CU_ReshapingNewYork_November2011

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ACitizensUnionReport

ResearchandPolicyAnalysisbyCitizensUnionFoundation

WrittenandPublishedbyCitizensUnion

NOVEMBER2011

CitizensUnionandCitizensUnionFoundation

299Broadway,Suite700NewYork,NY 100071976

phone2122270342fax2122270345www.citizensunion.org

PeterJ.W.Sherwin,ChairRobertAbrams,CUFPresidentDickDadey,ExecutiveDirector

FollowusonFacebookandTwitter

RESHAPINGNEWYORK:EndingtheRiggedProcessofPartisanGerrymanderingWith

AnImpartialandIndependentRedistrictingProcess


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CitizensUnionoftheCityofNewYork November2011

ReshapingNewYorkReport

TABLEOFCONTENTS

1. EXECUTIVESUMMARY Page12. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS Page223. INTRODUCTION Page254. RIGGINGTHESYSTEM:HOWNEWYORKSTATESLEGISLATIVEDISTRICTSARE Page28

CURRENTLYDRAWN

A. ABRIEFHISTORYOFREDISTRICTING Page28B. NEWYORKSTATESREDISTRICTINGPROCESS Page29C. THEAPPROVALPROCESS Page31D. SUBVERTINGTHEPUBLICINTEREST Page31

i. PopulationDeviation Page32ii. DividingCommunities Page36iii. ProtectingIncumbentsfromCompetition Page48iv. MarginalizingtheMinorityParty Page51

5. THEHARMFULEFFECTSOFGERRYMANDERING Page54A. NEWYORKSLESSTHANCOMPETITIVEELECTIONS Page54

i. MeasuringCompetitiveness Page55ii. NewYorkStateLegislativeGeneralElections Page56

a. PartisanAdvantage Page58b. IncumbentAdvantage Page59

iii. TheIncumbentReelectionRate20022010 Page61iv. NewYorkCityGeneralElectionsforStateLegislature Page62

a. TheIncumbentAdvantage Page62v. SpecialElections Page64

B. INCUMBENTINTERESTSOVERDIVERSEREPRESENTATION Page66i. TheVotingRightsAct Page66

ii. MinorityRepresentation Page69iii. RepresentationofWomen Page71

C. PROTECTINGPARTISANADVANTAGE Page72D. LONGTERMINCUMBENCY Page77

i. OtherContributorstoLongTermIncumbency Page78E. RISINGPOLARIZATIONANDPOLICYPARALYSIS Page80F. DISSATISFACTIONANDDECLININGVOTERPARTICIPATION Page86


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ReshapingNewYorkReport

6. SOLUTIONSTOGERRYMANDERING Page89A. OPTIONSFORABETTERREDISTRICTINGPROCESS Page89

i. ThePathwaytoReform Page90ii. TheElementsofReform Page91

a. WhoDrawstheLines Page91b. HowtheLinesareDrawn Page94c. PublicInvolvement/AccesstoInformation Page98d. TheApprovalProcess Page99

B. CITIZENSUNIONRECOMMENDATIONSFORAN Page100INDEPENDENTREDISTRICTINGPROCESS

i. CreatingaNominationsCommitteetoSelectPotentialMembers Page101ii. SelectingaNominationPool Page102

iii. FormingtheIndependentCitizensRedistrictingCommission Page103iv. EstablishingFairCriteriafortheDrawingofLines Page103v. CreatinganOpenandTransparentProcess Page105

vi. EncouragingApprovaloftheIndependentPlan Page105C. RECOMMENDATIONSFOR2012REDISTRICTINGPLANS Page106

i. GivingGreaterOpportunitiesforMinoritiestoElect Page106CandidatesofTheirChoice

ii. EnsuringthatUpstateNewYorksCitiesareNotCarvedUp Page107D. MAKINGREFORMAREALITY Page107

i. TheFutureofRedistricting Page107ii.

Common

Ground

for

Reform

Page

108

iii. HistoricSupportforReform Page109APPENDICES

1. NestingofNewYorkCityAssemblyandSenateDistrictsAfter2002RedistrictingCycle2. LegislatorPositionsonIndependentRedistrictingCommissionAssemblyandSenate3. DistrictPopulationsAndDeviationsOverTime,2000and2010AssemblyandSenate4. MapsofDistrictDeviationsintheSenateandAssembly,2002RedistrictingUpstate

NewYork,NewYorkCity,andLongIsland

5. CountyLinesCrossedbySenateandAssemblyDistricts2002Redistricting6. ComparisonofRedistrictingReformLegislation7. TheReShapeNYCoalition


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ReshapingNewYorkReport Page1

1ExecutiveSummary

Theriggedsystemofredistrictingiscorruptingthespiritandrealityofrepresentative

democracyinNewYork. Ithasbecomeaformofcollusionbetweenthetwoparties,

drawingsafedistrictsthatprotectincumbentsandlimitvoterchoicebyeffectively

endingcompetitiveelections. Thisinturnforcespowerinourpoliticstothemargins,

givingdisproportionateinfluencetospecialinterests. Anindependentredistricting

commissionwouldempowerpeopletochoosetheirpoliticians,ratherthanviceversa.

Noelectionreformwoulddomoretohealtheharshbutartificialpolarizationofour

politicswhileaddingrealaccountabilitytoAlbany. Itisareformthatcouldopenthe

doortoallothers. Anditisanideawhosetimehascome.

Withthereleaseof2010censusdatatoNewYorkearlierthisyear,theredistricting

processisfullyunderwaytodrawlegislativedistrictsintimeforthe2012elections

undertheoldsystemofpartisangerrymandering,evenasthepubliccallsforchangesto

createafairandimpartialprocess.

Theredistrictingprocessisakeydeterminantforhoweverycitizenandcommunitywill

berepresentedatthestateandfederallevelsofgovernmentforthenexttenyears.

Publicsupportforreformisstrongerandbroaderthaneverbefore,asexemplifiedby

ReShapeNY,astatewidecampaignforredistrictingreformledbygoodgovernment

groups

Citizens

Union,

New

York

Public

Interest

Group

(NYPIRG)

and

League

of

Women

VotersofNewYorkCity. ReShapeNYiscomprisedofacoalitionof37organizations

fromacrossthestate,includingcivicgroups,issueadvocacyorganizations,unionsand

businessgroupsunitedinthegoaltoreformourstatesredistrictingprocess. Public

approvalforindependentredistrictingisalsoatanalltimehigh:76percentofvoters

supportanindependentcommissionthatremovessomeoralloftheresponsibilityfor

drawinglinesfromthelegislature(48percentsupportafullindependentcommission

and28percentageanindependentcommissionwithsomelegislativeinput).1

Thecampaignsgoalissimple:creationofanindependentcommissiontodrawstate

legislativeandcongressionaldistrictboundariesaccordingtofairandobjectivecriteria

whileallowing

for

robust

public

input

into

the

process.

The

members

of

ReShapeNY,

likeNewYorkersacrossthestate,havejoinedincallingforlegislativeactionbeforethe

2012electionstocreateanewredistrictingparadigm.

1QuinnipiacUniversityPollingInstitute,KeepRace,JobProtectionOutOfRedistricting,NewYorkState

VotersTellQuinnipiacUniversityPoll;CuomoShouldVetoLawmakers'Lines,VotersSay,October26,

2011. Availableat:http://www.quinnipiac.edu/x1318.xml?ReleaseID=1667


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A. THENEEDFORASPECIALLEGISLATIVESESSIONTOPASSREDISTRICTINGREFORM

OneofthemostproductiveNewYorkStatelegislativesessioninyearsoccurredin2011,

owingto

the

leadership

of

Governor

Andrew

Cuomo,

Senate

Majority

Leader

Dean

Skelos,AssemblySpeakerSheldonSilverandtheother210membersofthestate

legislature. Leftonthetable,however,wasthecreationofanewimpartialredistricting

processthatwouldendtheriggedpracticeofpartisangerrymanderingandusherina

morerepresentativeandresponsiveerainstategovernment.

ThestatelegislatureneedstoreturntoAlbanyinaspecialsessiontopasslegislation

whichendsthepoliticalmanipulationforpartisanadvantageofthedrawingofdistrict

linesandestablishesanindependentredistrictingcommissiontodrawlinesbeforethe

2012elections. Thepoliticallybalancedandimpartialcommissionwouldusefairand

sensiblecriteriaandbeguidedbyclearguidelinesindrawingthemapstoensurethe

processservesallNewYorkersandtheircommunitiesratherthanpreservestheAlbanystatusquo.

Though184ofthe212statelegislatorscosponsoredorpledgedtosupportsuch

legislation,nobillpassedduringthelegislativesession.Thisinactionrevealstheworst

tendenciesinAlbanytheinabilityoflegislatorstoworktogetherandforgesolutions

thatthepublicdemandsandsupports. Nonetheless,redistrictingmustbereformed,

andthepowermustshiftbacktothevoters,whoshouldpicktheirelectedofficialsat

thepolls,ratherthanlegislatorspickingtheirvotersinhandcarved,safedistricts.

GovernorCuomo

has

publicly

and

repeatedly

reiterated

his

pledge

to

veto

lines

that

are

notdrawninanindependentornonpartisanmannerfollowinghisintroductionofa

programbilltoreformredistrictinginFebruary. Further,hedoesnotbelievethatthe

currentbodyresponsiblefordrawinglinestheLegislativeTaskForceonDemographic

ResearchandReapportionment(LATFOR)canbenonpartisan.2 Twentyfourmembers

oftheSenateDemocraticConferencehavecommittedtonotoverridetheGovernors

veto3ifanindependentprocessisnotputintoplace,resultingintheredistricting

processpossiblybeingthrowntothecourts. Thelegislature,therefore,faces

considerableoppositiontotheprocessitiscurrentlyconductingtodrawlinesunderthe

oldsystem.

2Vielkind,Jimmy.Cuomo:ImstillvetoingLATFORslines.CapitolConfidential,TimesUnion. July6,

2011. Availableat:http://blog.timesunion.com/capitol/archives/73902/cuomoimstillvetoinglatfors

lines/3Reisman,Nick.SenateDemocratsToCuomo:GetOutYourVetoPen. CapitalTonight.April6,2011.

Availableat:http://www.capitaltonight.com/2011/04/senate democratstocuomogetoutyourveto

pen/


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WemustgetbeyondtheshorttermthinkinginAlbanythatneverseesbeyondthe

horizonofthenextelection. Insteadofdoingwhatisrightandbeneficialforboth

partiesinthelongrun,whatevertheirpoliticalfortunestoday,ourelectedleadersseem

tothinkthatmajoritiescannotbebuiltthroughpoliciesthatareappealingtoNew

Yorkersbutratherrequiretheelectoralinsurancepolicyofgerrymandering. The

resultinglow

voter

turnout

is

not

surprising

in

apolitical

climate

lacking

competitive

electionswherevotersseenorealchoiceofcandidates,andmeaningfuldiscussionof

publicpolicyandrealdebateonissuestakeabackseattopartisaninterests.

