CONSTITUTIONAL LAW CLASS COMPILATION 5CONTENTSApplication for adm. Tabasa vs CA Jacot vs Dal Co vs HRET Frivaldo vs COMELEC De Guzman vs COMELECMa vs Commissioner Alterajos vs COMELEC Japzon vs COMELECRepublic vs Dela Rosa Bengson vs HRET Cordora vs COMELECCo vs Civil Registrar Petition for leave.. Akbayan vs COMELECKilosbayan vs Ermita Labo vs COMELEC Palatino vs COMELECVilando vs HRET Djumantan vs Domingo Rumualdez vs RTCAznar vs COMELEC Mercado vs Manzano Asistio vs Trinidad-PeValles vs COMELEC Valles vs COMELEC Velasco vs COMELECYu vs Santiago AASJS vs Datumanong Macalintal vs COMELEC

Nicolas-Lewis vs COMELECRE: APPLICATION FOR ADMISSION TO THE PHILIPPINE BAR. VICENTE D CHING,   digested

Bar Matter. No. 914, October 1, 1999 (Constitutional Law – Citizenship)

FACTS: Petitioner, who resided in the Philippines since his birth during the 1935 Constitution, is a legitimate son of a Filipina married to a Chinese citizen. Subsequently, petitioner elected Philippine citizenship 14 years after he reached the age of majority. OSG recommends the relaxation of the standing rule on the construction of the phrase “reasonable period” and the allowance of the petitioner to elect Philippine citizenship due to circumstances like petitioner having lived in the Philippines all his life and his consistent belief that he is a Filipino.

ISSUE: Whether or not a legitimate child under the 1935 Constitution of a Filipino mother and an alien father validly elect Philippine citizenship 14 years after he has reached the age of majority.

HELD: No, despite the special circumstances, Petitioner failed to validly elect Philippine citizenship. The span of 14 years that lapsed from the time he reached the age of majority until he finally expressed his intention to elect Philippine citizenship is clearly way beyond the contemplation of the requirement “upon reaching the age of majority.” In addition, there was no reason why he delayed his election of Philippine citizenship.

Co vs HRETFACTS:The respondent’s father, Jose Ong Chuan, was born in China but was brought to and grew up in the Philippines. He married a native Filipina, who bore eight children including the respondent. In 1955, Jose Ong Chuan was declared a Filipino citizen, and in 1957, he took his Oath of Allegiance and was issued a certificate of naturalization.Jose Jr. was a minor by that time and was finishing his elementary education in Samar. In search for better education, he went to Manila in order to acquire his secondary and college education, and thereafter took and passed the CPA Board Examinations. Since employment opportunities were better in Manila, the respondent looked for work there. He found a job in the Central Bank of the Philippines as an examiner. Later, however, he worked in the

hardware business of his family in Manila. The respondent frequently went home to Laoang, Samar, where he grew up and spent his childhood days.For the elections of 1984 and 1986, Jose Ong, Jr. registered himself as a voter of Laoang, Samar, and correspondingly, voted there during those elections. After being engaged for several years in the management of their family business, he decided to be of greater service to his province and ran for public office. On May 11, 1987, the congressional election for the second district of Northern Samal was held. Among the candidates who vied for the position of representative are the petitioners, Sixto Balinquit and Antonio Co, and the private respondent, Jose Ong, Jr.Ong was proclaimed the duly elected representative of the second district of Northern Samar. The petitioners filed election protests against the private respondent on the following grounds:1) Jose Ong, Jr. is not a natural born citizen of the Philippines; and2) Jose Ong, Jr. is not a resident of the second district of Northern Samar.The HRET decided in favor of the respondent. ISSUE:WON the HRET acted with grave abuse of discretion when it ruled that Ong was a resident of Northern Samar and a natural-born citizen of the Philippines.

HELD:No, the HRET did not commit grave abuse of discretion, based on the following premises:

1. On the issue of JurisdictionThe Constitution explicitly provides that the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) and the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) shall be the sole judges of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective members; and so long as the Constitution grants the HRET this power, any final action taken by the HRET on a matter within its jurisdiction shall, as a rule, not be reviewed by the Supreme Court.The power of the Electoral Commission "is beyond judicial interference except, in any event, upon a clear showing of such arbitrary and improvident use of power as will constitute a denial of due process." In the case at bar, the Court finds no improvident use of power, no denial of due process on the part of the HRET which will necessitate the exercise of the power of judicial review.

2. On the issue of CitizenshipUnder the 1935 Constitution, one born of a Filipino father and an alien mother was automatically granted the status of a natural-born citizen, while one born of a Filipino mother and an alien father would still have to elect Philippine citizenship. However, under the 1973 Constitution, those born of Filipino fathers and those born of Filipino mothers with an alien father were placed on equal footing. They were both considered as natural-born citizens. The Constitutional provision in question is curative in nature, thus it has to be applied retroactively.The respondent was born in the rural town of Samar. He has lived the life of a Filipino since birth. His father applied for naturalization when he was still a small boy. He is a Roman

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW CLASS COMPILATION 5Catholic. He has worked for a sensitive government agency. His profession requires citizenship for taking the examinations and getting a license. He has participated in political exercises as a Filipino and has always considered himself a Filipino citizen. There is nothing in the records to show that he does not embrace Philippine customs and values, no acts to show that this country is not his natural homeland.An election of Philippine citizenship presupposes that the person electing is an alien, or his status is doubtful because he is a national of two countries. There is no doubt in this case that Jose Ong, Jr. is a Filipino when he turned 21. Any election of Philippine citizenship on the part of the respondent would not only have been unnecessary but it would also have resulted in an absurdity. How can a Filipino citizen elect Philippine citizenship?

3. On the issue of ResidenceThe term "residence" has been understood as synonymous with domicile not only under the previous Constitutions but also under the 1987 Constitution. The term "domicile" denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent for business or pleasure, one intends to return. The absence of a person from said permanent residence, no matter how long, notwithstanding, it continues to be the domicile of that person.The petitioners alleged that since the private respondent owns no property in Laoang, Samar, he cannot, therefore, be a resident of said place. The Court ruled that it is not required that a person should have a house in order to establish his residence and domicile. It is enough that he should live in the municipality or in a rented house or in that of a friend or relative. The Constitution only requires that the candidate meet the age, citizenship, voting and residence requirements. Nowhere is it required by the Constitution that the candidate should also own property in order to be qualified to run.

MA VS COMMISSIONERFACTS:The petitioners herein were born of a Taiwanese father and a natural-born Filipino mother, under the 1935 Constitution. At that time, those who were born of a Filipino mother but an alien father have to elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. However, they were all raised, have resided and lived their whole lives in this country. They do not speak nor understand the Chinese language, have not set foot in Taiwan, and do not know any relative of their father. During their age of minority, they secured from the Bureau of Immigration their Alien Certificates of Registration (ACRs). Immediately upon reaching the age of twenty-one, they claimed Philippine citizenship. Having taken their oath of allegiance as Philippine citizens, petitioners, however, failed to have the necessary documents registered in the civil registry as required under Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 625.

ISSUE:WON late registration of the acquired Filipino citizenship in the Civil Registry impedes persons to become naturalized citizens of the Philippines.

HELD:

No. Petitioners complied with the first and second requirements upon reaching the age of majority. They timely took their oath of allegiance to the Philippines. This was a serious undertaking. It was commitment and fidelity to the state coupled with a pledge "to renounce absolutely and forever all allegiance" to any other state. This was unqualified acceptance of their identity as a Filipino and the complete disavowal of any other nationality.It was only the registration of the documents of election with the civil registry that was belatedly done. The SC ruled that under the facts peculiar to the petitioners, the right to elect Philippine citizenship has not been lost and they should be allowed to complete the statutory requirements for such election. Petitioners have passed decades of their lives in the Philippines as Filipinos. Their present status having been formed by their past, petitioners can no longer have any national identity except that which they chose upon reaching the age of reason. The actual exercise of Philippine citizenship, for over half a century by the herein petitioners, is actual notice to the Philippine public which is equivalent to formal registration of the election of Philippine citizenship.Under the 1973 Constitution, those born of Filipino fathers and those born of Filipino mothers with an alien father were placed on equal footing. They were both automatically considered as natural-born citizens. This Constitutional provision is curative in nature, and has to be applied retroactively. Thus, while the 1935 Constitution requires that children of Filipino mothers elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching their age of majority, upon the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution, they automatically become Filipinos and need not elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority.

REPUBLIC vs DELA ROSA Facts:Frivaldo, in his intent to run as Governor of Sorsogon, filed a petition for naturalization to be re-admitted as a citizen of the Philippines. When the judge set the date of the petition hearing on March, 1992, Frivaldo filed a ‘Motion to Set the Hearing Ahead of Schedule’ for it to be held on January instead, as the elections will be on May. On February, Judge Dela Rosa vested Frivaldo as a natural-born Filipino by naturalization. Subsequently, Frivaldo ran and won as the Governor of Sorsogon in the May 1992 Elections. Petitioner questioned the validity of Frivaldo’s citizenship, arguing that his citizenship is still pending at the moment.

Issue: Whether or not Frivaldo is already a Filipino citizen when he ran as Governor of Sorsogon

Ruling: No, Frivaldo is not yet a Filipino citizen when he ran as Governor of Sorsogon. Section 1 of R.A. No. 530 provides that no decision granting citizenship in naturalization proceedings shall be executory until after two years from its promulgation. Therefore, Frivaldo is not yet a Filipino citizen at the time of the elections, as his petition for citizenship can only be made final after two years.

