a greater reward. Besides, his entitlement tothe old-age pension is conditioned upon such completion. Thus, if theservice is not completed due to death or incapacity, he would be entitledto the benefit under Section 12, par. (b), i.e. cash equivalent to 100% of

his average monthly compensation for every year of service.Finally, in view of the aforesaid right accorded under Section 11, par. (b)of P.D. 1146, petitioner Cena should not be covered by MemorandumCircular No. 65 issued by then Executive Secretary Catalino Macaraig onJune 14, 1988. Memorandum Circular No. 65 allowing retention ofservice for only six (6) months for "extremely meritorious reasons"should apply only to employees or officials who have reached thecompulsory retirement age of 65 years but who, at the same time, havecompleted the 15-year service requirement for retirement purposes. Itshould not apply to employees or officials who have reached thecompulsory retirement age of 65 years, but who opted to avail of the old-age pension under par. (b), Section 11 of P.D. 1146, in which case, theyare allowed, at the discretion of the agency concerned, to complete the15-year service requirement.ACCORDINGLY, the petition is granted. The Land Registration

Authority (LRA) of the Department of Justice has the discretion to allowpetitioner Gaudencio Cena to extend his 11 years, 9 months and 6 days ofgovernment service to complete the 15-year service so that he may retirewith full benefits under Section 11 par. (b) of P.D. 1146.SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Bidin, Regalado,Davide, Jr., Nocon and Bellosillo, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

PADILLA, J.:concurring:I concur in the majority opinion written by Mr. Justice Leo D.Medialdea, with a slight modification. The majority opinion would vestupon the Land Registration Authority "the discretion to allow petitionerGaudencio Cena to extend his eleven (11) years, nine (9) months and six(6) days of government service to complete the fifteen (15) years serviceso that he may retire with full benefits under Section 11 par. (b) of P.D.1146" (decision, p. 16). A reading of the cited provision of law whichreads as follows:Sec. 11. Conditions for Old-Age Pension.xxx xxx xxx(b) Unless the service is extended by appropriate authorities, retirementshall be compulsory for an employee of sixty-five years of age with atleast fifteen years of service: Provided, That if he has less than fifteenyears of service, he shall be allowed to continue in the service tocomplete the fifteen years.would indicate, in my opinion, that the government employee who has

reached sixty-five (65) years of age but has rendered less than fifteen(15) years of service, has THE RIGHT to continue in the service tocomplete fifteen (15) years, and that the government office or agencywhere he is employed cannot but allow the exercise of such right of thesubject employee. In short, the employing government office oragency must allow the government employee who has reached sixty-five(65) years of age, but has rendered less than fifteen (15) years of service,the opportunity to complete the fifteen (15) years of service in order toenjoy the benefits of old-age pension. It follows from this that if suchgovernment employee is no longer fitto complete the remainder of thefifteen (15) year service (after reaching age 65), he should be terminated

for cause, after appropriate proceedings, otherwise, he has the right tocontinue in the service for purposes of completing his fifteen (15) yearsof service.


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GRIO-AQUINO, J.:dissenting:The issue raised in this petition for review of the Resolution No. 90-935dated October 17, 1990 of the Civil Service Commission, is whether thegovernment service of petitioner Gaudencio Cena as Registrar of Deedsfor Malabon, Metro Manila, may be extended for a period of one (1) yearonly (from January 22, 1991 up to January 22, 1992) and not for as longas necessary to enable him to complete 15 years service so that he may

retire with full benefits.After a careful consideration of related provisions of the retirement laws,I submit that inasmuch as P.D. No. 1146 is silent on the matter, the CivilService Commission, pursuant to the authority granted to it in theAdministrative Code of 1987, "to take appropriate action on . . . all

personnel matters in the Civil Service, including extension of servicebeyond retirement age" (paragraph 14, Section 12, Chapter 3, Subtitle A,Title I, Book V), appropriatelypromulgated Memorandum Circular No.27, Series of 1990, limiting the extension of service to "not exceedingone year." The pertinent provisions of the circular are quoted below:1. Any request for the extension of service of compulsory retirees tocomplete the fifteen (15) years service requirement for retirement shall

be allowed only to permanent appointees in the career service who areregular members of the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS),andshall be granted for a period not exceeding one (1) year.

