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C O N S T I T U T I O N A L L A W 1

Direct democracy

Refers to a situation in which citizens participate somewhat equally in the decision-making process.

Citizens make decisions directly by proposing laws or referendums on laws which are

disliked, voting to determine who enters public office, and recalling public officials who are notdoing their jobs.

Indirect democracy

Refers to a situation in which a subset of elected representatives makes most of thepolitical decisions.

On the other hand, uses a small group of officials to make decisions of importance onbehalf of their constituents. In both cases, the input of the people is the cornerstone of thegovernment, but the government is run in different ways.

Republicanism

The essence of republicanism is representation and renovation, the selection by thecitizenry of a corps of public functionaries who derive their mandate from the people and act ontheir behalf, serving for a limited period only, after which they are replaced or retained at theoption of their principal.

Checks and Balances

The Constitution fixes certain limits on the independence of each department. In orderthat these limits may be observed, the Constitution gives each department certain powers bywhich it may definitely restrain the other from exceeding their authority. Thus, checks andbalances are formed.

To carry out the system of checks and balances, the Constitution provides:1. The acts of the legislative department have to be presented to the executive forapproval or disapproval.2. The executive department may veto the acts of the legislature if in its judgment theyare not in conformity with the Constitution or are detrimental to the interests of thepeople.3. The courts are authorized to determine the validity of legislative measures orexecutive acts.4. Through its pardoning power, the executive may modify or set aside the judgments ofthe courts.5. The legislature may pass laws that in effect amend or completely revoke decisions ofthe courts if in its judgment they are not in harmony with its intention or policy which is

not contrary to the Constitution.6. President must obtain the concurrence of Congress to complete certain significantacts.7. Money can be released from the treasury only by authority of Congress

Majority Rule

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Government by the people; a form of government in which the supreme power is vestedin the people and exercised by them either directly or through their elected agents;... a state ofsociety characterized by nominal equality of rights and privileges.

What is left out of the dictionary definition of democracy is what constitutes "the people."In practice, democracy is governed by its most popularly understood principle: majority rule.

Namely, the side with the most votes wins, whether it is an election, a legislative bill, a contractproposal to a union, or a shareholder motion in a corporation. The majority (or in some casesplurality) vote decides. Thus, when it is said that "the people have spoken" or the "people's willshould be respected," the people are generally expressed through its majority.

The rule of law

Section 1. The Philippines is a democratic and republican State. Sovereignty resides inthe people and all government authority emanates from them.

Section 2. The Philippines renounces waras an instrument of national policy, adoptsthe generally accepted principles of international lawas part of the law of the land and

adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation, and amitywith allnations.

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PETITIONER-ORGANIZATION vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARYG.R No. 147036-37 April 10, 2012Facts:Congress enacted RA 6260 that establish a Coconut Investment Fund (CIF) for development ofthe coconut industry through capital financing.For this purpose, the law imposed a levy of P0.55 on the coconut farmers first domestic sale ofevery 100 kilograms of copra, or its equivalent, for which levy he was to get a receipt convertibleinto CIC shares of stock. About a year following his proclamation of martial law, PresidentFerdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree (P.D.) 276,5 which established a CoconutConsumers Stabilization Fund (CCS Fund), to address the crisis at that time in the domesticmarket for coconut-based consumer goods. . The CCS Fund was to be built up through theimposition of a P15.00-levy for every first sale of 100 kilograms of copra resecada. The levy wasto cease after a year or earlier provided the crisis was over. Any remaining balance of the Fundwas to revert to the CI Fund established under R.A. 6260Issue:WON the coco-levy funds are public fund.Ruling:Yes.For some time, different and conflicting notions had been formed as to the nature andownership of the coco-levy funds.The Court, however, finally put an end to the dispute when itcategorically ruled in Republic of the Philippines v.COCOFED43 that these funds are not onlyaffected with public interest; they are, in fact, prima facie public funds. Primafacie means a factpresumed to be true unless disproved by some evidence to the contrary.44The Court was

satisfied that the coco-levy funds were raised pursuant to law to support a proper governmentalpurpose.They were raised with the use of the police and taxing powers of the State for thebenefit of the coconut industry and itsfarmers in general. The COA reviewed the use of thefunds. The Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) treated them as publicfunds and the very lawsgoverning coconut levies recognize their public character.45The Court has also recentlydeclared that the coco-levy funds are in the nature of taxes and can only be used for publicpurpose.46 Taxes are enforced proportional contributions from persons and property, levied bythe State by virtue of its sovereignty for the support of the government and for all its public

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needs.47 Here, the coco-levy funds were imposed pursuant to law, namely, R.A. 6260 and P.D.276. The funds were collected and managed by the PCA, an independent governmentcorporation directly under the President.48 And, as the respondent public officials pointed out,the pertinent laws used the term levy,49 which means to tax,50 in describing the exaction.

Bayan Muna Vs. RomuloFacts:

Petitioner Bayan Muna is a duly registered party-list group established to represent themarginalized sectors of society. Respondent Blas F. Ople, now deceased, was the Secretary ofForeign Affairs during the period material to this case. Respondent Alberto Romulo wasimpleaded in his capacity as then Executive Secretary. Rome Statute of the International CriminalCourt. Having a key determinative bearing on this case is the Rome Statute establishing theInternational Criminal Court (ICC) with the power to exercise its jurisdiction over persons forthe most serious crimes of international concern x x x and shall be complementary to the nationalcriminal jurisdictions. The serious crimes adverted to cover those considered grave underinternational law, such as genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and crimes of

aggression. On December 28, 2000, the RP, through Charge dAffairesEnrique A. Manalo,signed the Rome Statute which, by its terms, is subject to ratification, acceptance orapproval by the signatory states. As of the filing of the instant petition, only 92 out of the 139signatory countries appear to have completed the ratification, approval and concurrenceprocess. The Philippines is not among the 92.Issue:

Whether or not the RP-US Non Surrender Agreement is void ab initio for contractingobligations that are either immoral or otherwise at variance with universally recognizedprinciples of international law.Held:

No. Petitioner urges that the Agreement be struck down as void ab initio for imposingimmoral obligations and/or being at variance with allegedly universally recognized principles of

international law. The immoral aspect proceeds from the fact that the Agreement, as petitionerwould put it, leaves criminals immune from responsibility for unimaginable atrocities thatdeeply shock the conscience of humanity; x x x it precludes our country from delivering an

American criminal to the [ICC] x x x. The above argument is a kind of recycling of petitioner searlier position, which, as already discussed, contends that the RP, by entering intothe Agreement, virtually abdicated its sovereignty and in theprocess undermined its treatyobligations under the Rome Statute, contrary to international law principles.The Court isnotpersuaded. Suffice it to state in this regard that the non-surrender agreement, as aptlydescribed by the Solicitor General, is an assertion by the Philippines of its desire to try andpunish crimes under its national law. x x x . The agreement is a recognition of the primacy andcompetence of the country s judiciary to try offenses under its national criminal laws anddispense justice fairly and judiciously. Petitioner, we believe, labors under the erroneous

impression that the Agreement would allow Filipinos and Americans committing high crimes ofinternational concern to escape criminal trial and punishment. This is manifestlyincorrect. Persons who may have committed acts penalized under the Rome Statute can beprosecuted and punished in the Philippines or in the US; or with the consent of the RP or theUS, before the ICC, assuming, for the nonce, that all the formalities necessary to bind bothcountries to the Rome Statute have been met. For perspective, whatthe Agreementcontextuallyprohibits is the surrender by either party of individuals to international tribunals, like theICC,without the consent of the other party, which may desire to prosecute the crime under its

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existing laws. With theview we take of things, there is nothing immoral or violative ofinternational law concepts in the act of the Philippines of assuming criminal jurisdiction pursuantto the non-surrender agreement over an offense considered criminal by both Philippine lawsand the Rome Statute.

Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the Philippines vs. Health Secretary

Named as respondents are the Health Secretary, Undersecretaries, and Assistant Secretariesof the Department of Health (DOH).

For purposes of herein petition, the DOH is deemed impleaded as a co-respondent sincerespondents issued the questioned RIRR in their capacity as officials of said executiveagency.1Executive Order No. 51 (Milk Code) was issued by President Corazon Aquino onOctober 28, 1986 by virtue of the legislative powers granted to the president under the FreedomConstitution. One of the preambular clauses of the Milk Code states that the law seeks to giveeffect to Article 112 of the International Code of Marketing of Breastmilk Substitutes (ICMBS), a

code adopted by the World Health Assembly (WHA) in 1981. From 1982 to 2006, the WHAadopted several Resolutions to the effect that breastfeeding should be supported, promoted andprotected, hence, it should be ensured that nutrition and health claims are not permitted forbreastmilk substitutes.In 1990, the Philippines ratified the International Convention on the Rightsof the Child. Article 24 of said instrument provides that State Parties should take appropriatemeasures to diminish infant and child mortality, and ensure that all segments of society,specially parents and children, are informed of the advantages of breastfeeding. On May 15,2006, the DOH issued herein assailed RIRR which was to take effect on July 7, 2006.

