DENMARK - Pearson · 2019-02-20 · history,even to the present,represents a difficult and protracted process of nation-building. The Second German Empire Through a combinationmilitary

BAVARIA

BADEN- WÜRTTEMBERG

SAAR- LAND

HESSE

SCHLESWIG- HOLSTEIN

MECKLENBURG- WEST POMERANIA

BRANDENBURG

BERLIN

BREMEN

HAMBURG

SAXONY- ANHALT

RHINELAND- PALATINATE

NORTH RHINE- WESTPHALIA

LOWER SAXONY

THURINGIA

SAXONY

N O R T H S E A

B A L T I C S E A

POLAND

FRANCE

SWITZERLAND ITALY

AUSTRIA

D E N M A R K

CZECH REPUBLIC

NETHER- LANDS

LIECHTENSTEIN

LUXEMBOURG

Lake Constance

Rostock

Bremen

Hannover

Leipzig

Nuremberg

Munich

Stuttgart

Wiesbaden

Düsseldorf

Essen

Erfurt

Mainz

Bonn

Dresden

Hamburg

Kiel

Magdeburg

Cologne

Potsdam Berlin

Elbe

Weser

Danube

Rhine

N

BEL

GIU

M

C H A P T E R

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253

Population82.4 million

Territory137,803 square miles

Year of Independence 1871

Year of Current Constitution1949

Head of StatePresident Horst Köhler

Head of GovernmentChancellor Angela Merkel

LanguagesGerman

ReligionProtestant 34%, Roman Catholic 34%, Muslim 4%,unaffiliated or other 28%

Country Bio

GE

RM

AN

Y

The unusual outcome of the 2005 elections has shapedcontemporary German politics. The election resultswere so close that even the next day it was unclear who“won” the election. This began a protracted process ofcoalition-building. Neither of the largest two partieshad a majority of votes, and in such cases, one partynormally forms a coalition with a smaller party. Butafter weeks of negotiation and false starts, a new solu-tion appeared. The two major parties—ChristianDemocrats and Social Democrats—would form aGrand Coalition with Angela Merkel becomingGermany’s newest chancellor.

This result is unusual because these two partieswere rivals in the just-completed election. It was as ifthe Democratic Party and the Republican Party in theUnited States decided to govern as partners despitetheir policy differences. The logic was that the twoGerman parties could unite to address some of the na-tion’s political problems that required a broad politi-cal agreement. But this meant the parties forming thegovernment held three-quarters of the seats in theparliament and the opposition held only a quarter ofthe seats.

At another level Merkel’s selection as chancellorwas an important result. She had never held a majorelective office. Having grown up in East Germany, shehad been a member of the Communist Youth League.Instead of seeking a political career, she worked as achemist until the collapse of the Berlin Wall. Further,she was a woman in a society that had always beengoverned by men. Merkel’s election represents howmuch Germany has changed. Communism now seemslike a memory from the distant past, and traditionalsocial norms that shaped gender roles and politicalroles have changed.

The major achievement of contemporary Germanpolitics is the creation of a unified, free, and democraticnation in the short period since the unification of WestGermany—the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG)—and East Germany—the German Democratic Repub-lic (GDR)—occurred in 1990. A unified, democraticGermany has contributed to the political stability ofEurope and has given millions of Eastern Germanstheir freedom and new opportunities. Now the chal-lenge facing the government is to maintain the socialand economic vitality of the nation, to enact reforms to

POLITICS IN GERMANY

Russell J. Dalton

254 Politics in Germany

ensure that the German economy and political systemcontinue to function effectively, and to build a policyconsensus on the reforms to achieve these goals.

CURRENT POLICY CHALLENGES

What political problems do Germans typically readabout when they open the daily newspaper or watchtheir favorite television newscast—and what politicalproblems preoccupy policymakers in Berlin? Often theanswer is the same as in most other industrial democ-racies. News reports analyze the state of the economy,report on crime, and generally track the social andeconomic health of the nation.

Economic issues are a recurring source of politicaldebate. Germany still faces a series of economic andsocial problems that emerged from unification. Be-cause the economic infrastructure of the East laggedfar behind that of the West, the Eastern economy hasstruggled to compete in the globalized economic sys-tem. Eastern plants lacked the technology and manage-ment of Western firms, Eastern workers lacked thetraining and experience of their Western counterparts,and the economic infrastructure of the East was crum-bling under the Communist regime. Consequently,government agencies and the European Union (EU)have invested more than 1,000 billion euros (€) in theEast since unification—raising taxes for all Germans inthe process. Still, the nightly news routinely chroniclesthe continuing economic difficulties in the East, whichstill affect the entire nation (see Box 10.1).

The economic challenges have worsened with theworldwide recession that began in late 2008. In themid 2000s, Germany’s export-oriented economy

benefited from global economic expansion and do-mestic economic reforms. However, when the reces-sion decreased international trade and consumptionwithin Europe, this created new economic strains.Merkel’s government has moved very cautiously, en-acting two modest stimulus bills in early 2009. The re-cession (and a looming election in 2009) ended plansfor broad structural reforms of the economic systemand social programs. The Federal Republic facesgreater economic uncertainty than perhaps at anyother time in its history. Germany has joined withother EU member states to strengthen the banking andcredit system and now faces economic slowdown withan unreformed economic system. This will be a majorchallenge for the new government elected in 2009.

Social services represent another source of policydebate. Health, pension, and other social welfare costshave spiraled upward, but there is little agreement onhow to manage these costs. As the German populationages, the demands being placed on the social welfaresystem are predictably increasing. Few economists be-lieve that the present system of social benefits is sus-tainable in the future, especially as Germany competesin a global economic system and works to improveconditions in the East. As the federal elections ap-proach in fall 2009, it is likely that partisan differenceson economic or social services policy will widen be-tween the governing partners and little policy reformwill occur.

The challenges of becoming a multicultural na-tion create another new source of political tension.Germany already had a sizeable foreign-born popula-tion because of its foreign worker programs of the1960s and 1970s. During the 1990s there was a large

The Curse of Unification?

Germany’s attempt to rebuild its once Communist East

has been an unmitigated disaster, and the massive finan-

cial transfers from the West endanger the entire nation’s

economy, according to a government-commissioned

report.

A panel of thirteen experts, headed by former

Hamburg Mayor Klaus von Dohnanyi, was charged with

examining the reconstruction of Germany’s eastern

states. The panel concluded that the estimated €1.25

trillion ($1.54 trillion) in aid has done little to help the

economically depressed region.

Perhaps even more worrying, the experts fear the

€90 billion spent by the government each year is slow-

ly destroying the economy of western Germany, as

growth stagnates and the eastern states fail to revive

fourteen years after German reunification.

B O X 1 0 . 1

Source: The Deutsche Welle Report, April 4, 2004, p. 62.

Russell J. Dalton 255

influx of refugees from the Balkan conflict, asylumseekers, and ethnic Germans from East Europe. Somepeople argue that “the boat is full” and new immigrationshould be limited, while others claim that immigrationis essential for the nation’s future. Policy reforms in the1990s restricted further immigration, and the govern-ment changed citizenship laws in 2000 and reformedimmigration legislation in 2002. However, the publicis divided on the appropriate policies. Like much ofthe rest of Europe, Germany now struggles to addressthese issues, which are particularly difficult because ofthe legacy of Germany’s past.

Finally, foreign policies are another source of publicdebate. The EU is an increasingly visible part of politicalreporting, and Germans are trying to determine theirdesired role in an expanding EU (see Chapter 12). Ger-many has been a prime advocate of the expansion of EUmembership to include Eastern Europe, even thoughthis may dilute Germany’s influence within the EU.However, EU policies, such as monetary union and thedevelopment of a European currency, are creating inter-nal divisions over the nation’s relationship to the EU.The economic downturn in 2008 was exceptionally hardin Eastern Europe, prompting calls for Germany andother affluent western economies to support the new EUmembers in the East. This creates a joint economic andforeign policy challenge.

In addition, Germany is trying to define its role inthe post–Cold War world. For the first time since WorldWar II, German troops took part in a military actionoutside of German territory: in Kosovo in 1999 and inAfghanistan in 2001. However, Germany actively op-posed the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, and the currentgovernment remains critical of the U.S. actions in Iraq.Merkel, however, has worked to strengthen Germany’sties to the United States through the North AtlanticTreaty Organization (NATO) military alliance and otherforeign policy activities.

The Federal Republic is one of the most successfuland vibrant democracies in the world today. It hasmade substantial progress in improving the quality oflife of its citizens, strengthening democracy, and de-veloping a secure nation, and it has become an impor-tant member of the international community. But thecontinuing burdens of German unification and thelack of consensus on future policy directions meanthat the current government has managed the currentpolicy challenges, but has not taken decisive action tofully address them. These policy challenges will thuscarry over to the new government elected in 2009.

THE HISTORICAL LEGACY

The German historical experience differs considerablyfrom that of most other European democracies. Thesocial and political forces that modernized the rest ofEurope came much later in Germany and had a less cer-tain effect. By the nineteenth century, when most nationshad defined their borders, German territory was stilldivided among dozens of political units. Although mostEuropean states had developed a dominant national culture, Germany was split by sharp religious, regional,and economic divisions. Industrialization generally wasthe driving force behind the modernization of Europe,but German industrialization came late and did notoverturn the old feudal and aristocratic order. Germanhistory, even to the present, represents a difficult andprotracted process of nation-building.

The Second German Empire

Through a combination of military and diplomaticvictories, Otto von Bismarck, the Prussian chancellor,enlarged the territory of Prussia and established a uni-fied Second German Empire in 1871.1 The empire wasan authoritarian state, with only the superficial trap-pings of a democracy. Political power flowed from themonarch—the Kaiser—and the government at timesbitterly suppressed potential opposition groups, espe-cially the Roman Catholic Church and the SocialDemocratic party. The government expected little ofits citizens: They were to pay their taxes, serve in thearmy, and keep their mouths shut.

The central government encouraged national de-velopment during this period. Industrialization finallyoccurred, and German influence in international affairsgrew steadily. The force of industrialization was not suf-ficient to modernize and liberalize society and the polit-ical system, however. Economic and political powerremained concentrated in the hands of the bureaucracyand traditional aristocratic elites. The authoritarian statewas strong enough to resist the democratic demands ofa weak middle class. The state was supreme: Its needstook precedence over those of individuals and society.

Failures of government leadership, coupled with ablindly obedient public, led Germany into World War I(1914–1918). The war devastated the nation. Almost 3 million German soldiers and civilians lost their lives,the economy was strained beyond the breaking point,and the government of the empire collapsed under theweight of its own incapacity to govern. The war endedwith Germany a defeated and exhausted nation.


The Weimar Republic

In 1919 a popularly elected constitutional assemblyestablished the new democratic system of the WeimarRepublic. The constitution granted all citizens the rightto vote and guaranteed basic human rights. A directlyelected parliament and president held political power,and political parties became legitimate political actors.Belatedly, the Germans had their first real experiencewith democracy.

From the outset, however, severe problemsplagued the Weimar government. In the Versaillespeace treaty ending World War I, Germany lost all itsoverseas colonies and a large amount of its Europeanterritory. The treaty further burdened Germany withthe moral guilt for the war and the financial cost ofpostwar reparations to the victorious Allies. A series ofradical uprisings threatened the political system.Wartime destruction and the reparations producedcontinuing economic problems that finally led to aneconomic catastrophe in 1923. In less than a year, theinflation rate was an unimaginable 26 billion percent!Ironically, the Kaiser’s government, which had pro-duced these problems, was not blamed for these devel-opments. Instead, many people criticized the empire’sdemocratic successor—the Weimar Republic.

The fatal blow came with the Great Depression in1929. The Depression struck Germany harder thanmost other European nations or the United States.Almost a third of the labor force became unemployed,and people were frustrated by the government’sinability to deal with the crisis. Political tensions in-creased, and parliamentary democracy began to fail.Adolf Hitler and his National Socialist GermanWorkers’ Party (the Nazis) were the major benefi-ciaries. Their vote share grew from a mere 2 percent in 1928 to 18 percent in 1930 and 33 percent inNovember 1932.

Increasingly, the machinery of the democraticsystem malfunctioned or was bypassed. In a final at-tempt to restore political order, President Paul vonHindenburg appointed Hitler chancellor of theWeimar Republic in January 1933. This was democ-racy’s death knell.

Weimar’s failure resulted from a mix of factors.2

The lack of support from political elites and the publicwas a basic weakness of Weimar. Democracy de-pended on an administrative and military elite that of-ten longed for the old authoritarian political system.Elite criticism of Weimar encouraged similar sentiments

among the public. Many Germans were not commit-ted to democratic principles. The fledgling state thenfaced a series of severe economic and political crises.Such strains might have overloaded the ability of anysystem to govern effectively. These crises furthereroded public support for Weimar and opened thedoor to Hitler’s authoritarian and nationalistic ap-peals. The institutional weaknesses of the political sys-tem contributed to Weimar’s political vulnerability.Finally, most Germans drastically underestimatedHitler’s ambitions, intentions, and political abilities.This underestimation, perhaps, was Weimar’s greatestfailure.

The Third Reich

The Nazis’ rise to power reflected a bizarre mixture ofruthless behavior and concern for legal procedures.Hitler called for a new election in March 1933 andthen suppressed the opposition parties. Although theNazis failed to capture an absolute majority of thevotes, they used their domination of the parliament toenact legislation granting Hitler dictatorial powers.Democracy was replaced by the new authoritarian“leader state” of the Third Reich.

Once entrenched in power, Hitler pursued ex-tremist policies. Social and political groups that mightchallenge the government were destroyed, taken overby Nazi agents, or coopted into accepting the Naziregime. The powers of the police state grew andchoked off opposition. Attacks on Jews and other mi-norities steadily became more violent. Massive publicworks projects lessened unemployment, but also builtthe infrastructure for a wartime economy. The gov-ernment enlarged and rearmed the military in viola-tion of the Versailles treaty. The Reich’s expansionistforeign policy challenged the international peace.

Hitler’s unrestrained political ambitions finallyplunged Europe into World War II in 1939. After ini-tial victories a series of military defeats beginning in1942 led to the total collapse of the Third Reich inMay 1945. A total of 60 million lives were lost world-wide in the war, including 6 million European Jewswho were murdered in a Nazi campaign of systematicgenocide.3 Germany lay in ruins: Its industry andtransportation systems were destroyed, its cities wererubble, millions were homeless, and even food wasscarce. Hitler’s grand design for a new German Reichhad instead destroyed the nation in a WagnerianGötterdämmerung.


The Occupation Period

The political division of postwar Germany began asforeign troops advanced onto German soil. At the endof the war, the Western Allies—the United States,Britain, and France—controlled Germany’s Westernzone, and the Soviet Union occupied the Eastern zone.This was to be an interim division, but growing fric-tions between Western and Soviet leaders increasedtensions between the regions.

In the Western zone, the Allied military governmentbegan a denazification program to remove Nazi officialsand sympathizers from the economic, military, and po-litical systems. The occupation authorities licensed newpolitical parties, and democratic political institutionsbegan to develop. These authorities also reorganized theeconomic system along capitalist lines. Currency andmarket economy reforms in 1948 revitalized the eco-nomic system of the Western zone, but also deepeneddivisions between the Eastern and Western zones.

Political change followed a much different coursein the Eastern zone. The new Socialist Unity Party(SED) was a mechanism for the Soviets to control thepolitical process. Since they saw capitalism as responsi-ble for the Third Reich, the Soviets tried to destroy thecapitalist system and construct a new socialist order inits place. By 1948 the Eastern zone was essentially acopy of the Soviet political and economic systems.

As the political distance between occupationzones widened, the Western allies favored creation of aseparate German state in the West. In Bonn, a smalluniversity town along the banks of the Rhine, the Germans began to create a new democratic system. In1948 a parliamentary council drafted an interim con-stitution that was to last until the entire nation was re-united. In May 1949 the state governments in theWestern zone agreed on the Basic Law (Grundgesetz)that created the FRG, or West Germany.

These developments greatly worried the Soviets.The Soviet blockade of Berlin in 1948, for example,partially sought to halt the formation of a separateWest German state—though it actually strengthenedWestern resolve. Once it became apparent that WestGermany would follow its own course, preparationsbegan for a separate East German state. A week afterthe formation of the FRG, the People’s Congress in theEast approved a draft constitution. On October 7,1949, the GDR, or East Germany, was formed. As inearlier periods of German history, a divided nationwas following different paths (see Figure 10.1). It

1948

1945 Germany surrenders

(May)

Berlin Blockade (July)

German Democratic

Republic founded

(October)GDR joins Comecon

East Berlin uprising

GDR joins Warsaw

Pact

Building of Berlin Wall

Honecker head of

stateBasic Agreement

New constitution

Hungarian border

opens

Berlin Wall falls

(November)National election

(March)

Monetary, economic,

and social union

(July)

Monetary, economic,

and social union (July)

Political unification

(October)

National elections

(December)

New CDU/CSU-FDP

government

INF decision

Basic Agreement

New SPD-FDP

government

FRG joins NATO

FRG joins Coal &

Steel Community

Federal Republic

established (May)

Germany surrenders

(May)

YEARGERMAN

DEMOCRATIC

REPUBLIC

FEDERAL REPUBLIC

OF GERMANY

Currency reform (June)

1949

1952

1955

1969

1972

1982

1983

1990

1994

1998

2005

1950

1953

1961

1971

1974

1989

1948

1949

1955

1990

1972

Schroder becomes

Chancellor

Merkel becomes

Chancellor

National elections

F I G U R E 1 0 . 1The Two Paths of Postwar

GermanyThe history of the Federal Republic and the

German Democratic Republic since 1949


would be more than forty years before these pathswould converge.

FOLLOWING TWO PATHS

Although they had chosen different paths (or had thesepaths chosen for them), the two German states facedmany of the same challenges in their initial years. Theeconomic picture was bleak on both sides of the bor-der. Unemployment remained high in West Germany,and the average wages were minimal. In 1950 almosttwo-thirds of the West German public felt they hadbeen better off before the war, and severe economichardships were still common. The situation was evenworse in East Germany.

West Germany was phenomenally successful inmeeting this economic challenge.4 Relying on a freeenterprise system championed by the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), the country experiencedsustained and unprecedented economic growth. Bythe early 1950s, incomes had reached the prewar level,and growth had just begun. Over the next twodecades, per capita wealth nearly tripled, averagehourly industrial wages increased nearly fivefold, andaverage incomes grew nearly sevenfold. By most eco-nomic indicators, the West German public in 1970was several times more affluent than at any time in itspre–World War II history. This phenomenal economicgrowth is known as West Germany’s EconomicMiracle (Wirtschaftswunder).

East Germany’s postwar economic miracle wasalmost as impressive. Its economic system was basedon collectivized agriculture, nationalized industry,and centralized planning.5 From 1950 until 1970,industrial production and per capita national income increased nearly fivefold. Although still lag-ging behind its more affluent relatives in the West,the GDR was the model of prosperity among social-ist states.

The problem of nation-building posed anotherchallenge. The FRG initially was viewed as a provi-sional state until both Germanies could be reunited.The GDR struggled to develop its own identity in theshadow of West Germany, while expressing a commit-ment to eventual reunification. In addition, the occu-pation authorities retained the right to intervene inthe two Germanies even after 1949. Thus, both statesfaced the challenge of defining their identity—as

separate states or as parts of a larger Germany—andregaining national sovereignty.

West Germany’s first chancellor, Konrad Ade-nauer, steered a course toward gaining national sover-eignty by integrating the FRG into the Western alliance.The Western Allies would grant greater autonomy toWest Germany if it was exercised within the frameworkof an international body. For example, economic rede-velopment was channeled through the European Coaland Steel Community and the European EconomicCommunity. West Germany’s military rearmament oc-curred within NATO.

The Communist regime in the GDR countered theFRG’s integration into the Western alliance with callsfor German unification. And yet, the GDR was simul-taneously establishing itself as a separate German state.In 1952 the GDR transformed the boundary betweenEast and West Germany into a fortified border; thisrestricted Western access to the East and limited East-erners’ ability to go to the West. The GDR integrated itseconomy into the Soviet bloc through membership inthe Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COME-CON), and it was a charter member of the WarsawPact military alliance. The Soviet Union recognized thesovereignty of the GDR in 1954. The practical andsymbolic division of Germany became official with theGDR’s construction of the Berlin Wall in August 1961.More than a physical barrier between East and West,it marked the formal existence of two separate Germanstates.

Intra-German relations took a dramatically dif-ferent course after the Social Democratic Party (SPD)won control of West Germany’s government after the1969 elections. The new SPD chancellor, Willy Brandt,followed a policy toward the East (Ostpolitik) that ac-cepted the postwar political situation and sought rec-onciliation with Eastern European nations, includingthe GDR. West Germany signed treaties with the So-viet Union and Poland to resolve disagreements datingback to World War II and to establish new economicand political ties. In 1971 Brandt received the NobelPeace Prize for his actions. The following year the twoGermanies adopted the Basic Agreement, which for-malized their relationship as two states within one na-tion. To the East German regime, Ostpolitik was amixed blessing. On the one hand, it legitimized theGDR through its recognition by the FRG and thenormalization of East-West relations. On the otherhand, economic and social exchanges increased East


Germans’ exposure to Western values and ideas, whichmany GDR politicians worried would underminetheir closed system. The eventual revolution of 1989seemingly confirmed their fears.