2. Any request for the extension of service of compulsory retiree tocomplete the fifteen (15) years service requirement for retirement whoentered the government service at 57 years of age or over upon priorgrant of authority to appoint him or her, shall no longer be granted.3. Any request for the extension of service to complete the fifteen (15)years service requirement for retirement shall be filed not later than three(3) years prior to the date of compulsory retirement.4. Any request for the extension of service of a compulsory retiree whomeets the minimum number of years of service for retirement purposesmay be granted for six (6) months only with no further extension. (pp.64-65,Rollo; emphasis supplied.)The maximum allowable extension of "not exceeding one year" fixed in

paragraph 1 of CSC Memorandum Circular No. 27 is reasonable, just,and consistent with the general rule that "retirement shall be automaticand compulsory at the age of 65 years" (Sec. 12[e], Com. Act 186).

I believe that Section 11, paragraph (b) of P.D. 1146 contemplates aborderline situation where a compulsory retiree on his 65th birthday hascompleted more than 14, but less than 15, years of government service,or a few months short of the 15-year requirement which would enablehim to collect an old-age pension. Pursuant to the beneficent objectivesof our retirement laws, said retiree may be granted an extension of notmore than one year to enable him to complete 15 years of governmentservice and receive full retirement benefits including old-age pensionwhich, otherwise, he would not be entitled to receive. Such extensionwill enable him to retire afterhis 65th birthday, but before he attains 66years of age, hence, still within the mandatory retirement age of 65 yearsfixed by law, for as a matter of fact, one is 65 years old upon reaching his65th birthday until the eve of his 66th.Since Cena, on his 65th birthday, had rendered service to the governmentfor a total of only 11 years, 9 months and 6 days, he is not entitled to anextension of his service to complete 15 years for it would illegally andunreasonably stretch his retirement age beyond his 68th birthday, or longafter he shall have ceased to be 65 years old.As Cena would not be able to complete 15 years of government serviceeven if he were given a one-year extension of service, paragraph 1 ofCSC Memorandum Circular No. 27 may not be availed of by him. Theapplicable legal provision to him would be paragraph (b), Section 12 ofP.D. 1146 which provides that "a member who has rendered at least three(3) years but less than 15 years of service at the time of separation shall, .. . upon separation after age sixty, ** receive a cash payment equivalentto 100% of his average monthly compensation for every year of service."He is not entitled to an old-age pension, length of service being thedeterminant of whether or not a retired employee would be entitled tosuch pension.

The petitioner's theory that a compulsory retiree (one who is 65 yearsold) should be allowed an extension of his service for any number ofyears to complete the 15-year-service requirement under Section 11(b),P.D. 1146, can produce absurd and inequitable results. An employee whohas rendered only 3 years of government service at the age of 65 canhave his service extended for 12 years and finally retire at the age of 77and receive a life pension, while one who has served for 14 years, butwhose service is terminated by death or incapacity at the age of 64, willonly receive a cash gratuity equivalent to one month pay for every yearof service in the government, without a life pension, under "Section 12,

paragraph (b), P.D. No. 1146.Worth pondering also are the points raised by the Civil ServiceCommission that extending the service of compulsory retirees for longerthan one (1) year would: (1) give a premium to late-comers in the

government service and in effect discriminate against those who enter theservice at a younger age; (2) delay the promotion of the latter and ofnext-in-rank employees; and (3) prejudice the chances for employment ofqualified young civil service applicants who have already passed thevarious government examinations but must wait for jobs to be vacated by"extendees" who have long passed the mandatory retirement age but areenjoying extension of their government service to complete 15 years so

they may qualify for old-age pension.While I agree with the stand of the Civil Service Commission that anextension of service may not exceed one year, I do not agree with thegrant to Cena of a service extension of one (1) year from January 23,1991, or until January 22, 1992 under paragraph 1 of MemorandumCircular No. 27 for that paragraph should apply to a compulsory retireewho needs an extension of "not exceeding one year" (Cena needs morethan 3 years) to complete the 15-year-service requirement for old-age

pension benefits. There is no point in granting to a 65-year-old retiree aone-year extension of service, if, anyway, as in Cena's case, the extensionwill not enable him to complete 15 years of government service.Applicable to Cena is paragraph (b), Section 12 of P.D. 1146 which

provides that "a member who has rendered . . . less than 15 years ofservice upon separation after age sixty, (shall) receive a cash paymentequivalent to 100% of his average monthly compensation for every year

of service."I therefore vote to dismiss the petition for certiorari.ROMERO, J.:dissenting:I adopt the arguments in the dissenting opinion of my esteemedcolleague, J. Carolina Grio-Aquino, which are at once logical andreasonable even as it takes into account the sociological implications of acontrary ruling. At the same time, I add my own.J. Aquino's interpretation is in consonance with the spirit of practicallyall existing retirement laws fixing thecompulsory retirement age ofgovernment employees at sixty-five. The precursor of PresidentialDecree No. 1146, Commonwealth Act No. 186, explicitly provided thatretirement should be "automatic and compulsory at the age of sixty-fiveyears." The phrase "automatic and compulsory" with reference to theretirement age of sixty-five years had been retained in subsequentamendatory laws, specifically Republic Act Nos. 660, 728 and 3096.

