Merjoff v Director of Prisons

G.R. No. L-4254; September 26, 1951

Ponente: Tuason, J.

FACTS:

The petitioner, Boris Mejoff, is a Russian who was brought in the Philippines from Shanghai as a

secret operative by the Japanese forces during the latters regime in these Islands. Upon liberation

he was arrested as a Japanese spy, by U.S. Army Counter Intelligence Corps. Later he was handed

to Commonwealth Government for disposition in accordance with Commonwealth Act. No. 682.

The Peoples Court ordered his release but the deportation board take his case and found out that

he doesnt have travel documents. They referred the case to the immigration authorities and the

investigation declared that Merjoff entered the Philippines illegally in 1944 without inspection and

admission in the immigration officials.

Further, by its Constitution (Art. II, Sec. 3) the Philippines "adopts the generally accepted

principles of international law as part of the law of Nation." And in a resolution entitled "Universal

Declaration of Human Rights", specifically Articles 1, 2, 8 and 9. After two years the petitioner is

not yet deported. Merjoff petitions for a writ of habeas corpus, but the Director of Prisons said that

Merjoff should stay in temporary detention as a necessary step in the process of exclusion or

expulsion of undesirable length of time.

ISSUES:

Whether or not Merjoff should be released from prison awaiting his deportation.

HELD:

Yes. In adherence with the United Nations Declaration on Human Rights, the Court found it

necessary to grant the petitioners request. The Court held that the writ will be issued commanding

the respondents to release the petitioner from custody but he the petitioner should be placed under

surveillance of the immigration authorities or their agents to keep him in peace and available when

the Government is ready to deport him.

Kuroda v. Jalandoni

83 Phil. 171; 1949

FACTS:

Executive Order No. 68, an act establishing a national war crimes office and prescribing rules

and regulation governing the trial of accused war criminals. Shigenori Kuroda, formerly a

Lieutant General of the Japanese Imperial Army and Commanding General of the Japanese Imperial Forces in the Philippines during a period covering by the Chief of Staff of the Armed

forces of the Philippines with having unlawfully disregarded and failed to discharge his duties as such command, permitted them to commit brutal atrocities and other high crimes against

noncombatant civilians and prisoners of the Imperial Japanese Forces in violation of the laws

and customs of war Melville Hussey and Robert Port, American Lawyers, were appointed prosecutors in behalf of USA .

Kuroda argues that: 1) The Executive Order No. 68 is illegal on the ground that it violates not

only the provisions of our constitutional law but also our local laws; 2) The participation of the

prosecution of the case against petitioner with attorneys Melvill Hussey and Rober Port is

violation of our Constitution for the reason that they are not qualified to practice law in the

Philippines and are not authorized by the Supreme Court. 3) The appointment of said attorneys

as prosecutors is a violative of our national sovereignty. And 4)That Attorneys Hussey and Port

have no personality as prosecutors, the United States not being a party in interest in the case.

ISSUES:

1) Whether or not Executive No. 68 is valid and constitutional 2) Whether or not rules and regulations of the Hague and Geneva Conventions form part of the

law of the nation even if Philippines was not a signatory to the conventions embodying

them.

3) Whether or not the American lawyers could participate in the prosecution of this case.

HELD:

The Court ruled in accordance with the generally accepted principle of international law of the

present day including the Hague Convention the Geneva Convention and significant precedents

of international jurisprudent established by the United Nation, all those person military of

civilian who have been guilty of planning preparing or waging war of aggression and of the

commission the laws and customs of war, of humanity and civilization are held accountable

therefor.

Consequently, in the promulgation and enforcement of Executive Order No. 68, the President of

the Philippines has acted in conformity with the generally accepted and policies of international

law which are part of our constitution. The Hague and Geneva conventions, United States and

Japan as signatories, form part of and are wholly based on the generally accepted principals of

international law even if the Philippines was not a signatory to the conventions embodying

them, for our Constitution has been deliberately general and extensive in its scope and is not

confined to the recognition of rules and principles of international law as contained in treaties to

which our government may have been or shall be signatory.

Additionally, when the crimes charged against petitioner were allegedly committed, the

Philippines was under the sovereignty of United States and thus we were equally bound

together with the United States and with Japan to the right and obligation contained in the

treaties between the belligerent countries.

There is nothing in said executive order which requires that counsel appearing before said

commission must be attorneys qualified to practice law in the Philippines in accordance with

the Rules of Court. Respondent Military Commission is a special military tribunal governed by

a special law and not by the Rules of Court which govern ordinary civil court. Secondly, the

appointment of the two American Attorneys is not violative of our Nation Sovereignty. It is

only fair and proper that United States be allowed representation in the trial of those very

crimes.

Agustin v Edu

G.R. No. L-49112; February 2, 1979

FACTS:

Agustin, the petitioner, is the owner of a Volkswagen Beetle Car, Model 13035, already properly

equipped when it came out from the assembly lines with blinking lights fore and aft, which could

very well serve as an early warning device in case of the emergencies mentioned in Letter of

Instructions No. 229, as amended, as well as the implementing rules and regulations in

Administrative Order No. 1 issued by the land transportation Commission,"

The petitioner contends that said Letter of Instruction No. 229, as amended, "clearly violates the

provisions and delegation of police power. That they are "oppressive, unreasonable, arbitrary,

confiscatory, nay unconstitutional and contrary to the precepts of our compassionate New

Society. He further contended that they are "infected with arbitrariness because it is harsh, cruel and unconscionable to the motoring public;" are "one-sided, onerous and patently illegal and

immoral because [they] will make manufacturers and dealers instant millionaires at the expense

of car owners who are compelled to buy a set of the so-called early warning device at the rate of

P 56.00 to P72.00 per set." are unlawful and unconstitutional and contrary to the precepts of a

compassionate New Society [as being] compulsory and confiscatory on the part of the motorists

who could very well provide a practical alternative road safety device, or a better substitute to

the specified set of EWD's."

