Departamento de Estado, elecciones presidenciales México 31

8/8/2019 Departamento de Estado, elecciones presidenciales Mxico 31

1/6

INFO LOG-00 AID-00 AMAD-00 CIAE-00 INL-00 DNI-00 DODE-00DOTE-00 DS-00B-00AAE-00 FBIE-00 VCI-00 TEDE-00INR-00 I0-00AB-01 L-00AC-00 VCIE-00 NSAE-00ISN-00 OIG-00 NIMA-00 PM-00SNE-00 CFPP-00 FMPC-00SP-00RM-00 SSO-00 SS-00CTC-00 PMB-00 DSCC-00PRM-00 DRL-00 G-00DIC-01 NFAT-00 SAS-00 SWCI-00/002WACTION WHA -00NCLASSIFIED52197F83 020003Z /38R 020000Z SEP 06

FM AMEMBASSY MEXICOTO SECSTATE WASHDC 3007INFO ALL US CONSULATES IN MEXICO COLLECTIVEDEPT OF TREASURY WASHDCEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

MERCE WASHDCDR USNORTHCOM MIAMI FLR USNORTHCOMWASHDC

RELEASED IN PARTB I , 1.4(D)

58: DECL: 08/31/2016PGOV, PREL, PINR, MXBJECT: DEBUNKING THE MYTH OF FRAUD: A. MEXICO 3907B. MEXICO 3700

ssified By: POLITICAL MINISTER-COUNSELOR CHARLES V. BARCLAY, REASONS

. (SBU) Summary: Underlying Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador'sMLO) on-going protest against the results of the July 2

ion is his contention that the election wasmong his most diehard supporters.

MIO's many allegations are charges that (i) theing preliminary returns contained a

t algorithm" that favored rival Felipe Calderon; (ii)him; (iii) the official vote count was manipulated

avor him; (iv) PAN representatives and poll workerso cheat him in precincts lacking PRD observers; and

y large number of spoiled votes and counting

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATEREVIEW AUTH ORITY: OSCAR .1 OLSONDATE/CASE ID: 22 MAY 2009 200704261 UNCLASSIFIED


2/6

UNCLASSIFIEDhim out of victory. On August 28, the Electoral Tribunal(TEPJF) rejected AMLO's allegations of widespread fraud,finding that he failed to document fraud in specificelectoral districts. A set of recent studies conducted byDr. Javier Aparicio of Mexico's well-respected Center forEconomic Research and Instruction (CIDE) corroborates theTEPJF's finding. Aparico analyzed a number of AMLO'sspecific allegations, finding that the available statisticalevidence tended to disprove each one of them. We offer thefollowing synopsis of Aparicio's research, drawing oninformation from other sources as appropriate, in the hopethis it will contribute to a better understanding of theflaws underlying AMLO's now officially discreditedallegations of electoral fraud. End summary.An Improbable Algorithm...

2. (SBU) One of the PRD's earliest allegations involved theFederal Electoral Institute's (IFS) preliminary vote count(PREP) which was intended to provide early but unofficialelection returns. The PRD alleged that the PREP somehow hadeen manipulated -- perhaps via a "secret algorithm" thatautomatically deducted Votes from AMLO's totals or added themto Calderon's as the votes were received -- to ensure thatalderon led from the moment the first returns were reported.Although the PRD conceded that as an unofficial count, the

was of no legal value, it argued that the Calderon camps apparent co-conspirators in IFE manipulated it to

alderon in the lead from the very beginning, thusCalderon indeed was

(SBU) Supporting its allegation, the PRD argued that inction as close as this one, AMLO and Calderon would belead for much of the

large and representative portiontive trends. The PRD argued that since Calderonstently led in the PREP from the outset, the PREP must

B

UNCLASSIFIED


3/6

UNCLASSIFIED

5. (SBU) In a statistical analysis of the returns, Apariciotook this explanation one step further, noting that of theapproximately 130,000 casillas nationwide, approximately 70$were in urban areas, where Calderon had a 2.2W advantage, and30% in rural areas, where AMLO had a 4.4$ advantage. (Note:Aparicio noted that although AMLO enjoyed a strong advantagein Mexico City and some Mexico state urban areas, togetherthey represented only 15% of the urban vote nationwide, notenough to overcome Calderon's advantage in Mexico's numerous

as. End note.) Aparicio found that urbanapproximately 50% of all urban

ereas only 25% ofd. Such a phenomenon is not surprising:

iver their tally sheets to the nearest IFEe, and often were unable to do so until the. As urban precincts reported their returns

kly, and as Calderon beat AMLO in the urban votein the returns, which shrank as pro-AMLO rural precincts