The word "compulsory" should be understood in its legal signification:involuntary or forced in contradistinction to voluntary. 1 Considering theuse of the word "compulsory" in connection with age sixty-five, the sameword in Sec. 11 (b) of P.D. No. 1146 should refer only to the specifiedretirement age and not to the fifteen-year service mentioned therein. This

paragraph merely cites one class of prospective retirees which would beeligible to receive old-age pension and that is, those who have reachedthe age of sixty-five years while at the same time having to their credit"at least fifteen years of service." That this is the intendment of the law is

borne out by the succeeding proviso that contemplates the possibility thatthe same sixty-five year old may have served "less than fifteen years ofservice."Moreover, to interpret the law as meaning that the age limit and thefifteen-year length of service should concur before a governmentemployee is allowed the old-age pension may well give rise to a situationwherein a person who enters government service a year before reachingage sixty-five would have to wait until he is seventy-nine years old to beentitled to the old-age pension provided for in P.D. No. 1146, which is anabsurdity. Hence, to give substance to the real signification of the law,the proviso in Sec. 11 (b) which states that a government employee whohas "less than fifteen years of service, . . . shall be allowed to continue inthe service to complete the fifteen years," should contemplate a situationwherein the employee has only a minimalperiod of time left to completethe fifteen-year period. What this minimal period is, the Civil ServiceCommission has correctly declared to be "not exceeding one year."Otherwise, the government may well be saddled with a corps of civilservants that may be regarded graphically as liabilities instead of assets.Moreover, encouraging the retention of employees well beyond the ageof sixty-five years would, in effect, swell the numbers of the qualified but

unemployed many who, even now, face the bleak prospect of beingedged out of the labor market by those who can but offer to thegovernment and the people their diminishing physical and mentalvitality.Attention should be called to the fact that the dissenting opinion is inconsonance with the present policy on retirement as well as trends beinglaid down by the other branches of the government on the matter.For instance, there are bills now pending in Congress that seek to lowerthe compulsory retirement age of the bureaucracy. House Bill No. 33769sponsored by Congressman Roco and other Congressmen would lower itfrom sixty-five to sixty. 2Its counterpart bill in the Senate, S. No. 561 whose author is SenatorTamano, likewise would amend the present law by lowering thecompulsory age of retirement to sixty. 3


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House Bill No. 25903 earlier authored by Congressmen Monfort andEstrella would further reduce the compulsory retirement age to fifty-sixin order to give the young retirees the opportunity to engage in gainfulemployment or otherwise utilize their skills and experiences while theyare still relatively strong.Along the same line of thinking, the proposed Civil Service Code wouldset the compulsory age of retirement at sixty.

On the specific issue of whether a compulsory retiree who has not servedfifteen years should be allowed an extension for as long as necessary toenable him to complete the fifteen years of service required forentitlement to a life pension (which is the position of the petitioner) or

just a maximum period of "not exceeding one year" as fixed in CSCMemorandum Circular No. 27 which is supported by the dissentingopinion, it is worthwhile calling attention to Memorandum Circular No.65 4 issued by Executive Secretary Catalino Macaraig, Jr. AmendingMemorandum Circular No. 163 dated March 5, 1968, it categoricallystates:Officials or employees who have reached the compulsory retirement ageof 65 yearsshall not be retained in the service, except for extremelymeritorious reasons in which case the retention shall not exceed six (6)months.According to the ponencia, this Circular "should apply only to employees

or officials who have reached the compulsory retirement age of 65 yearsbut who, at the same time, have completed the 15-year servicerequirement for retirement purposes." A close reading of the title ofMemorandum Circular No. 65, as well as the relevant provision quotedabove, leaves no room for ambiguity or interpretation inasmuch as thereis no phrase that qualifies the scope of the law to those employees whohave reached the compulsory retirement age of 65 years "but who, at the

same time, have completed the15-year service requirement for retirement purposes."To read into theMemorandum Circular this qualifying phrase is to unduly expand thecoverage of the law to cases not intended by the Office of the ExecutiveSecretary.The ponencia proffers the argument that since the Court has allowed theofficials and employees of the Judiciary who have reached thecompulsory age of retirement but lacked the fifteen-year service

requirement to continue working until they complete said period, there is"no cogent reason to rule otherwise in the case of ordinary employees ofthe Executive Branch as in the case of petitioner Cena". But there is acogent reason Petitioner Gaudencio T. Cena, being an employee of theLand Registration Authority under the Department of Justice, falls underthe Executive Department. Accordingly, Memorandum Circular No. 65quoted in the above preceding paragraph which allows a retention orextension ofonly six months and this, only for "extremely meritoriousreasons" should be applicable to his case.