The petitioner prayed for a judgment both the assailed Letters of Instructions and Memorandum

Circular void and unconstitutional and for a restraining order in the meanwhile.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Letter of Instruction No. 229, as amended is unconstitutional.

HELD:

No, the court said that the constitutional provision possessed relevance. The conclusion reached

by the Court that this petition must be dismissed is reinforced by this consideration. The petition

itself quoted these two whereas clauses of the assailed Letter of Instruction: "[Whereas], the

hazards posed by such obstructions to traffic have been recognized by international bodies

concerned with traffic safety, the 1968 Vienna Convention on Road Signs and Signals and the

United Nations Organization (U.N.); Whereas, the said Vienna Convention, which was ratified

by the Philippine Government under P.D. No. 207, recommended the enactment of local

legislation for the installation of road safety signs and devices;"

It cannot be disputed then that this Declaration of Principle found in the Constitution possesses

relevance: "The Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part

of the law of the land The 1968 Vienna Convention on Road Signs and Signals is impressed with such a character. It is not for this country to repudiate a commitment to which it had

pledged its word. The concept of Pacta sunt servanda stands in the way of such an attitude,

which is, moreover, at war with the principle of international morality.

J.B.L. Reyes v. Bagatsing

G.R. No. 65366; Oct. 25, 1983

FACTS:

In behalf of Anti-Bases Coalition (ABC), retired Justice J. B. L. Reyes seeks for a petition for

mandamus with alternative prayer for writ of preliminary mandatory injunction since October

20, 1983, no action had been taken as yet by respondent Mayor Ramon Bagatsing of the City of

Manila on the request of such organization to hold a rally. The permit sought was "for the use of

the empty field in front of the Luneta Grandstand and Roxas Boulevard in front of the United

States Embassy on October 26, 1983, from 2:00-5:00 in the afternoon. It is sponsoring an

International Conference for General Disarmament, World Peace and the Removal of All

Foreign Military Bases. It proposes a March for Philippine Sovereignty and Independence,

participated in by foreign and Philippine delegates.

The respondents denied the permit being sought by the said organization, for the reason that he

stated "in receipt of police intelligence reports which strongly militate against the advisability of

issuing such permit at this time and at the place applied for." It was suggested, however, in

accordance with the recommendation of the police authorities that "a permit may be issued for

the rally if it is to be held at the Rizal Coliseum or any other enclosed area where the safety of

the participants themselves and the general public may be ensured." The respondent invokes

Ordinance No. 7295 of the City of Manila prohibiting the holding or staging of rallies or

demonstration within a radius of five hundred (500) feet from any foreign mission or chancery;

and for other purposes. Such an ordinance finds justification in Art. 22 of the Vienna Convention

on Diplomatic Relations adopted in Vienna in 1961. It was concurred in by the then Philippine

Senate on May 3, 1965 and the instrument of ratification signed by the President on October 11,

1965 and thereafter deposited with the Secretary General of the United Nations on November 15.

As of that date then, it was binding on the Philippines.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Anti-Bases Coalition should be allowed to hold a peaceful protest rally in

front of the US Embassy.

HELD:

The Philippines is a signatory to the Vienna Convention which calls for the protection of the

premises of a diplomatic mission. But, the denial of permit to rally in front of the US Embassy is

only justified in the presence of clear and present danger to life or property of the embassy.

To the extent that the Vienna Convention is a restatement of the generally accepted principles of

international law, it should be part of the law of the land. That being the case, if there were a

clear and present danger of any intrusion or damage or disturbance of peace of the mission or

impairment of its dignity, there would be a justification for the denial of the permit insofar as the

terminal point would be the US Embassy, but there was not any.

The mandatory injunction prayed for is granted. This resolution is without prejudice to a more

extended opinion.

Ichong v. Hernandez

G. R. No. L-7995; May 31, 1957

FACTS:

Petitioners, for and in his own behalf and own behalf of other alien residents, corporations and

partnerships adversely affected by the provision brought this action to obtain a judicial

declaration that said act is unconstitutional, violating the spirit of Sections 1 and 5 of Article XIII

and Section 8 of Article XIV of the Constitution.

R.A. 1180, entitled An Act to Regulate the Retail Business, was enacted by the Congress of the Philippines prohibiting aliens, not citizen of the Philippines, from engaging directly or

indirectly in the retail trade in our country.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Congress violated the Constitution

HELD:

The petition was denied by the court, providing that the disputed law was enacted to remedy a

real actual threat and danger to national economy posed by alien dominance and control of the

retail business and free citizens and country from dominance and control; that the enactment

clearly falls within the scope of the police power of the State, thru which and by which it protects

its own personality and insures its security and future; that the law does not violate the equal

protection clause of the Constitution because sufficient grounds exist for the distinction between

alien and citizen in the exercise of the occupation regulated, nor the due process of law clause,

because the law is prospective in operation and recognizes the privilege of aliens already

engaged in the occupation and reasonably protects their privilege.

IBP v. Hon. Ronaldo B. Zamora

G.R. No. 141284; August 15, 2000

FACTS:

The petitioner in this case, IBP, prays for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and to

nullify the Presidents order of deploying the Marines to help the PNP. The IBP argue that the deployment is null and void because its unconstitutional because there is no Emergency Situation, in derogation of Art 2, Sec. 3 of the Constitution, the deployment is an insidious

incursion by the military into a civilian function of government, in derogation of Art 16, Sec.

5 of the Constitution and the deployment creates a dangerous tendency to rely on the military

for civilian government functions IBP says that it has standing because it is the official

organization of Filipino lawyers tasked with the bounden duty to uphold the rule of law and the

Constitution.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the calling of AFP to assist the PNP in joint visibility patrols violate the

constitutional provisions on civilian supremacy over the military.

