Decentralization of Serbia: the minority dimension / Szerbia decentralizációja: a kisebbségi dimenzió

8/8/2019 Decentralization of Serbia: the minority dimension / Szerbia decentralizcija: a kisebbsgi dimenzi

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Eurpai sszehasonlt Kisebbsgkutatsok Kzalaptvny

Huszka Beta

Szerbia decentralizcija:

a kisebbsgi dimenzi

Decentralization of Serbia:

the minority dimension

Kzirat lezrva: 2008. mjus 10.

Budapest, 2008


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TARTALOMJEGYZKTABLE OF CONTENTS

Foreword by Tibor Vrady .................................................... 7

Decentralization of Serbia the minority dimension ............ 9

The case of Albanians in Southern Serbia .......................... 23

The case of Bosniaks in Sandak ........................................ 45

Vojvodinas autonomy and its minorityprotection dimension .......................................................... 77

Vrady Tibor: Elsz ....................................................... 103

Szerbia decentralizcija: a kisebbsgi dimenzi ................ 105

Esettanulmny a dl-szerbiai albnokrl ............................ 119

Esettanulmny a szandzski bosnykokrl ......................... 139

A vajdasgi autonmia-mozgalom kisebbsgvdelmidimenzija ......................................................................... 171


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Foreword

Over the past decade or so, many papers have been written onthe inter-ethnic and minority problems on the territory of theformer Yugoslavia. This interest has been largely triggered offby the war. Clearly, getting attention is no cheap thing. Thesewritings, or the interpretations thereof, have given rise to a greatvariety of formulas and explanations. Travelling in various parts

of the world, I was on many occasions stunned by the fact howmany thought they knew what the core of the problem was, andwhat should be (should have been) done. During the bloodshed,an untold number of international problem-solving initiativeswere launched. The approaches of the Europeans, Americansetc. were quite similar. There was no success. After a while,one may have noted some caution in the statements of those

diplomats who did not portray themselves anymore as peace-makers; they ascribed, however, a lions share to themselves inthe making of the peace process. At the same time, however,international military troops stubbornly kept referring to peacekeeping even at the times of the gravest blood-shedding.

There are hardly any serious papers that would have failedto criticise (rightly) the prejudices and misbelieves of the parti-

cipants in the conict. At the same time, there are hardly anywritings which analyse (and criticise) the visions and the app-roach of the peace makers, of the mediators or peace keepers.In her paper, Beta Huszka does not repeat or explain any ofthe known formulas nor does she criticise them. And shedoes not offer new formulas, either. What is really interesting I may say extraordinary in her writings, is the attention

de voted to facts and details. On the territory of the formerYugoslavia, various minority problems, solutions, interests,and conicts of interests have emerged. But there is hardly asingle solution for all of them. In fact, it is hard even to seeand explain them from a single point of view. In addition tothe Voivodina, the most important province in the Hungarian


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Szerbia decentralizcija: a kisebbsgi dimenzi

context, Beta Huszka discusses two lesser known one couldeven say ignored regions. In the paper about the Sandak,the author describes the situation, conditions, prospects and

internal conicts of the Bosniaks (Muslims). The other paper isabout the Preevo Valley, which has a sizeable Albanian mino-rity, and the situation of which seems to be quite different fromthat of Kosovo. What links these writings together is the central idea of

decentralization as a prospect. Municipal autonomy at one levelor another, may offer a chance to minorities. It is not the only

chance, though, since cultural autonomy and other tools ofminority protection are important too. The author focuses ondecentralization, without suggesting that it is superior comparedwith other instruments. The papers collected in this book boththe English originals and the competent Hungarian translations(both the work of the author) describe and analyse many re-latively unknown details. To get these details right, Huszka

evidently had to go to these places and had to ask the rightquestions. While the facts and connections found do not applyto all minorities in Serbia, they offer new understandings andthoughts at a general level. The volume is the result of a serious,unbiased and successful research work. It is a contribution to abetter understanding of the Serbian reality.

Tibor Vrady


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Decentralization of Serbia the minority dimension1

Minority grievances a potential source of softsecurity threats

Serbia has recently come into the international spotlight, mostly

due to the Kosovo issue and the countrys lack of cooperationwith the Hague Tribunal. While sufcient attention has beengiven to solving tensions between ethnic Albanians and theSerbian minority in Kosovo, the grievances of ethnic minoritieswithin Serbia have gone mostly unnoticed by the internationalcommunity. Although the problems of Serbias national mino-rities do not compare with the gravity of the situation in Ko-

sovo, the EUs 2007 Progress Report on Serbia recognizes thatthe political situation remains tense in Southern Serbia andSandak, which are home to Serbias Albanian and Bosniakcommunities respectively.2 Developments on the ground alsoindicate that problems relating to the situation of these two mi-norities continue to pose soft security threats to Serbia and tothe wider region. While in Southern Serbia inter-ethnic tensions

are still pronounced, in Sandak political divisions within theBosniak community cause instability.

In January 2006, Albanian councilors of the municipalities ofPreevo, Bujanovac and Medvea adopted a common politicalplatform in which they commit to unication of Preevo Valleywith Kosovo in case of possible change of Kosovo borders.3

In June 2007, Jonuz Musliu, deputy chief of the Bujanovac

1 The present chapter is an updated version of a paper published by the Brussels basedCenter for European Policy Studies. Decentralization of Serbia: The Minority Dimension,CEPS Policy Brief, July 2007,http://shop.ceps.eu/BookDetail.php?item_id=1529.

2Serbia 2007 Progress Report, Commission Staff Working Document, SEC(2007) 1435,Brussels, 06-11-2007. http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2007/nov/serbia_progress_reports_en.pdf., 15.

3 Citation from the Platform. Albanian Councilors of Presheva Valley (Preshevo, Bujanovacand Medvedja) in Meeting Held on 14 January 2006 in Preshevo, Document.


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municipality, called on the leaders of all Albanian political partiesfrom Bujanovac and Preevo to form a joint National Council, which could represent Albanian aspirations to join Kosovo.

I believe it is time to form a National Council which wouldadopt a joint platform, with which we would start negotiations with the Serbian government about merging the Bujanovacand Preevo municipalities with Kosovo.4 Although SouthernSerbia is peaceful at the moment, ghting is not such a distantmemory for the Valleys Albanians. Their seventeen monthsinsurgency came to an end in May 2001, but small scale inci-

dents continued in 2002 and 2003.While the Albanians of Preevo Valley are contemplating the

idea of pushing for secession, Sandak Bosniaks demands forautonomy also resurface occasionally. In 2002 upon the draftingof the constitution of the state union of Serbia and Montenegro,Bosniaks argued for the creation of Sandak, as an autonomousterritorial and political unit within the common state.Although

hopes for creating a unied Sandak region extending across theborders of Serbia and Montenegro have vanished after the stateunion disintegrated, the List for Sandak, a coalition of Bosniakparties which participated in Kotunicas previous governingcoalition until 2007 keeps standing for administrative andterritorial autonomy for Sandak with wide ranging authoritiesincluding regional police and judiciary.5 However, in Sandak,

the most dangerous sources of insecurity are inghting amonglocal political bosses (which is often marked by violence), orga-nized crime (which has penetrated political structures), wide-spread drug use among the youth and the disturbing presenceof the radical Wahhabi group. Due to weak local governmentautonomy, the central government has been able to play offlocal political rivals within the Bosniak community against

each other, contributing to the escalation of tensions and to

4 Valley Albanians push for talks on the merger of Kosovo, B92, 06-06-2007, http://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics-article.php?yyyy=2007&mm=06&dd=06&nav_category=93&nav_id=41632.

5 Interview with Esad Dudevi, president of the Bosniak National Council, Novi Pazar,12-08-2006.


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Decentralization of Serbia the minority dimension

the destabilization of local governments. If the grievances ofthe Bosniak community are not addressed, there is a danger offurther nationalist and religious radicalization. Moreover, the

region could potentially turn into a hub of organized crime,with a continued presence of low scale violence.