Needless to say, it would conduce to sound management practice in thegovernment if this rule could be rationalized and applied uniformly to allgovernment employees, with the exceptions provided by law.

Separate OpinionsPADILLA, J.:concurring:I concur in the majority opinion written by Mr. Justice Leo D.Medialdea, with a slight modification. The majority opinion would vestupon the Land Registration Authority "the discretion to allow petitionerGaudencio Cena to extend his eleven (11) years, nine (9) months and six(6) days of government service to complete the fifteen (15) years serviceso that he may retire with full benefits under Section 11 par. (b) of P.D.1146" (decision, p. 16). A reading of the cited provision of law whichreads as follows:Sec. 11. Conditions for Old-Age Pension.xxx xxx xxx(b) Unless the service is extended by appropriate authorities, retirementshall be compulsory for an employee of sixty-five years of age with atleast fifteen years of service: Provided, That if he has less than fifteenyears of service, he shall be allowed to continue in the service to

complete the fifteen years.would indicate, in my opinion, that the government employee who hasreached sixty-five (65) years of age but has rendered less than fifteen(15) years of service, has THE RIGHT to continue in the service tocomplete fifteen (15) years, and that the government office or agencywhere he is employed cannot but allow the exercise of such right of thesubject employee. In short, the employing government office oragency must allow the government employee who has reached sixty-five(65) years of age, but has rendered less than fifteen (15) years of service,the opportunity to complete the fifteen (15) years of service in order toenjoy the benefits of old-age pension. It follows from this that if suchgovernment employee is no longer fitto complete the remainder of thefifteen (15) year service (after reaching age 65), he should be terminated

for cause, after appropriate proceedings, otherwise, he has the right to

continue in the service for purposes of completing his fifteen (15) yearsof service.GRIO-AQUINO, J., dissenting:The issue raised in this petition for review of the Resolution No. 90-935dated October 17, 1990 of the Civil Service Commission, is whether thegovernment service of petitioner Gaudencio Cena as Registrar of Deedsfor Malabon, Metro Manila, may be extended for a period of one (1) year

only (from January 22, 1991 up to January 22, 1992) and not for as longas necessary to enable him to complete 15 years service so that he mayretire with full benefits.After a careful consideration of related provisions of the retirement laws,I submit that inasmuch as P.D. No. 1146 is silent on the matter, the CivilService Commission, pursuant to the authority granted to it in theAdministrative Code of 1987, "to take appropriate action on . . . all

personnel matters in the Civil Service, including extension of servicebeyond retirement age" (paragraph 14, Section 12, Chapter 3, Subtitle A,Title I, Book V), appropriatelypromulgated Memorandum Circular No.27, Series of 1990, limiting the extension of service to "not exceedingone year." The pertinent provisions of the circular are quoted below:1. Any request for the extension of service of compulsory retirees tocomplete the fifteen (15) years service requirement for retirement shall

be allowed only to permanent appointees in the career service who are

regular members of the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS),andshall be granted for a period not exceeding one (1) year.2. Any request for the extension of service of compulsory retiree tocomplete the fifteen (15) years service requirement for retirement whoentered the government service at 57 years of age or over upon priorgrant of authority to appoint him or her, shall no longer be granted.3. Any request for the extension of service to complete the fifteen (15)years service requirement for retirement shall be filed not later than three(3) years prior to the date of compulsory retirement.4. Any request for the extension of service of a compulsory retiree whomeets the minimum number of years of service for retirement purposesmay be granted for six (6) months only with no further extension. (pp.64-65,Rollo; emphasis supplied.)The maximum allowable extension of "not exceeding one year" fixed in

paragraph 1 of CSC Memorandum Circular No. 27 is reasonable, just,

and consistent with the general rule that "retirement shall be automaticand compulsory at the age of 65 years" (Sec. 12[e], Com. Act 186).I believe that Section 11, paragraph (b) of P.D. 1146 contemplates a