CO vs CIVIL REGISTRARFacts:

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW CLASS COMPILATION 5Hubert and Arlene Co, born in 1974 and 1975 respectively, are children of Co Boon Peng, who applied for naturalization to become a citizen of the Philippines. In 1977, Peng’s application was granted and took an oath as a naturalized citizen of the country. In 1998, petitioners filed for correction of entries in their certificate of birth to become Filipino citizens on the ground of their father’s naturalization.

Issue:

Whether or not Peng’s naturalization would also grant naturalization to his children

Ruling:xNo, It is not enough that the petitioners adduce in evidence the certificate of naturalization of their father, Co Boon Peng, and of his oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, to entitle them to Philippine citizenship. They are likewise mandated to prove the following material allegations in their petition:

(a) that they are the legitimate children of Co Boon Peng;

(b) that they were born in the Philippines; and,

(c) that they were still minors when Co Boon Peng was naturalized as a Filipino citizen.

KILOSBAYAN vs ErmitaG.R. No. 177721FACTS:May 16, 2007, respondent Executive Secretary Ermita announced an appointment in favor of respondent Gregory S. Ong as Associate Justice of the Supreme Court. The appointment was reported the following day, May 17, 2007. However, on the day of the said appointment, it was “recalled” by the Malacañang in question of Ong’s citizenship, and was being validated by the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC)."

Petitioners contend that the appointment of Ong is patently unconstitutional and issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Petitioners also claim that respondent Ong is a Chinese citizen, as indicated in his birth certificate,which also reveals that at the time of respondent’s birth on May 25, 1953, his parents were Chinese.

Petitioners maintain that even if it were granted that eleven years after respondent Ong’s birth his father was finally granted Filipino citizenship by naturalization, that, by itself, would not make respondent Ong a natural-born Filipino citizen. Petitioners thereupon pray that a writ of certiorari be issued annulling the appointment. Subsequently, petitioners filed an Urgent Motion for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) to prevent and restrain respondent Executive Secretary from releasing the appointment of respondent Ong. The Court required respondents to Comment on the petition in which Ermita stated that the appointment of respondent Ong was made by the President pursuant to the powers vested in her by Article VIII, Section 9 of the Constitution.

In support, Ermita submits that 1) The President did not gravely abuse her discretion as she appointed a person, duly nominated by the JBC. 2) Ong is a natural-born citizen as determined by the Bureau of Immigration and affirmed by the Department of Justice. 3) Undisputed evidence disclosed that respondent Ong is a natural-born citizen. 4) Petitioners are not entitled to a temporary restraining order.

Respondent Ong submitted his Comment with Opposition, maintaining that he is a natural-born Filipino citizen; that petitioners have no standing to file the present suit and the petitioners failed to include the President who is an indispensable party as the one who extended the appointment.

Respondent Ong subsequently obtained from the Bureau of Immigration and the DOJ a certification and an identification that he is a natural-born Filipino citizen under Article IV, Sections 1 and 2 of the Constitution, since his mother was a Filipino citizen when he was born.ISSUEWhether or not respondent Ong a natural-born Filipino citizenRULING

Yes, respondent Ong is a naturalized Filipino citizen. On this point, the Court takes judicial notice of the records of Ong’s petition to be admitted to the Philippine bar. In his petition to be admitted to the Philippine bar, Ong alleged that he is qualified to be admitted to the Philippine bar because he is a Filipino citizen; and that he is a Filipino citizen because his father, Eugenio Ong Han Seng, a Chinese citizen, was naturalized in 1964 when he, respondent Ong, was a minor of eleven years and thus he, too, thereby became a Filipino citizen. It was on the basis of these allegations under oath and the submitted evidence of naturalization that this Court allowed respondent Ong to take the oath as a lawyer.

It is clear, therefore, that from the records of this Court, respondent Ong is a naturalized Filipino citizen. The alleged subsequent recognition of his natural-born status by the Bureau of Immigration and the DOJ cannot amend the final decision of the trial court stating that respondent Ong and his mother were naturalized along with his father.

Vilando vs HRETG.R. Nos.  192147 & 19214FACTSIn the May 14, 2007 elections, Limkaichong filed her certificate of candidacy for the position of Representative of the First District of Negros Oriental.  She won over the other contender, Olivia Paras.  On July 23, 2007, she assumed office as Member of the House of Representatives. Thereafter, petitions that questioned Limkaichong’s citizenship were filed by her detractors: Louis Biraogo, Olivia Paras and Renald F. Vilando.  These petitions were consolidated with the petition for certiorari filed by Limkaichong assailing the Joint Resolution issued by the COMELEC which resolved the disqualification cases against her. 

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW CLASS COMPILATION 5On April 1, 2009, the Court granted the aforesaid petition of Limkaichong, reversed the Joint Resolution of the Comelec, dismissed the three (3) other petitions, and directed the petitioners to seek relief before the HRET by way of a petition for Quo Warranto. 

 On April 21, 2009 and May 27, 2009, petitioner Vilando as taxpayer; and Jacinto Paras, as registered voter of the congressional district concerned, filed separate petitions for Quo Warranto against Limkaichong before the HRET. Petitioners asserted that Limkaichong was a Chinese citizen and ineligible for the office she was elected. They alleged that she was born to a father (Julio Sy), whose naturalization had not attained finality, and to a mother who acquired the Chinese citizenship of Julio Sy from the time of her marriage to the latter.  

          For her defense, Limkaichong maintained that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen.  She averred that the acquisition of Philippine citizenship by her father was regular and in order and had already attained the status of res judicata. Further, she claimed that the validity of such citizenship could not be assailed through a collateral attack. On March 24, 2010, the HRET dismissed both petitions and declared Limkaichong not disqualified as Member of the House of Representatives. The petitioners sought reconsideration of the aforesaid decision, but it was denied by the HRET in its Resolution dated May 17, 2010. Hence, this petition for certiorari filed by Vilando.

ISSUEWhether or not HRET erred in favoring the qualification of Limkaichong’s

citizenship. RULING          No, the Court is of the view that the HRET committed no grave abuse of discretion in finding that Limkaichong is not disqualified to sit as Member of the House of Representatives. Vilando’s argument, that the petition does not operate as a collateral attack on the citizenship of Limkaichong’s father as the certificate of naturalization is null and void from the beginning, is of no merit.

In this petition, Vilando seeks to disqualify Limkaichong on the ground that she is a Chinese citizen.  To prove his point, he makes reference to the alleged nullity of the grant of naturalization of Limkaichong’s father which, however, is not allowed as it would constitute a collateral attack on the citizenship of the father.  In our jurisdiction, an attack on a person's citizenship may only be done through a direct action for its nullity. Vilando asserts that as an incident in determining the eligibility of Limkaichong, the HRET, having the jurisdiction to determine her qualifications, can pass upon the efficacy of the certificate of naturalization.          

Records disclose that Limkaichong was born in Dumaguete City on November 9, 1959.  Indubitably, with Limkaichong’s father having been conferred the status as a naturalized Filipino, it follows that she is a Filipino citizen born to a Filipino father. 

Even on the assumption that the naturalization proceedings and the subsequent issuance of certificate of naturalization were invalid, Limkaichong can still be considered a natural-born Filipino citizen having been born to a Filipino mother and having impliedly elected Filipino citizenship when she reached majority age.  The HRET is, thus, correct in declaring that Limkaichong is a natural-born Filipino citizen. Vilando’s assertion that Limkaichong cannot derive Philippine citizenship from her mother because the latter became a Chinese citizen when she married Julio Sy, as provided for under Section 1 (7) of Commonwealth Act No. 63 in relation to Article 2 (1) Chapter II of the Chinese Revised Nationality Law of February 5, 1959,  must likewise fail.

           As aptly pointed out by the HRET, Vilando was not able to offer in evidence a duly certified true copy of the alleged Chinese Revised Law of Nationality to prove that Limkaichong’s mother indeed lost her Philippine citizenship.  Verily, Vilando failed to establish his case through competent and admissible evidence to warrant a reversal of the HRET ruling.

AZNAR VS COMELEC

Facts:

On November 19, 1987, private respondent Emilio "Lito" Osmeña filed his certificate of candidacy with the COMELEC for the position of Provincial Governor of Cebu Province in the January 18, 1988 local elections. On January 22, 1988, the Cebu PDP-Laban Provincial Council (Cebu-PDP Laban, for short), as represented by petitioner Jose B. Aznar in his capacity as its incumbent Provincial Chairman, filed with the COMELEC a petition for the disqualification of private respondent on the ground that he is allegedly not a Filipino citizen, being a citizen of the United States of America.

Private respondent maintained that he is a Filipino citizen, alleging: that he is the legitimate child of Dr. Emilio D. Osmeña, a Filipino and son of the late President Sergio Osmeña, Sr.; that he is a holder of a valid and subsisting Philippine Passport No. 0855103 issued on March 25, 1987; that he has been continuously residing in the Philippines since birth and has not gone out of the country for more than six months; and that he has been a registered voter in the Philippines since 1965. (pp. 107-108, Rollo)

On March 3, 1988, COMELEC (First Division) directed the Board of Canvassers to proclaim the winning candidates. Having obtained the highest number of votes, private respondent was proclaimed the Provincial Governor of Cebu. Thereafter, on June 11, 1988, COMELEC (First Division) dismissed the petition for disqualification for not having been timely filed and for lack of sufficient proof that private respondent is not a Filipino citizen.

