Consti Digests4

7/27/2019 Consti Digests4

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Tio v Videogram Regulatory BoardG.R. No. L-75697 June 18, 1987

Facts:

1. Petitioner on his own behalf and purportedly on behalf of other videogram operators

adversely affected assailed the constitutionality of PD 1987 entitled "An Act Creating the

Videogram Regulatory Board" with broad powers to regulate and supervise the videogram

industry. The Decree promulgated on October 5, 1985, took effect on April 10, 1986, fifteen

(15) days after completion of its publication in t he Official Gazette.

2. On November 5, 1985, a month after the promulgation of the decree, PD 1994 amended

the NIRC. Petitioner's contended that the tax provision of the decree is a rider.

ISSUE: Whether or not the PD 1987 is unconstitutional

PD 1987 constitutional.

The Constitutional requirement that "every bill shall embrace only one subject which shall

be expressed in the title thereof" is sufficiently complied with if the title be comprehensive

enough to include the general purpose which a statute seeks to achieve. It is not necessary

that the title express each and every end that the statute wishes to accomplish. The

requirement is satisfied if all the parts of the statute are related, and are germane to the

subject matter expressed in the title, or as long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign

to the general subject and title.

An act having a single general subject, indicated in the title, may contain any number of

provisions, no matter how diverse they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent with or

foreign to the general subject, and may be considered in furtherance of such subject by

providing for the method and means of carrying out the general object."

The rule also is that the constitutional requirement as to the title of a bill should not be so

narrowly construed as to cripple or impede the power of legislation. 4 It should be given

practical rather than technical construction.

Tested by the foregoing criteria, petitioner's contention that the tax provision of the DECREE

is a rider is without merit. That section reads, inter alia:

Section 10. Tax on Sale, Lease or Disposition o f Videograms.

xxx xxx xxx

The foregoing provision is allied and germane to, and is reasonably necessary for the

accomplishment of, the general object of the DECREE, which is the regulation of the video

industry through the Videogram Regulatory Board as expressed in its title . The tax provision

is not inconsistent with, nor foreign to that general subject and title. As a tool for regulation,

it is simply one of the regulatory and control mechanisms scattered throughout the

DECREE. The express purpose of the DECREE to include taxation of the video industry in

order to regulate and rationalize the heretofore uncontrolled distribution of videograms is

evident from Preambles 2 and 5, supra. Those preambles explain the motives of the

lawmaker in presenting the measure. The title of the DECREE, which is the creation of the

Videogram Regulatory Board, is comprehensive enough to include the purposes expressed in

its Preamble and reasonably covers all its provisions. It is unnecessary to express all those

objectives in the title or that the latter be an index to the body of the DECREE. 7

1. The title of the decree, which calls for the creation of the VRB is comprehensive enough to

include the purposes expressed in its Preamble and reasonably covered all its provisions. It is

unnecessary to express all those objectives in the title or that the latter be an index to the

body of the decree.

2. The foregoing provision is allied and germane to, and is reasonably necessary for the

accomplishment of, the general object of the decree, which is the regulation of the video

industry through the VRB as expressed in its title. The tax provision is not inconsistent with

nor foreign to the general subject and title. As a tool for regulation it is simply one of the


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regulatory and control mechanisms scattered throughout the decree.3. The express purpose

of PD 1987 to include taxation of the video industry in order to regulate and rationalize the

heretofore uncontrolled distribution of videos is evident from Preambles 2 and 5. Those

preambles explain the motives of the lawmaker in presenting the measure.


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G.R. No. L-28089 October 25, 1967

BARA LIDASAN, petitioner,

vs.

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

Facts:

1. Lidasan, a resident and taxpayer of the detached portion of Parang, Cotabato, and a

qualified voter for the 1967 elections assails the constitutionality of RA 4790 and petitioned

that Comelec's resolutions implementing the same for electoral purposes be nullified. Under

RA 4790, 12 barrios in two municipalities in the province of Cotabato are transferred to the

province of Lanao del Sur. This brought about a change in the boundaries of the two

provinces.

2. Apprised of this development, the Office of the President, recommended to Comelec that

the operation of the statute be suspended until "clarified by correcting legislation."

3. Comelec, by resolution declared that the statute should be implemented unless declared

unconstitutional by the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not RA 4790, which is entitled "An Act Creating the Municipality of

Dianaton in the Province of Lanao del Sur", but which includes barrios located in another

province Cotabato is unconstitutional for embracing more than one subject in the title

YES. RA 4790 is null and void

1. The constitutional provision contains dual limitations upon legislative power.

First. Congress is to refrain from conglomeration, under one statute, ofheterogeneous subjects.

Second. The title of the bill is to be couched in a language sufficient to notify thelegislators and the public and those concerned of the import of the single subject

thereof.

Of relevance here is the second directive. The subject of the statute must be "expressed in

the title" of the bill. This constitutional requirement "breathes the spirit of command."

Compliance is imperative, given the fact that the Constitution does not exact of Congress the

obligation to read during its deliberations the entire text of the bill. In fact, in the case of

House Bill 1247, which became RA 4790, only its title was read from its introduction to its

final approval in the House where the bill, being o f local application, originated.

2. The Constitution does not require Congress to employ in the title of an enactment,

language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and the

minute details therein. It suffices if the title should serve the purpose of the constitutional

demand that it inform the legislators, the persons interested in the subject of the bill, and

the public, of the nature, scope and consequences of the proposed law and its operation.

And this, to lead them to inquire into the body of the bill, study and discuss the same, take

appropriate action thereon, and, thus, prevent surprise or fraud upon the legislators.

3. The test of the sufficiency of a title is whether or not it is misleading; and, which

technical accuracy is not essential, and the subject need not be stated in express terms

where it is clearly inferable from the details set forth, a title which is so uncertain that the

average person reading it would not be informed of the purpose of the enactment or put

on inquiry as to its contents, or which is misleading, either in referring to or indicating onesubject where another or different one is really embraced in the act, or in omitting any

expression or indication of the real subject or scope of the act, is bad.

4. The title "An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton, in the Province of Lanao del

Sur" projects the impression that only the province of Lanao del Sur is affected by the

creation of Dianaton. Not the slightest intimation is there that communities in the adjacent

province of Cotabato are incorporated in this new Lanao del Sur town. The phrase "in the

Province of Lanao del Sur," read without subtlety or contortion, makes the title misleading,

deceptive.


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For, the known fact is that the legislation has a two-pronged purpose combined in one

statute: (1) it creates the municipality of Dianaton purportedly from twenty-one barrios in

the towns of Butig and Balabagan, both in the province of Lanao del Sur; and (2) it also

dismembers two municipalities in Cotabato, a province different from Lanao del Sur.

5. Finally, the title did not inform the members of Congress the full impact of the law. One,

it did not apprise the people in the towns of Buldon and Parang in Cotabato and in the

province of Cotabato itself that part of their territory is being taken away from their towns

and province and added to the adjacent Province of Lanao del Sur. Two, it kept the public in

the dark as to what t owns and provinces were actually affected by the bill.


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Dela Cruz v Paras

G.R. No. L-42571-72 July 25, 1983

Facts:

1. Assailed was the validity ofan ordinance which prohibit the operation of night clubs.

Petitioners contended that the ordinance is invalid, tainted with nullity, the municipality

being devoid of power to prohibit a lawful business, occupation or calling. Petitioners at the

same time alleging that their rights to due process and equal protection of the laws were

violated as the licenses previously given to them was in effect withdrawn without judicial

hearing.

2. RA 938, as amended, was originally enacted on June 20, 1953. It is entitled: "An Act

Granting Municipal or City Boards and Councils the Power to Regulate the Establishments,

Maintenance and Operation of Certain Places of Amusement within Their Respective

Territorial Jurisdictions.'

The first section reads, "The municipal or city board or council of each chartered city shall

have the power to regulate by ordinance the establishment, maintenance and operation of

night clubs, cabarets, dancing schools, pavilions, cockpits, bars, saloons, bowling alleys,

billiard pools, and other similar places of amusement within its territorial jurisdiction:

On May 21, 1954, the first section was amended to include not merely "the power to

regulate, but likewise "Prohibit ... " The title, however, remained the same. It is worded

exactly as RA 938.

3. As thus amended, if only the said portion of the Act was considered, a municipal council

may go as far as to prohibit the operation of night clubs. The title was not in any way altered.

