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DINAR I REŽIM

DEVIZNOG KURSA

Rezime

U prvom delu rada razmotrene su prednosti i slabosti fleksibilnih i fiksnih deviznih kurseva. U drugom delu data je klasifikacija deviznih kurseva prema metodologiji MMF. U trećem delu prikazan je model tzv. puzajućeg kursa, kao prelaznog deviznog aranžmana za određeni period. U četvrtom delu analizirana je politika vođenja „rukovođeno fleksibilnog“, ali precenjenog kursa i negativne posledice koje je izazvao. U petom delu date su projekcije kretanja kursa dinara. U šestom delu razmotrena je „evroizacija“i zašto nije moguće uvođenje evra u Srbiji, kako neki zagovaraju. Na kraju, dati su zaključak i pregled korišćene literature.

Ključne reči: dinar i devizni kurs; fiksni i fleksibilni devizni kursevi; rukovođeno fleksibilni kurs; precenjeni dinar; projekcije kursa dinara; evroizacija.

JEL klasifikacija: E42, E52, E58, O24

originalni naučni rad

UDK 336.748(497.11) ; 339.743(497.11)

dr Dejan JovovićPrivredna komora Srbije

dejan.jovovic@pks.rs

Rad primljen: 31.08.2011.

Odobren za štampu: 03.10.2011.

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Summary

In the first part of this paper advantages and disadvantage of the flexible and fixed exchange rates are examined. In the second part of the paper classification of the exchange rates after the IMF methodology is given. In the third part, the so-called crawling peg exchange rate is presented, as a transitional exchange arrangement for a given period of time. In the fourth part the policy is analysed of a “managed floating”, but overrated, exchange rate and the negative consequences that it has caused. In the fifth part projections are given for the movement of the dinar exchange rate. In the sixth part the “Eurisation” is examined and the reasons why it is not possible to introduce Euro currency in Serbia, as suggested in some quarters. Finally, conclusion is made and the list given of the literature used in this paper.

Key words: dinar and the exchange rate: fixed and flexible foreign exchange rates; managed floating exchange rate; overrated dinar; dinar exchange rate projections; Eurisation.

JEL Classification: E42, E52, E58, O24

DINAR AND THE EXCHANGE RATE REGIME

original scientific paper

UDC 336.748(497.11) ; 339.743(497.11)

Dejan Jovović PhDSerbian Chamber of Commerce dejan.jovovic@pks.rs

Paper received: 31.08.2011

Approved for publishing: 03.10.2011

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Potpuno fleksibilni ili fiksni kurs - prednosti i nedostaci

Sistem deviznih kurseva je skup pravila po kome se obavljaju transakcije i plaćanja preko državnih granica i taj sistem određuje vrednost valute jedne zemlje prema vrednosti drugih valuta na svetskom tržištu deviza. Devizni kurs je po definiciji cena neke strane valute izražena u domaćoj valuti, odnosno cena novca jedne zemlje iskazana u novcu druge zemlje. On je sredstvo preko koga se realizuju međunarodne transakcije u svetskoj privredi, a uspostavljanje deviznog kursa jedan je od osnovnih parametara tržišne ekonomije. Svaka država održava onaj devizni kurs, kao finalni proizvod platnobilansnih tokova i ukupnih finansijskih odnosa sa inostranstvom, kakav joj najviše odgovara u određenoj fazi razvoja. Termin „valuta“ odnosi se na efektivan novac, dok se pojam „devize“ upotrebljava za označavanje kratkoročnih potraživanja domaćih lica u stranoj valuti prema inostranim licima.

Fleksibilni kursevi su vrlo rasprostranjen devizni režim u svetu, kod koga se vrednost valute određuje ponudom i potražnjom na deviznom tržištu, odnosno gde se dozvoljava da tržište određuje vrednost valute. Međutim, treba reći da nema valute u svetu čija je vrednost određena samo ponudom i potražnjom na deviznom tržištu, odnosno nema potpuno slobodnog fluktuiranja kursa. Ako dođe do ekstremnog povećanja vrednosti (apresijacije) ili obezvređivanja ( d e p r e s i j a c i j e ) , centralna banka će da interveniše na tržištu, kako bi stabilizovala valutu. Prema tome, ovaj režim može tehnički biti poznat i kao nadzirani devizni kurs.

Kod nadziranog kursa vrednost se određuje na tržištu, ali je variranje vrednosti valute utvrđeno u određenim granicama. Postoje tri tipa ovog kursa. U prvom slučaju, vrednost valute varira u određenim granicama, koje se povremeno prilagođavaju, u zavisnosti od odgovarajućih ekonomsih pokazatelja i predviđanja. U drugom slučaju, vrednost valute je fiksirana, a menja se periodično, u zavisnosti

od stanja na tržištu. U trećem slučaju, vrednost valute može da varira u određenom fiksnom opsegu.

Nasuprot fleksibilnom kursu postoje fiksni (određeni) devizni kursevi, gde država određuje vrednost svoje valute ili vezuje njenu vrednost za neku drugu referentnu meru vrednosti. Ta mera može biti zlato (koje se koristilo u prošlosti), korpa valuta ili neka svetski rasprostranjena konvertibilna valuta, koja se razmenjuje na svetskom deviznom tržištu, a centralna banka stvara podlogu u stranoj valuti, gde je svaka jedinica domaće valute pokrivena odgovarajućim iznosom strane valute (uglavnom USD ili evrom).

Generalno, ekonomisti smatraju da je fleksibilni kurs u mnogim okolnostima bolji od fiksnog kursa, pošto može da reaguje na promenu situacije na deviznom tržištu. Međutim, fiksni kurs u određenim situacijama može biti pogodniji zbog veće stabilnosti koju daje valuti.

Neki naši ekonomski stručnjaci zalažu se za primenu potpuno fleksibilnog kursa, bez i k a k v i h intervencija Narodne b a n k e Srbije (NBS), pa da realna

kretanja dinara na tržištu pokažu njegovu pravu vrednost. Teško je reći koliki bi bio kurs dinara bez intervencija centralne banke. Prema nekim računicama iz sredine 2010. godine,

da je potpuno slobodno formiran devizni kurs, jedan evro

bi vredeo najmanje oko 150 dinara (procena IZIT - Instituta za istraživanje tržišta, Beograd). Neke procene govore da je sredinom 2010. precenjeni dinar realno bio oko 80% na višem nivou nego krajem 2000. godine (Kovačević, 2010.).

Treba reći da je osnovna prednost fleksibilnih (fluktuirajućih, kliznih, plivajućih, flotirajućih) kurseva mogućnost veće slobode u vođenju ekonomske i monetarne politike i olakšano platnobilansno uravnoteženje, gde su potrebne manje devizne rezerve. U slučaju recesije ovakav kurs pomaže da se ona ublaži, odnosno omogućava manji pad proizvodnje, a kod inflacije daje veću mogućnost da se

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Fully floating or a fixed exchange rate - Advantages and disadvantages

Exchange rate system is a set of rules regulating cross-border transactions and payments, and this system determines national currency value of a given country in respect to the other currencies traded on the world foreign exchange market. Exchange rate, per definition, is the price of a given foreign currency expressed in the national currency, i.e. the price of money of a country expressed in the money of another. It is the vehicle through which international transactions are carried out in the world economy, and the setting up of exchange rate is one of the basic parameters of the market economy. Every country in the world is upholding such an exchange rate that is the final product of its balance of payment flows and its overall financial cross-border dealings, and is the most appropriate for the country in its relevant development phase. The term “currency” designates effective money, while the notion “foreign exchange currency” is used to designate short-term claims of domestic persons in foreign currency from foreign persons.

Floating exchange rates are an exchange rate regime very largely encountered in the world, where the currency values are being determined through supply and demand on the foreign exchange market, i.e. where it is allowed for the market to determine the currency value. However, it must be noted that there is no currency in the world with its value determined solely through supply and demand on the foreign exchange market, i.e. there is no totally free fluctuating exchange rate. If an extreme rise in value (appreciation) or a fall in value (depreciation) is to occur, the central bank shall intervene on the market in order to stabilise the currency in question. Therefore, this regime may be technically termed also as a managed exchanged rate.

In the case of managed exchange rate the value is determined on the market, but the volatility of the currency value is set within certain limits. There are three types of this exchange rate. In the first case, currency value is floating within certain limits, which are being adjusted from time to time, depending on the

respective economic indicators and projections. In the second case, currency value is fixed, and is being changed periodically, depending on the market conditions. In the third case, currency value may fluctuate within a certain fixed range.

Unlike the floating rate, there are fixed exchange rates where the government is determining the value of its national currency, or is pegging its value to some other value reference measure. Such a measure may be gold (as used in the past), currency basket, or some world wide-spread convertible currency which is being traded on the world foreign exchange market, with the central bank keeping its reserves in foreign currency, where every domestic currency unit is covered by a corresponding amount in foreign currency (mostly USD or EUR).

Generally speaking, the economists are of the mind that the floating exchange rate in many circumstances functions better than the fixed rate, as it is capable of reacting to the situation changes on the foreign exchange market. However, fixed exchange rate in certain situations may be more appropriate because it provides higher currency stability.

Some of our economic experts are supporting the implementation of a fully floating exchange rate, without any interventions from the National Bank of Serbia (NBS), so that the real movement of the dinar currency on the market may demonstrate its real value. It is hard to say what would be the dinar exchange rate without interventions of the central bank. According to some estimates from the mid-2010, if the exchange rate was totally freely formed, one EUR would have been worth at least some 150 dinars (estimate made by the Market Research Institute - IZIT, Belgrade). Some other estimates indicate that in mid-2010, the overrated dinar was, in real terms, at a level for some 80% higher than late in the year 2000 (Kovacevic, 2010).

It should be noted that the main advantage of the flexible (fluctuating, sliding, floating) exchange rates is the option of having more freedom in the management of economic and monetary policy, and an easier balance of payment balancing, where lower foreign currency reserves are required. In case of recession, such an exchange rate is helping

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ona obuzda. Smanjuje udar na plate, jer kod fiksnog kursa smanjenje potrošnje mora da se obavi preko sniženja plata i zaposlenosti. Daju mogućnost za potrebna prilagođavanja prema spoljnim promenama, čime se olakšava ekonomska saradnja sa inostranstvom. Manje su mogućnosti da dođe do potcenjenosti i precenjenosti domaće valute, nego kod fiksnih kurseva. Smanjuju se potrebe uvođenja dodatnih mera za usklađivanje domaćih cena sa cenama inostrane konkurencije. Fleksibilni kursevi su generalno bolje rešenje od fiksnih kurseva za privrede koje su izložene spoljnim šokovima, dok fiksni kursevi imaju prednosti, ako se radi o unutrašnjim poremećajima u nacionalnoj privredi.