HELD: The deployment of the Marines does not constitute a breach of the civilian supremacy clause. The calling of the Marines in this case constitutes permissible use of military assets for civilian law enforcement. The participation of the Marines in the conduct of joint visibility patrols is appropriately circumscribed. It is their responsibility to direct and manage the deployment of the Marines. It is, likewise, their duty to provide the necessary equipment to the Marines and render logistical support to these soldiers. In view of the foregoing, it cannot be properly argued that military authority is supreme over civilian authority. Moreover, the deployment of the Marines to assist the PNP does not unmake the civilian character of the police force. Neither does it amount to an insidious incursion of the military in the task of law enforcement in violation of Section 5(4), Article XVI of the Constitution.

People v. Lagman

G.R. No. 45892; 13 July 1938

FACTS:

This case at bar involves the case of People v. De Sosa (No. 45893, 13 July 1938).Both of

the respondents violated Sec. 60 of Commonwealth Act No. 1 (or the National Defense LawThe

respondents were 20 years old during the year of 1936 and they willfully and unlawfully refused

to render military service between the 1st and 7th of April 1936, notwithstanding that they were

required and duly notified by corresponding authorities to appear before the Acceptance Board to

register. They did not register up to the date of filing their information. Lagman argued that he has

a father to support; has no military leaning; and does not want to kill and wish to be killed. De

Sosa also argued that he is fatherless and has a mother and an 8-year old brother to support.

The Court of First Instance of Bataan ordered imprisonment for the both of them for 1 month and

1 day, with costs.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the National Defense Law is unconstitutional for violating Article II of the 1935

Constitution.

HELD:

The court ruled that, the National Defense Law is not a violation of Article II, and is in fact in

faithful compliance. The duty of the government to defend the State cant be performed except

through an army. As regards the claim of Lagman and De Sosa, support does not excuse them from

their duty to present themselves before the Acceptance Board. Also, it is not valid as if such

circumstances exists, they can ask for determent in complying with their duty and at all events,

obtain pecuniary allowance to attend to family responsibilities.

People v. Manayao

78 Phil. 721; 1947

FACTS:

Japanese soldiers and a number of Filipinos affiliated with the Makapili, among them the instant

appellant, conceived the diabolical idea of killing the residents of Barrio Banaban of the same

municipality. Appellant alone killed about six women, two of whom he bayoneted to death in the

presence of their daughters, Maria Paulino and Clarita Perez, respectively the witnesses of this

case. Appellant Pedro Manayao and Filomeno Flores and Raymundo Flores were charged with

the high crime of treason with multiple murder in the People's Court. The Floreses not having

been apprehended, only Manayao was tried. The appellant himself admitted his participation in

the massacre in two sworn statements.

The appellant's counsel contends that appellant was a member of the Armed Forces of Japan, and

not subject to the jurisdiction of the People's Court; and in he contends the theory that appellant

had lost his Philippine citizenship and was therefore not amenable to the Philippine law of

treason. He invokes in its support paragraphs 3, 4 of section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 63.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Manayao lost his citizenship therefore he is not subject to Philippine law of

treason?

HELD:

The court ruled that there was no evidence that appellant has subscribed to an oath of allegiance

to support the constitution or laws of Japan. Neither is there any showing of the acceptance by

appellant of a commission "in the military, naval, or air service" of Japan. What he joined is the

Makapili, a group of Filipino traitors pure and simple.

Moreover, appellant's contention is repugnant to the most fundamental and elementary principles

governing the duties of a citizen toward his country under our Constitution. Article II, section 2,

of said constitution ordains: "SEC. 2. The defense of the State is a prime duty of government,

and in the fulfillment of this duty all citizens may be required by law to render personal, military

or civil service." (Emphasis supplied.). In this sense, the court said that no one can effectively

cast off his duty to defend the state by merely swearing allegiance to an enemy country.

Iglesia Ni Cristo v CA

G.R. No. 119673; July 26, 1996

FACTS:

Petitioner Iglesia ni Cristo, a duly organized religious organization, has a television program

entitled Ang Iglesia ni Cristo aired on Channel 2 every Saturday and on Channel 13 every Sunday. The Board of Review for Motion Pictures and Television the VTR, classified the series

as X or not for public viewing on the ground that they offend and constitute an attack against other religions which is expressly prohibited by law for the TV programs Series Nos. 116, 119, 121 and 128. Petitioner appealed to the Office of the President and it was succeeded and the

decision was reversed. Petitioner also filed against the respondent Board alleging that the

respondent acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in requiring petitioner to

submit the VTR tapes of its programs and in x-rating them. The Board invoked its power under

P.D. No. 1986 in relation to Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code.

The Court grant petitioner the necessary permit for all the series of Ang Iglesia Ni Cristo program. However the petitioner directed to refrain from offending and attacking other existing

religions in showing Ang Iglesia Ni Cristo program. The petitioner moved for reconsideration for the (a) deletion of the dispositive portion of the Decision and (b) for the Board to be perpetually

enjoined from requiring petitioner to submit for review the tapes of its program. The respondent

Board opposed the motion. And the trial court granted petitioners Motion for Reconsideration. Respondents are further prohibited from requiring petitioner Iglesia ni Cristo to

submit for review VTR tapes of its religious program Ang Iglesia ni Cristo.

The Board appealed to the Court of Appeals after its motion for reconsideration was denied. The

respondent, CA, reversed the trial court. It ruled that: (1) the respondent board has jurisdiction and

power to review the TV program and (2) the respondent did not act with grave abuse of discretion

when it denied permit for the exhibition on TC of the three series of the TV program on the ground

that the materials constitute an attack against another religion. It also found that the series are

indecent, contrary to law and contrary to good customs.