After reconciliation between the two Germanstates, both spent most of the next two decadesaddressing their internal needs. SPD policy reforms inthe West expanded social services and equalized accessto the benefits of the Economic Miracle. Total socialspending nearly doubled between 1969 and 1975. Asglobal economic problems grew in the mid-1970s,Helmut Schmidt of the SPD became chancellor andslowed the pace of reform and government spending.

The problems of unrealized reforms and renewedeconomic difficulties continued into the 1980s. In1982 the CDU enticed the Free Democratic Party(FDP) to form a new government under the leader-ship of Helmut Kohl, head of the Christian Demo-cratic Union. The new government wanted to restorethe FRG’s economy, while still providing for socialneeds. Kohl presided over a dramatic improvement ineconomic conditions. The government also demon-strated its commitment to the Western defense al-liance by accepting new NATO nuclear missiles. Thepublic returned Kohl’s coalition to office in the 1987elections.

Worldwide economic recession also buffeted theGDR’s economy starting in the late 1970s. The costcompetitiveness of East German products diminishedin international markets, and trade deficits with theWest grew steadily. Moreover, long-delayed invest-ment in the country’s infrastructure began to show ina deteriorating highway system, an aging housingstock, and an outdated communications system. Al-though East Germans heard frequent government re-ports about the nation’s economic success, their livingstandards evidenced a widening gap between officialpronouncements and reality.

In the late 1980s, East German government offi-cials were concerned with the winds of change risingin the East. Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev’s re-formist policies of perestroika and glasnost seemed toundermine the pillars supporting the East Germansystem (see Chapter 10). At one point an official GDRnewspaper even censored news from the Soviet Unionin order to downplay Gorbachev’s reforms. Indeed,the stimulus for political change in East Germanycame not from within, but from the events sweepingacross the rest of Eastern Europe.

In early 1989 the first cracks in the Communistmonolith appeared. Poland’s Communist governmentaccepted a series of democratic reforms, and the Hun-garian Communist Party endorsed democratic andmarket reforms. When Hungary opened its borderwith neutral Austria, a stream of East Germans vaca-tioning in Hungary started leaving for the West. EastGermans were voting with their feet. Almost 2 percentof the East German population emigrated to the FRGover the next six months. The exodus also stimulatedmass public demonstrations against the regime withinEast Germany.

Gorbachev played a crucial role in directing theflow of events in Germany. He encouraged the GDRleadership to undertake internal reforms with the cau-tious advice that “life itself punishes those who delay.”Without Soviet military and ideological support, theend of the old GDR system was inevitable. Rapidlygrowing public protests increased the pressure on thegovernment, and the continuing exodus to the Westbrought the East’s economy to a near standstill. Thegovernment did not govern; it barely existed, strug-gling from crisis to crisis. In early November the gov-ernment and the SED Politburo resigned. On theevening of November 9, 1989, a GDR official an-nounced the opening of the border between East andWest Berlin. In the former no-man’s-land of the BerlinWall, Berliners from East and West joyously celebratedtogether.

Once the euphoria of the Berlin Wall’s opening hadpassed, East Germany had to address the question of“What next?” The GDR government initially tried astrategy of damage control, appointing new leaders andattempting to court public support. However, thepower of the state and the vitality of the economy hadalready suffered mortal wounds. Protesters who hadchanted “We are the people” when opposing the Com-munist government in October took up the call for uni-fication with a new refrain: “We are one people.” Theonly apparent source of stability was unification withthe FRG, and the rush toward German unity began.

In March 1990 the GDR had its first truly freeelections since 1932. The Alliance for Germany, whichincluded the eastern branch of the Christian Demo-crats, won control of the government. Helmut Kohland Lothar de Maiziere, the new GDR leader, bothforcefully moved toward unification. On July 1 an intra-German treaty gave the two nations one currency andessentially one economy. Soviet concessions on the


terms of union opened the road to complete unifica-tion. On October 3, 1990, after more than four decadesof separation, the two German paths again converged.

Unification largely occurred on Western terms. Infact, Easterners sarcastically claim that the only traceof the old regime is one law kept from the GDR: Auto-mobiles can turn right on a red light in the East.Otherwise, the Western political structures, Westerninterest groups, Western political parties, and Westerneconomic and social systems were simply exported tothe East.

Unification was supposed to be the answer to adream, but during the next few years, it must haveoccasionally seemed like a nightmare. The Easterneconomy collapsed with the end of the GDR; at timesunemployment rates in the East exceeded the worstyears of the Great Depression. The burden of unifica-tion led to inflation and tax increases in the West andweakened the Western economy. The social strains ofunification stimulated violent attacks against foreign-ers in both halves of Germany. At the end of 1994,Kohl’s coalition won a razor-thin majority in nationalelections.

Tremendous progress had been made by 1998,but the economy still struggled and necessary changesin tax laws and social programs languished. When theGermans went to the polls in 1998, they voted for achange and elected a new government headed byGerhard Schröder and the Social Democrats in al-liance with The Greens (Die Grünen). The new gov-erning coalition made some progress on addressingthe nation’s major policy challenges—such as a majorreform of the tax system and continued investmentsin the East—but not enough progress. The coalitionwon the 2002 election, but with a reduced margin.

After cumulative losses in state elections and deep-ening dissatisfaction with the government, Schrödercalled for early elections in 2005. After an intense cam-paign, both the SPD and the Christian DemocraticUnion/Christian Social Union (CDU/CSU) gained thesame share of the vote. The closeness of the voteshowed the divisions on how the nation should dealwith its current policy challenges. Merkel eventuallyconvinced a Schröder-less SPD to join the CDU/CSU informing a Grand Coalition. Analysts hoped that this al-liance could enact significant economic and policy reforms, but the divisions within the coalition have ledto a cautious style of government with little major policy change.

SOCIAL FORCES

The new unified Germany is the largest state in theEuropean Union. It has about 82 million people,68 million in the West and 14 million in the East,located in Europe’s heartland. The total German econ-omy is also Europe’s largest. The combined territory ofthe new Germany is also large by European standards,although it is small in comparison to the UnitedStates—a bit smaller than Montana.

The merger of two nations is more complex thanthe simple addition of two columns of numbers on abalance sheet, however. Unification created newstrengths, but it also redefined and potentially strainsthe social system that underlies German society andpolitics. The merger of East and West holds the poten-tial for reviving some of Germany’s traditional socialdivisions.

Young people from East and West Berlin celebrate the

opening of the Berlin Wall in November 1989.

Lionel Cironneau/AP Images


Economics

Postwar economic growth occurred at different rates inthe West and East and followed different paths. In theFRG, the service and technology sectors grewsubstantially, and government employment more thandoubled during the later twentieth century. Although weoften think of Germany as an industrial society, barely aquarter of those in the labor force describe themselves asblue-collar workers; two-thirds say they have a white-collar occupation. In contrast, the GDR’s economicexpansion was concentrated in heavy industry and man-ufacturing. In the mid-1980s about half of the Easternlabor force worked in these two areas, and the service-technology sector was a small share of the economy.

By the mid-1980s the FRG’s standard of livingranked among the highest in the world. By compari-son, the average East German’s living standard wasbarely half that of a Westerner. Basic staples were inex-pensively priced in the East, but most consumer goodswere more expensive, and so-called luxury items(color televisions, washing machines, and automo-biles) were beyond the reach of the average family. In1985 about a third of the dwellings in East Germanylacked their own bathroom. GDR residents lived acomfortable life by East European standards, althoughfar short of Western standards.

German unification meant the merger of thesetwo different economies: the affluent Westerners andtheir poor cousins from the East; the sophisticated andtechnologically advanced industries of the FRG andthe aging rust-belt factories of the GDR. At least in theshort run, unification worsened the economic prob-lems of the East. By some accounts, Eastern industrialproduction fell by two-thirds between 1989 and1992—worse than the decline during the Great Depression. The government sold Eastern firms, andoften the new owners began by reducing the laborforce. Even by mid-2008, a sixth of the Eastern laborforce was still unemployed.

During the unification process, politicians claimedthat the East would enjoy a new economic miracle in afew years. This claim was overly optimistic. The govern-ment assumed a major long-term role in rebuilding theEast’s economic infrastructure and encouraging invest-ment in the East. Only massive social payments by theFRG initially maintained the living standards in theEast. And many young Easterners moved to the West tofind a job. While economic conditions have improved

in the East, many Easterners remain skeptical abouttheir economic future. The persisting economic gap be-tween East and West creates a basis for social and politi-cal division in the new Germany. Even after significanteconomic growth in recent years, in 2008 Germans feltthey have benefited little from this growth and worriedthat inflation is eroding their living standard.6

Religion

The postwar FRG experienced a moderation of reli-gious differences, partly because there were equalnumbers of Catholics and Protestants and partlybecause elites made a conscious effort to avoid the reli-gious conflicts of the past. Secularization also gradual-ly reduced the public’s religious involvement. In theEast the Communist government sharply limited thepolitical and social roles of the churches.

German unification has shifted the religious bal-ance in the new Federal Republic. Catholics make uptwo-fifths of Westerners, but less than a tenth of East-erners. Thus, Protestants now slightly outnumberCatholics in unified Germany. There is also a smallMuslim community that accounts for about 4 percentof the population. Even more dramatic, most Eastern-ers claim to be nonreligious, which may decreasesupport for policies that benefit religious interests.A more Protestant and secular electorate shouldchange the policy preferences of the German publicon religiously based issues, such as abortion, and maypotentially reshape electoral alliances.

Gender

Gender roles are another source of social differentia-tion. In the past the three K’s—Kinder (children),Kirche (church), and Küche (kitchen)—defined thewoman’s role, while politics and work were male mat-ters. Attempts to lessen role differences have met withmixed success. The FRG’s Basic Law guarantees theequality of the sexes, but the specific legislation to sup-port this guarantee has been lacking. Cultural normschanged only slowly; cross-national surveys show thatmales in the West are more chauvinist than the averageEuropean and that women in the West feel less liberat-ed than other European women.7

The GDR constitution also guaranteed the equalityof the sexes, and the government aggressively protectedthis guarantee. However, East German women were oneof the first groups to suffer from the unification process.


Eastern women lost rights and benefits that they hadheld under East German law. For instance, in 1993 theConstitutional Court resolved conflicting versions of theFRG and GDR abortion laws and essentially ruled forthe FRG’s more restrictive standards. The GDR providedchild-care benefits for working mothers that the FRGdid not. The greater expectations of Eastern womenmoved gender issues higher on the FRG’s politicalagenda after unification. The government passed newlegislation on job discrimination and women’s rights in1994. Most Eastern women feel they are better off todaythan under the old regime because they have gained newrights and new freedoms that were lacking under theGDR. Merkel’s selection as chancellor in 2005 is stimu-lating further changes in gender norms and policies inGermany.

Minorities

A new social cleavage involves Germany’s growingminority of foreigners.8 When the FRG faced a severelabor shortage in the 1960s, it recruited millions ofworkers from Turkey, Yugoslavia, Italy, Spain, Greece,and other less developed countries. German politi-cians and the public considered this a temporary situ-ation, and the foreigners were called guest workers(Gastarbeiter). Most of these guest workers workedlong enough to acquire skills and some personal sav-ings, and then they returned home.

A strange thing happened, however. Germanyasked only for workers, but they got human beings.Cultural centers for foreign workers emerged in manycities. Some foreign workers chose to remain in theFRG, and they eventually brought their families tojoin them. Foreigners brought new ways of life, as wellas new hands for factory assembly lines.

From the beginning the foreign worker popula-tion has faced several problems. They are concen-trated on the low rung of the economic ladder.Foreigners—especially those from Turkey and othernon-European nations—are culturally, socially, andlinguistically isolated from mainstream society. Theproblems of social and cultural isolation are espe-cially difficult for the children of foreigners. Foreign-ers also were a target for violence in reaction to thestrains of unification, and there is opposition to fur-ther immigration.

The nation has struggled with the problem of be-coming a multicultural society, but the solutions are

still uncertain. The Federal Republic revised the BasicLaw’s asylum clause in 1993 (making it closer to U.S.immigration policy), took more decisive action in com-bating violence, and mobilized the tolerant majority inGerman society. The government changed the citizen-ship laws in 2000 to better integrate foreign-bornresidents into German society. However, the gap be-tween native Germans and Muslim immigrants seemsto be widening. Attempts to liberalize naturalization ofcitizenship are linked to programs to educate the newcitizens about German language, culture, and politicalnorms. Addressing the issues associated with perma-nent racial/ethnic minorities (roughly 6 percent of thepopulation) will be a continuing feature of Germanpolitics.

Regionalism

Regionalism is another potential social and politicaldivision. Germany is divided into sixteen states(Länder), ten states in the West and six new states cre-ated in the East, including the city-state of Berlin. Manyof the Länder have their own distinct historical tradi-tions and social structure. The language and idioms ofspeech differentiate residents from the Eastern andWestern halves of the nation. No one would mistake anorthern German for a Bavarian from the south—theirmanners and dialects are too distinct.

Unification greatly increased the cultural, eco-nomic, and political variations among the statesbecause of differences between West and East. It iscommon to hear of “a wall in the mind” that separatesWessies (Westerners) and Ossies (Easterners). Easternersstill draw on their separate traditions and experienceswhen making political decisions, just as Westerners do.Regional considerations thus are an important factor insociety and politics.

The decentralized nature of society and the econ-omy reinforces these regional differences. Economicand cultural centers are dispersed throughout thecountry, rather than being concentrated in a singlenational center. There are more than a dozen regionaleconomic centers, such as Frankfurt, Cologne, Dres-den, Düsseldorf, Munich, Leipzig, and Hamburg. Themass media are organized around regional markets,and there are even several competing “national” the-aters.

These various social characteristics—economic,religious, gender, ethnicity, and regionalism—are


politically relevant for many reasons. They definediffering social interests, such as the economic needsof the working class versus those of the middle class,that are often expressed in policy debates. Socialgroups also are a source of political and social identitythat links individuals to interest groups and politicalparties. Voting patterns, for instance, typically showclear group differences in party support. Thus, identi-fying the important group differences in German soci-ety provides a foundation for understanding parts ofthe political process.

THE INSTITUTIONS AND STRUCTURE OF GOVERNMENT

When the Parliamentary Council met in Bonn in1948–1949, its members faced a daunting task. Theywere supposed to design a new political structure for anew democratic Germany that would avoid the prob-lems that led to the collapse of the Weimar Republic.9

If they failed, the consequences might be as dire as thelast collapse of German democracy.

The Basic Law they crafted is an exceptional ex-ample of political engineering—the construction of apolitical system to achieve specific goals:

■ Develop a stable and democratic political system,■ Maintain some historical continuity in political

institutions (which, for Germany, meant a parlia-mentary system of government),

■ Re-create a federal structure of government,■ Avoid the institutional weaknesses that con-

tributed to the collapse of Weimar democracy,and

■ Establish institutional limits on extremist andantisystem forces.

The framers wanted to establish clearer lines ofpolitical authority and to create a system with exten-sive checks and balances in order to prevent theusurpation of power that occurred during the ThirdReich. The new system created a parliamentarydemocracy that involves the public, encourages elitepolitical responsibility, disperses political power, andlimits the influence of extremists.

The Basic Law was supposedly temporary untilboth halves of Germany were united. In actuality, theGDR’s rapid collapse in 1990 led to its incorporation

into the existing constitutional and economic systemsof the Federal Republic. In September 1990 the FRGand the GDR signed a treaty to unify their two states,and the government amended the Basic Law to in-clude the states in the East. Thus, the political systemof the unified Germany functions according to theBasic Law. This section describes the key institutionsand procedures of this democratic system.

A Federal System

One way to distribute political power and to buildchecks and balances into a political system is througha federal system of government. The Basic Law creat-ed one of the few federal political systems in Europe(see Figure 10.2). Germany is organized into sixteenstates (Länder). Political power is divided between thefederal government (Bund) and the state govern-ments. The federal government has primary policyresponsibility in most policy areas. The states, however,have jurisdiction in education, culture, law enforce-ment, and regional planning. In several other policyareas, the federal government and the states shareresponsibility, although federal law takes priority.Furthermore, the states can legislate in areas that theBasic Law does not explicitly assign to the federal gov-ernment.

The state governments have a unicameral legisla-ture, normally called a Landtag, which is directlyelected by popular vote. The party or coalition thatcontrols the legislature selects a minister president tohead the state government. Next to the federal chan-cellor, the minister presidents are among the mostpowerful political officials in the Federal Republic.

The federal government is the major force in thelegislation of policy, and the states are primarily responsible for policy administration. The states enforce most of the domestic legislation enacted bythe federal government, as well as their own regulations.The state governments also oversee the operation of the local governments.

One house of the bicameral federal legislature,the Bundesrat, is comprised solely of representativesappointed by the state governments. State governmentofficials also participate in selecting the federal presi-dent and the justices of the major federal courts. Thisfederal system thus decentralizes political power bybalancing the power of the state governments againstthe power of the federal government.


Parliamentary Government

The central institution of the federal government isthe parliament, which is bicameral: The popularlyelected Bundestag is the primary legislative body; theBundesrat represents the state governments at the fed-eral level.

The Bundestag The 598 deputies of the Bundestag(Federal Diet) are the only national government offi-cials who are directly elected by the German public.10

Elections to select parliamentary deputies normallyoccur every four years.

The Bundestag’s major function is to enact legis-lation; all federal laws must receive its approval. Theinitiative for most legislation, however, lies in the exec-utive branch. Like other modern parliaments, theBundestag primarily evaluates and amends the gov-ernment’s legislative program. Another importantfunction of the Bundestag is to elect the federal chan-cellor, who heads the executive branch.

Through a variety of mechanisms, the Bundestagis a forum for public debate. Its plenary sessions dis-cuss the legislation before the chamber. Debating timeis allocated to all party groupings according to theirsize; both party leaders and backbenchers normally

participate. The Bundestag televises its sessions, in-cluding live broadcasts on the Internet, to expand thepublic audience for its policy debates.11

The Bundestag also scrutinizes the actions of thegovernment. The most common method of oversightis the “question hour” adopted from the British Houseof Commons. An individual deputy can submit awritten question to a government minister: Questionsrange from broad policy issues to the specific needs ofone constituent. Government representatives answerthe queries during the question hour, and deputiescan raise follow-up questions at that time. Bundestagdeputies posed more than 15,000 oral and writtenquestions during the 1998–2002 term of the Bun-destag.

The Bundestag boasts a strong set of legislativecommittees that strengthen its legislative and over-sight roles. These committees provide expertise to bal-ance the policy experience of the federal agencies; thecommittees also conduct investigative hearings intheir area of specialization. Their oversight function isfurther strengthened because opposition parties chaira proportionate share of these committees, a very un-usual pattern for democratic legislatures.

The opposition parties normally make greatestuse of these oversight opportunities; about two-thirds

Bundestag

(Federal Diet)

598 members

Chancellor

Cabinet

FederalConvention

FederalPresident

ConstitutionalCourt

Bundesrat

(Federal Council)

69 members

State Governments

16 State Governments

State Governments Legislature Executive Judiciary

Elects Elects

Elects

Elects

Appoint

Select

Select

Selects

PUBLIC

The Structure of Germany’s Federal Government

Germany merges federalism with a parliamentary system and a Constitutional Court.

F I G U R E 1 0 . 2


of the questions posed during the 1994–1998 termcame from the opposition parties. Rank-and-filemembers of the governing parties also use these de-vices to make their own views known.

Overall, the Bundestag’s oversight powers are con-siderable, especially for a legislature in a parliamentarysystem. Legislative committees can collect the informa-tion needed to understand and question governmentpolicymakers. Bundestag members can use the questionhour and other methods to bring attention to politicalissues and challenge the government. And through itsvotes, the Bundestag often prompts the government torevise its legislative proposals to gain passage.

The Bundesrat The second chamber of the parlia-ment, the Bundesrat (Federal Council), reflectsGermany’s federal system. The state governments

appoint its sixty-nine members to represent theirinterests. The states normally appoint members of thestate cabinet to serve jointly in the Bundesrat; thechamber thus acts as a permanent conference of stateofficials. Each state receives Bundesrat seats in num-bers roughly proportionate to the state’s population,from three for the least populous states to six seats forthe most. Each state delegation casts its votes in a bloc,according to the instructions of the state government.

The Bundesrat’s role is to represent state interests.It does this in evaluating legislation, debating govern-ment policy, and sharing information between federaland state governments. The Bundesrat is an essentialpart of the German federal system.

In summary, the parliament mainly reacts to gov-ernment proposals, rather than taking the policy ini-tiative. However, in comparison to other Europeanparliamentary systems, the Bundestag exercises moreautonomy than the typical parliament. Especially ifone includes the Bundesrat, the German parliamenthas considerable independence and opportunity to re-vise government proposals and to exercise oversighton the government. By strengthening the power of theparliament, the Basic Law sought to create a check onexecutive power. Experience shows that the politicalsystem has met this goal.

The Federal Chancellor and Cabinet

A weakness of the Weimar system was the division ofexecutive authority between the president and the chan-cellor. The Federal Republic still has a dual executive,but the Basic Law substantially strengthened the formalpowers of the federal chancellor (Bundeskanzler) asthe chief executive office. Moreover, the incumbents ofthis office have dominated the political process andsymbolized the federal government by their personal-ization of power. The chancellor plays such a centralrole in the political system that some observers describethe German system as a “chancellor democracy.”