Timeisrunningoutforreform,butwithpublicandlegislativesupportforreformatits

strongestindecades,reformisstillnecessaryandpossiblethisyear. Thisisaonceina

decadeopportunity. Timemustnotrunoutbeforevotersseethekindofreformthat

theyneedanddeserve. Redistrictingreformcannotwaituntilnextyear,andNew

Yorkersdeservefarbetterthanhavingreformpostponedyetanotherdecade.

B. THEREPORTSMAJORFINDINGSThisreportrevealshowthestatesredistrictingprocesscontributestouncompetitive

elections,unaccountablepublicofficials,unsolvedpublicpolicyissues,andastate

legislaturethatdoesnotreflectthediversityofNewYorkState. Asummaryofthe

majorfindingsisprovidedbelow.

1. COMPETITIONATTHEPOLLSISHISTORICALLYLOWa. Thereelectionrateforincumbentsfrom2002to2010wasastunning96

percentwithonly38incumbentsin941racesrunningforreelectionlosing

theirseats,consideringbothprimaryandgeneralelections.

b. In2006,astriking100percentoftheincumbentsthatranforreelectionwerevictorious.

c. Between1968and2010,competitioninNewYorkStatelegislativegeneralelectioncontestsdiminishedgreatly,withtheaveragemarginofvictory

increasingfrom33percentto51percent. Analltimelowin

competitivenesswasreachedin2004,withtheaveragemarginofvictoryat

63percent.

d. Between2002and2010,93percentofincumbentswoninracesthatwereeitheruncompetitiveoruncontested. Uncompetitiveraceswerewonby

marginsof10percentormore. Theaveragemarginofvictoryneared61

percent. Eveninracesforopenseatsinwhichtherewasnoincumbent

running,whichaccountedfor35percentofallracesduringthattimeperiod,

theaveragemarginofvictorywas42percent.


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2. THENUMBEROFUNCONTESTEDELECTIONSHASINCREASED,LEAVINGVOTERSFEWCHOICESATTHEPOLLS

a. Thenumberofuncontestedstategeneralelectionlegislativeraces(inwhichthereisnoopponentornomajorpartychallenger)increasedfrom1percent

in1968to19percentofallseatsin2010.

b. AssemblyDemocratsandSenateRepublicanshavefewercontestedelectionsthantheirminoritypartycolleaguesineachhouse,inspiteofthe

largerenrollmentofDemocratsstatewide. IntheAssembly,Democratshad

nomajorpartyopponentorwerewhollyunopposedin340racesbetween

1968and2010,whereasRepublicanswereunopposedinonly243races. In

theSenate,thereversebreakdownoccurs165Republicanssawnosuch

oppositionfrom1968to2010,whileDemocratswereunopposedinonly129

races. Onlywithlegislativedistrictsdrawntoweedoutcompetitionacross

theaislewouldoneseesuchanadvantageforthepartyinpowerineach

house.

c. NewYorkhadthefourthworstvoterturnoutinthenationin2010,withonly34.9percentofeligiblevotersvotingfortheirgovernor,thestates

highestoffice,likelyinpartduetothelackofrealchoicesatthepolls.

3. THESTATELEGISLATUREDOESNOTREFLECTTHEDIVERSITYOFNEWYORKSTATE

a. InNewYork,minorityrepresentationintheStateLegislaturein2011is25percent,wellunderthenearly42percentofminoritiesthatmadeupthe

statesentirepopulationin2010. Womenarealsounderrepresented,

demonstratinghowgerrymanderinghasbeenusedtokeepincumbents(who

havehistoricallybeenwhitemales)inpowerattheexpenseofequal

representation.

Latinosmakeup17.6percentofthestatespopulation,yetonlyholdabout9percent(19)ofseatsinthestatelegislaturein2011.

AsiansAmericansmakeupover7percentofthestatespopulation,yettheyhold,andhaveonlyeverheldoneseat(0.47percent)inthe

statelegislature.

NewYorkranks31stinthenationintermsoftherepresentationofwomeninitslegislatureat22.6percentofseats.

4. FRAGMENTATIONOFDISTRICTSCREATESVOTERCONFUSIONANDUNEQUALTREATMENT

OF

COMMUNITIES

IN

EACH

HOUSE

OF

THE

LEGISLATURE

a. Thelackofcollaborationbetweenbothhousesofthelegislatureindrawinglineshasledtoacomplexwebofsenateandassemblydistrictsoverlaying

eachother.

AllofNewYorkCityssenatedistrictscontainpartsof4ormoreassemblydistricts,andoverhalfofthemcontain6ormoreassembly

districts.


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ReshapingNewYorkReport Page5 Assemblydistrictsaresimilarlydiluted,withoverhalfcontaining3or

moresenatedistrictsinNewYorkCity.

b. With150assemblydistrictsand62senatedistricts,thereisnoneedtohavemorethanthreeassemblydistrictsinagivensenatedistrict. Thecurrent

fragmentationcreatesconfusionforvotersandresultsincollusionrather

thancooperationamongthehousesinthelegislaturetorepresentnatural

andconsistent

communities

of

interest,

essentially

treating

the

same

communitiesdifferentlyineachhouse.

c. Assemblydistrictsandtoalesserdegreesenatedistrictsoftencrossthesametwocountyborders. Populationvariancesofcountiesmightrequire

thatonedistrictconnecttoanothercounty,butthereisnoneedforacounty

tobeparceledbetweensomanydistricts,crossingthesamecountylines

morethanonce.

Eighteenassemblydistrictscrossthesametwocountylinescrossedbyanotherdistrict. TheErieNiagaracountyborderiscrossedby

threedifferentdistricts. TheRocklandOrange,PutnamWestchester,

JeffersonSt.

Lawrence,

Dutchess

Ulster,

Broome

Chenango,

and

AlbanyRensselaercountybordersareallcrossedbytwodifferent

districts. Fourassemblydistrictsdistricts106,107,108and127

evencrossthesamecountybordersasotherdistrictsintwoseparate

instances.

Sixsenatedistrictscrossthesametwocountylinescrossedbyanotherdistrict. TwodistrictscrosstheBronxWestchestercounty

linewhileanothertwodistrictscrosstheBronxNewYorkcountyline,

therebyjoiningBronxresidentsindistrictsfromanothercountyin

fourinstances. TwodistrictsalsocrosstheNassauSuffolkborderin

thesenate.

5. REDISTRICTINGISCONDUCTEDTO,ABOVEALLELSE,BENEFITTHEPARTIESINPOWERINEACHHOUSE

a. Inthepastthreeredistrictingcycles,DemocratsintheAssemblygained10seatsin1982,6seatsin1992and4seatsin2002.

b. DespitetherelativegrowthinDemocraticregistration,SenateRepublicanshavemostlypreservedexistingmajoritiesinthepastthreeredistricting

cyclesandevengainedtwoseatsin2002foratotalof38memberstaking

officein2003.

c. Communitieswiththesamedemographicsmayalsohavedifferentpoliticalparty

representation

based

simply

on

the

collusion

between

the

two

housesandtheresultingwayinwhichlinesaredrawn.

Rochesteranditsenvironsareaperfectcaseinpoint. Thesamemetropolitanregionhasvastlydifferentpoliticalrepresentationin

eachhouse. IntheAssembly,theareaisrepresentedby3

Democrats;intheSenate,theareaisrepresentedby3Republicans.

Thisowesinlargeparttohowthecityisdividedintodistricts.


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6. THEPOPULATIONDEVIATIONALLOWANCELEAVESGREATDISPARITIESINREPRESENTATION

a. NewYorkscurrentpracticeofa10percentdeviationinpopulationsizefromthelargesttosmallestdistrictinthestatelegislature(+/ 5percent)

allowsadifference

of

over

30,000

people

among

senate

districts

and

12,600amongassemblydistricts.

Iflegislativelinesweredrawnfairly,thesizeofdistrictsthroughoutthestate

wouldberoughlyequal.Indeed,federallawrequiresthatU.S.congressional

districtsbeasnearlyequalinpopulationaspossible,allowingadifferenceof

nomorethanoneperson. The10percentdeviationhasallowedforlarge

populationgapsbetweendistrictsandthusdisparitiesinrepresentationfrom

onecommunitytoanother. Whilethedeviationhasbeenusedincertain

districtstocomplywithsegmentsofthestateconstitutionandtheVoting

RightsAct,itmoreoftenthannothasbeenusedforthepurposeofpolitical

manipulationand

partisan

advantage.

46percentofassemblydistrictsand30percentofsenatedistrictswerebetween3and5percentfromtheaveragedistrictsizein2002.

Fewerthan12percentofassemblydistrictsand17percentofsenatedistrictswerewithin1percentoftheaveragedistrictsizein

2002.

b. Thepopulationdeviationhasprovidedthelegislatureitsgreatesttoolforpartisangerrymanderingbyinflatingcertainregionsofthestateover

others. AssemblydistrictshavebeenunderpopulatedinNewYorkCityto

allowforgreaterDemocraticrepresentation,andoverpopulatedinupstate

NewYorkandonLongIslandtominimizeRepublicanrepresentation. The

reversehasoccurredinthestatesenatetomaximizeRepublican

representationintypicallyRepublicanleaningareassuchasupstateNew

York.

EverydistrictinLongIslandintheAssemblywasoverpopulatedbynearly4percent,whileinNewYorkCity,districtswere

underpopulatedbyasmuchas4percent(exceptfortheboroughof

Manhattan,whichwasoverpopulatedbyaboutonly1percent).

IntheSenate,alldistrictsinNewYorkCitywereoverpopulated,thehighestbeing4percentinQueens,whileinthe36districtsoutsideof

NewYork

City,

32

of

these

districts

were

underpopulated

(only

4

districtsoutsideofNewYorkCitywereoverpopulated,allintheNew

YorkCitymetropolitanregioninWestchester,RocklandandOrange

Counties).


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ReshapingNewYorkReport Page7c. Thereisnowbasedon2010censusdata,aswingof26percentbetween

thelargestandsmallestassemblydistrict,adifferenceofnearly40,000

people.Inthesenate,thereisnowaswingof25percentbetweenthe

largestandsmallestdistricts,adifferenceofover75,000people. Dueto

shiftsinpopulation,manydistrictsoncewithinthe5percentallowancein

2010arewelloverthemaximumdeviationallowed,pointingtotheneedfor

tighterdeviations

to

help

prevent

the

disparities

in

representation

as

the

yearsadvanceaftereachredistrictingcycle. Whileredistrictingeveryten

yearsrecalibratesdistrictsizetoreflectpopulationshifts,drawingdistricts

closetothe10percentmarginshowshowquicklyitcangobeyondthat

acceptableallowance.

Overonethirdofcurrentassemblyseats52of150afterthe2010censusarenowabovethe5percentdeviationfromtheaverage

districtsize.

Similarly,overonethirdofcurrentsenateseats22of62afterthe2010censusarenowabovethe5percentdeviation.

C. RIGGINGTHESYSTEM:HOWNEWYORKSLINESARECURRENTLYDRAWN

Redistrictingistheprocessthatoccurstoredrawstatelegislativeandcongressional

districtlinesinordertomaintainequitablypopulatedelectoraldistricts. Populations

arenotstatic,andovertimeelectoraldistrictsnolongerrepresentthepopulations

livingwithinthem. Redistrictingwasdesignedtoprotectthebalanceofpoweramong

electoraldistrictsandamongstates,andensurethatthepublicisproportionallyand

fairlyrepresented.