ISSUES:

(1) Whether or not the "Ang Iglesia Ni Cristo" program is not constitutionally protected as a form

of religious exercise and expression.

(2) Whether or not the honorable court of appeals erred in not holding that being an exercise of

religious freedom, the Ang Iglesia Ni Cristo program is subject to the police power of the

state only in the extreme case that it poses a clear and present danger.

HELD:

Yes. The court ruled that the Decision of the respondent Court of Appeals is affirmed insofar as it

sustained the jurisdiction of the respondent MTRCB to review petitioners TV program entitled

Ang Iglesia ni Cristo, and is reversed and set aside insofar as it sustained the action of the

respondent MTRCB x-rating petitioners TV Program Series Nos. 115, 119, and 121.

The right to religious freedom and worship has two-fold aspect: the freedom to believe and the

freedom to act on ones belief. The first is absolute as long as the belief is confined within the

realm of thought. The second is subject to regulation where the belief is translated into external

acts that affect the public welfare. It is error to think that the mere invocation of religious freedom

will contest the State and render it impotent in protecting the general welfare. The inherent police

power can be exercised to prevent religious practices damaging the society.

Aglipay v Ruiz

G.R. No. L-45459; March 13, 1973

FACTS:

In May, 1963, Juan Ruiz, the respondent, announced in the dailies of Manila that he would order

the issues of postage stamps commemorating the celebration in the City of Manila of the 3rd

International Eucharist Congress, organized by Roman Catholic Church.

The petitioner, Mons. Aglipay, Supreme Head of the Philippine Independent Church, seeks the

issuance from the court of a writ of prohibition to prevent the respondent from issuing and

selling postage stamps commemorative of the 33rd International Eucharist Congress.

The petitioner alleges that the said act is in violation of the principle of the separation of the

church and the State because the act is in support of one religious organization which is contrary

to the said principle. And that the Act No. 4052, appropriates fund for a certain religious

organization which is in violation also of the section 23, subsection 3, Article VI, of the

Constitution.

ISSUE: Whether or not the act of the respondents is violative of the principle of the separation of

the church and the state.

HELD: No. The the issuance of stamps is not a violation to the constitution, it is made rather to

adverise Philippines and attract more tourists to the country. It does not authorize the

appropriation, use or application of public money or property for the use, benefit or support of a

particular sect of a church. What is emphasized in the stamp is the map of the Philippines and

Manila being the focus. The court further explained, The prohibition herein expressed is a direct

effect of the principle of separation of church and state. Without the necessity of adverting to the

historical background of this principle in our country, it is sufficient to say that our history, not to

speak of the history of mankind, has taught us that the union of church and state is prejudicial to

both, for occasions might arise when the estate will use the church, and the church the state, as a

weapon in the furtherance of their recognized this principle of separation of church and state in

the early stages of our constitutional development.

Religious freedom, however, as a constitutional mandate is not inhibition of profound

reverence for religion and is not denial of its influence in human affairs. Religion as a profession

of faith to an active power that binds and elevates man to his Creator is recognized. And, in so

far as it instills into the minds the purest principles of morality, its influence is deeply felt and

highly appreciated. When the Filipino people, in the preamble of their Constitution, implored

"the aid of Divine Providence, in order to establish a government that shall embody their ideals,

conserve and develop the patrimony of the nation, promote the general welfare, and secure to

themselves and their posterity the blessings of independence under a regime of justice, liberty

and democracy," they thereby manifested reliance upon Him who guides the destinies of men

and nations. The elevating influence of religion in human society is recognized here as

elsewhere. In fact, certain general concessions are indiscriminately accorded to religious sects

and denominations.

People v Palomar

G.R No. L-22008; Nov. 3, 1924

FACTS:

Macaria Fajardo was an employee of La Flor de la Isabela, a Tobacco factory. She was granted a

vacation leave, by reason of her pregnancy, which commenced on the 16th of July 1923.

According to Fajardo, during that time, she was not given the salary due her in violation of the

provisions of Act No. 3071. Fajardo filed a criminal complaint based on Section 13 and 15 of

said Act against the manager of the tobacco Factory, Julio Pomar, herein defendant. The latter,

on the other hand, claims that the facts in the complaint did not constitute an offense and further

alleges that the aforementioned provisions of Act No. 3071 was unconstitutional. Section 13, Act

No. 3071 provides that, Every person, firm or corporation owning or managing a factory, shop

or place of labor of any description shall be obliged to grant to any woman employed by it as

laborer who may be pregnant, thirty days vacation with pay before and another thirty days after

confinement: Provided, That the employer shall not discharge such laborer without just cause,

under the penalty of being required to pay to her wages equivalent to the total of two months

counting from the day of her discharge. Section 15 of the same Act provides for the penalty of

any violation of section 13. The latter was enacted by the legislature in the exercise of its

supposed Police Power with the purpose of safeguarding the health of pregnant women laborers

in "factory, shop or place of labor of any description," and of insuring to them, to a certain

extent, reasonable support for one month before and one month after their delivery. The trial

court rendered a decision in favor of plaintiff, sentencing the defendant to pay the fine of fifty

pesos and in case of insolvency, to suffer subsidiary imprisonment. Hence, the case was raised to

the Court of Appeals which affirmed the former decision.

ISSUES:

Whether or not Section 13 of Act No. 3071 is unconstitutional.

HELD:

The Court declared Section 13 of Act No. 3071 to be unconstitutional for being violative or

restrictive of the right of the people to freely enter into contracts for their affairs. It has been

decided several times, that the right to contract about one's affairs is a part of the liberty of the

individual, protected by the "due process of law" clause of the constitution. The contracting

parties may establish any agreements, terms, and conditions they may deem advisable, provided

they are not contrary to law, morals or public policy. The police power of the state is a very

broad and expanding power. The police power may encompass every law for the restraint and

punishment of crimes, for the preservation of the public peace, health, and morals. But that

power cannot grow faster than the fundamental law of the state, nor transcend or violate the

express inhibition of the constitution. The Police Power is subject to and is controlled by the

paramount authority of the constitution of the state, and will not be permitted to violate rights

secured or guaranteed by the latter.