Issue: . Whether Administrative Order or the Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations(RIRR) issued by the Department of Health (DOH) is not constitutional;

Held: YES

under Article 23, recommendations of the WHA do not come into force for members,in the sameway that conventions or agreements under Article 19 and regulations under Article 21 come intoforce. Article 23 of the WHO Constitution reads:

Article 23. The Health Assembly shall have authority to make recommendations to Memberswith respect to any matter within the competence of the Organizationfor an international rule to be considered as customary law, it must be established that such ruleis being followed by states because they consider it obligatory to comply with such rules

Under the 1987 Constitution, international law can become part of the sphere of domestic laweither

By transformation or incorporation. The transformation method requires that an international lawbe transformed into a domestic law through a constitutional mechanism such as locallegislation. The incorporation method applies when, by mere constitutional declaration,international law is deemed to have the force of domestic law.

Consequently, legislation is necessary to transform the provisions of the WHA Resolutions into

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domestic law. The provisions of the WHA Resolutions cannot be considered as part of the lawof the land that canbe implemented by executive agencies without the need of a law enacted bythe legislature

IBP VS ZAMORAPosted by kaye lee on 11:27 PMG.R. No. 141284 August 15 2000 [Judicial Review; Civilian supremacy clause]

FACTS:Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Sec 18, Art. VII of the Constitution,President Estrada, in verbal directive, directed the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief tocoordinate with each other for the proper deployment and campaign for a temporary period only.The IBP questioned the validity of the deployment and utilization of the Marines to assist thePNP in law enforcement.

ISSUE:

1. WoN the President's factual determination of the necessity of calling the armed forces issubject to judicial review.2. WoN the calling of AFP to assist the PNP in joint visibility patrols violate the constitutionalprovisions on civilian supremacy over the military.

RULING:1. The power of judicial review is set forth in Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, to wit:Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts asmay be established by law.Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involvingrights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there hasbeen grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any

branch or instrumentality of the Government.When questions of constitutional significance are raised, the Court can exercise its power ofjudicial review only if the following requisites are complied with, namely: (1) the existence of anactual and appropriate case; (2) a personal and substantial interest of the party raising theconstitutional question; (3) the exercise of judicial review is pleaded at the earliest opportunity;and (4) the constitutional question is the lis mota of the case.

2. The deployment of the Marines does not constitute a breach of the civilian supremacyclause. The calling of the Marines in this case constitutes permissible use of military assets forcivilian law enforcement. The participation of the Marines in the conduct of joint visibility patrolsis appropriately circumscribed. It is their responsibility to direct and manage the deployment ofthe Marines. It is, likewise, their duty to provide the necessary equipment to the Marines andrender logistical support to these soldiers. In view of the foregoing, it cannot be properly arguedthat military authority is supreme over civilian authority. Moreover, the deployment of theMarines to assist the PNP does not unmake the civilian character of the police force. Neitherdoes it amount to an insidiousincursionof the military in the task of law enforcement inviolation of Section 5(4), Article XVI of the Constitution.

GUDANI VS. SENGAPosted by kaye lee on 10:51 PM
http://skinnycases.blogspot.com/2013/10/ibp-vs-zamora.htmlhttp://skinnycases.blogspot.com/2013/09/gudani-vs-senga.htmlhttp://skinnycases.blogspot.com/2013/09/gudani-vs-senga.htmlhttp://skinnycases.blogspot.com/2013/10/ibp-vs-zamora.html

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GR No. 170165, August 15, 2006 [Article VI Sec. 22: Congress' Power of Inquiry; LegislativeInvestigation]

FACTS:The Senate invited Gen. Gudani and Lt. Col. Balutan to clarify allegations of 2004 election fraudand the surfacing of the Hello Garci tapes.PGMA issued EO 464 enjoining officials of the

executive department including the military establishment from appearing in any legislativeinquiry without her consent. AFP Chief of Staff Gen. Senga issued a Memorandum, prohibitingGen. Gudani, Col. Balutan et al from appearing before the Senate Committee withoutPresidential approval. However, the two appeared before the Senate in spite the fact that adirective has been given to them. As a result, the two were relieved of their assignments forallegedly violating the Articles of War and the time honoured principle of the Chain ofCommand. Gen. Senga ordered them to be subjected before the General CourtMartial proceedings for willfuly violating an order of a superior officer.

ISSUE:Whether or not the President has the authority to issue an order to the members of the AFPpreventing them from testifying before a legislative inquiry.

RULING:Yes. The SC hold that President has constitutional authority to do so, by virtue of her power ascommander-in-chief, and that as a consequence a military officer who defies such injunction isliable under military justice. At the same time, any chamber of Congress which seeks theappearance before it of a military officer against the consent of the President has adequateremedies under law to compel such attendance. Any military official whom Congress summonsto testify before it may be compelled to do so by the President. If the President is not soinclined, the President may be commanded by judicial order to compel the attendance of themilitary officer. Final judicial orders have the force of the law of the land which the President hasthe duty to faithfully execute.SC ruled in Senate v. Ermita that the President may not issue a blanket requirement of prior

consent on executive officials summoned by the legislature to attend a congressional hearing. Indoing so, the Court recognized the considerable limitations on executive privilege, and affirmedthat the privilege must be formally invoked on specified grounds. However, the ability of thePresident to prevent military officers from testifying before Congress does not turn on executiveprivilege, but on the Chief Executives power as commander-in-chief to control the actions andspeech of members of the armed forces. The Presidents prerogatives as commander-in-chiefare not hampered by the same limitations as in executive privilege.

At the same time, the refusal of the President to allow members of the military to appear beforeCongress is still subject to judicial relief. The Constitution itself recognizes as one of thelegislatures functions is the conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation. Inasmuch as it is ill-advised for Congress to interfere with the Presidents power as commander-in-chief, it is

similarly detrimental for the President to unduly interfere with Congresss right to conductlegislative inquiries. The impasse did not come to pass in this petition, since petitioners testifiedanyway despite the presidential prohibition. Yet the Court is aware that with its pronouncementtoday that the President has the right to require prior consent from members of the armedforces, the clash may soon loom or actualize.

The duty falls on the shoulders of the President, as commander-in-chief, to authorize theappearance of the military officers before Congress. Even if the President has earlier disagreed

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with the notion of officers appearing before the legislature to testify, the Chief Executive isnonetheless obliged to comply with the final orders of the courts.

JAMAR KULAYAN,

. GOV. ABDUSAKUR TAN,in his capacity as Governor of Sulu,The calling-out powers contemplated under the Constitution is exclusive to the President.An exercise by another of cial, even if he is the local chief executive, is ultra vires, andmay notbe justi ed by the invocation of Section 465 of the Local Government Code.Three members from the International Committee of the Red Cross(ICRC) were kidnapped inthe vicinity of the Provincial Capitol in Patikul,Sulu. Andres Notter, Eugenio Vagni, and Marie Jean Lacaba, were purportedly inspectingawater sanitation project for the Sulu Provincial Jail when they were seized bythree armed men who were later con rmed to be members of the Abu SayyafGroup (ASG). A Local Crisis Committee, later renamed Sulu Crisis ManagementCommittee (Committee) was then formed to investigate the kidnapping incident. The Committeeconvened under the leadership of respondent Abdusakur Mahail Tan, the Provincial Governor

of Sulu.Governor Tan issued Proclamation No. 1, Series of 2009, declaring a stateof emergencyin the province of Sulu. The Proclamation cited the kidnappingincident as a ground for the saiddeclaration, describing it as a terrorist act pursuantto the Human Security Act (R.A. 9372). Italso invoked Section 465 of the LocalGovernment Code of 1991 (R.A. 7160), which bestows onthe Provincial Governorthe power to carry out emergency measures during man-made andnatural disastersand calamities, and to call upon the appropriate national law enforcementagenciesto suppress disorder and lawless violence. In the Proclamation, Tan called uponthePNP and the Civilian Emergency Force (CEF) to set up checkpoints andchokepoints, conductgeneral search and seizures including arrests, and otheractions necessary to ensure publicsafety.Petitioners, Jamar Kulayan, et al.claimed that Proclamation No. 1-09 was issuedultra vires , and thus null and void, for violating Sections 1 and 18,