Osnovni nedostatak režima fleksibilnog kursa je veći rizik u poslovanju sa inostranstvom, kao i veća izloženost domaće privrede raznim potresima na svetskom tržištu. Podstiče inflaciju u domaćoj privredi. Zbog znatne depresijacije dinara došlo bi do drastičnog poskupljenja uvoza i rasta domaćih cena i velikog udara na devizne dužnike, što bi još više pogoršalo i onako nizak životni standard građana, posebno onih koji su preuzeli kreditne obaveze u stranoj valuti. Inflacioni talas bi po inerciji zahvatio sva tržišta, gde bi se uvozna inflacija prelila u sve sektore privrede, a preko budžeta vršio odliv nacionalnog bogatstva (po osnovu plaćanja kamata i glavnice za dugove). Porast domaćih

cena preko deviznog kursa vodio bi novom disparitetu kursa, pa bi dinar dalje padao, a klizanje kursa postao autonoman proces (Komazec, 2011.). Pad kursa ili najava da će se on slobodno formirati pokreće i mehanizam psiholoških faktora koji bi povećali tražnju deviza, pa bi kurs dinara dalje klizao na dole nezavisno od stanja privrede i platnobilansne situacije. Zbog očekivanja stalnog pada kursa dinara naglo bi opala prodaja deviza od stanovništva, ali bi stalno rasla tražnja, što bi dovelo do smanjenja deviznih rezervi. Takođe, zbog nepredvidljivosti, veće su mogućnosti špekulacija i ne postoje stabilne kalkulacije za spoljnotrgovinske poslove, odnosno kriterijumi za ocenu rentabilnosti investicija. Utisak je da je za srpsku vladu neprihvatljiva značajnija depresijacija dinara, jer je rizična sa socijalnog aspekta i mogla bi da potkopa poverenje u vođenje njene ekonomske politike.

Nasuprot ovom tipu deviznog kursa, u osnovne prednosti fiksnih kurseva spada minimiziranje rizika spoljnotrgovinskih tokova, špekulacija i gubitaka, jer oni daju veću sigurnost u kalkulisanju poslova izvoza i uvoza. Zatim, domaću privredu štite od iznenadnih promena na finansijskim tržištima u svetu i povećavaju interes stranaca da poseduju domaću valutu. Povoljnije deluju kod zaključivanja dugoročnih poslova sa inostranstvom i ocene rentabilnosti domaćih investicija. Fiksni kursevi su i značajan

a n t i i n f l a c i o n i faktor, jer doprinose stabilizaciji cena u zemlji. U maloj i otvorenoj privredi, stabilnim kursom izbegavaju se makroekonomski udari, gde bi veliki pad vrednosti domaće valute opteretio troškove s e r v i s i r a n j a spoljnog duga. D e p r e s i j a c i j a valute ne odgovara n a c i o n a l n i m k o r p o r a c i j a m a , čija se vrednost s m a n j u j e

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alleviate the situation, i.e. it allows for a smaller fall in production, and in case of inflation, it is offering better chances for its containment. It is also mitigating the impact on salaries, because in the case of a fixed exchange rate, the fall in consumption must be conducted through lowering of salaries and employment (redundancy). They give options for the necessary adjustments to external changes, thus facilitating foreign economic cooperation. There are also fewer chances that the domestic currency will be under-rated or overrated than in the case of fixed exchange rates. Fewer are also the needs to introduce supplementary measures for the adjustment of domestic prices to prices of foreign competition. Flexible exchange rates are, in general, a better solution than the fixed rates for the economies that are exposed to exterior shocks, while the fixed rates have the advantage when speaking of the internal turbulence in the national economy.

The main disadvantage of the flexible exchange rate is a higher cross-border business risk and a higher exposure of the national economy to various stresses on the world market. It is also boosting inflation in the national economy. Any significant depreciation of the dinar currency would cause a drastic jump in price of imports and growth of domestic prices, but also a great impact on foreign currency debt servicing obligors, which would in turn even further undermine the already low standard of living of citizens, especially those with credit repayment liabilities in foreign currency. The inflation wave would by inertia engulf all the markets, where the imported inflation would spill over into all the sectors of economy, while at the same time and through the budget, there would be a drain of national assets (for debt repayment - both interest and principle). The growth of domestic prices, through the exchange rate, would lead towards a new disparity of the exchange rate, and dinar would continue to fall, while sliding of the exchange rate would become an autonomous process (Komazec, 2011). The fall of exchange rate, or announcement that it shall be freely formed, is also setting in motion the psychological factor mechanism leading to a higher demand for foreign currency, and the exchange rate of dinar would be sliding downwards regardless of the

real situation in the economy and the balance of payment status of the country. Since the anticipated constant fall in dinar exchange rate would cause a sudden fall in sales of foreign currency by citizens, but with a constant rise in demand, the result would be reduction of the foreign currency reserves of the country. In addition, because of the unpredictability, higher speculative options would be present and there would be no stable calculation for foreign trading deals, i.e. the criteria for assessing profitability of investments. The impression is that for the Serbian Government, no substantial depreciation of the dinar currency is acceptable, because it is risky from the social aspect and could undermine the confidence in the management of its economic policy.

As the opposite to this type of exchange rate, the basic advantages of the fixed rates are the minimised risks in the foreign trade flows, speculations and losses, as they offer higher security in calculating import and export deals. In addition, domestic economy is protected from sudden changes on financial markets in the world, and the interest of foreign nationals is boosted for possessing domestic currency. Fixed rates have a favourable effect on contracting long-term cross-border deals and in assessment of profitability of domestic investments. Fixed rates are also a significant anti-inflationary factor as they contribute towards stabilisation of prices in the country. In a small and open economy, stable exchange rate is the way to avoid macro-economic shocks, where a drastic fall in value of domestic currency would burden foreign debt servicing costs. Currency depreciation is not convenient for national corporations whose value decreases proportionally with the indebtedness in foreign currency, and is also detrimental for households with majority of domestic indebtedness in foreign currency, while the effect of depreciated exchange rate on the country’s exports is not substantial.

Some economic experts, for example Steve Henke, professor of applied economy at the John Hopkins University in Baltimore, are of the mind that the “hammering down” of the dinar exchange rate on a certain level, through the introduction of a Currency Board, would be the best solution for Serbia (Teleskovic, 2011).

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proporcionalno zaduženosti u stranoj valuti, a takođe škodi i domaćinstvima čija je većina domaćih dugovanja u stranim valutama, dok uticaj depresiranog kursa na izvoz zemlje nije veliki.

Pojedini ekonomski stručnjaci, kao na primer Stiv Henke, profesor primenjene ekonomije na univerzitetu Džons Hopkins u Baltimoru, smatraju da bi „zakucavanje“ kursa dinara na određenom nivou, uvođenjem valutnog odbora, bilo najbolje za Srbiju (Telesković, 2011.). Naveden je primer Bugarske u kojoj je to učinjeno krajem devedesetih godina prošlog veka. On smatra da se tokom velike depresijacije dinara teško kontroliše situacija, dok valutni odbor ojačava centralnu banku i guvernera. Fiksiranjem kursa na određenom nivou „eliminšu se rizici u sistemu, situacija postaje predvidljivija, a tražnja za nacionalnom valutom raste“. Posledica toga je, kako navodi, smanjenje kamatnim srtopa, ali i povećanje likvidnosti. Uvođenje valutnog odbora bi doprinelo relaksaciji problema likvidnosti, koji je prisutan u Srbiji. Ističe da je u svakoj zemlji u kojoj je to učinjeno usledio pad kamatnih stopa. To podrazumeva da 100% deviznih rezervi bude u jakoj valuti (evrima), kako bi se obezbedila stabilnost dinara. Nasuprot ovom stavu, pojedini domaći stručnjaci smatraju da je „monetarna politika ciljane inflacije“ mnogo bolje rešenje za Srbiju od fiksiranja kursa, jer daje „mnogo više elastičnosti finansijskom sistemu“. Zato je po njima za Srbiju bolje da se kroz promenu kursa, slabljenje dinara obavi deo prilagođavanja, jer u slučaju valutnog odbora, prilagođavanje je jedino moguće kroz smanjenje plata i cena što vodi u recesiju (M. L., 2011.).

Drugi ekonomski stručnjaci, smatraju da zbog velike uvozne zavisnosti domaće privrede (spoljnotrgovinski deficit oko 24% BDP) i kada je evro preuzeo funkciju merila vrednosti, treba preći na fiksni kurs dinara prema evru ili na programirano kretanje kursa prema evru (Ilić, 2011.). Smatraju da u našoj situaciji ne možemo da imamo kurs kao mehanizmu za stimulisanje izvoza ili smanjivanje uvoza. Iznose da kurs može da bude u funkciji spoljnotrgovinske ravnoteže samo u zemljama koje imaju ujednačeni spoljnotrgovinski bilans sa malim deficitima ili suficitima i gde domaća

valuta ima funkciju mere vrednosti. Srbija mora da koristi carine i necarinske barijere za postizanje spoljnotrgovinske ravnoteže. Naglašavaju da se „ne može izolovano krenuti u rešavanje problema stabilnosti i realnosti kursa bez promene spoljnotrgovinske politike, kreditno-monetarne i politike raspodele“. Prvo treba obezbediti stabilnost kursa, jer je to „neophodnije, lakše i brže“ nego traganje za realnom vrednošću dinara. Pristalice teorije o nerealnom kursu dinara svoje tvrdnje baziraju na „pogrešnom“ sabiranju stope inflacije u evrozoni i u Srbiji i polaze od inflacije tražnje, koja ne postoji u našoj zemlji, već imamo troškovnu i strukturalnu inflaciju. Precenjen kurs stvara spoljnotrgovinski deficit i sprečava povećanje zaposlenosti, dok potcenjeni kurs dovodi da se u spoljnotrgovinskom prometu stalno gubi deo nacionalnog bogatstva. Oni tvrde da „jeftina radna snaga proizvodi potcenjenu valutu, a ona stvara gubitke u spoljnotrgovinskoj razmeni“ (Ilić, 2011, str. 41.).

Što se tiče slabosti fiksnih kurseva, oni zahtevaju veće devizne rezerve za odbranu kursa i ugrožavaju izvozni potencijal privrede, a domaća privreda se teže povezuje sa svetskom privredom. Ne doprinose platnobilansnoj ravnoteži, smanjuju mogućnosti delovanja drugih instrumenata ekonomske politike i zahtevaju dodatne mere za usklađivanje cena u zemlji, sa cenama inostranih partnera. Nacionalna privreda je podređena potrebama održavanja ovakvog deviznog kursa, gde je domaća valuta često precenjena, pa moguća devalvacija poništava mnoge prednosti fiksnog kursa. Kod ovog režima kursa gubi se autonomnost u vođenju monetarne politike, jer se ne može istovremeno kontrolisati količina novca i valutni kurs, a trošak održavanja fiksnog kursa je suviše veliki.

U praksi je poznato da je pored relativno visokog nivoa rezervi za sprovođenje fiksnog kursa, potrebno i sprečavanje rasta cena, odnosno efektivne tražnje preko restriktivne kreditno-monetarne politike, kao i povećano administriranje za ograničavanje uvoza. Poznato je da fiksni kurs može „ojačati stabilnost cena u zemljama koje stvarno sprovode finansijsku disciplinu“. U zemljama gde to nije slučaj, kao u našoj, ozbiljni ekonomski problemi će se pojaviti, bez obzira na režim kursa valuta.