It is argued here that the Serbian government could reduceexisting ethnic tensions by increasing local government autono-my. This would be a simple and effective way to address someeveryday life problems of minorities. In light of Kosovos recentdeclaration of independence, it is likely that solutions implying

any kind of territorial autonomy or federalization would beunacceptable for Serbian authorities. Yet decentralization atthe municipal level could be a feasible option, which wouldplease not only minorities, but all municipalities regardless ofethnicity, as it would empower local communities and increasethe accountability of local governments. The most importantnext step would be to transfer public property to local govern-

ments in order to enable them to play a bigger role in the up-grading of local infrastructure and to contribute to local econo-mic development. The Serbian government should also furtherextend the sphere of local competencies, which would strengthenlocal ownership over public services.

Minority rights in Serbia

In principle, minorities are granted far-reaching rights in Ser-bia, including the right to preserve their language, culture andnational identity; the right for education in their mother tongueuntil high school; the right to use their national symbols; theright for public information in their languages; and for appro-

priate representation in the public sector, among others. Thelaw on national minorities provides a sound legal basis for theprotection of minority rights in Serbia and grants minoritiescultural autonomy. It allows them to set up minority councilsthrough which they can exercise their rights of self-governmentregarding the use of language and script, education, information


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and culture.6 The major provisions of the law on national mi-norities were also enshrined in the new Serbian constitutionadopted in late 2006. However, problems arise with the imple-

mentation of the law, which often falls short of the rights gran-ted in principle.

While minorities are putting ethnic-territorial autonomyeven more vocally on the agenda, their grievances center oneveryday life problems, such as under-representation in thepublic sector, lack of economic development, higher ratheraverage unemployment, and the obstacles which prevent the

implementation of cultural and language rights granted by law.Strengthening local autonomy would be a way to respond tothese grievances, which could reduce tensions and marginalizepotential irredentists.

However, it should be stressed here that decentralization isnot a panacea and would not solve all the problems minoritiesare facing, so should be complemented by further measures.

School curricula should reect the multi-ethnic character ofSerbia, hate-speech and ethnocentric views spread by the mediaor school textbooks should not be tolerated, people belongingto minorities should be included into the police and judiciaryin higher numbers, just to name a few examples that would beequally important in order to create a more minority-friendlyatmosphere in Serbia. Minorities better representation in

the police and the judiciary would be especially crucial, asthese institutions are often perceived as being insensitive tominorities problems. Weak response of the judiciary and po-lice was at least partly responsible for the increase in inter-ethnic incidents in 2003 and 2004 in Vojvodina, thus theintegration of minorities into the police and the courts couldbe strongly recommended, which could raise the level of trust

between minorities and the state.7

6 Law on Protection of Rights and Freedoms of National Minorities, Official Gazette of FRYNo. 11. 27 February 2002, translated by OSCE Mission to FRY, Article 19.

7 See more on this: Florian Bieber and Jenni Winterhagen, Ethnic Violence in Vojvodina:Glitch or Harbinger of Conflicts to Come?, ECMI Working Paper#27, April, 2006, http://www.ecmi.de/download/working_paper_27.pdf.


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Minority grievances

Most of the problems facing minorities, especially in Sandak

and Southern Serbia, are related to poverty and economic under-development. Sandak and Southern Serbia are among Serbiasmost economically depressed areas, with per capita annual incomea third of the Serbian average. Unusually high unemploymentrates (estimated around 60-70% in Southern Serbia,8 and ataround 30% in Sandak9), neglected infrastructure and a lackof economic prospects continue to be serious destabilizing

factors. A history of discriminating state policies means thatgrievances often gain an ethnic interpretation. The recentlygro wing popularity of wahhabism among Sandak Muslims,who traditionally practice a moderate version of Islam, was alsoblamed on the dire economic circumstances by local analysts.Mehmed Slezovic , co-chair of the Sandak Intellectual Circle,a local NGO argued that that the single most important local

factor behind the growing number of wahhabi followers was theregions economic crisis. Jobs are hard to come by for youngpeople who are then exposed to various inuences they areeasy prey both for drug dealers and religious fundamentalists.Similarly, Belgrade mufti Muhamed Jusufspahic maintainedthat unemployment, political conicts and increasing numbersof drug addicts had created fertile ground for the spread of

Wahhabism in Novi Pazar.10Similarly, Albanian secessionist aspirations are also fueled

mostly by growing impenitence with the lack of economic prog-ress and Albanians lack of integration into the public sector. Aswas explained by a local Albanian politician why Albanians ofPreevo Valley wanted to join Kosovo: six years af ter the end ofthe conict in this region, nothing has changed in the political

and economic sense, except for the forming of multi-ethnic

8 60% in Bujanovac, 70% in Preevo, ICG information, Southern Serbia in Kosovos Sha-dow, Crisis Group Europe Briefing N. 43, 27-06-2006, 7.

9 It was 35% in Novi Pazar, Serbias Sandzak: Still Forgotten, Crisis Group Europe ReportN. 162, 08-04-200 5, 35.

10 Amela Bajrovi, Wahhabism Fuels Novi Pazar Religious Tensions, Balkan Insight, 06-12-2007, http://www.birn.eu.com/en/62/10/1844/?ILStart=20.


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police.11 Despite recent efforts by the state, ethnic minorities re-main strongly underrepresented in mostinstitutions under cent-ral control (among them the post ofce, tax authorities, land re-

gistry, social institutions, health centers, customs services, stateinspection bodies, the police and the judiciary). This impliesnot only that public sector jobs are less available for them, butas a result, minority languages are rarely used in ofcial commu-nications within these state bodies and agencies, even if theore-tically a minority language is in ofcial use locally.12

It should also be noted that since Bosniak, Albanian and

Hungarian parties have begun to participate in municipal self-governments, the problem of ethnic disproportion has decreasedin local administration and in those areas that are under localauthority.

Obstacles hampering local government autonomy

Given that Sandak and Preevo Valley are among the poorestareas in Serbia, removing the existing barriers to local econo-mic development is essential. The single biggest problem oflocal governments in Serbia is the fact that they do not ownany property. Municipalities only have usage rights on publicproperty owned by the state, which severely limits the viabi-

lity of local governments. The European Council in its Euro-pean Partnership document called on Serbia to adopt andimplement decentralization reform ensuring viability of localgovernments.13 It should be noted though that the new cons-

11 Valley Albanians push for talks on the merger of Kosovo, B92, 06-06-2007.12 According to the law on official language use, the language of a minority becomes official

in a municipality if that minority makes up at least 15% of the population, or if the proportionof all national minorities reaches 10% of the population. However, the law allowsmunicipalities to recognize a language as official also if the proportion of a minority groupin question is below 15 per cent. Hungarian for example is official in 30 municipalities outof the 45 in Vojvodina.

13 Council Decision, of 30 January 2006 on the principles, priorities and conditionscontained in the European Partnership with Serbia and Montenegro including Kosovo asdefined by the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244 of 10 June 1999 andrepealing Decision 2004/520/EC, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/oj/2006/l_035/l_03520060207en00320056.pdf.


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titution mentions the category of municipal property, which canbe a promising sign of future devolution.

In Serbia, municipal governments lack of ownership rights

hampers local economic development in two ways. First, itdiscourages the much needed upgrading of local infrastructureand public services, which would be a prerequisite of attractinginvestment and creating favorable conditions for private busi-nesses. Second, local administrative procedures tend to be slowand complicated, putting unnecessary barriers in the way ofpotential investors. Municipal authorities have to obtain the

consent of central authorities on all major decisions related topublic property.14 Sometimes the procedure might last for years,

which can jeopardize potential investments.The example of Tutin, the poorest municipality in Sandak

with a Bosniak majority population, demonstrates how thelack of property rights is restraining economic growth. In 2004the municipality of Tutin applied to the Republics Property

Directorate for approval to transfer usage rights of a piece of landto Orije MZ, a local community. The local community wantedto use the area for a 2 million euro investment, including theconstruction of a ski center. This investment would not onlyhave boosted tourism in the region, but would have created200 new jobs. It took two years for the municipality where theannual income is 17% of the Serbian average to obtain the

consent of the Republic delaying the project.15It should be stressed that property devolution in itself would

not eliminate poverty and underdevelopment, yet it wouldcreate the necessary preconditions for local infrastructuredevelopment and local development in general. Local effortsshould be accompanied by a balanced regional developmentpolicy an aspiration which was already adopted as one of

the governments main priorities also backed by the EUstechnical and nancial assistance.