Instead

redistricting

has

become

agrab

for

institutional

power

by

thosewhocontroltheredistrictingprocessinmanycases,asinNewYork,the

legislatorsthemselves.

InNewYorkincumbentlegislatorscurrentlygettodecidehowtheywanttheirown

electoraldistrictsdrawn,andwhichvoterswillresideintheirdistricts. Thisessentially

entrenchestheirpower,allowinglegislatorstochoosetheirvotersbeforevoterschoose

them. Toensuretheredistrictingprocessdoesnotweakenthedemocraticprocess,

CitizensUnionhaslongcalledforreformandatthiscrucialtimecallsforreformbefore

thelinesarepermanentlydrawnforthenext10years,startingwiththe2012elections.

Redistrictingthatisunderwaythisyearwillgreatlyinfluencewhoiselectedand,by

extension,major

policy

decisions

for

the

next

decade.

Citizens

Union

believes

that

controloftheredistrictingprocessmustberemovedfromthedirectcontrolofthe

legislatorswhohaveselfinterestinthedrawingoflinesandplacedintothehandsof

anindependentandimpartialredistrictingcommissionguidedbyclearandconsistent

guidelinestoensureafairpracticethatisaccountableandindependentofpoliticalself

interest.


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ReshapingNewYorkReport Page8TheLegislativeTaskForceonDemographicResearchandReapportionment(LATFOR)is

currentlychargedwiththeresponsibilityofprovidingtechnicalplansforthe

reapportionmentofstatesenate,assemblyandcongressionaldistricts,whicharethen

approvedvialegislationbythefulllegislatureandsignedintolawbythegovernor. The

appointmentprocessformembersofLATFORisinherentlyflawed,withlegislators

sittingontheappointmentcommissionitselfandthushavingdirectcontroloverthe

drawingof

district

lines.

Even

worse,

the

majority

parties

of

each

house

each

appoint

twomemberstoLATFOR,whiletheminoritypartieseachappointonemember. This

hasledtothemajoritypartiesineachhouseessentiallydrawingtheirownlines,turning

ablindeyetotheotherhousewheretheotherpartyiscurrentlyinthemajority.

InadditiontocontrollingthemembershipofLATFOR,legislatorsinthemajoritiesof

eachhouseuseseveraltoolstoretainandextendtheirgriponpower. Therulesfor

drawinglinesarebothcomplicatedandtoolaxinNewYork. Theprimaryfederalrules

thatthestatelegislaturefollowsinredistrictingarethosedeterminedbytheVoting

RightsActwhichprotectstherightofminoritycitizenstoelectarepresentativewho

willprotect

their

interestsand

by

several

United

States

Supreme

Court

decisions.

U.S.

SupremeCourtprecedentrequiresthatstatelegislativedistrictsarethesamesize

withinatotal10percentdeviationandcongressionaldistrictsarenearlymathematically

equalunlessthereissomelegitimateobjectivethatwillbeobstructedbythisrule. The

leewayallowedforthesizeofstatelegislativedistricts,inadditiontotechniquessuchas

splittingcommunities,drawingchallengersoutofdistricts,anddrawingpartisandistricts

thatservetomarginalizetheminoritypartyofeachdistrict,allresultinpartisan

gerrymanderingthathasinhibitedtheabilityofthelegislaturetoproperlyservethe

public.

D. THEHARMFULEFFECTSOFGERRYMANDERINGNewYorksGerrymanderedAffectedLegislature

Untilmostrecentlyin2011,NewYorksstatelegislaturehashistoricallyfailedtosolve

pressingissuesinatimelymanner.Themuchmalignedbodygainedadegreeof

credibilitythefirsthalfofthisyear,passinganontimebudgetanddemonstratingit

couldforgecompromisesonintractableissueslikeethicsreformandmarriageequality.

ItappearedthatundertheleadershipofGovernorCuomo,functionalgovernmentwas

notonlypossiblebutdoable. Yetoldhabitsdiehard,andthestatelegislatureissowing

theseeds

of

future

dysfunction

by

maintaining

the

current

system

of

partisan

gerrymandering.

Historicpolicygridlockhasresultedinalackoflegislativeactiononanumberofissues

importanttoNewYorkers,perhapsmostnotablythealmostalwayslatepassageofthe

statebudgetoverthepasttwodecades.Otherhistoricinactionordelaysincludesthe

longtermfailuretoconsolidateandmakemoreefficientgovernmententitieslike


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ReshapingNewYorkReport Page9schooldistrictsandpublicauthorities,andprovidemandatereliefforlocalities. Issues

likeRockefellerDrugLawreform,highpropertytaxes,andaffordablehousinghave

takenyearstoaddressinspiteofbroadpublicsupportforchange.

Issuesofpoliticalreformhaveseenparticularstagnationinspiteofoverwhelmingpublic

support. Thoughthestatelegislatureandgovernordeservecreditforthepassageof

ethicslegislation

which

for

the

first

time

provides

alevel

of

independent

oversight

over

thelegislatureandincreaseddisclosureofoutsidebusinessdealings,campaignfinance

reformandredistrictingreformhavefailedtobeaddressed. NewYorknowhasthe

highestspendinglimitsforcandidatesofthe45statesinthenationthathavelimits,

allowingcontributionsofover$100,000topartycommittees.4 Similarly,whilestates

suchasCaliforniaandArizonahaveseenthecreationofindependentredistricting

commissions,NewYorklagsbehindinremovingtheconflictofinterestinherentin

legislatorsdrawingtheirownseats.

Thelackofactionontheseimportantissuesislargelyduetotheincreasedpolarization

ofdistricts

and

the

creation

of

safe

seats

in

which

legislators

do

not

face

much

competitionatthepolls,amajorresultofpartisangerrymandering. Thelevelof

partisanbickeringreachedanewlowinthesummerof2009whentheNewYorkState

Senateenteredintoamonthlongdeadlock,therootcauseofwhichcanbetracedto

thelastroundofredistrictingthatcreatedanevennumberofseatsinthestatesenate.

Thelackofoutcomeshasledtoincreasedscrutinyofthestatelegislatureandits

politicalprocesses. Dubbedthemostdysfunctionallegislatureinthenation,theNew

YorkStatelegislaturehaslongbeencriticizedforitslackoftransparency,accountability

andadherencetobasicnotionsofademocraticprocess.5

Voterstooareunsatisfiedwiththestatelegislature,withanOctober2011Quinnipiac

pollfindingthat63percentofvotersdisapproveofthejobthelegislatureisdoing.6 The

lowopinionofstategovernmentcontributestothedisenchantmentofNewYorkers

whowouldturnoutorchoosenottoatthepollsonElectionDay.

ThePartisanDivide

NewYorkhadthelongestrunningpoliticalpartysplitbetweenhousesofthelegislature

inthenation,startingin1974withtheSenateunderRepublicancontrolandthe

AssemblyunderDemocraticcontrolfordecades. ThischangedbrieflyinJanuary2009

4Katz,Celeste.NYPIRG:NewYorkOnTrackToBeFirstStateWithContributionLimitOver$100,000,

DailyPolitics.

January

21,

2011.

Available

at:

http://www.nydailynews.com/blogs/dailypolitics/2011/01/nypirgnewyorkontracktobefirststate

withcontributionlimitover1000005TheBrennanCenterhasissuedseveralreportsonthedysfunctionalnatureoftheNewYorkState

Legislature,thefirstbeingTheNewYorkStateLegislativeProcess:AnEvaluationandBlueprintforReform

in2004.6QuinnipiacUniversityPollingInstitute,KeepRace,JobProtectionOutOfRedistricting,NewYorkState

VotersTellQuinnipiacUniversityPoll;CuomoShouldVetoLawmakers'Lines,VotersSay.October26,

2011.Availableat:http://www.quinnipiac.edu/x1318.xml?ReleaseID=1667


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ReshapingNewYorkReport Page10whenthelegislaturewassworninandDemocratscontrolledbothhouses. Asaresultof

the2010GeneralElection,RepublicanshaveregainedcontroloftheSenateand

DemocratscontinuetoholdalargemajorityintheAssembly,meaningthatthereisa

returntothestatusquothatexistedbetween1974and2008. Thislongstanding

partisandividecanbeattributedto,amongotherthings,thelackofcompetitive

electionsandthefactthatbothpartiesinpowerusetheredistrictingprocesstoensure

thattheir

members

are

protected

from

serious

competition.

E. SOLUTIONSTOGERRYMANDERING:CITIZENSUNIONSRECOMMENDATIONS

The2010Censushasbeenconductedandthepoliticalramificationsofthenew

legislativedistrictsthatwillbedrawnin20112012areenormous. FortheU.S.Houseof

Representatives,NewYorkwilllosetwocongressionalseats,asitdidnotgrowin

populationattherateofotherstatessuchasTexasandFlorida. Asidefromthepolitics

ofredistricting,theStateLegislaturefacesincreasingpublicdissatisfactionwiththe

functioningof

state

government.

Voters

are

also

disappointed

with

the

legislatures

lack

ofactionthusfaronredistrictingreformachiefcampaignpromisefromthe2010

electionsand48percentofvotersstatetheywouldfeelbetrayedthelegislaturewere

toapprovedistrictlinesthesameoldwayandnotputinplaceanindependent

commissionfor2012.7 Publicoutcryforreform,combinedwiththerecentstridesstates

likeCaliforniaandFloridahavemadetowardsinstitutingredistrictingreforms,arewhy

CitizensUnionbelievesthatwemustseizethemomenttoensuretherightsofNew

Yorkersarefinallyprotected.

Thoughourpreferredapproachofconstitutionalchangestotheredistrictingprocessis

nolonger

aviable

option

before

the

2012

elections,

statutory

reforms

remain

possible

beforelinesaredrawn. Whodrawsthelines,whatrulesdeterminehowlinesare

drawn,theamountofpublicinputandtheapprovalprocessareallimportantfactorsin

consideringanewredistrictingsystemforNewYork. Whileseveralmodelsexistfor

eachofthesefactorsandareexploredinthisreport,itisclearthatamoreindependent

processisneededinNewYork.

Onelegislativeproposal,sponsoredbythenAssemblymemberMichaelGianarisand

SenatorDavidValesky,sawadvancementinbothhousesin2010,passingtheSenate

ElectionsandGovernmentalOperationsCommittees,andtheAssemblyGovernmental

OperationsCommittee.Thelegislation(A.3432/S.2543)hasbeenreintroducedin2011

bynow

Senator

Michael

Gianaris

and

Assemblymember

Hakeem

Jeffries,

and

has

the

supportofmorethanamajorityofmembersoftheAssemblyandstrongsupportamong

DemocratsintheSenate.

7QuinnipiacUniversityPollingInstitute,StormSurgeTakesCuomoApprovalToAllTimeHigh,Quinnipiac

UniversityPollFinds;VotersWantGovToSpeakUpOnRedistricting.September20,2011.Availableat:

http://www.quinnipiac.edu/x1318.xml?ReleaseID=1647


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ReshapingNewYorkReport Page11Mostnotablyin2011,GovernorAndrewCuomohasputforthaprogrambill(S.