borderline situation where a compulsory retiree on his 65th birthday hascompleted more than 14, but less than 15, years of government service,or a few months short of the 15-year requirement which would enablehim to collect an old-age pension. Pursuant to the beneficent objectivesof our retirement laws, said retiree may be granted an extension of notmore than one year to enable him to complete 15 years of governmentservice and receive full retirement benefits including old-age pensionwhich, otherwise, he would not be entitled to receive. Such extensionwill enable him to retire afterhis 65th birthday, but before he attains 66years of age, hence, still within the mandatory retirement age of 65 yearsfixed by law, for as a matter of fact, one is 65 years old upon reaching his65th birthday until the eve of his 66th.Since Cena, on his 65th birthday, had rendered service to the governmentfor a total of only 11 years, 9 months and 6 days, he is not entitled to anextension of his service to complete 15 years for it would illegally andunreasonably stretch his retirement age beyond his 68th birthday, or longafter he shall have ceased to be 65 years old.As Cena would not be able to complete 15 years of government serviceeven if he were given a one-year extension of service, paragraph 1 ofCSC Memorandum Circular No. 27 may not be availed of by him. Theapplicable legal provision to him would be paragraph (b), Section 12 ofP.D. 1146 which provides that "a member who has rendered at least three(3) years but less than 15 years of service at the time of separation shall, .. . upon separation after age sixty, ** receive a cash payment equivalentto 100% of his average monthly compensation for every year of service."He is not entitled to an old-age pension, length of service being the

determinant of whether or not a retired employee would be entitled tosuch pension.The petitioner's theory that a compulsory retiree (one who is 65 yearsold) should be allowed an extension of his service for any number of

years to complete the 15-year-service requirement under Section 11(b),P.D. 1146, can produce absurd and inequitable results. An employee whohas rendered only 3 years of government service at the age of 65 canhave his service extended for 12 years and finally retire at the age of 77and receive a life pension, while one who has served for 14 years, butwhose service is terminated by death or incapacity at the age of 64, willonly receive a cash gratuity equivalent to one month pay for every yearof service in the government, without a life pension, under "Section 12,

paragraph (b), P.D. No. 1146.


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Worth pondering also are the points raised by the Civil ServiceCommission that extending the service of compulsory retirees for longerthan one (1) year would: (1) give a premium to late-comers in thegovernment service and in effect discriminate against those who enter theservice at a younger age; (2) delay the promotion of the latter and ofnext-in-rank employees; and (3) prejudice the chances for employment ofqualified young civil service applicants who have already passed the

various government examinations but must wait for jobs to be vacated by"extendees" who have long passed the mandatory retirement age but areenjoying extension of their government service to complete 15 years sothey may qualify for old-age pension.While I agree with the stand of the Civil Service Commission that anextension of service may not exceed one year, I do not agree with thegrant to Cena of a service extension of one (1) year from January 23,1991, or until January 22, 1992 under paragraph 1 of MemorandumCircular No. 27 for that paragraph should apply to a compulsory retireewho needs an extension of "not exceeding one year" (Cena needs morethan 3 years) to complete the 15-year-service requirement for old-age

pension benefits. There is no point in granting to a 65-year-old retiree aone-year extension of service, if, anyway, as in Cena's case, the extensionwill not enable him to complete 15 years of government service.Applicable to Cena is paragraph (b), Section 12 of P.D. 1146 which

provides that "a member who has rendered . . . less than 15 years ofservice upon separation after age sixty, (shall) receive a cash paymentequivalent to 100% of his average monthly compensation for every yearof service."I therefore vote to dismiss the petition for certiorari.ROMERO, J.:dissenting:I adopt the arguments in the dissenting opinion of my esteemedcolleague, J. Carolina Grio-Aquino, which are at once logical andreasonable even as it takes into account the sociological implications of acontrary ruling. At the same time, I add my own.J. Aquino's interpretation is in consonance with the spirit of practicallyall existing retirement laws fixing thecompulsory retirement age ofgovernment employees at sixty-five. The precursor of PresidentialDecree No. 1146, Commonwealth Act No. 186, explicitly provided thatretirement should be "automatic and compulsory at the age of sixty-five

years." The phrase "automatic and compulsory" with reference to theretirement age of sixty-five years had been retained in subsequentamendatory laws, specifically Republic Act Nos. 660, 728 and 3096.The word "compulsory" should be understood in its legal signification:involuntary or forced in contradistinction to voluntary. 1 Considering theuse of the word "compulsory" in connection with age sixty-five, the sameword in Sec. 11 (b) of P.D. No. 1146 should refer only to the specifiedretirement age and not to the fifteen-year service mentioned therein. This

paragraph merely cites one class of prospective retirees which would beeligible to receive old-age pension and that is, those who have reachedthe age of sixty-five years while at the same time having to their credit"at least fifteen years of service." That this is the intendment of the law is