14 Newsletter, Issue 12, Serbian Local Government Reform Program, SeptemberDecember2005, http://www.slgrp.usaid.org.yu/.

15 Newsletter, Issue 12, Serbian Local Government Reform Program, SeptemberDecember2005, http://www.slgrp.usaid.org.yu/.


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In addition, it can also be argued that some functions stillunder central control could be carried out more effectivelylocally. The literature on local government nance maintains

that placing certain public services at the local level would lead toa quality and quantity of services which most closely matches thepreferences of a local community. In Serbia, local governmentshave no inuence on the operations of the electricity, gas andtelecommunications providers, which are run by republicowned companies. They also do not have any inuence on localbranches of republic ministries and agencies.16 The quality of

some services might improve by delegating them to the locallevel, because local governments would be directly responsibleand would have more stakes in them.

One such sphere of competency is the ordering of landregisters. The fact that real estate registries are in disorder andthat many buildings have no property status is currently a serious

problem hindering economic development in Serbia. Undersuch circumstances investors take a considerable risk uponbuying any property, since there is no guarantee that registriesmatch real conditions. Moreover, the disorderly real estateregistry makes urban and infrastructure investment planningdifcult and complicated. Local governments have a clear inte-rest in clearing up and ordering the real estate registry and deed

books, if they want to attract investors or carry out any kindof local development plan. Furthermore, since the collecting ofthe property tax has been fully assigned to the local level, localgovernments became especially interested in creating an up-to-date cadastre and land register. It would make sense, therefore, iflocal governments had some kind of control over land and deedregisters, which are today fully in control of the state.17

The central government should also deal with property res-titution, however, without which property ownership relations

16 Correspondence with Duan Vasiljevi, Serbian Local-Government Reform Program(SLGRP), 25-01-2007.

17Handbook for local councilors, Website of the Standing Conference of Towns andMunicipalities, http://www.skgo.org/code/navigate.php?Id=266, 51.


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cannot be claried. This issue was also stressed by the EuropeanCouncils European Partnership document.

It should be also added here that local governments can manage

more competencies only if they have sufcient administrativecapacity. Therefore, the central government should assistlocal authorities in the process, providing them the necessarytechnical expertise and know how. Particular functions shouldbe delegated to the local level only when a local governmentdemonstrates its ability to handle a certain task.

In Macedonia during the recently launched decentralizationreform several functions were delegated to the local levelgradually, which used to be under central control, including landregistries, transport and communication, public revenue ofces,among others. Often these remained delegated functions oflocal governments, meaning that the central government couldcheck not only the lawfulness but review the appropriateness of

performance of these duties. Still, as a result local governmentsgained a direct insight into and inuence on their functioning;moreover, from the beginning of 2007 the employees of theseinstitutions have been paid from the local budget, which alsomeans that hiring staff became a local competency.18

It can be also presupposed had local governments authorityover services and bodies being currently under central state

control, not only the quality of services could improve, but theintegration of minorities into those institutions would accelerate.As a positive side effect it would also provide the opportunityto implement the ofcial use of minority languages more wi-dely. In those municipalities where minorities participate in lo-cal government, local authorities are more likely to make thenecessary effort to create conditions for the ofcial use of minority

languages and to integrate minorities into public institutions.Obviously, changing employment patterns is a long process

and cannot be done overnight. Recruiting more persons be-longing to minorities into public institutions requires a range

18 Interview with Islam Yusufi, Analytica, Skopje, 18-09-2006.


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of afrmative action, including educational and training prog-rams.

Nevertheless, if local governments spheres of authority

would be extended, responsibility would lie more with them forfullling the need for integration of minorities into the publicsector and implementing the ofcial use of minority languages,and the Serbian state would be less easily blamed for the lackof progress.

Waiting for the right moment

The fate of reforms clearly depends very much on the outcomeof the May 2008 elections. As Serbia nally managed to signthe Stabilization and Association Agreement with the EUand visa liberalization became a realistic perspective, the newgovernments composition will determine how much leverage the

EUs will have on Serbia. If the European oriented, democraticforces manage to win the elections, reforms can continue,such as the decentralization process, launched in 2002 by theadoption of the law on local self-government.19 After Kosovosindependence declaration, the EU has a clear interest to drawSerbia closer to itself, in order to preserve stability on its South-Eastern borders. The EU has a stake in keeping Serbia on the

pro-European, democratic path, and seems willing to speed upSerbias accession process. As soon as negotiations with the EUrecommence, there will be a window of opportunity to stimulatethe continuation of pro-European political reforms in Serbiathat were put on hold since a series of government crises beganin October 2006.

If there will be such an opportunity, the EU should grab it to

push for reforms also because in light of the recent political crisisand the popularity of the Serbian Radical Party, the prevalenceof democratic forces cannot be taken for granted; the chance ofa nationalist backlash cannot be fully excluded.

19 Law on Local Self-Government, adopted by the Serbian Assembly on 14 February 2002(Official gazette of RS, No. 9).


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Conclusions and recommendations

Decentralization would be a general good for every local com-

munity, not only for minorities. Establishing meaningful localautonomy would require the Serbian government to proceed with the decentralization reform through adopting furthermeasures. The mentioned law on local governments was in-tended as a rst step in a longer process, and was greeted bythe Council of Europe, according to which the law was goodenough to provide an acceptable legal basis for local authority.

However, municipalities keep facing many difculties. A newlaw on local government nance20 that came into force on the1stof January 2007 means greater scal decentralization, yet,necessary regulations on municipal property and managementhave not been adopted. The Standing Conference of Cities andMunicipalities, which is the biggest organization of local self-governments, prepared the draft law on municipal property,

but passing this law has been continually postponed by thegovernment.

The new Serbian constitution, which although introduced thecategory of municipal property failed expectations for furtherdecentralization. Instead of strengthening local autonomy, theconstitution increased central government inuence over localgovernments.

The inuence and pressure of the EU would thus be necessaryfor reforms to continue and further decentralization to come. Therequirement for further decentralization meaning increasingthe autonomy of local-governments should be put forward asa demand by the EU during its negotiations with Serbia.

Recommendations to Serbia and the EU: Serbia should continue with the decentralization reform

launched in 2002. The most important next step would bethe devolution of property to municipal governments.

Serbia should review which further functions could bemanaged better locally. Several functions being of vital im-

20 Law on Local Government Finance, document published in the Republic of SerbiaOfficial Gazette, implemented as of January 1, 2007.


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portance for local communities are still under central statecontrol, and the management of these institutions is alsoappointed by the central state, such as hospitals, electricity

providers, the audit ofce and post ofce, gas provider, te-lecommunications, inspection organization, land and deedregistry, cadastre. Local authorities have no inuence onemployment practices and on the work of these bodies,thus on the quality of services.

As devolving more competencies to the local level requiressufcient local administrative capacity to manage these

tasks, the government should work closely with the Stand-ing Conference of Cities and Municipalities (SKGO), theEuropean Agency for Reconstruction, USAID and otherstakeholders during the decentralization process. SKGOhas recently launched a project investigating how legislativeimpediments for local economic development in Serbia canbe overcome, including analyzing the legal changes needed.

The recently adopted reforms related to the intergovernmentalnance system especially the introduction of property taxat the local level and granting local discretion over varioustax rates points into the direction of greater local scalautonomy. The implementation of these reforms should beclosely monitored as their credibility will be measured byimplementation.

Safeguard measures are needed, which guarantee that nolocal majority can overrule local minorities. Introducing therequirement of supermajorities could be a solution.

Institutional mechanisms and safeguards need to be putin place that foster the appointment of people to variousfunctions based upon merit and qualication and not onparty connections.

Sharing authority over the police between the central andthe local government could be also recommended. It wouldbe desirable if cooperation between the local police andmunicipal authorities would be institutionalized.

Revitalization of the local economy and developing localinfrastructure in Presevo Valley and Sandak would be


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crucial in order to create lasting stability. The internationalcommunity should provide nancial and technical assistanceto Serbia to carry out a balanced regional development

policy, recognizing that stabilizing these areas is a regionalinterest.