It was not changed one bit. The exact wording was followed. The power granted remains t hat

of regulation, not prohibition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the ordinance is valid

NO. It is unconstitutional. It undoubtly involves a measure not embraced within the

regulatory power but an exercise of an assumed power to prohibit.

1. The Constitution mandates: "Every bill shall embrace only one subject which shall be

expressed in the title thereof. "Since there is no dispute as the title limits the power to

regulating, not prohibiting, it would result in the statute being invalid if, as was done by the

Municipality of Bocaue, the operation of a night club was prohibited. There is a wide gap

between the exercise of a regulatory power"to provide for the health and safety, promote

the prosperity, and improve the morals, in the language of the Administrative Code, such

competence extending to all "the great public needs.

2. Under the Local Govt Code, it is clear that municipal corporations cannot prohibit the

operation of night clubs. They may be regulated, but not prevented from carrying on their

business.

3. Herein what was involved is a measure not embraced within the regulatory power but

an exercise of an assumed power to prohibit.


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G.R. No. L-114783 December 8, 1994

ROBERT V. TOBIAS, RAMON M. GUZMAN, TERRY T. LIM, GREGORIO D. GABRIEL, and

ROBERTO R. TOBIAS, JR. petitioners,

vs.

HON. CITY MAYOR BENJAMIN S. ABALOS, CITY TREASURER WILLIAM MARCELINO, and THE

SANGGUNIANG PANLUNGSOD, all of the City of Mandaluyong, Metro Manila, respondents.

FACTS:

Prior to Republic Act No., 7675 also known as An Act Converting the Municipality of

Mandaluyong into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Mandaluyong ,

Mandaluyong and San Juan belonged to only one legislative district. A plebiscite was held for

the people of Mandaluyong whether or not they approved of the said conversion. The

plebiscite was only 14.41% of the said conversion. Nevertheless, 18,621 voted yes whereas

7, 911 voted no.

Petitioners allege that the inclusion of the assailed Section 49 in the subject law resulted in

the latter embracing two principal subjects, namely: (1) the conversion of Mandaluyong into

a highly urbanized city; and (2) the division of the congressional district of San

Juan/Mandaluyong into two separate districts.

Petitioners contend that the second aforestated subject is not germane to the subject

matter of R.A. No. 7675 since the said law treats of the conversion of Mandaluyong into a

highly urbanized city, as expressed in the title of the law. Therefore, since Section 49 treats

of a subject distinct from that stated in the title of the law, the "one subject-one bill" rule has

not been complied with.

ISSUE: Whether or not the ratification of RA7675 was unconstitutional citing Article VI

26(1)

HELD/RULING:

Section 26(1). Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall

be expressed in the title thereof.

Contrary to petitioners' assertion, the creation of a separate congressional district for

Mandaluyong is not a subject separate and distinct from the subject of its conversion into a

highly urbanized city but is a natural and logical consequence of its conversion into a highly

urbanized city. Verily, the title of R.A. No. 7675, "An Act Converting the Municipality ofMandaluyong Into a Highly Urbanized City of Mandaluyong" necessarily includes and

contemplates the subject treated under Section 49 regarding the creation of a separate

congressional district for Mandaluyong.

Moreover, a liberal construction of the "one title-one subject" rule has been invariably

adopted by this court so as not to cripple or impede legislation. Thus, in Sumulong v.

Comelec (73 Phil. 288 [1941]), we ruled that the constitutional requirement as now

expressed in Article VI, Section 26(1) "should be given a practical rather than a technical

construction. It should be sufficient compliance with such requirement if the title expresses

the general subject and all the provisions are germane to that general subject."

The liberal construction of the "one title-one subject" rule had been further elucidated in

Lidasan v. Comelec (21 SCRA 496 [1967]), to wit:

Of course, the Constitution does not require Congress to employ in the title of an

enactment, language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents

and the minute details therein. It suffices if the title should serve the purpose of the

constitutional demand that it inform the legislators, the persons interested in the subject

of the bill and the public, of the nature, scope and consequences of the proposed law and

its operation" (emphasis supplied).


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Requirements as to certain laws - Appropriation laws

G.R. No. 71977 February 27, 1987

DEMETRIO G. DEMETRIA, M.P., AUGUSTO S. SANCHEZ, M.P., ORLANDO S. MERCADO, M.P.,

HONORATO Y. AQUINO, M.P., ZAFIRO L. RESPICIO, M.P., DOUGLAS R. CAGAS, M.P., OSCAR

F. SANTOS, M.P., ALBERTO G. ROMULO, M.P., CIRIACO R. ALFELOR, M.P., ISIDORO E. REAL,M.P., EMIGDIO L. LINGAD, M.P., ROLANDO C. MARCIAL, M.P., PEDRO M. MARCELLANA,

M.P., VICTOR S. ZIGA, M.P., and ROGELIO V. GARCIA. M.P., petitioners,

vs.

HON. MANUEL ALBA in his capacity as the MINISTER OF THE BUDGET and VICTOR

MACALINGCAG in his capacity as the TREASURER OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

FACTS

1.) Petitioners filed as concerned citizens of the country, as members of the National

Assembly/Batasan Pambansa representing their millions of constituents, as parties with

general interest common to all the people of the Philippines, and as taxpayers whose vital

interests may be affected by the outcome of the reliefs

2.) Petitioners assailed the constitutionality of the first paragraph of Section 44 of

Presidential Decree No. 1177, otherwise known as the Budget Reform Decree of 1977 on

the ff. grounds:

- It infringes upon the fundamental law by authorizing the illegal transfer of public moneys

- It is repugnant to the constitution as it fails to specify the objectives and purposes for which

the proposed transfer of funds are to be made

- It allows the President to override the safeguards, form and procedure prescribed by the

Constitution in approving appropriations

- it amounts to undue delegation of legislative powers on the transfer of funds by the

President and the implementation thereof by the Budget Minister and the Treasurer are

without or in excess of their authority and jurisdiction

- The threatened and continuing transfer of funds by the president and the implementation

thereof by the budget minister and the treasurer of the Philippines are without or in excess of

their authority and jurisdiction.

ISSUE: WON the Paragraph 1 of Section 44 of Presidential Decree No. 1177 is

unconstitutional.

2. YES. Paragraph 1 of Section 44 of Presidential Decree No. 1177, being repugnant to

Section 16(5) Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution is null and void.

- Paragraph 1 of Section 44 provides: The President shall have the authority to transfer

any fund, appropriated for the different departments, bureaus, offices and agencies of the

Executive Department, which are included in the General Appropriations Act, to any

program, project or activity of any department, b ureau, o r office included in the General

Appropriations Act or approved after its enactment.

- Section 16(5) Article VIII reads as follows:No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer

of appropriations, however, the President, the Prime Minister, the Speaker, the Chief

Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of constitutional commissions may by law be

authorized to augment any item in the general appropriations law for their respective

offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations.

- Prohibition to transfer was explicit and categorical. For flexibility in the use of public funds,

the Constitution provided a leeway in which the purpose and condition for which funds may

be transferred were specified.


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- The constitution allows the enactment of a law authorizing the transfer of funds for the

purpose of augmenting an item from savings in another item in the appropriation of the

government branch or constitutional body concerned

- Paragraph 1 of Section 44 unduly over-extends the privilege granted under Section 16(5),

and empowers the President to indiscriminately transfer funds from one department,

bureau, office or agency of the Executive Department, which are included in the GeneralAppropriations Act, to any program, project or activity of any department, bureau, or office

included in the General Appropriations Act or approved after its enactment, without regard

to whether or not the funds to be transferred are savings, or whether or not the transfer is

for the purpose of augmenting the item to which the transfer is to be made.

- It completely disregards the standards set in the fundamental law, amounting to an

undue delegation of legislative power


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G.R. No. 94571 April 22, 1991

TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR. and AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., petitioners,

vs.

HON. GUILLERMO CARAGUE, in his capacity as Secretary, Budget & Management, HON.

ROZALINA S. CAJUCOM in her capacity as National Treasurer and COMMISSION ON AUDIT,

respondents.

This is a case of first impression whereby petitioners question the constitutionality of the

automatic appropriation for debt service in the 1990 budget.

Facts: The 1990 budget consists of P98.4 Billion in automatic appropriation (with P86.8

Billion for debt service) and P155.3 Billion appropriated under Republic Act No. 6831 ,

otherwise known as the General Appropriations Act, or a total of P233.5 Billion, while the

appropriations for the Department of Education, Culture and Sports amount to

P27,017,813,000.00.