The Bundestag elects the chancellor, who is re-sponsible for the conduct of the federal government.The chancellor wields substantial power. She repre-sents a majority of the Bundestag and normally cancount on their support for the government’s legislativeproposals. The chancellors usually have led their ownparty, directing party strategy and leading the party atelections. Each chancellor also brings a distinct person-ality to the office. Schröder was a doer who governed

The beginning of a new nation: Chancellor Helmut

Kohl addresses the first meeting of the all-German

parliament (Bundestag) held in the Berlin Reichstag

building in October 1990.

dpa/Newscom


with a strong personality; Merkel prefers a more con-sultative and cooperative decisionmaking style, whilestill shaping the course of her government.

Another source of the chancellor’s authority isher control over the Cabinet. The federal governmentnow consists of fourteen departments, each headed bya minister. The Cabinet ministers are formally ap-pointed, or dismissed, by the federal president on therecommendation of the chancellor (Bundestag ap-proval is not necessary). The Basic Law also grants thechancellor the power to decide the number of Cabinetministers and their duties.

The federal government functions in terms of threeprinciples described in the Basic Law. First, thechancellor principle says that the chancellor defines gov-ernment policy. The formal policy directives issued bythe chancellor are legally binding on the Cabinet and theministries. Thus, in contrast to the British system ofshared Cabinet responsibility, the German Cabinet isformally subordinate to the chancellor in policymaking.

The second principle, ministerial autonomy, giveseach minister the authority to direct the ministry’s in-ternal workings without Cabinet intervention as longas the policies conform to the government’s guide-lines. Ministers are responsible for supervising the ac-tivities of their departments, guiding their policyplanning, and overseeing the administration of policywithin their jurisdiction.

The cabinet principle holds that when conflictsarise between departments over jurisdictional or bud-getary matters, the Basic Law calls for the Cabinet toresolve them.

The actual working of the federal government ismore fluid than the formal procedures listed in the Basic Law. The number and choice of ministries foreach party are major issues in building a multipartygovernment coalition after each election. Cabinetmembers also display great independence on policydespite the formal restrictions of the Basic Law. Minis-ters are appointed because of their expertise in a policyarea. In practice, ministers often identify more withtheir role as department head than with their role asagent of the chancellor; their political success is judgedby their representation of department interests.

The Cabinet thus serves as a clearinghouse for thebusiness of the federal government. Specific ministerspresent policy proposals originating in their depart-ments in the hope of gaining government endorse-ment. The chancellor defines a government program

that reflects a consensus of the Cabinet and relies onnegotiations and compromise within the Cabinet tomaintain this consensus.

The Federal President

Because of the problems associated with the WeimarRepublic’s divided executive, the Basic Law changed theoffice of federal president (Bundespräsident) into amostly ceremonial post. The president’s official dutiesinvolve greeting visiting heads of state, attending offi-cial government functions, visiting foreign nations, andcarrying out similar tasks.12 To insulate the office fromelectoral politics, the president is selected by theFederal Convention, composed of all Bundestagdeputies and an equal number of representatives cho-sen by the state legislatures. The president is supposedto remain above partisan politics once elected.

The reduction in the president’s formal politicalrole does not mean that an incumbent is uninvolvedin the policy process. The Basic Law assigns several le-gal functions to the president, who appoints govern-ment and military officials, signs treaties and laws, andhas the power of pardon. In these instances, however,the chancellor must countersign the actions. The pres-ident also nominates a chancellor to the Bundestagand can dissolve parliament if a government bill losesa no-confidence vote. In both instances the Basic Lawlimits the president’s ability to act independently.

Potentially more significant is the constitutionalambiguity over whether the president must honorcertain government requests. The legal precedent isunclear on whether the president has the constitu-tional right to veto legislation, to refuse the chancel-lor’s recommendation for Cabinet appointments, oreven to reject a request to dissolve the Bundestag. An-alysts see these ambiguities as another safety valvebuilt into the Basic Law’s elaborate system of checksand balances.

The office of the federal president also has politi-cal importance that goes beyond the articles of the Basic Law. An active, dynamic president can influencethe political climate through his speeches and publicactivities. The president is the one political figure whocan rightly claim to be above politics and who canwork to extend the vision of the nation beyond itseveryday concerns. Horst Köhler was elected presidentin 2004 after serving as director of the InternationalMonetary Fund.


The Judicial System

The ordinary courts, which hear criminal cases andmost legal disputes, are integrated into a unitary sys-tem. The states administer the courts at the local andstate levels. The highest ordinary court, the FederalCourt of Justice, is at the national level. All courtsapply the same national legal codes.

A second set of administrative courts hear cases inspecialized areas. One court deals with administrativecomplaints against government agencies, one handlestax matters, another resolves claims involving socialprograms, and one deals with labor-management dis-putes. Like the rest of the judicial system, these special-ized courts exist at both the state and the federal levels.

The Basic Law created a third element of the ju-diciary: the independent Constitutional Court. Thiscourt reviews the constitutionality of legislation, me-diates disputes between levels of government, andprotects the constitutional and democratic order.13

This is an innovation for the German legal systembecause it places one law, the Basic Law, above allothers. This also implies limits on the decisionmak-ing power of the parliament and the judicial inter-pretations of lower court judges. Because of theimportance of the Constitutional Court, its sixteenmembers are selected in equal numbers by the Bun-destag and Bundesrat and can be removed only forabuse of the office.

The creation of a body to conduct constitutionalreview is another successful institutional innovationof the Federal Republic. The Constitutional Courtprovides another check on the potential excesses ofgovernment and gives citizens additional protectionfor their human rights. It has become a third pillar ofcontemporary German democracy.

The Separation of Powers

One of the Basic Law’s secret strengths is avoiding theconcentration of power in the hands of any one actoror institution. The framers wanted to disperse politicalpower so that extremists or antidemocrats could notoverturn the system; democracy would require aconsensus-building process. Each institution of gov-ernment has strong powers within its own domain, buta limited ability to force its will on other institutions.

For instance, the chancellor lacks the authority todissolve the legislature and call for new elections,

something that normally exists in parliamentarysystems. Equally important, the Basic Law limits thelegislature’s control over the chancellor. In a parlia-mentary system, the legislature typically can remove achief executive from office by a simple majority vote.During the Weimar Republic, however, extremist par-ties used this device to destabilize the democratic sys-tem by opposing incumbent chancellors. To addresssituations where parliament might desire to removethe chancellor, the Basic Law created a constructiveno-confidence vote.14 In order for the Bundestag toremove a chancellor, it simultaneously must agree ona successor. This ensures continuity in governmentand an initial majority in support of a new chancel-lor. It also makes it more difficult to remove an in-cumbent; opponents cannot simply disagree with thegovernment—a majority must agree on an alterna-tive. The constructive no-confidence vote has been attempted only twice—and has succeeded only once.In 1982 a majority replaced Chancellor Schmidt witha new chancellor, Helmut Kohl.

The Constitutional Court is another check ongovernment actions, and it has assumed an importantrole as the guarantor of citizen rights and the protec-tor of the constitution. The distribution of power andpolicy responsibilities between the federal and stategovernments is another moderating force in the polit-ical process. Even the strong bicameral legislature en-sures that multiple interests must agree before makingpublic policy.

This structure complicates the governingprocess—compared with a unified system, such asthat in Britain, the Netherlands, or Sweden. However,democracy is often a complicated process. This systemof shared powers and of checks and balances has en-abled German democracy to grow and flourish. This isa very successful example of how constitutional engi-neering helped democratize the nation.

REMAKING POLITICAL CULTURES

Consider for a minute what the average German musthave thought about politics as World War II was end-ing. Germany’s political history was hardly conduciveto good democratic citizenship. Under the Kaiser thegovernment expected people to be subjects, not activeparticipants in the political process; this style nurturedfeelings of political intolerance. The interlude of the


Weimar Republic did little to change these values. Thepolarization, fragmentation, and outright violence ofthe Weimar Republic taught people to avoid politics,not to be active participants. Moreover, democracyeventually failed, and national socialism arose in itsplace. The Third Reich then raised another generationunder an intolerant, authoritarian system.

Because of this historical legacy, the Federal Re-public’s development was closely linked to the ques-tion of whether its political culture was congruentwith its democratic system. Initially, there were wide-spread fears that West Germany lacked a democraticpolitical culture, thereby making it vulnerable to thesame problems that undermined the Weimar Repub-lic. Postwar opinion polls in the West presented a neg-ative image of public opinion that was probablyequally applicable to the East.15 West Germans werepolitically detached, accepting of authority, and intol-erant in their political views. A significant minority ofthem were unrepentant Nazis, sympathy for many ele-ments of the Nazi ideology was widespread, and anti-Semitic feelings remained commonplace.

Perhaps even more amazing than the EconomicMiracle was the transformation of West Germany’spolitical culture in little more than a generation. Con-fronted by an uncertain public commitment todemocracy, the government undertook a massive po-litical reeducation program. The schools, the media,and political organizations were mobilized behind theeffort. The citizenry itself also was changing—oldergenerations raised under authoritarian regimes weregradually being replaced by younger generations so-cialized during the postwar democratic era. The suc-cesses of a growing economy and a relatively smoothlyfunctioning political system also changed public per-ceptions. These efforts created a new political culturemore consistent with the democratic institutions andprocess of the Federal Republic.

With unification Germany confronted another se-rious cultural question. The Communists had tried tocreate a rival culture in the GDR that would supporttheir state and its socialist economic system. Indeed, theefforts at political education in the East were intenseand extensive; they aimed at creating a broad “socialistpersonality” that included nonpolitical attitudes andbehavior.16 Young people were taught a collective iden-tity with their peers, a love for the GDR and its socialistbrethren, acceptance of the Socialist Unity Party, and aMarxist-Leninist understanding of history and society.

German unification meant the blending of thesetwo different political cultures, and at first the conse-quences of this mixture were uncertain. Without sci-entific social science research in the GDR, it wasunclear if Easterners had internalized the govern-ment’s propaganda. At the same time, the revolution-ary political events leading to German unificationmay have reshaped even long-held political beliefs.What does a Communist think after attending com-munism’s funeral?

Unification thus created a new question: Couldthe FRG assimilate 16 million new citizens with po-tentially different beliefs about how politics and soci-ety should function? The following sections discussthe key elements of German political culture and howthey have changed over time.

Orientations Toward the Political Community

A common history, culture, territory, and languagecreated a sense of a single German community longbefore Germany was politically united. Germany wasthe land of Schiller, Goethe, Beethoven, and Wagner,even if the Germans disagreed on political boundaries.The imagery of a single Volk binds Germans togetherdespite their social and political differences.

Previous regimes had failed, however, to developa common political identity to match the German so-cial identity. Succeeding political systems were shortlived and did not develop a popular consensus on thenature and goals of German politics. Postwar WestGermany faced a similar challenge: building a politicalcommunity in a divided and defeated nation.

In the early 1950s, large sectors of the West German public identified with the symbols and per-sonalities of previous regimes.17 Most people felt thatthe Second Empire or Hitler’s prewar Reich repre-sented the best times in German history. Substantialminorities favored a restoration of the monarchy or aone-party state. Almost half the population believedthat if it had not been for World War II, Hitler wouldhave been one of Germany’s greatest statesmen.

Over the next two decades, these ties to earlierregimes gradually weakened, and the bonds to the newinstitutions and leaders of the Federal Republicsteadily grew stronger (see Figure 10.3). The numberof citizens who believed that Bundestag deputies rep-resent the public interest doubled between 1951 and1964; public respect shifted from the personalities of


prior regimes to the chancellors of the Federal Repub-lic. By the 1970s an overwhelming majority of thepublic felt that the present was the best time in German history. West Germans became more politi-cally tolerant, and feelings of anti-Semitism declinedsharply. The public displayed a growing esteem for thenew political system.18

Even while Westerners developed a new acceptanceof the institutions and symbols of the Federal Republic,something was missing, something that touched thespirit of their political feelings. The FRG was a provi-sional entity, and “Germany” meant a unified nation.Were citizens of West Germany to think of themselvesas Germans, West Germans, or some mix of both? Inaddition, the trauma of the Third Reich burned a deepscar in the Western psyche, making citizens hesitant toexpress pride in their nation or a sense of German na-tional identity. Because of this political stigma, the FRGavoided many of the emotional national symbols thatare common in other nations. There were few politicalholidays or memorials, one seldom heard the national

anthem, and even the anniversary of the founding ofthe FRG received little public attention. This legacymeans that even today Germans are hesitant to openlyexpress pride in the nation (see Box 10.2).

The quest for a national identity also occurred inthe East. The GDR claimed to represent the “pure”elements of German history; it portrayed the FRG asthe successor to the Third Reich. Most analysts believethat the GDR had created at least a sense of resignedloyalty to the regime because of its political and socialaccomplishments. Thus, a 1990 study found that East-ern youth most admired Karl Marx (followed by thefirst president of the GDR), while Western youth weremost likely to name Konrad Adenauer, the first chan-cellor of the FRG.19 Once socialism failed, however,the basis for a separate East German political identityalso evaporated.

Unification began a process by which the Germansearch for a national political identity could finally beresolved. The opening of the Berlin Wall created posi-tive political emotions that were previously lacking.The celebration of unification, and the designation ofOctober 3 as a national holiday, finally gives Germansa positive political experience to celebrate. Citizens inEast and West remain somewhat hesitant to embracean emotional attachment to the nation, and Easternersretain a lingering tie to their separate past. Yet, the basic situation has changed. For the first time in over acentury, nearly all Germans agree where their bordersbegin and end. Germany is now a single nation—democratic, free, and looking toward the future.

Orientations Toward the Democratic Process

A second important element of the political cultureinvolves citizen attitudes toward the political processand system of government. In the early years of WestGermany, the rules of democratic politics—majorityrule, minority rights, individual liberties, and pluralis-tic debate—did not fit citizens’ experiences. To breakthis pattern, political leaders constructed a system thatformalized democratic procedures. Citizen participa-tion was encouraged and expected, policymakingbecame open, and the public gradually learned demo-cratic norms by continued exposure to the new politi-cal system. Political leadership provided a generallypositive example of competition in a democratic set-ting. Consequently, a popular consensus slowly devel-oped in support of the democratic political system. By

70

60

50

40

30

20

10

0

1950 1960 1970 1980 1990

Pleased to see

FRG flag

FRG chancellor

did most

Bundestag is good

representative

of public

Perc

enta

ges

F I G U R E 1 0 . 3

Source: Russell J. Dalton, Politics in Germany, 2nd ed. (New York:

HarperCollins, 1993), p. 121.

Increase in Support for the

Democratic Regime,

1951–1986West Germans’ support for the institutions

and procedures of the Federal Republic

grew substantially over time


the mid-1960s there was nearly unanimous agreementthat democracy was the best form of government.More important, the Western public displayed a grow-ing commitment to democratic procedures—a multi-party system, conflict management, minority rights,and representative government.20

Political events occasionally have tested popularcommitment to democratic values in West Germany.For instance, during the 1970s a small group of ex-tremists attempted to topple the system through aterrorist campaign.21 In the early 1980s, the Kohl gov-ernment faced a series of violent actions by anarchicand radical ecology groups. In recent years newthreats from international terrorists and jihadist ex-tremists have threatened the nation. In these in-stances, however, the basic conclusion was that thepolitical system could face the onslaughts of politi-cal extremists and survive with its basic proceduresintact—and without the public losing faith in the demo-cratic process.

The propaganda of the East German governmentalso stressed a democratic creed. In reality, however, theregime tried to create a political culture that was com-patible with a communist state and a socialist economy.The culture drew on traditional Prussian values of obe-dience, duty, and loyalty: The government again toldpeople that obedience was the responsibility of a goodcitizen and that support of the state (and the party) wasan end in itself. Periodically, political events—the 1953East Berlin uprising, the construction of the BerlinWall, and the expulsions of political dissidents—

reminded East Germans of the gap between the demo-cratic rhetoric of the regime and reality.

One reason the popular revolt may have grown sorapidly in 1989 was that citizens no longer supportedthe principles of the regime, even if they might be hes-itant to publicly express such sentiments under a Stasipolice state. For instance, studies of young Easternersfound that identification with Marxism-Leninism andbelief in the inevitable victory of socialism droppedoff dramatically during the mid-1980s.22 At the least,the revolutionary changes that swept through EastGermany as the Berlin Wall fell nurtured a belief indemocracy as the road to political reform. A 1990public opinion survey found nearly universal supportfor basic tenets of democracy among both West andEast Germans.23

The true test of democracy, of course, occurs inthe real world. Some studies suggest that Easterners’initial understanding of democracy was limited, or atleast different from that of Westerners.24 Yet, East-erners in 1989 were markedly more supportive ofdemocracy than were Germans in 1945. Rather thanremaking this aspect of the East German culture, thegreater need was to transform Eastern support fordemocracy into a deeper and richer understanding ofthe workings of the process and its pragmaticstrengths and weaknesses. And now, almost twodecades after unification, with an Easterner as thechancellor, the principles of democracy are becom-ing engrained in the political culture—both Westand East.

Can One Be Proud and German?

Could anyone imagine a French president or a British

prime minister or indeed just about any other world

leader refusing to say he was proud of his nationality?

Yet, this is a contentious statement in Germany

because expressions of nationalism are still linked by

some to the excessive nationalism of the Third Reich.

Thus, when in 2001 the general secretary of the

Christian Democratic Union declared: “I am proud to

be German,” he set off an intense national debate. A

Green member of the Social Democratic Party–Green

Cabinet replied that this statement demonstrated the

mentality of a right-wing skinhead. President Rau tried

to sidestep the issue by declaring that one could be

“glad” or “grateful” for being German, but not “proud.”

Then Chancellor Schröder entered the fray: “I am

proud of what people have achieved and our demo-

cratic culture. . . . In that sense, I am a German patriot

who is proud of his country.” It is difficult to imagine

such exchanges occurring in Washington, D.C., or

Paris.

B O X 1 0 . 2

Source: The Economist, March 24, 2001, p. 62.


Social Values and the New Politics

Another area of cultural change in West Germanyinvolves a shift in public values produced by the socialand economic accomplishments of the nation. OnceWest Germany addressed traditional social and eco-nomic needs, the public broadened its concerns toinclude a new set of societal goals. New issues—suchas the environment, women’s rights, and increasingcitizen participation—attracted public attention.

Ronald Inglehart explained these political devel-opments in terms of the changing value orientationsof Westerners.25 He maintains that a person’s valuepriorities reflect the family and societal conditionsthat prevail early in life. Older generations, socializedbefore the post–World War II transformation, haveexperienced uncertain economic and political condi-tions, which lead them to still emphasize economicsecurity, law and order, religious values, and a strongnational defense—despite the economic and politicaladvances of the past half century. In contrast, becauseyounger generations grew up in a democratic and af-fluent nation, they were shifting their attention towardNew Politics values. These new values emphasize self-expression, personal freedom, social equality, self-fulfillment, and quality of life.

Although only a minority of Westerners hold thesenew values, they represent a “second culture” embeddedwithin the dominant culture of FRG society. These val-ues are less developed among Easterners. Still, the evi-dence of political change is apparent. Public interest inNew Politics issues has gradually spread beyond itsyouthful supporters and developed a broader base.Even in the East, many of the early demonstrations fordemocracy had supporters calling for “Freiheit undUmwelt” (freedom and the environment).

Two Peoples in One Nation?

Citizens in the East and West share a common Germanheritage, but forty years of separation created culturaldifferences that now are blended into a single nationalculture.

Because of these different experiences, the broadsimilarities in many of the political beliefs of Western-ers and Easterners are surprising. Easterners andWesterners both espouse support for the democraticsystem and its norms and institutions. There is alsobroad acceptance of the principles of Germany’s social

market economy. Thus, the Federal Republic’s secondtransition to democracy features an agreement onbasic political and economic values that is markedlydifferent from the situation after World War II.

Yet, other aspects of cultural norms do differbetween regions. For instance, although residents inboth the West and the East endorse the tenets ofdemocracy, it is harder to reach agreement on howthese ideals translate into practical politics. The open,sometimes confrontational style of Western politics is amajor adjustment for citizens raised under the closedsystem of the GDR. In addition, Easterners endorse abroader role for government in providing social ser-vices and guiding social development than is foundamong Westerners.26

There are also signs of a persisting gap inregional identities between East and West. The

Greenpeace Germany protests against nuclear power

and the nuclear recycling plant at Sellafield.

AP Images/Fabian Bimmer


passage of time and harsh postunification adjust-ments created a nostalgia for some aspects of theGDR among its former residents. Easterners do notwant a return to communism or socialism, but manymiss the slower and more predictable style of theirformer lives. Even while expressing support for Westerncapitalism, many Easterners have difficulty adjustingto the idea of unemployment and to the competitivepressures of a market-based economy. There is a nos-talgic yearning for symbols of these times, rangingfrom the Trabant automobile to consumer productsbearing Eastern labels. The popularity of the 2003movie Goodbye Lenin! is an indication of these sen-timents—and a good film for students interested inthis phase of German history. In fact, Easternershave developed a regional identity that is similar tothe feelings of Southerners in the United States.Moreover, even though Easterners favor democracy,only 41 percent in 2007 were satisfied with how itfunctions in the Federal Republic, compared withmore than two-thirds among Westerners.27 Eastern-ers still feel that the political system overlooks theirneeds.

Unification may have also heightened New Poli-tics conflicts within German society. The GDR hadstruggled to become a materialist success, while theWest enjoyed its postmaterial abundance. Conse-quently, Easterners give greater weight to such goals ashigher living standards, security, hard work, and betterliving conditions. Most Easterners want first to sharein the affluence and consumer society of the Westbefore they begin to fear the consequences of thisaffluence. The clash of values within West German so-ciety is now joined by East-West differences.