Calalang v Williams

G.R. No. 47800; December 2, 1940

FACTS:

Maximo Calalang, in his capacity as a private citizen and as a taxpayer of Manila, brought before

this court this petition for a writ of prohibition against the respondents. That the respondents

caused to enforce the resolution of the National Traffic Commission dated July 17, 1940

pursuant to the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 548, that such enforcement is detrimental

not only of their owners but of the riding public as well.

The resolution of the NTC pursuant to the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 548 which

states that animal-drawn vehicles be prohibited from passing along Rosario Street extending

from Plaza Calderon de la Barca to Dasmarias Street, from 7:30 a.m. to 12:30 p.m. and from

1:30 p.m. to 5:30 p.m.; and along Rizal Avenue extending from the railroad crossing at Antipolo

Street to Echague Street, from 7 a.m. to 11 p.m., from a period of one year from the date of the

opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic.

The petition contends that the rules and regulations complained of infringe upon the

constitutional precept regarding the promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and

economic security of all the people.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the rules and regulation promulgated by the respondents violates Art. 2, Sec. 10

of the Constitution.

HELD:

No, the court explained the promotion of social justice, however, is to be achieved not through a

mistaken sympathy towards any given group. Social justice is neither communism, nor

despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy, but the humanization of laws and the equalization of

social and economic forces by the State so that justice in its rational and objectively secular

conception may at least be approximated.

Social justice means the promotion of the welfare of all the people, the adoption by the

Government of measures calculated to insure economic stability of all the competent elements of

society, through the maintenance of a proper economic and social equilibrium in the

interrelations of the members of the community, constitutionally, through the adoption of

measures legally justifiable, or extra-constitutionally, through the exercise of powers underlying

the existence of all governments on the time-honored principle of salus populi est suprema lex.

Social justice, therefore, must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of interdependence

among divers and diverse units of a society and of the protection that should be equally and

evenly extended to all groups as a combined force in our social and economic life, consistent

with the fundamental and paramount objective of the state of promoting the health, comfort, and

quiet of all persons, and of bringing about the greatest good to the greatest number.

Hence, the petition for prohibition has been dismissed.

Bacani v. NACOCO

100 Phil. 468; 1956

FACTS:

The petitioners are court stenographers assigned in Branch VI of the CFI of Manila. During the

pendency of a civil case of said court, entitled Francisco Sycip vs. NACOCO, Assistant

Corporate Counsel Federico Alikpala, counsel for NACOCO, requested said stenographers for

copies of the transcript of the stenographic notes taken by them during the hearing. Plaintiffs

complied with the request by delivering to Counsel Alikpala the needed transcript containing 714

pages and thereafter submitted to him their bills for the payment of their fees. The National

Coconut Corporation paid the amount of P564 to Bacani and P150 to Matoto for said transcript

at the rate of P1 per page.

Upon inspecting the books of this corporation, the Auditor General disallowed the payment of

these fees and sought the recovery of the amounts paid. On January 1953, the Auditor General

required the Plaintiffs to reimburse said amounts on the strength of a circular of the Department

of Justice wherein the opinion was expressed that NACOCO, being a government entity, was

exempt from the payment of the fees in question. On Feb 1954, the Auditor General issued an

order directing the Cashier of the DOJ to deduct from the salary of Bacani the amount of P25

every payday and from the salary of Matoto the amount of P10 every payday beginning March

30, 1954. To prevent deduction of these fees from their salaries and secure a judicial ruling that

the NACOCO is not a government entity within the purview of section 16, Rule 130 of the Rules

of Court, this action was instituted in the CFI of Manila.

ISSUE:

Whether or not NACOCO is part of the government.

HELD:

GOCCs do not acquire that status for the simple reason that they do not come under the

classification of municipal or public corporation. Take for instance the NACOCO. While it was

organized with the purpose of adjusting the coconut industry to a position independent of trade

preferences in the United States and of providing Facilities for the better curing of copra

products and the proper utilization of coconut by-products, a function which our government

has chosen to exercise to promote the coconut industry, however, it was given a corporate power

separate and distinct from our government, for it was made subject to the provisions of our

Corporation Law in so far as its corporate existence and the powers that it may exercise are

concerned (sections 2 and 4, Commonwealth Act No. 518). It may sue and be sued in the same

manner as any other private corporations, and in this sense it is an entity different from our

government.

Wherefore, the decision appealed from is affirmed, without pronouncement as to costs.

National Federation of Sugar Workers v. Ovejera,

114 SCRA 354; 1982

FACTS:

On January 22, 1982, NFSW filed with the Ministry of Labor and Employment (MOLE)

Regional Office in Bacolod City a notice to strike based on non-payment of the 13th month pay,

under PD 851(13th Month Pay Law), to the CAC. Labor Arbiter Ethelwoldo R. Ovejera of the

National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), among others, declared the ongoing strike of the

NFSW at the CAC illegal, principally for being violative of Batas Pambansa Blg. 130, that is, the

strike was declared before the expiration of the 15-day cooling-off period for unfair labor

practice (ULP) strikes, and the strike was staged before the lapse of seven days from the

submission to MOLE of the result of the strike-vote.

ISSUES:

Whether under Presidential Decree 851 (13th Month Pay Law), CAC is obliged to give its

workers a 13th month salary in addition to Christmas, milling and amelioration bonuses, the

aggregate of which admittedly exceeds by far the disputed 13th month pay.