The said automatic appropriation for debt service is authorized by P.D. No. 81, entitled

Amending Certain Provisions of Republic Act Numbered Four Thousand Eight Hundred Sixty,

as Amended (Re: Foreign Borrowing Act), by P.D. No. 1177, entitled Revising the Budget

Process in Order to Institutionalize the Budgetary Innovations of the New Society, and by

P.D. No. 1967, entitled An Act Strengthening the Guarantee and Payment Positions of the

Republic of the Philippines on Its Contingent Liabilities Arising out of Relent and Guaranteed

Loan by Appropriating Funds For The Purpose.

The petitioner seek the declaration of the unconstitutionality of P.D. No. 81, Sections 31 of

P.D. 1177, and P.D. No. 1967. The petition also seeks to restrain the disbursement for debt

service under the 1990 budget pursuant to said decrees.

Issue:Is the appropriation of P86 billion in the P233 billion 1990 budget violative of Section

29(1), Article VI of the Constitution?

Held: No. There is no provision in our Constitution that provides or prescribes any

particular form of words or religious recitals in which an authorization or appropriation by

Congress shall be made, except that it be made by law, such as precisely the authorization

or appropriation under the questioned presidential decrees. In other words, in terms of time

horizons, an appropriation may be made impliedly (as by past but subsisting legislations) as

well as expressly for the current fiscal year (as by enactment of laws by the present

Congress), just as said appropriation may be made in general as well as in specific terms.

The Congressional authorization may be embodied in annual laws, such as a general

appropriations act or in special provisions of laws of general or special application which

appropriate public funds for specific public purposes, such as the questioned decrees. An

appropriation measure is sufficient if the legislative intention clearly and certainly appears

from the language employed (In re Continuing Appropriations, 32 P. 272), whether in the

past or in the present.

The Court finds that in this case the questioned laws are complete in all their essential terms

and conditions and sufficient standards are indicated therein.

The legislative intention in R.A. No. 4860, as amended, Section 31 of P.D. No. 1177 and P.D.

No. 1967 is that the amount needed should be automatically set aside in order to enable

the Republic of the Philippines to pay the principal, interest, taxes and other normal

banking charges on the loans, credits or indebtedness incurred as guaranteed by it when

they shall become due without the need to enact a separate law appropriating funds

therefor as the need arises. The purpose of these laws is to enable the government to make

prompt payment and/or advances for all loans to protect and maintain the credit standing of

the country.

Although the subject presidential decrees do not state specific amounts to be paid,

necessitated by the very nature of the problem being addressed, the amounts nevertheless

are made certain by the legislative parameters provided in the decrees. The Executive is not

of unlimited discretion as to the amounts to be disbursed for debt servicing. The mandate is

to pay only the principal, interest, taxes and other normal banking charges on the loans,

credits or indebtedness, or on the bonds, debentures or security or other evidences of


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indebtedness sold in international markets incurred by virtue of the law, as and when they

shall become due. No uncertainty arises in executive implementation as the limit will be the

exact amounts as shown by the books of the Treasury.

** While it is true that under Section 5(5), Article XIV of the Constitution Congress is

mandated to "assign the highest budgetary priority to education" in order to "insure that

teaching will attract and retain its rightful share of the best available talents through

adequate remuneration and other means of job satisfaction and fulfillment," it does not

thereby follow that the hands of Congress are so hamstrung as to deprive it the power to

respond to the imperatives of the national interest and for the attainment of other state

policies or objectives.

Having faithfully complied therewith, Congress is certainly not without any power, guided

only by its good judgment, to provide an appropriation, that can reasonably service our

enormous debt, the greater portion of which was inherited from the previous

administration. It is not only a matter of honor and to protect the credit standing of the

country. More especially, the very survival of our economy is at stake. Thus, if in the process

Congress appropriated an amount for debt service bigger than the share allocated to

education, the Court finds and so holds that said appropriation cannot be thereby assailed as

unconstitutional.


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G.R. No. 113105 August 19, 1994

PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION, EXEQUIEL B. GARCIA and A. GONZALES,

petitioners,

vs.

HON. SALVADOR ENRIQUEZ, as Secretary of Budget and Management; HON. VICENTE T.

TAN, as National Treasurer and COMMISSION ON AUDIT, respondents.

FACTS: RA 7663 (former House bill No. 10900, the General Appropriations Bill of 1994)

entitled An Act Appropriating Funds for the Operation of the Government of the

Philippines from January 1 to December 1, 1994, and for other Purposes was approved by

the President and vetoed some of the provisions.

Petitioners assail the special provision allowing a member of Congress to realign his

allocation for operational expenses to any other expense category claiming that it violates

Sec. 25, Art 7 of the Constitution.

PhilConsA prayed for a writ of prohibition to declare unconstitutional and void a.) Art 16 on

the Countrywide Development Fund and b.) The veto of the President of the Special

provision of Art XLVIII of the GAA of 1994.

16 members of the Senate sought the issuance of writs of certiorari, prohibition and

mandamus against the Exec. Secretary, the Sec of Dept of Budget and Management and the

National Treasurer and questions: 1.) Constitutionality of the conditions imposed by the

President in the items of the GAA of 1994 and 2.) the constitutionality of the veto of the

special provision in the appropriation for debt services.

ISSUE: Whether or not the veto of the president on four special provisions is constitutional

and valid?

HELD:

1. Special Provision on Debt Ceiling Congress provided for a debt-ceiling. Vetoed by the

Pres. w/o vetoing the entire appropriation for debt service. The said provisions are germane

to & have direct relation w/ debt service. They are appropriate provisions & cannot be

vetoed w/o vetoing the entire item/appropriation. VETO VOID.

2. Special Provision on Revolving Funds for SCUs said provision allows for the use of

income & creation of revolving fund for SCUs. Provision for Western Visayas State Univ. &

Leyte State Colleges vetoed by Pres. Other SCUs enjoying the privilege do so by existing law.

Pres. merely acted in pursuance to existing law. VETO VALID.

3. Special Provision on Road Maintenance Congress specified 30% ratio for works for

maintenance of roads be contracted according to guidelines set forth by DPWH. Vetoed by

the Pres. w/o vetoing the entire appropriation. It is not an inappropriate provision; it is not

alien to the subj. of road maintenance & cannot be veoted w/o vetoing the entire

appropriation. VETO VOID.

4. Special Provision on Purchase of Military Equip. AFP modernization, prior approval of

Congress required before release of modernization funds. It is the so-called legislative veto.

Any provision blocking an administrative action in implementing a law or requiring legislative

approval must be subject of a separate law. VETO VALID.

5. Special Provision on Use of Savings for AFP Pensions allows Chief of Staff to augment

pension funds through the use of savings. According to the Constitution, only the President

may exercise such power pursuant to a specific law. Properly vetoed. VETO VALID.

6. Special Provision on Conditions for de-activation of CAFGUs use of special fund for the

compensation of the said CAFGUs. Vetoed, President requires his prior approval. It is also an

amendment to existing law (PD No. 1597 & RA No. 6758). A provision in an appropriation act

cannot be used to repeal/amend existing laws. VETO VALID.

Congress cannot include in a general appropriations bill matters that should be more

properly enacted in separate legislation, and if it does that, the inappropriate provisions


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inserted by it must be treated as "item", which can be vetoed by the President in the

exercise of his item-veto power.

It is readily apparent that the Special Provision applicable to the appropriation for debt

service insofar as it refers to funds in excess of the amount appropriated in the bill, is an

"inappropriate" provision referring to funds other than the P86,323,438,000.00

appropriated in the General Appropriations Act of 1991.

The veto power, while exercisable by the President, is actually a part of the legislative

process (Memorandum of Justice Irene Cortes as AmicusCuriae, pp. 3-7). That is why it is

found in Article VI on the Legislative Department rather than in Article VII on the Executive

Department in the Constitution. There is, therefore, sound basis to indulge in the

presumption of validity of a veto. The burden shifts on those questioning the validity

thereof to show that its use is a violation of the Constitution.

Under his general veto power, the President has to veto the entire bill, not merely parts

thereof (1987 Constitution, Art. VI, Sec. 27[1]). The exception to the general veto power is

the power given to the President to veto any particular item or items in a general

appropriations bill (1987 Constitution, Art. VI, Sec. 27[2]). In so doing, the President must

veto the entire item.