borne out by the succeeding proviso that contemplates the possibility thatthe same sixty-five year old may have served "less than fifteen years ofservice."Moreover, to interpret the law as meaning that the age limit and thefifteen-year length of service should concur before a governmentemployee is allowed the old-age pension may well give rise to a situationwherein a person who enters government service a year before reachingage sixty-five would have to wait until he is seventy-nine years old to beentitled to the old-age pension provided for in P.D. No. 1146, which is anabsurdity. Hence, to give substance to the real signification of the law,the proviso in Sec. 11 (b) which states that a government employee whohas "less than fifteen years of service, . . . shall be allowed to continue inthe service to complete the fifteen years," should contemplate a situationwherein the employee has only a minimalperiod of time left to completethe fifteen-year period. What this minimal period is, the Civil ServiceCommission has correctly declared to be "not exceeding one year."Otherwise, the government may well be saddled with a corps of civil

servants that may be regarded graphically as liabilities instead of assets.Moreover, encouraging the retention of employees well beyond the ageof sixty-five years would, in effect, swell the numbers of the qualified butunemployed many who, even now, face the bleak prospect of beingedged out of the labor market by those who can but offer to thegovernment and the people their diminishing physical and mentalvitality.Attention should be called to the fact that the dissenting opinion is inconsonance with the present policy on retirement as well as trends beinglaid down by the other branches of the government on the matter.For instance, there are bills now pending in Congress that seek to lowerthe compulsory retirement age of the bureaucracy. House Bill No. 33769sponsored by Congressman Roco and other Congressmen would lower itfrom sixty-five to sixty. 2

Its counterpart bill in the Senate, S. No. 561 whose author is SenatorTamano, likewise would amend the present law by lowering thecompulsory age of retirement to sixty. 3House Bill No. 25903 earlier authored by Congressmen Monfort andEstrella would further reduce the compulsory retirement age to fifty-sixin order to give the young retirees the opportunity to engage in gainfulemployment or otherwise utilize their skills and experiences while they

are still relatively strong.Along the same line of thinking, the proposed Civil Service Code wouldset the compulsory age of retirement at sixty.On the specific issue of whether a compulsory retiree who has not servedfifteen years should be allowed an extension for as long as necessary toenable him to complete the fifteen years of service required forentitlement to a life pension (which is the position of the petitioner) or

just a maximum period of "not exceeding one year" as fixed in CSCMemorandum Circular No. 27 which is supported by the dissentingopinion, it is worthwhile calling attention to Memorandum Circular No.65 4 issued by Executive Secretary Catalino Macaraig, Jr. AmendingMemorandum Circular No. 163 dated March 5, 1968, it categoricallystates:Officials or employees who have reached the compulsory retirement ageof 65 yearsshall not be retained in the service, except for extremely

meritorious reasons in which case the retention shall not exceed six (6)months.According to the ponencia, this Circular "should apply only to employeesor officials who have reached the compulsory retirement age of 65 years

but who, at the same time, have completed the 15-year servicerequirement for retirement purposes." A close reading of the title ofMemorandum Circular No. 65, as well as the relevant provision quotedabove, leaves no room for ambiguity or interpretation inasmuch as thereis no phrase that qualifies the scope of the law to those employees whohave reached the compulsory retirement age of 65 years "but who, at the

same time, have completed the15-year service requirement for retirement purposes."To read into theMemorandum Circular this qualifying phrase is to unduly expand thecoverage of the law to cases not intended by the Office of the ExecutiveSecretary.

The ponencia proffers the argument that since the Court has allowed theofficials and employees of the Judiciary who have reached thecompulsory age of retirement but lacked the fifteen-year servicerequirement to continue working until they complete said period, there is"no cogent reason to rule otherwise in the case of ordinary employees ofthe Executive Branch as in the case of petitioner Cena". But there is acogent reason Petitioner Gaudencio T. Cena, being an employee of theLand Registration Authority under the Department of Justice, falls underthe Executive Department. Accordingly, Memorandum Circular No. 65quoted in the above preceding paragraph which allows a retention orextension ofonly six months and this, only for "extremely meritoriousreasons" should be applicable to his case.

Needless to say, it would conduce to sound management practice in thegovernment if this rule could be rationalized and applied uniformly to allgovernment employees, with the exceptions provided by law.FootnotesGRIO-AQUINO, J.: concurring:** Separation at age sixty-five is separation "after age sixty."ROMERO, J.: dissenting:1 8 Words and Phrases 465 and 15A C.J.S. 312 both citingState v.Bradley, 230 P. 2d 216, 220.2 The pertinent provision is reproduced below:(INTRODUCED BY CONGRESSMEN ROCO, BAUTISTA, SR.,PONCE DE LEON, BELTRAN, JR., MONFORT,CONGRESSWOMAN PLAZA (C), CONGRESSWOMEN JAVIER (R),BANDON, JR., ANIAG, JR., CONGRESSWOMEN COSETENG,LOBREGAT, CONGRESSMEN DANS, MITRA, DRAGON,BACALTOS, MONTEJO, MIRAN, VALDEZ, MASKARINO, TY,PUZON, CALINGASAN, PALACOL, DOMINGUEZ, ROMERO,