HELD:

The Court ruled that NFSW cannot insist on its claim that its members are entitled to a 13th

month pay in addition to the bonuses already paid by CAC and the CAC is not obliged to give its

workers a 13th month salary in addition to Christmas, milling and amelioration bonuses, the

aggregate of which admittedly exceeds by far the disputed 13th month pay.

The evident intention of the Presidential Decree No. 851, was to grant an additional income in

the form of a 13th month pay to employees not already receiving the same. Otherwise put, the

intention was to grant some relief,- not to all workers- but only to the unfortunate ones not

actually paid a 13th month salary or what amounts to it, by whatever name called; but it was not

envisioned that a double burden would be imposed on the employer already paying his

employees a 13th month pay or its equivalent whether out of pure generosity or on the basis

of a binding agreement and, in the latter ease, regardless of the conditional character of the grant

(such as making the payment dependent on profit), so long as there is actual payment.

Roe v. Wade

410 U.S. 113; 1973

FACTS:

The petitioner is a pregnant single woman, brought a class action suit challenging the constitutionality

of the Texas abortion laws. These laws made it a crime to obtain or attempt an abortion except on

medical advice to save the life of the mother. The defendant was county District Attorney Wade. A

three-judge District Court panel tried the cases together and held that Roe and Hallford had standing

to sue and presented justiciable controversies, and that declaratory relief was warranted.

Roe and Hallford won their lawsuits at trial. The district court held that the Texas abortion statutes were

void as vague and for over broadly infringing the Ninth and Fourteenth Amendment rights of the

plaintiffs.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a womans right to privacy as protected by the constitution includes the right to abort her

child.

HELD:

Yes. The court ruled that the right of privacy is broad enough to encompass a womans decision

whether or not to terminate her pregnancy. The Court further said we therefore conclude that the right

of personal privacy includes abortion decision, but that this right is not unqualified and must be

considered against important state interests in regulation. A state criminal abortion statute of the

current Texas type that exempts from criminality only a lifesaving procedure on behalf of the mother,

without regard to pregnancy stage and without recognition of the interests involved (such as liberty

interests), is violative of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Imbong v. Ochoa

G.R. Nos. 204819, 204934, 204957, 204988,

205003, 205043, 205138, 205478, 205491,

205720, 206355; 08 April 2014

FACTS:

The case at bar is the petition for certiorari and prohibition by spouses Attys. James M. Imbong

and Lovely Ann C. Imbong, in their personal capacities as citizens, lawyers and taxpayers and on

behalf of their minor children; and the Magnificat Child Leaming Center, Inc., a domestic,

privately-owned educational institution. The petitioners contend that the RH Law violates the

right to life of the unborn.

The petitioners argued that the implementation of the RH Law would authorize the purchase of

hormonal contraceptives, intra-uterine devices and injectable which are abortive, in violation of

Section 12, Article II of the Constitution which guarantees protection of both the life of the

mother and the life of the unborn from conception. Also, The RH Law intrudes into the zone of

privacy of one's family protected by the Constitution. It is contended that the RH Law providing

for mandatory reproductive health education intrudes upon their constitutional right to raise their

children in accordance with their beliefs.

The respondents argues for the dismissal of the petitions for the reasons that: there is no actual

case or controversy and, therefore, the issues are not yet ripe for judicial determination.; some

petitioners lack standing to question the RH Law; the petitions are essentially petitions for

declaratory relief over which the Court has no original jurisdiction.

On May 30, 2013, the Court held a preliminary conference with the counsels of the parties to

determine and/or identify the pertinent issues raised by the parties and the sequence by which

these issues were to be discussed in the oral arguments. Thereafter, the Court directed the parties

to submit their respective memoranda within sixty (60) days and, at the same time posed several

questions for their clarification on some contentions of the parties.

ISSUES:

Whether or not RA 10354/Reproductive Health (RH) Law is unconstitutional for violating the

right to life and the righ to privacy.

HELD:

Accordingly, the Court declares R.A. No. 10354 constitutional except with respect to the

following provisions which are declared unconstitutional

Section 23(a)(2)(i), Section 23(a)(2)(ii), Section 3.0l(a) and Section 3.01G).

The Court further opined, as follows:

1. Majority of the Members of the Court believe that the question of when life begins is

a scientific and medical issue that should not be decided, at this stage, without proper

hearing and evidence. However, they agreed that individual Members could express

their own views on this matter.

Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution states: The State recognizes the sanctity of

family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social

institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn

from conception.

In its plain and ordinary meaning (a canon in statutory construction), the traditional

meaning of conception according to reputable dictionaries cited by the ponente is

that life begins at fertilization. Medical sources also support the view that conception

begins at fertilization.

The framers of the Constitution also intended for (a) conception to refer to the

moment of fertilization and (b) the protection of the unborn child upon fertilization.

In addition, they did not intend to ban all contraceptives for being unconstitutional;

only those that kill or destroy the fertilized ovum would be prohibited. Contraceptives

that actually prevent the union of the male sperm and female ovum, and those that

similarly take action before fertilization should be deemed non-abortive, and thus

constitutionally permissible.

The intent of the framers of the Constitution for protecting the life of the unborn child

was to prevent the Legislature from passing a measure prevent abortion. The Court

cannot interpret this otherwise. The RH Law is in line with this intent and actually

prohibits abortion. By using the word or in defining abortifacient (Section 4(a)),

the RH Law prohibits not only drugs or devices that prevent implantation but also

those that induce abortion and induce the destruction of a fetus inside the mothers

womb. The RH Law recognizes that the fertilized ovum already has life and that the

State has a bounded duty to protect it.

However, the authors of the IRR gravely abused their office when they redefined the

meaning of abortifacient by using the term primarily. Recognizing as abortifacients

only those that primarily induce abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the

mothers womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in

the mothers womb (Sec. 3.01(a) of the IRR) would pave the way for the approval of

contraceptives that may harm or destroy the life of the unborn from

conception/fertilization. This violates Section 12, Article II of the Constitution. For

the same reason, the definition of contraceptives under the IRR (Sec 3.01(j)), which

also uses the term primarily, must be struck down.