3419/A.5388)forredistrictingreformthatincorporatesmanyoftheelementsofthe

Gianarislegislation. ItissponsoredbySpeakerSheldonSilverintheAssemblyandhas

beenputintotheRulesCommitteeintheSenate. Whilethemeasurehassecured

overwhelmingsupportintheAssembly,with96cosponsors,itsdeliberateintroduction

intotheRulesCommitteeintheSenate,whereitcannotbecosponsored,enabledthe

Senatemajority

to

effectively

stall

its

movement

and

prevent

indications

of

support

by

rankandfilemembersofbothparties.

Statutoryapproachestoredistrictingreformhavepredictablyseenresistance,

particularlyfromtheSenateRepublicanMajoritywhichclaimsthatlegislation

introducedbyGovernorCuomoisunconstitutional. Inresponse,CitizensUnionandthe

leadersoftheReShapeNYcoalitionreleasedalegalmemowrittenprobonobythe

prestigiousinternationallawfirmWeil,GotshalandMangesLLP8,whichconcludedthat

theCuomoredistrictingreformbillisindeedconstitutional,aswellassimilarlegislation

introducedbySenatorsGianarisandValesky,andAssemblymemberJeffries. The

legislationis

consistent

with

the

legislature's

ability

to

delegate

its

powers

in

a

circumscribedmanneranddoesnotviolatetheseparationofpowersbetweendifferent

branchesofgovernment.

Inperhapsoneofthemorecynicalactsof2011,ameasuretoamendtheState

ConstitutiontoaltertheredistrictingprocesswaspassedbytheStateSenateinMarch.

Thelegislation(S.3331)wassponsoredbySenatorJohnBonacic,andwhileheraldedby

theSenateRepublicanMajorityascreatingamoreindependentredistrictingprocess

andabsolvingtheconferenceofitscommitmentstovoterstopassredistrictingreform,

itwasopposedbyreformadvocatesasnotcontainingatrulyindependentcommission

andnotbeingeffectiveuntil2022. Asaconstitutionalamendment,itcouldnothave

takeneffectthisredistrictingcycle,andthereforewasdismissedbyNewYorkUprising

(aPACfoundedbyformerMayorEdKochsupportingreforminAlbany)asnotsatisfying

theircampaignpledge.

CommonGroundforReform

Whilethelegislaturehasyettocometoconsensusaroundthedetailsofredistricting

reforminadvanceof2012,thereisbroadagreementontheprinciplesofchangeas

seeninredistrictingreformbillssponsoredinthelegislaturethatduringthe2011

legislativesession,

as

mentioned

previously.

8WeilGotshalMemorandumtoCitizensUnion.Availableat:

http://www.citizensunion.org/www/cu/site/hosting/Redistricting/WeilGotshal%20_Manges_memo_on_c

onstitutionality_of_Cuomo_bill_FINAL.pdf


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ReshapingNewYorkReport Page12Themajorredistrictingreformproposalsare:

S.3419/A.5388(Cuomo/Silver) S.2543/A.3432(Gianaris/Jeffries) S.3331/A.5271(Bonacic/GalefpassedtheSenateonMarch14,2011witha

voteof35to24,with3Senatorsabsentorexcused)

S.660/A.5602(Valesky/Cahill)

Allofthesebillspossessthefollowingcoreprinciples:

1) Legislatorsshouldnotdrawdistrictboundaries. Allfourproposalsrecognizetheconflictofinterestthatoccurswhenlegislatorsdrawdistrictsforthevery

officestheywillrunagainfor. Allfourproposalsputthedistrictdrawingpenin

thehandsofnonlegislators.

2) Thosewithpoliticalinfluenceshouldbedisqualifiedfrombeingmembersofthe

independent

redistricting

commission.

All

four

proposals

have

prohibitions

thatareaimedtopreventpoliticalinsiderstoocloselyaffiliatedwithlegislators

andtherefore,alsohaveaconflictofinterest,fromdrawingmaps.

3) Majorityandminoritypartiesinbothhousesofthelegislatureshouldbeequallyrepresentedontheindependentcommission. Thebillsallreflectthe

conclusionthatmajorityandminoritypartieshaveanequalstakeinafair

redistrictingprocessandshouldthereforehaveequalrepresentationonany

commissionthatdrawsthelines. Thiswillpreventmajorityparties,whether

theyareDemocratsorRepublicans,fromusingredistrictingasapoliticalcudgel

againsttheirminoritycolleaguesinthelegislature.

4) LessIncumbentProtection. Allproposalsseektopreventelectionswithpreordainedoutcomesbyprohibitinglinesdrawntofavorordisfavorparticular

incumbents,challengers,orparties.

5) Oneperson/OneVote,TheVotingRightsAct,Contiguity,andCompactnessareallcriteriaincommonfordrawingdistrictboundaries. Allproposals,in

accordancewithfederallaw,identifyOneperson/OneVoteandtheVoting

RightsActasbeingcriteriathatmustbefollowedinmakingmaps. Allproposals

alsoincludecontiguityandcompactnessasgoalsindrawingdistrictboundaries.

Giventhelackofactiontocreateanindependentredistrictingprocessfor2012,Citizens

callsonthestatelegislaturetoreturninaspecialsessionthisfalltoenactstatutory

redistrictingreformsandfulfilllegislatorscommitmentstovoters.


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ReshapingNewYorkReport Page13CITIZENSUNIONRECOMMENDATIONS:ANewandImpartialApproach

GiventhestatelegislaturesauthorityundertheStateConstitutiontoapprovedistrict

lines,theonlywaytoestablishanabsolutelyindependentredistrictingprocessis

throughaconstitutionalamendment. Whilewestillsupportandpreferaconstitutional

amendment,itistoolateforaconstitutionalamendmenttotakeeffectbeforethe2012

elections. Forthisredistrictingcycle,CitizensUnionhassupportedlegislationtocreate

anindependentprocessthroughstatute,coupledwithpassageofaconstitutional

amendmenttocreatepermanentreform.

Withlittletimeremainingtoproposeandfinalizelinesfor2012,CitizensUnioncallson

theGovernor,theStateSenate,andtheStateAssemblytoresolvetheimpasseon

redistrictingandadoptatwostagedapproachinachievingredistrictingreform. The

firststagewouldinvolveenactinglegislationthatcreatesalessthanidealreform

approachfor2012,butonethatisconsistentwiththeprinciplesofcurrentreform

proposalsputforwardbyGovernorCuomo,SenatorsGianarisandValesky,and

AssemblymemberJeffries.

An

independent

panel,

appointed

directly

and

equally

by

the

fourlegislativeleadersbutonwhichnolegislatorwouldserve,wouldinheritthework

donetodatebyLATFORandbeguidedbyestablishedandagreeduponcriteria. The

criteriawouldnotbeasstrongasoriginallyproposed,butsufficientlyclearsoasnotto

continuetheriggedpracticeofpoliticalmanipulationinthedrawingoflinesforpartisan

gain. Thisprocessandpanelwouldstillrecommendmapstothelegislature,which

wouldhavethefinalsay.

Inacceptingthislessthanidealapproach,CitizensUnionwouldinsistonitbeing

coupledwithasecondstage. Thisyearsreformlightlegislativeapproachmustbe

tied

to

first

passage

of

a

much

stronger

constitutional

amendment

that

would

bring

wholesalechangetotheredistrictingprocessandcreateanewimpartialand

independentprocessonepromisedtothevotersinthecampaignof2010.

Werecognizethatastatutealonecannottaketheprocessentirelyoutofthehandsof

thelegislature.Ourlongstandingproposal,therefore,isintendedtocreateadegreeof

independenceby:establishinganindependentcommissionwithacertaindegreeof

legislativeinput;givingthecommissionclearstandardstofollow;andrequiringthe

legislaturetoactonitsplans,whilerecognizingthattheultimatedecisionstillremains

withthelegislature,whichcanrejecttheindependentcommissionsrecommendations

ifitsochooses.Aspreviouslymentioned,however,theGovernorhaspledgedtoveto

anyredistricting

plan

that

is

not

independent,

so

there

is

greater

onus

on

the

legislature

toacceptaplanthatisdrawnindependently.

Withthegoalofestablishingafairsolutionthatwillputanendtopartisanmaneuvering

andensurethatthepublicinterestisservedintheredistrictingprocess,CitizensUnion

providesthefollowingrecommendationsandframeworkforcreatinganindependent

commissionviastatuteorconstitutionalamendment. Ouridealsolutionisprovided


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ReshapingNewYorkReport Page14below,andwhilewerecognizethatthereisnotcurrentlytimeforafullindependent

processtounfoldforthiscycle,particularlywithregardstoforminganindependent

commissionthroughanominatingpool,weprovidetheframeworkbelowforanideal

statutorysolutionorconstitutionalamendmentcreatinganindependentcommission.

Thisproposalwouldbetruncatedforastatutorysolutionfor2012,consistentwiththe

goalsofcreatingamoreindependentandfairprocess.

1. Creationof NominationsCommitteetoSelectPotentialCommissionMembers

WhileCitizensUnionwouldpreferthatanindependentcommissionbegivenfull

authorityovertheredistrictingprocesswithoutsignoffbythelegislature,wesupport

avenuestoallowlegislativeinputandforthelegislaturetomakeappointmentstothe

commission. Wealsorecognizethatthelegislatureisunlikelytopasslegislation

amendingtheconstitutiontofullyremoveitsroleintheprocess.

CitizensUnionbelievesanominationscommitteeshouldbeformedtoselectapoolof

candidatesforappointmenttotheredistrictingcommission. Inordertoadvance

neededreformbefore2012viastatute,however,thereisnolongertimefora

nominationscommitteetobeformed. Thetwostepprocessofanominations

committeeinaconstitutionalamendmentwouldbeusedtoprovideadegreeof

separationfromtheelectedofficialswhosedistrictlineswillbedrawnbythe

commission. Wealsosupportprohibitionsonmembershiponthecommissionand

requiringconsultationwithorganizationsdevotedtoprotectingthevotingrightsof

minoritiesandothervotersinordertoremovepotentialconflictsandensurediversity.

Legislativerepresentationshouldbebalancedwithstatewiderepresentationthrough

appointmentsbythegovernor,attorneygeneral,comptrollerandchiefjudge,for

example,toenhanceindependenceandprovideforbroaderperspectiveofthe

nominatingcommission.

Thenominationscommitteewouldbecomposedofeightmembers,withthefollowing

individualsappointingmembersofthecommission:

thegovernor4members,2fromeachmajorparty; thetemporarypresidentofthesenate2members; the

speaker

of

the

assembly

2members;

theminorityleaderofthesenate2members;and theminorityleaderoftheassembly2members.


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ReshapingNewYorkReport Page15Nomemberoftheappointednominationscommitteeshall:

holdorhaveheldwithinthepreviousfouryearsanelectedgovernmentofficeoranyotherpartisanappointedgovernmentalorpoliticalpartyposition;

beemployedorhavebeenemployedwithinthepreviousfouryearsinanyotherpositionbytheUSCongress,theStateLegislature,ortheExecutive

Chamber;

beorhavebeenwithinthepreviousfouryearsaregisteredlobbyistinNewYork;

beaspouseoforrelatedtoanymemberoftheUSCongress,theStateLegislature,ortheExecutiveChamber;or

holdorhaveheldapositionwithinthepreviousfouryearsasaseniorcampaignstafferforcandidatesrunningforofficeinNewYorkStateforstate

orfederaloffice,orforpoliticalcommitteesoperatinginNewYorkState.