Issue:

Whether or not private respondent is an alien. NO

Ruling:

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW CLASS COMPILATION 5Petitioner's contention that private respondent is not a Filipino citizen and, therefore, disqualified from running for and being elected to the office of Provincial Governor of Cebu, is not supported by substantial and convincing evidence.

In the proceedings before the COMELEC, the petitioner failed to present direct proof that private respondent had lost his Filipino citizenship by any of the modes provided for under C.A. No. 63. Among others, these are: (1) by naturalization in a foreign country; (2) by express renunciation of citizenship; and (3) by subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the Constitution or laws of a foreign country. From the evidence, it is clear that private respondent Osmeña did not lose his Philippine citizenship by any of the three mentioned hereinabove or by any other mode of losing Philippine citizenship.

In concluding that private respondent had been naturalized as a citizen of the United States of America, the petitioner merely relied on the fact that private respondent was issued alien certificate of registration and was given clearance and permit to re-enter the Philippines by the Commission on Immigration and Deportation. Petitioner assumed that because of the foregoing, the respondent is an American and "being an American", private respondent "must have taken and sworn to the Oath of Allegiance required by the U.S. Naturalization Laws." (p. 81, Rollo)

Philippine courts are only allowed to determine who are Filipino citizens and who are not. Whether or not a person is considered an American under the laws of the United States does not concern Us here. By virtue of his being the son of a Filipino father, the presumption that private respondent is a Filipino remains. It was incumbent upon the petitioner to prove that private respondent had lost his Philippine citizenship. As earlier stated, however, the petitioner failed to positively establish this fact.

In the instant case, private respondent vehemently denies having taken the oath of allegiance of the United States (p. 81, Rollo). He is a holder of a valid and subsisting Philippine passport and has continuously participated in the electoral process in this country since 1963 up to the present, both as a voter and as a candidate (pp. 107-108, Rollo). Thus, private respondent remains a Filipino and the loss of his Philippine citizenship cannot be presumed.

VALLES VS COMELEC

Facts:

Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born on May 16, 1934 in Napier Terrace, Broome, Western Australia, to the spouses, Telesforo Ybasco, a Filipino citizen and native of Daet, Camarines Norte, and Theresa Marquez, an Australian. In 1949, at the age of fifteen, she left Australia and came to settle in the Philippines. On June 27, 1952, she was married to Leopoldo Lopez, a Filipino citizen, at the Malate Catholic Church in Manila. Since then, she has continuously participated in the electoral process not only as a voter but as a candidate, as well. She served as Provincial Board Member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Davao Oriental. In 1992, she ran for and was elected governor of Davao Oriental. Her election was contested by her opponent, Gil Taojo, Jr., in a petition for quo warranto, docketed as

EPC No. 92-54, alleging as ground therefor her alleged Australian citizenship. However, finding no sufficient proof that respondent had renounced her Philippine citizenship, the Commission on Elections en banc dismissed the petition.

In the 1995 local elections, respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez ran for re-election as governor of Davao Oriental. Her opponent, Francisco Rabat, filed a petition for disqualification, docketed as SPA No. 95-066 before the COMELEC, First Division, contesting her Filipino citizenship but the said petition was likewise dismissed by the COMELEC, reiterating substantially its decision in EPC 92-54.

The citizenship of private respondent was once again raised as an issue when she ran for re-election as governor of Davao Oriental in the May 11, 1998 elections. Her candidacy was questioned by the herein petitioner, Cirilo Valles, in SPA No. 98-336.

The Commission on Elections ruled that private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez is a Filipino citizen and therefore, qualified to run for a public office because (1) her father, Telesforo Ybasco, is a Filipino citizen, and by virtue of the principle of jus sanguinis she was a Filipino citizen under the 1987 Philippine Constitution; (2) she was married to a Filipino, thereby making her also a Filipino citizen ipso jure under Section 4 of Commonwealth Act 473; (3) and that, she renounced her Australian citizenship on January 15, 1992 before the Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs of Australia and her Australian passport was accordingly cancelled as certified to by the Australian Embassy in Manila; and (4) furthermore, there are the COMELEC Resolutions in EPC No. 92-54 and SPA Case No. 95-066, declaring her a Filipino citizen duly qualified to run for the elective position of Davao Oriental governor.

Issue:

Whether or not Rosalind Lopez is an Australian or a Filipino.

Ruling:

The Philippine law on citizenship adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis. Thereunder, a child follows the nationality or citizenship of the parents regardless of the place of his/her birth, as opposed to the doctrine of jus soli which determines nationality or citizenship on the basis of place of birth.

Private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born on May 16, 1934 in Napier Terrace, Broome, Western Australia, to the spouses, Telesforo Ybasco, a Filipino citizen and native of Daet, Camarines Norte, and Theresa Marquez, an Australian. Historically, this was a year before the 1935 Constitution took into effect and at that time, what served as the Constitution of the Philippines were the principal organic acts by which the United States governed the country. These were the Philippine Bill of July 1, 1902 and the Philippine Autonomy Act of August 29, 1916, also known as the Jones Law.

Under both organic acts, all inhabitants of the Philippines who were Spanish subjects on April 11, 1899 and resided therein including their children are deemed to be Philippine citizens. Private respondent’s father, Telesforo Ybasco, was born on January 5, 1879 in

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW CLASS COMPILATION 5Daet, Camarines Norte, a fact duly evidenced by a certified true copy of an entry in the Registry of Births. Thus, under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the Jones Law, Telesforo Ybasco was deemed to be a Philippine citizen. By virtue of the same laws, which were the laws in force at the time of her birth, Telesforo’s daughter, herein private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, is likewise a citizen of the Philippines.

So also, the principle of jus sanguinis, which confers citizenship by virtue of blood relationship, was subsequently retained under the 1973[4] and 1987[5] Constitutions. Thus, the herein private respondent, Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, is a Filipino citizen, having been born to a Filipino father. The fact of her being born in Australia is not tantamount to her losing her Philippine citizenship. If Australia follows the principle of jus soli, then at most, private respondent can also claim Australian citizenship resulting to her possession of dual citizenship.

YU vs SANTIAGO

FACTS:

Petitioner was issued a Portuguese passport in 1971 valid for 5 years and is renewable after presentment to the proper Portuguese consular officer. Although he became a naturalized Philippine citizen on February 10, 1978, the petitioner applied for and was issued Portuguese passport by the Consular Section of the Portuguese Embassy in Tokyo in July 21, 1981. While he was still a citizen of the Philippines, he declared his nationality as Portuguese in commercial documents which he signed sometime in April 1980.

The Court issued TRO pending hearings with the Board of Special Inquiry, CID. However, the pleadings submitted before the Court clearly showed that the petitioner expressly renounced his Philippine citizenship.

ISSUE:

Whether the petitioner’s claim to continued citizenship is still valid as a ground to be released from detention in spite having reacquired Portuguese citizenship

RULING:

No, the petitoner’s motion for the release from detention is denied. “Philippine citizenship is not a commodity or were to be displayed when reacquired and suppressed when convenient.”

TABASA vs CA

FACTS:

Petitioner Joevanie Arellano Tabasa was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. In 1968, when he was seven years old, his father, Rodolfo Tabasa became a naturalized US citizen. By derivative naturalization (citizenship derived from that of another as from a

person who holds citizenship by virtue of naturalization), the petitioner also acquired American citizenship.

Petitioner arrived in the Philippines on August 3, 1995 as a “balikbayan.” He was arrested and detained on May 23, 1996. Records showed that on April 16, 1996, the Consul-General of the U.S. Embassy in Manila, filed a request with the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID) to apprehend and deport petitioner on the ground that a standing warrant for several charges had been issued against him and that respondent’s passport had been revoked.

Petitioner filed before the CA a Petition for Habeas Corpus with Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order on May 29, 1996. On May 30, 1996, the CA ordered that the Bureau be restrained from summarily deporting him. Meanwhile, Tabasa was temporary released through bail.

However, on June 13, 1996, petitioner filed a Supplemental Petition alleging that he had acquired Filipino citizenship through repatriation in accordance with RA No. 8171 “An Act Providing for the Repatriation of Filipino Women Who Have Lost Their Philippine Citizenship by Marriage to Aliens and of Natural-Born Filipinos.” He further contended that because of this, he was already a Filipino citizen and therefore cannot be deported or detained by BID.

The CA, in its August 7, 1996 Decision, 16 denied Tabasa’s petition on the ground that he had not legally and successfully acquired––by repatriation––his Filipino citizenship as provided in RA 8171. The court said that although he became an American citizen by derivative naturalization when his father was naturalized in 1968, there is no evidence to show that he lost his Philippine citizenship "on account of political or economic necessity," as explicitly provided in Section 1, RA 8171(note: find further explanation below, after the ruling). The court noted that after petitioner was ordered deported by the BID on May 29, 1996, he successively executed an Affidavit of Repatriation on June 6, 1996 and took an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on June 13, 1996––more than ten months after his arrival in the country on August 3, 1995.

ISSUE: Whether the petitioner has validly reacquired Philippine citizenship under RA 8171

RULING: No, the petitioner has no legal and valid reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.

RA 8171 provides repatriation to two kinds of persons:

(1)Filipino women who have lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens

(2)Natural-born Filipinos who have lost their Philippine citizenship, including their minor children, on account of political or economic necessity except those provided by Sec 4, CA 63:

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW CLASS COMPILATION 5(1) Person opposed to organized government or affiliated with any association or group of persons who uphold and teach doctrines opposing organized government;

(2) Person defending or teaching the necessity or propriety of violence, personal assault, or association for the predominance of their ideas;

(3) Person convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude; or

(4) Person suffering from mental alienation or incurable contagious diseases

This means that if a parent who had renounced his Philippine citizenship due to political or economic reasons later decides to repatriate under RA 8171, his repatriation will also benefit his minor children according to the law. To claim the benefit of RA 8171, however, the children must be of minor age at the time the petition for repatriation is filed by the parent. It is clear that Tabasa can no longer claim repatriation under RA 8171 given that only a parent can file for it, the approval of which will only benefit the children by extension. Also, clearly, he lost his citizenship by operation of law and not due to political and economic reasons.