Article VII of the Constitution, which grants the President sole authority to exerciseemergency

powers and calling-out powers as the chief executive of the Republic and commander-in-chief of the armed forces.ISSUE:Whether or not a governor can exercise the calling-out powers of aPresidentHELD:It has already been established that there is one repository of executive powers, and that is thePresident of the Republic. This means that when Section1, Article VII of the Constitution speaksof executive power, it is granted to thePresident and no one else. Corollarily, it is only thePresident, as Executive, whois authorized to exercise emergency powers as provided underSection 23, Article VI, of the Constitution, as well as what became known as the calling-outpowersunder Section 7, Article VIIThereof. While the President is still a civilian, Article II, Section 3 of theConstitution mandates

that civilian authority is, at all times, supreme over themilitary, making the civilian president thenations supreme military leader. Thenet effect ofArticle II, Section 3, when read with Article VII,Section 18, is that a civilian President is the ceremonial, legal and administrative head of thearmedforces. The Constitution does not require that the President must be possessedof militarytraining and talents, but as Commander-in-Chief, he has the power todirect military operationsand to determine military strategy. Normally, he wouldbe expected to delegate theactual command of the armed forces to militaryexperts; but the ultimate power is his.Given theforegoing, Governor Tan is not endowed with the power to callupon the armed forces at his

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own bidding. In issuing the assailed proclamation,Governor Tan exceeded his authority when hedeclared a state of emergency andcalled upon the Armed Forces, the police, and his ownCivilian Emergency Force. The calling-out powers contemplated under the Constitutionis exclusive to the President. An exercise by another of cial, even if he is the localchief executive, is ultra vires , and may not be justi ed by the invocation of Section 465 of theLocal Government Code.

BAYAN v. ZAMORA

Case Digest: G.R. No. 138570. October 10, 2000. 342 SCRA 449BAYAN (Bagong Alyansang Makabayan), a Junk VFA Movement, Bishop Tomas Millamena(Iglesia Filipina Independiente), Bishop Elmer Bolocan (United Church of Christ of the Phil.), Dr.Reynaldo Legasca, Md, Kilusang Mambubukid Ng Pilipinas, Kilusang Mayo Uno, Gabriela,Prolabor, and The Public Interest Law Center, petitioners, vs. Executive Secretary RonaldoZamora, Foreign Affairs Secretary Domingo Siazon, Defense Secretary Orlando Mercado, Brig.Gen. Alexander Aguirre, Senate President Marcelo Fernan, Senator Franklin Drilon, SenatorBlas Ople, Senator Rodolfo Biazon, And Senator Francisco Tatad, respondents.

Facts: On March 14, 1947, the Philippines and the United States of America forged a MilitaryBases Agreement which formalized, among others, the use of installations in the Philippineterritory by United States military personnel. In view of the impending expiration of the RP-USMilitary Bases Agreement in 1991, the Philippines and the United States negotiated for apossible extension of the military bases agreement. On September 16, 1991, the PhilippineSenate rejected the proposed RP-US Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Security which, ineffect, would have extended the presence of US military bases in the Philippines. On July 18,1997, the United States panel, headed by US Defense Deputy Assistant Secretary for AsiaPacific Kurt Campbell, met with the Philippine panel, headed by Foreign Affairs UndersecretaryRodolfo Severino Jr., to exchange notes on the complementing strategic interests of the United

States and the Philippines in the Asia-Pacific region. Both sides discussed, among other things,the possible elements of the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA for brevity). Thereafter, thenPresident Fidel V. Ramos approved the VFA, which was respectively signed by publicrespondent Secretary Siazon and Unites States Ambassador Thomas Hubbard. On October 5,1998, President Joseph E. Estrada, through respondent Secretary of Foreign Affairs, ratified theVFA. On October 6, 1998, the President, acting through respondent Executive SecretaryRonaldo Zamora, officially transmitted to the Senate of the Philippines, the Instrument ofRatification, the letter of the President and the VFA, for concurrence pursuant to Section 21,

Article VII of the 1987 Constitution

Issues(justiciable controversy): (1) Whether or not petitioners have legal standing as

concerned citizens, taxpayers, or legislators to question the constitutionality of the VFA; (2)whether the VFA is governed by the provisions of Section 21, Article VII or of Section 25, ArticleXVIII of the Constitution; (3) and whether or not the Supreme Court has jurisdiction.

Ruling: (1) No. Petitioners failed to show that they have sustained, or are in danger ofsustaining any direct injury as a result of the enforcement of the VFA. As taxpayers, petitionershave not established that the VFA involves the exercise by Congress of its taxing or spending

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powers. On this point, it bears stressing that a taxpayers suit refers to a case where the actcomplained of directly involves the illegal disbursement of public funds derived from taxation.

(2) Yes.The fact that the President referred the VFA to the Senate under Section 21, Article VII,

and that the Senate extended its concurrence under the same provision, is immaterial. For ineither case, whether under Section 21, Article VII or Section 25, Article XVIII, the fundamentallaw is crystalline that the concurrence of the Senate is mandatory to comply with the strictconstitutional requirements.

(3) No. In fine, absent any clear showing of grave abuse of discretion on the part ofrespondents, the Court as the final arbiter of legal controversies and staunch sentinel of therights of the people is then without power to conduct an incursion and meddle with such affairspurely executive and legislative in character and nature. For the Constitution no less, maps outthe distinct boundaries and limits the metes and bounds within which each of the three politicalbranches of government may exercise the powers exclusively and essentially conferred to it by

law.

Lim vs. Executive Secretary G.R. No. 151445 April 11, 2002July 25, 2009 at 12:11 pm (1)

FACTS :

Beginning 2002, personnel from the armed forces of the United States started arriving inMindanao, to take part, in conjunction with the Philippine military, in Balikatan 02-1. In theory,they are a simulation of joint military maneuvers pursuant to the Mutual Defense Treaty, abilateral defense agreement entered into by the Philippines and the United States in 1951.

On Feb. 2002, Lim filed this petition for certiorari and prohibition, praying that respondents berestrained from proceeding with the so-called Balikatan 02-1, and that after due notice andhearing, judgment be rendered issuing a permanent writ of injuction and/or prohibition againstthe deployment of US troops in Basilan and Mindanao for being illegal and in violation of theConstitution.

Petitioners contend that the RP and the US signed the Mutual Defense Treaty to provide mutualmilitary assistance in accordance with the constitutional processes of each country only in thecase of a armed attack by an external aggressor, meaning a third country, against one of them.They further argued that it cannot be said that the Abu Sayyaf in Basilan constitutes an externalaggressor to warrant US military assistance in accordance with MDT of 1951. Anothercontention was that the VFA of 1999 does not authorize American soldiers to engage in combatoperations in Philippine territory.

ISSUE :

Whether or not the Balikatan 02-1 activities are covered by the VFA.

RULING :
http://angelcapacio.wordpress.com/category/1/http://angelcapacio.wordpress.com/category/1/

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Petition is dismissed. The VFA itself permits US personnel to engage on an impermanent basis,in activities, the exact meaning of which is left undefined. The sole encumbrance placed on itsdefinition is couched in the negative, in that the US personnel must abstain from any activ ityinconsistent with the spirit of this agreement, and in particular, from any political activity.

Under these auspices, the VFA gives legitimacy to the current Balikatan exercises. It is only

logical to assume that Balikatan 02-1 a mutual anti terrorism advising assisting and trainingexercise falls under the umbrella of sanctioned or allowable activities in the context of theagreement. Both the history and intent of the Mutual Defense Treaty and the VFA support theconclusion that combat-related activitiesas opposed to combat itselfsuch as the onesubject of the instant petition, are indeed authorized.

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In re LAURETAIN THE MATTER OF PROCEEDINGS FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION AGAINST ATTY. WENCESLAOLAURETA, AND OF CONTEMPTPROCEEDINGS AGAINST EVA MARAVILLA-ILUSTRE in G.R. No.