A general appropriations bill is a special type of legislation, whose content is limited to

specified sums of money dedicated to a specific purpose or a separate fiscal

As the Constitution is explicit that the provision which Congress can include in an

appropriations bill must "relate specifically to some particular appropriation therein" and

"be limited in its operation to the appropriation to which it relates ," it follows that any

provision which does not relate to any particular item, or which extends in its operation

beyond an item of appropriation, is considered "an inappropriate provision" which can be

vetoed separately from an item. Also to be included in the category of "inappropriate

provisions" are unconstitutional provisions and provisions which are intended to amend

other laws, because clearly these kind of laws have no p lace in an appropriations bill.


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TAX LAWS

G.R. No. 115455 October 30, 1995

ARTURO M. TOLENTINO, petitioner,

vs.

THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE and THE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE,

respondents.

Facts: The value-added tax (VAT) is levied on the sale, barter or exchange of goods and

properties as well as on the sale o r exchange of services. RA 7716 seeks to widen the tax base

of the existing VAT system and enhance its administration by amending the National Internal

Revenue Code. There are various suits challenging the constitutionality of RA 7716 on various

grounds.

One contention is that There is also a contention that S. No. 1630 did not pass 3 readings as

required by the Constitution.

Issue: Whether or not RA 7716 violates Art. VI, Secs. 24 of the Constitution

Held:

Article VI Section 24. All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the

public debt, bills of local application, and private bills, shall originate exclusively in the H ouse

of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments.

The argument that RA 7716 did not originate exclusively in the House of Representatives as

required by Art. VI, Sec. 24 of the Constitution will not bear analysis. To begin with, it is not

the law but the revenue bill which is required by the Constitution to originate exclusively in

the House of Representatives. To insist that a revenue statute and not only the bill which

initiated the legislative process culminating in the enactment of the law must substantially

be the same as the House bill would be to deny the Senates power not only to concur with

amendments but also to propose amendments.

Indeed, what the Constitution simply means is that the initiative for filing revenue, tar iff or

tax bills, bills authorizing an increase of the public debt, private bills and bills of local

application must come from the House of Representatives on the theory that, elected as

they are from the districts, the members of the House can be expected to be more

sensitive to the local RA 7716 did not originate exclusively in the House of Representatives

as required by Art. VI, Sec. 24 of the Constitution, because it is in fact the result of the

consolidation of 2 distinct bills, H. No. 11197 and S. No. 1630. needs and problems.

Nor does the Constitution prohibit the filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation

of its receipt of the bill from the House, so long as action by the Senate as a body is withheld

pending receipt of the House bill.

The enactment of S. No. 1630 is not the only instance in which the Senate proposed an

amendment to a House revenue bill by enacting its own version of a revenue bill.

On the other hand, amendment by substitutiona mere matter of form. Petitioner has not

shown what substantial difference it would make if, as the Senate actually did in this case, a

separate bill like S. No. 1630 is instead enacted as a substitute measure, " taking into

Consideration . . . H.B. 11197."

Nor is there merit in petitioners' contention that, with regard to revenue bills, the Philippine

Senate

Art. I, 7, cl. 1 of the U.S. Constitution reads:

All Bills for raising Revenue shall originate in the House of

Representatives; but the Senate may propose or concur with

amendments as on other Bills.

Art. VI, 24 of our Constitution reads:

All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the

public debt, bills of local application, and private bills shall originate


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14

exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose

or concur with amendments.

The power of the Senate to propose amendments must be understood to be full, plenary

and complete "as on other Bills." Thus, because revenue bills are required to originate

exclusively in the House of Representatives, the Senate cannot enact revenue measures of

its own without such bills. After a revenue bill is passed and sent over to it by the House,however, the Senate certainly can pass its own version on the same subject matter. This

follows from the coequality of the two chambers of Congress.

The power of the Senate to propose or concur with amendments is apparently without

restriction. It would seem that by virtue of this power, the Senate can practically re -write a

bill required to come from the House and leave only a trace of the original bill.

In sum, while Art. VI, 24 provides that all appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills

authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local application, and private bills must

"originate exclusively in the House of Representatives," it also adds, " but the Senate may

propose or concur with amendments." In the exercise of this power, the Senate may

propose an entirely new bill as a substitute measure. As petitioner Tolentino states in a

high school text, a committee to which a bill is referred may do any of the following:

(1) to endorse the bill without changes

(2) to make changes in the bill omitting or adding sections or altering

its language;

(3) to make and endorse an entirely new bill as a substitute, in which

case it will be known as a committee bill; or

(4) to make no report at al l.

***

III. The President's certification.

As to what Presidential certification can accomplish, we have already explained in the main

decision that the phrase "except when the President certifies to the necessity of its

immediate enactment, etc." in Art. VI, 26 (2) qualifies not only the requirement that

"printed copies [of a bill] in its final form [must be] distributed to the members three days

before its passage" but also the requirement that before a bill can become a law it musthave passed "three readings on separate days." There is not only textual support for such

construction but historical basis as well.

This provision of the 1973 document, with slight modification, was adopted in Art. VI, 26 (2)

of the present Constitution, thus:

(2) No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has passed three readings on

separate days, and printed copies thereof in its final form have been distributed to its

Members three days before its passage, except when the President certifies to the necessity

of its immediate enactment to meet a public calamity or emergency. Upon the last reading

of a bill, no amendment thereto shall be allowed, and the vote thereon shall be taken

immediately thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered in the Journal.

The exception is based on the prudential consideration that if in all cases three readings on

separate days are required and a bill has to be printed in final form before it can be passed,

the need for a law may be rendered academic by the occurrence of the very emergency or

public calamity which it is meant to address.

Apparently, the members of the Senate (including some of the petitioners in these cases)

believed that there was an urgent need for consideration of S. No. 1630, because they

responded to the call of the President by voting on the bill on second and third readings on

the same day.

The purpose for which three readings on separate days is required is said to be two-fold:

(1) to inform the members of Congress of what they must vote on and


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(2) to give them notice that a measure is progressing through the enacting process, thus

enabling them and others interested in the measure to prepare their positions with

reference to it. (1 J. G. SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 10.04, p.

282 (1972)). These purposes were substantially achieved in the case of R.A. No. 7716.


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G.R. No. 144104 June 29, 2004

LUNG CENTER OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.

QUEZON CITY and CONSTANTINO P. ROSAS, in his capacity as City Assessor of Quezon City,

respondents.

Facts: Lung Center of the Philippines is a non-stock and non-profit entity established by

virtue of PD No. 1823. It is t he registered owner of the land on which the Lung Center of the

Philippines Hospital is erected. A big space in t he ground floor of the hospital is being leased

to private parties, for canteen and small store spaces, and to medical or professional

practitioners who use the same as their private clinics. Also, a big portion on the right side of

the hospital is being leased for commercial purposes to a private enterprise known as the

Elliptical Orchids and Garden Center.

When the City Assessor of Quezon City assessed both its land and hospital building for real

property taxes, the Lung Center of the Philippines filed a claim for exemption on its

averment that it is a charitable institution with a minimum of 60% of its hospital beds

exclusively used for charity patients and that the major thrust of its hospital operation is to

serve charity patients.

The claim for exemption was denied.

On appeal, the Central Board of Assessment Appeals of Quezon City affirmed the local

boards decision, finding that Lung Center of the Philippines is not a charitable institution

and that its properties were not actually, directly and exclusively used for charitable

purposes.

Issue: Is the Lung Center of the Philippines a charitable institution within the context of the

Constitution, and therefore, exempt from rea l property tax?

Held: The Lung Center of the Philippines is a charitable institution. To determine whether

an enterprise is a charitable institution or not, the elements which should be considered

include the statute creating the enterprise, its corporate purposes, its constitution and by-

laws, the methods of administration, the nature of the actual work performed, that character

of the services rendered, the indefiniteness of the beneficiaries and the use and occupation

of the properties.

However, under the Constitution, in order to be entitled to exemption from real property

tax, there must be clear and unequivocal proof that (1) it is a charitable institution and

(2)its real properties are ACTUALLY, DIRECTLY and EXCLUSIVELY used for charitable

purposes. While portions of the hospital are used for treatment of patients and the

dispensation of medical services to them, whether paying or non-paying, other portions

thereof are being leased to private individuals and enterprises.