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The case of Albanians in SouthernSerbia

Introduction

In May 2001, the 17-month insurgency of Albanians in SouthernSerbia came to an end. In the Konculj Agreement, Albaniansagreed to disarm and disband the Liberation Army of Preevo,

Medvea and Bujanovac (UCPMB) in exchange for the promiseof amnesty for their ghters, the return of refugees, the creationof a multi-ethnic police force and the integration of Albaniansinto public institutions. After decades of ofcial discriminationand exclusion from state institutions, the adoption of the CovicPlan, which foresaw the goals mentioned above, provided anopportunity to respond to Albanian grievances and win loyalty

of the Albanian minority to the Serbian state. The plan drawnup by Neboja Covic , Deputy Prime Minister of Serbia in 2001,contained clear goals with deadlines, including the integrationof Albanians into the political, government and social system,meaning into the police, judiciary, health services, education,municipal institutions, economy, etc. in proportion to theirnumbers.21

During the Milosevic era, both during and after the Kosovoconict, Albanians in Southern Serbia were subjected to policeharassment, including torture and execution of civilians, whichwas the main motivation for forming the UCPMB and ignitingan armed conict in the Valley. During the ghting, which las-ted around a year and a half, about 100 people were killed andas a result 12,500 Albanians left the area. Since the ghting

ended, around 10,000 people have returned and the situation

* This chapter was first published by the Brussels based Center for European Policy Studies:The Presevo Valley of Southern Serbia alongside Kosovo: The Case for Decentralizationand Minority Protection, CEPS Policy Brief, 29 January 2007, http://shop.ceps.be/BookDetail.php?item_id=1428. This is a updated version of the CEPS brief.

21 International Crisis Group (ICG), Southern Serbia: In Kosovos Shadow, Policy BriefingNo. 43, Belgrade/Pristina/Brussels, 27 June 2006, p. 3.


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has signicantly improved. One of the greatest successes hasbeen the creation of the multi-ethnic police force with the help ofOSCE (Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe).

In July 2002, local elections were held which brought Albanianparties to power in local municipal assemblies.

Local Albanians mostly support moderate parties; thus theresurgence of armed conict is quite unlikely although in2002 and 2003, small-scale incidents continued. Nevertheless,the situation is still fragile and still poses a potential security

threat for the wider region. The 2001 conict in Macedonia was due to a spill-over from southern Serbia (see on map1and 2), and nobody knows what will be the mid-term effectsof Kosovos independence on the Valleys delicate situation.Certainly goodwill on behalf of the Serbian government isneeded to make local Albanians feel like equal citizens of theSerbian state. The lack of economic and social development,

coupled with high numbers of Serbian security forces stationedin the Valley, does not foster mutual trust and stability.Moreover, Albanians are becoming increasingly dissatised with their political moderates who, during the last politicalterm, cooperated with Covic and Belgrade, yet delivered noresults in terms of economic development and integration ofAlbanians into public institutions.

As Kosovos independence will likely keep tensions highalong the borders of Serbia and Kosovo in the near future,the problems of Albanians in Preevo Valley deserve seriousattention. The international community, especially OSCE,NATO, UNDP and other non-governmental and multilateralorganisations, has played a crucial role in preserving peace,reconstruction and refugee return so far. Continuation with

the Covic plan, decentralization and demilitarisation togethercould bring about the desired stability for the region, whichneeds continued attention and assistance of international bo-dies, among them the European Union.22

22 Ibid., p. 4.


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The case of Albanians in Southern Serbia

The next section highlights the main problems the Albanianminority is facing today in Serbia, a signicant portion of whichcould be effectively addressed through further empowering

of municipal self-governments. It will be argued here thatdecentralization coupled with demilitarisation and integrationcould mean a real solution to most of their grievances, whichcould ease tensions and bring lasting stability in the Valley.

2. The drawbacks of the current administrativeorganisation

Preevo Valley, a regional home to Serbias largest Albanianminority, is situated in Southern Serbia bordering Macedoniato the south and Kosovo to the west (see on map1 and 2). Themunicipalities of Preevo and Bujanovac are part of the Pcinjedistrict with its centre in Vranje, while Medvea belongs to the

district of Jablanica. The total population of the Valley is around86,000 inhabitants, of whom around 57,000 are Albaniansand the rest are Serbs and Roma. Preevo has an Albanianmajority of 89% of the people. Bujanovacs population is splitamong the three ethnic groups, where Albanians constitutethe majority (54%), although Serbs (34%) and Roma (9%)also live in considerable numbers. Medvea is the only Serb

majority municipality of the Valley, where Serbs constitute 66%of the population and Albanians 36%. Altogether Albanianscontribute to around 25% of the Pcinje district population, yetthe regional administrative centre in Vranje is dominated bySerbs, where the Serbian Radical Party and Serbian SocialistParty enjoy the most popular support. The local parties and theirpolicies are often openly anti-Albanian and the court system is

infamously corrupt.23 Albanians especially feel excluded fromdistrict-level administration, having no representative at thedistrict-level court or in other institutions.

23 Ibid., p. 3.


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Whereas current administrative arrangements do not favourAlbanians, some proposals for future regionalisation of Serbiacould lead to even worse solutions, providing opportunities

for ethnic gerrymandering. According to Kotunicas DSSproposal, Serbia should be organised into six regions, amongwhich Preevo Valleys three municipalities would be added toa bigger region with its centre in Ni, instead of Vranje. Such asolution would mean that the proportion of Albanians in sucha region would diminish to about 4%, further reducing theirchances for effective political participation.24

Albanians would prefer either to abolish the present dist-rict-level administration and delegate its functions to the mu-nicipalities or to create a Preevo district made up by the threemunicipalities of Preevo, Bujanovac and Medvea.25

Altogether, the lack of local autonomy in various elds hasnumerous negative consequences for local Albanians, such as

their weak presence in the public sector, high unemployment,limited implementation of their language rights and the lackof economic development. These issues are explored in thefollowing.

3. Central control and its implications

Under-representation in the public sector

In those municipalities where national minorities constitute amajority, it is a crucial question who appoints local police chiefs,staff and personnel of the local courts. At present municipallocal authorities have no control over local courts and police;all employees of these bodies are appointed by Belgrade. It is

true in general, however, that Albanians are barely representedin all institutions under central control (such as the post ofce,tax authorities, land registry, local development ofces, social

24 Interview with Shaip Kamberi, Council for Human Rights, Bujanovac, 19 September2006.

25 Ibid.


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institutions, health centres, customs services, different inspectionbodies such as state nancial, market, sanitary and labour ins-pections, and among principals of primary and secondary

schools). In socially-owned companies, most of which are stillwaiting to be privatised, the situation is the same: the majorityof employees are also of Serbian ethnicity. For instance, in thecompany called Heba,which is a producer of mineral water andone of the few protable companies in the region, 95% of theworkers are Serbs.

At the Bujanovac municipal court, only 4 out of 44 employees

are Albanians and the rest are Serbs. At the municipal courtin Preevo, 11 out of 40 employees are Albanians, 3 Romaand 24 are Serbs. The public prosecution department in Bu-janovac has 8 employees, 7 Serbs and 1 Albanian who is adeputy prosecutor. In the same body in Preevo, there are 10employees, 5 Serbs and 5 Albanians. The Health Centre inBujanovac has 272 employees, of which 212 are Serbs, 57 Al-

banians and 3 Roma. The situation is somewhat better in theHealth Centre in Preevo where out of 169 employees, 126Albanians and 43 Serbs.26 The police force is also an exceptionin this regard since the establishment of the multi-ethnic force,which incorporated many Albanians into its ranks.