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The case of Bulgaria is here cited, where this was implemented in the late 1990s. He is of the view that during the great depreciation of the dinar currency it is very hard to control the situation, while the currency board serves for strengthening the position of both the central bank and of its governor. Fixing the exchange rate on a certain level would “eliminate the risks in the system, situation would become more predictable, and the demand for national currency would grow”. The effects in this case, according to this author, would be the fall in the interest rates, but also growth of liquidity. Introduction of the currency board would help relaxation of the liquidity problem which is present in Serbia. He also notes that in every country where this was done, what followed was the fall in the interest rates. This requires that 100% of the foreign currency reserves be held in strong currency (euro) in order to secure stability of the dinar. Certain local experts, however, are of the mind that “the monetary policy of targeted inflation” is a much better solution for Serbia than is the fixing of the exchange rate, as it offers “much higher flexibility to the financial system”. According to those experts, it is better for Serbia, through the change of exchange rate and weakening of the dinar, to conduct one part of adjustment, because in the case of presence of a currency board, the adjustment would be possible only through cutting down of salaries and prices, which leads to a recession. (M.L., 2011)

Other economic experts support the stance that because of high import dependency of the domestic economy (foreign trade deficit of some 24% of the GDP), and since euro has taken over the function of a value measure, it is necessary to convert to a fixed dinar/euro exchange rate, or to a programmed dinar/euro exchange rate movement (Ilic, 2011). Their opinion is that, under our circumstances, it is not possible to have an exchange rate as a mechanism for boosting exports or reducing imports. They argue that the exchange rate could serve the function of a foreign trade equilibrium only in the countries that are having a well harmonised foreign trade balance, with small deficit or surplus, and where the national currency serves the function of a value measure. Serbia must use customs and non-customs barriers for reaching

its foreign trade balance. They underline that “it is not possible to venture solely and in isolation into solution of the problem of stability and reality of the exchange rate, without inducing changes in the foreign trade policy, crediting and monetary policy, and the policy of distribution.” Firstly, it is necessary to secure the stability of the exchange rate, because “this is more urgently needed, yet easier and faster” than is the quest for the real dinar value. Supporters of the theory on the unrealistic dinar exchange rate are basing their arguments on “an erroneous” adding up of the inflation rate in the Euro-zone and in Serbia, starting from the inflation in demand, which is not present in our country, where we have cost and structural inflation. The overrated exchange rate is creating a foreign trade deficit and is preventing growth of employment, while the under-rated exchange rate is leading to the situation where the foreign trading is constantly making losses for the national wealth, assets. They claim that “the cheap labour is producing an under-rated currency, and in turn, it is creating losses in the foreign trade exchange.” (Ilic, 2011, p. 41)

Regarding the disadvantages of the fixed interest rates, they require higher foreign currency reserves for the defence of the exchange rate and are undermining the export potential of the national economy, making it more difficult for the domestic industry to connect itself with the world. They do not aid the balance of payment equilibrium, lower the options for the impact of other economic policy instruments, and demand additional measures for balancing out prices in the country with the prices of foreign counterparts. National economy is subjected to the requirements of upholding such a foreign exchange rate where the domestic currency is often overrated so that any possible devaluation would undermine many advantages of a fixed exchange rate. In the fixed exchange rate regime the autonomy in conducting monetary policy is being lost, because it is not possible to control simultaneously the quantity of money and the foreign currency exchange rate, while the cost of maintaining the fixed exchange rate becomes too high.

It is well known that in practice, in addition to a rather high level of reserves needed for the

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Postoji opasnost da bi odmah posle eventualnog prelaska na režim fiksnog kursa u Srbiji oživeli „aveti prošlosti“, gde bi samo „podobni“ privrednici mogli da kupuju evre po zvaničnom kursu, dok bi svi ostali morali da ih plaćaju po tržišnom, znatno višem kursu. Fiksni kurs dinara bi, znači, otvorio vrata crnom tržištu deviza. Uslov za režim fiksnog kursa je i drastično smanjenje javne potrošnje, što bi bilo veoma bolno i za korisnike budžeta i za kreatore e k o n o m s k e politike. Fiksni kurs bi doveo do ubrzanog trošenja deviznih rezervi zemlje, podstakao bi uvoz i potrošnju, a najveće koristi bi imao, pre svega, krupni kapital. Došli bismo onda u situaciju da su potrošene devizne rezerve i da nemamo čime da branimo nerealan fiksni kurs, jer nedostaju realni izvori prihoda u situaciji kada nam je mali izvoz i nema novih značajnijih stranih investicija.

Ako bi se, recimo, odlukom vlade fiksirao kurs, to bi značilo da bi se dinari emitovali i povlačili iz opticaja samo sa prilivom ili povlačenjem evra i drugih stranih valuta. Tada bi povećanje plata i penzija iz budžeta teško bilo izvodljivo, jer priliv konvertibilnih valuta - evra određuje štampanje novca. Zato je postojeći režim rukovođeno fleksibilnog kursa dinara za vladu znatno jevtinija varijanta.

Klasifikacija deviznih kurseva (aranžmana) prema MMF

Posle sloma tzv. „bretonvudskog sistema“ deviznih kurseva 1971. godine, koji je bio na snazi od 1944. godine kada su osnovani MMF i Svetska banka, većina zemalja u svetu prešla je na režim fleksibilnih, umesto fiksnih kurseva svojih valuta. Ukinuti su pariteti valuta izraženi u zlatu i formalno-pravno legalizovano slobodno formiranje deviznih kurseva u skladu sa interesima nacionalnih privreda.

Kada je suspendovana konvertibilnost američkog dolara za zlato u avgustu 1971, a politika fluktuirajućih kurseva uzela maha na globalnom svetskom nivou, i Jugoslavija je od 1973. godine uvela režim fleksibilne valute. Tada je napušten sistem fiksnih deviznih kurseva (s mogućnošću fluktuacija u okviru uske marže od plus-minus 1% oko pariteta, odnosno plus-minus 2,25% od decembra 1971), što

znači da se više nije primenjivao sistem fiksnog pariteta dinara, koji je bio utvrđen u odnosu na zlato, a preko njega i u odnosu na USD. Jugoslavija je posle uvođenja tzv. Drugog amandmana na Statut MMF 1978. godine, dostavila MMF formalnu notifikaciju svog deviznog

aranžmana, izjavljujući da se sve transakcije, izuzev

klirinških aranžmana, obavljaju po fluktuirajućem kursu. Ona je tada

predstavljala jednu od 21 zemlje-članice MMF koje su primenjivale taj režim deviznog kursa. Zapravo, radilo se o rukovođenom flotiranju dinara prema korpi valuta najvažnijih trgovinskih partnera, gde su najvažniji kriterijumi bili odnos ponude i potražnje deviza, stanje platnog bilansa i razlika u domaćoj i inostranoj stopi inflacije. Od kraja 1989. godine utvrđen je fiksni kurs dinara prema nemačkoj marki.

Po klasifikaciji MMF, postoji više kategorija deviznih kurseva (aranžmana), kao što je fiksiranje za pojedinačnu valutu, vezivanje za korpu valuta, valutni odbori, rukovođena fleksibilnost, nezavisno flotiranje i dr. (IMF, 2009.). Prema podacima MMF, oko jedne četvrtine zemalja sprovodilo je režim kontrolisano fluktuirajućeg kursa, dok je druga četvrtina zemalja imala valute koje nezavisno fluktuiraju. U prvoj grupi su i zemlje koje sprovode tranziciju, a u drugoj neke najrazvijenije zemlje sveta. Inače, najveći broj zemalja sprovodi aranžmane vezanih kurseva za najvažnije svetske valute.

Dve zemlje u našem okruženju (BiH i

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implementation of a fixed exchange rate, it is also necessary to prevent growth of prices, i.e. rise in effective demand through a restrictive crediting and monetary policy, and a higher administration work aimed at limiting imports. It is also known that a fixed exchange rate may “reinforce price stability in countries which are truly implementing financial discipline”. In the countries where this is not the case, however, not unlike our own country, serious economic problems may appear, regardless of the foreign currency exchange rate regime.

There is a danger that, immediately after an eventual transition to a fixed exchange rate regime in Serbia, there would be a recurrence of the “ghosts from the past”, when only those “suitable and eligible” businessmen could buy Euro currency at the official exchange rate, while all the other citizens in the country had to pay it at a market rate, i.e. a higher exchange rate. Hence the fixed exchange rate of dinar would open the doors to the foreign currency black market. The prerequisite for the regime of the fixed exchange rate is also a drastic reduction of public consumption, which would be very painful both for the budget beneficiaries and for the authors of the economic policy. The fixed exchange rate would lead to an accelerated spending of the foreign currency reserves of the country, it would stimulate import and consumption, and the highest benefits would be enjoyed, most of all, by the large capital holders. We would find ourselves in the situation where the foreign currency reserves would be spent, without having anything in our hands to defend unrealistic fixed exchange rate, because of the absence of real revenue sources in the situation when our exports are small and where there are no new and substantial foreign investments present in the country.

Let us assume, for instance, that the government would decide to fix the exchange rate. This would mean that the dinar currency would be issued and withdrawn from circulation only with the inflow or outflow of Euro and other foreign currencies. In such a case, the raise in salaries and retirement pensions financed from the budget would hardly be achievable, as the inflow of convertible currency - Euro, demands printing of money. Thus the present regime of managed floating dinar exchange rate

is a substantially less costly alternative for the government.

Classification of exchange rates (exchange arrangements) after the IMF method

After the break down of the so-called “Bretton-Woods System” of exchange rates in 1971, introduced and in force ever since 1944, with the establishment of the International Monetary Fund - IMF, and of the World Bank, most of the countries in the world converted to a flexible regime, rather than to a fixed exchange rate of their currencies. Currency parities expressed in gold were abolished and there ensued a formally legalised free formation of the exchange rates in accordance with the best interests of respective national economies.

When the parity of US dollar to gold was suspended in August 1971, and the policy of fluctuating exchange rates set in motion on a global world level, Yugoslavia followed suit, and in 1973 introduced the regime of a flexible currency exchange rate. At that time, the system of fixed foreign exchange rates was abandoned (with the fluctuating options within a narrow margin of plus-minus 1% on parity, i.e. plus-minus 2.25% from December 1971), which means that a fixed parity of the dinar currency was not effective any more, the one prescribed for gold parity, and through it also in respect to the USD. Yugoslavia, after the introduction of the so-called Second Amendment to the IMF Statute in 1978, submitted to the IMF a formal notification of its exchange arrangement, stating that on all the transactions, except for the clearing arrangements, the fluctuating exchange rate will apply. Yugoslavia, at that time, was one of the 21 IMF member-countries that were applying this exchange rate regime. In fact, it was a managed floating dinar in respect to the currency basket of its most important trading partners, where the most significant criteria was the ratio between the supply and demand of foreign currencies, the status of the balance of payment, and the disparity between the domestic and foreign inflation rate. Starting from the end of 1989, a fixed exchange rate of dinar currency was introduced, pegged to the Deutsche Mark.

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Bugarska) sprovode režim tzv. valutnog ili monetarnog odbora (currency board), što znači da imaju obavezu da određuju količinu novca u opticaju, koje ima potpuno pokriće u deviznim rezervama. Kombinuju se tri elementa: devizni kurs koji je fiksiran za „valutu sidro“, automatska konvertibilnost (pravo da se domaća valuta zameni po fiksnom kursu) i podložnost sistemu, koji je regulisan propisima centralne banke. Glavni razlog za uvođenje valutnih odbora je da se „sledi politika vidljive antiinflacije“. Po oceni MMF, prednosti valutnog odbora su, „ekonomski kredibilitet, niska inflacija i niže kamate“, dok se ograničenja mogu ispoljiti kod zemalja koje imaju „slabe bankarske sisteme ili su sklone ekonomskim šokovima“ (Jovović, 1999.).