Exclusive is defined as possessed and enjoyed to the exclusion of others, debarred from

participation or enjoyment. If real property is used for one or more commercial purposes,

it is not exclusively used for the exempted purposes but is subject to taxation.

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The respondent

Quezon City Assessor is hereby DIRECTED to determine, after due hearing, the precise

portions of the land and the area thereof which are leased to private persons, and to

compute the real property taxes due thereon as provided for by law.


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G.R. No. 109289 October 3, 1994

RUFINO R. TAN, petitioner,

vs.

RAMON R. DEL ROSARIO, JR., as SECRETARY OF FINANCE & JOSE U. ONG, as

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, respondents.

Facts:

1. Two consolidated cases assail the validity of RA 7496 or the Simplified Net Income

Taxation Scheme ("SNIT"), which amended certain provisions of the NIRC, as well as the Rules

and Regulations promulgated by public respondents pursuant to s aid law.

2. Petitioners posit that RA 7496 is unconstitutional as it allegedly violates the following

provisions of the Constitution:

-Article VI, Section 26(1) Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject

which shall be expressed in the title thereof.

- Article VI, Section 28(1) The rule of taxation shall be uniform and equitable. The Congress

shall evolve a progressive system of taxation.

- Article III, Section 1 No person shall be deprived of . . . property without due process of

law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.

Petitioners contended that public respondents exceeded their rule-making authority in

applying SNIT to general professional partnerships. Petitioner contends that the title of HB

34314, progenitor of RA 7496, is deficient for being merely entitled, "Simplified Net Income

Taxation Scheme for the Self-Employed and Professionals Engaged in the Practice of their

Profession" (Petition in G.R. No. 109289) when the full t ext of the title actually reads, 'An Act

Adopting the Simplified Net Income Taxation Scheme For The Self-Employed and

Professionals Engaged In The Practice of Their Profession, Amending Sections 21 and 29 of

the National Internal Revenue Code,' as amended. Petitioners also contend it violated due

process.

ISSUE: Whether RA 7496 in unconstitutional

HELD:

Article VI, Section 26(1), of the Constitution has been envisioned so as (a) to prevent log-

rolling legislation intended to unite the members of the legislature who favor any one of

unrelated subjects in support of the whole act, (b) to avoid surprises or even fraud upon the

legislature, and (c) to fairly apprise the people, through such publications of its proceedings

as are usually made, of the subjects of legislation. 1 The above objectives of the

fundamental law appear to us to have been sufficiently met. Anything else would be to

require a virtual compendium of the law which could not have been the intendment of the

constitutional mandate.

Petitioner intimates that Republic Act No. 7496 desecrates the constitutional requirement

that taxation "shall be uniform and equitable" in that the law would now attempt to tax

single proprietorships and professionals differently from the manner it imposes the tax on

corporations and partnerships. The contention clearly forgets, however, that such a system

of income taxation has long been the prevailing rule even prior to Republic Act No. 7496.

Uniformity of taxation, like the kindred concept of equal protection, merely requires that all

subjects or objects of taxation, similarly situated, are to be treated alike both in privileges

and liabilities (Juan Luna Subdivision vs. Sarmiento, 91 Phil. 371). Uniformity does not forfend

classification as long as: (1) the standards that are used therefor are substantial and not

arbitrary, (2) the categorization is germane to achieve the legislative purpose, (3) the law

applies, all things being equal, to both present and future conditions, and (4) the

classification applies equally well to all those belonging to the same class.

What may instead be perceived to be apparent from the amendatory law is the legislative

intent to increasingly shift the income tax system towards the schedular approach in the

income taxation of individual taxpayers and to maintain, by and large, the present global


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treatment on taxable corporations. We certainly do not view this classification to be

arbitrary and inappropriate.


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G.R. No. 101273 July 3, 1992

CONGRESSMAN ENRIQUE T. GARCIA (Second District of Bataan), petitioner, vs. THE

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS, THE NATIONAL ECONOMIC

AND DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, THE TARIFF COMMISSION, THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE,

and THE ENERGY REGULATORY BOARD, respondents.

Facts:

On 27 November 1990, Cory issued EO 438 which imposed, in addition to any other duties,

taxes and charges imposed by law on all articles imported into the Philippines, an

additional duty of 5% ad valorem. This additional duty was imposed across the board on all

imported articles, including crude oil and other oil products imported into the Philippines .

In 1991, EO 443 increased the additional duty to 9%. In the same year , EO 475 was passed

reinstating the previous 5% duty except that crude oil and other oil products continued to

be taxed at 9%.

Garcia, a representative from Bataan, avers that EO 475 and 478 are unconstitutional for

they violate Sec 24 of Art 6 of the Constitution which provides: " All appropriation, revenue

or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local application, and

private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may

propose or concur with amendments."

He contends that since the Constitution vests the authority to enact revenue bills in

Congress, the President may not assume such power of issuing Executive Orders Nos. 475

and 478 which are in the nature of revenue-generating measures.

Issue: whether or not EO 475 and 478 are unconstitutional

HELD:

Art VI Sec. 24: All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the

public debt, bills of local application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in the

House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments.

Under Section 24, Article VI of th e Constitution, the enactment of appropriation, revenue and

tariff bills, like all other bills is, of course, within the province of the Legislative rather than

the Executive Department. It does not follow, however, that therefore Executive OrdersNos. 475 and 478, assuming they may be characterized as revenue measures, are

prohibited to the President, that they must be enacted instead by the Congress of the

Philippines.

Section 28(2) of Article VI of the Constitution provides as follows:

(2) The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within specified limits, and

subject to such limitations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and export

quotas, tonage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of

the national development program of the Government. (Emphasis supplied)

There is thus explicit constitutional permission from Congress to authorize the President

"subject to such limitations and restrictions is [Congress] may impose" to fix "within

specific limits" "tariff rates . . . and other duties or imposts . . ."


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[G. R. No. 119775. October 24, 2003]

JOHN HAY PEOPLES ALTERNATIVE COALITION, MATEO CARIO FOUNDATION INC., CENTER

FOR ALTERNATIVE SYSTEMS FOUNDATION INC., REGINA VICTORIA A. BENAFIN

REPRESENTED AND JOINED BY HER MOTHER MRS. ELISA BENAFIN, IZABEL M. LUYK

REPRESENTED AND JOINED BY HER MOTHER MRS. REBECCA MOLINA LUYK, KATHERINE PE

REPRESENTED AND JOINED BY HER MOTHER ROSEMARIE G. PE, SOLEDAD S. CAMILO,ALICIA C. PACALSO ALIAS KEVAB, BETTY I. STRASSER, RUBY C. GIRON, URSULA C. PEREZ

ALIAS BA-YAY, EDILBERTO T. CLARAVALL, CARMEN CAROMINA, LILIA G. YARANON,

DIANE MONDOC,petitioners, vs. VICTOR LIM, PRESIDENT, BASES CONVERSION

DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY; JOHN HAY PORO POINT DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, CITY

OF BAGUIO, TUNTEX (B.V.I.) CO. LTD., ASIAWORLD INTERNATIONALE GROUP, INC.,

DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, respondents.

FACTS:Petitioners assail, in the main, the constitutionality ofPresidential Proclamation No.

420, Series of 1994, CREATING AND DESIGNATING a portion of the area covered by the

former Camp John [Hay] as THE JOHN HAY Special Economic Zone pursuant to Republic Act

No. 7227. and creating a regime of tax exemption within the John Hay Special Economic

Zone.

Petitioners argue that nowhere in R. A. No. 7227 is there a grant of tax exemption to SEZs yet

to be established in base areas, unlike the grant under Section 12 thereof of tax exemption

and investment incentives to the therein established Subic SEZ. The grant of tax exemption

to the John Hay SEZ, petitioners conclude, thus contravenes Article VI, Section 28 (4) of the

Constitution which provides that No law granting any tax exemption shall be passed

without the concurrence of a majority of all the members of Congress.

ISSUE: Whether or not the president may grant tax exemption within John Hay SEZ

HELD: It is clear that under Section 12 of R.A. No. 7227 it is only the Subic SEZ which was

granted by Congress with tax exemption, investment incentives and the like. There is no

express extension of the aforesaid benefits to other SEZs still to be created at the time via

presidential proclamation.

While the grant of economic incentives may be essential to the creation and success of SEZs,

free trade zones and the like, the grant thereof to the John Hay SEZ cannot be sustained. The

incentives under R.A. No. 7227 are exclusive only to the Subic SEZ, hence, the extension of

the same to the John Hay SEZ finds no support therein.