2. SelectionofaNominationPoolThenominationscommitteewouldthenselectapoolofnominees,ornominations

pool,whichwouldrepresentthediversityofthestatewithregardtorace,ethnicity,

andgender;wouldincludepersonsfromeachregionofthestate(LongIsland,NewYork

City,HudsonValley,Northern,Central,SouthernTier,andWestern);andwouldinclude

atotalof40persons:

15enrolledDemocrats, 15enrolledRepublicans,and 10personsnotenrolledineitherparty

Nomemberofthenominationspoolshall:

holdorhaveheldwithinthepreviousfouryearsanelectedgovernmentofficeoranyotherpartisanappointedgovernmentalorpoliticalpartyposition;

beemployedorhavebeenemployedwithinthepreviousfouryearsinanyotherpositionbytheUSCongress,theStateLegislature,ortheExecutive

Chamber;

beorhavebeenwithinthepreviousfouryearsaregisteredlobbyistinNY; beaspouseoforrelatedtoanymemberoftheUSCongress,theState

Legislature,ortheExecutiveChamber;or

hold

or

have

held

a

position

within

the

previous

four

years

as

a

senior

campaignstafferforcandidatesrunningforofficeinNewYorkStateforstate

orfederaloffice,orforpoliticalcommitteesoperatinginNewYorkState.


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ReshapingNewYorkReport Page163. FormationoftheIndependentCitizensRedistrictingCommission

Theredistrictingcommissionwouldconsistofatotalof11membersselectedfromthe

nominationspool. Inastatutoryapproachfor2012,however,thereisnolongertime

foranominationscommitteetoformandselectcandidates,soadifferentapproachwill

beneededtoformasindependentcommissionasispossibleinthetimeallowed. Eight

ofthese

selected

members

would

be

appointed

from

the

nominations

pool

by

each

of

thelegislativeleadersasfollows:

2membersbythetemporarypresidentofthesenate; 2membersbythespeakeroftheassembly; 2membersbytheminorityleaderofthesenate;and 2membersbytheminorityleaderoftheassembly.

These8memberswouldthenappoint3additionalmembersfromthenominationspool,

1ofwhomwouldserveaschairofthecommission,foratotalof11members.

CitizensUnionbelievesthatthestructureasoutlinedabovewouldbeasignificant

improvementfromthestatusquoinwhichtheminorpartiesineachhouseare

marginalizedbyhavingfewerappointmentstotheredistrictingbody. Further

consideration,however,shouldbegiventothepresenceofgubernatorialappointments

ontheredistrictingcommissiontoprovideastatewideperspectiveandgreater

independence. Werecognizethattheremaybelegislativeresistancetosuch

appointments;however,giventhefulllegislaturesultimateapprovaloftheredistricting

plansandabilitytoamendafinalplanunderthisproposal,thisresistancedoesnothave

asoundbasis. Intheabsenceofanominationspool,whichprovidesalayerof

separationbetweenthelegislatureanditsappointments,CitizensUnionbelieves

gubernatorialappointmentswouldbeanimportantadditiontothosethatwouldbe

madedirectlybythelegislativeleaders.

Nomorethan4membersoftheredistrictingcommissionwouldbeenrolledinthesame

politicalparty,andmemberswouldbeselectedtorepresentthediversityofthestateto

theextentpracticable.Asthememberswouldbeselectedfromthenominationspool,

theywouldbecomposedofregisteredvotersoftheStateofNewYorkwhodonothold,

orhavenotheld,anelectiveoffice,apartypositionoranappointmenttoapartisan

position;havenotbeenemployedasalobbyistwithinfouryearsofselectiontothe

redistrictingcommission;arenotthespouseorrelativeofanelectedofficialinthestate

legislativeor

state

executive

branch

or

the

U.S.

Congress;

and

have

not

held

asenior

positioninacampaignforastateorfederaloffice,orforpoliticalcommitteesoperating

inNewYorkStateforthepreviousfouryears.


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ReshapingNewYorkReport Page174. EstablishingFairCriteriafortheDrawingofLines

Justasimportantaswhoholdsthepenindrawingdistrictlinesaretherulesthatmust

befollowedintheformationofdistricts. Thecurrentmapsofdistrictlinesaredrawn

forpartisangoalsratherthanintheinterestsofthevotingpublic,andoftensplit

communitiesandresultinvoterconfusion.

CitizensUnionspecificallyrecommendsthatfourmainrequirementsbefollowedinthe

drawingoflines,consistentwiththerequirementsoffederallaw,includingthefederal

VotingRightsActof1965(totheextentthattheyareappliedviastatute,consistentwith

theStateConstitution):

(a) allcongressionaldistrictsshallbeasnearlyequalinpopulationasispracticable;(b)eachdistrictshallconsistofcontiguousterritory;nodistrictshallconsistofparts

entirelyseparatedbytheterritoryofanotherdistrictofthesamebody,whether

suchterritorybelandorwater,populatedorunpopulated.Apopulatedcensus

blockshall

not

be

divided

by

adistrict

boundary,

unless

it

can

be

determined

thatthepopulatedpartofsuchblockiswithinasingledistrict;

(c) senate,assembly,orcongressionaldistrictsshallnotbeestablishedthatareintendedtoorresultinadenialorabridgementofminorityvotingrights

includingtheopportunityofminorityvoterstoparticipateinthepoliticalprocess

andtoelectthecandidatesoftheirchoice,includingbutnotlimitedtoinstances

inwhichminoritypopulationsdonotcompriseamajorityofthedistrict;and

(d)senate,assembly,orcongressionaldistrictsshallnotbedrawnwithanintenttofavororopposeanypoliticalparty,anyincumbentfederalorstatelegislator,or

anypreviousorpresumedcandidateforoffice.

Inadditiontotherequiredprinciples(a),(b),(c)and(d)above,thefollowingprioritized

principleswouldbeusedinthecreationofsenate,assembly,andcongressionaldistricts

totheextentpracticable.

(i) themostandleastpopuloussenatedistrictsshallnotexceedorbelowerthanthemeanpopulationofallsenatedistrictsbymorethanonepercent,

andthemostandleastpopulousassemblydistrictsshallnotexceedorbe

lowerthanthemeanpopulationofallassemblydistrictsbymorethanone

percent. Innoeventshallthecommissionadvantageanyregionofthestate

overanyotherbycreatingmultipledistrictsthereinexceedingorlowerthan

themean

population

by

more

than

one

percent.

(ii) asenate,assembly,orcongressionaldistrictshallunitecommunitiesdefinedbyactualsharedinterests,takingaccountofgeographic,social,economic,

andotherfactorsthatindicatecommonalityofinterest,anddistrictsshallbe

formedsoastopromotetheorderlyandefficientadministrationof

elections.


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ReshapingNewYorkReport Page18(iii)countiesshallnotbedividedintheformationofdistricts,excepttocreate

districtswhollywithinacounty.Wheresuchdivisionofcountiesis

unavoidable,morepopulouscountiesshallbedividedinpreferencetothe

divisionoflesspopulouscounties.Totheextentpracticable,ifanyassembly

districtoranysenatedistrictincludestheterritoryoftwocounties,thenno

otherassemblydistrictorsenatedistrictshallincludeterritoryofbothofthe

sametwo

counties.

(iv)countysubdivisionsshallnotbedividedintheformationofdistricts,excepttocreatedistrictswhollywithinacountysubdivision.Forthepurposesofthis

article,acountysubdivisionshallbeacity,exceptthecityofNewYork,a

town,oranIndianreservationwhoseterritoryisexclusiveoftheterritoryof

anycityortown.Countysubdivisionswithlargerpopulationsshallbedivided

inpreferencetothedivisionofthosewithsmallerpopulations.

(v) incorporatedvillagesshallnotbedividedintheformationofdistricts.(vi)thesenate,assembly,andcongressionaldistrictsshallbeascompactinform

aspossible.

Inpresentingitsplantothelegislatureandthepublic,thelegislatureshouldberequired

tosubmitastandardizedscorecardindicatingcompliancewiththecriteriaand

requirements,presentingtheplansscoreoneachoftheaforementionedprinciples.

5. CreatinganOpenandTransparentProcessThecommissionshouldsubmitthefirstplantothelegislatureafterholdingrequired

publichearingsthroughoutthestateinthefollowinglocations:Albany,Buffalo,Syracuse,

Rochester,

GlenCove,

White

Plains,

and

Bronx,

Kings,

New

York,

Queens

and

Richmond

Counties. Totheextentpracticable,meetingsshouldbewebcast.

Regardingthematerialsusedforredistricting,thecommissionshouldmakeavailableto

thepublicinprintformandinelectronicformontheinternet,usingthebestavailable

technology,allredistrictingplans,relevantdataandwebbasedmapmakingsoftware

usedtopreparesuchplans,informationonthemembersoftheredistricting

commissionandallotherrelevantinformation. Thecommissionshouldberequiredto

postplanssubmittedbythepubliconitswebsiteandconsiderpublicplansinthe

formulationofitsplans.

6. EncouragingApprovaloftheIndependentPlanCitizensUnionrecommendsthatthelegislaturehavetheopportunitytoprovide

feedbackonuptotwoplanssubmittedbythecommission,andcanonlyamendathird

planwithamendmentsthatmeetthestatutoryguidelinesestablished. Inaddition,the

legislatureshouldbeconstrainedfrommakingamendmentsthataffectmorethan2

percentofthepopulationofanydistrict. Inastatutoryscheme,theabilitytocomment


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ReshapingNewYorkReport Page19andamendtheplanisconsistentwiththestatelegislaturesauthorityundertheState

Constitutiontoultimatelyapprovearedistrictingplan. Ideallyinaconstitutional

amendment,theindependentcommissionsplanwouldnotrequirelegislativeapproval,

butCitizensUnionrecognizesthatthestatelegislatureisunlikelytoapprovelegislation

removingtheirroleintheapprovalprocess. Theprocesswouldworkasfollows:

Thefirst

plan

would

require

avote

of

the

legislature

without

amendments.

If

the

proposalisrejected,thecommissionwouldsubmitanamendedproposalafter

hearingthereasonsgivenbythelegislatureregardingthefirstplansrejectionat

apublichearing.

Thesecondplan,again,wouldbevoteduponbythelegislaturewithoutamendments.Ifthesecondproposalisalsorejected,thecommissionwould

submitathirdplanfollowingasecondpublichearingatwhichthelegislature

wouldtestify.

Thethirdplanwouldbesubjecttothenormalamendmentprocesswithintheestablishedstatutoryguidelinesforredistricting,giventhelegislaturesultimate

authorityover

redistricting

under

the

State

Constitution.

TheCourtofAppealsshouldbegivenoriginalandexclusivejurisdictionoverchallenges

totheredistrictingplantopreventforumshoppingandtoallowfortheexpedited

reviewofsuitsfrommembersofthepublic.