Puzajući devizni kurs kao jedno prelazno rešenje

Da delimično zadovolji zagovornike fiksnih kurseva, NBS bi mogla da u okviru raznih raspoloživih deviznih aranžmana, za jedan određeni prelazni period primeni i model tzv. „pokretnih - puzajućih tačaka ili pariteta“ (crawling peg, crawling band). To bi značilo da kada devizni kurs pređe granice u kojima zvanično utvrđen kurs oscilira, onda bi se odredio novi kurs dinara sa novim marginama fluktuacija. Prilagođavanje kursa vršilo bi se češće u manjim iznosima, ali u intervalima koji ne bi bili unapred utvrđeni. To bi amortizovalo moguće snažne monetarne udare na domaću privredu. Valuta može da se prilagođava prema odabranim kvantitativnim indikatorima (recimo razlika u inflaciji prema glavnim trgovinskim partnerima), što nameće određena ograničenja u vođenju monetarne politike.

Prednosti ovakve varijante kursa dinara su: postizanje stabilnijih uslova privređivanja; jačanje dinara kao platnog sredstva; rasterećenje deviznih rezervi da brane kurs; manji obim intervencija centralne banke; smanjenje spoljnotrgovinskog deficita; liberalizacija spoljne trgovine zemlje. Normalno, ni ovaj režim nije imun na određene slabosti, u koje se, recimo, pominju špekulacije i destabilizacija deviznog tržišta, kao rezultat zloupotrebe informacija o nameravanoj promeni kursa domaće valute.

Precenjeni kurs dinara i posledice

Poslednjih desetak godina kod nas se vodi politika tzv. „rukovođeno fleksibilnog“ kursa dinara (managed floating), koju sprovode mnoge zemlje u tranziciji, umesto ranijeg fiksnog kursa vezanog za nemačku marku. Ovakav režim koji je kompromis između fiksnih i fluktuirajućih kurseva, koga neki ekonomisti nazivaju „prljavo plivajućim“, trebalo bi da uzme u obzir dobre strane obe varijante kursa: prednosti discipline fiksnog kursa i veće delovanje tržišta kod fluktuirajućeg kursa. Rasprava oko režima fiksnog ili fleksibilnog kursa dinara, svodi se na pitanje da li vršiti češće devalvacije ili pustiti dinar da stalno depresira. Fiksni kurs treba braniti sa visokim deviznim rezervama, a s druge strane, slobodno fluktuiranje kursa dinara može svojom nestabilnošču da izazove velike i nepredvidive oscilacije na deviznom tržištu, dobro znane iz iskustava mnogih zemalja.

Diskrecione odluke monetarnih vlasti utiču na nivo kursa dinara, a najvažniji kriterijumi su: odnos ponude i potražnje deviza, stanje platnog bilansa i razlike u domaćoj i inostranoj inflaciji. NBS može da utvrdi margine mogućih oscilacija kursa i da vrši intervencije u slučaju eventualnog proboja. Na deviznom tržištu vrši se određena kontrola kretanja stranih valuta prema dinaru, pa u slučaju kada ekonomski interesi zahtevaju, NBS na osnovu arbitrarnih kriterijuma može da interveniše na tržištu.

U praksi je već više godina u primeni politika precenjenog i doskoro relativno stabilnog kursa dinara. NBS određuje kurs na osnovu ponude i potražnje, a interveniše na deviznom tržištu samo u slučaju sprečavanja velikih dnevnih oscilacija kursa, bez, kako navodi, usmeravanja kursa u određenom pravcu. Rast domaćih cena bio je znatno veći od promene kursa dinara prema najvažnijim svetskim valutama. Ovo je, između ostalog, dovelo do ogromnog spoljnotrgovinskog deficita, sve većeg zaduživanja građana, privrede i države, a imalo je pokriće u privatizaciji, inostranom zaduženju, stranim investicijama, prilivu doznaka, donacija i sl., kada je u zemlju posle 2000. do 2010. godine, po ovom osnovu ušlo, po nekim procenama ekonomista, oko 70 milijardi USD, korišćenih, uglavnom, za potrošnju, a

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After the IMF classification, there are several categories of the exchange rates (exchange arrangements), such as the pegging to an individual currency, pegging to a certain currency basket, currency boards, managed flexibility, free floating rates, etc. (IMF, 2009). According to the IMF data, one quarter of the total number of the IMF member countries were implementing the regime of a managed floating exchange rate, while the other quarter of the countries had their freely floating currencies. In the first group of countries were also the countries in transition, while the second quarter contained some of the most developed countries of the world. It is worth noting that the major number of countries is implementing their exchange arrangement pegged to the most important world currencies.

Two countries in our neighbourhood (Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Bulgaria) are applying the regime of the so-called currency or monetary board, which means that they must determine quantity of money in circulation depending on its full coverage by the foreign currency reserves of the country. There are three elements that are combined here: exchange rate that is fixed to the “currency anchor”, an automatic convertibility (the right to exchange domestic currency at a fixed exchange rate), and the subscription to the system which is regulated by the central bank regulations. The main reason for the introduction of the currency boards is “to follow the policy of transparent anti-inflation”. According to the IMF assessment, the advantages of the currency board are “economic credibility, lower inflation and lower interest rates”, while the limitations may be manifested in the case of countries having “weak banking systems, or those prone to economic shocks.” (Jovovic, 1999)

Crawling peg exchange rate as one of the transitional solutions

In order to partly gratify supporters of the fixed exchange rates, National Bank of Serbia could within the scope of its various available foreign currency arrangements, and for a certain transitional period of time, apply the model of the so-called “mobile - crawling peg or crawling band” parities. This would imply that when the

exchange rate crosses the limits officially set in for oscillations of the rates, thereupon a new exchange rate of the dinar currency would be set within the new fluctuation margins. Exchange rate adjustment would be done more frequently, and in smaller amounts, but also in the intervals that are not set in advance. This would absorb any possible strong monetary impacts on the domestic economy. Currency can be adjusted according to the selected quantitative indicators (for example, the difference between inflation with the main trading counterparties), imposing certain limitations in the implementation of the monetary policy.

The advantages of such an dinar exchange rate policy are the following: achievement of more stable conditions for earning; strengthening of dinar as the means of payment; setting free foreign reserves from defending the national currency exchange rate; lower scope for central bank interventions; lowering of the foreign trade deficit; liberalisation of foreign trade of the country. Normally speaking, neither this regime would be immune from certain drawbacks, which are, for instance, speculations and destabilisation of the foreign currency market, as a result of misuse of information on an intended and forthcoming change in the exchange rate of the domestic currency.

Overrated exchange rate of dinar and its consequences

During the last decade, we are witnessing the policy of the so-called “ managed floating” dinar exchanged rate, conducted also by many countries in transition, instead of the earlier fixed exchange rate pegged to the Deutsche Mark. Such a regime, which is a compromise between the fixed and the floating exchange rates, called by some of the economists the “dirty floating”, was designed to take into account good sides of both the exchange rate variants: the advantages of the fixed rate discipline and the higher market impact of the floating rate. The debate regarding the regime of the fixed or the flexible dinar currency exchange rate is coming down to the question of whether to make more frequent devaluation or to let the dinar currency depreciate constantly. Fixed exchange rate

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manje za razvoj privrede (Kovačević, 2010.) Na primer, u ovom periodu ukupan devizni priliv od doznaka iz inostranstva dostigao je iznos od oko 28 milijardi evra, a učešće doznaka u BDP je dva i po puta veće od učešća stranih direktnih investicija u poslednjih deset godina. Prema podacima Međunarodnog monetarnog fonda (MMF), u poslednjih pet godina pre krize oko 80% stranih direktnih investicija u Srbiji otišlo je u sektore koji ne proizvode robu za izvoz (Jovović, 2011.) Veliki uvoz je bio najveći podsticaj rastu BDP, dok je rast realnog sektora - industrije i poljoprivrede bio skroman.

Precenjeni kurs dinara i ranije sprovedena nagla liberalizacija uvoza, koji guše domaću proizvodnju i vode uništavanju domaćih proizvodnih kapaciteta, ima negativan uticaj na ukupna makroekonomska kretanja u zemlji, a posebno u oblasti ekonomskih odnosa sa inostranstvom, jer kurs je bio jedan od generatora velikog uvoza, koji nije u funkciji povećanja proizvodnje i izvoza.

Na primer, prema nekim podacima, vrednost dinara u 2001. godini u odnosu na kraj 2000. godine bila je veća realno za oko 30%, dok je prosečna carina na uvoz robe bila oko 9% (a u 2000. oko 18%), što je sa skidanjem raznih uvoznih ograničenja snažno uticalo na veliko povećanje cenovne konkurentnosti u v o z a . Uoči izbijanja svetske ekonomske krize u jesen 2008. godine, kurs dinara realno je bio čak oko 110% na višem nivou nego krajem 2000. godine (Kovačević, 2009).

Dinar se našao u paradoksalnoj situaciji, jer je jačao u godinama izrazito niske konkurentske snage privrede i nedovoljne proizvodne aktivnosti u industriji, sa nelikvidnim realnim sektorom i zastarelom p r i v r e d n o m strukturom. Stalno je rastao uvoz i spoljnotrgovinski deficit, a ogromna devizna sredstva trošila su se na uvoz robe široke potrošnje, a u skromnom

izvozu oko dve trećine su činili proizvodi niske faze obrade, odnosno sirovine i repromaterija (gvožđe i čelik, odeća, žitarice, voće i povrće, obojeni metali). Znači, imali smo kontinuiranu apresijaciju domaće valute, bez realnog pokrića, umesto da je dinar depresirao i logički imao nižu vrednost.

Zbog ovakvog trenda, postoji opasnost da zemlja zapadne u dužničku krizu sa svim njenim posledicama. Ukupan spoljni dug Srbije, i pored delimičnog otpisa od oko pet milijardi evra, dostigao je 2011. godine iznos od oko 23 milijarde evra (preko 30 milijardi dolara). Ovaj dug je vrlo blizu kritične tačke od 80% BDP, koji po metodologiji Svetske banke deli srednje od visoko zaduženih zemalja (Konjukturni trndovi Srbije, 2011.)

Projekcije kursa dinara

Devizni kurs je ogledalo privrede i nemoguće je imati jak dinar u slaboj privredi sa malim izvozom, koji učestvuje sa svega oko 20% u BDP (18% u 2009), pa treba očekivati njegovo dalje postepeno slabljenje.

Niko pouzdano ne može da prognozira koliko će evro vredeti u odnosu na nacionalnu valutu. Teško je prognozirati kretanje kursa, j e r se ne može sa sigurnošću

predvideti da li će i kada doći

do novih značajnijih

svetskih i l i

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should be defended by high foreign currency reserves, while on the other hand, freely floating dinar rate may, with its instability, induce some major and unpredictable, oscillations on the foreign currency market, rather well known and already experienced by many countries.

The discretionary decisions passed by the monetary authorities are impacting the level of dinar, while the most important criteria remain the following: foreign currency supply and demand ratio, status of the balance of payment and the discrepancies in the domestic and foreign inflation. NBS can set margins for possible oscillations of the exchange rate and conduct interventions in case of eventual extreme situations. Certain control of foreign currency movements in respect to the dinar currency on the foreign exchange market is being conducted, and when the economic interests so demand, NBS is able to intervene on the market on the basis of its arbitrary criteria.