Germans share a common language, culture, andhistory—and a common set of ultimate politicalgoals—although the strains of unification may mag-nify and politicize the differences. The nation’sprogress in blending these two cultures successfullywill strongly affect the course of the new Germany.

POLITICAL LEARNING AND POLITICALCOMMUNICATION

If a congruent political culture helps a political systemto endure, as many political experts maintain, thenone of the basic functions of the political process is tocreate and perpetuate these attitudes. This process is

known as political socialization. Researchers normallyview political socialization as a source of continuity ina political system, with one generation transmittingthe prevailing political norms to the next. In Germany,however, the socialization challenges for the past halfcentury have been to change the culture inheritedfrom the Third Reich and then to change the cultureinherited from the GDR.

Family Influences

During their early years, children have few sources oflearning comparable to their parents—normally themajor influence in forming basic values. Family dis-cussions can be a rich source of political informationand one of the many ways that children internalizetheir parents’ attitudes. Basic values acquired duringchildhood often persist into adulthood.

In the early postwar years, family socialization didnot function smoothly on either side of the Germanborder. Many parents did not discuss politics withtheir children for fear that the child would ask, “Whatdid you do under Hitler, Daddy?” The potential forparental socialization grew steadily as the political sys-tem of the FRG began to take root, however.28 The fre-quency of political discussion increased in the West,and family conversations about politics became com-monplace. Moreover, young new parents raised underthe system of the FRG could pass on democraticnorms held for a lifetime.

The family also played an important role in thesocialization process of the GDR. Family ties wereespecially close in the East, and most young peopleclaimed to share their parents’ political opinions. Thefamily was one of the few settings where people couldopenly discuss their beliefs, a private sphere whereindividuals could be free of the watchful eyes of oth-ers. Here one could express praise for—or doubtabout—the state.

Despite the growing socialization role of the fam-ily, there is often a generation gap in political values inboth West and East. Youth in the West are more liberalthan their parents, more oriented toward noneco-nomic goals, more positive about their role in thepolitical process, and more likely to challenge prevail-ing social norms.29 Eastern youth are also a product oftheir times, now being raised under the new demo-cratic and capitalist systems of the Federal Republic.Under the GDR, conformity was mandated; imagine


what Eastern parents think when their teenagers adopthiphop or punk lifestyles. Clearly, young people’s val-ues and goals are changing, often putting them in con-flict with their elders.

Education

The educational system was a major factor in the cre-ation of a democratic political culture in the FRG. Aspublic support for the FRG’s political systemincreased, this decreased the need for formal instruc-tion in the principles of democracy and the new insti-tutions of the political system. The content of civicsinstruction changed to emphasize an understanding ofthe dynamics of the democratic process—interest rep-resentation, conflict resolution, minority rights, andthe methods of citizen influence. The present systemtries to prepare students for their adult roles as politi-cal participants.

In the East the school system also played an essen-tial role in political education, although the contentwas very different. The schools tried to create a socialistpersonality that encompassed a devotion to commu-nist principles, a love of the GDR, and participation instate-sponsored activities. Yet, again, the rhetoric ofeducation conflicted with reality. The textbooks toldstudents that the GDR endorsed personal freedom, butthen they stared from their school buses at the barbedwire strung along the border. Many young people ac-cepted the rhetoric of the regime, but the educationefforts remained incomplete.

Another cornerstone of the GDR’s socializationefforts was a system of government-supervised youthgroups. Nearly all primary school students enrolled inthe Pioneers, a youth organization that combined nor-mal social activities—similar to those in the BoyScouts or Girl Scouts in the United States—with aheavy dose of political education. At age 14 aboutthree-fourths of the young joined the Free GermanYouth (FDJ) group, which was a training and recruit-ing ground for the future leadership of East Germany.Like other communist states, the GDR staged masssporting events that included an opportunity forpolitical indoctrination and used the Olympic medalcount as a measure of the nation’s international status.In short, from a school’s selection of texts for first-grade readers to the speeches at a sports awards ban-quet, the values of the GDR regime touched everydaylife. This changed, of course, with German unification,

so that the schools teach about common values acrossthe nation.

Social Stratification Another important effect of edu-cation involves its consequences for the social stratifi-cation of society. The secondary school system in theFederal Republic has three distinct tracks. One trackprovides a general education that normally leads tovocational training and working-class occupations.A second track mixes vocational and academic train-ing. Most graduates from this program are employed inlower middle-class occupations. A third track focuseson academic training at a Gymnasium (an academichigh school) in preparation for university education.

In selecting students for different careers, theseeducational tracks reinforce social status differenceswithin society. The schools direct students into onetrack after only four to six years of primary schooling,based on their school record, parental preferences, andteacher evaluations. At this early age, family influencesare still a major factor in the child’s development—your future career choices are largely determined atage 10. This means that most children in the academictrack come from middle-class families, and most stu-dents in the vocational track are from working-classfamilies. Sharp distinctions separate the three tracks.Students attend different schools, so that social con-tact across tracks is minimized. The curriculums ofthe three tracks are so different that once a student isassigned, he or she would find it difficult to transfer.The Gymnasia are more generously financed andrecruit the best-qualified teachers. Every student whograduates from a Gymnasium is guaranteed admis-sion to a university, where tuition is free.

Reformers have made numerous attempts tolessen the class bias of the educational system. There isa clear tendency for middle-class children to benefitunder the tracked educational system. Some stateshave a single, comprehensive secondary school that allstudents may attend, but only about 10 percent ofWestern secondary school students are enrolled inthese schools. Reformers have been more successful inexpanding access to the universities. In the early1950s, only 6 percent of college-aged youths pursuedhigher education; today this figure is over 30 percent.The Federal Republic’s educational system retains anelitist accent, though it is now less obvious.

The socialist ideology of the GDR led to a differ-ent educational structure. Students from different


social backgrounds and with different academic abili-ties attended the same school—much like the struc-ture of public education in the United States. Theschools emphasized practical career training, with aheavy dose of technical and applied courses in thelater years. Those with special academic abilitiescould apply to the extended secondary school duringtheir twelfth year, which led to a university education.Ironically, the Eastern system provided more oppor-tunities for mobility than did the educational systemin the FRG.

At first, the Eastern states attempted to keep theirsystem of comprehensive schools after German union.However, unification has generally led to the expan-sion of the West’s highly tracked educational system tothe East, rather than to reforms to liberalize the German system of secondary education to lessen social biases and grant greater opportunity to all.

Mass Media

The mass media have a long history in Germany: Theworld’s first newspaper and first television serviceboth appeared on German soil. Under previousregimes, however, political authorities frequently cen-sored or manipulated the media. National socialismshowed what a potent socialization force the mediacould be, especially when placed in the wrong hands.

The mass media of the Federal Republic weredeveloped with the goal of avoiding the experience ofNazi propaganda and contributing to a new demo-cratic political culture.30 The Federal Republic beganwith a new journalistic tradition, committed to demo-cratic norms, objectivity, and political neutrality.

The German media are also highly regionalized.The Federal Republic lacks an established nationalpress like that of Britain or France. Instead, each re-gion or large city has one or more newspapers thatcirculate primarily within that locale. Of the severalhundred daily newspapers, only a few—such as theFrankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Welt, SüddeutscheZeitung, and Frankfurter Rundschau—have a nationalfollowing.

The electronic media in the Federal Republic arealso regionally decentralized. Public corporationsorganized at the state or regional level manage thepublic television and radio networks. These publicbroadcasting networks still are the major Germantelevision channels. To ensure independence from

commercial pressures, the public media are financedmostly by taxes assessed on owners of radios andtelevision sets. But new technologies of cable andsatellite television have undercut the government’smedia monopoly. These new media have eroded thegovernment’s control of the information flow andincreased pressures to cater to consumer preferences.Many analysts see these new media offerings asexpanding the citizens’ choice and the diversity of in-formation, but others worry that the quality of Ger-man broadcasting has suffered as a result. Once onecould not even watch soccer matches on televisionbecause government planners considered it inappro-priate. Now cable subscribers can watch a previouslyunimaginable range of social, cultural, political, andsports programming.

The mass media are a primary source of informa-tion for the public and a communications link betweenelites and the public. The higher-quality newspapersdevote substantial attention to domestic and interna-tional reporting, although the largest circulationnewspaper, Bild Zeitung, sells papers through sensa-tionalist stories. The public television networks arealso strongly committed to political programming;about one-third of their programs deal with social orpolitical issues.

Public opinion surveys show that Germans have avoracious appetite for the political information pro-vided by the mass media. A 2005 survey found that 52 percent of the public claimed to read news in thenewspaper on a daily basis, 56 percent listened to newson the radio daily, and 70 percent said they watchedtelevision news programs daily.31 These high levels ofmedia usage indicate that Germans are attentivemedia users and well informed on the flow of politicalevents.

CITIZEN PARTICIPATION

In the In the 1950s the Western public did not partic-ipate in the new political process; they acted like polit-ical spectators who were following a soccer matchfrom the grandstand. Previous German history cer-tainly had not been conducive to developing wide-spread public involvement in politics. The final step inremaking the political culture was to involve citizensin the process—to have them come onto the field andparticipate.


From the start both German states encouragedtheir citizens to be politically active, but with differentexpectations about what was appropriate. The demo-cratic procedures of West Germany induced manypeople to at least vote in elections. Turnout reached upto 90 percent for some national elections. Westernersbecame well informed about the political system anddeveloped an interest in political matters. After con-tinued democratic experience, people began tointernalize their role as participants. Most Westernersthink their participation can influence the politicalprocess—people believe that democracy works.

The public’s changing political norms led to adramatic increase in involvement. In the 1950s almosttwo-thirds of the West German public never discussedpolitics; today about three-quarters claim they talkabout politics regularly. Expanding citizen interestcreated a participatory revolution in the FRG asinvolvement in campaigns and political organizationsincreased. Perhaps the most dramatic example of ris-ing participation levels was the growth of citizenaction groups (Bürgerinitiativen). Citizens interestedin a specific issue form a group to articulate theirpolitical demands and influence decisionmakers. Par-ents organize for school reform, homeowners becomeinvolved in urban redevelopment projects, taxpayerscomplain about the de-livery of governmentservices, or residentsprotest the environmen-tal conditions in theirlocale. These groups ex-panded citizen influencesignificantly beyond theinfrequent and indirectmethods of campaignsand elections.

The GDR systemalso encouraged politi-cal involvement, butpeople could be activeonly in ways that rein-forced their allegianceto the state. For exam-ple, elections offeredthe Communist leader-ship an opportunity toeducate the public politically. More than

90 percent of the electorate cast ballots, and thegovernment parties always won nearly all the votes.People were expected to participate in government-approved unions, social groups (such as the FreeGerman Youth or the German Women’s Union), andquasi-public bodies, such as parent-teacher organiza-tions. However, participation was a method not forcitizens to influence the government, but for the gov-ernment to influence its citizens.

Although they draw on much different experi-ences, Germans from both the East and the West havebeen socialized into a pattern of high political in-volvement (see Figure 10.4).32 Voting levels innational elections are among the highest of any Euro-pean democracy. Almost 80 percent of Westernersand almost 75 percent of Easterners turned out at thepolls in the 2005 Bundestag elections. This turnoutlevel is very high by U.S. standards, but it has declinedfrom nearly 90 percent in FRG elections of the 1980s.High turnout partially reflects the belief that voting ispart of a citizen’s duty. In addition, the electoral sys-tem encourages turnout: Elections are held on Sun-day when everyone is free to vote, voter registrationlists are constantly updated by the government, andthe ballot is always simple—there are at most twovotes to cast.

Wore button

Worked for p

arty

Demonstratio

n

Contact politic

ian

Boycott

Worked with

community group

Sign petition

Interest in politic

s

Voted in 2005

Perc

enta

ge

90

80

70

60

50

40

30

20

10

0

West East

Participation Levels in West and East GermanyWesterners are generally more politically active than Easterners, although

there are many ways people participate

F I G U R E 1 0 . 4

Source: 2004 European Social Survey (ess.nsd.uib.no); voter turnout is from government statistics for the 2005

election.


Beyond the act of voting, many Germans partici-pate in other ways. A survey conducted after the 2004European election illustrates the participation pat-terns of Easterners and Westerners (see again Figure10.4). Almost a third of the public in West and Easthad signed a petition in the previous year, and a fifthhad boycotted some product on political grounds.These are high levels by cross-national standards.

The pattern of working with political parties andcitizen action groups is also interesting. A significantproportion of Westerners (3 percent) and Easterners(4 percent) said they had worked for a political partyduring the 2004 election, and about the samepercentages said they had displayed a campaignsticker or button. Yet, participating in a legal demon-stration or working with others on a communityproblem was much more common than campaign ac-tivity in both regions. A substantial proportion of thepublic had also written or contacted a politician dur-ing the past year. This indicates the expansion of po-litical involvement to new modes of action.

Thus, Germans on both sides of the former bor-der are now actively involved in politics. Moreover,participation extends beyond the traditional role ofvoting in elections to include a wide range of politicalactivities. The spectators have become participants.

POLITICS AT THE ELITE LEVEL33

The Federal Republic is a representative democracy.This means that above the populace is a group of a few

thousand political elite who manage the actual work-ings of the political system. Elite members, such asparty leaders and parliamentary deputies, are directlyresponsible to the public through elections. Civil ser-vants and judges are appointed, and they are at leastindirectly responsible to the citizenry. Leaders of inter-est groups and political associations participate as rep-resentatives of their specific clientele groups. Althoughthe group of politically influential elites is readily iden-tifiable, it is not a homogeneous power elite. Rather,elites in the Federal Republic represent the diverseinterests in German society. Often there is as muchheterogeneity in policy preferences among the politi-cal elites as there is among the public.

Individuals may take numerous pathways to elitepositions. Party elites may have exceptional politicalabilities; administrative elites are initially recruited be-cause of their formal training and bureaucratic skills;interest group leaders are selected for their ability torepresent their group.

One feature of elite recruitment that differs fromAmerican politics is the long apprenticeship periodbefore one enters the top elite stratum. Candidates fornational or even state political office normally have along background of party work and officeholding atthe local level. Similarly, senior civil servants spendnearly all their adult lives working for the govern-ment. Chancellor Merkel’s biography is an unusualexample because she did not follow the typical modelof a long career or party and political positions (seeBox 10.3).

The Atypical Chancellor

Angela Merkel has the most unlikely biography for a

German chancellor. She was born in West Germany in

1954, and when she was a year old, her father, a left-

leaning Protestant minister, chose to move his family to

East Germany. Like many young East Germans, she

became a member of the Communist youth league, the

Free German Youth group. She eventually earned a

Ph.D. in chemistry from the East Berlin Academy of

Sciences in 1989. Merkel pursued a career as a research

scientist until the German Democratic Republic (GDR)

began to collapse in 1989. She first joined the

Democratic Awakening and then the Christian

Democratic Union (CDU) and was elected to the

Bundestag as a CDU deputy in 1990. She rose quickly

through the ranks of CDU leaders, serving as minister for

women and youth from 1991 to 1994 and as environment

minister from 1994 to 1998. In 2000 Merkel became the

national chair of the CDU. With her election in 2005, she

became the first woman, and the first former citizen of the

GDR, to head the German federal government. In 2008

Forbes magazine ranked Chancellor Merkel as number 1

on their list of the 100 most powerful women in the world.

B O X 1 0 . 3


A long apprenticeship means that political eliteshave extensive experience before attaining a positionof greatest power; elites also share a common basis ofexperience built up from interacting over many years.National politicians know each other from workingtogether at the state or local level; the paths of civilservants frequently cross during their long careers.These experiences develop a sense of trust and respon-sibility in elite interactions. For instance, members ofa chancellor’s Cabinet are normally drawn from partyelites with extensive experience in state or federal gov-ernment. Until Merkel was elected, chancellors sincethe 1960s had previously served as the minister presi-dent of their state. Seldom can top business leaders orpopular personalities use their outside success toattain a position of political power quickly. This alsocontributes to the cohesion of elite politics.

Because they represent different political con-stituencies, elites differ in many of their policy priori-ties. For instance, SPD elites and officials from laborunions are more likely to emphasize the need forgreater social and economic equality, social security,and the integration of foreigners.34 Church officialsstress moral and religious principles, whileCDU/CSU and business representatives typically havea distinct economic position. Green activists havetheir own distinct alternative agenda. This method ofrepresentation gives citizens a voice in the decisionsmade by elites, and the clearer the link, the more di-rect the voice.

INTEREST GROUPS

Interest groups are an integral part of the Germanpolitical process, even more so than in the UnitedStates. Some specific interests may be favored morethan others, but interest groups are generally welcomedas necessary participants in the political process.

German interest groups are connected to the gov-ernment more closely than are such groups in theUnited States. Doctors, lawyers, and other self-employedprofessionals belong to professional associations thatare established by law and receive government autho-rization of their activities, making them quasi-publicbodies. These associations, which date back to the me-dieval guilds, enforce professional rules of conduct.

Interest groups also participate in a variety ofgovernmental commissions and bodies, such as that

managing public radio and television. Some groupsreceive financial or administrative support from thegovernment to assist them in carrying out policy-related activities, such as the administration of a hos-pital or the monitoring of environmental conditions.Federal administrative law requires that ministry offi-cials contact the relevant interest groups when for-mulating new policies that may affect them. Theseconsultations ensure that the government can benefitfrom the groups’ expertise.

In some instances the pattern of interest groupactivity approaches the act of governance. For exam-ple, when the government sought structural reform inthe steel industry, it assembled interest group repre-sentatives from the affected sectors to discuss and ne-gotiate a common plan. Group officials attempted toreach a consensus on the necessary changes and thenimplemented the agreements, sometimes with the of-ficial sanction of the government. Similar activitieshave occurred in other policy sectors.

This cooperation between government and inter-est groups is described as neocorporatism, a generalpattern having the following characteristics:35

■ Social interests are organized into virtually com-pulsory organizations.

■ A single association represents each social sector.■ Associations are hierarchically structured.■ Associations are accepted as formal representa-

tives by the government.■ Associations may participate directly in the policy

process.

Policy decisions are reached in discussions andnegotiations between the relevant association and thegovernment—then the agreements are implementedby government action.

This neocorporatist pattern solidifies the role ofinterest groups in the policy process. Governmentsfeel that they are responding to public demandswhen they consult with these groups, and the mem-bers of these interest groups depend on the organiza-tion to have their views heard. Thus, representativesof the major interest groups are important actors inthe policy process. Neocorporatist relations alsolessen political conflict; for instance, strike levels andpolitical strife tend to be lower in neocorporatistsystems.


Another advantage of neocorporatism is that itmakes for efficient government; the involved interestgroups can negotiate on policy without the pressuresof public debate and partisan conflict. However, effi-cient government is not necessarily the best govern-ment, especially in a democracy. Decisions are reachedin conference groups or advisory commissions, out-side of the representative institutions of governmentdecisionmaking. The “relevant” interest groups are in-volved, but this assumes that all relevant interests areorganized and that only organized interests are rele-vant. Decisions affecting the entire public are oftenmade through private negotiations, as democraticallyelected representative institutions—state governmentsand the Bundestag—are sidestepped and interestgroups deal directly with government agencies.Consequently, interest groups play a less active role inelectoral politics, as they concentrate their efforts ondirect contact with government agencies.

Interest groups come in many shapes and sizes.This section describes the large associations that rep-resent the major socioeconomic forces in society.These associations normally have a national organiza-tion, a so-called peak association, that speaks for itsmembers.

Business

Two major organizations represent business andindustrial interests. The Federation of GermanIndustry (BDI) is the peak association for thirty-fiveseparate industrial groupings. The BDI-affiliated asso-ciations represent nearly every major industrial firm,forming a united front that speaks with authority onmatters affecting their interests.

The Confederation of German Employers’ Asso-ciations (BDA) includes even more business organiza-tions. Virtually every large- or medium-sized employerin the nation is affiliated with one of the sixty-eightemployer and professional associations of the BDA.

The two organizations have overlapping mem-bership, but they have different roles in the politicalprocess. The BDI represents business on national po-litical matters. Its officials participate in governmentadvisory committees and planning groups, presentingthe view of business to government officials andmembers of parliament. In contrast, the BDA repre-sents business on labor and social issues. The individ-ual employer associations negotiate with the labor

unions over employment contracts. At the nationallevel, the BDA represents business on legislation deal-ing with social security, labor legislation, and socialservices. It also nominates business representativesfor a variety of government committees, rangingfrom the media supervisory boards to social securitycommittees.

Business interests have a long history of close re-lations with the Christian Democrats and conservativepoliticians. Companies and their top managementprovide significant financial support for the ChristianDemocrats, and many Bundestag deputies have strongties to business. Yet both the Social Democrats and theChristian Democrats readily accept the legitimate roleof business interests within the policy process.

Labor

The German Federation of Trade Unions (DGB) isthe peak association that incorporates eight separateunions—ranging from the metalworking and build-ing trades to the chemical industry and the postalsystem—into a single organizational structure.36

The DGB represents more than 7 million workers.Union membership has declined, however, andtoday barely a third of the labor force belongs to aunion. The membership includes many industrialworkers and an even larger percentage of govern-ment employees.

As a political organization, the DGB has close tiesto the Social Democratic Party, although there is noformal institutional bond between the two. Most SPDdeputies in the Bundestag are members of a union,and about one-tenth are former labor union officials.The DGB represents the interests of labor in govern-ment conference groups and Bundestag committees.The large mass membership of the DGB also makesunion campaign support and the union vote essentialparts of the SPD’s electoral base.