68635, entitled "EVA MARAVILLA-ILUSTRE, vs. HON. INTERMEDIATEAPPELLATE COURT, ET AL

G.R. No. L-68635May 14, 1987

Facts:Maravilla Illustre wrote to the justices of the SC, complaining about the dismissal of the her case(aland dispute involving large estate) by a minute-resolution. Illustre claims that it was an unjustresolution deliberately and knowingly promulgated by the 1stDivision, that it was railroaded withsuch hurry beyond the limits of legal and judicial ethics. Illustre also threatened in her letter that,there is nothing finalin this world. This case is far from finished by a long shot. She threatenedthat she would call for a press conference.Illustres letter basically attacks the participation ofJustice Pedro Yap in the first division. It was established that Justice Yap was previously a law

partner of Atty. Ordonez, now the Solgen and counsel for the opponents.The letters werereferred to the SC en banc. The SC clarified that when the minute-resolution was issued,thepresiding justice then was not Justice Yap but Justice Abad Santos (who was about to retire),and thatJustice Yap was not aware that Atty Ordonez was the opponents counsel. It was alsomade clear thatJustice Yap eventually inhibited himself from the case.Still, Illustre wrote lettersto the other justices (Narvasa, Herrera, Cruz), again with more threats to exposethe kindofjudicial performance readily constituting travesty of justice.True to her threats, Illustre laterfiled a criminal complaint before the Tanodbayan, charging the Justiceswith knowingly renderingan unjust Minute Resolution. Justice Yap and Solgen Ordonez were also chargedof using theirinfluence in the First Division in rendering said Minute Resolution.Atty LAURETA was thecounsel of Illustre. He circulate copies of the complain to the press, without anycopy furnishedthe Court, nor the Justices charged. It was made to appear that the Justices were chargedwith

graft and corruption.The Tanodbayan dismissed the complaint.Now, the SC is charging themwith contempt.They claim that the letters were private communication, and that they did notintend to dishonor thecourt.Issue: WON privacy of communication was violatedHeld: The letters formed part of the judicial record and are a matter of concern for the entire court.

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There is no vindictive reprisal involved here. The Courts authorityand duty under the premisesis unmistakable. It must act to preserve its honor and dignity from the scurrilous attacks of anirate lawyer,mouthed by his client, and to safeguard the morals and ethics of the legalprofession. We re not convinced that Atty Laureta had nothing to do with Ilustres letters, norwith the complaint filed with the tanod bayan. Atty Laureta repeated disparaging remarks suchas undue influence, powerful influence in his pleadings. This wasbolstered by the report that

Laureta distributed copies of the complaint to the newspaper companies in envelopes bearinghis name. He was also heard over the radio. Lastly, as Illustres lawyer, he had control of theproceedings.SC resolutions are beyond investigation from other departments of the governmentbecause of separation of powers. The correctness of the SC decisions are conclusive uponother branches of government.

DEMETRIA V ALBA

13MAR

Facts:Petitioners assail the constitutionality of first paragraph of Sec 44 of PD 1177 (Budget ReformDecree of 1977)as concerned citizens, members of the National Assembly, parties withgeneral interest common to all people of the Philippines, and as taxpayerson the primarygrounds that Section 44 infringes upon the fundamental law by authorizing illegal transfer ofpublic moneys, amounting to undue delegation of legislative powers and allowing the Presidentto override the safeguards prescribed for approving appropriations.

The Solicitor General, for the public respondents, questioned the legal standing of thepetitioners and held that one branch of the government cannot be enjoined by another,coordinate branch in its performance of duties within its sphere of responsibility. It also allegedthat the petition has become moot and academic after the abrogation of Sec 16(5), Article VIII ofthe 1973 Constitution by the Freedom Constitution (which was where the provision underconsideration was enacted in pursuant thereof), which states that No law shall be passed

authorizing any transfer of appropriations, however, the Presidentmay by law be authorized toaugment any item in the general appropriations law for their respective offices from savings inother items of their respective appropriations.

Issue:1. W/N PD 1177 is constitutional

2. W/N the Supreme Court can act upon the assailed executive act

Held:1. No. Sec 44 of PD 1177 unduly overextends the privilege granted under Sec16(5) byempowering the President to indiscriminately transfer funds from one department of the

Executive Department to any program of any department included in the General AppropriationsAct, without any regard as to whether or not the funds to be transferred are actually savings inthe item. It not only disregards the standards set in the fundamental law, thereby amounting toan undue delegation of legislative powers, but likewise goes beyond the tenor thereof.Par. 1 of Sec. 44 puts all safeguards to forestall abuses in the expenditure of public funds tonaught. Such constitutional infirmities render the provision in question null and void.2. Yes. Where the legislature or executive acts beyond the scope of its constitutional powers, itbecomes the duty of the judiciary to declare what the other branches of the government has
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assumed to do as void, as part of its constitutionally conferred judicial power. This is not to saythat the judicial power is superior in degree or dignity. In exercising this high authority, the

judges claim no judicial supremacy; they are only the administrators of the public will.Petition granted. Par. 1, Sec. 44 OF PD 1177 null and void.

48 SCRA 208Political LawTransfer of FundsPower of the President to Realign FundsDemetrio Demetria et al as taxpayers and members of the Batasan Pambansa sought toprohibit Manuel Alba, then Minister of the Budget, from disbursing funds pursuant to PresidentialDecree No. 1177 or the BudgetReform Decree of 1977. Demetria assailed the constitutionalityof paragraph 1, Section 44 of the said PD. This Section provides that:The President shall have the authority to transfer any fund, appropriated for the differentdepartments, bureaus, offices and agencies of the Executive Department, which are included inthe General Appropriations Act, to any program, project or activity of any department, bureau, oroffice included in the General Appropriations Act or approved after its enactment.

Demetria averred that this is unconstitutional for it violates the 1973 Constitution.ISSUE: Whether or not Paragraph 1, Section 44, of PD 1177 is constitutional.HELD: No. The Constitution provides that no law shall be passed authorizing any transfer ofappropriations, however, the President, the Prime Minister, the Speaker, the Chief Justice of theSupreme Court, and the heads of constitutional commissions may by law be authorized toaugment any item in the general appropriations law for their respective offices from savings inother items of their respective appropriations.However, paragraph 1 of Section 44 of PD 1177 unduly overextends the privilege granted underthe Constitution. It empowers the President to indiscriminately transfer funds from onedepartment, bureau, office or agency of the Executive Department to any program, project oractivity of any department, bureau or office included in the General Appropriations Act orapproved after its enactment, without regard as to whether or not the funds to betransferred are actually savings in the item from which the same are to be taken, orwhether or not the transfer is for the purpose of augmenting the item to which said transfer is tobe made. It does not only completely disregard the standards set in the fundamental law,thereby amounting to an undue delegation of legislative powers, but likewise goes beyond thetenor thereof. Indeed, such constitutional infirmities render the provision in question null andvoid.But it should be noted, transfers of savings within one department from one item to another inthe GAA may be allowed by law in the interest of expediency and efficiency. There is no transferfrom one department to another here.

G.R. Nos. 177857-58. January 24, 2012

Philippine Coconut, Producers Federation, Inc. (COCOFED), Manuel V. Del Rosario,Domingo P. Espina, Salvador P. Ballares, Joselito A. Moraleda, Paz M. Yason,Vicente A.Cadiz, Cesaria De Luna Titular, and Raymundo C. De Villa, Petitioners, vs. Republic ofthe Philippines, respondent.

Facts:

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In 1971,R.A. 6260 was enacted creating the Coconut Investment Company to administerthe Coconut Investment Fund. The declaration of martial law in September 1972 saw theissuance of several presidential decrees purportedly designed to improve the coconut industrythrough the collection and use of the coconut levy fund. In G.R. Nos. 177857-58, class actionpetitioners COCOFED and a group of purported coconut farmers and COCOFED members,hereinafter COCOFEDet al. collectivelyseek the reversal of the judgments and resolutions of

the anti-graft court insofar as these issuances are adverse to their interests. As a proceduralissue, COCOFED, et al. and Ursua contends that in the course of almost 20 years that thecases have been with the anti-graft court, they have repeatedly sought leave to adduceevidence (prior to respondents complete presentation of evidence) to prove the cocofarmers actual and beneficial ownership of the sequestered shares. The Sandiganbayan,however, had repeatedly and continuously disallowed such requests, thus depriving them oftheir constitutional right to be heard.Issues:

(1) Whether or not petitioners COCOFED et al. were not deprived of their right to be heard; and (2)whether or not the right to speedy trial was violated.Ruling:

(1) No, petitioner COCOFEDs right to be heard had not been violated by the mere issuance of

PSJ-A and PSJ-F before they can adduce their evidence. As it were, petitioners COCOFED etal. were able to present documentary evidence in conjunction with its Class Action OmnibusMotion datedFebruary 23, 2001 where they appended around four hundred (400) documentsincluding affidavits of alleged farmers. These petitioners manifested that said documentscomprise their evidence to prove the farmers ownership of the UCPB shares, which weredistributed in accordance with valid and existing laws. Lastly, COCOFED et al. even filed theirown Motion for Separate Summary Judgment, an event reflective of their admission that thereare no more factual issues left to be determined at the level of the Sandiganbayan. This act offiling a motion for summary judgment is a judicial admission against COCOFED under Section26, Rule 130 which declares that the act, declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant factmay be given in evidence against him.