In actual practice, however, and for a number of years now, there is an implementation of the policy of an overrated and, until recently, relatively stable exchange rate of the dinar currency. NBS is fixing the exchange rate on the basis of the supply and demand, and is intervening on the foreign exchange market only in order to prevent large daily exchange rate oscillations without, as it alleges, streamlining the exchange rate in any particular direction. Domestic prices growth was substantially higher than the change in the dinar exchange rates in respect to the most important world currencies. This led, among others, to an enormous foreign trade deficit, to a much higher indebtedness of both households and economy but also of the government, having as its cover privatisation, foreign borrowing, foreign investments, inflow of remittances, donations, and similar, when into the country, after 2000 and up to 2010, on these grounds and according to the estimates of economists, some 70 billion USD entered the country, to be used mainly for consumption, much less for development of country’s economy (Kovacevic, 2010). To give an example, during this period, the total foreign currency inflow from the remittances from abroad reached an amount of some 28 billion EUR, and the share of remittances in the GDP was two and a half times higher than

the share of foreign direct investment over the last ten years. According to the data of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), during the last five years, prior to the crisis, some 80% of direct foreign investments in Serbia went into the sectors which are not producing any export oriented goods (Jovovic, 2011). A very large amount of imports was the highest boost to the GDP growth, while the growth of the real economy - industry and agriculture, remained very modest.

The overrated exchange rate of dinar currency, together with the previously implemented and sudden liberalisation of imports, stifling the domestic production and leading towards the destruction of domestic production capacities, have a negative effect on the overall macro-economic movements in the country, and especially in the field of economic foreign relations, as the exchange rate served as one of the main generators for large-scale imports, and was not in the function of promoting either production or exports.

For example, according to some data, the value of dinar currency in 2001, in comparison with the end of 2000, was really higher for some 30%, while the average customs duty on the import of goods was some 9% (and in 2000 some 18%), which has, together with the suspension of various import limitations, strongly impacted a large scale growth of competitive pricing for imports. On the eve of eruption of the world economic crisis, in the autumn of 2008, the exchange rate of dinar was really and actually at a level some 110% higher than by the end of 2000. (Kovacevic, 2009)

Dinar currency found itself in a paradoxical situation, having strengthened in the years of extremely low competitive strength of both its economy and insufficient production activity in its industry, with an illiquid real sector and an obsolete economic structure. There was a constant growth of imports and of the foreign trade deficit, and an enormous amount of foreign currency was being spent on import of consumer goods, while in modest export field some two thirds was composed of products in the lower phase of processing, i.e. they were raw materials and commodities (iron and steel, clothing, cereals, fruit and vegetables, light metals). This means that we have had

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regionalnih poremećaja.Po nekim procenama, dinar će u 2011. godini

biti stabilniji nego u 2010. Ocenjuje se da neće biti puno prostora za veće slabljenje dinara, već će on blago depresirati. To će najviše zavisiti od priliva deviza kroz nove strane investicija i kretanja inflacije. Nove investicije bi otvarale nove fabrike i nova radna mesta. Treba nastaviti sa poboljšanjem uslova poslovanja, jer stabilnost i predvidljivost ekonomije traže svi inostrani investitori.

Sredinom decembra 2010. godine čule su se špekulacije da je „postignut politički dogovor da se drži jak dinar u godini pred izbore“? ! Ovakvom razvoju događaja, po navodima pojedinih analitičara, mogla bi da doprinese, pre svega, restriktivna monetarna politika NBS, ponude evroobveznica i priliv deviza od buduće prodaje „Telekoma“. Neki ekonomisti prognoziraju da će se „zbog događaja koji predstoje, kao što su izbori, i bez jasne ekonomske politike, pogoršati ekonomska situacija, inflacija jačati, a dinar slabiti“, pa na kraju 2011. godine evro bi mogao da bude na nivou od najmanje 120 dinara (Jovanović, 2011.). Za IZIT, kako je izneto u februaru 2011. godine, realni devizni kurs je čak između 160 i 170 dinara za evro! Uvođenje ovog kursa dinara smatra kao nužnu meru za oporavka privrede i države, čime bi se podstakao izvoz, rast proizvodnje i zaposlenosti, i slanje doznaka u zemlju (Z. M., 2011.).

Slab dinar, u principu, odgovara dominantnim neto izvoznicima; zatim onima koji prihode imaju vezane za evro; deviznim štedišama; bankama koje depozite zasnivaju na pozajmicama iz inostranstva, kao i menjačnicama. Nasuprot ovome, jak dinar delimično odgovara uvoznicima; zatim onima koji plate primaju u dinarima; dužnicima čiji su krediti indeksirani u stranoj valuti; dinarskim štedišama, kao i bankama sa „domaćom“ štednjom. Generalno govoreći, nikome ne odgovara nestabilan kurs. Interesnim grupаma odgovara ili jak ili slab dinar. Po oceni stručnjaka, dinar koji fluktuira tokom godine više od 10% u odnosu na evro može doneti koristi pojedinim pravnim i fizičkim licima, samo ako bi se njihov novčani ciklus poklopio sa fluktuacijama kursa u toku godine. Nestabilan kurs dinara više označava pojačavanje rizika

u privredi i za sobom povlači niz drugih negativnih ekonomskih efekata, nego što će bilo kome doneti korist.

Od početka svetske krize septembra 2008. do kraja 2010. godine dinar je izgubio prema evru oko 30% svoje vrednosti. U 2010. godini dinar je depresirao prema evru za 10%, a na intervencije na deviznom tržištu NBS je potrošila preko 2,3 milijarde evra (Rabrenović, 2011.). Slabljenje dinara uticalo je na određeni oporavak srpskog izvoza i platnobilansno usklađivanje.

Prema proceni pojedinih analitičara, privrednika, banaka i institucija, i u 2011. godini dinar će nastaviti da pada, iako je u prvoj polovini godine došlo do određene stabilizacije kursa, kao posledica delovanja mera vlade i NBS. Naime, od kraja 2010. godine dinar je nešto ojačao, pa je NBS, vodeći restriktivnu monetarnu politiku, kupovala evre umesto što ih je prodavala, da bi ublažila prekomerne dnevne oscilacije kursa. Povećano je ulaganje stranih investitora u domaću valutu, što je ojačalo dinar. Pojedini inostrani ulagači prodaju evre, pa dinare investiraju u državne obveznice Srbije (prvenstveno trezorske zapise Ministarstva finansija), što donosi visoke kamate. Da bi strani investitori plasirali novac u zapise, neophodno je da prodaju evre za dinare, što je povećalo ponudu strane valute u odnosu na tražnju. Prema tome, u Srbiju po raznim osnovama pristižu znatne količine deviza, jer se država zadužuje da bi pokrila planirani budžetski deficit od oko 1,5 milijardi evra. Znači, uzima zajmove i prodaje dinarske i devizne obveznice po viskokim kamatama, ali te devize umesto u otvaranje novih preduzeća, fabrika i radnih mesta, uglavnom odlaze u potrošnju. Inostranim bankama i raznim investicionim fondovima isplati se da prodaju devizna sredstva i kupuju domaću valutu i time vrše pritisak ka apresijaciji kursa dinara, a kreditirajući deficit Srbije znatno zarađuju bez ikakvog rizika, pošto iza tih obaveza stoji država. Kupovina hartija od vrednosti je logičan izbor za njih, pošto je u Srbiji sve manje kreditno sposobnih klijenata, pa je profitabilnije za njih da kupe državne hartije od vrednosti nego da svoj novac plasiraju privredi i građanima. Visoka inostrana i domaća tražnja za obveznicama Ministarstva finansija Srbije doprinela je apresijaciji dinara prema evru

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a continuous appreciation of the domestic currency, without any real cover, instead of having a depreciation of the dinar currency, giving it its logically assumed lower value.

Due to such a development trend, there is a danger for the country to fall into a debtor crisis with all of its consequences. The total foreign debt of Serbia, in spite of a partial writing-off of some five billion EUR, has reached in 2011 the amount of some 23 billion EUR (over 30 billion USD). This debt is very close to the critical point of 80% of the GDP, which according to the World Bank methodology is separating medium from highly indebted countries. (Konjukturni trendovi Srbije, 2011)

Projections for the dinar currencyThe exchange rate is a mirror of an economy

and it is impossible to have a strong dinar, as a national currency, and a weak economy with small exports, which is having a share of barely some 20% in the GDP (18% in 2009), hence it is to be expected that it will gradually fall.

No one can reliably prognosticate what will be the value of Euro in respect to the national currency. It is hard to predict the trend of the exchange rate, as it is not possible to project with any certainty if and when some significant global or regional disturbance might happen.

According to some estimates, dinar currency in 2011 will be more stable than in 2010. It is assumed that there will not be much room for some larger weakening of the dinar currency, but that it shall slightly depreciate. This will mostly depend on the inflow of foreign currency from new foreign investments and the inflation trends. New investments would open up new factories and create new jobs opportunities. It should be continued with the upgrading of conditions for business operations as the stability and predictability of the economy is requested by all the foreign investors.

In mid-December 2010, some speculations were voiced that “a political deal was made to support a strong dinar in the year preceding the elections”?! Such developments, according to some analysts, could be sustained mostly by a restrictive monetary policy of the NBS, an offer of Euro-bonds and the inflow of foreign currency from the future sale of the “Telekom” company. Some of the economists are prognosticating that “because of the events

that are forthcoming, such as the elections, and without a clear and transparent economic policy, economic situation will deteriorate, inflation will gain momentum, and the dinar will be weakened”, hence by the end of 2011, EUR could reach the level of at least 120 dinars. (Jovanovic, 2011) According to the IZIT -Market Research Institute, as reported in February 2011, the real exchange rate would be even between 160 and 170 dinars for one Euro! They deem that the introduction of this exchange rate of the dinar currency is an urgent measure for the recovery of the economy and of the country, thus boosting up of the exports, growth of production and employment, and sending remittances to the country. (Z. M., 2011)

Weak dinar, as a matter of principle, is suitable for the predominantly net exporters; but also for those who are having their revenues linked to EUR; for the holders of savings accounts in foreign currency; for banks basing their deposits on cross-border borrowings, and for the foreign exchange dealers. Conversely, a strong dinar is in part suitable for importers; but also for those who are receiving their salaries in dinars; for obligors whose credit liabilities are indexed in foreign currencies; for dinar savings depositors, as well as for banks with “domestic” savings deposits. In general, no one is happy with an unstable exchange rate. Interest groups are supporting either a strong or a weak dinar. According to the experts, dinar currency which fluctuates during the year for more than 10% in respect to EUR may bring gains to some legal entities and physical persons, but only if their monetary cycle has fitted in the exchange rate fluctuations during the year. An unstable dinar exchange rate means an increased risk for the economy and entails a series of other negative economic effects, rather than a benefit for any one in particular.

From the beginning of the economic crisis in September 2008, and up to the end of 2010, dinar lost some 30% of its value to EUR. In 2010, dinar depreciated towards EUR for 10%, and for its interventions on the foreign exchange market NBS had to spend over 2.3 billion EUR. (Rabrenovic, 2011). Weakening of the dinar impacted a certain recovery of the Serbian exports and the balance of payment equilibrium.

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u prvom polugođu 2011. U zavisnosti od ročnosti, kada dođe period naplate kupljenih državnih zapisa, biće više dinara u opticaju, što tada može dovesti do njegovog pada u odnosu na evro.