Even if the SC concedes that petitioner Tabasa can avail of the benefit of RA 8171, still he failed to follow the procedure for reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. He has to file his petition for repatriation and submit required documents with the Special Committee on Naturalization (SCN), designated to process petitions for it. Such will which enable the SCN to verify if his reasons indeed qualify him for repatriation under RA 8171.

The petitioner is not entitled to repatriation under RA 8171 for he has not shown that his case falls within the coverage of the law.

Since Tabasa remains to be an alien and his passport has already been cancelled by the U.S. Embassy, under Immigration Act Sec 10 and 15, the alien automatically loses the privilege to undergo deportation proceedings. A summary judgment of deportation may be issued to take effect immediatel

Frivaldo vs Comelec

Facts: On March 20, 1995 private respondent Juan G. Frivaldo filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the Office of Governor in May, 8, 1995 election. Petitioner Raul Lee another candidate filed a petition with the COMELEC praying that Frivaldo be disqualified from seeking and holding any public office or position by reason of not being a citizen of the Philippines and that his Certificate of Candidacy be cancelled. In defense Frivaldo stated that he was able to regain his Filipino Citizenship through Repatriation.

The Second Division of COMELEC promulgated a Resolution granting the petition of Lee. The motion for reconsideration filed by Frivaldo remained unacted until the May 8, 1995 elections. His candidacy continued and was voted during the elections and he garnered the highest number of votes. The COMELEC affirmed the resolution of the 2nd resolution and directed the Board of Canvassers to reconvene thus Raul Lee was proclaimed the governor of Sorsogon.

Issue: Whether or not the Repatriation of Frivaldo was valid and legal and would qualify him to act and hold office of being a Governor in Sorsogon.

Ruling: No, the Repatriation of Frivaldo was valid and legal and it will qualify him to hold an office of being a Governor.

Under Section 117 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that a qualified voter must be, among other qualifications, a citizen of the Philippines, this

being an indispensable requirement for suffrage under Article V, Section 1, of the Constitution. PD 725, was enacted to cure the defect of existing

naturalization law in the Philippines after the regime of Marcos. Curative Statutes are retroactive since they are intended to supply

defects, abridge superfluities in existing laws and curb certain evils. This was being used by the Petitioner to claim his Citizenship through Repatriation with Naturalization.

Section 39 of the Local Government Code it states that the law intended Citizenship to be a qualification distinct from being a voter, even if being a voter presumes being a citizen first.

Philippine Citizenship is an indispensable requirement for holding an elective public office. Mr. Frivaldo indubitably a Filipino Citizen having taken his oath of allegiance and the candidate being proclaimed, who garnered the highest number of votes and such oath had already cured his previously “judicially declared” alienage.

The law intended citizenship to be a qualification distinct from being a voter, even if being a voter presumes being a Citizen first. Frivaldo’s status as a registered voter would also be deemed settled. In as much as he is considered having been repatriated, his Filipino Citizenship resolved and his previous registration as a voter is likewise deemed validated. To put all doubts on this issue with repatriation of Frivaldo, it retroacted to the date of the filing of his application.

Alterajos vs COMELEC

Facts: Petitioner was a candidate for mayor in the Municipality of San Jacinto, Masbate in the May 10, 2004 local and national election. Private

respondents filed a petition with the COMELEC to disqualify and deny or cancel his candidacy on the grounds that he is not a Filipino citizen and he made false representation on Certificate of Candidacy he was not a permanent resident of the Municipality of San Jacinto, Masbate. Altarejos answered that he was already issued a Certificate of Repatriation by the Special Committee on Naturalization in December 17, 1997.

Issue: Whether or not the registration of petitioner’s repatriation with the proper civil registry and with the Bureau of Immigration a prerequisite in

effecting repatriation and he is eligible to run as a Mayor of Masbate.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW CLASS COMPILATION 5Ruling: Yes. Alterajos registration with Civil Registry is a prerequisite in effecting

repatriation.

Section 2 RA 8171 The repatriation shall be effected by taking the Oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registration in the proper Civil Registar under the Bureau of Immigration.

Petitioner took his Oath of Allegiance Dec. 12, 1997 but his Certificate of Repatriation was registered in the Civil Registry of Makati City only after 6 years February 18, 2004 and with the Bureau of Immigration March 1, 2004.

Petitioner therefore completed all the requirements of repatriation after he filed his Certificate of Candidacy.

Petitioners repatriation retroacted to the date he filed his application, therefore he is qualified to run for a mayoralty position i the government.

Bengzon v. HRET

FACTS:

Cruz is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, born of Filipino parents who enlisted in the US Marine Corps in 1985. Taking an oath of allegiance to the USA without expressed consent of the Republic of the Philippines, he lost his Filipino citizenship based on CA No. 63 by “rendering service to or accepting commission in the armed forces of a foreign country.”

In 1994, Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship through repatriation under RA 2630 [(An Act Providing for Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship by Persons Who Lost Such Citizenship by Rendering Service To, or Accepting Commission In, the Armed Forces of the United States (1960)]. He ran for and was elected as the Representative of the 2nd District of Pangasinan in the 1998 elections.

Subsequently, petitioner Bengson, filed a case for Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam with respondent HRET claiming that Cruz was not qualified to become a member of the HOR since he is not a natural-born citizen as required under Article VI, section 6 of the Constitution.

ISSUE: Whether or not Cruz can still be considered a natural-born Filipino upon his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship to qualify him to become a member of the House of Representatives?

RULING:

Yes. The court ruled that his Filipino citizenship was valid and thus qualified his position as member of the House of Representatives. He reacquired Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 2630, which allowed any person who has rendered service to the Armed Forces of the

United States to reacquire Philippine citizenship after taking the required oath of allegiance to the Republic and having registered the same in the Civil Registry.

Also, respondent was still considered a natural-born Filipino as correctly defined in Article III, Section 4 of the 1973 Constitution as follows:

Sec. 4. A natural-born citizen is one who is a citizen of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect his Philippine citizenship.

As respondent Cruz was not required by law to go through naturalization proceedings in order to reacquire his citizenship, he obtained the requisite of becoming a natural-born Filipino, given that the two requisites are: (1) a person must be a Filipino citizen from birth and (2) he does not have to perform any act to obtain or perfect his Philippine citizenship.

As such, he possessed all the necessary qualifications to be elected as member of the House of Representatives.

PETITION FOR LEAVE TO RESUME PRACTICE OF LAW,BENJAMIN M. DACANAY, petitioner.Facts:

Petitioner here is a lawyer who migrated to Canada and became a citizen thereof in order to avail Canada’s free medical aid program to remedy his ailments.

Two years after acquiring his Canadian citizenship, he re-acquired his Philippine citizenship pursuant to RA 9225 and returned to his home country intending to resume his practice in law.

Issue: Whether or not the re-acquisition of petitioner’s citizenship qualifies him to continue his practice in law in the Philippines?

Ruling:

Yes. The court held that the re-acquisition of petitioner’s citizenship will qualify him to resume practice in law in the Philippines given some conditions. A Filipino lawyer who becomes a citizen of another country is deemed never to have lost his Philippine citizenship if he reacquires it in accordance with RA 9225. Although he is also deemed never to have terminated his membership in the Philippine bar, no automatic right to resume law practice accrues.

Under RA 9225, if a person intends to practice the legal profession in the Philippines and he reacquires his Filipino citizenship pursuant to its provisions “(he) shall apply with the proper authority for a license or permit to engage in such practice.” 18 Stated otherwise, before a lawyer who reacquires Filipino citizenship pursuant to RA 9225 can resume his law practice, he must first secure from this Court the authority to do so, conditioned on:

(a) the updating and payment in full of the annual membership dues in the IBP;

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW CLASS COMPILATION 5(b) the payment of professional tax;

(c) the completion of at least 36 credit hours of mandatory continuing legal education; this is specially significant to refresh the applicant/petitioner’s knowledge of Philippine laws and update him of legal developments and

(d) the retaking of the lawyer’s oath which will not only remind him of his duties and responsibilities as a lawyer and as an officer of the Court, but also renew his pledge to maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines.

Compliance with these conditions will restore his good standing as a member of the Philippine bar.

Labo v. Comelec

Facts:

Ramon Labo, Jr. is the respondent in question of his qualification for the position of Mayor of Baguio given the speculation on his Filipino citizenship. He was naturalized as an Australian in 1976, not in accordance to his marriage to an Australian spouse, but by formally taking an Oath of Allegiance to Australia. He used an Australian Visa in coming back to the Philippines in 1980, when he declared before the immigration authorities that he was an alien. He later asked for the change of his status from immigrant to a returning former Philippine citizen and was granted Immigrant certificate.

His rival for the Mayoral position, Luis Lardizabal filed a petition for quo warranto against Labo, asserting that he is disqualified on the ground of the invalidity of his Philippine citizenship. Labo avers that his marriage with an Australian did not make him an Australian; that at best he has dual citizenship, Australian and Filipino; that even if he indeed became an Australian when he married an Australian citizen, such citizenship was lost when his marriage with the Australian was later declared void for being bigamous.