Unemployment

Unemployment is a serious problem not only because Alba-nians have a hard time feeling like equal citizens of Serbia dueto their under-representation in public institutions, but alsobecause unemployment in the region is a grave issue, even forthe Serbian population. Employment in the public sector cangrant some level of social stability under such severe economiccircumstances. In Bujanvac the rate of unemployment is estimated

around 60%, and in Preevo around 70%. After ve years ofthe adoption of the Covic plan which foresaw the integrationof Albanians into state institutions, it can be concluded that,except for the multi-ethnic local police, integration has been

26 Shaip Kamberi, Council of Human Rights, Bujanoc, Annual Report 2004, p. 6.


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very slow, if at all, in all institutions controlled by the centralstate. Since Albanians have been essentially excluded fromthe public sector, they were forced to open small businesses,

or work abroad and help their families through remittances.According to the ICG, the greatest long-term security challengeis to address the unemployment of the young male population,many of whom are former UPCMB ghters.27

At the same time, cross-border smuggling is ourishing in thearea, and not only Albanians, but Serb authorities and police,and Serb organised crime are involved in illegal businesses.28

Obstacles impeding ofcial language use

Partially as a consequence of employment practices, the of-cial use of Albanian in Bujanovac and Preevo is lacking inmany areas due to the shortage of Albanian-speaking staff. InBujanovac, in the local court out of eight judges only one isAlbanian; therefore the ofcial use of Albanian exists mainly on

paper, except in the municipal administration. Since Albanianparties took control of the local governments in Preevo andBujanovac, the communication with local authorities and admi-nistration can be conducted in Albanian. In principle, Albanianbecame an ofcial language in Bujanovac and Preevo in 2002,when the law on national minorities was adopted at the federallevel, which enabled municipal local governments to recognise

minority languages as ofcial next to Serbian. Besides thelack of Albanian-speaking staff, however, legal loopholes alsohinder the ofcial use of Albanian. The act on the ofcial use oflanguage foresees the issuing of bilingual ofcial documents andempowers the minister to order the issuing of such documents.In Vojvodina, for instance, the provincial bodies have theauthority to order the printing of bilingual birth certicates in

all minority languages that are in ofcial use on the territory ofVojvodina. Yet, outside of Vojvodina, in the rest of Serbia, ifthe relevant ministry fails to deliver these bilingual documents,

27 ICG, Southern Serbias Fragile Peace, ICG Europe Report No. 152, 9 December 2003,p. 15.

28 Ibid., p. 11.


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local governments cannot do much about it.29 Clearly, in theabsence of bilingual documents, the ofcial use of Albaniancannot be practiced in reality. The fact that Albanian cannot be

used in practice in many spheres of communication has also agender aspect. It is especially a problem for Albanian womenand children who often know very little Serbian, while the menin general have a good command of Serbian.30

It can be assumed that if local governments had authorityover the institutions31 that are currently under central state

control, the integration of Albanians into those institutionswould accelerate. It would not only improve their employmentsituation, but as a positive side effect it would provide theopportunity to implement the ofcial use of Albanian morewidely. Nevertheless, in general, responsibility would lie morewith local authorities for fullling the need for integration andofcial language use of Albanian, and the Serbian state would

be less easily blamed for the lack of progress. One solutioncould be the delegation of these functions to municipal localgovernments, while the state could still sustain its control overthe lawfulness and appropriateness of the conduct of thesefunctions. At the same time, local authorities could have aninuence over employment practices in these institutions,as is the case in Macedonia. If the Serbian state insists on

maintaining the district-level administration system, then itshould be a priority to achieve proportionate representation ofAlbanians and other minorities in these institutions. It wouldbe also desirable to dene districts corresponding to the needsof national minorities; in this case, the three municipalities ofPreevo Valley could constitute one single district.

However, full implementation of language rights would re-

quire further action by the state, besides decentralization. Sin-ce Serbias framework law on national minorities grants far-

29 Interview with Jnos Orosz, Novi Sad, 25 September 2006.30 Interview with Shaip Kamberi.31 These are: post office, tax authorities, land registry, local development offices, social ins-

titutions, health centres, customs services and various inspection organs such as statefinancial, market, sanitary and labour inspections.


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reaching rights to minorities in this regard, the Serbian government should address the legal inconsistencies and otherobstacles that impede the practical implementation of existing

minority rights, such as the issuing of bilingual documents.

Economic situation

Preevo Valley has been traditionally an economically neglectedregion in Serbia, with per capita income of less than one-thirdthe Serbian average. A lot of villages even today lack electricity,piped water, telephone and surfaced roads. In the last few years

international donors have invested a lot of money in the localinfrastructure, while the Serbian government gave most fundingto the municipality of Medvea, which is the only Serb-majorityarea in the Valley. This kind of investment policy of the statenot only makes Albanians feel like second-class citizens ofSerbia, but also remains a continued source of disappointmentand instability.32

Privatisation has been marked by corruption and cronyism,and allegedly it has been much politicised. Municipal localgovernments have been left out of the process, and Serbs tookcontrol of lucrative rms with the help of the centrally-controlledPrivatisation Agency. According to local analysts, Albanians donot have equal chances to purchase companies.33 In general thewhole process has been lagging behind, and as most companies

are not protable, they are therefore hard to sell. While in otherparts of Serbia most rms have been sold already, in PreevoValley very few companies have been privatised since 2001.

At the same time, local municipal governments do not havemany tools at their disposal to attract investment. They canoffer breaks from local taxes, yet they cannot offer property forinvestors, since all public property is owned by the state. Therefore,

increasing the role of local governments in local economic32 ICG Report, 2003, op. cit., p. 5.33 Such a case was the privatisation of Balkan Brick factory from Vladiin Han. The

municipality of Vladiin Han and the BIA put political pressure on the Agency for Privati-sation to annul the auction, because Nexhat Beluli, an Albanian businessman from Buja-novac, wanted to buy it. The BIA suggested to the Agency for Privatisation that the dealshould be cancelled since an UCPMB terrorist bought the company. Source: ShaipKamberi, Council of Human Rights, Bujanoc, Annual Report 2004, p. 9.


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development, which would above all require the devolution ofproperty to municipalities, would be crucial in order to revitalisethese local economies. Nevertheless, as long as Kosovo remains

in a legal limbo, southern Serbia will not be perceived as a stableenvironment, and investors will probably keep away.

4. Other corrective measures needed

Besides the problems discussed above, which can be to some

extent associated with the lack of sufcient local autonomy, thereare further concerns that could be addressed through meansother than decentralization. Such issues are related to education,refugee return and the presence of armed forces in the Valleythat keep fuelling resentment among the local population.

Education

Preevo has eight Albanian primary schools, one Serbian anda mixed high school. Bujanovac has six primary schools andone high school, two of which are Serbian.34 For Albaniansthe biggest problem is posed by parts of the curricula, especiallyhistory containing humiliating ethnic content.35

As most students study in Kosovo, the recognition of Kosovardiplomas is a crucial issue for Albanians. A peculiar situation

emerged in which diplomas received at Kosovar universities areaccepted in practice since 2003, yet there has been no ofcialdecision in terms of legislation in Serbia. The use of textbooksbrought from Kosovo is allowed in practice, yet the curriculahave not been harmonised with Serbian curricula. Moreover, which particular books will be approved depends on ad hocdecisions of civil servants in Belgrade. On the whole, due to

the lack of ofcial regulation, the recognition of diplomas andpermitting the use of textbooks depend on the goodwill of thecentral authorities. This is not an ideal solution, since it keeps theAlbanian minority vulnerable to the political mood of the central

34 ICG Report, 2003, op. cit., p. 21.35 Shaip Kamberi, Council of Human Rights, Bujanoc, Annual Report 2004, p. 5.


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government.36 The adoption of some kind of legal measure onbehalf of the Serbian government would be needed to settle theproblem of diplomas and textbooks received from Kosovo.

Refugee return

Another grievance of local Albanians is the fact that many whoed the area to Kosovo during the conict in 2000 cannotreturn. They cannot go back either because UNMIK papers arenot recognised in Serbia or because most of the houses that weredestroyed during the conict have not been rebuilt. Around

3,000 people from Bujanovac live as IDPs (internally displacedpersons) in Kosovo currently, most of them in Gjilanje.37 Mostof them ed from the 5 kilometre-wide ground safety zone inthe Bujanovac highlands (see on map1), where their houseswere either destroyed or were simply demolished after they weredeserted by their inhabitants. Not only the policies of Milose-vic, but economic hardships also prompted mass emigration to

Kosovo and to Western Europe, which was also characteristic ofother minority communities in Serbia, such as the Hungarians.