Sa aspekta nacionalne ekonomije bilo bi najbolje da je priliv novca u Srbiju posledica većeg izvoza roba i usluga, stranih direktnih investicija, a ono što se dešava u poslednje vreme je da imamo priliv portfolio investicija - u hartije u vrednosti, koje po svojoj prirodi ne moraju biti trajne investicije u zemlju. Kod intervencija NBS na deviznom tržištu radi sprečavanja preteranog jačanja dinara, treba imati u vidu da kupovinom evra dolazi do ubrizgavanja dodatne dinarske likvidnosti u situaciji kada je inflacija iznad gornje granice cilja. Međutim, i taj višak dinara može da se povuče iz prometa, na primer izdavanjem blagajničkih zapisa NBS. Činjenica je da dinar nije ojačao zbog poboljšanih performansi srpske privrede, već zbog kupovina državnih hartija od vrednosti, čime se stvara iluzija stabilnosti domaće valute, ali i stabilizacija makroekonomskih prilika, koja nemaju realno utemeljenje u privrednoj strukturi. Zato ovakvo stanje sa jakim dinarom nije održivo na duži rok, već će u jednom trenutku kurs evra morati da poraste. Izgleda da su državne obveznice postale glavno objašnjenje za kolebanje vrednosti domaće valute, a datumi njihovog emitovanja i dospeća, povod za „svojevrsnu kladionicu“ o tome koliko će dinar da vredi. Prilikom emitovanja tih hartija vrši se pritisak na jačanje dinara, a kod dospeća na slabljenje, posle čega se kurs „vraća u normalu“.

Kurs dinara je 29. aprila 2011. godine probio psihološku granicu i p a o

ispod 100 dinara za evro (srednji kurs evra 99,62 dinara), koliko je vredeo i godinu dana ranije, a ocena ekonomskih analitičara je da bi njegovo dalje jačanje bilo „politički i marketinški kontraproduktivno“ i dugoročno neodrživo, mada je snažan dinar ubedljiv argument građanima pred izbore, koji se očekuju 2012. godine (Milošević, 2011.). Politički aspekt je da je „vlast popularnija“ što je dinar jači, pa će ona učiniti sve da u predizbornoj godini veštački održi jak dinar, iako za njega nema realne podloge.

Apresijacija dinara odgovara i prezaduženoj srpskoj privredi i građanima, koji sa teškoćom otplaćuju dospele kredite, kao i uvozničkom lobiju, ali zato ugožava izvoz koji nam je prioritet i investiranje u proizvodne sektore, a efekti na suzbijanju inflacije neće biti značajni. NBS verovatno želi da stabilizuje kurs na višem nivou dinara kako bi se izbeglo njegovo dejstvo na inflaciju, pa pušta da dinar jača više nego što nalaže vrednost izvoza i privreda zemlje. Treba imati u vidu i da je smanjena tražnja za devizama na tržištu, jer rate za otplatu inostranih kredita stižu za naplatu, uglavnom polovinom, a najviše na kraju godine. Jačanju dinara doprinele su i doznake građana iz dijaspore, a zahvaljujući njima Srbija, spada među prvih deset zemalja u svetu koje primaju najviše novca od iseljenika. Ovakva kretanja na deviznom tržištu ne odražavaju realno stanje domaće privrede, jer nisu posledica najvažnije stvari, a to je ostvarenje većeg priliva deviza od izvoza roba i usluga. Što su jače proizvodne i izvozne performanse jedne zemlje, to je i snažnija njena valuta. Međutim, paradoksalna situacija u Srbiji je takva da zaposlenost stalno opada, inflacija raste, imamo stalni i veliki spoljnotrgovinski i tekući platnobilansni deficit, raste zaduženost, a dinar jača.

NBS je od 19. maja 2011. godine u periodu od 20 dana, do 7. juna, vršila

kupovine evra (u vrednosti do 40 miliona evra) na

međubankarskom tržištu, kako

b i

u b l a ž i l a o s c i l a c i j e

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According to the estimates of some analysts, businessmen, banks and institutions, dinar will continue to fall also in 2011, although in the first half of the year there was a certain stabilisation of the exchange rate, as a result of the action of measures conducted by the government and the NBS. Namely, from the end of 2010, dinar was gaining strength, and the NBS, leading a restrictive monetary policy, was buying EUR instead of selling them, in order to mitigate excessive daily oscillations of the exchange rate. There was a growth in the investments of foreign investors in the domestic currency, which in turn strengthened dinar currency. Foreign investors were selling euro currency in order to invest dinars into the government bonds of Serbia (primarily in the treasury bills of the Ministry of Finance), yielding high interest. In order for the foreign investors to place their money in bonds, it was necessary for them to sell EUR for dinars, which then boosted the foreign currency supply on the market in respect to demand. Hence, on various grounds there is an influx of substantial quantities of foreign currency into Serbia, as the government is borrowing heavily in order to cover its planned budgetary deficit of some 1.5 billion EUR. This means that the government is taking loans and selling dinar and foreign currency denominated bonds at very high interest rates, but those foreign currency funds, instead of being allocated into opening of new companies, factories and jobs, are mainly used for consumption. Foreign banks and various investment funds are finding it profitable to sell foreign currency and then buy domestic currency, thus making a pressure on the appreciation of the dinar exchange rate, and while crediting the deficit of Serbia, they are making substantial gains free of any risks, as these liabilities are being guaranteed by the government. Purchase of securities is a logical choice for them as in Serbia there is a constantly falling number of clients with appropriate credit worthiness, so it is more profitable for them to buy government securities than to place their money as a lending facility for businesses and households. High cross-border and domestic demand for bonds of the Ministry of Finance of Serbia boosted the appreciation of the dinar currency in respect to EUR in the first half of 2011. Depending on their maturity,

when the period of collection for the purchased treasury bills arrives, there will be more dinars in circulation, which may, in turn, bring about its fall in respect to the EUR currency.

From the aspect of the national economy, the best option would be for the money inflow into Serbia to be the result of higher exports of goods and services, from foreign direct investments, yet what has been happening of late is the result of an inflow from investment portfolios - investment into securities, which by their nature may not be a permanent investment into the country. When the NBS intervenes on the foreign exchange market in order to prevent an excess strengthening of the dinar, it is necessary to bear in mind that with buying of EUR currency what is caused in an injection of additional dinar liquidity in a situation when the inflation is already above its targeted upper limit. However, even this excess of dinar supply can be withdrawn from the circulation, for example, by issuing of treasury bills of the NBS. The fact is that dinar did not gain strength because of improved performances of the Serbian economy, but because of buying of the government securities, thus creating an illusion of stability of the domestic currency, but also of the stabilisation of the macro-economic situation, which does not have any really grounded facts in the economic structure. Hence this situation with the strong dinar is not sustainable in any long-term future, as at a certain moment, the exchange rate of EUR must rise. It seems that the government bonds have become the main explanation for the volatility in value of the domestic currency, and the dates of their issue and maturity, a reason for having “a maverick betting house”, betting on what will be the value of dinar. During the issue of securities, the pressure is being made on the strengthening of the dinar currency, while at maturity, pressure is on the weakening of dinar, and thereafter the exchange rate “returns to normal”.

The dinar exchange rate, on 29 April 2011, broke the psychological limit and fell below 100 dinars for one EUR (with the mean EUR/Dinar exchange rate of 99.62 dinars), the value that it had one year earlier, and the estimate of the economic analysts was that its further strengthening would be “in a political and

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kursa, ali nije objavljivala podatke o dnevnoj kupovini (Jovović, 2011.). Ukupno je od početka 2011. godine do sredine godine, od strane NBS kupljeno 45 miliona evra, a prodato 30 miliona evra, dok je dinar u tom periodu apresirao za oko 3% u odnosu na evro i 12% prema američkom dolaru (Beta, 2011.). U junu 2011. domaća valuta nominalno je oslabila prema evru za 5,4% (Konjukturni trendovi Srbije, 2011). Povećana neizvesnost zbog ekonomskih problema u nekoliko zemalja evrozone sredinom 2011. godine, dovela je do „krize poverenja“ i povećanog opreza investitora za ulaganje u bilo koju nacionalnu valutu, pa i dinara, što je dovelo do određenog slabljenja dinara. Analitičari „Barclays banke“ u Londonu ocenjuju da na kretanje kursa dinara utiče više faktora, među kojima je i kriza u Grčkoj i Italiji, čije banke zauzimaju oko 23%, odnosno 16% srpskog bankarskog tržišta (Z. M., 2011.). U 2011. godini domaća valuta je prema evru bila najslabija 6. januara, kada je kurs bio 106,49 dinara za evro, a najjači 23. maja i tada je evro vredeo 96,70 dinara. Dinar je, inače, bio najslabiji 4. novembra 2010. godine, kada je zvanični srednji kurs iznosio 107,52 dinara za jedan evro (Beta, 2011).

Ambijent u kome posluju privreda i banke je dosta nepovoljan i nepredvidljiv, a velika neizvesnost postoji i u domenu deviznog kursa. U svakom slučaju nije moguće dugoročno jačanje dinara, jer iza njega ne stoji jaka privreda, pa treba očekivati fluktuacije u oba smera, odnosno jačanje i slabljenje domaće valute prema evru. Mišljenja oko kretanja kursa dinara su oprečna, a prognoze različite. Pojedini ekonomisti misle da bi kurs mogao biti relativno stabilan do izbora čime se pozitivno utiče na raspoloženje građana, drugi veruju u njegovu stabilnost do kraja leta 2011, a treći koji su u manjini misle da će dinar biti čvrst cele 2011. godine (Krkić, 2011.).

Prema istraživanjima Centra za strateška ekonomska istraživanja „Vojvodina CES S“ u februaru 2011. godine, a u okviru modela za prognoziranje kretanja kursa dinara u naredne dve godine, dinar će se stabilizovati na „dugi rok“ (Danas, 2011.). Pretpostavljena je stabilizacija kursa u odnosu na evro na nivou od oko 105 dinara za evro u 2011. i 2012. godini, a prema USD na oko 79 dinara

za dolar. Takođe, neke banke, kao na primer „Raiffeisen Bank“, izvršile su reviziju ranijih projekcija kretanja kursa dinara prema evru u 2011. i 2012. godini (RB, Market Weekly Report, 2011.). Po analizi ove banke dinar bi mogao oslabiti u 2011. za oko 5%, a inflacija bi bila oko 7,5%. Naime, prvobitna projekcija ove banke bila je da će kurs dinara na kraju 2011. godine iznositi 111,5 dinara i 117 dinara za evro na kraju 2012. godine. Nova revizija kursa urađena krajem marta 2011. predviđa kurs od 106, odnosno 105 dinara za evro na kraju 2011. i 2012. godine. Pri modeliranju ove prognoze, nisu predviđeni: moguće iznenadno povlačenje stranih investitora u slučaju eventualne krize dugova u zemljama EU (grčka kriza je doprinela depresijaciji dinara prema evru za 3,4% u maju 2010.), zatim politički rizik mogućih ranijih parlamentarnih izbora u zemlji, kao i bilo koja ozbiljnija ekonomska i dužnička kriza u regionu. U julskom nedeljnom izveštaju 2011. godine, ova banka vidi kurs od 102,50 dinara za evro kao „potencijalni donji cilj“ (RB, Market Weekly Report, 2011.). Kurs će umnogome zavisiti od priliva inostranog kapitala koji je u 2010. bio izuzetno nizak. Strane direktne investicije su u 2010. godini iznosile manje od 900 miliona evra (pad za oko 38% u odnosu na 2009.), čemu je doprinela i kriza u evrozoni, dok je za prvih pet meseci 2011. godine neto priliv ovih investicija bio na nivou od 684 miliona USD, što je porast od 26% u odnosu na isti period 2010. (Pregled, 2011.).