In spite of their differing interests, business andunions have shown an unusual ability to work together.The Economic Miracle was possible because labor andmanagement implicitly agreed that the first priority waseconomic growth, from which both sides would pros-per. Work time lost through strikes and work stoppageshas been consistently lower in the Federal Republicthan in most other Western European nations.

This cooperation is encouraged by joint partici-pation of business and union representatives in


government committees and planning groups. Coop-eration also extends into industrial decisionmakingthrough codetermination (Mitbestimmung), a fed-eral policy requiring that employees elect half of theboard of directors in large companies. The systemwas first applied to the coal, iron, and steel industriesin 1951, and in 1976 it was extended a modified formto large corporations in other fields. Initially, therewere dire forecasts that codetermination would de-stroy German industry. The system generally has been successful, however, in fostering better labor-management relations and thereby strengthening theeconomy. The Social Democrats also favor codetermi-nation because it introduces democratic principlesinto the economic system.

Religious Interests

Religious associations are the third major organizedinterest. Rather than being separated from politics, asin the United States, church and state are closely relat-ed. The churches are subject to the rules of the state,and in return they receive formal representation andsupport from the government.

The churches are financed mainly through achurch tax collected by the government. The govern-ment adds a surcharge (about 10 percent) to an em-ployee’s income tax, and the government transfers thisamount to the employee’s church. A taxpayer can officially decline to pay that tax, but social norms dis-courage this. Catholic primary schools in several statesreceive government funding, and the churches acceptgovernment subsidies to support their social pro-grams and aid to the needy.

The churches are often directly involved in thepolicy process. Church appointees regularly sit ongovernment planning committees that deal with edu-cation, social services, and family affairs. By law thechurches participate on the supervisory boards of thepublic radio and television networks. Members ofthe Protestant and Catholic clergy occasionally servein political offices, as Bundestag deputies or as stategovernment officials.

The Catholic and Protestant churches receive thesame formal representation by the government, butthe two churches differ in their political styles. TheCatholic Church has close ties to the Christian Democrats and at least implicitly encourages its mem-bers to support this party and its conservative policies.

The Catholic hierarchy is not hesitant to lobby thegovernment on legislation dealing with social ormoral issues and often wields an influential role inpolicymaking.

The Protestant community is a loose associationof mostly Lutheran churches spread across Germany.Church involvement in politics varies with the prefer-ences of local pastors, bishops, and their respectivecongregations. In the West the Protestant churches arenot very involved in partisan politics, although theyare seen as favoring the Social Democrats. Protestantgroups also work through their formal representationon government committees or function as individuallobbying organizations.

Protestant churches played a more significant po-litical role in the GDR because they were one of thefew organizations that was autonomous from thestate. Churches were places where people could freelydiscuss the social and moral aspects of contemporaryissues. As the East German revolution gathered forcein 1989, many churches acted as rallying points foropposition to the regime. Religion was not the opiateof the people, as Marx had feared, but one of theforces that swept the Communists from power.

Declining church attendance in both West andEast marks a steady secularization of German soci-ety. About one-tenth of Westerners claim to be non-religious, as are nearly half the residents in the East.The gradual secularization of German society sug-gests that the churches’ popular base will continue itsslow erosion.

Germany’s growing Muslim community repre-sents a new aspect of religious interests. These commu-nities have built mosques across Germany, often facingresistance from the local population. The mosquesthen receive tax support, just like the Catholic andProtestant churches. Some activists have demandedthat schools teach the Koran and that they provide in-struction in languages other than German. As moreforeign residents become German citizens, this com-munity is likely to become a more vocal participant inthe political process.

New Politics Movement

During the late twentieth century, new citizen groupsemerged as part of the New Politics movement.Challenging business, labor, religion, agriculture, andother established socioeconomic interests, these new


organizations have focused their efforts on thelifestyle and quality-of-life issues facing Germany.37

Environmental groups are the most visible part ofthe movement. Following the flowering of environ-mental interests in the 1970s, antinuclear groupspopped up like mushrooms around nuclear powerfacilities, local environmental action groups prolifer-ated, and new national organizations formed. Thewomen’s movement is another part of the NewPolitics network. That movement developed a dualis-tic strategy for improving the status of women:changing the consciousness of women and reformingthe laws. A variety of associations and self-helpgroups at the local level nurture the personal devel-opment of women, while other organizations focuson national policymaking.

Different New Politics groups have distinct issueinterests and their own organizations, but they arealso part of a common movement unified by theirshared interest in the quality of life for individuals, in-cluding the quality of the environment, the protectionof human rights, and peace in an uncertain world.They draw their members from the same social base:young, better educated, and middle-class citizens.These groups also are more likely to use unconven-tional political tactics, such as protests and demon-strations.

New Politics groups do not wield the influence ofthe established interest groups, although their com-bined membership now exceeds the formal member-ship in the political parties. These groups are importantand contentious actors in the political process. More-over, the reconciliation of women’s legislation in theunited Germany and the resolution of the East’s envi-ronmental problems are likely to keep these concernsnear the top of the political agenda.

THE PARTY SYSTEM

Political parties are an essential part of a democraticgovernment, and they perform a variety of functionswithin the political process. Moreover, political partiesin Germany play a larger and more active role than dopolitical parties in the United States. Germany is oftendescribed as a system of party government.

Following World War II, the Western Allies cre-ated a new democratic, competitive party system inthe West. The Allies licensed a diverse set of parties

that were free of Nazi ties and committed to demo-cratic procedures. The Basic Law requires that partiessupport the constitutional order and democraticmethods of the FRG. Because of these provisions, theFRG developed a strong system of competitive partypolitics that is a mainstay of the democratic order.Elections focused on the competition between the con-servative Christian Democrats and the leftist SocialDemocrats, with the smaller parties typically holdingthe balance of power. When New Politics issues en-tered the political agenda in the 1980s, a new politicalparty, the Greens, formed to represent these concerns.A small extreme-right party, the Republikaner (REP),formed in the late 1980s as an advocate of nationalistpolicies and antiforeigner propaganda.38

The GDR supposedly had a multiparty systemand elections, but this presented only the illusion ofdemocracy—the Socialist Unity Party (SED) firmlyheld political power. When the GDR collapsed, theSED and other Communist front parties also col-lapsed. Support for the SED plummeted, and the partyremade itself by changing its name to the Party ofDemocratic Socialism (PDS). Although many oppo-sition groups competed in the 1990 democratic elec-tions in the East, the West German parties largelycontrolled the electoral process, taking over the fi-nancing, tactics, organization, and substance of thecampaign. Today the party system of unified Germanylargely represents an extension of the Western systemto the East.

Christian Democrats

The creation of the Christian Democratic Union(CDU) in postwar West Germany signified a sharpbreak with the tradition of German political parties.The CDU was founded by a mixed group of Catholicsand Protestants, businesspeople and trade unionists,conservatives and liberals. Rather than representingnarrow special interests, the party wanted to appeal to abroad segment of society in order to gain governmentpower. The party sought to reconstruct West Germanyalong Christian and humanitarian lines. KonradAdenauer, the party leader, developed the CDU into aconservative-oriented catchall party (Volkspartei)—asharp contrast to the fragmented ideological parties ofWeimar. This strategy succeeded; within a singledecade, the CDU emerged as the largest party, capturing40 to 50 percent of the popular vote (see Figure 10.5).


The CDU operates in all states except Bavaria,where it allies itself with the Bavarian Christian SocialUnion (CSU), whose political philosophy is more con-servative than that of the CDU. These two parties gen-erally function as one (CDU/CSU) in national politics,forming a single parliamentary group in the Bundestagand campaigning together in national elections.

The CDU/CSU’s early voting strength allowed theparty to control the government, first under Adenauer(1949–1963) and then under Ludwig Erhard(1963–1966), as shown in Table 10.1. In 1966, how-ever, the party lost the support of its coalition partner,the Free Democrats, and formed a Grand Coalitionwith the Social Democrats. Following the 1969election, the Social Democrats and Free Democratsformed a new government coalition; for the first timein the history of the FRG, the CDU/CSU was the op-position party.

In the early 1980s, a weakening economic situa-tion increased public support for the party and its con-servative policies. In 1982 the Christian Democrats andthe Free Democrats formed a new conservative gov-ernment through the first successful constructive

no-confidence vote, which elected Helmut Kohl aschancellor. Public support for Kohl’s policies returnedthe governing coalition to power following the 1983and 1987 elections.

The collapse of the GDR in 1989 provided a his-toric opportunity for the CDU and Kohl. While otherslooked on the events with wonder or uncertainty, Kohlembraced the idea of closer ties between the two Germanies. Thus, when the March 1990 GDR electionbecame a referendum in support of German unifica-tion, the Christian Democrats were assured of victorybecause of the party’s early commitment to Germanunion. Kohl emerged victorious from the 1990 Bun-destag elections, but his government struggled withthe policy challenges produced by German unifica-tion. The governing coalition lost seats in the 1994elections, but Kohl retained a slim majority. By the1998 elections, the accumulation of sixteen years ofgoverning and the special challenges of unificationhad taken their toll on the party and Helmut Kohl.Many Germans looked for a change. The CDU/CSUfared poorly in the election, especially in the EasternLänder, which were frustrated by their persisting

0

20

40

60

80

100

1.5

Perc

enta

ge

1994a

1990a 19871983198019761972196919651961195719531949

29.2 28.831.8

36.239.3

42.745.9

42.6 42.9 38.2

5.6

37.0

8.3

33.5

5.1

36.4

7.3

31.0 45.2 50.2 45.4 47.6 46.1 44.8 48.6 44.5 48.8 44.3 43.8 41.5

11.9

27.9

16.510.3 5.6

3.6 5.4

0.90.9 0.5 0.4 1.3

6.67.9

9.5

7.7

12.89.5 5.8 8.4

7.910.6

7.09.1 11.0 6.9

GreensSPDOthersFDPCDU/CSU

1998a

40.9

6.7

35.2

11.1

6.2

2002a2005

a

38.5

7.08.1

38.5 35.2

8.612.7

7.4 9.8

34.2

Shares of the Party Vote (Second Vote), 1949–2005The multiparty system has the CDU/CSU and SPD as the two largest parties, joined by a changing set of

smaller parties

F I G U R E 1 0 . 5

a1990–2005 percentages combine results from western and eastern Germany.


second-class status. The CDU’s poor showing in theelection was a rebuke to Kohl, and he resigned theparty leadership.

The CDU made some gains after the election andseemed poised to win several state elections in 1999and 2000—and then lightning struck. Investigationsshowed that Kohl had accepted illegal campaigncontributions while he was chancellor. Kohl’s allieswithin the CDU were forced to resign, and the party’selectoral fortunes suffered. To change its popular image,in 1999 the CDU selected a party leader who wasnearly the opposite of Kohl: Angela Merkel.

The CDU/CSU chose Edmund Stoiber, the headof the Christian Social Union, as its chancellor candi-date in 2002. Stoiber’s campaign stressed the strug-gling German economy, and the CDU/CSU gained thesame vote share as the Social Democrats and nearly asmany seats in the Bundestag (see Figure 10.6). How-ever, an SPD-led coalition retained control of thegovernment.

When early elections were called in 2005, theCDU/CSU selected Merkel as its chancellor candidate.Merkel and the party ran ahead of the SPD throughoutthe campaign, and most observers expected a CDUvictory. But the party, and Merkel, faltered late in thecampaign. The election ended as a dead heat betweenthe CDU/CSU and the SPD—and both Merkel andSchröder declared victory. After weeks of negotiationand the exploration of potential coalitions, theCDU/CSU and a Schröder-less SPD agreed to form aGrand Coalition, which was similar to the U.S. Demo-crats and Republicans sharing control of the govern-ment. Government positions, including Cabinet posts,were split between the two parties. It was hoped thatthis collaboration between the two large parties wouldenable the government to undertake the difficult re-forms needed to reenergize the economy and society. Inactuality, the differences in political philosophies be-tween the two large parties led to limited policy change.Merkel’s style of modernization and compromise kept

Date Formed Source of Change Coalition Partnersa Chancellor

September 1949 Election CDU/CSU, FDP, DP Adenauer (CDU)

October 1953 Election CDU/CSU, FDP, DP, G Adenauer (CDU)

October 1957 Election CDU/CSU, DP Adenauer (CDU)

November 1961 Election CDU/CSU, FDP Adenauer (CDU)

October 1963 Chancellor retirement CDU/CSU, FDP Erhard (CDU)

October 1965 Election CDU/CSU, FDP Erhard (CDU)

December 1966 Coalition change CDU/CSU, SPD Kiesinger (CDU)

October 1969 Election SPD, FDP Brandt (SPD)

December 1972 Election SPD, FDP Brandt (SPD)

May 1974 Chancellor retirement SPD, FDP Schmidt (SPD)

December 1976 Election SPD, FDP Schmidt (SPD)

November 1980 Election SPD, FDP Schmidt (SPD)

October 1982 Constructive no-confidence vote CDU/CSU, FDP Kohl (CDU)

March 1983 Election CDU/CSU, FDP Kohl (CDU)

January 1987 Election CDU/CSU, FDP Kohl (CDU)

December 1990 Election CDU/CSU, FDP Kohl (CDU)

October 1994 Election CDU/CSU, FDP Kohl (CDU)

September 1998 Election SPD, Greens Schröder (SPD)

September 2002 Election SPD, Greens Schröder (SPD)

September 2005 Election CDU/CSU, SPD Merkel (CDU/CSU)

Composition of Coalition Governments

A listing of government parties and chancellors of the Federal Republic

TA B L E 1 0 . 1

a CDU: Christian Democratic Union; CSU: Christian Social Union; DP: German Party; FDP: Free Democratic Party; G: All-German Bloc Federation

of Expellees and Displaced Persons; SPD: Social Democratic Party.


the coalition together, but little more. Thus, many ofthe challenges the government faced in 2005 will stillface the new government elected in 2009.

Social Democrats

The postwar Social Democratic Party (SPD) in WestGermany was constructed along the lines of the SPDin the Weimar Republic—an ideological party, pri-marily representing the interests of unions and theworking class.39 In the early postwar years, the SocialDemocrats espoused strict Marxist doctrine and con-sistently opposed Adenauer’s Western-oriented for-eign policy. The SPD’s image of the nation’s future wasradically different from that of Adenauer and theChristian Democrats.

The SPD’s poor performance in early elections(see again Figure 10.5) generated internal pressuresfor the party to broaden its electoral appeal. At the1959 Godesberg party conference, the party re-nounced its Marxist economic policies and generallymoved toward the center on domestic and foreignpolicies. The party continued to represent working-class interests, but by shedding its ideological banner,the SPD hoped to attract new support from the mid-dle class. The SPD transformed itself into a progres-sive catchall party that could compete with theChristian Democrats.

An SPD breakthrough finally came in 1966 with theformation of the Grand Coalition (see again Table 10.1).By sharing government control with the CDU/CSU, theSPD decreased public uneasiness about the party’s in-tegrity and ability to govern. Political support for the

party also grew as the SPD played an active part in re-solving the nation’s problems.

Following the 1969 election, a new SDP–FDPgovernment formed with Willy Brandt (SPD) as chan-cellor. After enacting an ambitious range of new poli-cies, a period of economic recession let to Brandt’sreplacement by Helmut Schmidt in 1974 and a newfocus on the faltering economy. The SPD retainedgovernment control in the 1976 and 1980 elections,but these were trying times for the party. The SPD andthe FDP frequently disagreed on economic policy, andpolitical divisions developed within the SPD.

These policy tensions eventually led to thebreakup of the SPD-led government in 1982. Onceagain in opposition, the SPD faced an identity crisis.In one election it tried to appeal to centrist voters andin the next election to leftist/Green voters—but nei-ther strategy succeeded. In 1990 the SPD campaignwas overtaken by events in the East.

Perhaps no one (except perhaps the Commu-nists) was more surprised than the SPD by the courseof events in the GDR in 1989–1990. The SPD hadbeen normalizing relations with the SED as a basis ofintra-German cooperation, only to see the SEDousted by the citizenry. The SDP stood by quietly asKohl spoke of a single German Vaterland to crowds ofapplauding East Germans. The party’s poor perfor-mance in the 1990 national elections reflected its in-ability either to lead or to follow the course of theunification process. Germans were frustrated by thenation’s policy course after unification; they came tothe brink of voting the SPD into office in 1994—andthen pulled back.

PDS

Greens

SPD

FDP

CDU/CSU

2

2002

60355

251248

47Majority

2005

614

51

54

226

61

222

Majorit

y

Majority

The Distribution of Bundestag Seats in 2002 and 2005The parity of CDU/CSU and SPD in 2005 lead to the creation of the Grand Coalition

F I G U R E 1 0 . 6


In 1998 the Social Democrats selected the moder-ate Gerhard Schröder to be their chancellor candidate.Schröder attracted former CDU/CSU and Free Demo-cratic voters who were dissatisfied with the govern-ment’s performance. The SPD vote share increased in1998, and the party formed a new coalition govern-ment with the Green Party. Schröder pursued a mid-dle course, balancing the centrist and leftist viewsexisting within the governing coalition. For instance,the government allowed German troops to play an ac-tive role in Kosovo and Afghanistan, while mandatingthe phasing out of nuclear power.

During the 2002 election, Schröder vocally op-posed U.S. policy toward Iraq to win support fromleftist voters. This strategy succeeded, and the SPD-Green government returned to office with a narrowmajority, but this strained relations between Germanyand the United States.

The SPD-Green government was criticized bysome for doing too much to reform the economy andby others for not doing enough. As the economy stag-nated, the party lost important state elections, and itspopularity declined further. Schröder was a gambler,and instead of struggling on until the next election, inearly 2005 he called for early elections. At first, fewgave him a chance to win—but by the end of the cam-paign, he had matched Merkel in the final vote tally.This was Schröder’s last hurrah, and he left the partyto new faces.

The SPD now shares governing responsibilitieswith the CDU/CSU, with Frank-Walter Steinmeier ofthe SPD serving as vice chancellor and foreign minis-ter. In 2008 the party selected Steinmeier as its chan-cellor candidate for 2009. His election would returnGermany to many of the policies of the Schröder era,although winning a majority in the election appears tobe very difficult. Certainly, he and Merkel would offerdistinctly different choices for Germany’s future in theelection.

Free Democratic Party

Although the Free Democratic Party (FDP) is farsmaller than the CDU/CSU or the SPD, it has oftenheld enough seats to have a pivotal role in forming agovernment coalition. This has given the FDP a largerpolitical role than its small size would suggest.

The FDP was initially a strong advocate of privateenterprise and drew its support from the Protestant

middle class and farmers. Its economic policies madethe FDP a natural ally of the CDU/CSU in difficulteconomic times (see again Table 10.1). Its liberal for-eign and social programs have opened the way forcoalition with the SPD when the these issues dominatethe agenda. This led to a coalition with the SPD from1969 until 1982.

The FDP has generally been a moderating politicalinfluence, limiting the leftist leanings of the SPD andthe conservative tendencies of the CDU/CSU. Thisplaces the party in a precarious position, however, be-cause if it allies itself too closely with either majorparty, it may lose its political identity. The party strug-gled with this problem for the past several elections.

In January 2001 Guido Westerwelle became partyleader. The party fared poorly in 2002 because ofinternal divisions, which kept the conservativeCDU/CSU–FDP coalition from winning a majority.After 2005 it became the largest party on the opposi-tion benches. The party’s hope is that it will hold thebalance of power after the 2009 election and reenterthe government to pursue its mix of economic conser-vativism and social liberalism.

The Greens

The Greens (Die Grünen) are literally a party of a dif-ferent color.40 The party addresses a broad range ofNew Politics issues: opposition to nuclear energy andGermany’s military policies, commitment to environ-mental protection, support for women’s rights, andfurther democratization of society. The party also wassynonymous with an unconventional political style.The Greens initially differed so markedly from theestablished parties that one Green leader describedthem as the “antiparty party.”

The party won its first Bundestag seats in 1983,becoming the first new party to enter parliamentsince the 1950s. Using this political forum, the Greenscampaigned vigorously for an alternative view of pol-itics, such as stronger measures to protect the envi-ronment, gender equality, and staunch opposition tonuclear power. The Greens also added a bit of colorand spontaneity to the normally staid procedures ofthe political system. The typical dress for Greendeputies was jeans and a sweater, rather than the tra-ditional business attire of the established parties;their desks in parliament often sprouted flowers,rather than folders of official-looking documents.


The party’s loose and open internal structure stood insharp contrast to the hierarchic and bureaucratizedstructure of the established parties. Despite initialconcerns about the Greens’ impact on the politicalsystem, most analysts now agree that the partybrought necessary attention to political viewpointsthat previously were overlooked.

German unification caught the Greens unpre-pared. To stress their opposition of Western hegemony,the Western Greens refused to form an electoral al-liance with the Eastern Greens in the 1990 elections.The Eastern Greens/Alliance ‘90 won enough votes toenter the new Bundestag, but the Western Greens fellshort of the 5 percent hurdle and won no seats. TheGreens’ unconventional politics had caught up withthem. After this loss the Greens charted a more moder-ate course for the party. They remained committed tothe environment and an alternative agenda, but theytempered the unconventional style and structure of theparty. The party reentered the Bundestag in 1994.