2. Section 23(a)(2)(i) of the RH Law, which permits RH procedures even with only the

consent of the spouse undergoing the provision (disregarding spousal

content), intrudes into martial privacy and autonomy and goes against the

constitutional safeguards for the family as the basic social institution. Particularly,

Section 3, Article XV of the Constitution mandates the State to defend: (a) the right

of spouses to found a family in accordance with their religious convictions and the

demands of responsible parenthood and (b) the right of families or family associations

to participate in the planning and implementation of policies and programs that affect

them. The RH Law cannot infringe upon this mutual decision-making, and endanger

the institutions of marriage and the family.

The exclusion of parental consent in cases where a minor undergoing a procedure is

already a parent or has had a miscarriage (Section 7 of the RH Law) is also anti-

family and violates Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution, which states: The

natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic

efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive the support of the

Government. In addition, the portion of Section 23(a)(ii) which reads in the case of

minors, the written consent of parents or legal guardian or, in their absence, persons

exercising parental authority or next-of-kin shall be required only in elective surgical

procedures is invalid as it denies the right of parental authority in cases where what

is involved is non-surgical procedures.

Lastly, the Status Quo Ante Order is lifted, insofar as the provisions of R.A. No. 10354

which have been declared as constitutional. Hence, the petitions are PARTIALLY GRANTED.

Oposa v. Factoran, Jr.

224 SCRA 792; 1993

FACTS:

The principal petitioners are all minors duly represented and joined by their respective parents.

Impleaded as an additional plaintiff is the Philippine Ecological Network, Inc. (PENI), a

domestic, non-stock and non-profit corporation organized for the purpose of, inter alia, engaging

in concerted action geared for the protection of our environment and natural resources. The

original defendant was the Honorable Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., then Secretary of the

Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).

The complaint was instituted as a taxpayers' class suit and alleges that the plaintiffs "are all

citizens of the Republic of the Philippines, taxpayers, and entitled to the full benefit, use and

enjoyment of the natural resource treasure that is the country's virgin tropical forests." This

instant petition was filed to seek for the cancelation of all existing timber license agreements

(TLAs) in the country and to cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or

approving new timber license agreements. Minor petitioners contend that continued granting of

timber license constitutes a misappropriation or impairment of the natural resource property and

violates their constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology (Art. II, Sec. 16, 1987

Constitution). As strong support, they presented scientific evidence that deforestation have

resulted in a host of environmental tragedies.

Defendant, Secretary Factoran, Jr., filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint based on two

grounds, namely: the plaintiffs have no cause of action against him and, the issue raised by the

plaintiffs is a political question which properly pertains to the legislative or executive branches

of Government.

Petitioners contend that the complaint clearly and unmistakably states a cause of action as it

contains sufficient allegations concerning their right to a sound environment based on Articles

19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code (Human Relations), Section 4 of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 192

creating the DENR, Section 3 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1151 (Philippine Environmental

Policy), Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution recognizing the right of the people to a

balanced and healthful ecology, the concept of generational genocide in Criminal Law and the

concept of man's inalienable right to self-preservation and self-perpetuation embodied in natural

law.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not petitioners have a cause of action.

2. Whether or not the petitioners failed to allege in their complaint a specific legal right violated

by the respondent Secretary for which any relief is provided by law.

HELD:

1. Every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony for the

full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the minors' assertion

of their right to a sound environment constitutes, at the same time, the performance of their

obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the generations to come. The Court finds no

difficulty in ruling that they can file a class suit because they represent their generation as well as

generations yet unborn. Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can only

be based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and

healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right, as hereinafter expounded, considers the "rhythm

and harmony of nature."

2. The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right the right to a balanced and healthful ecology which, for the first time in our nation's constitutional history, is solemnly

incorporated in the fundamental law (Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution). Hence, the

Court does not agree with the trial court's conclusions that the plaintiffs failed to allege with

sufficient definiteness a specific legal right involved or a specific legal wrong committed, and

that the complaint is replete with vague assumptions and conclusions based on unverified data.

While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the Declaration of

Principles and State Policies and not under the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is less

important than any of the civil and political rights enumerated in the latter. Such a right belongs

to a different category of rights altogether for it concerns nothing less than self-preservation and

self-perpetuation aptly and fittingly stressed by the petitioners the advancement of which

may even be said to predate all governments and constitutions. The petitioners personality to

sue in behalf of their own as well as the future generations behalf can only be based on the

concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the said right is concerned.

Laguna Lake Development Authority v CA

G.R. No. 110120; March 16, 1994

FACTS:

The petitioner, Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA), seeks for a review of the decision

of the Court of Appeals declaring LLDA no power and authority to issue a cease and desist order

enjoining the dumping of garbage in Barangay Camarin, Tala Estate, Caloocan City. The LLDA

issued a Cease and Desist Order ordering the City Government of Caloocan, Metropolitan Manila

Authority, their contractors, and other entities, to completely halt, stop and desist from dumping

any form or kind of garbage and other waste matter at the Camarin dumpsite. The dumping

operation was stopped however the operation resumed.

Pending resolution of its motion for reconsideration earlier filed on September 17, 1992 with the

LLDA, the City Government of Caloocan filed with the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City an

action for the declaration of nullity of the cease and desist order with prayer for the issuance of

writ of injunction, docketed as Civil Case No. C-15598. In its complaint, the City Government of

Caloocan sought to be declared as the sole authority empowered to promote the health and safety

and enhance the right of the people in Caloocan City to a balanced ecology within its territorial

jurisdiction. The City Government went to the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City to file an

action for the declaration of nullity of the cease and desist order and sought to be declared as the

sole authority empowered to promote the health and safety and enhance the right of the people in

Caloocan City to a balanced ecology within its territorial jurisdiction.