Lost" Vote

y after Election Day, AMLO provokede charged that IFE "lost" approximately 2.5

been omitted from the PREP totalst day, IFE President Luis Carlos Ugaldesuch votes had not been lost; rather, by prior

y sheets with errors orwere initially omitted from the PREP andncies." Only once thesers) could be clarified,be included in the PREP totals. As it turned out,otes in the "file of inconsistencies" favored AMLO over

ron, helping AMLO to shrink Calderon's preliminaryn from 1.04% to 0.63% (ref B), and fueling AMLO's

votes.e precincts to determine why they

AMLO more than the overall nationwide vote. He

UNCLASSIFIED


4/6

ting Behind the PRD's Back???

UNCLASSIFIEDdetermined that 65% of these precincts were rural; givenAMLO's decided advantage in rural areas, it is predictablethat such votes would favor him. Nor is it surprising thattally sheets from rural areas contained more errors thanthose from urban areas, since rural Mexicans tend to have aonsiderably lower education level.

U) In support of their allegation that electoral fraude, AMLO partisans also argued that their candidateignificantly fewer votes in precincts where the PRDe Election Day observers. The implication was

free from the watchful eye of PRD observers, PAN- presumably in collusion with the four

selected citizen election workers -- were free toin fraud. Aparicio's statistical analysis disproves

theory. Although AMLO indeed received fewer votes ints without PRD representatives, Aparicio found that

UNCLASSIFIED


5/6

UNCLASSIFIEDthat Felipe Calderon likewise received fewer votes inprecincts lacking a PAN representative. In fact, he foundthat AMLO and Calderon received fewer votes in precinctslacking their own party's observers at virtually an identicalrate. (Note: Furthermore, according to IFE statistics, thePAN and PRD had virtually identical coverage of precincts byparty observers, 79.9% vs. 79.4%, respectively. End note.)10. (SBU) Not surprisingly, Aparicio found that as a generalrule, the PAN and PRD were able to field more party observersin states in which they had more supporters. For example, inAMLO's home state of Tabasco, nearly 1000 of precincts hadPRD representatives, whereas only 33% had PRD representativesin the PAN stronghold of Nuevo Leon. Conversely, the PAN hadrepresentatives at only 35% of Mexico City precincts -- a keyMLO stronghold -- whereas it had approximately 90% coveragen its own stronghold of Guanajuato. Aparicio concluded it

of a party's observer and the number ofthe party received. Rather, AMLO and Calderon tended

in precincts where they had no partys because they often were unable to field observerss in which they had little support.ed Votes Did Not Spoil AMLO's Victory

1. (SBU) AMLO supporters also argued that the allegedlyar's election

suspicions that numerous AMLO votes were counted asd, presumably where the PRD had no partytatives to defend those votes. This argument suffers

irst, while the number of spoiled votes ine terms was higher this year than in 2000 -- therehis year -- the percentage of spoiled votes

rtually the same (2.16% vs. 2.10%). Second, Apariciotsoever between the absence of PAN

RD representatives and the number of spoiled votes in therepudiating the PRD's argument. He did find,tended to be more spoiled votes in rural

s -- which tended to favor AMLO and PRI candidate Robertothan in urban areas. Again, as rural voters tend

educated and sophisticated than urban voters,more likely to spoil

by marking their ballots improperly.id Errors Deny AMLO Los Pinos

UNCLASSIFIED


6/6

UNCLASSIFIED12. (SBU) Yet another argument advanced by AMLO supporterswas that there were an unusual number of errors -- bothcounting and arithmetic -- in this year's election and thatthese errors somehow reflected an effort to cheat AMLO ofvictory. Again Aparicio's research uncovered two flaws inthis theory. First, while Aparicio found that indeed therewere numerous arithmetic errors this year, the number oferrors was nevertheless 5% lower than in the 2000presidential election. Second, he found that there waslittle difference in the error rate in precincts won byCalderon as opposed to those won by AMLO.13. (SBU) Note: A study by Hugo Almada Mireles of theCitizens' Committee for Monitoring the Electoral Processsuggests that the final, August 5-9 recount of approximately12,000 precincts uncovered far more errors favorable toCalderon than to AMLO, particularly in the PAN strongholds ofGuanajuato and Jalisco. We strongly discount the integrityof this study, however, because it was based entirely onnofficial recount returns supplied by the PRD, which have

roughout the post-electorald note.)

UNCLASSIFIED

Documents

Departamento de Estado, elecciones presidenciales México 31