By 1998 moderates controlling the Green Partyasked voters to support a new Red-Green coalition ofSPD and the Greens. This Red-Green coalition

received a majority in the election, and for the firsttime, the Greens became part of the national govern-ment. It is difficult to be an outsider when one is in-side the establishment, however. The antiparty partystruggled to balance its unconventional policies withthe new responsibilities of governing—and steadilygave up its unconventional style. For instance, theparty supported military intervention into Kosovo,despite its pacifist traditions; it supported tax reformthat lowered the highest rates in exchange for a newenvironmental tax. It pressed for the abolition of nu-clear power, but agreed to wait thirty years for this tohappen. The Greens ran a 2002 campaign heavilybased on the personal appeal of their leader, JoschkaFischer, and their success returned the SPD-Greengovernment to power.

The Greens faired well in 2005, but the coalitionmath did not include them in the government. Andwith a new strong rival in the Die Linke, their futureidentity and electoral fortunes have blurred. TheGreens have become a conventional party in terms oftheir style, now pursuing unconventional and reformistpolicies as a critique of the CDU/CSU–SPD alliance.

Communists to Die Linke

The Communist Party was one of the first parties toform in postwar Germany, and its history reflectsGermany’s two postwar paths. In the West theCommunist Party (KPD) suffered because of its iden-tification with the Soviet Union and the GDR. Theparty garnered a shrinking sliver of the vote in theearly elections, and then in 1956 the ConstitutionalCourt banned the KPD because of its undemocraticprinciples. A reconstituted party began contestingelections again in 1969, but never attracted a signifi-cant following.

The situation was obviously different in the East.As World War II was ending, Walter Ulbricht returnedto Berlin from exile in Moscow to reorganize theCommunist Party in the Soviet military zone. In 1946the Soviets forced a merger of the Eastern KPD andSPD into a new Socialist Unity Party of Germany(SED), which became the ruling institution in theEast. The SED controlled the government apparatusand the electoral process, party agents were integratedinto the military command structure, the party super-vised the infamous state security police (Stasi), andparty membership was a prerequisite to positions of

Angela Merkel celebrates victory after the 2005 federal

elections.

Peer Grimm/DPA/epa/Corbis


authority and influence. The state controlled East German society, and the SED controlled the state.

The SED’s power collapsed in 1989 along with theEast German regime. Party membership plummeted,and local party units abolished themselves. The om-nipotent party suddenly seemed impotent. To save theparty from complete dissolution and to compete inthe upcoming democratic elections, the party changedits name to the Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS).The old party guard was ousted from positions of au-thority, and new moderates took over the leadership.

The PDS has campaigned as the representative ofthose who opposed the economic and social course ofGerman unity. In the 1990 Bundestag elections, thePDS won 11 percent of the Eastern vote, but capturedonly 2 percent of the national vote. The PDS was suc-cessful in winning Bundestag seats in the 1994 and1998 elections, but failed to surmount the electoralthreshold in 2002.

The PDS suffered in 2002 partly because of internalparty divisions and partly because the SPD consciouslysought support from former PDS voters. The party’spopular leadership was also aging, and the PDS seemeddestined to be a regional party of the East. Then the earlyelections in 2005 prompted a change in party history.Oscar Lafontaine, a former SPD chancellor candidate,orchestrated a coalition of leftist interests in the West,Die Linke, and the PDS in the East. This new party drewthe support of Western leftists who were disenchantedby Schröder’s government and PDS voters from theEast. They nearly doubled the PDS vote over the previ-ous election and gained more than fifty Bundestag seats.The party’s success precluded the formation of either anSPD-Green or a CDU/CSU–FDP government.

In 2007 the two parties formally merged, and nowwill compete under the label Die Linke.41 This is likelyto inject new ideological debate into the politicalprocess and make it more complicated to form amajority coalition in national and state governments.

THE ROLE OF ELECTIONS

The framers of the Basic Law had two goals in mindwhen they designed the electoral system. One was tocreate a proportional representation (PR) system thatallocates legislative seats based on a party’s percentageof the popular vote. If a party receives 10 percent ofthe popular vote, it should receive 10 percent of the

Bundestag seats. Other individuals saw advantages inthe system of single-member districts used in Britainand the United States. They thought that this systemwould avoid the fragmentation of the Weimar partysystem and ensure some accountability between anelectoral district and its representative.

To satisfy both objectives, the FRG created amixed electoral system. On one part of the ballot, citi-zens vote for a candidate to represent their district.The candidate with the most votes in each district iselected to parliament.

On a second part of the ballot, voters select aparty. These second votes are added nationwide to de-termine each party’s share of the popular vote. Aparty’s proportion of the second vote determines itstotal representation in the Bundestag. Each party re-ceives additional seats so that its percentage of thecombined candidate and party seats equals its per-centage of the second votes. These additional seats aredistributed to party representatives according to listsprepared by the state parties before the election. Halfof the Bundestag members are elected as district rep-resentatives and half as party representatives.42

An exception to this PR system is the 5-percentclause, which requires that a party win at least 5 per-cent of the national vote (or three district seats) toshare in the distribution of party-list seats.43 The lawaims to withhold representation from the type ofsmall extremist parties that plagued the Weimar Re-public. In practice, however, the 5-percent clausehandicaps all minor parties and lessens the number ofparties represented in the Bundestag.

This mixed system has several consequences forelectoral politics. The party-list system gives partyleaders substantial influence on who will be elected toparliament by the placement of people on the list.The PR system also ensures fair representation for thesmaller parties. The FDP, for example, has won onlyone direct candidate mandate since 1957 and yet it re-ceives Bundestag seats based on its national share ofthe vote. In contrast, Britain’s district-only systemdiscriminates against small parties; in 2005 theBritish Liberal Democrats won 22.1 percent of thenational vote but less than 10 percent of the parlia-mentary seats. The German two-vote system also af-fects campaign strategies. Although most voters castboth their ballots for the same party, the smaller par-ties encourage supporters of the larger parties to“lend” their second votes to the smaller party.


Because of its mixed features, the German system issometimes described as the ideal compromise inbuilding an electoral system.44

The Electoral Connection

Democratic elections are about making policy choicesin the form of a future government, and Germans havea rich set of parties and policy programs from which tochoose. Think of how the United States would be dif-ferent if there were some communists and environ-mentalists elected to the House of Re presentatives, aswell as the two major parties and a traditionalEuropean liberal party. One of the essential functionsof political parties in a democracy is interest represen-tation, and this is especially clear in the case ofGermany elections.

The voting patterns of social groups reflect the ide-ological and policy differences among parties. Althoughsocial differences in voting have gradually narrowed,voting patterns in 2005 reflect the traditional social divi-sions in German society and politics (see Table 10.2).45

The CDU/CSU’s electoral coalition draws morevoters from the conservative sectors of society, withgreater support from seniors, residents of rural areasand small towns, and the middle class. Catholics andthose who attend church frequently also give dispro-portionate support to the party.

The SPD now forms a coalition with theCDU/CSU in the government, but its voter base con-trasts with that of the CDU/CSU: A large share of SPDvotes comes from nonreligious voters and blue-collarworkers, although the middle class provides most of theparty’s voters. In some ways the SPD has suffered be-cause its traditional voter base—blue-collar workers—has declined in size and it has not established a newpolitical identity that draws a distinct voter clientele.

The Greens’ electoral base is heavily drawn fromgroups that support New Politics movements: the newmiddle class, the better educated, the nonreligious,and urban voters. A large proportion of Green voters(42.5 percent) are under age 40. However, this youthvote has steadily declined over time, partially becausethe party and its leadership are aging.

The FDP’s voter base in 2005 illustrates theparty’s ambiguous electoral appeal. The FDP votersstill include a high percentage of the self-employed,but for many other characteristics, it mirrors the gen-eral population. It no longer clearly appeals to the

better educated, Protestants, and urban voters, whichwere its traditional voter base.

Perhaps the most distinct voter bloc is theLinke/PDS. This is first an East-oriented party, with 46.9percent of its vote coming from the East. The PDS’sCommunist roots also appear in its appeal to blue-collarworkers and the nonreligious. The Linke/PDS has themost distinctly male electorate. It is a party for thosefrustrated with the economic and political path Ger-many has followed since unification.

In recent elections these social group differenceshave generally narrowed, as fewer voters make theirdecisions based on class, religious, or other cues. In-stead, more voters are deciding based on their issueopinions or evaluations of the candidates. Yet, the ide-ology and clientele networks of the parties still reflectthese traditional group bases, so they have a persistinginfluence on the parties.

PARTY GOVERNMENT

Political parties in Germany deserve special emphasisbecause they are such important actors in the politicalprocess, perhaps even more important than in mostother European democracies. Some observers describethe political system as government for the parties, bythe parties, and of the parties.

The Basic Law is unusual because it specificallyrefers to political parties (the U.S. Constitution doesnot). Because the German Empire and the Third Reichsuppressed political parties, the Basic Law guaranteestheir legitimacy and their right to exist if they accept theprinciples of democratic government. Parties are alsodesignated as the primary institutions of representativedemocracy. They act as intermediaries between thepublic and the government and function as a means forcitizen input on policy preferences. The Basic Law takesthe additional step of assigning an educational functionto the parties, directing them to “take part in formingthe political will of the people.” In other words, the par-ties should take the lead and not just respond to publicopinion.

The parties’ centrality in the political process ap-pears in several ways. There are no direct primariesthat would allow the public to select party representa-tives in Bundestag elections. Instead, a small group ofofficial party members or a committee appointed bythe membership nominates the district candidates.


State party conventions select the party-list candi-dates. Thus, the leadership can select list candidatesand order them on the list. This power can be used toreward faithful party supporters and discipline partymavericks; placement near the top of a party list virtu-ally ensures election, and low placement carries littlechance of a Bundestag seat.

Political parties also dominate the electionprocess. Most voters view the candidates merely asparty representatives, rather than as autonomous po-litical figures. Even the district candidates are electedprimarily because of their party ties. Bundestag, state,and European election campaigns are financed by thegovernment; the parties receive public funds for each

Electoral Coalitions in 2005Voting patterns show the conservative social base of the CDU/CSU and the liberal base of the SPD,

Greens, and Linke

TA B L E 1 0 . 2

CDU/CSU SPD Greens FDP Linke/PDS Total PublicRegion

West 78.3% 82.3% 84.0% 81.6% 53.2% 81.1%

East 21.7 17.7 16.0 18.4 46.9 18.9

Occupation

Worker 20.1% 23.8% 19.3% 16.8% 29.7% 22.0%

Self-employed 13.7 4.9 16.1 17.8 9.5 10.7

White-collar/government 66.3 71.3 64.6 65.4 60.8 67.4

Education

Basic 49.5% 45.0% 28.9% 34.0% 33.3% 42.5%

Medium 30.5 31.4 26.0 43.2 44.9 33.5

Advanced 20.0 23.6 45.3 22.8 21.8 24.0

Religion

Catholic 44.2% 34.0% 20.4% 35.3% 12.8% 35.3%

Protestant 39.5 45.3 45.3 40.3 32.1 41.4

Other, none 16.3 20.7 34.3 24.3 55.1 24.0

Church Attendance

Never 24.2% 39.2% 43.6% 35.4% 60.3% 36.2%

Occasionally 53.8 50.1 47.0 51.9 33.3 49.8

Frequently 22.0 10.7 9.4 12.6 6.4 14.0

Size of town

Less than 50,000 30.0% 21.3% 13.7% 21.8% 26.4% 24.0%

50,001–100,000 24.1 23.7 29.7 23.3 23.7 24.2

100,001–500,000 24.8 24.8 26.4 30.6 25.0 25.9

More than 500,000 21.1 20.1 30.2 24.3 25.0 26.0

Age

Under 40 28.4% 34.3% 42.5% 37.9% 29.5% 33.4%

40–59 32.9 32.9 36.9 34.5 47.4 34.5

60 and over 38.8 32.7 21.0 27.7 23.1 32.2

Gender

Male 46.7% 46.8% 47.0% 54.9% 57.1% 47.9%

Female 53.3 53.2 53.0 45.1 42.9 52.3

Note: Some percentages may not total 100 because of rounding.

Source: Comparative Study of Electoral Systems Survey, Germany, Postelection September 2005 conducted by the Bernhard Wessels,

Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (weighted N = 2,018).


vote they get. The government provides free televisiontime for a limited number of campaign advertise-ments, and these are allocated to the parties, not theindividual candidates. Government funding for theparties also continues between elections, to help themperform their informational and educational func-tions as prescribed in the Basic Law.

Once an election is completed, the parties thenshift to forming a government. Since no party has amajority, a group of parties with a majority of the votesmust agree to form a coalition government. Often suchagreements are made before the election, but some-times they wait until the votes are counted. Because ofthe closeness of the vote in 2005, it took months for theeventual governing parties to agree on a coalition andthe program that the new CDU/CSU–SPD govern-ment would follow.

Within the Bundestag, the parties are also centralactors. The Bundestag is organized around partygroups (Fraktionen), rather than individual deputies.The important legislative posts and committee assign-ments are restricted to members of a party Fraktion.The size of a Fraktion determines its representation onlegislative committees, its share of committee chairs,and its participation in the executive bodies of the legis-lature. Government funds for legislative and adminis-trative support are distributed to the Fraktion, not tothe deputies.

Because of these factors, the cohesion of partieswithin the Bundestag is exceptionally high. Partiescaucus before major legislation to decide the party po-sition, and most legislative votes follow strict partylines. This is partially a consequence of a parliamen-tary system and partially a sign of the pervasive influ-ence parties have throughout the political process.

As a result of these many factors, political partiesplay a larger role in structuring the political process inGermany (and many other parliamentary systems) thanthey do in the United States. Parties are more distinctivein their policy positions, more unified in their views, andmore decisive in their actions. Representative democracyworks largely through and by political parties as themeans to connect voters to the decisions of government.

THE POLICYMAKING PROCESS

The policymaking process may begin with any part ofsociety—an interest group, a political leader, an

individual citizen, or a government official. These ele-ments interact in making public policy. This makes itdifficult to trace the true genesis of any policy idea.Moreover, once a new policy is proposed, other inter-est groups and political actors are active in amending,supporting, or opposing the policy.

The pattern of interaction among policy actorsvaries with time and policy issues. One set of groups ismost active on labor issues, and these groups use themethods of influence that are most successful for theircause. A very different set of interests may attempt toaffect defense policy and use far different methods ofinfluence. This variety makes it difficult to describepolicymaking as a single process, although the institu-tional framework for enacting policy is relatively uni-form in all policy areas.

The growing importance of the European Unionhas also changed the policymaking process for itsmember states.46 Now, policies made in Brussels oftentake precedence over German legislation. Laws passedby the German government must conform to EUstandards in many areas. The European Court of Jus-tice also has the power to overturn laws passed by theGerman government. Thus, policymaking is no longera solely national process.

This section describes the various stages of thepolicy process and clarifies the balance of poweramong the institutions of the German government.

Policy Initiation

Most issues reach the policy agenda through theexecutive branch. One reason for this predominanceis that the Cabinet and the ministries manage theaffairs of government. They are responsible forpreparing the budget, formulating revenue propos-als, administering existing policies, and conductingthe other routine activities of government. Thenature of a parliamentary democracy furtherstrengthens the policymaking influence of the chan-cellor and the Cabinet. The chancellor is the primarypolicy spokesperson for the government and for amajority of the Bundestag deputies. In speeches,interviews, and formal policy declarations, she setsthe policy agenda for the government. It is theresponsibility of the chancellor and Cabinet to pro-pose new legislation to implement the government’spolicy promises. Interest groups realize the impor-tance of the executive branch, and they generally


work with the federal ministries—rather thanBundestag deputies—when they seek new legislation.

The executive branch’s predominance means thatthe Cabinet proposes about two-thirds of the legisla-tion considered by the Bundestag. Thirty members ofthe Bundestag may jointly introduce a bill, but onlyabout 20 percent of legislative proposals begin in thismanner. Most of the Bundestag’s own proposals involveprivate-member bills or minor issues. State govern-ments also can propose legislation in the Bundesrat,but they do so infrequently.

The Cabinet generally follows a consensual deci-sionmaking style in setting the government’s policyprogram. Ministers seldom propose legislation that isnot expected to receive Cabinet support. The chancel-lor has a crucial part in ensuring this consensus. Thechancellor’s office coordinates the legislative proposalsdrafted by the various ministries. If the chancellor feelsthat a bill conflicts with the government’s stated objec-tives, she may ask that the proposal be withdrawn orreturned to the ministry for restudy and redrafting. If aconflict on policy arises between two ministries, thechancellor may mediate the dispute. Alternatively, in-terministerial negotiations may resolve the differences.Only in extreme cases is the chancellor unable to re-solve such problems; when such stalemates occur, pol-icy conflicts are referred to the full Cabinet.

The chancellor also plays a major role in Cabinetdeliberations. The chancellor is a fulcrum, balancingconflicting interests to reach a compromise that thegovernment as a whole can support. This leadershipposition gives the chancellor substantial influence asshe negotiates with Cabinet members. Very seldomdoes a majority of the Cabinet oppose the chancellor.When the chancellor and Cabinet agree on a legisla-tive proposal, they have a dominant position in thelegislative process. Because the Cabinet also representsthe majority in the Bundestag, most of its initiativesare eventually enacted into law. In the fifteenth Bun-destag (2002–2005), almost 90 percent of the govern-ment’s proposals became law; in contrast, about 40 percent of the proposals introduced by Bundestagmembers became law. The government’s legislativeposition is further strengthened by provisions in theBasic Law that limit the Bundestag’s authority in fiscalmatters. The parliament can revise or amend mostlegislative proposals. However, it cannot alter thespending or taxation levels of legislation proposed by the Cabinet. Parliament cannot even reallocate

expenditures in the budget without the approval ofthe finance minister and the Cabinet.

Legislating Policy

When the Cabinet approves a legislative proposal, thegovernment sends it to the Bundesrat for review (seeFigure 10.7). After receiving the Bundesrat’s com-ments, the Cabinet formally transmits the govern-ment’s proposal to the Bundestag. The bill receives afirst reading, which places it on the agenda of thechamber, and it is assigned to the appropriate com-mittee.

Much of the Bundestag’s work takes place inthese specialized committees. The committee struc-ture generally follows the divisions of the federalministries, such as transportation, defense, labor, oragriculture. Because bills are referred to the commit-tee early in the legislative process, committees havereal potential for reviewing and amending their con-tent. Committees evaluate proposals, consult with in-terest groups, and then submit a revised proposal tothe full Bundestag. Research staffs are small, but com-mittees also use investigative hearings. Governmentand interest group representatives testify on pendinglegislation, and committee members themselves oftenhave expertise in their designated policy area. Mostcommittees hold their meetings behind closed doors.The committee system thus provides an opportunityfor frank discussions of proposals and negotiationsamong the parties before legislation reaches the floorof the Bundestag.

When a committee reports a bill, the full Bun-destag examines it and discusses any proposed revi-sions. At this point in the process, however, politicalpositions already are well established. Leaders in thegoverning parties took part in developing the legisla-tion. The parties have caucused to decide their officialposition. Major revisions during the second and thirdreadings are infrequent; the government generally isassured of the passage of its proposals as reported outof committee.

Bundestag debate on the merits of governmentproposals is thus mostly symbolic. It allows the partiesto present their views to the public. The successfulparties explain the merits of the new legislation andadvertise their efforts to their supporters. The opposi-tion parties place their objections in the public record.Although these debates seldom influence the outcome


of a vote, they are nevertheless an important part ofthe Bundestag’s information function.

A bill that passes the Bundestag is transmitted tothe Bundesrat, which represents the state governmentsin the policy process. As in the Bundestag, much of theBundesrat’s work is done in specialized committeeswhere bills are scrutinized for both their policy contentand their administrative implications for the states. Thelegislative authority of the Bundesrat equals that of theBundestag in areas where the states share concurrentpowers with the federal government or administer

federal policies. In these areas the Bundesrat’s approvalis necessary for a bill to become law. In the policy areasthat do not involve the states directly, such as defense orforeign affairs, Bundesrat approval of legislation is notessential. Historically, about two-thirds of legislativeproposals required Bundesrat approval.47

The sharing of legislative power between the stateand federal governments has mixed political conse-quences. State leaders can adapt legislation to localand regional needs through their influence on policy-making. This division of power also provides another

Cabinet

Cabinet review and comment Bundesrat review and comment

30 Deputies

First reading

Committee study

2nd and 3rd readings

Pass compromise/

override veto

Joint Mediation Committee

Chancellor and Ministerial approval

Presidential approval

Law

Vote on compromise

Study/Vote

Accept

compromise

Accept

Suspensive

veto

Majority of State Governments

Federal Government

Initia

te

Legis

lation

Legis

lative C

onsid

era

tion

Enactm

ent

Bundestag Bundesrat

The Legislative ProcessThis figure describes the steps from the initiation to the passage of new laws

F I G U R E 1 0 . 7


check in the system of checks and balances. Withstrong state governments, it is less likely that oneleader or group could control the political process byusurping the national government.

The Bundesrat’s voting procedures give dispropor-tionate weight to the smaller states; states representingonly a third of the population control half the votes inthe Bundesrat. Thus, the Bundesrat cannot claim thesame popular legitimacy as the proportionally repre-sented and directly elected Bundestag. The Bundesratvoting system may encourage parochialism by the states.The states vote as a bloc; therefore, they view policy fromthe perspective of the state, rather than the national in-terest or party positions. The different electoral bases ofthe Bundestag and Bundesrat make such tensions overpolicy an inevitable part of the legislative process.

During most of the 1990s and into the early2000s, different party coalitions controlled the Bun-destag and the Bundesrat. In one sense this divisionstrengthened the power of the legislature because thefederal government had to negotiate with the opposi-tion in the Bundesrat, especially on the sensitive issuesof German union. However, divided government alsoprevented necessary new legislation in a variety ofareas. The current CDU/CSU–SPD coalition controlsboth houses of parliament.