Priliv deviza od eventualne prodaje „Telekoma“ mogao da utiče na kretanje kursa dinara. Naime, devizni prihod od buduće privatizacije bio položen na devizni račun države u NBS, odakle se povlači u skladu sa porebama države. Ako se, na primer, devize povlače za plaćanje obaveza prema inostranstvu, to neposredno ne utiče na kretanje kursa dinara. Ali ako se podmiruju obaveze u dinarima, država devize prodaje NBS, a ona kupujući devize ubrizgava likvidnost u monetarni sistem. Generalno govoreći, novac od buduće prodaje „Telekoma“ mogao bi da se „potroši“ na stabilizaciju kursa dinara, za vraćanje rizičnih kredita, pokrivanje budžetskog deficita, a jedan deo na infrastrukturne projekte i subvencije.

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marketing sense, counter-productive”, and unsustainable on longer-term, although a strong dinar is a convincing argument for citizens before elections, which are expected to take place in 2012 (Milosevic, 2011). Political aspect is that “the government is more popular” as the dinar is stronger, so the government will do everything in its power to preserve a strong dinar in the pre-election year by any artificial means, although without either any realistic grounds for doing so.

Appreciation of the dinar currency is suitable also for the over-indebted Serbian economy and citizens, who are finding it hard to repay their credit liabilities, but also for the import lobby. Yet it is undermining exports which are our priority and investments in the production sectors, while the effects of suppression of the inflation will not be substantial. NBS probably wishes to stabilise the exchange rate at a higher level of dinar currency in order to avoid its effects on the inflation, so it is letting the dinar currency gain in strength more than appropriate for the value of exports and the economy of the country. It is necessary to bear in mind also the fall in demand for foreign currency on the market, as the foreign currency denominated credit facilities are maturing for repayment, mostly in mid-year and by the end of the year. Strengthening of the dinar currency was boosted by the remittances from the citizens living abroad in our Diaspora, and thanks to them, Serbia is ranking amongst the top ten countries in the world for the receipts of the highest amounts of money coming from abroad, from its migrants. Such movements on the foreign exchange market are not reflecting the real state of facts of the domestic economy, as they are not the result of the most important thing, and that is the achievement of a high inflow of foreign currency from the export of goods and services. The stronger the production and export performances of a country, the stronger and more viable its national currency will be. However, a paradoxical situation prevails in Serbia where employment is constantly falling, inflation growing, we have a permanent and large foreign trade and current balance of payment deficit, growth of indebtedness, yet dinar is gaining strength.

NBS has from 19 May 2011, in the period

of 20 days, up to 7 June 2011, bought EUR in the value of 40 million EUR on the Interbank market, in order to mitigate exchange rate oscillations, but did not publish data on daily purchases (Jovovic, 2011). From the beginning of 2011 and up to the mid-2011, NBS bought a total of 45 million EUR, and sold a total of 30 million EUR, while the dinar during that period appreciated for some 3% in respect to EUR, and 12% in respect to the US dollar (Beta, 2011). In June 2011, national currency experienced a nominal fall towards EUR of 5.4% (Konjukturni trendovi Srbije, 2011). A growing uncertainty caused by economic problems present in several Euro-zone countries in mid-2011 instigated “confidence crisis” and a high prudence of investors for investing into any national currency, thus in dinar, which caused a certain weakening of dinar. Analysts of the Barclays Bank in London are of the view that the movement of the dinar exchange rate is impacted by several factors, among them crisis in Greece and Italy, whose banks are having a share of some 23%, i.e. 16% respectively in the Serbian banking market (Z.M., 2011). In 2011, national currency was the weakest towards EUR on 6 January, when the exchange rate was 106.49 dinars for 1 EUR and the strongest on 23 May when it reached 96.70 dinars. Dinar was the weakest on 4 November 2010, when the official mean exchange rate was 107.52 dinars for 1 EUR (Beta, 2011).

The climate in which the economy is functioning and the banks operating is rather unfavourable and unpredictable, and there is a great uncertainty also in the field of the foreign exchange rate. In any case, any long-term strengthening of the dinar is not feasible as it is not supported by a strong economy, so fluctuations are to be expected in both directions, i.e. strengthening and weakening of the national currency towards EUR. Opinions regarding the exchange rate of dinar are controversial, and projections are diverse. Some economists are of the mind that the exchange rate could be relatively stable until the elections, in order to produce a positive effect on the mood of the citizens, while some other ones believe that its stability will prevail until the end of summer of 2011, although the third ones, those who are a minority, argue that the dinar currency will

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Zašto sada nije moguće uvođenje evra u Srbiji?

Dominacija evra u našoj privredi, tzv. „evroizacija“, kao slaba strana srpske privrede, samo je posledica g u b i t k a poverenja u nacionalnu valutu, gde dinar ne uspeva da se nametne na domaćem terenu već više decenija. Evroizacija ili dolarizacija je termin za veoma rasprostranjenu upotrebu stranog novca kao platežnog sredstva u nacionalnoj privredi.

Prema proceni NBS, stepen evroizacije u Srbiji je vrlo visok i iznosi oko 80%. Više od 70% zajmova preduzeća je u devizama ili sa deviznom klauzulom, a 30% u dinarima (u decembru 2009. godine 26% kredita privredi bilo je u dinarima).

Nepoverenje prema dinaru kao stabilnom novcu naročito je prisutno od početka devedesetih godina pošlog veka kada smo, na primer u januaru 1994. godine, imali najveću hiperinflaciju u svetu ikada zabeleženu (posle Mađarske 1946). Učinjene su ogromne greške u vođenju, pre svega monetarne politike, što je ostalo duboko u pamćenju našeg stanovništva.

Pošto nacionalna valuta nije prepreka ekonomskom prosperitetu zemlje, iz ozbiljne ekonomske krize Srbija ne može da izađe jednostavnim prelaskom na evro, kako zagovaraju neki ekonomisti i privrednici, već, pre svega, ravnotežnim kursom dinara, znači njegovom daljom depresijacijom i radikalnom promenom ekonomske i razvojne politike i privredne strukture.

Uvođenjem evra, koji je u opticaju u 17 zemalja EvropskeUnije (EU), Srbija bi izgubila monetarni suverenitet, odnosno sopstvenu monetarnu politiku, a time i samostalno vođenje ekonomske politike. Prelaskom na evro, NBS ne bi mogla da obezbedi likvidnost i stabilnost finansijskog sistema, koji bi zapravo postao bespomoćan, jer bi se bazirao na tuđoj valuti.

Srbija bi i sa evrom i dalje imala velike ekonomske probleme. Pre svega, ako bi se zamena dinara za evre izvršila na sadašnjem

nivou nerealnog

d e v i z n o g kursa, ostale bi

previsoke domaće cene, nekonkurentnost privrede,

veliki trgovinski deficit, a odliv evra bi bio veći od priliva. Smanjila bi se ukupna

količina evra u opticaju i pojavio problem likvidnosti. Jedino ne bi imali problema oko nepovoljnog kursa, ali bi opadale plate, nadnice i penzije i prihodi preduzeća, a nezaposlenost dalje rasla. Evro ne garantuje nižu inflaciju ili manje kamatne stope, niti spasava srpske dužnike.

Crna Gora je specifičan slučaj, splet različitih, uglavnom političkih okolnosti. Ona je prvo prešla na nemačku marku novembra 1999. godine (pored jugoslovenskog dinara), jednostavnom trgovačko-bankarskom transakcijom, na koju nije reagovala Nemačka iz političkih razloga. U novembru 2000. godine izbacila je dinar iz upotrebe i marka je postala jedina valuta u opticaju u Crnoj Gori. Posle je lakše prešla na evro od 2002. godine i nije bilo protivljenja drugih zemalja EU. Pitanje je šta će biti kada Crna Gora bude ulazila u EU. Nije isključeno da se traži da odustane od evra, jer članstvo u EU je jedna, a u evrozoni druga stvar.

I da hoće da uvede evro, Srbija gotovo sigurno ne bi dobila dozvolu, jer Evropska centralna banka i EU zahtevaju poštovanje tzv. „Mastrihtskih uslova“. Treba ispuniti stroge kriterijume, odnosno pet tesno povezanih pravila za ulazak u evrozonu. Prvo, stopa inflacije da ne bude veća od 1,5% od proseka u tri zemlje EU sa najnižim cenama na malo. Drugo, da dugoročna nominalna kamatna stopa na državne papire ne bude viša od 2% iznad prosečne kamate u tri najpovoljnije zemlje EU. Treće, da budžetski deficit ne pređe 3% bruto domaćeg proizvoda (BDP). Četvrto, da javni dug ne bude iznad 60% BDP. Peto, da zemlja prihvati članstvo u mehanizmu deviznih kurseva ERM najmanje dve godine pre ulaska u EU.

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remain strong throughout 2011 (Krkic, 2011).According to the research conducted by the

Strategic Economic Research Centre “Vojvodina CES S”, in February 2011, and within the scope of the model for prognosticating the dinar exchange rate movement over the next two years, dinar will be stabilised over a “long-term” period (Danas, 2011). Exchange rate stabilisation is assumed in respect to EUR at the level of some 105 dinars for 1 EUR in 2011 and 2012, and towards the USD at some 79 dinars for a US dollar. In addition, some of the banks, for example the “Raiffeisen Bank, have made a revision of their earlier projections for the movement of the dinar/EUR exchange rate in 2011 and 2012 (RB, Market Weekly Report, 2011). According to the analysis of this bank, dinar could fall in 2011 for some 5%, and the inflation would be some 7.5%. Namely, previous projections of this bank were that the dinar exchange rate, by the end of 2011, will be 111.5 dinars, and 117 dinars for 1 EUR by the end of the year 2012. New exchange rate revision was made in late March 2011 anticipating the exchange rate of 106, i.e. 105 dinars for 1 EUR by the end of 2011 and 2012 respectively. In modelling this prognosis, the following was not forecasted: a possible sudden withdrawal of foreign investors in case of an eventual debt crisis in the EU countries (Greek crisis boosted dinar depreciation towards EUR for 3.4% in May 2010), and also the political risk of earlier parliamentary elections in the country, but also any of the more serious economic and debt crisis in the region. In the June weekly report for 2011, this bank is viewing the exchange rate of 102.50 dinars for 1 EUR as “a potential lower target” (RB, Market Weekly report, 2011). Exchange rate will mainly depend on the inflow of foreign capital which was extremely low in 2010. Direct foreign investments in 2010 amounted to less than 900 million EUR (a fall of some 38% in respect to 2009), which was in part a result of the Euro-zone crisis, while in the first five months of 2011, net inflow of these investments was at the level of 684 million USD, which is a growth of 26% in respect to the same period of 2010 (Pregled, 2011).

Foreign currency inflow from an eventual sale of “Telekom” company could impact the movement of the dinar exchange rate. Namely,

foreign currency revenues from the future privatisation would be deposited on the foreign currency account of the Government, kept with the NBS, from where funds would be drawn according to the requirements of the State. For example, if foreign currency is being withdrawn for payment of cross-border liabilities, this would not directly impact the movement of the dinar exchange rate. But if funds are used for covering liabilities in dinars, the government would be selling foreign currency to the NBS and the NBS, when buying this foreign exchange, would be injecting liquidity into the monetary system. Generally speaking, money from the future sale of “Telekom” company could be “spent” on stabilisation of the dinar exchange rate, or on repayment of risky loans, even for covering of budgetary deficit, while one part could be used for financing infrastructural projects and subsidies.