CitizensUnionRecommendationsFor2012RedistrictingPlans

Regardlessofwhatentitywilldrawdistrictlinesforthe2012elections,CitizensUnion

hasanumber

of

recommendations

regarding

how

the

maps

should

be

drawn.

Through

ourresearchofthecurrentprocess,wehaveidentifiedinstancesinwhichcommunities

havebeensplitapartandcertaingroupshavebeenmarginalizedinordertoprotect

incumbents. Themapsthatwillbedrawnwillhaveaprofoundimpactoncommunities

throughoutthestate,andwebelievethatthestatemusttakeactiontoallowforfair

representationforallNewYorkers. CitizensUnionsrecommendationsforthelines

drawnin2012arelistedbelow.

1. GreaterOpportunitiesShouldbeGivenforMinoritiestoElectCandidatesofTheirChoice

Thediversityofthestateisnotreflectedinourelectedrepresentation,asdiscussedin

Section5bofthisreport. Takingintoconsiderationgrowingminoritypopulationsin

NewYork,particularlyinNewYorkCityandLongIsland,werecommendthefollowing:


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ReshapingNewYorkReport Page20 NewYorkCity

AsianAmericansshouldbegivengreateropportunitiestoelectcandidatesoftheirchoiceintheCityofNewYorkthroughthecreation

ofoneormoremajorityminoritydistrictsineachhouse. Theborough

ofQueenshasonlyoneAsianAmericanstatelegislatorintheAssembly,

andAsianAmericanshavenorepresentationintheSenate. Itshouldalso

benoted

that

Asian

Americans

are

adiverse

community,

and

that

South

AsianscommunitiesarealsogrowinginNewYorkCity.

- Flushing,Queens;Elmhurst,Queens;SunsetPark,Brooklyn;andDykerHeights,Brooklynareareasforpossibledistrictsgiven

growingAsianAmericanpopulations.

LatinosshouldbegivengreateropportunitiestoelectcandidatesoftheirchoiceintheCityofNewYorkthroughthecreationofoneormore

majorityminoritydistrictsineachhouse. Latinosholdonly19seatsin

thestatelegislature(9percent),whilehaving17.6ofthestates

population.

- WashingtonHeights

and

Inwood,

Manhattan;

as

well

as

Jackson

Heights,Queensareareasforpossibledistrictsgivengrowing

Latinopopulations.

LongIsland GrowingBlackandLatinocommunitiesinLongIslandshouldbegiven

greateropportunitiestoelectcandidatesoftheirchoice,particularlyin

theStateSenate,andconsiderationshouldbegiventothecreationof

opportunitytoelectdistrictswherethesecommunitiesdonotcomprisea

majorityofthedistrict.

- ThetownofHempsteadinNassauCountyandthetownsofIslipand

Babylon

in

Suffolk

County

are

areas

for

possible

districts,

givengrowingminoritypopulations.

2. CitiesinUpstateNewYorkShouldNotBeCarvedUpUpstateNewYorksurbanareashavebeendividedupforpartisanadvantageinboth

housesofthelegislature. Considerationshouldbegiventorespectingtheexisting

politicalboundariesofcitiessothattheseurbancommunitiescanremainwholeand

havemoreunifiedrepresentationinthestatelegislature. Theseincludebutarenot

limitedtothecitiesofBuffalo,Rochester,Albany,Syracuse,SchenectadyandUtica.

NewYorkscitiesshouldberepresentedbyasfewdistrictsasdictatedbythe

population,to

the

extent

that

it

protects

the

unified

voice

of

these

communities.

F. MAKINGREFORMAREALITYNewYorkStateisinneedoffundamentalchangetothewayinwhichlegislativedistrict

linesaredrawn. Decadesofgerrymanderinghaveresultedinpolarizeddiscussionand


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ReshapingNewYorkReport Page21ontoomanyoccasionsalessthanfullyfunctionalstatelegislaturethatshieldsitself

fromcompetitionandthereforefromaccountability. Nowisthetimetoendtheself

interesteddrawingofdistrictlinesbylegislators,andcreateanindependent

commissionaswellasclearandconsistentrulesforthedrawingoflines.

UnprecedentedSupportforRedistrictingReform

Thefutureofredistrictingreformisinthehandsofthestatelegislature,whomust

approvelegislationtocreateamoreindependentprocess,andthegovernor,whowould

signthelegislationintolaw. Thereisunprecedentedandhistoricsupportforcreating

anindependentcommissiontodrawdistrictlines,withamajorityoflegislatorsinboth

houses,184of212,includingamajorityofbothconferencesineachhouseofthe

legislature,supportingthecreationofanindependentcommissiontodrawdistrictlines

accordingtofairandobjectivecriteria,asstatedabove.

Inadditiontotheunprecedentedleveloflegislativesupport,publicopinionpollsshow

thehighest

ever

public

support

for

independent

redistricting:

77

percent

of

voters

supportanindependentcommissiontodrawdistrictlines. Thevotersalsoagreethat

GovernorCuomoshouldvetolinesthatarenotdrawnbyanindependentcommission,

with49percentofthosepolledinagreementandonly30percentdisagreeing.9

Whilethelegislaturehasconductedpublichearingsthroughoutthestatewiththeintent

tosolicitpublicinputonhowmapsshouldbedrawn,asignificantnumberofthose

testifyinghavepointedtotheneedtochangetheprocessitself. AtLATFORhearings

throughoutthestate,thepublichascontinuedtocallforanindependentcommission

andafairprocess,includingmembersoftheReShapeNYcoalition.Thepublichas

spokenloudandclearinfavorofreform,andwillcontinuetospeakinfavorofan

independentcommissiontodrawstatelegislativeandcongressionaldistrictboundaries

accordingtofairandobjectivecriteriawhileallowingforrobustpublicinputintothe

process.

Pressurehasalsobeenmountinginthemedia,withaneweditorialnearlyeverymonth

thispastyearfromnewsoutletsthroughoutthestateaskingforanindependentprocess

tobeputinplaceinadvanceof2012asLATFORhascontinueditsroadshowofpublic

hearings.

LegislatorsmusthonortheirwordandkeeptheircommitmentsbyreturningtoAlbany

inaspecial

legislative

session

to

finally

end

partisan

gerrymandering

and

enact

redistrictingreform. NewYorkershavealreadywaitedformanydecadesfor

redistrictingreform. Thefulfillmentofthatpromisecannotwaitanothertenyears.

9QuinnipiacUniversityPollingInstitute,August11,2011 NewYorkVotersBackFracking,Despite

Concerns,QuinnipiacUniversityPollFinds;MoreWomenInGovernmentMeansFewerSexScandals.

August11,2011. Availableat:http://www.quinnipiac.edu/x1318.xml?ReleaseID=1635


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2Acknowledgements

Thisreporthasbeenseveralyearsinthemakingandtherearenumberofindividuals

whohavebeeninstrumentalinresearchingdata,compilinginformation,and

contributingtothewritingofthisreport.

AuthorsforthisreportincludeRachaelFauss,ResearchandPolicyManager;DougIsrael,

formerpolicydirector;SydneyBeveridge,formerpolicyassociate;andDickDadey,

ExecutiveDirector. ThisreportwaseditedbyAlexCamarda,DirectorofPublicPolicy

andAdvocacy;AdeliaHarrison,ExecutiveAssistant;andDeNoraGetachew,former

policydirector.

CitizensUnionthanksitsboardmembersRobertAbrams,JohnAvlon,RichardBriffault,

GailErickson,GraceLyuVolckhausen,SallyRobinson,AlanRothstein,andGregSilbert

fortheiractiveinvolvementintheorganizationsworkontheissue,andspecifically

Avlon,Briffault,andRothsteinfortheirthoughtfuleditsandsuggestionstothe

executivesummaryofthereport. Wealsothankthemembersofourstateaffairs

committeewhohaveworkedonthisissuesinceCitizensUnionfirststartedaddressing

redistrictingreformin2004inadvanceof2012.

Atthestartofthisreportsresearch,valuableguidancetoitsapproachandcontentwas

provided

by

respected

government

expert,

Gerald

Benjamin,

a

distinguished

professor

andAssociateVicePresidentforRegionalEngagementandDirectoroftheCenterfor

Research,RegionalEducationandOutreach(CRREO)atSUNYNewPaltz.

Internswhohaveaidedinresearchandwritinginclude:GennadyKolker,DarenMills,

LaurenRandall,JessicaLee,AndrewSlater,IlanaNovick,HannahRyu,LillianSmith,and

KevinMaloney.

CitizensUnionalsoacknowledgesitsgoodgovernmentpartners,specificallytheNew

YorkPublicInterestGroupandtheLeagueofWomenVoters,NewYorkStatewho

helpedformandleadthestatewideredistrictingreformcampaign,ReShapeNY. Alistof

ReShapeNYssupporters

is

detailed

in

Appendix

7.

Generousfundingfortheresearchanddevelopmentofthisreportwasprovidedbythe

RockefellerBrothersFund,NewYorkCommunityTrust,MertzGilmoreFoundationand

LilyAuchinclossFoundation. CitizensUnionthanksitsDirectorofDevelopment,

BethanyWall,forherhelpinsecuringneededfundingforthisreport.


26/115


ReshapingNewYorkReport Page23ThelawfirmWeilGotshal&Mangesprovidedvaluableprobonoservicesonimportant

issuesrelatedtotheorganizationslegalworkonredistricting.

Andfinally,thetwoorganizations,CitizensUnionandCitizensUnionFoundationhave

benefitedfromthesupportofourmanymembersandindividualdonors,including

membersoftheboardsofdirectors,infundingourmultiyearworktoendpartisan

gerrymanderingand

usher

in

redistricting

reform.

CitizensUnionoftheCityofNewYork

BoardofDirectors

PeterJ.W.Sherwin,Chair

LuisGardenAcosta,ViceChair

RichardBriffault,ViceChair

GenaLovett,Treasurer

ChristinaR.Davis,Secretary

Hon.Robert

Abrams

JohnP.Avlon,CoChair,

MunicipalAffairsCommittee

NancyBowe,Chair,

NominatingCommittee

GerrardP.Bushell

LucyCabrera,Ph.D.

CurtisCole,M.D.

AllanH.Dobrin

MarkFoggin

EsterR.Fuchs,Ph.D.

RobertM.Kaufman

IanL.Kelley

HaroldLevy

OgdenN.Lewis

MarkLieberman

MalcolmMacKay

RandyMastro

TonyMattia

BruceRabb

LuisO.Reyes,Ph.D.