If the Bundesrat approves of a bill, it transmitsthe measure to the chancellor for her signature. If theBundesrat objects to the Bundestag’s bill, the repre-sentatives of both bodies meet in a joint mediationcommittee and attempt to resolve their differences.

The mediation committee submits its recommen-dation to both legislative bodies for their approval. Ifthe proposal involves the state governments, the Bun-desrat may cast an absolute veto and prevent the billfrom becoming a law. In the remaining policy areas,the Bundesrat can cast only a suspensive veto. If theBundestag approves of a measure, it may override asuspensive veto and forward the proposal to the chan-cellor. The final step in the process is the promulga-tion of the law by the federal president.

There are several lessons from this process. On theone hand, the executive branch is omnipresentthroughout the legislative process. After transmittingthe government’s proposal to the Bundestag, the federalministers work in support of the bill. Ministry repre-sentatives testify before Bundestag and Bundesrat com-mittees to present their position. Cabinet ministerslobby committee members and influential members of

parliament. Ministers may propose amendments or negotiate policy compromises to resolve issues that ariseduring parliamentary deliberations. Government repre-sentatives may also attend meetings of the joint media-tion committee between the Bundestag and Bundesrat;no other nonparliamentary participants are allowed.The importance of the executive branch is commonwith most parliamentary systems.

On the other hand, despite this large role playedby the executive, the German parliament has greaterautonomy than most parliamentary legislatures. Thegovernment frequently makes compromises and ac-cepts amendments proposed in the legislature. Thetwo houses of parliament often reflect different partycoalitions and different political interests, so the gov-ernment must take these into account. This is espe-cially important for state interests advocated in theBundesrat.

Thus, the process reflects the autonomy of bothbranches and the checks and balances that the framershad sought in designing the Federal Republic’s institu-tions. Compared to other parliamentary systems inEurope, the German system gives more voice to com-peting interests and is more likely to require compro-mise to enact new legislation.

Policy Administration

In another attempt to diffuse political power, the BasicLaw assigned the administrative responsibility formost domestic policies to the state governments. Asevidence of the states’ administrative role, the statesemploy more civil servants than the federal and localgovernments combined.

Because of the delegation of administrative du-ties, federal legislation normally is fairly detailed toensure that the actual application of a law matches thegovernment’s intent. Federal agencies may also super-vise state agencies, and in cases of dispute, they mayapply sanctions or seek judicial review.

Despite this oversight by the federal government,the states retain discretion in applying most federallegislation. This is partially because the federal gov-ernment lacks the resources to follow state actionsclosely. Federal control of the states also requires Bun-desrat support, where claims for states’ rights receive asympathetic hearing. This decentralization of politicalauthority provides additional flexibility for the politi-cal system.


Judicial Review

As in the United States, legislation in Germany is sub-ject to judicial review. The Constitutional Court canevaluate the constitutionality of legislation and voidlaws that violate the provisions of the Basic Law.48

Constitutional issues are brought before the courtby one of three methods. The most common involvesconstitutional complaints filed by individual citizens.Individuals may appeal directly to the court when theyfeel that a government action violates their constitu-tional rights. More than 90 percent of the cases pre-sented to the court arise from citizens’ complaints.Moreover, cases can be filed without paying courtcosts and without a lawyer. The court is thus like anombudsman, assuring the average citizen that his orher fundamental rights are protected by the Basic Lawand the court.

The Constitutional Court also hears cases basedon “concrete” and “abstract” principles of judicial re-view. Concrete review involves actual court cases thatraise constitutional issues and are referred by a lowercourt to the Constitutional Court. In an abstract re-view, the court rules on legislation as a legal principle,without reference to an actual case. The federal gov-ernment, a state government, or one-third of theBundestag deputies can request review of a law.Groups that fail to block a bill during the legislativeprocess sometimes use this legal procedure. In recentyears various groups have challenged the constitution-ality of the unification treaty with the GDR (upheld),the abortion reform law (overturned), the involve-ment of German troops in United Nations peacekeep-ing roles (upheld), the new citizenship law (upheld),and several other important pieces of legislation. Overthe last two decades, the court received an average oftwo or three such referrals a year.49 Judicial review inthe abstract expands the constitutional protection ofthe Basic Law. This directly involves the court in thepolicy process and may politicize the court as anotheragent of policymaking.

In recent years the judicial review by the Euro-pean Court of Justice (ECJ) has added a new dimen-sion to policymaking in Germany and the other EUstates.50 Petitioners can challenge German legislationthat they believe violates provisions of certain EUpolicies. Hundreds of German laws are reviewed eachyear, and anticipation of ECJ review also now influ-ences the legislative process of the parliament.

POLICY PERFORMANCE

By most standards, the two Germanies could bothboast of their positive records of government perfor-mance since their formation. The FRG’s economicadvances in the 1950s and early 1960s were truly phe-nomenal, and the progress in the GDR was nearly asremarkable. By the 1980s the FRG had one of thestrongest economies in the world, and other policiesimproved the education system, increased workers’participation in industrial management, extendedsocial services, and improved environmental quality.

The GDR had its own impressive record of policyaccomplishments, even though it lagged behind theWest. It developed a network of social programs, someof which were even more extensive than in the West.The GDR was the economic miracle of the Eastern blocand the strongest economy in COMECON. Unificationcreated new challenges of maintaining the advances inthe West and improving conditions in the East.

The integration of two different social and politi-cal systems created strains that are still one of Ger-many’s major policy challenges. In addition, the nationfaces many of the same policy issues as other Europeandemocracies: competing in a global economic system,dealing with the new issues of multiculturalism, andcharting a foreign policy course in a changing world.This section describes the present policy programs andoutputs of the Federal Republic. Then we discuss thepolicy challenges currently facing the nation.

The Federal Republic’s Policy Record

For Americans who hear politicians rail against “biggovernment” in the United States, the size of theGerman government gives greater meaning to thisterm. Over the past half century, the scope ofGerman government has increased both in total pub-lic spending and in new policy responsibilities. Todaygovernment spending accounts for almost half of thetotal economy, and government regulations touchmany areas of the economy and society. Germans aremuch more likely than Americans to consider thestate responsible for addressing social needs and tosupport government policy activity. In summary,total public expenditures—federal, state, local, and thesocial security system—have increased from less than€15 billion in 1950 to €269 billion in 1975 and over€1 trillion for a united Germany in 2006, which is


nearly 50 percent of the gross domestic product. Thatis big government.

Public spending in Germany flows from manydifferent sources. Social security programs are thelargest part of public expenditures; however, they aremanaged in insurance programs that are separatefrom the government’s normal budget.

In addition, the Basic Law distributes policy re-sponsibilities among the three levels of government.Local authorities provide utilities (electricity, gas, andwater), operate the hospitals and public recreation fa-cilities, and administer youth and social assistanceprograms. The states manage education and culturalpolicies. They also hold primary responsibility forpublic security and the administration of justice. Thefederal government’s responsibilities include foreignpolicy and defense, transportation, and communica-tions. Consequently, public expenditures are distrib-uted fairly evenly over the three levels of government.In 2006 the federal budget’s share was 28.3 percent,the state governments spent 25.9 percent, and the local governments spent 15.6 percent (plus the social in-surance spending and other miscellaneous programs).

Figure 10.8 describes the activities of government,combining public spending by local, state, and federalgovernments, as well as the expenditures of the social in-surance systems in 2002. Public spending on social pro-grams alone amounted to €555.3 billion, more than wasspent on all other government programs combined. Be-cause of these extensive social programs, analysts oftendescribe the Federal Republic as a welfare state—ormore precisely, a social services state. A compulsory so-cial insurance system includes nationwide health care,accident insurance, unemployment compensation, andretirement benefits. Other programs provide financialassistance for the needy and individuals who cannotsupport themselves. Finally, additional programs spreadthe benefits of the Economic Miracle regardless of need.For instance, the government provides financial assis-tance to all families with children and has special tax-free savings plans and other savings incentives for theaverage wage earner. The unemployment program is atypical example of the range of benefits available (seeBox 10.4). For much of the FRG’s early history, politi-cians competed to expand the coverage and benefits ofsuch programs. Since the 1980s the government has

tried to scale back socialprograms, but the basicstructure of the welfarestate has endured.

Unification has putthis system (and the federal budget) to an ad-ditional test. Unemploy-ment, welfare, andhealth benefits providedfor basic social needs inthe East during the diffi-cult economic times following unification.However, this effort costseveral hundred billionDeutschmarks (DM;now euros) and placednew strains on the politi-cal consensus in supportof these social programs,as well as the govern-ment’s ability to providethese benefits (as dis-cussed in the followingsection).

Social programs

(555.3 = 55.9%)

Education

(86.3 = 8.7%)

Culture, health

(23.8 = 2.4%)

Transportation

(23.0 = 2.3%)

Economic

development

(28.0 = 2.8%)

Urban programs

(24.9 = 2.5%)

Other

(194.8 = 19.6%)

Defense

(24.5 = 2.5%)

Public security

(32.1 = 3.2%)

992.7

Total

The Distribution of Total Public Expenditures, 2002

(in billions)The largest share of public spending is for various social programs and then

education.

F I G U R E 1 0 . 8

Source: Statistisches Jahrbuch für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Berlin: Statistiches Bundesamt,

2005), p. 565.


The federal government is also involved in arange of other policy activities. Education, for exam-ple, is an important concern of all three levels of gov-ernment, accounting for about one-tenth of all publicspending (see again Figure 10.8). The federal govern-ment is deeply involved in communications andtransportation; it manages public television and radio,as well as owning the railway system.

In recent years the policy agenda has expanded toinclude new issues; environmental protection is themost visible example. Several indicators of air and wa-ter quality show real improvements in recent decades,and Germany has a very ambitious recycling program.The Green Dot system recycles about 80 percent ofbottles used in commercial packaging, compared toabout 20 percent in the United States. The SPD-Greengovernment developed stronger policies for environ-mental protection, such as phasing out nuclear power,encouraging renewable energy, and initiating pro-grams to limit global warming.

Defense and foreign relations are also important ac-tivities of government. More than for most other Euro-pean nations, the FRG’s economy and security systemare based on international interdependence. The FederalRepublic’s economy depends heavily on exports and for-eign trade; in the mid-1990s over one-fourth of theWestern labor force produced goods for export, a higherpercentage than for most other industrial economies.

The FRG’s international economic orientationmakes the nation’s membership in the EuropeanUnion (EU) a cornerstone of its economic policy. TheFRG was an initial advocate of the EU and has bene-fited considerably from its EU membership. Free ac-cess to a large European market was essential to thesuccess of the Economic Miracle, and it still benefitsthe FRG’s export-oriented economy. Germany’s

integration into the EU has gradually grown over re-cent decades, as illustrated by the currency shift fromthe DM to the euro in 2002. The Federal Republic hasalso strongly advocated expanding the policy respon-sibilities and membership of the EU. At the same time,participation in EU decisionmaking gives the FederalRepublic an opportunity to influence the course ofEuropean politics on a transnational scale.

The Federal Republic is also integrated into theWestern military alliance through its membership inthe North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).Among the Europeans the Federal Republic makes thelargest personnel and financial contributions toNATO forces, and the German public supports theNATO alliance. In the post–Cold War world, however,the threats to Germany’s national security no longercome from the Warsaw Pact in the East. This has led toa reduction in overall defense spending to less than 3 percent of total public spending.

Public expenditures show the policy efforts of thegovernment, but the actual results of this spending aremore difficult to assess. Most indicators of policy performance suggest that the Federal Republic is rel-atively successful in achieving its policy goals. Stan-dards of living have improved dramatically, andhealth statistics show similar improvement. Even innew policy areas such as energy and the environment,the government has made real progress. The opinionsof the public reflect these policy advances (see Figure10.9). In 2004 most Westerners were satisfied withmost aspects of life that might be linked to govern-ment performance: housing, living standards, work,income, and education. Eastern evaluations of theirlives lag behind those of the West, but still represent amarked improvement from the years immediately after unification.

German Unemployment Benefits

An unemployed worker receives insurance payments

that provide up to 67 percent of normal pay (60 percent

for unmarried workers and those without children) for up

to two years. After that, unemployment assistance con-

tinues at a reduced rate for a period that depends on

one’s age. The government pays the social insurance

contributions of individuals who are unemployed, and

government labor offices help the unemployed worker

find new employment or obtain retraining for a new job.

If the worker locates a job in another city, the program

partially reimburses travel and moving expenses. These

benefits are much more generous than those typically

found in the United States and may be a factor in the

higher unemployment rate in Germany.

B O X 1 0 . 4


Paying the Costs

The generous benefits of government programs arenot, of course, due to government largesse. Individualand corporate taxes and financial contributions pro-vide the funds for these programs. Therefore, largegovernment outlays inevitably mean an equally largecollection of revenues by the government. These rev-enues are the real source of government programs.

Three different types of revenue provide the bulk ofthe resources for public policy programs.51 Contribu-tions to the social security system represent the largestsource of public revenues (see Figure 10.10). The health,unemployment, disability, retirement, and other socialsecurity funds are primarily self-financed by employerand employee contributions. For example, contributionsto the pension plan amount to about 20 percent of aworker’s gross monthly wages; health insurance is about13 percent of wages; and unemployment is 6.5 percent.The various insurance contributions are divided betweencontributions from the worker and from the employer.

The next most important source of public revenuesis direct taxes—that is, taxes that are directly assessed bythe government and paid to a government office. One

of the largest portions of public revenues comes froma personal income tax that the federal, state, and localgovernments share. The rate of personal taxation riseswith income level, from a base of 15 percent to a max-imum of 45 percent for high-income taxpayers (plus asolidarity surcharge to benefit the East). Even after therecent reforms of the tax rates, the German rates arestill significantly higher than those in the UnitedStates. Corporate profits are taxed at a lower rate thanpersonal income to encourage businesses to reinvesttheir profits in further growth.

The third major source of government revenues isindirect taxes. Like sales and excise taxes, indirect taxesare based on the use of income, rather than on wagesand profits. The most common and lucrative indirecttax is the value-added tax (VAT)—a charge that isadded at every stage in the manufacturing process andincreases the value of a product. The standard VAT is19 percent for most goods and 7 percent for basiccommodities such as food. Other indirect taxes includecustoms duties and liquor and tobacco taxes. In 1999the government introduced a new energy tax on theuse of energy to create incentives for conservation and

Housing Living

Standard

Work Leisure Education Goods/

Services

Housework Health Income

0

10

20

30

40

50

Perc

ent S

atisfied

60

80

80

90

West

East

Source: Statistisches Bundesamt, ed., Datenreport 2006 (Berlin: Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 2006), pp. 443–444.

Satisfaction with Life Areas in 2006Westerners are generally more satisfied than Easterners with their life conditions

F I G U R E 1 0 . 9

borrowing—to maintainthe level of governmentservices. The costs ofunification inevitably in-creased the flow of redink. A full accounting ofpublic spending wouldshow deficits averagingmore than €50 billion ayear since union.

The German tax-payer seems to con-tribute an excessiveamount to the publiccoffers, and Germans areno more eager thanother nationalities to paytaxes. Yet, the currentCDU/CSU–SPD govern-ment has further de-creased corporate taxes,while raising incometaxes on the highestearners. Still, the ques-tion is not how much

citizens pay, but how much value is returned for theirpayments. In addition to normal government activities,Germans are protected against sickness, unemployment,and disability; government pension plans furnish livableretirement incomes. Moreover, the majority of the pub-lic expects the government to take an active role in pro-viding for the needs of society and its citizens.

ADDRESSING THE POLICY CHALLENGES

The last decade has been a time of tremendous policychange and innovation for the Federal Republic as it hasadjusted to its new domestic and foreign policy circum-stances. While a government faces policy needs in manyareas, we discuss three prominent issues. The first is toaccommodate the remaining problems flowing fromGerman unification. The second is to reform theGerman economic and social systems. And the third isto define a new international role for Germany.

The Problems of Unification

Some of the major policy challenges facing contempo-rary Germany flow from the unification of East and


Income tax

(191.2 = 19.3%)

Social Security

(457.1 = 46.0%)

Deficit

(45.5 = 4.6%)

Solidarity tax

(10.4 = 1.0%)

Other income

(10.7 = 1.1%)

Excise tax

(64.8 = 6.5%)

Value-added tax

(138.2 = 13.9%)

Other taxes

(48.2 = 4.9%)

Trade tax

(23.5 = 2.3%)

Corporate tax

(31.3 = 0.3%)

992.7

Total

The Sources of Public Revenues, 2002 (in € billions)Public spending is financed by a combination of direct taxes, indirect taxes,

various fees, and deficit spending

F I G U R E 1 0 . 1 0

Source: Statistisches Jahrbuch für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Berlin: Statistiches

Bundesamt, 2005), p. 571.

to provide additional government revenue. Altogether,indirect taxes account for about two-fifths of all publicrevenues. Indirect taxes—one of the secrets to the dra-matic growth of government revenues—are normally“hidden” in the price of an item, rather than explicitlylisted as a tax. In this way people are not reminded thatthey are paying taxes every time they purchase a prod-uct; it is also easier for policymakers to raise indirecttaxes without evoking public awareness and opposi-tion. Indirect taxes are regressive, however; they weighmore heavily on low-income families because a largershare of their income goes for consumer goods.

The average German obviously has deep pocketsto fund the extensive variety of public policy pro-grams; U.S. taxation levels look quite modest by com-parison. On average German workers pay about halfof their income for taxes and social security contribu-tions, compared with a rate of about 40 percent in theUnited States.

Even with these various revenue sources, public ex-penditures repeatedly have exceeded public revenues inrecent years. To finance this deficit, the governmentdraws on another source of “revenue”—loans and public


West. Most observers were surprised by the suddenand dramatic collapse of the East German economicand social systems in the wake of the November 1989revolution. During the first half of 1990, for instance,the gross domestic product of the GDR decreased bynearly 5 percent, unemployment skyrocketed, andindustrial production fell off by nearly 60 percent.52

The most immediate economic challenge afterunification was the need to rebuild the economy ofthe East, integrating Eastern workers and companiesinto the West’s social market economy. The GDR’s im-pressive growth statistics and production figures oftenpapered over a decaying economic infrastructure andoutdated manufacturing facilities. Similarly, the GDRwas heavily dependent on trade with other COME-CON nations. When COMECON ended with thecollapse of communism in Eastern Europe, a majorportion of the GDR’s economy was destroyed.

The Currency Union in July 1990 was an experi-ence in “cold turkey capitalism”—overnight the East-ern economy had to accept the economic standards ofthe Federal Republic. Even with salaries one-thirdlower in the East, productivity was still out of balance.Matching the Western economy against that of theEast was like racing a Porsche against the GDR’s anti-quated two-cylinder Trabant—a race in which theoutcome is foreordained.

The Federal Republic took several steps to rebuildthe economy of the East and then raise it to Westernstandards. The government-directed Trust Agency(Treuhandanstalt) privatized the 8,000 plus firms thatthe GDR government had owned. All of these firmswere sold off or closed by 1994, when the Treuhand it-self was disbanded. However, privatization did not gen-erate capital for investment as had been planned, anddisputes about property ownership further slowed thepace of development. The sale of the GDR’s economicinfrastructure generated a net loss for the nation.

German unification had multiple economic by-products. The high levels of unemployment placedgreat demands on the Federal Republic’s social welfareprograms. Unemployed Eastern workers drew unem-ployment compensation, retraining benefits, andrelocation allowances—without having made priorcontributions to these social insurance systems. TheFRG also took over the pensions and health insurancebenefits of Easterners. The government spent massiveamounts: from rebuilding the highway and railway sys-tems of the East, to upgrading the telephone system, tomoving the capital from Bonn to Berlin. In 1991, for

example, the combined payments to the new Länderfrom official sources amounted to DM 113 billion (al-most DM 7,000 per capita); this was more than twicePoland’s per capita disposable income for the sameyear.53 Even today, roughly 4 percent of the gross do-mestic product is transferred to the East.

Economic progress is being made. Recent eco-nomic growth rates in the East often exceed those in theWestern states by a comfortable margin. However, theEast-West gap is still wide. Unemployment rates in the East are still more than double the rates in the West,and even after years of investment, productivity in theEast still lags markedly behind that of the West.Although standards of living in the East have rapidlyimproved since the early 1990s, they remain signifi-cantly below Western standards. Furthermore, even ifthe Eastern economy grows at double the rate of theWest, it will take decades to reach full equality.

German unification also creates new noneco-nomic challenges. For example, the GDR had modelenvironmental laws, but these laws were not enforced.Consequently, many areas of the East resembled anenvironmentalist’s nightmare: Untreated toxic wastesfrom industry were dumped into rivers, emissionsfrom power plants poisoned the air, and many citieslacked sewage treatment plants. The unification treatycalled for raising the environmental quality of the Eastto Western standards. The cost of correcting theGDR’s environmental legacy competes against eco-nomic development projects for government funding.Thus, unification intensified the political debate onthe trade-offs between economic development andenvironmental protection.

Thus, despite the real progress that has beenmade since 1990, a real policy gap still exists betweenWest and East. At the same time, Germans still pay anextra “solidarity surcharge” on their income tax thatfunds part of the Eastern reconstruction. Equalizingliving conditions across regions remains a nationalgoal, but it is a goal that will demand continuing re-sources and take decades more to accomplish.