Serbias loss of its authority in Kosovo, which led to the erectionof a de facto international border between Kosovo and Serbia,hit the Albanians in Preevo Valley especially hard, making themovement of people across the borders extremely difcult. Inthe former Yugoslavia, there were no borders between Serbia,

Kosovo and Macedonia, and Albanians living along these threeborders fostered intense social links with each other.A report commissioned by Freedom House 38 urged the Serbian

and the Kosovar governments, to improve economic ties andfree movement of people along the Serbian-Kosovar border withthe assistance of the European Union, which would require achange in trade and visa regimes in both countries. Admittedly,

36 Interview with Shaip Kamberi, Council for Human Rights, Bujanovac, 19 September2006.

37 Interview with Emrullah Muftiu, chief of administration in Bujanovac municipal government,Bujanovac, 19 September 2006.

38A Joint European Vision: Free Movement for Goods and People in Kosovo and Serbia,report published jointly by Freedom House, European Movement in Serbia, KosovarInstitute for Policy Research and Development. (see http://www.otvoreno.org.yu/doku-menti/emins_eng.pdf).


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the report was inspired by fears that the Western Balkansrisks becoming a ghetto consisting of ghettos, meaning thatthe region becomes isolated from the rest of Europe, and that

the countries of the region become isolated from each otheras well. Another aspect of this problem, however, which wasnot mentioned by the report, is that the Albanian populationliving on both sides of the Serbian-Kosovar border and theSerbian minority living in Kosovo would especially need theimprovement of trade and visa regimes between Kosovo andSerbia. Since the interests seem to be mutual, trade and visa

regimes should be placed at the top of the negotiations agendabetween Serbia and Kosovo.

Security forces

The establishment of the multi-ethnic police force with theassistance of OSCE can be regarded as a real success. In themunicipal police in Bujanovac, for instance, the chief of police

is a Serb, but one of his deputies is an Albanian. Yet, at thedistrict-level, which has its centre in Vranje and includes sevenmunicipalities, Albanians are not represented at all.

However, essential policing power, with the right of carryingout searches and arrests still lies with the Gendarmerie, whichis a special police body incorporating former members of theSerbian state security. The presence of the Gendarmerie is very

intimidating for local Albanians, as they drive around in thevillages brandishing their machine guns in a demonstration offorce. Their active operation in a 5-kilometer-wide border zonewith Kosovo and Macedonia (see on map1) prevents the freemovement of people within the area and the use of land. LocalAlbanians would prefer the buffer zone to be reduced to 300meters instead of 5 kilometres.39

Construction of a new army base for the Gendarmerie recentlybegan near Bujanovac, but the construction works stopped,probably due to the lack of funding. Besides the Gendarmerie,

39 Shaip Kamberi, Council of Human Rights, Bujanoc, Annual Report 2004, p. 4.


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the army and the multi-ethnic police are the security bodies activein Preevo Valley. Certainly the deployment of special forces insuch high numbers in the area does suggest that the state relates

to this population as a potential enemy, and such an attitudecertainly does not help to build trust and stability in the region.Therefore, one of the highest priorities for Albanian politiciansis the demilitarisation of Southern Serbia. Moreover, althoughthe multi-ethnic police has been created, its authority is limitedcompared to that of the Gendarmerie. Albanian politicians wouldprefer the local multi-ethnic police to guard the borders and for

ethnic Albanians to be incorporated into border police bodies andcustom services, which currently do not employ Albanians.40

Serbian media also contribute to the maintenance of distrustand tensions between Serbs and Albanians. Albanians aremost often portrayed as Islamic terrorists and smugglers, andare overwhelmingly presented in a negative light.41

5. Local Albanian politics

The issues explored above have to be addressed in the contextof local politics. Interestingly, the Albanian minority is amongthe few in Serbia that has not formed its own national council.It is an important fact, because according to the law on national

minorities, national councils are the bodies through which culturalautonomy can be realised in Serbia. That they have failed to setup their national council is telling about their attitude towards theSerbian state and also about their internal political dynamics.

Part of the reason might be that forming their councilwould imply acceptance of the fact that their country is Serbia.However, this kind of attitude seems to be changing, as evi-

denced by the Albanian parties decision to participate in therecent parliamentary elections in January 2007.42 This is a big

40 Interview with Ragmi Mustafa, mayor of Preevo, 19 September 2006, Preevo.41 Shaip Kamberi, Council of Human Rights, Bujanoc, Annual Report 2004, p. 7.42 It is worth to be noted though that the two more radical Albanian parties led by Mustafa and

Musliu boycotted the elections, as a result just enough votes were cast sufficient for onemandate. ICG, 2007


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development, taking into account that they have boycotted allnational election over the last 15 years.

The other reason why Albanian parties failed to form theirnational council was due to disagreements about who shouldbe its leader. The strongest party is the moderate Party forDemocratic Action (PDD) led by Riza Halimi. Recently,however, PDD lost its leading inuence in Preevos localgovernment. In the three municipalities of the Valley, Albanianparties together control 66 seats in local assemblies, out of

which 34 belongs to PDD. The other Albanian parties do notwant PDD to dominate the national council, which would beinevitable due to its numerical majority. The failure to set upthe Albanian National Council often serves as an excuse forSerbian authorities as to why many Albanian national minorityrights, such as ofcial language use, are not implemented inpractice. Nevertheless, forming their national council would

be the minimum Albanians could do to assert their minorityrights. Given their unwillingness to create their nationalcouncil, it is somewhat strange to put all the blame on Belgradefor the lack of progress.

PDD, which is still the most popular among Albanian voters,represents a moderate political option, ghting for the rightsof Albanians in the Serbian state. Its leader, Riza Halimi, has

been the chief negotiator with Belgrade and the internationalcommunity.

During the last local elections in June 2004 in Preevo, thePDD failed to win the majority in the local assembly. Thecoalition of other Albanian parties consisting of the Party forDemocratic Progress (LDP), the Democratic Party of Albanians

(PDA) and the Democratic Union of the Valley (BDL) wor-ked together to remove the PDD mayor and replaced him in2005 with Ragmi Mustafa, leader of the PDA. The PDA isa nationalist party advocating the unication of Albanian-in-habited regions in Macedonia and Southern Serbia with Ko-


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sovo and is closely linked to former UPCMB commanders.43According to analysts, the take-over by the PDA in Preevo isnot a sign of radicalisation of local Albanians, but indicates

that people got tired of Halimis politics, which delivered noprogress in terms of economic development, but were markedby much corruption. The low turnout of 21% during the June2006 mayoral elections (when Mustafas position as mayor wasconrmed) also suggest that Halimis call for a boycott was suc-cessful, and the moderate political option is still popular amongpeople.44

In Bujanovac, Albanian parties received 22 seats out of 44 inthe local assembly (PDD 13, LDP 9), while Serbs received 17mandates (SRS 12, DOS coalition 5). The incumbent mayor,Nagip Ari, the PDD candidate, won the mayoral election. InMedvea, Albanian parties won only 7 seats. A local citizensgroups representative won the race for mayor.45

It should be stressed that most Albanian voters, not only inSerbia but also in Macedonia, favour moderates. The recentlocal elections in Preevo represent the rst time a radical Al-banian party promoting unication with Kosovo came out asstrongest and could form the ruling coalition.46 As was notedabove, however, this vote was probably more an expression ofdissatisfaction with the previous mayor, Riza Halimi, than a

sign of radicalisation. The Kosovar Albanian leadership alsotries to keep tensions low in Preevo Valley, which also doesnot favour extremists.

6. The Kosovo factor

Despite that fact that a radical mayor took over the ofce inPreevo, the security situation seems quite stable at the moment.

43 ICG Report 2003, op. cit., p. 19.44 ICG Report 2006, op. cit, pp. 8-10. See same source for more on local politics.45 ICG Report 2006, op. cit., p. 10.46 Such as the ICG.


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Yet, no one knows how Kosovos independence will inuencethe Valleys stability on the middle and long run. It is veryunlikely that the Albanians in Preevo Valley would want to

take up arms to join an independent Kosovo within its presentborders. Admittedly Albanians in Preevo Valley are both happyand sad about Kosovos independence happy about Kosovohaving gained its freedom from Serbia and sad because theycannot participate in the new state. Yet, they emphasise that ifKosovo becomes independent, it would not trigger irredentistaspirations in the Valley. According to the International Crisis

Group, Albanian leaders in Pristina are encouraging theirethnic kin in Preevo Valley to accept the fact that their countryis Serbia, since any conict in southern Serbia might disturbKosovos independence.47

Nevertheless, Kosovos independence could still cause troubleon Serbias southern borders. There are two main sources fromwhich security threats can emanate: one is the potential inux

of Serbian refugees, the other is Kosovos partition. While therst could be dealt with if there was sufcient political will inSerbia and help from the international community, the secondrepresents a trickier challenge.