(2) No. As a matter of settled jurisprudence, but subject to equally settled exception, an issue not

raised before the trial court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. The sporting ideaforbidding one from pulling surprises underpins this rule. For these reasons, the instant casecannot be dismissed for the alleged violation of petitioners right to a speedy disposition of thecase. It must be clarified right off that the right to a speedy disposition of case and the accusedsright to a speedy trial are distinct, albeit kindred, guarantees, the most obvious difference beingthat a speedy disposition of cases, as provided in Article III, Section 16 of the Constitution. Infine, the right to a speedy trial is available only to an accused and is a peculiarly criminal lawconcept, while the broader right to a speedy disposition of cases may be tapped in anyproceedings conducted by state agencies

Hacienda Luisita Inc. (HLI) v. Presidential Agrarian Reform Council (PARC), et al.,G.R. No. 171101, July 5, 2011, VELASCO, JR., J.

I. Facts

In 1958, Tarlac Development Corporation (Tadeco), assisted by the Central Bank of thePhilippines, purchased Hacienda Luisita and the Central Azucarera de Tarlac, the sugar mill ofthe hacienda, from the Spanish owners of Compaia General de Tabacos de Filipinas(Tabacalera). Tadeco was then owned and controlled by the Jose Cojuangco Sr. Group. Also,the GSIS extended a PhP5.911 million loan in favor of Tadeco to pay the peso price component

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of the sale, with the condition that the lots comprising the Hacienda Luisita be subdivided bythe applicant-corporation and sold at cost to the tenants, should there be any, and wheneverconditions should exist warranting such action under the provisions of the Land Tenure

Act.Tadeco however did not comply with this condition.

On May 7, 1980, the martial law administration filed a suit before the Manila RTC against

Tadeco, et al., for them to surrender Hacienda Luisita to the then Ministry of Agrarian Reform(MAR) so that the land can be distributed to farmers at cost. Tadeco alleged that HaciendaLuisita is not covered by existing agrarian reform legislations for it does not have tenants. Theargument did not convince the Manila RTC, thus rendered judgment ordering Tadeco tosurrender Hacienda Luisita to the MAR. Tadeco appealed the case to the CA.

On March 17, 1988, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) moved to withdraw thegovernments case against Tadeco,et al. By Resolution of May 18, 1988, the CA dismissed thecase the Marcos government initially instituted and won against Tadeco, et al. The dismissalaction was, however, made subject to the obtention by Tadeco of the PARCs approval of astock distribution plan (SDP) that must initially be implemented after such approval shall havebeen secured. On August 23, 1988, Tadeco organized a spin-off corporation, herein petitioner

HLI, as vehicle to facilitate stock acquisition by the farmworkers. For this purpose, Tadecoconveyed to HLI the agricultural land portion (4,915.75 hectares) and other farm-relatedproperties of Hacienda Luisita in exchange for HLI shares of stock.

On May 9, 1989, some 93% of the then farmworker-beneficiaries (FWBs) complement ofHacienda Luisita signified in a referendum their acceptance of the proposed HLIs StockDistribution Option Plan (SODP). On May 11, 1989, the SDOA was formally entered into byTadeco, HLI, and the 5,848 qualified FWBs. This attested to by then DAR Secretary PhilipJuico. The SDOA embodied the basis and mechanics of HLIs SDP, which was eventuallyapproved by the PARC after a follow-up referendum conducted by the DAR on October 14,1989, in which 5,117 FWBs, out of 5,315 who participated, opted to receive shares in HLI.

On August 15, 1995, HLI applied for the conversion of 500 hectares of land of thehacienda from agricultural to industrial use, pursuant to Sec. 65 of RA 6657. The DAR approvedthe application on August 14, 1996, subject to payment of three percent (3%) of the grossselling price to the FWBs and to HLIs continued compliance with its undertakings under theSDP, among other conditions. On December 13, 1996, HLI, in exchange for subscription of12,000,000 shares of stocks of Centennary Holdings, Inc. (Centennary), ceded 300 hectares ofthe converted area to the latter. Consequently, HLIs Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.287910 was canceled and TCT No. 292091 was issued in the name of Centennary. HLItransferred the remaining 200 hectares covered by TCT No. 287909 to Luisita RealtyCorporation (LRC) in two separate transactions in 1997 and 1998, both uniformly involving 100hectares for PhP 250 million each. Subsequently, Centennary sold the entire 300 hectares forPhP750 million to Luisita Industrial Park Corporation (LIPCO), which used it in developing an

industrial complex. Later, LIPCO transferred these 2 parcels to the Rizal Commercial BankingCorporation (RCBC) in payment of LIPCOs PhP431,695,732.10 loan obligations toRCBC. LIPCOs titles were cancelled and new ones were issued to RCBC. Apart from the 500hectares, another 80.51 hectares were later detached from Hacienda Luisita and acquired bythe government as part of the Subic-Clark-Tarlac Expressway (SCTEX) complex. Thus,4,335.75 hectares remained of the original 4,915 hectares Tadeco ceded to HLI.

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provisions. Any of these key issues may be resolved without plunging into the constitutionality ofSec. 31 of RA 6657.

By virtue of Sec. 5 of RA 9700, the stock distribution scheme under Sec. 31 of RA 6657is no longer an available option under existing law; thus the question of unconstitutionalityshould be a moot issue.

(2) NO, the PARC did not gravely abuse its discretion in revoking the subjectSDP and placing the hacienda under CARPs compulsory acquisition and distributionscheme. The revocation of the approval of the SDP is valid: (1) the mechanics and timelines ofHLIs stock distribution violate DAO 10 because the minimum individual allocation of eachoriginal farm worker-beneficiaries (FWBs) of 18,804.32 shares was diluted as a result of the useof man days and the hiring of additional farmworkers; (2) the 30-year timeframe for HLI-to-FWBs stock transfer is contrary to what Sec. 11 of DAO 10 prescribes.

As explained by HLI, a beneficiary needs to work for at least 37 days in a fiscal yearbefore he or she becomes entitled to HLI shares. If it falls below 37 days, the FWB,unfortunately, does not get any share at year end. The number of HLI shares distributed variesdepending on the number of days the FWBs were allowed to work in one year. Worse, HLI

hired farm workers in addition to the original 6,296 FWBs, such that, as indicated in theCompliance dated August 2, 2010 submitted by HLI to the Court, the total number of farmworkers of HLI as of said date stood at 10,502. All these farm workers, which include theoriginal 6,296 FWBs, were given shares out of the 118,931,976.85 HLI shares representing the33.296% of the total outstanding capital stock of HLI. Clearly, the minimum individual allocationof each original FWB of 18,804.32 shares was diluted as a result of the use of man days andthe hiring of additional farm workers.

Par. 3 of the SDOA expressly provides for a 30-year timeframe for HLI-to-FWBs stocktransfer is an arrangement contrary to what Sec. 11 of DAO 10 prescribes. Said Sec. 11provides for the implementation of the approved stock distribution plan within three (3) monthsfrom receipt by the corporate landowner of the approval of the plan by PARC. Evidently, the

land transfer beneficiaries are given thirty (30) years within which to pay the cost of the landthus awarded them to make it less cumbersome for them to pay the government.

DAO 10, having the force and effect of law, must be duly complied with; therefore, PARCis correct in revoking the SDP.

(3) YES, those portions of the converted land within Hacienda Luisita that RCBCand LIPCO acquired by purchase should be excluded from the coverage of the assailedPARC resolution. It can rightfully be said that both LIPCO and RCBC, adduced from theirforegoing actions, are purchasers in good faith for value, so entitled to the benefits arising fromsuch status.

First, at the time LIPCO purchased the entire three hundred (300) hectares of industrialland, there was no notice of any supposed defect in the title of its transferor, Centennary, or thatany other person has a right to or interest in such property. The same is true with respect toRCBC. To be sure, intervenor RCBC and LIPCO knew that the lots they bought were subjectedto CARP coverage by means of a stock distribution plan, as the DAR conversion order wasannotated at the back of the titles of the lots they acquired. However, they are of the honestbelief that the subject lots were validly converted to commercial or industrial purposes and forwhich said lots were taken out of the CARP coverage subject of PARC Resolution No. 89-12-2

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and hence, can be legally and validly acquired by them. After all, Sec. 65 of RA 6657 explicitlyallows conversion and disposition of agricultural lands previously covered by CARP landacquisition after the lapse of five (5) years from its award when the land ceases to beeconomically feasible and sound for agricultural purposes or the locality has become urbanizedand the land will have a greater economic value for residential, commercial or industrialpurposes. And second, both LIPCO and RCBC purchased portions of Hacienda Luisita for

value. Undeniably, LIPCO acquired 300 hectares of land from Centennary for the amount ofPhP 750 million pursuant to a Deed of Sale dated July 30, 1998. On the other hand, in a Deedof Absolute Assignment dated November 25, 2004, LIPCO conveyed portions of HaciendaLuisita in favor of RCBC by way of dacion en pago to pay for a loan of PhP 431,695,732.10.