Reforming the Welfare State

The Wirtschaftswunder (Economic Miracle) is a cen-tral part of the Federal Republic’s modern history—but these miraculous times are now in the distant past.Contemporary Germany faces a series of new prob-lems as its economy and social programs strain toadjust to a new global economic system.


For instance, business interests repeatedly criti-cize the uncompetitiveness of the German economyin a global economy. Labor costs are higher than inmany other European nations and dramaticallyhigher than labor costs in Eastern Europe and otherregions. The generous benefits from liberal socialservices programs come at a cost in terms of em-ployee and employer contributions. Other regula-tions impede the creation of new jobs or temporaryemployment. A recent report claimed that someGerman firms are mired in a spider web of govern-ment bureaucracy; they must provide sixty-two differ-ent datasets to government offices, file seventy-eightreports for social insurance, supply another sixtyforms for tax purposes, and complete no less than 111more to comply with labor laws. Thus, German unem-ployment remains relatively high, productivity has not grown as rapidly as experts might expect, and Germany faces pressures to change these public policies.

A related issue is the economic viability ofGermany’s social service programs. A rapidly agingpopulation means that the demand for health care andpension benefits will steadily increase over time, butthere are fewer employed workers to contribute to so-cial insurance programs. For instance, in the 1950sthere were roughly four employees for every person re-ceiving a pension; by 2010 there will be fewer than twoemployees for every pensioner. Similar demographicissues face Germany’s other social programs. As thepopulation ages, health care costs have also increased.

The Schröder government commissioned a seriesof studies and blue-ribbon commissions to formulatepolicy reforms. In 2004 the government enacted a newreform program known as Agenda 2010. One set ofmeasures reformed the labor market by easing em-ployment rules, reducing the nonwage labor costs, andreforming the unemployment system. A second set ofreforms reduced benefits in the pension and healthcare systems. The third set of reforms was to restruc-ture the tax system.

While these reforms moved in a positive direc-tion, many experts claimed that more was needed. Theeconomy stagnated during Schröder’s second term,which contributed to the government’s loss in the2005 elections. The economy began to grow in 2005,partially as a result of earlier reforms. The gross do-mestic product increased by 10 percent from 2005 to2008, and unemployment edged downward.

Many analysts hoped the Grand Coalition ofCDU/CSU and SPD would undertake a new round of

reforms that would be even more far-reaching and reapeven greater returns. However, Merkel has pursued acautious course. Modest economic and social servicesreforms changed policies at the margins without dealingwith the fundamental policy challenges. Then the Ger-man economy suffered as part of the global recessionthat began in 2008. The immediate economic prioritiestook precedence over longer term economic reforms. Inaddition, the citizens and the elites lack a political con-sensus on what policies are most desirable. Thus, thesepolicy challenges will still face the new German govern-ment that forms after the 2009 Bundestag elections.

A New World Role

Paralleling its domestic policy challenges, the newGermany is redefining its international identity and itsforeign policy goals. The Federal Republic’s role ininternational politics is linked to its participation inthe NATO alliance and the European Union. Bothrelationships are changing because of German unity.

In mid-1990 Russia agreed to continued Germanmembership in NATO in return for concessions on thereduction of combined German troop levels; the defini-tion of the GDR territory as a nuclear-free zone; andGermany’s continued abstention from the developmentor use of atomic, biological, and chemical weapons.With unification, Germany became a fully sovereign na-tion and now seeks its own role in international affairs.

The new Germany will likely play a different mili-tary and strategic role because of these agreementsand the changing international context. NATO existedas a bulwark of the Western defense against the Sovietthreat; the decline of this threat will lessen the militaryrole of the alliance. Moreover, Germany wants to be anactive advocate for peace within Europe, developingits role as a bridge between East and West. The FederalRepublic thus was among the strongest proponents ofthe recent expansion of EU membership to severalEast European nations.

The new Germany is also assuming a larger re-sponsibility in international disputes outside the NATOregion. In 1993 the Constitutional Court interpretedthe Basic Law to allow German troops to serve outsideof Europe as part of international peacekeeping activi-ties. In 1998 Schröder survived a no-confidence vote onsending German soldiers into former Yugoslavia, whichchanged the course of German foreign policy. In mid-2008 German troops served in twelve nations as part ofinternational peacekeeping efforts.


After Schröder’s disagreements with the UnitedStates over the Iraq war, Merkel worked to restoreGermany’s relationship with the United States. Even inthe case of Iraq, Germany assists the reconstructionthrough training and support programs that do notrequire a military presence in Iraq. There may be moredisagreements between Merkel and her SPD foreignminister Frank-Walter Steinmeier than between herand American foreign policy. But regardless of theoutcome of the 2009 election, the Federal Republicwill likely exercise a more independent foreign policy,within a framework of partnership with its allies.

Unification is also reshaping the Federal Repub-lic’s relationship to the European Union.54 The newGermany outweighs the other EU members in both itspopulation and its gross national product; thus, theparity that underlies the consensual nature of the EUwill change. Germany has been a strong advocate of theEU, but this has sometimes made other Western mem-bers uneasy. For instance, Germany had pushed for theeastward expansion of the EU and strongly supportedthe euro, while other nations favor a slower course.And now with the new EU constitution on hold anddifficult issues of further expansion of EU membershipon the table, the debates on the future of the EU willintensify. At the least, it is clear that a united Germanywill approach the process of European integrationbased on a different calculus than that which guided itsactions for the previous forty years.

AFTER THE REVOLUTION

Revolutions are unsettling, both to the participants andto the spectators. Such is the case with the German rev-olution of 1989. Easterners realized their hopes for

freedom, but they also have seen their everyday liveschange before their eyes, sometimes in distressing ways.Westerners saw their hopes for German union and anew peace in Europe answered, but at a substantialpolitical and economic cost to the nation. The FederalRepublic is now forging a new social and political iden-tity that will shape its domestic and international poli-cies. Many Germans on both sides of the former borderare hopeful about, but still uncertain of, what the futureholds for their nation. The Federal Republic’s neighborswonder what role the new Germany will play inEuropean and international affairs. Addressing thesequestions will test the strength of the Federal Republicand its new residents in the East.

Unification has clearly presented new social, politi-cal, and economic challenges for the nation. One cannotmerge two such different systems without experiencingproblems. However, these strains were magnified by theinability or unwillingness of elites to state the problemshonestly and to deal with them in a forthright manner.As seen in the 2005 elections, Germans are divided onthe direction they want the government to follow. Tomake further progress, Germany must reforge the socialand political consensus that was a foundation for theFederal Republic’s past accomplishments.

Unification has created a new German state linkedto Western political values and social norms. Equallyimportant, unity was achieved through a peaceful rev-olution (and the power of the DM), not blood andiron. The trials of the unification process are testing thepublic’s commitment to these values. The govern-ment’s ability to show citizens in the East that democ-racy and the social market economy can improve thequality of their lives is the best way to consolidate thepolitical gains of unification and to move the nation’ssocial development forward.

K E Y T E R M S

Adenauer, Konrad

Basic Law (Grundgesetz)

Bundesrat (FederalCouncil)

Bundestag (Federal Diet)

Christian DemocraticUnion (CDU)

Christian Social Union(CSU)

citizen action groups(Bürgerinitiativen)

codetermination(Mitbestimmung)

Confederation ofGerman Employers’

Associations (BDA)

Constitutional Court

constructive no-confidence vote

Economic Miracle(Wirtschaftswunder)

European Union (EU)

federal chancellor(Bundeskanzler)

federal president(Bundespräsident)

Federal Republic ofGermany (FRG)

Federation of GermanIndustry (BDI)


Free Democratic Party(FDP)

German DemocraticRepublic (GDR)

German Federation ofTrade Unions (DGB)

The Greens

guest workers(Gastarbeiter)

Hitler, Adolf

Kaiser

Kohl, Helmut

Die Linke

Merkel, Angela

National Socialist GermanWorkers’ Party (theNazis)

neocorporatism

New Politics

Ostpolitik

Party of DemocraticSocialism (PDS)

peak association

proportionalrepresentation (PR)

Republikaner (REP)

Schröder, Gerhard

Social Democratic Party(SPD)

Socialist Unity Party (SED)

Third Reich

value-added tax (VAT)

Weimar Republic

S U G G E S T E D R E A D I N G S

Anderson, Christopher, and Karsten Zelle, eds. Stability and Changein German Elections: How Electorates Merge, Converge, orCollide. Westport, CT: Praeger, 1998.

Ash, Timothy Garton. In Europe’s Name: Germany in a DividedContinent. New York: Random House, 1993.

Bark, Dennis, and David Gress. A History of West Germany. 2 vols.2nd ed. London: Blackwell, 1993.

Childers, Thomas, and Jane Caplan, eds. Reevaluating the ThirdReich. New York: Holmes and Meier, 1993.

Fulbrook, Mary. Anatomy of a Dictatorship: Inside the GDR,1949–1989. New York: Oxford University Press, 1995.

———. History of Germany, 1918–2000. Oxford, England:Blackwell, 2002.

Gellner, Winand, and John Robertson, eds. “The Berlin Republic:German Unification and a Decade of Changes,” special issueof German Politics 11, no. 3 (December 2002).

Kershaw, Ian. Hitler: A Biography. New York: Norton, 2008.

Kolinsky, Eva. Women in Contemporary Germany. New York: Berg,1993.

Kopstein, Jeffrey. The Politics of Economic Decline in East Germany,1945–1989. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press,1997.

Krisch, Henry. The German Democratic Republic: The Search forIdentity. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1985.

Langenbocher, Eric. Launching the Grand Coalition: The 2005Election and the Future of German Politics. New York:Berghahn Books, 2006.

McAdams, James. Germany Divided: From the Wall to Unification.Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993.

———. Judging the Past in Unified Germany. New York: CambridgeUniversity Press, 2001.

Merkl, Peter, ed. The Federal Republic at Fifty: The End of a Centuryof Turmoil. New York: New York University Press, 1999.

Orlow, Dietrich. A History of Modern Germany. 5th ed. EnglewoodCliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2001.

Padgett, Stephen. Organizing Democracy in Eastern Germany.Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 2000.

Padgett, Stephen, William Patterson, and Gordon Smith, eds.Developments in German Politics 3. London: Palgrave, 2003.

Rohrschneider, Robert. Learning Democracy: Democratic andEconomic Values in Unified Germany. New York: OxfordUniversity Press, 1999.

Sheehan, James. German History 1770–1866. New York: OxfordUniversity Press, 1989.

Sinn, Gerlinde, and Hans-Werner Sinn. Jumpstart: The EconomicUnification of Germany. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1992.

Sinn, Hans-Werner. Can Germany Be Saved? The Malaise of theWorld’s First Welfare State. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2007.

Spielvogel, Jackson. Hitler and Nazi Germany: A History. 5th ed.Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2005.

Turner, Henry. Germany from Partition to Unification. New Haven,CT: Yale University Press, 1992.

Vanberg, Georg. The Politics of Constitutional Review in Germany.New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005.

I N T E R N E T R E S O U R C E S

Bundestag: www.bundestag.de

Federal government: www.bundesregierung.de

German Information Center: www.germany-info.org

Politics in Germany (online textbook edition): www.socsci.uci.edu/~rdalton/Pgermany.htm


E N D N O T E S

1. The First German Empire was formed in the ninth centurythrough the partitioning of Charlemagne’s empire. See KurtReinhardt, Germany: 2000 Years, vol. 1 (New York: Ungar, 1986).

2. Karl Dietrich Bracher, The German Dictatorship (New York:Praeger, 1970); Martin Broszat, Hitler and the Collapse ofWeimar Germany (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1987).

3. Raul Hilberg, The Destruction of the European Jews, 3rd. ed.(New York: Holmes and Meier, 2003); Deborah Dwork andRobert Jan van Pelt, Holocaust: A History (New York: Norton,2002).

4. Karl Hardach, The Political Economy of Germany in theTwentieth Century (Berkeley: University of California Press,1980); Eric Owen Smith, The German Economy (London:Routledge, 1994).

5. Gregory Sandford, From Hitler to Ulbricht: The CommunistReconstruction of East Germany, 1945-1946 (Princeton, NJ:Princeton University Press, 1983).

6. Forschungsgruppe Wahlen, Politbarometer, June 2008(Mannheim, Germany: Forschungsgruppe Wahlen, 2008).

7. Eva Kolinsky, Women in Contemporary Germany (New York:Berg, 1993); Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart, A Rising Tide(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003); RussellDalton, Citizen Politics, 5th ed. (Washington, DC: CQ Press,2008), ch. 6.

8. Ruud Koopmans, Paul Statham, Marco Giugni, and FlorencePassy, Contested Citizenship: Immigration and CulturalDiversity in Europe (Minneapolis: University of MinnesotaPress, 2005); Richard Alba, Peter Schmidt, and MartinaWasmer, eds., Germans or Foreigners? Attitudes Toward EthnicMinorities in Post-reunification Germany (New York: PalgraveMacmillan, 2003).

9. The Allied occupation authorities oversaw the drafting of theBasic Law and held veto power over the final document. SeePeter Merkl, The Origins of the West German Republic (NewYork: Oxford University Press, 1965).

10. In 2002 the membership of the Bundestag was reduced fromits previous size of 656. This resulted from redistricting toequalize the number of voters in each district.

11. The URL for the Bundestag is: www.bundestag.de.

12. Ludger Helms, “Keeping Weimar at Bay: The German FederalPresidency Since 1949,” German Politics and Society 16(Summer 1998): 50–68.

13. Donald Kommers, Constitutional Jurisprudence of the FederalRepublic (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1989); DonaldKommers, “The Federal Constitutional Court in the GermanPolitical System,” Comparative Political Studies 26 (1994):470–491.

14. A second type of no-confidence vote allows the chancellor toattach a no-confidence provision to a government legislativeproposal. If the Bundestag defeats the proposal, the chancel-lor may ask the federal president to call for new Bundestagelections. This tool was used by Kohl in 1983 and Schröder in2005 to call for early elections.

15. Anna Merritt and Richard Merritt, Public Opinion inOccupied Germany (Urbana: University of Illinois Press,1970); Ralf Dahrendorf, Society and Democracy in Germany(New York: Doubleday, 1967).

16. Christiane Lemke, “Political Socialization and the‘Micromilieu,’” in The Quality of Life in the GermanDemocratic Republic, ed. Marilyn Rueschemeyer andChristiane Lemke (New York: M. E. Scharpe, 1989).

17. Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1963); DavidConradt, “Changing German Political Culture,” in The CivicCulture Revisited, ed. Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba(Boston: Little Brown, 1980).

18. Conradt, “Changing German Political Culture,” pp. 229-231;Kendall Baker, Russell J. Dalton, and Kai Hildebrandt,Germany Transformed: Political Culture and the New Politics(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981).

19. Deutsches Jugendinstitut, Deutsche Schüler im Sommer 1990(Munich: Deutsches Jugendinstitut, 1990).

20. Conradt, “Changing German Political Culture.”

21. Gerald Braunthal, Political Loyalty and Public Service in WestGermany (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1990).

22. Walter Friedrich and Hartmut Griese, Jugend und Jugendforschung in der DDR (Opladen, Germany: WestdeutscherVerlag, 1990).

23. Russell Dalton, “Communists and Democrats: DemocraticAttitudes in the Two Germanies,” British Journal of PoliticalScience 24 (1994): 469–493; Frederick Weil, “TheDevelopment of Democratic Attitudes in Eastern andWestern Germany in a Comparative Perspective,” inDemocratization in Eastern and Western Europe, ed. FrederickWeil (Greenwich, CT: JAI Press, 1993).

24. Richard Hofferbert and Hans-Dieter Klingemann,“Democracy and Its Discontents in Post-wall Germany,”International Political Science Review 22 (2001): 363-378;Robert Rohrschneider, Learning Democracy: Democratic andEconomic Values in Unified Germany (New York: OxfordUniversity Press, 1999).

25. Ronald Inglehart, Modernization and Postmodernization(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997); RonaldInglehart, Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990).

26. See Chapter 3; Dalton, Citizen Politics, ch. 6.

27. Commission of the European Union, Eurobarometer 67(Brussels: European Union, 2007).

28. Christiane Lemke,“Political Socialization and the ‘Micromilieu.’”

29. Meredith Watts et al., Contemporary German Youth and TheirElders (New York: Greenwood, 1989); Elizabeth Noelle-Neumann and Renate Köcher, Die verletze Nation (Stuttgart:Deutsche Verlag, 1987); Deutsches Jugendinstitut, DeutscheSchüler im Sommer 1990.

30. Peter Humphreys, Media and Media Policy in Germany: ThePress and Broadcasting Since 1945, rev. ed. (New York: Berg,1994).

31. Commission of the European Union, Eurobarometer 63.4.

32. Achim Koch, Martina Wasmer, and Peter Schmidt, eds.,Politische Partizipation in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland:Empirische Befunde und theoretische Erklärungen. (Opladen,Germany: Leske and Budrich, 2001).

33. Wilhelm Bürklin, Hilke Rebenstorf, et al. Eliten inDeutschland: Rekutierung und Integration (Opladen,


Germany: Leske and Budrich, 1997); Dietrich Herzog, HilkeRebensstorf, and Bernhard Wessels, eds., Parliament undGessellschaft: (Opladen, Germany: Westdeutscher Verlag,1993).

34. Wilhelm Bürklin, “Einstellungen und Wertorientierungen ost-und westdeutscher Eliten 1995,” in Einstellungen und politischesVerhalten in Transformationsprozess, ed. Oskar Gabriel(Opladen, Germany: Leske and Budrich, 1996); Rohrschneider,Learning Democracy.

35. Also see Chapter 4; Volker Berghahn and Detlev Karsten,Industrial Relations in West Germany (New York: Berg, 1989);Claus Offe, “The Attribution of Political Status to InterestGroups,” in Organizing Interests in Western Europe, ed.Suzanne Berger (New York: Cambridge University Press,1981), pp. 123–158.

36. Kathleen Thelen, Union in Parts: Labor Politics in PostwarGermany (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991).

37. Ruud Koopmans, Democracy from Below: New SocialMovements and the Political System in West Germany(Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995).

38. The Republikaner and other small right-wing parties have notwon Bundestag seats, but they have won seats at the state andlocal levels. See Hans-Joachim Veen, Norbert Lepszy, andPeter Mnich, Die Republikaner Party in Germany: Right-WingMenace or Protest Catchall? (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1993);and Pietro Ignazi, Extreme Right Parties in Western Europe(Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 2006).

39. Gerard Braunthal, The German Social Democrats Since 1969,2nd ed. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994).

40. Thomas Poguntke, Alternative Politics: The German GreenParty (Edinburgh: University of Edinburgh Press, 1993);Margit Mayer and John Ely, eds., The German Greens: ParadoxBetween Movement and Party (Philadelphia: TempleUniversity Press, 1998).

41. Dan Hough, Michael Koss, and Jonathan Olsen, The Left Partyin Contemporary German Politics (London: Palgrave, 2007).

42. If a party wins more district seats in a state than it shouldhave based on its proportion of the second vote, the party isallowed to keep the additional seats and the size of theBundestag is increased. In 2005 the actual Bundestag mem-bership was 614.

43. A party that wins at least three district seats also shares in thePR distribution of seats. In 1994 and 1998, the PDS won fourdistrict seats in East Berlin, which earned it additional seats

through the PR distribution. In 2002 the PDS won only twodistrict seats.

44. Matthew Shugart and Martin Wattenberg, eds., Mixed-Member Electoral Systems: The Best of Both Worlds? (Oxford,England: Oxford University Press, 2001). Also see Chapter 4.

45. For voting patterns in prior elections, see ChristopherAnderson and Karsten Zelle, eds., Stability and Change inGerman Elections: How Electorates Merge, Converge, or Collide(Westport, CT: Praeger, 1998); and Russell Dalton, “VoterChoice and Electoral Politics” in Developments in GermanPolitics 3, Stephen Padgett, William Patterson, and GordonSmith, eds. (London: Palgrave, 2003).

46. Vivien Schmitt, The Futures of European Capitalism (Oxford,England: Oxford University Press, 2002); Alec Stone Sweet,Wayne Sandholtz, and Neil Fligstein, eds., The Institution-alization of Europe (Oxford, England: Oxford UniversityPress, 2001).

47. A constitutional reform in 2006 has changed the Bundesrat’slegislative role. In exchange for greater state autonomy in sev-eral policy areas, the Bundesrat’s approval is no longerrequired for the passage of various administrative proposals.Analysts predict that under the new system only 30–40 percentof legislation will now require Bundesrat approval.

48. The European Court of Justice also has the power to evaluateGerman legislation against the standards of the EU agreements.

49. Alec Stone, “Governing with Judges: The New Constitution-alism,” in Governing the New Europe, ed. Jack Hayward andEdward Page (Oxford, England: Polity Press, 1995).

50. Karen Alter, Establishing the Supremacy of European Law: TheMaking of an International Rule of Law in Europe (Oxford,England: Oxford University Press, 2001).

51. Arnold Heidenheimer, Hugh Heclo, and Carolyn Adams,Comparative Public Policy, 3rd ed. (New York: St. Martin’sPress, 1990), ch. 6.

52. Gerlinde Sinn and Hans-Werner Sinn, Jumpstart: TheEconomic Unification of Germany (Cambridge, MA: MITPress, 1992).

53. Sinn and Sinn, Jumpstart, pp. 24-25.

54. Maria Cowles, Thomas Risse, and James Caporaso, eds.,Transforming Europe (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press,2001); Desmond Dinan, Ever Closer Union? An Introduction tothe European Community, 2nd ed. (Boulder, CO: LynneRienner, 1999).

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