Tensions could still escalate, if for instance in the the inde-pendent Kosovo a new upsurge of violence would prompt a

large inux of Serbian refugees from Kosovo to Southern Ser-bia, tipping the delicate ethnic balance in the region. Alreadyaround 3,500 Serbian refugees live in the area near Bujanovac.The arrival of Serbs eeing from Kosovo might be especiallydangerous, since ethnic tolerance can hardly be expected frompeople who just lost their homes in Kosovo and are ready totake revenge. The presence of the Gendarmerie and its possible

reaction to potential unrest is a matter of concern as well. The-refore it is very important that authorities prepare for such ascenario and establish refugee camps outside of the Albanian-inhabited areas.

47 ICG Report 2006, op. cit., p. 8.


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Conict could also break out if Kosovo does not keep its pre-sent borders, in the event that some Serbian villages in northernKosovo are joined to Serbia. Although the international commu-

nity appears to be rmly against such a redrawing of borders, asreected by the Contact Groups position, northern Mitrovicais essentially run by Serbian authorities and linked to Serbiasinfrastructure. Most functions, including health care, schools,water supply and telephone services, are controlled by Serbia,hence the area is de facto under Serbian authority.48 If thiscontrol gains international recognition that could lead to the

renewal of armed conict in Preevo Valley. The Albanians willdemand the three municipalities of Preevo Valley to be unitedwith Kosovo in exchange for northern Mitrovica, Zevc an, ZubinPotok and Leposavic . In fact, the Albanian councillors of themunicipalities of Preevo, Bujanovac and Medvea adopteda common political platform in January 2006 in which theycommit to unication of Preevo Valley with Kosovo in case of

possible change of Kosovo borders.49However, the councillors raised a list of other demands in

the platform as well, many of which are related to aspirationsof the Covic plan. Addressing them has been a long overduetask of the Serbian state, such as the proportional integrationof Albanians in all state and public institutions. The plat-form also mentions the need for decentralization, foreseeing

some kind territorial autonomy for Preevo Valley. The plat-form maintains that the Valley should have a form of admi-nistrative-territorial organisation with functions in the elds ofthe judiciary, police, education, use of language and nationalsymbols, health, economic and cultural development, localplanning, environment, natural resources, housing issues andsocial services.50 This claim for local autonomy was repeatedly

reiterated by local Albanian politicians who argue that Albanians

48 Interiew with James Lyon, Director of International Crisis Group, Belgrade, 26 September2006.

49 Citation from the platform on Albanian Councilors of Preevo Valley (Preevo, Bujanovacand Medvea) in meeting held on 14 January 2006 in Preshevo.

50 Ibid.


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are due the same rights that the Serbs demand in Kosovo;meaning essential decentralization at the municipal level.51

Probably any solution implying any kind of territorial auto-

nomy or federalisation would be unacceptable to the Serbianauthorities, yet essential decentralization at the municipal levelcould be a feasible option. This would please not only mino-rities but all local municipalities regardless of ethnicity. Decent-ralization could also accelerate the integration of Albanians intothe public sector, and create better conditions for the ofcial useof the Albanian language.

7. Conclusions and recommendations

Whatever happens in Kosovo, it is very likely that developmentsthere will have an impact on the security situation in SouthernSerbia. Therefore it would be urgent to address the grievances

of the Albanian minority in Preevo Valley in an effective andcredible fashion. The solutions are not hard to nd, in factthey are ready on the table. Moving on with the Covic plan,reducing the presence of the Gendarmerie and continuing thedecentralization reform started in 2002 could be effective waysto reduce ethnic tensions in the Valley and prevent a renewedescalation of conict. Such measures could make the Albanians

of Preevo Valley feel more like equal citizens of, and at homein, Serbia.

Therefore, the following issues need to be addressed:

Recommendations to the Serbian government

Continue with the decentralization reform launched in 2002.The most important next step would be the devolution of

property to municipal governments. The borders and therole of districts should be also reconsidered. The presentdistrict-level administration should be

51 Allegedly, Veton Surroi, a Kosovar Albanian member of the Vienna negotiations insistedthat if Belgrade demands more autonomy for the Serbian municipalities in Kosovo, itshould provide an example of how to do it in Southern Serbia.


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either abolished and its functions delegated to the muni-cipalities or

a new Preevo district should be created, made up by

the three municipalities of Preevo, Bujanovac and Med-vea.

Legal and other necessary steps should be taken in orderto guarantee the ofcial use of the Albanian language inPreevo Valley, especially in the police and judicial bodies,but also in other state institutions. Since the right to ofciallanguage use has been granted to the Albanian minority by

the Law on Protection of Rights and Freedoms of NationalMinorities,52 the Serbian state should take the necessaryaction to ensure that the law is implemented in practice.

The recognition of diplomas obtained at Kosovo universitiesand the usage of textbooks imported from Kosovo shouldbe dealt with through a legal measure and not through adhoc decisions by civil servants in Belgrade.

Policing functions should be handed over to the multi-ethnicpolice, and the operations of the Gendarmerie should bereduced in the Valley in order to establish trust betweensecurity forces and the local population.

Recommendations to Albanian politicians

In general, Albanian politicians should make the best use

of the opportunities and institutions that are offered tothem by law. While Albanians are not able to set up theirnational council, it is somewhat strange to put all the blameon the Serbian state for the lack of implementation of theircultural and language rights.

Recommendations to the Serbian government and Albanian poli-

ticians The use of national symbols and the celebration of national

holidays, which are also due right of Albanians according

52 Law on Protection of Rights and Freedoms of National Minorities, Article 11 [OfficialGazette of FRY, No. 11 of 27 February 2002].


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to the law, should be allowed.53 However, in this regard,Albanian politicians should respect the stipulation in thelaw according to which national signs and symbols may

not be identical to the signs and symbols of another state,and should give up insisting on the usage of symbols of theAlbanian state.

Speeding up the integration of Albanians into the publicsector should be put high on the agenda, as was foreseenoriginally by the Covic plan. The responsibility lies not onlywith the Serbian government, but also with local Albanian

politicians who should pursue a politics of cooperationrather than confrontation.

Recommendations to the EU and the Serbian government

Revitalisation of the local economy would be crucial in orderto create lasting stability. A 70% unemployment rate and alack of economic prospects continue to be serious destabi-

lising factors in the region. The international communityshould provide nancial and technical assistance to Serbia,recognising that stabilising the Valley is a regional interest.

Lastly, it should be a priority to adopt trade and visa regimesthat would make the free movement of goods and peopleacross the Serbian-Kosovo border easier. This would servethe interests not only of Southern Serbias Albanians, but

of Kosovos Serbian minority as well. Since any escalation of conict in Southern Serbia might

easily spill over not only to Kosovo but to Macedonia as well(see map1 and 2), an intensied and continuing monitoringof the situation on the ground by the international commu-nity especially by the EU and increased internationalpolitical engagement would be strongly recommended.54

53 Ibid.54 This point was stressed in a recent ICG report on southern Serbia as well see Southern

Serbia: In Kosovos Shadow, Europe Briefing N43, ICG, 27 June 2006 (http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?l=1&id=4184).