More importantly, the nature of most of the assailed privileges is one of tax exemption. It

is the legislature, unless limited by a provision of the state constitution, that has full powerto exempt any person or corporation or class of property from taxation, its power to

exempt being as broad as its power to tax .[42] Other than Congress, the Constitution may

itself provide for specific tax exemptions,[43] or local governments may pass ordinances on

exemption only from local taxes.[44]

The challenged grant of tax exemption would circumvent the Constitutions imposition that a

law granting any tax exemption must have the concurrence of a majority of all the members

of Congress.[45] In the same vein, the other kinds of privileges extended to the John Hay SEZ

are by tradition and usage for Congress to legislate upon.

Contrary to public respondents suggestions, the claimed statutory exemption of the John

Hay SEZ from taxation should be manifest and unmistakable from the language of the law on

which it is based; it must be expressly granted in a statute stated in a language too clear to

be mistaken.[46] Tax exemption cannot be implied as it must be categorically and

unmistakably expressed.[47]

If it were the intent of the legislature to grant to the John Hay SEZ the same tax exemption

and incentives given to the Subic SEZ, it would have so expressly provided in the R.A. No.

7227.

However, the entire assailed proclamation cannot be declared unconstitutional, the other

parts thereof not being repugnant to the law or the Constitution . The delineation and

declaration of a portion of the area covered by Camp John Hay as a SEZ was well within the

powers of the President to do so by means of a proclamation. Where part of a statute is

void as contrary to the Constitution, while another part is valid, the valid portion, if

separable from the invalid, as in the case at bar, may stand and be enforced.


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PROCEDURE FOR THE PASSAGE OF BILLS

Gonzales v. Macaraig, Jr. 1990

GR No. 87636

Facts:

Congress passed House Bill No. 19186 (GAB of Fiscal Year 1989) which eliminated or

decreased certain items included in the proposed budget submitted by t he president

President signed bill into law (RA 6688) but vetoed 7 special

provisions and Sec 55, a general provision.

February 2, 1989 Senate passed Res. No. 381 Senate as an institution decided to contest

the constitutionality of the veto of the president of SEC 55 only.

SEC. 55 disallows the president and heads of several department to augment any item in

the GAB thereby violation CONSTITUTION ART VI SEC 25 (5) No law shall be passed

authorizing any transfer of appropriations; however, the President, the President of the

Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme

Court, and the heads of Constitutional Commissions may, by law, be authorized to augment

any item in the general appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in other

items of their respective appropriations.

ISSUE: Whether or not the veto by the President of SEC 55 of GAB for FY 1989 and SEC 16 of

GAB for FY 1990 is unconstitutional.

HELD: The veto is CONSTITUTIONAL. Although the petitioners contend that the veto

exceeded the mandate of the line-veto power of the president because SEC 55 and SEC 16

are provisions the court held that inappropriate provisions can be treated as items (Henry v.

Edwards) and therefore can be vetoed validly by the president. Furthermore inappropriate

provisions must be struck down because they contravene the constitution because it limits

the power of the executive to augment appropriations (ART VI SEC 25 PAR 5.)

The provisions are inappropriate because

o They do not relate to particular or distinctive appropriations

o Disapproved or reduced items are nowhere to be found on the face of the bill

o It is more of an expression of policy than an appropriation

Court also said that to make the GAB veto-proof would be logrolling on the part of the

complete legislation but because they are aware that it would be NOT passed in that

manner they attempt hide it in the GAB

If the legislature really believes that the exercise of veto is really invalid then congress

SHOULD resort to their constitutionally vested power to override the veto. (ART VI SEC 21

PAR 1)


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Issue: whether or not the President exceeded the item-veto power accorded by the

Constitution or differently put, has the President the power to veto provisions of an

Appropriations Bill

Held: No. The veto power of the President is expressed in Article VI, Section 27 of the 1987

Constitution. Paragraph (1) refers to the general veto power of the President and if

exercised would result in the veto of the entire bill, as a general rule. Paragraph (2) is what

is referred to as the item-veto power or the line-veto power. It allows the exercise of the

veto over a particular item or items in an appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill.

As specified, the President may not veto less than all of an item of an Appropriations Bill. In

other words, the power given the executive to disapprove any item or items in an

Appropriations Bill does not grant the authority to veto a part of an item and to approve

the remaining portion of the same item. Notwithstanding the elimination in Article VI,

Section 27 (2) of the 1987 Constitution of any reference to the veto of a provision, the extent

of the Presidents veto power as previously defined by the 1935 Constitution has not

changed.

In other words, in the true sense of the term, a provision in an Appropriations Bill is limited in

its operation to some particular appropriation to which it relates, and does not relate to the

entire bill. The President promptly vetoed Section 55 (FY 89) and Section 16 (FY 90)

because they nullify the authority of the Chief Executive and heads of different branches of

government to augment any item in the General Appropriations Law for their respective

offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations, as guaranteed by

Article VI, Section 25 (5) of the Constitution.

Issue: whether Section 55 (FY 89) and Section 16 (FY 90) are provisions, not items, in the

appropriation bill

Held: No. Section 55 (FY 89) and Section 16 (FY 90) are not provisions in t he budgetary

sense of the term.

Article VI, Section 25 (2) of the 1987 Constitution provides: Sec. 25 (2) No provision or

enactment shall be embraced in the general appropriations bill unless it relates specifically

to some particular appropriation therein. Any such provision or enactment shall be limited

in its operation to the appropriation to which itrelates.

Explicit is the requirement that a provision in the Appropriations Bill should relate

specifically to some particular appropriation therein. The challenged provisions fall

short of this requirement. Firstly, the vetoed provisions do not re late to any particular or

distinctive appropriation. They apply generally to all items disapproved or reduced by

Congress in the Appropriations Bill. Secondly, the disapproved or reduced items are

nowhere to be found on the face of the Bill. To discover them, resort will have to be made

to the original recommendations made by the President and to the source indicated by the

Legislative Budget Research and Monitoring Office. Thirdly, the vetoed Sections are more

of an expression of Congressional policy in respect of augmentation from savings rather

than a budgetary appropriation. Consequently, Section 55 (FY 89) and Section 16 (FY 90)

although labeled as provisions, are actually inappropriate provisions that should be

treated as items for the purpose ofthe Presidents veto power.

Issue:

whether the Legislatures inclusion of qualifications, conditions, limitations or

restrictions on expenditure of funds in the Appropriation Bill was proper

Held:


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There can be no denying that inherent in the power of appropriation is the power to

specify how money shall be spent; and that in addition to distinct items of appropriation,

the Legislature may include in Appropriation Bills qualifications, conditions, limitations or

restrictions on expenditure of funds. Settled also is the rule that the Executive is not

allowed to veto a condition or proviso of an appropriation while allowing the appropriation

itself to stand. The veto of a condition in an Appropriations Bill which did not include a

veto of the items to which the condition related was deemed invalid and without effectwhatsoever.

However, for the rule to apply, restrictions should be such in the real sense of the term, not

some matters which are more properly dealt with in a separate legislation. Restrictions or

conditions in an Appropriations Bill must exhibit a connection with money items in a

budgetary sense in the schedule of expenditures. Again, the test is appropriateness. It is

not enough that a provision be related to the institution or agency to which funds are

appropriated. Conditions and limitations properly included in an appropriation bill must

exhibit such a connection with money items of appropriation that they logically belong in a

schedule of expenditures . . . the ultimate test is one of appropriateness.

Tested by these criteria, Section 55 (FY 89) and Section 16(FY 90) must also be held to be

inappropriate conditions. While they, particularly, Section 16 (FY 90), have been artfully

drafted to appear as true conditions or limitations, they are actually general law measures

more appropriate for substantive and, therefore, separate legislation. Further, neither of

them shows the necessary connection with a schedule of expenditures.

Issue: whether the legislature has a remedy when it believes that the veto powers by the

executive were unconstitutional

Held: Yes. If, indeed, the legislature believed that the exercise of the veto powers by the

executive were unconstitutional, the remedy laid down by the Constitution is crystal clear.