YULO, MENDIOLA, DIMAPORO (M.A.B.), NAVARRO, SR.,ROXAS, JR., CONGRESSWOMAN RAYMUNDO, CONGRESSMENGILLEGO, MARTINEZ, JR., TIROL, BORJAL, LACSON, DUREZA,DEL MAR, BAGATSING (A), ESTRELLA (E), CONGRESSWOMENALMARIO, LABARIA, CONGRESSMEN WEBB, NOGRALES,SINGSON (L.) AND VILLAREAL, SR. PER COMMITTEE REPORT

NO. 1318)"Sec. 11. Conditions for [Old-Age Pension] OPTIONAL ANDCOMPULSORY RETIREMENT. (a) [Old-Age pension] OPTIONALRETIREMENT shall be [paid] AVAILABLE to a member who:(1) Has at least [fifteen] TWELVE years of service;(2) Is at least [sixty] FIFTY-FIVE years of age; and(3) Is [separated from] LEAVING the service.(b) [Unless the service is extended by appropriate authorities,] R


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Retirement shall be compulsory for an employee at [sixty-five] SIXTYyears of age with at least [fifteen] TWELVE years of service:Provided,That, if he has less than [fifteen] TWELVE years of service, he shall beallowed to continue in the service to complete the [fifteen] TWELVEyears:PROVIDED, HOWEVER, THAT ALL SERVICES RENDEREDIN THE GOVERNMENT IRRESPECTIVE OF STATUS OFAPPOINTMENT DULY ACCREDITED SHALL BE COUNTED AS

GOVERNMENT SERVICE FOR RETIREMENT UNDER THISACT;PROVIDED, FURTHER, THAT ALL GOVERNMENTEMPLOYEES WHO, AT THE TIME OF THE EFFECTIVITY OFTHIS ACT, ARE SIXTY-ONE YEARS OF AGE AND ABOVE SHALLRETIRE UNDER THE FOLLOWING PHASES:(1) THOSE WITHIN THE AGES OF SIXTY-FOUR TO SIXTY-FIVEYEARS OLD SHALL BE RETIRED ON THE FIRST YEAR OFIMPLEMENTATION OF THIS ACT;(2) THOSE WITHIN THE AGES OF SIXTY-TWO TO SIXTY-THREEYEARS OLD SHALL BE RETIRED ON THE SECOND YEAR OFIMPLEMENTATION; AND(3) THOSE SIXTY-ONE YEARS OF AGE SHALL BE RETIRED ONTHE THIRD YEAR OF IMPLEMENTATION,"PROVIDED, FINALLY, THAT PAYMENT OF ALL RETIREMENTBENEFITS TO A RETIREE SHALL BE MADE IN LUMP-SUM AND

PAID NOT LATER THAN THE EFFECTIVITY DATE OF HISRETIREMENT."3 The pertinent provision runs thus:"Sec. 11. Condition for Old-Age Pension. (a) Old-Age Pension shall be paid to a member who:(1) has at least [fifteen] TWENTY years of service;(2) is at least [sixty] FIFTY-FIVE years of age; and(3) is separate from the service.(b) Unless the service is extended by appropriate authorities, retirementshall be compulsory for an employee at [sixty-five] SIXTY years of agewith at least [fifteen] TWENTY years of service;Provided, That if hehas less than [fifteen] TWENTY years of service he shall be allowed tocontinue in the service to complete the (fifteen) TWENTY years."4 This Circular states:"MEMORANDUM CIRCULAR NO. 65

FURTHER AMENDING CIRCULAR NO. 163, DATED MARCH 5,1968, AS AMENDED, PARTICULARLY AS REGARDS THERETENTION IN THE SERVICE OF PERSONS WHO HAVEREACHED THE COMPULSORY RETIREMENT AGE OF 65 YEARS.WHEREAS, this Office has been receiving requests for reinstatementand/or retention in the service of employees who have reached thecompulsory retirement age of 65 years, despite the strict conditions

provided for in Memorandum Circular No. 163, dated March 5, 1968, asamended.WHEREAS, the President has recently adopted a policy to adhere morestrictly to the law providing for compulsory retirement age of 65 yearsand, in extremely meritorious cases, to limit the service beyond the ageof 65 years to six (6) months only.WHEREFORE, the pertinent provision of Memorandum Circular No.163 on the retention in the service of officials or employees who havereached the compulsory retirement age of 65 years, is hereby amended toread as followsOfficials or employees who have reached the compulsory retirement ageof 65 years shall not be retained in the service; except for extremelymeritorious reasons in which case the retention shall not exceed six (6)months.All heads of departments, bureaus, offices and instrumentalities of thegovernment including government-owned or controlled corporations, arehereby enjoined to require their respective offices to strictly comply withthis circular.This Circular shall take effect immediately.By authority of the President(Sgd.)CATALINO MACARAIG, JR.