AlanRothstein,Chair,

StateAffairsCommittee

RickSchaffer

KennethSeplow

GregorySilbert

AnthonySmith

HectorSoto

CitizensUnionFoundationoftheCityofNewYork

BoardofDirectors

PeterJ.W.Sherwin,Chair

Hon.RobertAbrams,President

JudiRappoportBlitzer,ViceChair

GailErickson,ViceChair

RobertM.Kaufman,ViceChair

GraceLyu

Volckhausen,

Vice

Chair

GenaLovett,Treasurer

ChristinaR.Davis,Secretary

KennethAustin

NicoleGordon

AshokGupta

JohnR.Horan

GeorgeS.Kaufman

EricS.Lee

OgdenN.Lewis

LillianRodrguezLpez

MarcD.Norman

TomOsterman

AnushaRasalingam

SallyRobinson

TorranceRobinson

ClaireSilberman

EdwardC.Swenson


27/115


ReshapingNewYorkReport Page24CitizensUnionoftheCityofNewYork

StateAffairsCommittee

AlanRothstein,Chair

MarkAlcott

PhyllisBamberger

TomBergdall

NancyBowe

RichardBriffault

GailErickson

PeggyFarber

EricFrawley

WendyGoldstein

NicoleGordon

SusanHinko

SallyRobinson

MarjorieShea

PeterSherwin

ClaireSilberman

GregSilbert

AnthonyR.Smith

JohnSnyder

RogerWaldman


28/115



25

3Introduction

ThisreportistheculminationofseveralyearsofresearchbyCitizensUnionFoundationstaff. It

hasbeenanevolvingproduct,asthepathofredistrictingreformhastakenmanyturns.Support

forredistrictinghasgrowntremendouslywithinstategovernmentinrecentyearsandtheissue

hasalsoseenaresurgenceofpublicandmediainterestwiththecompletionofthe2010Census

andthestartoftheprocessofdrawingdistrictlinesforthestatelegislatureandtheU.S.Houseof

Representatives. Atthispointintime,redistrictingreformisatoppriorityforNewYorkers,and

onethatmustbeaddressedbythestatelegislatureinaspecialsessioninordertohaveanaffect

beforethe2012elections.

CitizensUnion

Foundation

intends

for

this

report

to

be

both

relevant

to

todays

debate

in

Albany

regardingredistrictingreformforthe2012cycle,andasanhistoricdocumentnotingtrendsof

decreasedvoterparticipationandconfidenceinstategovernmentovertime,aswellasthelackof

competitioninthestateselections. Tobalancethesetwogoals,weprovidesignificantresearchof

thestateselectionsandalongtermviewofissuessuchaslegislativegridlockandpolarizationof

thelegislature,whilealsonotingthesupportin2011forproposalstocreateanindependent

commission. Thisreportutilizesthisresearchandcasestudiestodemonstratewhyredistricting

reformisneededinNewYorkState,showingtheconnectionbetweenredistrictingreformandthe

lackofactiononissuesofimportancetoNewYorkersinAlbany. Thereportisalsoaprimeronthe

redistrictingprocessandthemeansbywhichcommunitieshavebeenmarginalizedandpartisan

interestsand

incumbency

have

been

protected

over

the

needs

of

voters.

Reformershavelongdecriedthestatesredistrictingprocess,andCitizensUnion,firstfoundedin

1897,hasbeenaparticipantinthecallforreformfordecades. Inthe1980s,wedrewourown

legislativemaps,formingashadowcommission,andinthe1990s,wecontinuedtoadvocatefor

amoreindependentandfairprocessfordrawingdistrictlines. Ashasoftenbeenthecasein

Albany,reformhastakenabackseattootherissues,andentrenchedpartisaninterestshavefailed

toaddresstheflawsofthestatesredistrictingprocess.

Lookingaheadtothe2012redistrictingcycle,CitizensUnionwithitscoalitionpartnersfirstdrafted

statelegislationin2005withthenAssemblymemberMichaelGianaris(DQueens),tocreatean

independentcommission

to

draw

legislative

district

lines.

Legislative

support

has

steadily

increased,andlegislationwasalsointroducedbyGovernorAndrewCuomoin2011which

proposedthecreationofanindependentcommission,modeledaftertheGianarislegislation.

Today,184ofthe212membersofthestatelegislaturehaveeithersignedontolegislation

creatinganindependentcommissionorpledgedtosupportsuchareform.

Publicsupportforreformisstrongerandmorediversethaneverbefore,asexemplifiedby

ReShapeNY,CitizensUnionsstatewidecampaignforredistrictingreformformedinearly2011.


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ReshapingNewYorkReport Page26ReShapeNYiscomprisedofacoalitionofover37organizationsfromacrossthestate,including

civicgroups,issueadvocacygroups,unionsandbusinessgroupsunitedinthecommongoalto

reformourstatesredistrictingprocess. ReShapeNYseeksanindependentcommissiontodraw

statelegislativeandcongressionaldistrictboundariesaccordingtofairandobjectivecriteriawhile

allowingforrobustpublicinputintotheprocess.ThemembersofReShapeNY,likeNewYorkers

acrossthe

state,

have

joined

in

calling

for

legislative

action

before

the

2012

elections

to

create

a

newredistrictingparadigm.

CitizensUnion,alongwiththeLeagueofWomenVotersN.Y.SandtheNewYorkPublicInterest

ResearchGroup(NYPIRG)serveontheleadershipteamofReShapeNY. MembersoftheSteering

CommitteeandendorsersofthecampaignincludeACTNOW,theAssociationforaBetterNY.

CitizensCommitteeforNewYorkCity,CitizensforaBetterNewYork,theInterfaithAllianceof

Rochester,NaturalResourcesDefenseCouncil,NewYorkUprising,theLongIslandProgressive

Coalition,theMentalHealthAssociationofNewYork,MinKwonCenterforCommunityAction,the

PublicEmployeesFederation,theRegionalPlanAssociation,andTransportationAlternatives,

among

others.

10

AnumberofhighprofileNewYorkersserveasReShapeNYscochairsfromacrosspartylines,

includingFormerDemocraticNewYorkCityMayorEdwardI.Koch,formerRepublicanState

SenatorFrankPadavan,formerDemocraticAttorneyGeneralRobertAbrams,andformer

RepublicanCandidateforStateComptroller,HarryWilson. Thesecochairsarejoinedbysixother

significantcivicandpublicserviceleaders:JohnAvlon,PhoebeBender,Dr.GeraldBenjamin,Rev.

CalvinO.ButtsIII,GraceLyuVolckhausen,andLillianRodriguezLopez.

Mediaattentionhasincreasedontheissue,asthelegislaturehasfailedtoenactlegislation

creatingamoreindependentandfairprocess. Editorialshavebeenwrittenacrossthestatein

recentmonths

calling

for

independent

redistricting

by

the

New

York

Times,

the

Rochester

DemocratandChronicle,theAlbanyTimesUnion,theNewYorkDailyNews,theBuffaloNews,

Newsday,theOneidaDispatch,theHenriettaPost,theGatesChiliPost,thePoughkeepsieJournal,

WayneCountyMessengerPost,theStatenIslandAdvance,CrainsNewYork,theUticaObserver

Dispatch,HudsonValleyJournalNews,SchenectadyDailyGazette,theCorningLeader,andthe

HeraldCommunitypapersinLongIsland. Opedsandletterstotheeditorhavealsobeenprinted

inpapersacrossthestate,pointingtofurtherpublicsupportforreform.

GovernorCuomomadehisstanceknownonredistrictingreformduringthe2010campaign

season,andhasnowrepeatedseveraltimeshispledgetovetodistrictlinesthatarenotdrawn

independentlyor

are

partisan.

He

has

further

stated

that

he

does

not

believe

that

the

Legislative

TaskForceonDemographicResearchandReapportionment(knownasLATFOR,whichisthe

currentbodyresponsiblefordrawinglines)canbenonpartisan. Ignoringthepublicwilland

continuingwithLATFORproceedings,thoughtheonlylegallymandatedprocessatthistime,will

onlyendinGovernorCuomovetoingthelines,makingthisentireprocessawasteoftimeuntilthe

powerofthepenisplacedinthehandsofanindependentcommission.

10ThefulllistofReShapeNYcoalitionmembersisavailableinAppendix7.


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ReshapingNewYorkReport Page27Thestatelegislatureisinanuntenablepositionhavingnotpassedreformsupportedbythepublic,

civicgroups,theGovernor,themedia,anditsownmembersandcontinuingthestatusquo

therebysowingtheseedsoffutureinactionandpolarizationonbigissues.

CitizensUnionsrecommendationsasprovidedinthisreportprovidetheframeworkforan

independentcommission

to

draw

district

lines

according

to

fair

and

objective

criteria

while

allowingforrobustpublicinput. Itmaybepasttimeforalltheelementsofthesereformstobe

putinplaceforthisredistrictingcycle,butitisnottoolatetostillcreateanimpartialprocessfor

2012andamorelastinglevelofreformintheformofaconstitutionalamendment.

TheworkthatisbeingconductedbyLATFORcouldeasilybetakenoverbyanindependent

commission,whowouldconsiderthepublicinputgiventhusfarandseekadditionalcommentin

drawingmapsforsubmissiontothelegislature. ThelastofLATFORspublichearingshave

concludedsolicitinginputonthepublicbeforemapsaredrafted. Indeed,wewouldhopethatit

wouldnotbecurrentlydrawinglineswithoutconsideringthepublicinputgivenatthesehearings.

Not

only

is

reform

still

possible,

it

is

needed

more

than

ever.

NewYorkgovernmentsawoneofthemostproductivelegislativesessionsinrecentmemoryin

2011. Redistrictingreform,however,isthemajorpieceofunfinishedbusiness. CitizensUnion

callsonthestatelegislaturetoreturntoAlbanyinaspecialsessionandkeeptheirpromisesto

finallyendpartisangerrymanderingandenactredistrictingreform. NewYorkershavewaited

decadesforredistrictingreform,andwenowhaveaonceinadecadeopportunitytodrawthe

linesin2012forthebetter. Wecannotwaitanothertenyearsforreform,andurgeimmediate

actionbythelegislaturetoputanindependentcommissioninplacetofinishthejobofLATFOR.


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4Rigging

the

System:

How

New

York

States

LegislativeDistrictsareCurrentlyDrawn

Thepowertodrawcongressionalandstatelegislativedistrictlines,asmandatedeverytenyears

bytheU.S.Constitution,hasbeenlargelylefttothestates. Statesmustundertakeredistricting

followingeverycensus,andtheredistrictingprocessisakeydeterminantforhoweverycitizen

andcommunitywillberepresentedatthestateandfederallevelsofgovernmentforthenextten

years. HereinNewYork,aselsewhere,itisalsoakeyfactorindeterminingwhetherthestates

minoritycommunitieswillhavesufficientpoliticalstrengthtoelectcandidatesoftheirchoice.

Underthe

current

system

of

redistricting

in

New

York

State,

the

majority

party

in

each

house

of

thestatelegislatureisessentiallygiventhepowertodesigndistrictsthroughtheirappointment

powerstothebodyinchargeofdrawingthemaps. Inpractice,leadersofbothhouses,withinput

fromfellowmajoritymembers,havedeterminedhowdistrictlineswillbedrawnindependentlyof

oneanother. Inonelegislativebill,theSenateandAssemblyledbythemajoritiesineachhouse

havehistoricallypassedeachothersplanstopreservetheirownmajoritiesandtheseatsof

incumbentsintheirparty,andtheplanhasbeenpassedwithlittleinputfromtheGovernor.

Withaneyetowardmaintainingpowerandincumbency,politicalleadersuseamyriadoftoolsand

carefulcalculationstocraftdistrictsthatminimizenotonlytheelectabilityofanoppositionparty

or

independent

candidate,

but

also

of

insurgent

candidates

within

the

majority

party

as

well

as

communitiesthataregrowinginelectoralstrengththatcanpotentiallythreatenanincumbents

holdonpower.