Both RCBC and LIPCO cannot be considered at fault for believing that certain portionsof Hacienda Luisita are industrial/commercial lands and are, thus, outside the ambit ofCARP. The PARC, and consequently DAR, gravely abused its discretion when it placedLIPCOs and RCBCs property which once formed part of Hacienda Luisita under the CARPcompulsory acquisition scheme.

BMABureau of Customs v Teves G.R. No. 181704 December 6, 2011

Facts:Former Pres. Arroyo signed into law R.A. No. 9335 for the purpose of optimizing therevenue-generation capability and collection of the BIRand BOC and to encourage BIR andBOC officials and employees to exceed their revenue targets by providing a system of rewardsandsanctions through the creation of Rewards and Incentives Fund and a RevenuePerformance Evaluation Board.The Boards in the BIR and BOC are composed of Secretaries ofFinance, Budget and their undersecretaries, Dir Gen NEDA and his deputy DirGen,Commissioners of BIR and BOC and their deputy commissioners, two representatives from rankand file employees and representativefrom the officials nominated by their recognizedorganization.Each Board has the duty to;

1.Prescribe the rules and guidelines for the allocation, distribution and release of theFund;2.Set criteria and procedures for removing from the service officials and employeeswhose revenue collection falls short of the target;3.Terminate personnel in accordance with the criteria adopted by the Board;4.Prescribe a system for performance evaluation;5.Perform other functions, including the issuance of rules and regulations and;6.Submit an annual report to Congress.

Petitioner Bureau of Customs Employees Association (BOCEA) contends that enactment andimplementation of R.A. No. 9335 are taintedwith constitutional infirmities.Pursuant to RA 9335and its IRR, Collection District Performance Contracts was disseminated to lower rankingofficials and employees forsigning. BOCEA contends that the target was impossible to meet due

to governments own policies on reduced tariff rates and tax breaks tobig business, theoccurrence of natural calamities and because of other economic factors. BOCEA claimed thatsome BOC employees werecoerced and forced to sign the performance contract. Thepersonnel were threatened if they will not sign they would face possiblereassignment,reshuffling, or worse be placed on floating status.Petition was filed to the Supreme Court.BOCEA argued among others, that its members and other BOC employees are in great dangerof losing their jobs should they failed to meet the required target, in clear violation of theirconstitutional right of security of tenure and theirrespective families prejudice.During the first

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year implementation of RA 9335, BOC employees exerted commendable efforts and exceedtheir target of 196B of as much as2B for that year alone. However this was attained because oilcompanies made advance tax payments to BOC. Rewards are given, which theydescribed asunjust, unfair, dubious and fraudulent because only top officials of BOC got huge reward whilethe employees received only P8,500.00.Issues:

1.

WON RA9335 and its IRR is a bill of attainderit inflicts punishment without trial.

The court ruled that RA 9335 is not a bill of attainder. A bill of attainder is a legislative actwhich inflicts punishment without judicial trial. Essential to bill of attainder are aspecification of certain individuals or group of individuals, theimposition of apunishment, penal or otherwise, and the lack of judicial trial. It is essentially a usurpationof

judicial power by a legislative body. RA 9335 does not possess the elements of a bill of attainder. It does not seek to inflict punishment without a judicial trial. RA 9335 merelylays down the grounds for the termination of a BIR and BOC official or employee and

provides for a consequences.2.WON RA9335 and its IRR violate the right to due processtermination of employees isperemptory and done without any form of hearing.

Due process an opportunity to be heard or as applied to administrative proceedings, a fair andreasonable opportunity to explainones side. Insection 7 of RA 9335 clearly give due consideration that may affect the level of collection. In thesame manner, exemptions were set, contravening BOCEAs claim that its members may beremoved for unattained target collection even due to causes which are beyond their control.Moreover, an employees right to be heard is not at all prevented and his right to appeal is notdeprived of him. 43 In fine, a BIR or BOC official or employee in this case cannot be arbitrarily

removed from the service without according him his constitutional right to due process.

3. WON RA9335 and its IRR violates equal protection clauseunduly discriminates against BIRand BOC as compared to otherrevenue generating government agencies.

The law concerns only the BIR and the BOC because they have the common distinct primaryfunction of generating revenues for the national government through the collection of taxes,customs duties, fees and charges. Both the BIR and the BOC are bureaus under the DOF.They principally perform the special function of being the instrumentalities through which theState exercises one of its great inherent functions taxation. Indubitably, such substantialdistinction is germane and intimately related to the purpose of the law. Hence, the classificationand treatment accorded to the BIR and the BOC under RA [No.] 9335 fully satisfy the demands

of equal protection. 37

4.WON RA9335 and its IRR violates right to security of tenure- it effectively removed remediesprovided in the ordinary course of administrative procedure afforded to government employees.

Clearly, RA [No.] 9335 in no way violates the security of tenure of officials and employees of theBIR and the BOC. The guarantee of security of tenure only means that an employee cannot bedismissed from the service for causes other than those provided by law and only after due
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processis accorded the employee. In the case of RA [No.] 9335, it lays down a reasonableyardstick for removal (when the revenue collection falls short of the target by at least 7.5%) withdue consideration of all relevant factors affecting the level of collection. This standard isanalogous toinefficiency and incompetence in the performance of official duties, a ground fordisciplinary action under civil service laws. The action for removal is also subject to civil servicelaws, rules and regulations and compliance with substantive and procedural due process.

5.WON RA9335 and its IRR violates constitutionundue delegation of legislative powersgranted to Revenue PerformanceEvaluation Board the unbridled discretion of formulating thecriteria for termination, manner of allocating targets, the distributionof rewards.

In this case there was a valid delegation of legislative power. The court ruled that the test forvalidity of delegation of legislative power werefully satisfied. RA 9335 adequately states thepolicy and standards to guide the President in fixing revenue targets and theimplementingagencies carrying out the provisions of the law as stated in Section 2 Declarationof Policy. The court has recognized the following assufficient standards: Public Interest, Justiceand equity, public convenience and welfare and simplicity, economy and welfare. In this case,thedeclared policy optimization of the revenue-generation capability and collection of the BIR

and BOC is infused with public interest.

Footnote:Section 22 Article III 1987 Constitution: No ex post facto law or bill of attainder shall be enacted.Section 7.Powers and Functions of the Board.the Board in the agency shall have thefollowing powers and functions:

(a) To prescribe the rules and guidelines for the allocation, distribution and release of thefund due to the agency as provided for inSections 4 and 5 of this Act:Provided, that the rewards under this Act may also take the form of nonmonetary benefits;

(b) To set the criteria and procedures for removing from service officials and employeeswhose revenue collection falls short of thetarget by at least seven and a half percent (7.5%),with due consideration of all relevant factors affecting the level of collection asprovided in the

rules and regulations promulgated under this Act, subject to civil service laws, rules andregulations andcompliances with substantive and procedural due process: Provided, That thefollowing exemptions shall apply:

1. Where the district or area of responsibility is newly-created, not exceeding twoyears in operation, as has no historicalrecord of collection performance that can be usedas basis for evaluation; and

2. Where the revenue or customs official or employee is a recent transferee inthe middle of the period underconsideration unless the transfer was due tononperformance of revenue targets or potential nonperformance of revenuetargets:Provided, however, That when the district or area of responsibility covered by revenue orcustoms officials oremployees has suffered from economic difficulties brought about bynatural calamities or force majeure or economiccauses as may be determined by the

Board, termination shall be considered only after careful and proper review by the Board.(c) To terminate personnel in accordance with the criteria adopted in the preceding

paragraph: Provided, That such decision shallbe immediately executory: Provided, further, Thatthe application of the criteria for the separation of an official or employee fromservice under this

Act shall be without prejudice to the application of other relevant laws on accountability of publicofficers andemployees, such as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards of Public Officersand Employees and the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act;

(d) To prescribe a system for performance evaluation;

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(e) To perform such other functions as are necessary or incidental to its mandatedfunctions, including the issuances of rules andregulations for the proper conduct of its functions;and

(f) To submit as annual report to the Congress.