Executive SecretaryManila, June 14, 1988

FIRST DIVISION[G.R. No. 113470. March 26, 1997]

PLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaint if f-appell ee, vs. DANILO CORBES YOLAZO, MANUEL, VERGEL Y PASCUAL, and six (6) JOHNDOEs,accused. DANILO CORBES Y OLAZO and MANUELVERGEL Y PASCUAL, accused-appellants. D E C I S I O NBELLOSILLO, J.:

DANILO CORBES y OLAZO and MANUEL VERGEL yPASCUAL appeal from the decision dated 27 December 1991 of theRegional Trial Court of Caloocan City, Br. 124, finding them guilty as

principals by conspiracy of the crime of robbery with homicide underpar. 1, Art. 294 of the Revised Penal Code and sentencing them to sufferthe penalty ofreclusion perpetuaplus damages.[1]

The antecedents: At about nine o'clock in the morning of 17

November 1990 six (6) armed men entered the premises of the CaloocanConsortium Corporation at No. 305 Cordero Street, Caloocan City, andtook away from the establishment P169,000.00 in cash and P4,500.00from Mateo Figuracion, an employee therein. They also took with themthe .38 calibre revolver of security guard Timoteo Palicpic whom theyshot to death. The malefactors then ran towards 8th Avenue whereDaniel Corbes and Manuel Vergel had parked their getaway vehicle, a

blue passenger jeep. They then sped away.That same day, Manuel Vergel went to the Caloocan Police Station

and reported the incident. He claimed that the robbers used his passengerjeep in fleeing from the Caloocan Consortium Corporation, but he deniedany previous knowledge of the robbery or of any intentional participationtherein. However, upon further interrogation by P/Cpl Daniel G. DelRosario, Supervisor of the Dayshift Investigation Section, Caloocan CityInvestigation Division, Vergel retracted his earlier statements and

pointed to Danilo Corbes who together with the other accused allegedlyplanned the robbery and convinced him to drive for them.[2]Whenapprehended and brought to the police station, Corbes in turn pointed to acertain "Benny" as the brains behind the crime.[3]

Corbes, Vergel and six (6) John Does (still at large) were chargedas principals by conspiracy. On the witness stand Vergel howeverdiverged from his earlier story and insisted that the jeep he was drivingwas merely hired by Corbes and Benny on the pretext of hauling scrapmetal from Caloocan City. As soon as he parked his jeep along 8thAvenue, Benny alighted from the jeep leaving him with Corbes. Vergelmaintained that at that time he knew nothing of the robbery being

perpetrated at the Caloocan Consortium Corporation and that he becameaware of it only when Benny came back from the direction of CorderoStreet about ten (10) to fifteen (15) minutes later with several armed menwho boarded the jeep and threatened him with bodily harm if he would

not start its engine and drive. So he did as they ordered. After the menalighted at 9th Avenue, he proceeded to the house of Avelino Vergel, theowner of the jeep, and together they went to the Caloocan City PoliceStation to report the matter.

Daniel Corbes likewise professed innocence. Although headmitted having approached Vergel, he contended that he did so only toaccommodate Benny who had sought his help in looking for a jeepfor hire. Being the Vice-President of DAMATA (Damayan ngMaralitang Tahanan), a neighborhood association in Letre, Malabon, heaccompanied Benny to Sangandaan and there waited for Vergel whoagreed to have the jeep he was driving hired for a fee of P250.00. Thentogether with Vergel and Benny he left for Caloocan City allegedly uponVergel's invitation.

The trial court rejected the pretensions of Corbes andVergel; instead, it convicted the two (2) accused on the basis of theeyewitness account of Elena San Jose whose testimony established their

participation in the robbery as lookout and driver, respectively.Specifically, Elena San Jose testified that while she was rocking

her baby to sleep in the veranda of her house at 8th Avenue she noticed ablue-colored jeep parked about three (3) meters away. Vergel was atthe driver's seat. She saw Vergel alight several times from the jeepostensibly to inspect its engine and other parts as if something was wrongwith them, while Vergel's companion whom she identified as Corbeswalked to and fro along 8th Avenue up to the corner of CorderoStreet. Half an hour la

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