A Presidential veto may be overridden by the votes of two-thirds of members of Congress

(1987 Constitution, Article VI, Section 27[1]). But Congress made no attempt to override the

Presidential veto. Gonzales et al.s argument that the veto is ineffectual so that there is

nothing to override has lost force and effect with the executive veto having been herein

upheld. There need be no future conflict if the legislative and executive branches of

government adhere to the spirit of the Constitution, each exercising its respective powers

with due deference to the constitutional responsibilities and functions of the other. Thereby,

the delicate equilibrium of governmental powers remains on even keel.

Note: SC ruled that Congress cannot include in a general appropriations bill matters that

should be more properly enacted in separate legislation, and if it does that, the

inappropriate provisions inserted by it must be treated as item, which can be vetoed by

the President in the exercise of his item-veto power. The SC went one step further and rules

that even assuming arguendo that provisions are beyond the executive power to veto, and

Section 55 (FY 89) and Section 16 (FY 90) were not provisions in the budgetary sense of

the term, they are inappropriate provisions that should be treated as items for the

purpose of the Presidents veto power.

Note: Executive Impoundment

Definition: This refers to a refusal by the President, for whatever reason, to spend funds

made available by Congress. It is the failure to spend or obligate budget authority of any

type.

Argument against executive impoundment: Those who deny to the President the power to

impound argue that once Congress has set aside the fund for a specific purpose in an

appropriations act, it becomes mandatory on the part of the President to implement the

project and to spend the money appropriated therefor. The President has no discretion on

the matter, for the Constitution i mposes on him the duty to faithfully execute the laws.


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Argument for executive impoundment: Proponents of impoundment have invoked at least

three principal sources of the authority of the President. Foremost is the authority to

impound given to him either expressly or impliedly by Congress. Second is the executive

power drawn from the Presidents role as Commander-in-Chief. Third is the Faithful

Execution Clause which ironically is the same provisions invoked by petitioners herein.

The proponents insist that a faithful execution of the laws requires that the President desist

from implementing the law if doing so would prejudice public interest. An example given is

when through efficient and prudent management of a project, substantial savings are made.

In such a case, it is sheer folly to expect the President to spend the entire amount budgeted

in the law.


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G.R. No. 103524 April 15, 1992

CESAR BENGZON, QUERUBE MAKALINTAL, LINO M. PATAJO, JOSE LEUTERIO, ET AL.,

petitioners,

vs.

HON. FRANKLIN N. DRILON, in his capacity as Executive Secretary, HON. GUILLERMO

CARAGUE, in his capacity as Secretary of Department of Budget and Management, and

HON. ROSALINA CAJUCOM, in her capacity as National Treasurer, respondents.

Facts: On 15 Jan 1992, some provisions of the Special Provision for the Supreme Court and

the Lower Courts General Appropriations were vetoed by the President because a

resolution by the Court providing for appropriations for retired justices has been enacted.

The vetoed bill provided for the increase of the pensions of the retired justices of the

Supreme Court, and the Court of Appeals as well as members of the Constitutional

Commission.

Issue:whether the President may veto certain provisions of the General Appropriatons Act

Held: The act of the Executive in vetoing the particular provisions is an exercise of a

constitutionally vested power. But even as the Constitution grants the power, it also

provides limitations to its exercise. The Executive must veto a bill in its entirety or not at all.

He or she is, therefore, compelled to approve into law the entire bill, including its

undesirable parts. It is for this reason that the Constitution has wisely provided the item

veto power to avoid inexpedient riders from being attached to an indispensable

appropriation or revenue measure. What was done by the President was the vetoing of a

provision and not an item.

The Constitution provides that only a particular item or items may be vetoed. The power to

disapprove any item or items in an appropriate bill does not grant the authority to veto a

part of an item and to approve the remaining portion of the same item.

We distinguish an item from a prov ision in the following manner:

The terms item and provision in budgetary legislation and practice are

concededly different. An item in a bill refers to the particulars, the

details, the distinct and severable parts . . . of the bill (Bengzon, supra,

at 916.) It is an indivisible sum of money dedicated to a stated

purposeThe United States Supreme Court, in the case of Bengzon v.

Secretary of Justice declared "that an "tem" of an appropriation bill

obviously means an item which in itself is a specific appropriation ofmoney, not some general provision of law, which happens to be put

into an appropriation bill." (id. at page 465)

The general fund adjustment is an item which appropriates P500,000,000.00 to enable the

Government to meet certain unavoidable obligations which may have been inadequately

funded by the specific items for the different branches, departments, bureaus, agencies, and

offices of the government.

The President did not veto this item. What were vetoed were methods or systems placed

by Congress to insure that permanent and continuing obligations to certain officials would

be paid when they fell due.

An examination of the entire sections and the underlined portions of the law which were

vetoed will readily show that portions of the item have been chopped up into vetoed and

unvetoed parts. Less than all of an item has been vetoed. Moreover, the vetoed portions are

not items. They are provisions.

Doctrine: Pocket Veto Power

Under the Constitution, the President does not have the so-called pocket-veto power, i.e.,

disapproval of a bill by inaction on his part. The failure of the President to communicate his

veto of any bill represented to him within 30 days after the receipt thereof automatically

causes the bill to become a law.


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This rule corrects the Presidential practice under the 1935 Constitution of releasing veto

messages long after he should have acted on the bill. It also avoids uncertainty as to what

new laws are in force.

When is it allowed?

The exception is provided in par (2),Sec 27 of Art 6 of the Constitution which grants the

President power to veto any particular item or items in an appropriation, revenue or tariff

bill. The veto in such case shall not affect the item or items to which he does not object.

3 ways how a bill becomes a law:

1. When the President signs it

2. When the President vetoes it but the veto is overridden by 2/3 vote of all the members

of each House; and

3. When the president does not act upon the measure within 30 days after it shall have

been presented to him.

In the case at bar, the veto of these specific provisions in the General Appropriations Act is

tantamount to dictating to the Judiciary how its funds should be utilized, which is clearly

repugnant to fiscal autonomy.

There should be no question, therefore, that statutory authority has, in fact, been granted.

And once given, the heads of the different branches of the Government and those of the

Constitutional Commissions are afforded considerable flexibility in the use of public funds

and resources (Demetria v. Alba, supra). The doctrine of separation of powers is in no way

endangered because the transfer is made within a department (or branch of government)

and not from one department (branch) to another.

The Constitution, particularly Article VI, Section 25(5) also provides:

Sec. 25. (5) No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations; however, the

President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the

Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of Constitutional Commissions may, by

law, be authorized to augment any item in the general appropriations law for their

respective offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations.

In the instant case, the vetoed provisions which relate to the use of savings for augmenting

items for the payment of the pension differentials, among others, are clearly in consonance

with the abovestated pronouncements of the Court. The veto impairs the power of the

Chief Justice to augment other items in the Judiciary's appropriation, in contravention of

the constitutional provision on "fiscal autonomy."


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G.R. No. L-15138 July 31, 1961

BILL MILLER, petitioner-appellee, vs. ATANACIO A. MARDO, and MANUEL GONZALES,

respondents-appellants.

ISSUE: validity of Reorganization Plan No. 20-A, prepared and submitted by the Government

Survey and Reorganization Commission under the authority of Republic Act No. 997, as

amended by Republic Act No. 1241, insofar as it confers jurisdiction to the Regional Offices

of the Department of Labor created in said Plan to decide claims of laborers for wages,

overtime and separation pay, etc.

FACTS: Gonzales filed with Regional Office No. 3 of the Department of Labor, in Manila, a

complaint (IS-1148) against Bill Miller (owner and manager of Miller Motors) claiming to be

a driver of Miller from December 1, 1956 to October 31, 1957, on which latter date he was

allegedly arbitrarily dismissed, without being paid separation pay.

.Upon receipt of said complaint, Chief Hearing Officer Atanacio Mardo of Regional Office No.

3 of the Department of Labor required Miller to file an answer. Whereupon, Miller filed with

the Court of First Instance of Baguio a petition (Civil Case No. 759) praying for judgment

prohibiting the Hearing Officer from proceeding with the case, for the reason that said

Hearing Officer had no jurisdiction to hear and decide the subject matter of the complaint.

RESPONDENT argues that pursuant to Reorganization Plan No. 20-A, regional offices of the

Department of labor have exclusive and original jurisdiction over all cases affecting money

claims arising from violations of labor standards or working conditions. Said motions to

dismiss were denied by the court.

ISSUE: whether conferment of power to the Department of Labor to take cognizance of

cases affecting money claims is valid under our Constitution and applicable statutes.