Section 12. Joint Congressional Oversight Committee.There is hereby created a Joint

Congressional Oversight Committee composed of seven Members from the Senate and sevenMembers from the House of Representatives. The Members from the Senate shall be appointedbythe Senate President, with at least two senators representing the minority. The Members fromthe House of Representatives shall beappointed by the Speaker with at least two membersrepresenting the minority. After the Oversight Committee will have approved theimplementingrules and regulations (IRR) it shall thereafter become functus officio and therefore cease toexist.Section 13. Separability Clause.If any provision of this Act is declared invalid by acompetent court, the remainder of this Act anyprovision not affected by such declaration ofinvalidity shall remain in force and effect.In Abakada, Supreme Court declared Section 12 of RA9335 creating Joint Congressional Oversight Committee to approve the IRR asunconstitutionaland violative of principle separation of powers. However the constitutionality of other provisions

was upheld and unlessthe contrary is shown, it is presumed valid and effective even withoutapproval of Joint Congressional Oversight Committee

Nazareth v.s. Villar G.R. 188635 (2013)

Facts

1. On December 22, 1997, Congress enacted R.A. No. 8439 to address the policy of theState to provide a program forhuman resources development in science

andtechnology in order to achieve and maintain the necessary reservoir of talent andmanpower that would sustain the drive for total scienceandtechnology mastery.3Section 7 of R.A. No. 8439 grants the following additionalallowances and benefits (Magna Carta benefits) to the covered officials and employeesof the Department of Science andTechnology (DOST). Under R.A. No. 8439, the fundsfor the payment of the Magna Carta benefits are to be appropriated by the General

Appropriations Act (GAA) of the year following the enactment of R.A. No. 8439.2. The DOST Regional Office No. IX in Zamboanga City released the Magna Carta benefits

to the covered officials and employees commencing in CY 1998 despite the absence ofspecific appropriation for the purpose in the GAA. Subsequently, following the post-auditconducted by COA State Auditor Ramon E. Vargas on April 23, 1999, October 28, 1999,June 20, 2000, February 27, 2001, June 27, 2001, October 10, 2001 and October 17,

2001, several NDs (Notice of Disallowance) were issued disapproving the payment ofthe Magna Carta benefits. The provision for the use of savings intheGeneralAppropriations Act (GAA) was vetoed by the President; hence, there was nobasis for the payment of the aforesaid allowances or benefits according to the State

Auditor.3. DOST Secretary Dr. Filemon Uriarte, Jr. to request the Office of the President (OP)

through his Memorandum dated April 3, 2000 (Request for Authority to Use Savings forthe Payment of Magna Carta Benefits as provided for in R.A. 8439) for the authority to
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utilize the DOSTs savings to pay the Magna Carta benefits.6The salient portions of theMemorandum of Secretary Uriarte, Jr. explained the request in the following manner: x xx. However, the amount necessary for its full implementation had not been provided intheGeneralAppropriations Act (GAA). Since the Acts effectivity, the Department hadpaid the 1998 MC benefits out of its current years savings as provided for in the BudgetIssuances of the Department of Budget and Management while the 1999 MC benefits

were likewise sourced from the years savings as authorized in the 1999 GAA. The 2000GAA has no provision for the use of savings. The Department, therefore, cannotcontinue the payment of the Magna Carta benefits from its 2000 savings. x x x. TheDOST personnel are looking forward to His Excellencys favorable consideration for thepayment of said MC benefits, being part of the administrations 10-point action programto quote I will order immediate implementation ofRA 8439 (the Magna Carta forScience andTechnology Personnel in Government) as published in the Manila Bulletindated May 20, 1998.

4. Through the Memorandum dated April 12, 2000, then Executive Secretary RonaldoZamora, acting by authority of the President, approved the request of Secretary Uriarte,Jr., With reference to your Memorandum dated April 03, 2000 requesting authority touse savings from the appropriations of that Department and its agencies for the payment

of Magna Carta Benefits as provided for in R.A. 8439, please be informed that the saidrequest is hereby approved.

5. On July 28, 2003, the petitioner, in her capacity as the DOST Regional Director inRegion IX, lodged an appeal with COA Regional Cluster Director Ellen Sescon, urgingthe lifting of the disallowance of the Magna Carta benefits for the period covering CY1998 to CY 2001 amounting to P4,363,997.47. She anchored her appeal on the April 12,2000 Memorandum of Executive Secretary Zamora, and cited the provision in the GAAof 1998.

Issue: Is the act of the Executive Secretary falls under Article VI, Section 25 (5) which provides (5) No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations, however, thePRESIDENT, x x x may by law, be authorized to augment any item in the general appropriations

law for their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations.

Held:

NO. Simply put, it means that only the President has the power to augment savings from oneitem to another in the budget of administrative agencies under his control and supervision. Thisis the very reason why the President vetoed the Special Provisions in the 1998 GAA that wouldauthorize the department heads to use savings to augment other items of appropriations withinthe Executive Branch. Such power could well be extended to hisCabinet Secretaries as alteregos under the doctrine of qualified political agency enunciated by the Supreme Court in thecase of Binamira v. Garrucho, 188 SCRA 154, where it was pronounced that the official acts ofa Department Secretary are deemed acts of the President unless disapproved or reprobated by

the latter. Thus, in the instant case, the authority granted to the DOST by the ExecutiveSecretary, being one of the alter egos of the President, was legal and valid but in so far as theuse of agencys savings for the year 2000 only. Although 2000 budget was reenacted in 2001,the authority granted on the use of savings did not necessarily extend to the succeeding year.

METROBANK V TOBIASKULANG
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Brief Fact Summary.William Marbury (Marbury), an end-of-term appointee of President JohnAdams (President Adams) to a justice of the peace position in the District of Columbia, broughtsuit against President Thomas Jeffersons (President Jefferson) Secretary of State, JamesMadison, seeking delivery of his commission.

Synopsis of Rule of Law.The Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) has

constitutional authority to review executive actions and legislative acts. The Supreme Court haslimited jurisdiction, the bounds of which are set by the United States Constitution (Constitution),which may not be enlarged by the Congress.

Facts.Before the inauguration of President Jefferson, outgoing President Adams attempted tosecure Federalist control of the judiciary by creating new judgeships and filling them withFederalist appointees. Included in these efforts was the nomination by President Adams, underthe Organic Act of the District of Columbia (the District), of 42 new justices of the peace for theDistrict, which were confirmed by the Senate the day before President Jeffersons inauguration.

A few of the commissions, including Marburys, were undelivered when President Jefferson tookoffice. The new president instructed Secretary of State James Madison to withhold delivery ofthe commissions. Marbury sought mandamus in the Supreme Court, requiring James Madison

to deliver his commission.

Issue.Is Marbury entitled to mandamus from the Supreme Court?

Held.No. Case dismissed for want of jurisdiction.As the President signed Marburys commission after his confirmation, the appointment has beenmade, and Marbury has a right to the commissionGiven that the law imposed a duty on the office of the president to deliver Marburyscommission, that the Supreme Court has the power to review executive actions when theexecutive acts as an officer of the law and the nature of the writ of mandamus to direct an officer

of the government to do a particular thing therein specified, mandamus is the appropriateremedy, if available to the Supreme Court.To issue mandamus to the Secretary of State really is to sustain an original action, which is (inthis case) outside the constitutional limits of jurisdiction imposed on the Supreme Court.

Discussion.The importance of Marbury v. Madison is both political and legal. Although thecase establishes the traditions of judicial review and a litigable constitution on which theremainder of constitutional law rests, it also transformed the Supreme Court from anincongruous institution to an equipotent head of a branch of the federal government.

Angara v Electoral Commission

In the elections of Sept 17, 1935, Angara, and the respondents, Pedro Ynsua et al. werecandidates voted for theposition of member of the National Assembly for the first district of theProvince of Tayabas. On Oct 7, 1935, Angara was proclaimed as member-elect of the NA forthe said district. On November 15, 1935, he took his oath of office. On Dec 3, 1935, the NA insession assembled, passed Resolution No. 8 confirming the election of the members of theNational Assembly against whom no protest had thus far been filed. On Dec 8, 1935, Ynsua,filed before the Electoral Commission a Motion of Protest against the election of Angara. On

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Dec 9, 1935, the EC adopted a resolution, par. 6 of which fixed said date as the last day for thefiling of protests against the election, returns and qualifications of members of the NA,notwithstanding the previous confirmation made by the NA. Angara filed a Motion to Dismissarguing that by virtue of the NA proclamation, Ynsua can no longer protest. Ynsua argued backby claiming that EC proclamation governs and that the EC can take cognizance of the electionprotest and that the EC cannot be subject to a writ of prohibition from the SC.