Issue: Whether or not Labo has re-acquired his Filipino citizenship from an Australian one, thus, qualifying him to assume the position of Mayor of Baguio?

Held:

No. It was held that Labo has not proven that he re-acquired his Filipino citizenship after he took an Oath of Allegiance to Australia, nor was it proven that he has dual citizenship. Such a specious argument cannot stand against the clear provisions of CA No. 63, which enumerates the modes by which Philippine citizenship may be lost. Among these are: (1) naturalization in a foreign country; (2) express renunciation of citizenship; and (3) subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the Constitution or laws of a foreign country, all of which are applicable to the petitioner.

Under CA No. 63 as amended by PD No. 725, Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by naturalization, or by repatriation. It does not appear in the record, nor does the petitioner claim, that he has reacquired Philippine citizenship by any of these methods. He does not point to any judicial decree of naturalization as to any statute directly conferring Philippine citizenship upon him. Neither has he shown that he has complied with PD No. 725 which requires him to take the necessary oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, after which they shall be deemed to have reacquired Philippine citizenship. The Commission on Immigration and Deportation shall thereupon cancel their certificate of registration.

It can be concluded that the petitioner is not nor was he on the day of the local elections a citizen of the Philippines. In fact, he was not even a qualified voter under the Constitution itself because of his alienage. He was therefore ineligible as a candidate for mayor of Baguio City under Section 42 of the Local Government Code.

Djumantan v. DomingoG.R. No. 99358Facts:

Bernard Banez, Marina Cabael’s husband, went to Indonesia as a contract worker. On April 1974, he was converted to Islam and married petitioner Djumantan in accordance with Islamic rites. He then returned to the Philippines on January 1979 and petitioner with their two children immediately followed. Banez made it appear that they were just his “guests.” Petitioner and her children were admitted to the Philippines as temporary visitors and lived in the house of Banez and Marina. In 1981, Marina discovered the true relationship of her husband and petitioner. On March 1982, petitioner’s immigration status was changed to that of permanent resident under Section 13(a) of the Immigration Act of 1940 allowing an alien wife of a Philippine citizen to be admitted. However, on September 1990, upon finding that petitioner’s marriage with Banez was not in accordance with the Philippine laws, the Commission on Immigration and Deportation (CID) revoked the status of permanent resident given to petitioner and made pending deportation proceedings. Petitioner moved for the dismissal of the deportation case on the ground that she was validly married to a Filipino citizen.

Issue:

Whether the Indonesian wife has the right to stay in the Philippines

Ruling:

No. There is no law guaranteeing aliens married to Filipino citizens the right to be admitted, much less to be given permanent residency, in the Philippines. The fact of marriage by an alien to a citizen does not withdraw her from operation of immigration laws governing admission & exclusion of aliens. Marriage of an alien woman to Filipino citizen does not automatically make her a Filipino citizen & does not excuse her from her failure to depart from the country upon expiration of her extended stay here as alien.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW CLASS COMPILATION 5Under Section 9 of the Immigration Act of 1940, it is not mandatory for the CID to admit any alien who applies for a visitor's visa. Once admitted into the country, the alien has no right to an indefinite stay. Under Section 13 of the law, an alien allowed to stay temporarily may apply for a change of status and "may be admitted" as a permanent resident. Among those considered qualified to apply for permanent residency is the wife or husband of a Philippine citizen (Immigration Act of 1940, Sec. 13[a]). The entry of aliens into the country and their admission as immigrants is not a matter of right, even if they are legally married to Filipino citizens.

Mercado vs ManzanoG.R. No. 135083Facts:

Petition for disqualification was filed against Eduardo Manzano to hold elective office on the ground that he holds dual citizenship, having been born in the United States whose laws are under the principle of jus soli and of Filipino parents, under the principle of jus sanguinis. COMELEC granted the petition and disqualified Manzano for being a dual citizen pursuant to Section 4(d) of RA 7160, stating that those with dual citizenship are disqualified from running any public position.

Issue:

Whether the involuntary acquirement of dual citizenship of respondent Manzano is a ground for disqualification to hold or run office in the local position

Ruling:

No. Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former arises when, as a result of the concurrent application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is simultaneously considered a national by the said states. For instance, such a situation may arise when a person whose parents are citizens of a state which adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis is born in a state which follows the doctrine of jus soli, like in the case of respondent Manzano, who as a result was able to acquire dual citizenship without any voluntary act on his part. What is inimical is not dual citizenship per se, but with naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to their countries of origin even after their naturalization. Hence, the phrase “dual citizenship” in RA 7160 must be understood as referring to “dual allegiance”. Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this disqualification.

In the case at bar, by filing a certificate of candidacy when he ran, private respondent elected Philippine citizenship and in effect renounced his American citizenship. Such act sufficed to renounce his American citizenship, effectively removing any disqualification he might have as a dual citizen. Also, by private respondent’s oath of allegiance to the Philippines, when considered with the fact that he has spent his youth and adulthood,

received his education, practiced his profession as an artist, and has taken part in past elections in this country, leaves no doubt of his election of Philippine citizenship.

Cirilo Valles,petitioner vs COMELEC

Facts: Rosalind Y basco Valles ran for re<election as governor of Davao Oriental. As with her previous experiences in running for public office, an issue was raised by her opponents, this time one by the name of Cirilo Valles, questioning the authenticity of her Filipino citizenship with regards to qualifying her to run as governor.

The COMELEC ruled in favor of the respondent stating that there were no new and enough evidence to prove that the respondent is not a Filipino citizen. The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied by the COMELEC. Hence, the instant petition.

Petitioner argues that the respondents, aside from renouncing her Filipino citizenship when she acquired a an alien certificate from the Bureau of Immigration as an Australian national, an immigrant certificate of residence, and an Australian passport, even assuming that the respondent is Filipino, she cannot run as government official because of her dual citizenship.

Issue: Whether the respondent's dual citizenship, inter alia, disqualifies her from running as a governor of Davao Oriental?

Ruling: The court dismissed the petition and affirmed the previous rulings in the previous cases of the same matter against the respondent.

First, there was sufficient evidence proving that the respondent cancelled the documents stating she was an Australian national.

Second, under the Philippine Bill of 1902, the Jones Law, as well as the 1935 Philippine Constitution, the respondent is a Filipino given that she is born to a Filipino father. Moreover,under Commonwealth Act No. 63, in order for one to lose his/her citizenship s/he must expressly renounce it < one which the respondent did not do, and where the respondent has not met the requirements to lose her citizenship under the said Act < and her being born in a different country is not a ground for losing one's Philippine citizenship.

Lastly, the court reiterated the decision in Mercado( v( Manzano, stating that the term "dual citizenship" used in the Local Government code and as reconciled in Sec 5, Art 4 of the 1987

Constitution, refers to "dual allegiance" and as such, the respondent's dual citizenship does not automatically disqualify her from running for public office.

AASJS vs Datumanong

Facts: The petitioner filed petition praying for a writ of prohibition to stop respondent from mplementing RA 9225, particularly sections 2 and 3, on the ground

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW CLASS COMPILATION 5that it violates Section 5, Article 4 of the 1987 Constitution which states, "dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law".

The OSG contends that section 2 merely declares a state policy while section 3 is an "effective renunciation and repudiation of his foreign citizenship" and "recognizes the supreme authority of the Philippines".

Issues:

1. Whether Republic Act no. 9225 ("An Act Making the Citizenship of Philippine Citizens Who Acquire Foreign Citizenship Permanent, Amending for the Purpose Commonwealth Act No. 63, As Amended and for Other Purposes") is unconstitutional?

2. Whether the Court have jurisdiction to pass upon the issue of dual allegiance?

Ruling: The court dismissed the petition for lack of merit.

The court ruled that the Section 2 of RA 9225 only allows dual citizenship, and not dual allegiance, to Filipinos who have lost their Philippine citizenship due to their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country. Section 3 of said Act steers clear from the problem of dual allegiance by shifting the burden of resolving the said problem to the concerned foreign country.

Section 5 of Article 4 of the 1987 Constitution, noting that it is a declaration of policy and not a self-executing provision, states that dual allegiance shall be dealt with by law. Thus, the court held that it would be premature for the judicial department to rule on issues pertaining to dual allegiance until the legislature enacts a law governing it.

Jacot vs Dal

Facts:

Petitioner Jacot, a natural born Philippine citizen, became a naturalized US citizen. He sought to reacquire his Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225, so he filed a request for Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines with the PCG of Los Angeles, California. The PCG issued on 2006 an Order of Approval of petitioner’s request, and on the same day he took his Oath of Allegiance. The Bureau of Immigration issued Identification Certificate No. 06-12019 recognizing petitioner as a citizen of the Philippines.

On March 2007, petitioner filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the Position of Vice-Mayor of Catarman, Camiguin.

Respondent Rogen T. Dal filed a Petition for Disqualification against petitioner before the COMELEC, arguing that the latter failed to renounce his US citizenship, as required under Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225.

Petitioner countered that his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines made before the Los Angeles PCG and the oath contained in his Certificate of Candidacy operated as an effective renunciation of his foreign citizenship.

Petitioner garnered the highest number of votes for the position of Vice Mayor.

On 12 June 2007, COMELEC issued its Resolution disqualifying the petitioner from running for the position of Vice-Mayor of Catarman, Camiguin, for failure to make the requisite renunciation of his US citizenship.