LLDA sought to dismiss the complaint, invoking the Pollution Control Law that the review of

cease and desist orders of that nature falls under the Court of Appeals and not the RTC. RTC

denied LLDAs motion to dismiss, and issued a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining LLDA from enforcing the cease and desist order during the pendency of the case. The Court of Appeals

promulgated a decision that ruled that the LLDA has no power and authority to issue a cease and

desist order enjoining the dumping of garbage. The residents seek a review of the decision.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the LLDA has authority and power to issue an order which, in its nature and effect

was injunctive.

HELD:

The petition is granted. The temporary restraining order issued by the Court on July 19, 1993

enjoining the City Mayor of Caloocan and/or the City Government of Caloocan from dumping

their garbage at the Tala Estate, Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City is hereby made

permanent.vLLDA was been mandated by the law to manage the environment, preserve the quality

of human life and ecological disturbances, deterioration and pollution in the Laguna Lake area and

surrounding provinces and cities, including Caloocan.is mandated by law to manage the

environment, preserve the quality of human life and ecological systems and prevent undue

ecological disturbances, deterioration and pollution in the Laguna Lake area and surrounding

provinces and cities, including Caloocan. While pollution cases are generally under the Pollution

Adjudication Board under the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, it does not

preclude mandate from special laws that provide another forum. In this case, RA No. 4850 provides

that mandate to the LLDA. It is mandated to pass upon or approve or disapprove plans and

programs of local government offices and agencies within the region and their underlying

environmental/ecological repercussions. The DENR even recognized the primary jurisdiction of

the LLDA over the case when the DENR acted as intermediary at a meeting among the

representatives of the city government, LLDA and the residents. LLDA has the authority to issue

the cease and desist order.

Metro Manila Development Authority (MMDA) v. Residents of Manila Bay

G.R. Nos. 171947-48; 2008

FACTS:

The concerned residents of Manila Bay filed a complaint before the Regional Trial Court in Imus

Cavite for cleanup, rehabilitation, and protection of the Manila Bay since it the condition of

Manila Bay had fallen way below the allowable standards set by law, specifically Presidential

Decree No. (PD) 1152 or the Philippine Environment Code, that water quality to be class B

waters fit for swimming, skin-diving, and other forms of contact recreation.

The petitioners argued to the CA that PD 1152s provision only pertain to the cleaning of

specific pollution incidents and do not cover cleaning in general but the CA affirmed the RTCs

decision.

ISSUES:

1. Whether Sections 17 and 20 of PD 1152 under the headings, Upgrading of water Quality and

Clean-up Operations, envisage a cleanup in general or are they limited to the cleanup of

specific pollution incidents

2. Whether petitioners be compelled by mandamus to clean up and rehabilitate the Manila Bay.

HELD:

The Supreme Court held that Sections 17 and 20 of PD 1152 include cleaning in general. Section

17 provides that in case the water quality has deteriorated, the government agencies concerned

shall act on it to bring back the standard quality of water. It also emphasizes that government

agencies should clean that water for the sake of meeting and maintaining the right quality

standard. This presupposes that the government agencies concerned have the duties of cleaning

the water not only in times when water is polluted. While Section 20 also mandates the

government agencies concerned to take action in cleaning-up in case the polluters failed to do

their part.

According to the Supreme Court, the obligations to perform the duties of the petitioners and on

how they carry out such duties are two distinct concepts. That is, discretionary and ministerial

duty. As for this case it is the discretion of the petitioners to choose not to perform or to perform

their duties as defined by law and when they have chosen to perform their duties, the way they

carry out those duties are called ministerial acts.

It is very clear in their charters that aside from performing their main function as an agency, they

are also mandated to perform certain functions relating directly or indirectly to the cleanup,

rehabilitation, and preservation of the Manila Bay.

Basco v. PAGCOR

G.R. No.91649; May 14, 1991

FACTS:

Petitioners in this case, seeks to annul the PAGCOR because it is allegedly contrary to morals,

public policy and public order, among others.

On July 11, 1983, PAGCOR was created under Presidential Decree 1869, pursuant to the policy

of the government, to regulate and centralize through an appropriate institution all games of

chance authorized by existing franchise or permitted by law. This was subsequently proven to

be beneficial not just to the government but also to the society in general. It is a reliable source of

much needed revenue for the cash-strapped Government.

The petitioners argue that PD 1869 is unconstitutional because: 1.) it is contrary to morals, public

policy and public order; 2.) it constitutes a waiver of the right of the City of Manila to improve

taxes and legal fees; and that the exemption clause in PD 1869 is violative of constitutional

principle of Local Autonomy; 3.) it violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution in that

it legalizes gambling thru PAGCOR while most other forms are outlawed together with

prostitution, drug trafficking and other vices; and 4.) it is contrary to the avowed trend of the

Cory Government, away from monopolistic and crony economy and toward free enterprise and

privatization.

ISSUE:

Whether PD 1869 is unconstitutional.

HELD:

The Court explained that gambling, in all its forms, is generally prohibited, unless allowed by

law. But the prohibition of gambling does not mean that the government cannot regulate it in the

exercise of its police power, wherein the state has the authority to enact legislation that may

interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare.

The equal protection clause of the Constitution does not preclude classification of individuals

who may be accorded different treatment under the law, provided it is not unreasonable or

arbitrary. The clause does not prohibit the legislature from establishing classes of individuals or

objects upon which different rules shall operate.

Every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality, thus, to be nullified, it must be

shown that there is a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution. In this case, the grounds

raised by petitioners have failed to overcome the presumption.

Therefore, the case is dismissed for lack of merit.