HELD:

Constitution expressly provides that "the Judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme

Court and in such inferior courts as may be established by law.(Sec. 1, Art. VII of the

Constitution). Thus,judicial power rests exclusively in the judiciary.

It may be conceded that the legislature may confer on administrative boards or bodies quasi-

judicial powers involving the exercise of judgment and discretion, as incident to the

performance of administrative functions. But in so doing, the legislature must state its

intention in express terms that would leave no doubt, as even such quasi-judicial

prerogatives must be limited, if they are to be valid, only to those incidental to or in

connection with the performance of jurisdiction over a matter exclusively vested in the

courts.

And so we held in Corominas et al. v. Labor Standards Commission, et al. (G.R. No. L-14837

and companion cases, June 30, 1961);

. . . it was not the intention of Congress, in enacting Republic Act No. 997, to authorize the

transfer of powers and jurisdiction granted to the courts of justice, from these to the officials

to be appointed or offices to be created by the Reorganization Plan. Congress is well aware

of the provisions of the Constitution that judicial powers are vested 'only in the Supreme

Court and in such courts as the law may establish'. The Commission was not authorized to

create courts of justice, or to take away from these their jurisdiction and transfer said

jurisdiction to the officials appointed or offices created under the Reorganization Plan. The

Legislature could not have intended to grant such powers to the Reorganization Commission,

an executive body, as the Legislature may not and cannot delegate its power to legislate or

create courts of justice any other agency of the Government.

But it is urged, in one of the cases, that the defect in the conferment of judicial or quasi-

judicial functions to the Regional offices, emanating from the lack of authority of the

Reorganization Commission has been cured by the non-disapproval of Reorganization Plan

No. 20-A by Congress under the provisions of Section 6(a) of Republic Act No. 997, as

amended.


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It is an established fact that the Reorganization Commission submitted Reorganization Plan

No. 20-A to the President who, in turn, transmitted the same to Congress on February 14,

1956. Congress adjourned its sessions without passing a resolution disapproving or adopting

the said reorganization plan. It is now contended that, independent of the matter of

delegation of legislative authority (discussed earlier in this opinion), said plan, nevertheless

became a law by non-action on the part of Congress, pursuant to the above-quoted

provision.

Such a procedure of enactment of law by legislative in action is not countenanced in this

jurisdiction. By specific provision of the Constitution

No bill shall be passed or become a law unless it shall have been printed and copies thereof

in its final form furnished the Members at least three calendar clays prior to its passage by

the National Assembly (Congress), except when the President shall have certified to the

necessity of its immediate enactment. Upon the last reading of a bill no amendment

thereof shall be allowed, and the question upon its final passage shall be taken

immediately thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered on the Journal. (Sec. 21-[a], Art. VI).

Every bill passed by the Congress shall, before it becomes a law, be presented to the

President. If he approves the same, he shall sign it, but if not, he shall return it with his

objections to the House where it originated, which shall enter the objections at large on its

Journal and proceed to reconsider it. If, after such reconsideration, two-thirds of all the

Members of such House shall agree to pass the bill, it shall be sent, together with the

objections, to the other House by which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by

two-thirds of all the Members voting for and against shall be entered on its journal. If any bill

shall not be returned by the President as herein provided within twenty days (Sundays

excepted) after it shall have been presented to him, the same shall become a law in like

manner as if he has signed it, unless the Congress by adjournment prevent its return, in

which case it shall become a law unless vetoed by the President within thirty days after

adjournment. (Sec. 20[1]. Art. VI of the Constitution).

A comparison between the procedure of enactment provided in section 6 (a) of the

Reorganization Act and that prescribed by the Constitution will show that the former is in

distinct contrast to the latter.

procedure of enactment provided in section 6 (a) of the Reorganization Act - consent or

approval is to be manifested by silence or adjournment or by "concurrent resolution." In

either case, the contemplated procedure violates the constitutional provisions requiring

positive and separate action by each House of Congress . It is contrary to the "settled and

well-understood parliamentary law (which requires that the) two houses are to hold separate

sessions for their deliberations, and the determination of the one upon a proposed law is to

be submitted to the separate determination of the other," (Cooley, Constitutional

Limitations, 7th ed., p. 187).

Furthermore, Section 6 (a) of the Act would dispense with the "passage" of any measure, as

that word is commonly used and understood, and with the requirement presentation to

the President. In a sense, the section, if given the effect suggested in counsel's argument,

would be a reversal of the democratic processes required by the Constitution, for under it,

the President would propose the legislative action by action taken by Congress

On the basis of the foregoing considerations, we hold ad declare that Reorganization Plan

No. 20-A, insofar as confers judicial power to the Regional Offices over cases other than

these falling under the Workmen's Compensation on Law, is invalid and of no effect.


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Effectivity of Laws

EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 200 June 18, 1987

PROVIDING FOR THE PUBLICATION OF LAWS EITHER IN THE OFFICIAL GAZETTE OR IN A

NEWSPAPER OF GENERAL CIRCULATION IN THE PHILIPPINES AS A REQUIREMENT FOR

THEIR EFFECTIVITY

WHEREAS, Article 2 of the Civil Code partly provides that "laws shall take effect after

fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is

otherwise provided . . .;"

WHEREAS, the requirement that for laws to be effective only a publication thereof in the

Official Gazette will suffice has entailed some problems, a point recognized by the Supreme

Court in Taada. et al. vs. Tuvera, et al. (G.R. No. 63915, December 29, 1986) when it

observed that "[t]here is much to be said of the view that the publication need not be

made in the Official Gazette, considering its erratic release and limited readership";

WHEREAS, it was likewise observed that "[u]ndoubtedly, newspapers of general circulation

could better perform the function of communicating the laws to the people as such

periodicals are more easily available, have a wider readership, and come out regularly";

and

WHEREAS, in view of the foregoing premises Article 2 of the Civil Code should accordingly

be amended so the laws to be effective must be published either in the Official Gazette or

in a newspaper of general circulation in the country;

NOW, THEREFORE, I, CORAZON C. AQUINO, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the

powers vested in me by the Constitution, do hereby order:

Sec. 1. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their

publication either in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the

Philippines, unless it is otherwise provided.

Sec. 2. Article 2 of Republic Act No. 386, otherwise known as the "Civil Code of the

Philippines," and all other laws inconsistent with this Executive Order are hereby repealed

or modified accordingly.

Sec. 3. This Executive Order shall take effect immediately after its publication in the Official

Gazette.

Done in the City of Manila, this 18th day of J une, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred

and eighty-seven.

LEGISLATIVE INVESTIGATION

G.R. No. L-3820 July 18, 1950

JEAN L. ARNAULT, petitioner, vs. LEON NAZARENO, Sergeant-at-arms, Philippine Senate,

and EUSTAQUIO BALAGTAS, Director of Prisons, respondents

FACTS: The Senate investigated the purchase by the government of two parcels of land,

known as Buenavista and Tambobong estates. An intriguing question that the Senate sought

to resolve was the apparent irregularity of the government's payment to one Ernest Burt, a

non-resident American citizen, ofthe total sum of 1.5 million pesos for his alleged interest

in the two parcels or estates that only amounted to 20,000 pesos, which he seemed to have


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forfeited anyway long before. The Senate sought to determine who were responsible for and

who benefited from the transaction at the expense of th e government.

Petitioner Jean Arnault, who acted as agent of Ernest Burnt in the subject transactions, was

one of the witnesses summoned by the Senate to its hearings. In the course of the

investigation, the petitioner repeatedly refused to divulge the name of the person whom

she gave the amount of 440,000 pesos, which she withdrew from the 1.5 million pesos

proceeds pertaining to Ernest Burt.

Arnualt was therefore cited in contempt by the Senate and was committed to the custody

of the Senate Sergeant-at-Arms for imprisonment until she answers the questions . She

thereafter filed a petition for Habeas Corpus directly with the Supreme Court questioning the

validity of her detention.

He contends that the Senate has no power to punish him for contempt for refusing to reveal

the name of the person to whom he gave the P440,000, because such information is

immaterial to, and will not serve, any intended or purported legislation and his refusal to

answer the question has not embarrassed, obstructed, or impeded the legislative process

ISSUE: 1. Whether or not the Senate have the power to punish the petitioner for contempt

for refusing to reveal the name of the person whom she gave the 440,000 pesos.

HELD: Once an inquiry is admitted or established to be within the jurisdiction of a legislative

body to make, we think the

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Consti Digests4