A. ABRIEFHISTORYOFREDISTRICTINGTheU.S.ConstitutionrequiresthatcongressionaldistrictboundariesfortheHouseof

Representativesbereapportionedandredrawneverytenyearstoreflectpopulationshifts

detectedbytheFederalcensus.11

Asisthepractice,ineveryyearendingin"1",theallocationof

congressionalseatsamongstatesfortheHouseofRepresentativesarereapportionedtoreflect

changesinpopulation,withthenumberofastate'scongressionaldistrictsbaseduponeachstate's

proportionof

the

national

population.

While

the

national

total

number

of

congressional

house

seatshasessentiallyremainedstaticat435since1929,12

reapportionmentineachstatemight

alterthenumberofcongresspersonsthateachparticularstatesendstoWashingtonfollowingthe

decennialcensus.

11U.S.Constitution,Article1,2.

12435seatswereestablishedbyPublicLaw625,whichtookeffectin1913.


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Illustration1:

"The

Gerry

Mander"

by

Gilbert

Stuart.

OriginallypublishedintheBostonCentinel,1812.

Datingbacktothecountrysfounding,

politicianshaverealignedandredrawn

politicaldistrictstoattainorprotect

power. LegendhasitthatPatrickHenry

triedtodrawJamesMadisonoutofhis

districtin

the

late

1780s.13

A

Massachusettsnewspaperin1812

printedacomicaldepiction(atright)of

anoddlyshapeddistrictthatgaverise

toanameforthepractice. Accordingto

lore,theartistandeditorlookedata

cartoonanddubbeditGerrymander,

acombinationofthenameofthen

GovernorElbridgeGerryandthe

amphibioussalamanderitresembled.

Untilthelasthalfcentury,thecourtsor

thefederalgovernmentrarely

intervenedinredistrictingefforts. However,priorto1960,thestateofTennesseehadfailedto

reapportionthestatelegislaturefor60yearsdespitethegrowthandredistributionofits

population. Consequently,theissuewasforthefirsttimetakentothecourtsinthelandmark

decisionBakerv.Carr,14

whichestablishedaplaintiffsrighttobringcasestocourttodetermine

theconstitutionalityofastateredistrictingplan.Thiseventuallyledtothedecisionestablishing

theoneperson,onevoteprincipleinGrayv.Sanders15

in1961thatwasextendedtofederal

electionsin1964underWesberryv.Sanders.16

Thesuit

in

Baker

v.

Carr

was

brought

by

Charles

Baker,

avoter,

against

the

state

in

federal

district

court,andJoeCarr,thestateofficialinchargeofelections. Bakerclaimedthathisvotewas

dilutedasaresultofthestatesfailuretoreapportionandthatitviolatedtheequalprotection

clauseoftheFourteenthAmendmenttotheConstitution. Thefederaldistrictcourtdismissedthe

complaintonthegroundsthatitcouldnotdecideapoliticalquestion. However,uponappeal,the

U.S.SupremeCourtruledin1962thatacaseraisingapoliticalissuecouldbeheard.Thislandmark

decisionsetaprecedentthatallowedfortheresolutionofredistrictingconflictsincourt,

andopenedthewayfornumeroussuitsonlegislativeredistricting.

B.

NEW

YORK

STATES

REDISTRICTING

PROCESS

Sincethe1980s,NewYorksLegislativeTaskForceonDemographicResearchand

Reapportionment(LATFOR)hasbeenresponsibleforassistingthelegislatureindrawing

congressionalandstatelegislativedistrictseverytenyears. LATFORwasestablishedbyChapter45

13Toobin,Jeffrey. DrawingtheLine,TheNewYorker. March6,2006.

14Bakerv.Carr,369U.S.186(1962)

15Grayv.Sanders,372U.S.368(1963)

16Wesberryv.Sanders,376U.S.1(1964)


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ReshapingNewYorkReport Page30oftheNewYorkStateLawsof1978toresearchandstudythetechniquesandmethodologiesto

beusedbytheU.S.CommerceDepartments'BureauoftheCensusincarryingoutthedecennial

federalcensus.17

FundingforLATFORisprovidedeveryyearaspartofthebudgetbillfundingthelegislature,and

includesLATFORs

committees,

task

forces

and

other

legislative

bodies.

The

FY

2011

2012

budget

providesfor$358,325totheTaskForceforAssemblypurposes,$358,325forSenatepurposes,

and$1,142,109forjointoperations,fortotalfundingof$1,858,759.18

UsinghighlytechnicaldemographicandgeographicdataprovidedbytheCensusBureau,LATFOR

ischargedwithaidingthelegislaturebyprovidingtechnicalplansformeetingtherequirements

oflegislativetimetablesforreapportionmentofSenate,AssemblyandCongressionaldistricts.19

AfterreceivingthedatafromtheU.S.CensusbyApril1stofyearsendingin1,LATFORconducts

hearingsandreceivesinputfromthepublicabouthowbesttodevelopplansthataddressthe

interestsofcommunities,minorities,andthepublicatlarge. Eachhousethendevelopsitsown

plan,

with

the

staff

not

even

seeing

the

other

houses

plan

before

their

own

is

finished.

20

The

publiccantestifyandcommentonLATFORsplans,aswellassubmittheirownplans,though

publichearingsarenotrequiredbylaw. LATFORmaymodifyitsproposedplansbasedonpublic

input,thoughitisnotrequiredto. Whiletheprocessfordrawingmapsissupposedtofollow

publicinputandfeedback,legislatorshavereportedthatatleastinsomeinstancesdistrict

boundarieshavebeendrawninadvanceofLATFORpublichearings. Whennotformulating

redistrictingplans,LATFORconductsresearchonboundarysuggestionsandCensustracts.

LegislatorssitonLATFORasmembersandhaveadirecthandintheprocess. Thecommissionis

madeupofsixmembers,includingfourlegislatorsandtwononlegislators,appointedasfollows:21

One legislator and one private citizen chosen by the Temporary President of theSenate,

with

the

legislator

serving

as

co

chair

OnelegislatorandoneprivatecitizenchosenbytheSpeakeroftheAssembly,withthelegislatorservingascochair

OnelegislatorselectedbytheSenateMinorityLeader OnelegislatorappointedbytheAssemblyMinorityLeader

Thecurrentcommissionmembersare:

AppointedbytheTemporaryPresidentoftheSenate:- SenatorMichaelNozzolio(CoChair)- WelquisR.Lopez

17NewYorkConsolidatedLawsA.5A83m(1978).

18NewYorkStateLegislatureandJudiciarybudgetlegislation,A.4001A/S.2801A. Availableat:

http://assembly.state.ny.us/leg/?default_fld=&bn=A04001&term=2011&Summary=Y&Text=Y19

TheNewYorkStateLegislativeTaskForceonDemographicResearchandReapportionment,see

http://www.latfor.state.ny.us/20

Rizzo,Nick.RedistrictingReformersCharge,AlbanyShrugs. CapitalNewYork.December1,2010. Availableat:

http://www.capitalnewyork.com/article/culture/2010/12/870203/crooked linesredistrictingreformerscharge

albanyshrugs21

StateLegislativeLaw,83m


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ReshapingNewYorkReport Page31 AppointedbytheSpeakeroftheAssembly:

- AssemblymemberJackMcEneny(CoChair)- Dr.RomanHedges

AppointedbytheSenateMinorityLeader- Senator

Martin

Malav

Dilan

(Co

Chair)

AppointedbytheAssemblyMinorityLeader- AssemblymemberRobertOaks

C. THEAPPROVALPROCESSTheproposedplansdevelopedbyLATFORinthepasthavebeencompiledintotwolegislativebills:

oneforstatelegislativedistrictsandoneforcongressionaldistricts. Thelegislaturevotesonthe

legislationasitwouldonanyotherbill. Itisworthnotingthatnotonlydoesthelegislaturehavea

keyroleinshapingtheplansattheLATFORlevel,butitalsohasthepowertoaltertheplans

throughthe

legislative

process.

This

past

redistricting

cycle,

the

bills

were

S6796/A11014

(with

an

amendingbillS7300/A11184)passedinApril2002creatingstatelegislativedistricts.22

Thebilland

amendmentwereeachpassedwithinadayoftheirsubmission. Congressionaldistrictswere

createdwithS.7536/A.11750of2002,whichwaspassedwiththeuseofamessageofnecessity

fromtheGovernor,negatingtheneedforthenormalthreedayagingprocess. Afterpassageby

bothhouses,thebillsthengoontothegovernorforhisorhersignature.

ThreecountiesofNewYorkCity(Bronx,Kings,andNewYork)arecoveredbySection5ofthe

VotingRightsActof1965asamendedin1982,meaningthattheredistrictingplansapprovedby

thestatemustbereviewedandapprovedbytheUnitedStatesDepartmentofJusticeforpre

clearancebeforeimplementation. Section5preclearancerelatestolegislativechangestothe

electionprocesssuchaspollingplacelocations,votingmethods,andboundariesforlegislative

districts. Intheory,aproposedchangewouldbedeniedifitwouldnegativelyimpactminority

groupmemberswithrespecttotheiropportunitytoexercisetheelectoralfranchiseeffectively.

TheVotingRightsActisfurtherdiscussedinSection5bofthisreport.

D.SUBVERTINGTHEPUBLICINTERESTDuetotheirnearabsolutepowerovertheprocess,legislatorsandLATFORcanmanipulatethe

linesinsuchawayastofashiondistrictsmeanttoensurethemajoritypartyretainsorincreases

itscontrolineachhouseaswellasreelectsindividuallegislators. Oftentimes,thesepartisan

interestsrun

counter

to

the

public

interest.

Theprotectionofmajoritypartiesandincumbentshasbeenprioritized,andLATFORhasusedthe

lackofrulesandcriteriafordrawinglinestoadvantageincumbentsandthepartiesincontrolof

eachhouse. Pastpractices,whicharedescribedingreaterdetailinthefollowingsections,have

included:drawingachallengershomeorpoliticalbasesoutofdistrictsafterhavingmounteda

strongchallengeagainstanincumbent;goingtothemarginsofallowabledistrictpopulationsize

22LegislationavailablefromLATFORathttp://latfor.state.ny.us/maps/amend.html


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ReshapingNewYorkReport Page32toadvantageregionsofthestateoverothers;andthegerrymanderingofdistrictsanddividingof

communitiestosplitthevoteofburgeoningethniccommunities.

i. PopulationDeviationThe

central

goal

of

redistricting

that

is

established

by

law,

if

not

practice,

is

to

ensure

that

voters

areaffordedfairandequalrepresentation;themaintenetoffairrepresentationisanearequal

distributionofpopulationbetweendistricts.

InNewYorkState,theStateConstitutionrequirestherebe150assemblydistrictsandprovidesa

formulaforthedeterminationofthenumberofsenatedistricts(currentlysetat62).23

The

averagenumberofpeoplerepresentedbytheselegislatorsasofthelastredistrictingin2002was

126,510perassemblydistrictand306,072persenatedistrict. NewYork's29congressional

districtsaveraged654,361people,withadifferenceofonly1personbetweenthesmallestand

largestdistrict. Thecurrentallowanceofa10percentdeviationinpopulationsizefromthe

larg

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CU_ReshapingNewYork_November2011