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration reiterating that his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and his oath in his Certificate of Candidacy sufficed as an effective renunciation of his US citizenship. Attached to the said Motion was an "Oath of Renunciation of Allegiance to the United States and Renunciation of Any and All Foreign Citizenship" dated 27 June 2007, wherein petitioner explicitly renounced his US citizenship. The COMELEC dismissed petitioner’s Motion for lack of merit.

Issue:

Whether petitioner is disqualified from running as a candidate in the 2007 local elections for his failure to make a personal and sworn renunciation of his US citizenship.

Ruling:

Yes, he is disqualified. The Court held that his oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and his Certificate of Candidacy do not substantially comply with the requirement of a personal and sworn renunciation of foreign citizenship because these are distinct requirements to be complied with for different purposes.

Now, Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225 specifically provides that:

Section 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities.–Those who retain or reacquire Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines and the following conditions: x x x x

(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the qualifications for holding such public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath. x x x x

The law categorically requires persons seeking elective public office, who either retained their Philippine citizenship or those who reacquired it, to make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before a public officer authorized to administer an oath simultaneous with or before the filing of the certificate of candidacy.

To qualify as a candidate in Philippine elections, Filipinos must only have one citizenship, namely, Philippine citizenship.

De Guzman vs COMELEC

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW CLASS COMPILATION 5Facts: Petitioner and Angelina Dela Cruz were vying for the vice-mayoralty post of Guimba, Nueva Ecija in the May 14, 2007 Elections. Respndent Dela Cruz filed a petition for disqualification against De Guzman, alleging that he is not a Filipino Citizen but an immigrant of the USA.

Petitioner De Guzman admitted that he is a naturalized American, and that he applied for dual citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225 (R.A. No. 9225), otherwise known as the Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003, and took oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on 2006. With this, he argued that he is now entitled to exercise full civil and political rights, and is qualified to run for vice-mayor.

During the May 14, 2007 elections, private respondent won as vice-mayor.

On June 15, 2007, the COMELEC rendered a decision regarding the petition for disqualification filed by Dela Cruz, disqualifying Petitioner De Guzman, stating that he failed to meet the requirement in Subparagraph (2) Section 5 of RA 9225.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it was dismissed by the COMELEC for having been rendered moot in view of private respondent’s victory.

Petitioner filed petition for certiorari alleging that COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion when it disqualified him, invoking the rulings in Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections and Mercado v. Manzano, that the filing by a person with dual citizenship of a certificate of candidacy, containing an oath of allegiance, constituted as a renunciation of his foreign citizenship.

Respondent contends that RA 9225 effectively abandons the Court’s rulings in Frivaldo and Mercado, and that petitioner, having failed to renounce his American citizenship, remains a dual citizen and is therefore disqualified from running for an elective public position under Section 40 of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991 (LGC).

Issue: Whether petitioner is disqualified from running for vice-mayor of Guimba, Nueva Ecija in the May 14, 2007 elections for having failed to renounce his American citizenship in accordance with R.A. No. 9225.

Ruling: Yes, petitioner is disqualified from running for vice-mayor in view of his failure to renounce his American citizenship.

R.A. No. 9225 was enacted to allow re-acquisition and retention of Philippine citizenship for: 1) natural-born citizens who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country; and 2) natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of the law, become citizens of a foreign country. The law provides that they are deemed to have re-acquired or retained their Philippine citizenship upon taking the oath of allegiance.

Petitioner falls under the first category, being a natural-born citizen who lost his Philippine citizenship upon his naturalization as an American citizen. In the instant case, there is no question that petitioner re-acquired his Philippine citizenship after taking the oath of allegiance on 2006. However, it must be emphasized that R.A. No. 9225 imposes an additional requirement on those who wish to seek elective public office, as follows:

Section 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. – Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine Citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines and the following conditions: xxxx

(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the qualifications for holding such public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath. xxxx

The filing of a certificate of candidacy does not amount to a renunciation of his foreign citizenship under R.A. No. 9225. The rulings in Frivaldo and Mercado are not applicable to the instant case because R.A. No. 9225 provides for more requirements.

Hence, Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225 compels natural-born Filipinos, who have been naturalized as citizens of a foreign country, but who reacquired or retained their Philippine citizenship (1) to take the oath of allegiance under Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225, AND (2) for those seeking elective public offices in the Philippines, to additionally execute a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before an authorized public officer prior or simultaneous to the filing of their certificates of candidacy, to qualify as candidates in Philippine elections.

To qualify as a candidate in Philippine elections, Filipinos must only have ONE citizenship, namely, Philippine citizenship.

Japzon v COMELEC

FACTS:

Japzon filed a petition to the COMELEC to disqualify Ty from running for public office and the cancellation of the certificate of candidacy. For the reason that Ty was not able to fulfill the requirements in running for public office- he was not able to renounce his foreign citizenship and he did not reside in East Samar long enough to be able to run for public office. He contended that private respondent left the Philippines from July 2006-January 2007 while still declaring his American citizenship. Private respondent (Ty) admitted that he was a natural born Filipino then went to the USA to work and then became a naturalized citizen there. Ty contended that he already fulfilled the necessary requirements to become a Filipino citizen once again and to be able to run for public office. He was able to apply for reacquisition of Philippine citizenship in Los Angeles from the Philippine consulate general office. And on October 2005 he executed an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines in Los Angeles from the Vice Consul of the Philippine Consulate General. And

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW CLASS COMPILATION 5when he applied for a Philippine Passport on October 26, 2005, he indicated that his address was at east samar where he would reside. The passport was approved and later he paid taxes in the said address and obtained tax certificate from the said address. He even became a registered voter in the said address. He then renounced his citizenship by March 19, 2007. He had reacquired Filipino Citizenship, renounced his American citizenship, and lived in east Samar for more than a year prior to the May 14, 2007 elections.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Ty is ineligible to be mayor of the Municipality of General McArthur, Eastern Samar?

DECISION:

No he is not ineligible; he is eligible to be mayor.

HELD:

R.A. 9225 imposes no residency requirement for the reacquisition or retention of Philippine citizenship on the current residence of the concerned natural-born Filipino. Ty’s intent to establish a new domicile of choice in eastern Samar became apparent when he applied for a Philippine passport indicating that his residence or domicile in the Philippines was at Mabini St., Brgy 6, Poblacion, Gen McArthur, Eastern Samar, Philippines. The Supreme Court held that the length of residence shall be determined from the time he made it his domicile of choice. The court sees no basis for it to require Ty to never leave the address he stated, the fact that he returned after his trips proved his intent to stay in the said address.

Cordora v COMELEC

FACTS:

Petitioner alleges that private respondent Tambunting is not eligible to run for public office because he lacked citizenship requirements and residency requirements necessary for said office. Petitioner claims that Tambunting is not a Filipino citizen but a naturalized American citizen. Tambunting on the other hand says that he is born of a Filipino mother and an American father therefore making him a dual citizen and not a naturalized American citizen. Private respondent also stated that he took an oath of allegiance by virtue of R.A. 9225 (Citizen Retention and Reacquisition act of 2003) and he resided in the Philippines since birth.

The COMELEC dismissed the complaint because petitioner failed to substantiate his claim but commissioner Sarmiento pointed out that Tambunting can be considered a person with dual citizenship but he effectively renounced his American citizenship when he filed the certificate of candidacy in 2001 and 2004 and ran for public office.

ISSUE:

Whether or not private respondent Tambunting is eligible for public office?

DESICION

Yes he is eligible for public office.

HELD:

The fact that he had dual citizenship did not disqualify him from running for public office. In a previous case decided by the Supreme Court it was held that dual citizenship is not a ground for disqualification from running for any elective local position. In cases of dual citizenship, where it is most of the time involuntary to be one, when they run for public office they just have to elect their Philippine citizenship to terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship. The problem posits when it is an issue of dual allegiance, which may be a ground for disqualification, because it is a result of one’s volition. One simply cannot govern a place where their allegiance is not fully dedicated to the place where they ought to serve.

AKBAYAN-Youth v. COMELECG.R. 147066FACTS;* Youth Sectors, represented by different organizations wanted to COMELEC to conduct an additional special registration specifically for new voter ages 18-21 yrs. old in preparation for the upcoming May 2001 General Elections because around 4M youth failed to register before December 27, 2000.* Due to clamor of students and civic leaders, Sen. Raul Roco, Committee Chairperson on Electoral Reforms, Suffrage and People’s Participation invited officials from the COMELEC for a public hearing for the purpose of discussing the extension of the registration.* As a result of the meeting and the consensus among regional heads and representatives, COMELEC Resolution No. 3584, dated February 8, 2001, denying the request to conduct a two-day additional registration of new voters on the ground that Section 8 of RA 8189 explicitly provides that no registration shall be conducted during the period starting 120 days before a regular election and that the COMELEC has no more time left to accomplish all pre-election activitiesISSUE/S;1. Whether or not COMELEC’s Resolution No. 3584 is an exercise of grave abuse of discretion?2. Whether or not Supreme Court can compel COMELEC, through the extraordinary writ of mandamus, to conduct a special registration of new voters, less than 120 days before the May 14, 2001general elections?RULING:1. NO, COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in relation to the issuance of Resolution No. 3584 denying the request of petitioners (AKBAYAN-Youth) for the extension of voters registration. It acted within the bounds and confines of the applicable law on the matter. The act of registration is an indispensable precondition of the right of suffrage. However, Article V of the 1987 Philippine Constitution and Section 8 of RA 8189 clearly provides for the procedural limitations and requirements in order for a citizen to exercise his right to vote. Considering that the aforesaid law explicitly provides that no registration shall be conducted during the period starting (120) days before a regular election. Furthermore, it

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW CLASS COMPILATION 5is an accepted doctrine in administrative law that the determination of administrative agency as to the operation, implementation and application of a law would be accorded great weight considering that these specialized government bodies are, by their nature and functions, in the best position to know what they can possible do or not do, under the prevailing circumstances. Thus, COMELEC acted within the bounds of its authority in implementing the clear text of the law. 2. NO, the Supreme Court cannot issue an extraordinary writ of mandamus to compel COMELEC to conduct a special registration for new voters. The petitioner failed to establish, to the satisfaction of the Supreme Court that they are entitled to the issuance of this extraordinary writ so as to effectively compel respondent COMELEC to conduct special registration of voters. The determination with regard to preparation of all requirements for voter’s registration is an exercise of discretion. As an extraordinary writ, the remedy of mandamus lies only to compel an officer to perform a ministerial duty, not a discretionary one; mandamus will not issue to control the exercise of discretion of a public office where the law imposes upon him the duty to exercise his judgment in reference to any manner in which he is required to act, because it is his judgment that is to be exercised an not that of the court.