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Map 1. Map of Southern Serbia, with the 5 km wide border

zone between Serbia and Kosovo highlighted with red

j kp kellene, ez ekkora


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Map 2. Map of Kosovo with Sandzak and Southern Serbia


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The case of Bosniaks in Sandzak

Introduction

Sandak, a geographical region in Southwestern Serbia is hometo Serbias Bosniak community. The region borders Bosnia-Herzegovina to the northwest, Montenegro to the southwestand Kosovo to the south. In the socialist Yugoslavia, Sandakextended beyond the borders of Serbia and connected Serbia

with Montenegro and Bosnia and included six municipalitiesin Serbia, ve in Montenegro and three in Bosnia. (It is lessknown that in neighboring Bosnia three municipalities alsoused to belong to the historical Sandak, out of which todayonly Gorade has a Bosniak majority.55) Serbian Sandak is alsothe true cradle of the medieval Serbian kingdom, known asRascia, which was the center of the Serbian state in the 11-12th

centuries under Byzantine rule.56Serbian Sandak can be divided into an eastern and a wes-

tern part, with three municipalities in each. OverwhelminglyBosniak majority Novi Pazar, Tutin and Sjenica are situatedin the eastern part while Nova Varo, Priboj and Prijepolje,with a mixed population but Serbs outnumbering Bosniaks,belong to the western part. According to the 2002 census, the

six municipalities together have a population of 235,567, 60%of whom (142,350) reported themselves Bosniaks, with the re-maining 38% (93,314) being Serbs and Montenegrin.57

Today the region does not have any kind of political autono-my and in legal terms it does not constitute any kind of admi-nistrative unit. During World War II, for a short time Sandakbecame an autonomous region on the territory liberated by the

partisans. Then it was split into a Montenegrin and a Serbianpart, and the six Serbian municipalities were arranged into a

55 Interview with Sedat Vrci, head of the NGO Flores in Sjenica, 08-08-2006.56 International Crisis Group, Serbias Sandzak: Still Forgotten, Europe Report N162,

8 April 2005, www.icg.org, 4.57 ICG, 1.


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single district with its centre in Novi Pazar. After 1947, however,these six municipalities were added to different Serb majoritydistricts, the boundaries and administrative systems of which

changed several times during the communist era.Due to the 1968 constitutional amendments, which recog-

nized Muslims as a constituent people of Yugoslavia, commu-nist Yugoslavia won the loyalty of Bosniaks. Still today, manylook back at the Tito era with nostalgia when Muslims wererecognized as equal partners in government.58

In 1991, during the dissolution of Yugoslavia, the Muslim

National Council of Sandak organized a referendum about theautonomy of Sandak in which 70% of registered voters partici-pated and 98.9% of them supported autonomy. However, thereferendum failed to achieve anything as Belgrade refused torecognize the plebiscite as legal.

In the Miloevic era the campaigns demonizing Muslims andrepressive policies against them alienated Bosniaks from the sate.

Between 1991 and 1995 the state repeatedly committed serioushuman rights violations in the region. In 1992-93, the Yugoslavarmy together with paramilitaries and the police carried out ethniccleansing in Sandak, including murder, torture, kidnappings,bombings, beatings and expulsions of entire Bosniak villages.59

Although today the danger of ethnic conict between Serbs

and Bosniaks is negligible as they live together peacefully,the stability and security of the region remains fragile. Nextto Preevo Valley, Sandak is one of the most economicallydepressed areas of Serbia. Despite some recent positive effortson behalf of the Serbian state, as a consequence of decadesof ofcial discrimination Bosniaks are still underrepresentedin the public sector and suffer high unemployment. However,

the gravest sources of insecurity are the often violent inghtingbetween local political bosses, organized crime penetratingpolitical structures, widespread drug use among the youth andthe disturbing presence of the radical Wahhabi group.

58 ICG, 6-7.59 ICG, 10.


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has continued to leave them without property and withoutsignicant responsibilities in the areas of health, welfare andeducation. The lack of property ownership rights has made it

difcult for local governments to pursue substantial economicdevelopment initiatives, which would be particularly importantin areas with high concentrations of minorities, such as inSandak. In addition, in the absence of competencies relatedto health care, education and social welfare, they are unable toinuence precisely those policy areas which are typically of thegreatest concern to those minorities.

It will be argued, however, that even though theoreticallydecentralization could be a remedy for exactly those problems which cannot be solved solely through minority rights legis-lation, in Sandak the success of such an approach would bequestionable due to the political division within the Bosniakcommunity. The animosity between the two main politicalgroups seems unstoppable, as political rivals bitterly ght to mo-

nopolize all power in their hands while stripping their opponentsof any signicant economic and political position. Under thecircumstances of corruption, nepotism and low scale violence,it would be quite risky to further empower local governments,which are caught in the middle of the ght between politicalinterest groups.

In this chapter the situation of Bosniaks living in Sandak will

be explored in more detail. First, the most pressing problemsof the Bosniak community will be presented. The next sectionwill introduce the two main Bosniak parties, the SDA (BosniakParty for Democratic Action) led by Sulejman Ugljanin and theSDP (Democratic Party of Sandak) led by Rasim Ljajic , anddiscuss local political dynamics, including the activities of theBosniak National Council. Local politics in three municipalities,

Sjenica, Novi Pazar and Projepolje, will be presented here inorder to provide an insight into how the two parties behave ingovernment. Novi Pazar is important because it is the centerof the region both in the political and cultural sense. Sjenica,another Bosniak majority municipality, was chosen because itslocal government is ruled by the SDP, while the SDA is in power


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in Novi Pazar. Projepolje was selected as a case study becauseit is one of the best illustrations of multi-ethnic coexistence inSerbia. The interviews were conducted in August 2006, thus

reect local conditions of that period. The chapter also aims todraw some conclusions regarding possible solutions, which willbe presented at the end of this chapter.

Problems in Sandak Sources of ethnic

discontentAdministrative organization

Today the six municipalities of Sandak are divided up betweentwo Serb majority districts. Novi Pazar and Tutin belong to theRaka district with its center in Kraljevo while Sjenica, Priboj,Prijepolje and Nova Varo joined the Zlatibor district, basedin Uice.61 As Raka and Zlatibor are also electoral districts,

the majority Bosniak municipalities were split between them.Moreover, Prijepolje municipality, where the ethnic proportionof Bosniaks and Serbs is about half and half, was also subject ofethnic gerrymandering. In order to ensure Serb majority duringelections, two Serb majority villages from Sjenica municipality(which on the whole has an overwhelming Bosniak majority) Meotani and Aljinovici were joined to Prijepolje municipality

in the nineties.Among the municipalities in Sandak, Sjenica is in the worst

position, illustrating well why it would be necessary to changethe present administrative organization. Due to a political de-cision adopted in 1992, Sjenica belongs to four different statedistricts, which control various functions. The police and courtbelong to the district of Novi Pazar, the business court to the

district of Raka, and health services to the district of Zlatibor.Forestry and water management belong to the Morava district,which has its center in Ivanica. This administrative organizationmakes the everyday life of citizens really difcult, as for instance

61 ICG, 17.


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people living in the village of Duga Poljava, which is situated20km from Novi Pazar and Sjenica, have to go for medicaltreatment to the hospital in Uice, which is 170km away. If

somebody wants to open a private business in Sjenica, he/shehas to go to Kraljevo to register at the business court, but also toUice, which is the center of public administration.62

No wonder that the Bosniaks wish that the six municipalitiesof Sandak would be grouped into one single district. Certainly,it would make more sense from a geographic and a governanceperspective as well if at least the municipalities of Novi Pazar,

Sjenica, Tutin and Prijepolje municipalities with a sizableBosniak population would be put in one district with a centerin Novi Pazar.63

Granting autonomy for the region made up of these sixmunicipalities would also be a way to overcome the administ-rative difculties of the present system. During the nineties

in the Miloevic era, the Bosniak parties promoted the ideaof Sandak autonomy, though the exact form and content ofthe desired autonomy was never specied. Interestingly, sin-ce 2000 they have become much less vocal about their aspi-ration for autonomy, despite the fact that the government ofinic seemed to be open to such ideas. According to localanalysts, most Bosniaks would support some kind of auto-

nomy, yet they are afraid to step up their demands for fearof confrontation, remembering the atrocities in the times ofthe Miloevic regime. Local Serbs are much less enthusiasticabout a possible Sandak autonomy and even prefer to call theregion Raka instead of Sandak. This attitude is mostly a resultof the aggressive nationalist politics of the SDA, one of themain Bosniak parties. Nevertheless, even if autonomy for the

Sandak region constituted by the six municipalities is a distantprospect, all parties agree that these should at least be groupedin one district.

62 Interview with Esad Zorni, mayor of Sjenica, Sjenica, 08-08-2006.63 ICG, 17.


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Lack of economic perspective

The bigge

Documents

Decentralization of Serbia: the minority dimension / Szerbia decentralizációja: a kisebbségi dimenzió