ISSUES: Whether or not the SC has jurisdiction over such matter.Whether or not EC acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the electionprotest.HELD:The SC ruled in favor of Angara. The SC emphasized that in cases of conflict betweenthe several departments and among the agencies thereof, the judiciary, with the SC as the finalarbiter, is the only constitutional mechanism devised finally to resolve the conflict and allocateconstitutional boundaries.That judicial supremacy is but the power of judicial review in actual and appropriate cases andcontroversies, and is the power and duty to see that no one branch or agency of thegovernment transcends the Constitution, which is the source of all authority.That the Electoral Commission is an independent constitutional creation with specific powersand functions to execute and perform, closer for purposes of classification to the legislative than

to any of the other two departments of the government.That the Electoral Commission is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returnsand qualifications of members of the National Assembly.

G.R. No. L-10520 February 28, 1957LORENZO M. TAADA and DIOSDADO MACAPAGAL,petitioners,vs.MARIANO JESUS CUENCO, FRANCISCO A. DELGADO, ALFREDO CRUZ, CATALINACAYETANO, MANUEL SERAPIO, PLACIDO REYES, and FERNANDO HIPOLITO in hiscapacity as cashier and disbursing officer,respondents.

After the 1955 national elections, the membership in the Senate was overwhelmingly occupiedby the Nacionalista Party. The lone opposition senator was Lorenzo Taada who belonged tothe Citizens Party. Diosdado Macapagal on the other hand was a senatorial candidate who lostthe bid but was contesting it before the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET). But prior to a decisionthe SET would have to choose its members. It is provided that the SET should be composed of9 members comprised of the following: 3 justices of the Supreme Court, 3 senators from themajority party and 3 senators from the minority party. But since there is only one minoritysenator the other two SET members supposed to come from the minority were filled in by theNP. Taada assailed this process before the Supreme Court. So did Macapagal because hedeemed that if the SET would be dominated by NP senators then he, as a member of theLiberalista Party will not have any chance in his election contest. Senator Mariano Cuenco et al(members of the NP) averred that the Supreme Court cannot take cognizance of the issuebecause it is a political question. Cuenco argued that the power to choose the members of theSET is vested in the Senate alone and the remedy for Taada and Macapagal was not to raisethe issue before judicial courts but rather to leave it before the bar of public opinion.ISSUE: Whether or not the issue is a political question.HELD: No. The SC took cognizance of the case and ruled that the issue is a justiciablequestion. The term Political Question connotes what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, aquestion of policy. It refers to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decidedby the people in their sovereign capacity; or in regard to which full discretionary authority has

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been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. It is concerned withissues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure.In this case, the issue at bar is not a political question. The Supreme Court is not being askedby Taada to decide upon the official acts of Senate. The issue being raised by Taada waswhether or not the elections of the 5 NP members to the SET are valid which is a judicialquestion. Note that the SET is a separate and independent body from the Senate which does

not perform legislative acts.But how should the gridlock be resolved?The nomination of the last two members (who would fill in the supposed seat of the minoritymembers) must not come from the majority party. In this case, the Chairman of the SET,apparently already appointed members that would fill in the minority seats (even though thosewill come from the majority party). This is still valid provided the majority members of the SET(referring to those legally sitting) concurred with the Chairman. Besides, the SET may set itsown rules in situations like this provided such rules comply with the Constitution.

Daza v singsong

The Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) was reorganized resulting to a political realignment

in the lower house. LDP also changed its representation in the Commission on Appointments.They withdrew the seat occupied by Daza (LDP member) and gave it to the new LDP member.Thereafter the chamber elected a new set of representatives in the CoA which consisted of theoriginal members except Daza who was replaced by Singson. Daza questioned suchreplacement.ISSUE: Whether or not a change resulting from a political realignment validly changes thecomposition of the Commission on Appointments.HELD:As provided in the constitution, there should be a Commission on Appointmentsconsisting of twelve Senators and twelve members of the House of Representatives elected byeach House respectively on the basis of proportional representation of thepolitical partiestherein, this necessarily connotes the authority of each house of Congress to see to it that therequirement is duly complied with. Therefore, it may take appropriate measures, not only upon

the initial organization of the Commission but also subsequently thereto NOT the court.

MIRANDA VS AGUIRREPosted by kaye lee on 12:46 PMG.R. No. 133064 September 16 1999

FACTS:1994, RA No. 7720 effected the conversion of the municipality of Santiago, Isabela, into anindependent component city. July 4th, RA No. 7720 was approved by the people of Santiago ina plebiscite. 1998, RA No. 8528 was enacted and it amended RA No. 7720 that practicallydowngraded the City of Santiago from an independent component city to a component city.Petitioners assail the constitutionality of RA No. 8528 for the lack of provision to submit the law

for the approval of the people of Santiago in a proper plebiscite.

Respondents defended the constitutionality of RA No. 8528 saying that the said act merelyreclassified the City of Santiago from an independent component city into a component city. Itallegedly did not involve any creation, division, merger, abolition, or substantial alteration ofboundaries of local government units, therefore, a plebiscite of the people of Santiago isunnecessary. They also questioned the standing of petitioners to file the petition and arguedthat the petition raises a political question over which the Court lacks jurisdiction.
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ISSUE:Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the petition at bar.

RULING:Yes. RA No. 8528 is declared unconstitutional. That Supreme Court has the jurisdiction oversaid petition because it involves not a political question but a justiciable issue, and of which only

the court could decide whether or not a law passed by the Congress is unconstitutional.

That when an amendment of the law involves creation, merger, division, abolition or substantialalteration of boundaries of local government units, a plebiscite in the political units directlyaffected is mandatory.Petitioners are directly affected in the imple-mentation of RA No. 8528. Miranda was the mayorof Santiago City, Afiado was the President of the Sangguniang Liga, together with 3 otherpetitioners were all residents and voters in the City of Santiago. It is their right to be heard in theconversion of their city through a plebiscite to be conducted by the COMELEC. Thus, denial oftheir right in RA No. 8528 gives them proper standing to strike down the law as unconstitutional.

Sec. 1 of Art. VIII of the Constitution states that: the judicial power shall be vested in one

Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law. Judicial power includesthe duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legallydemandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse ofdiscretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instru-mentality of the Government.

Francisco vs. HRErnesto Francisco, Jr. vs. The House of RepresentativesG.R. No. 160261 November 10, 2003Carpio Morales, J.:Facts:On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution which directedthe Committee on Justice to conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of

disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the JudiciaryDevelopment Fund (JDF). Then on June 2, 2003, former President Joseph Estrada filed animpeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices.The complaint was endorsed and was referred to the House Committee in accordance withSection 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution.The House Committee on Justice ruled on October 13, 2003 that the first impeachmentcomplaint was sufficient in form, but voted to dismiss the same on October 22, 2003 for beinginsufficient in substance. On October 23, 2003, a second impeachment complaint was filedagainst Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged results of the legislativeinquiry initiated by above-mentioned House Resolution. This second impeachment complaintwas accompanied by a Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment signed by at least one-third(1/3) of all the Members of the House of Representatives.

Issues:1. Can the Court make a determination of what constitutes an impeachable offense?2. Whether or not Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of the Rules on Impeachment adopted by the12th Congress are unconstitutional.

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3. Whether or not the second impeachment complaint is barred under Section 3(5) of Article XIof the Constitution.

Held:1. No. Such a determination is a purely political question which the Constitution has left to the

sound discretion of the legislation. Although Section 2 of Article XI of the Constitutionenumerates six grounds for impeachment, two of these, namely, other high crimes and betrayalof public trust, elude a precise definition.2. Yes. The provisions of Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rulescontravene Section 3 (5) of Article XI as they give the term initiate a meaning different fromfiling.

3. Yes. Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the impeachmentcomplaint and referral to the House Committee on Justice, the initial action taken thereon, themeaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint hasbeen initiated in the foregoing manner, another may not be filed against the same official withina one year period following Article XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution.

In fine, considering that the first impeachment complaint, was filed on June 2, 2003 and thesecond impeachment complaint filed was on October 23, 2003, it violates the constitutionalprohibition against the initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same impeachableofficer within a one-year period.

Article VIII Case Digest Constitutional law 1Mendoza vs PeopleG.R. No. 183891October 19, 2011

Facts:Romarico Mendoza (petitioner) is a company boss/employer convicted for violating a special

law known as the Social SecurityCondonation Law of 2009 for non-remittance of the SocialSecurity Service (SSS) contributions to his employees. The offense iscriminal in nature.Nevertheless, Mendoza admitted his fault, as he said, he acted in good faith. But still, the Courthas to render judgment and apply the proper penalty how harsh it may be dura lex sed lex).TheCourt sentenced Mendoza to an indeterminate prison term. Considering the circumstances, thecourt the Court transmitted thecase to the Chief Executive, through the Department of Justice,and RECOMMENDS the grant of executive clemency to the

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