Palatino v. COMELECG.R. 189868FACTS:* COMELEC issued Resolution No. 8514 to set the date for continuing voter registration all over the Philippines except ARMM from December 2 – December 15, 2008 in relation to May 10, 2010 National Election*However, for the reason that it needs ample time to prepare for the automated election, COMELEC issued a subsequent Resolution No. 8585 adjusting the deadline and changed it to October 31, 2009* Petitioners (KABATAAN Party List) contend that there are 12M unregistered voters to be disenfranchised if the registration will not be extended. Further contend, Resolution No. 8585 is an unconstitutional encroachment on legislative power of Congress as it amends the system of continuing voter registration under Section 8 of Republic Act 8189, The Voter’s Registration Act of 1996. There was an intense clamor for an extension of registration date.* COMELEC maintains, the basis of their resolution to shorten the date is the Constitution and the Omnibus Election Code confers upon it the power to promulgate rules and regulations in order to ensure free, orderly and honest elections. ISSUE/S:* Whether or not the COMELEC Resolution No. 8585 is unconstitutional based on its alleged encroachment of the legislative powers of Congress in relation to the provisions provided for by Section 8 of Republic Act 8189?RULING:* YES, the COMELEC Resolution No. 8585 is null and void insofar as it set deadline of voter registration for the May 2010 elections on October 31,2009.* The right of suffrage as stated in Article V of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, lies at the heart of our constitutional democracy. The right of every Filipino to choose the leaders who

will lead the country and participate, to the fullest extent possible, in every national and local election is so zealously guarded by the fundamental law. The paramount importance of this right is also a function of the State policy of people empowerment. Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them.* Section 8 of RA 8189 provides for System of Continuing Registration of Voters. Registration must be conducted daily. No registration shall be conducted during the period starting 120 days before a regular election and 90 days before special election. The extension prayed for, December 15, 2009 is within the limit prescribed by law. Clear text of the law needs no interpretation.* COMELEC’s rule-making power should be in accordance with the prevailing law. Court’s primary duty is to harmonize laws rather than consider one as repealed by the other.

Romualdez vs. RTCG.R. No. 104960Facts: Philip Romualdez, a natural born citizen of the Philippines, in consonance with his decision to establish his legal residence at Barangay Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte, fearing for their personal safety, "fled" the country, together with his immediate family, left the Philippines and sought "asylum" in the United States which the United States (U.S.) government granted.

On 25 September 1991, Romualdez received a letter from Mr. Charles Cobb, District Director of the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, informing him that he should depart from the U.S. at his expense on or before 23 August 1992. Upon receipt of the letter, Romualdez departed from the U.S. for the Philippines, arriving on December 1991 apparently without any government document.

When Romualdez came back in the Philippines and run in National Congress the Congress the Commission on Elections allowed him to vote and have him registered on precint 9 of Tolosa, Malbog, Leyte where he had resided.

Private respondent Donato Advincula filed a petition with the Municipal Trial Court of Tolosa, Leyte, praying that Romualdez be excluded from the list of voters in Precinct No. 9 of Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte, under BP 881 and RA 7166.

Advincula alleged that Romualdez was a resident of Massachusetts, U.S.A. That his profession and occupation was in the U.S.A.; that he had just recently arrived in the Philippines; and that he did not have the required one-year residence in the Philippines and the six-month residence in Tolosa to qualify him to register as a voter in Barangay Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte.

The court finds the respondent to be a resident of Brgy. Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte and qualified to register as a voter thereat. Hence, the instant petition for exclusion of Philip G. Romualdez from the list of voter of Precinct No. 9, Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte is hereby ordered DENIED and petition DISMISSED

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW CLASS COMPILATION 5

Advincula appealed the case to the respondent court.

Issues: Whether or not the respondent court erred in finding the petitioner to have voluntarily left the country and abandoned his residence in Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte.

RulingIn election cases, the Court treats domicile and residence as synonymous terms, thus: "(t)he term "residence" as used in the election law is synonymous with "domicile", which imports not only an intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention." Domicile" denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent for business or pleasure, or for like reasons, one intends to return. That residence, in the case of the petitioner, was established during the early 1980's to be at Barangay Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte. Residence thus acquired, however, may be lost by adopting another choice of domicile. In order, in turn, to acquire a new domicile by choice, there must concur (1) residence or bodily presence in the new locality, (2) an intention to remain there, and (3) an intention to abandon the old domicile.

The political situation brought about by the "People's Power Revolution" must have truly caused great apprehension to the Romualdezes, as well as a serious concern over the safety and welfare of the members of their families. Their going into self-exile until conditions favorable to them would have somehow stabilized is understandable. Certainly, their sudden departure from the country cannot be described as "voluntary," or as "abandonment of residence" at least in the context that these terms are used in applying the concept of "domicile by choice."

The court finding merit on the petition the same is hereby GRANTED DUE COURSE.

Asistio vs. Trinidad - PeG.R. No. 191124

Facts: On January 26, 2010, private respondent Enrico R. Echiverri filed against petitioner Luis A. Asistio a Petition for Exclusion of Voter from the Permanent List of Voters of Caloocan City before MeTC, Branch 52, Caloocan City.

Echiverri alleged that Asistio is not a resident of Caloocan City, specifically not of 123 Interior P. Zamora St, Barangay 15, Caloocan City as stated in his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for Mayor in the 2010 Automated National and Local Elections. Both were candidate for Mayor of Caloocan City.

On January 28, 2010, the MeTC issued a Notice of Hearing notifying Asistio, through Atty. Carlos M. Caliwara, his counsel of record in SPA No. 09-151 (DC), entitled "Asistio v. Echiverri," before the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), of the scheduled hearings of the case on February 1, 2 and 3, 2010.

Trial on the merits ensued and on February 5, 2010, Judge Malabaguio rendered a decision directing removal of the name of LUIS AQUINO ASISTIO from the list of permanent voters of Caloocan City.

An appeal to the MeTC decision was made as it would deprive Asistio of his right to vote. Echiverri filed a Motion to Dismiss Appeal, arguing that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the Appeal on the ground of failure to file the required appeal fees. Petitioner having paid his docket fee only on February 11, 2010 which was not simultaneous with the filing of his notice of appeal on February 10, 2010 . RTC granted the motion of Echiverri to dismiss Asistio’s appeal of the MeTC decision on the ground of non-payment of the required docket fees.

Issue: Whether or not Asistio should be excluded from the permanent list of voters of Precinct 1811A of Caloocan City for failure to comply with the residency required by law evidenced by the declaration of a false or non- existent address.

Ruling:Under Section 117 of The Omnibus Election Code (Batas Pambansa Bilang 881) and Section 9 states the qualifications of a voter. From these provisions, the residency requirement of a voter is at least one (1) year residence in the Philippines and at least six (6) months in the place where the person proposes or intends to vote.

Domicile denotes a fixed permanent residence where, when absent for business or pleasure, or for like reasons, one intends to return. Domicile is not easily lost. To successfully effect a transfer thereof, one must demonstrate: (1) an actual removal or change of domicile; (2) a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one; and (3) acts which correspond with that purpose

Asistio has always been a resident of Caloocan City since his birth or for more than 72 years. His family is known to be among the prominent political families in Caloocan City. In 2007, he also sought election as City Mayor. Asistio cast his vote in the same city. It cannot be denied that Asistio has qualified, and continues to qualify, as a voter of Caloocan City. There is no showing that he has established domicile elsewhere, or that he had consciously and voluntarily abandoned his residence in Caloocan City. He I1811A, Barangay 15, Caloocan City.

The petition of Luis A. Asistio is GRANTED.

Velasco vs Comelec GR NO. 180051Facts: Sasmuan, Pampanga on June 22, 1952. He got married in Pampanga and on 1983, he moved to and worked in the USA where he became a citizen. In 2006, Velasco applied for dual citizenship under RA 9225, otherwise known as the Citizenship Retention and Re-

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW CLASS COMPILATION 5Acquisition Act of 2003. His application was approved on July 31, 2006. He returned to the Philippines on September 14, 2006 and has not left since. Soon thereafter or on October 13, 2006, Velasco applied for registration as a voter of Sasmuan, Pampanga. The Election Registration Board (ERB) denied his application. Velasco filed a petition for the inclusion of his name in the list of voters with the Municipal Trial Court of Sasmuan (MTC). Finding no evidence of Velasco’s change of domicile, MTC granted Velasco’s petition on February 9, 2007. On March 1, 2007, the RTC reversed and set aside, on appeal, the MTC decision. The RTC reasoned out that Velasco lost his domicile of origin when he became a US citizen; under Philippine immigration laws, he could only stay in the Philippines as a visitor or as a resident alien. Velasco only regained or reacquired his Philippine residency on July 31, 2006 when he reacquired his Filipino citizenship. Velasco filed for an appeal via petition for review under rule 42 of the rules of ourt.It was his contention that his COC contains the required information that he is a registered voter of Precinct No. 103-A of Sasmuan, Pampanga. He executed on even date an Affidavit renouncing, abandoning, and relinquishing his American citizenship. The next day, private respondent Mozart Panlaqui, who also filed his COC for the position of Mayor of Sasmuan, filed a Petition to Deny Due Course To and to Cancel Velasco’s COC, claiming that he is not a registered voter of Precinct as his name is not included in the list of voters and the RTC has rendered a decision denying Velasco’s petition for inclusion as voter. Also Velasco does not possess the constitutional requirement of legal residency (i.e., one year residency in the Philippines immediately preceding the election as provided under Section 1, Article V of the Constitution) to register as voter. Panlaqui asked for the annulment, revocation and cancellation of, or denial of due course to, Velasco’s COC that allegedly contained obvious and gross material misrepresentation In his Answer, Velasco denied the allegations of Panlaqui’s petition and claimed in defense that he possesses all the qualifications of a voter of Sasmuan, as he is a domiciliary and permanent resident of the Philippines and Sasmuan since birth; that, when he took his oath of allegiance on July 31, 2006, he is considered not to have lost his Philippine citizenship and therefore continues to enjoy full civic and political rights under the Constitution and the statutes and he did not act with malice, bad faith and gross misrepresentation when he stated that he is a registered voter of Precinct No. 103-A of Sasmuan in his COC. In the May 2007 election, Velasco garnered 7,822 for the position of Mayor of Sasmuan. As the COMELEC failed to resolve Panlaqui’s petition prior to the election, Velasco was proclaimed Mayor. He took his oath of office and assumed the powers and functions of the office on June 30, 2007. On July 6, 2007, the COMELEC issued a Resolution canceling Velasco’s COC and declaring his proclamation as Mayor of Sasmuan null and void. Citing Section 138 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC) which declared the decision of the RTC in the voters inclusion/exclusion proceedings final and executory, the Second Division of the COMELEC found Velasco guilty of material misrepresentation when he claimed in his COC filed on March 28, 2007 that he is a registered voter of Sasmuan, Pampanga. This defect, according to the Second Division, effectively voided Velasco’s COC. Velasco moved to reconsider but the COMELEC denied the motion. Velasco responded to this development by filing the present petition with the Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not Velasco is disqualified to vote thereby declaring his victory as a mayor null and void.

RULING: YES. At the time he filed his application for registration with the COMELEC local office on October 13, 2006, Velasco was a dual citizen. The records show that Velasco renounced his American citizenship only on March 28, 2007, although he secured his dual citizenship status as early as July 31, 2006 at the Philippine Consulate in San Francisco, California. Under his dual citizenship status, he possessed the right to vote in Philippine elections through the absentee voting scheme under Republic Act No. 9189. Absentee voters are exempted from the constitutional residency requirement for regular Philippine voters. Thus, the residency requirements cited do not apply to Velasco, assuming he registered as a dual citizen/absentee voter. By law, however, the right of dual citizens who vote as absentee voters pertains only to the election of national officials, specifically: the president, the vice-president, the senators, and party-list representatives. Thus, Velasco was not eligible to vote as an absentee voter in the local election of 2007. In fact, the records do not show that Velasco ever registered as an absentee voter for the 2007 election. On the other hand, Velasco could not have registered as a regular voter because he did not possess the residency requirement of one-year stay in the Philippines and six-months stay in the municipality where he proposed to vote at the time of the election. The records show that he arrived in the Philippines only on September 14, 2006 and applied for registration on October 13 of that year. Velasco could not have therefore validly registered as a regular voter eight months before the May 2007 local elections. In the present case, Velasco is not only going around the law by his claim that he is registered voter when he is not, as has been determined by a court in a final judgment. Equally important is that he has made a material misrepresentation under oath in his COC regarding his qualification. For these violations, he must pay the ultimate price – the nullification of his election victory. He may also have to account in a criminal court for making a false statement under oath, but this is a matter for the proper authorities to decide upon.

Macalintal vs Comelec GR No. 157013FACTS: Macalintal, as a taxpayer and a lawyer, filed a petition questioning the validity of the provisions of RA 9189 (Overseas absentee voting act of 2033). He claimed that he has actual and material legal interest in the subject matter of the case in seeing to it that public funds are properly and lawfully used and appropriated. Petitioner claims that it is violative of the residency requirement in Section 1 Article V of the Constitution which requires the voter must be a resident in the Philippines for at least one yr., and a resident in the place where he proposes to vote for at least 6 months immediately preceding an election.

ISSUES: Whether or not Section 5(d) of RA 9189 violates the residency requirement in Section 1 of Article V of the Constitution.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW CLASS COMPILATION 5Whether or not Section 18.5 of the same law violates the constitutional mandate under Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution that the winning candidates for President and the Vice-President shall be proclaimed as winners by Congress.

Whether or not Congress may, through the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee created in Section 25 of RA 9189, exercise the power to review, revise, amend, and approve the Implementing Rules and Regulations that the Commission on Elections, promulgate without violating the independence of the COMELEC under Section 1, Article IX-A of the Constitution.

RULING: No. Section 5 of RA No. 9189 enumerates those who are disqualified voting under this Act. It disqualifies an immigrant or a permanent resident who is recognized as such in the host country. However, an exception is provided i.e. unless he/she executes, upon registration, an affidavit prepared for the purpose by the Commission declaring that he/she shall resume actual physical permanent residence in the Philippines not later than 3 years from approval of registration. Such affidavit shall also state that he/she has not applied for citizenship in another country. Failure to return shall be cause for the removal of the name of the immigrant or permanent resident from the National Registry of Absentee Voters and his/her permanent disqualification to vote in absentia. However, OSG held that ruling in said case does not hold water at present, and that the Court may have to discard that particular ruling. Panacea of the controversy: Affidavit for without it, the presumption of abandonment of Phil domicile shall remain. The qualified Filipino abroad who executed an affidavit is deemed to have retained his domicile in the Philippines and presumed not to have lost his domicile by his physical absence from this country. Section 5 of RA No. 9189 does not only require the promise to resume actual physical permanent residence in the Philippines not later than 3 years after approval of registration but it also requires the Filipino abroad, WON he is a green card holder, a temporary visitor or even on business trip, must declare that he/she has not applied for citizenship in another country. Thus, he/she must return to the Philippines otherwise consequences will be met according to RA No. 9189.Although there is a possibility that the Filipino will not return after he has exercised his right to vote, the Court is not in a position to rule on the wisdom of the law or to repeal or modify it if such law is found to be impractical. However, it can be said that the Congress itself was conscious of this probability and provided for deterrence which is that the Filipino who fails to return as promised stands to lose his right of suffrage. Accordingly, the votes he cast shall not be invalidated because he was qualified to vote on the date of the elections. In fine, considering the underlying intent of the Constitution, which is to grant Filipino immigrants and permanent residents abroad the unquestionable right to exercise the right of suffrage (Section 1 Article V) the Court finds that Section 5 of RA No. 9189 is not constitutionally defective.

Yes. Congress should not have allowed COMELEC to usurp a power that constitutionally belongs to it. The canvassing of the votes and the proclamation of the winning candidates for President and Vice President for the entire nation must remain in the hands of Congress

as its duty and power under Section 4 of Article VII of the Constitution. COMELEC has the authority to proclaim the winning candidates only for Senators and Party-list Reps.

No. By vesting itself with the powers to approve, review, amend and revise the Implementing Rules & Regulations for RA No. 9189, Congress went beyond the scope of its constitutional authority. Congress trampled upon the constitutional mandate of independence of the COMELEC. Under such a situation, the Court is left with no option but to withdraw from its usual silence in declaring a provision of law unconstitutional.

Nicolas-Lewis v. Commission On ElectionsG.R. No. 162759FACTS:Petitioners filed a petition on April 1, 2004 to be able to vote in the May 2004 elections. As dual citizens, they were questioned by the COMELEC whether or not they accomplished the requirements stated in Sec. 1 and sec. 2 of Art. 5 of the 1987 constitution.Petitioners contend that they can exercise their right to suffrage as absentee voters since it is indicated in R.A 9189 (OAVL) as amended in R.A 9225 that they (as duals) are free to exercise their political rights. COMELEC counteracted by saying, petitioners weren’t able to comply the one year residence requirement prescribed by the constitution and R.A 9225 right to suffrage was not made for those who have re-acquired their citizenship.After filing the petition, COMELEC filed a comment praying for the denial of the petition. Comment was granted by the lower court. As a result, petitioners weren’t able to register let alone vote in the said elections.

ISSUE:Whether or not those who retain or re-acquire Philippine citizenship under R.A no. 9225 may exercise the right to vote under the system of absentee voting in R.A 9189.

HELD:Yes, dual citizens are allowed to enjoy full civil and political rights under section 5 of the act provided they meet the requirements under section 1, Art. 5 of the constitution in relation to R.A 9189.According to COMELEC, duals must first establish their domicile/residence in the Philippines, but Supreme Court disagrees. SC asserts that there is no provision in the“dual citizenship law” or R.A 9225 requiring “duals” to actually establish residence and physically stay in the Philippines before they can vote.Therefore, dual citizens are allowed to exercise their right to vote and exercise their political exercise.