Why it is not possible now to introduce Euro in Serbia?

Euro predominance in our economy, or the so-called Eurisation, as the weaker side of the Serbian economy, is only a consequence of the loss of confidence in the national currency, where the dinar currency has remained unsuccessful in imposing itself on the local playfield for several decades back. Eurisation or Dollarisation are the terms designating a very widely spread use of foreign money as the means of payment within the national economy.

According to the NBS estimates, the degree of Eurisation in Serbia is very high and amounts to some 80%. More than 70% of corporate loans is in foreign currency or with the currency clause, while some 30% is in dinars (in December 2009 some 26% of corporate loans were granted in dinars).

The mistrust towards dinar, as stable money, especially is present from the early 1990s, when in January 1994, for example, we had the highest hyperinflation ever recorded in the world history (after Hungary in 1946). Some enormous mistakes were made, primarily in the management of monetary policy, and this has left profound marks on minds and memory of our population.

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Prema tome, Evropska centralna banka ne dozvoljava uvođenje evra u zemlje koje najpre ne postanu članica EU, a zatim prođu višegodišnju proceduru prilagođavanja kroz evropski mehanizam deviznog kursa. Neprihvatljivo je da evro zameni nacionalnu valutu u zemlji koja nije ušla u evrozonu i nije ispunila navedene uslove.

Uvođenje evra nije poželjno u procesu intenzivne tranzicije srpske privrede, a odgovarajuća monetarna politika kod nas različita je od one u evrozoni. Najzad, eventualno jednostrano uvođenje evra ugrozilo bi odnose i otežalo put Srbije ka EU.

Zaključak

Dugoročnu stabilnost kursa dinara nije moguće postići bez otklanjanja fundamentalnih neravnoteža, odnosno sprovođenja strukturnih promena domaće privrede. Ona podrazumeva i poresku reformu i rigoroznu finansijsku disciplinu, smanjenje potrošnje, platnobilansnog (pre svega, spoljnotrgovinskog) i fiskalnog deficita i inflacije, povećanje priliva stranog kapitala, domaće konkurentnosti i deviznih rezervi, kao i ozbiljne reforme javnog sektora.

Pošto je kurs odraz stanja u srpskoj privredi, manje potrebe za prilagođavanjem deviznog kursa će biti, ukoliko strukturne reforme budu bolje i uspešnije. Mora biti u funkciji povećanja proizvodnje, zaposlenosti, naše konkurentnosti na svetskom tržištu i smanjenja enormnog

deficita spoljnotrgovinske razmene. Nerealni devizni kurs vodi ka neekonomskoj alokaciji nacionalnih resursa i raspodeli nacionalnog dohotka. Nasuprot njemu, realni kurs podstiče konkurentsku sposobnost izvoznika i omogućava razvoj novih industrija, koje u uslovima precenjene domaće valute nisu imale svoju ekonomsku opravdanost. Po oceni NBS, kurs dinara na dugi rok će u najvećoj meri zavisiti od „jačanja izvozno orijentisanog sektora domaće privrede i povećanja deviznog priliva“.

Izbor valutnog režima zavisi od stanja date privrede, njene konkurentnosti i izvozne sposobnosti, stanja platnog bilansa, visine spoljne zaduženosti, inflacije i drugih makroekonomskih parametara u određenom vremenskom periodu. U našoj situaciji izrazite nekonkurentnosti i nedovoljno osposobljene, tehnološki zastarele i slabo organizovane privrede za izvoz, režim kontrolisano fleksibilnog kursa dinara sa redovnim prilagođavanjem NBS prema kretanjima na deviznom tržištu, koji omogućava amortizaciju spoljnih ekonomskih udara, za sada je ipak najbolja opcija za Srbiju. I NBS smatra da je ovaj devizni režim kursa adekvatan, odnosno najmanje loš u odnosu na moguće alternative. Blagi trend depresijacije treba da približi dinar njegovoj održivoj vrednosti i delotvorno deluje u pravcu poboljšanja međunarodne konkurentnosti srpske privrede.

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As the national currency is not an obstacle to the prosperity of the country, Serbia can not overcome a serious economic crisis simply by converting into EUR, as suggested by some economists and businessmen, but primarily by maintaining a well balanced dinar exchange rate. Hence, crisis could be resolved through its further depreciation and a radical change in the economic and development policies and economic structure.

Introduction of EUR, currency used in 17 countries of the European Union (EU), would cause Serbia to lose its monetary sovereignty, i.e. its own monetary policy, and thus also its autonomous implementation of the economic policy. Convergence into EUR would prevent the NBS from securing liquidity and stability of the financial system, which would actually become helpless, because it would be based on an alien currency.

Serbia would also have some very substantial economic problems with the EUR. Most of all, if the exchange of dinar for EUR would be done at the present-day and unrealistic foreign exchange rate, the domestic prices would remain too high, economy of the country could not compete, there would be a high trade deficit, while the outflow of EUR would exceed its inflow. The total quantity of EUR would diminish in circulation, and the problem of liquidity would arise. The only problem that would be absent would be the problem of an adverse exchange rate, but the salaries would fall and also wages and retirement pensions, as well as the revenues of companies, and the unemployment would continue to grow. EUR can not guarantee either a lower inflation or lower interest rates, and neither is it able to come to the rescue of Serbian obligors.

Montenegro is a specific case as a set of different, mostly political, circumstances. It has initially converted to the Deutsche Mark in November 1999 (parallel with the Yugoslav dinar), through a simple trading and banking transaction, without any reaction received from Germany for political reasons. In November 2000, it suspended the dinar from the circulation and the Deutsche Mark remained the only currency in circulation in Montenegro. The conversion into EUR was therefore much simpler in 2002, without

encountering any protests from the other EU countries. The question is what will happen when Montenegro is to join European Union. It is not impossible that it will be requested to abandon EUR, because the EU membership is one matter, while the Euro-zone accession is quite another.

Even if it were willing to introduce EUR, Serbia almost certainly would not be allowed or permitted to do so, as the European Central Bank and the EU would demand compliance with the so-called “Maastricht Provisions”. It is necessary to fulfil strict criteria, i.e. to comply with five closely connected rules for the admission into the Euro-zone. Firstly, the inflation rate must not exceed 1.5% from the average in the three EU countries with the lowest retail prices. Secondly, the long-term nominal interest rate on government bonds must not be higher than 2% above the average interest rate in three of the most favourable EU countries. Thirdly, budget deficit must not be higher than 3% of the GDP. Fourthly, public debt must not be above 60% of the GDP. Fifthly, the country must accept membership in the exchange rates mechanism - ERM, at least two years prior to its accession to the EU.

Therefore, European Central Bank is not allowing introduction of EUR in the countries which have not yet become the EU members, to be followed by those countries passing through a several-year long procedure of harmonisation through the European exchange rates mechanism. It is unacceptable for EUR to replace the national currency in any country which has not entered the Euro-zone and which has not fulfilled the above stated conditions, requirements.

Introduction of EUR is not desirable in the process of an intensive transition of the Serbian economy, and an appropriate monetary policy in our case is different from the one in the Euro-zone. Finally, an eventual unilateral introduction of EUR would undermine the relations and would make more difficult the road of accession of Serbia to the EU.

Conclusion

Long-term stability of the dinar exchange rate can not be achieved without elimination

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Literatura / References

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and Exchange Restrictions 2009, IMF.3. Beta: “Dinar slabiji prema evru”, 8. jul 2011,

Beograd.4. “Evro na 105 dinara sledeće godine”, Danas,

24. februar 2011, Beograd.5. Ghosh A. and Ostry J.: „Choosing an

Exchange Rate Regime - A new look at an old question: should countries fix, float, or chose someting in between? “, Finance and Development, December 2009, IMF.

6. Ilić M.: „Šta da radimo sa kursom dinara? “, Profit magazin, jun 2011, Beograd.

7. Jovanović I. : “Dinar će opet padati kada prođu izbori”, 24 sata, 18. april 2011, Beograd.

8. Jovović D.: Dinar i srpska privreda - devizni kurs i stabilizacija, Privredna komora Srbije, 2011, Beograd.

9. Jovović D.: „Devizni kurs dinara - precenjeni dinar i alternativni režimi deviznog kursa“, Zbornik radova: Kako povećati konkurentnost privrede i izvoza Srbije, Naučno društvo ekonomista Srbije i Ekonomski fakultet, Beograd. 2010.

10. Jovović D.: „Fixed or Fluctuating Course of the Dinar - Solution is in Exports“, Cord magazine, October 2010, Belgrade.

11. Jovović D.: „Politika devizni kurs dinara - makroekonomski aspekt, “ časopis Jugoslovensko bankarstvo, br. 5-6 /1999, Beograd.

12. Komazec S.: „Relativno stabilan ili slobodan kurs dinara“, Srpska politika, 19. mart 2011, www. srpskapolitika. com

13. Kovačević M.: Izvoz za dugove“, Politika, 18. februar 2010, Beograd.

14. Kovačević M.: „Ekonomsko-finansijski odnosi Srbije sa inostranstvom u periodu 2000-2009. godine“, Ekonomska diplomatija, jul - decembar 2009, Beograd.

15. Konjukturni trendovi Srbije, br. 4. i 7, Privredna komora Srbije, 2011, Beograd.

16. Krkić M. : “Dinar će biti stabilan do leta”, 24 sata, 5. april 2011, Beograd.

17. Market Weekly Report, Serbia, March 24, July 18-22, 2011, Raiffeisen Bank. a. d.

18. Milošević A. : ”Predizborno jačanje dinara politički kontraprodultivno”, Danas, 27. april 2011, Beograd.

19. M. L. : “Dvougao o kursu”, Novi magazin, 13. maj 2011, Beograd.

20. Pregled: “Rast deficita platnog bilansa”, 3. avgust 2011, Beograd.

21. Rabrenović J.: “Inflacija iznad cilja NBS”, Politika, 19. maj 2011, Beograd.

22. Ristić Ivana: “Kritična tačka za Srbiju su reforme”, Ekonomist magazin, 7. jul 2011, Beograd.

23. Republic of Serbia: Ex Post Assessment of Longer-Term Program Engagement and Ex Post Evaluation of Exceptional Access—Staff Report; Public Information Notice on the Executive Board Discussion; and Statement by the Executive Director for Republic of Serbia, Series: Country Report No. 11/213, July 27, 2011, IMF.

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of some fundamental unbalances, i.e. without introduction of structural changes in the domestic economy. It would cover also the fiscal reform and a rigorous financial discipline, reduction of consumption, balance of payment (first of all, the foreign trade one) and fiscal deficit and inflation, an increased inflow of foreign capital, domestic competitive advantage and foreign currency reserves, but also serious reforms of the public sector.

Since the exchange rate is a reflection of the state of facts prevailing in the Serbian economy, there will be fewer needs for the adjustment of the exchange rate if structural reforms are better and more successful. They must be in the function of an increased production, employment, our competitive edge on the world market, and the reduction of enormous foreign trade exchange deficit. Unrealistic exchange rate is leading towards an uneconomic allocation of national resources and distribution of national revenues. Conversely, a real exchange rate is boosting up the competitive advantages of the exporters and is allowing for the development of new industries, which in the circumstances of an overrated national currency did not have their economic justification. According to the estimates of the NBS, the dinar exchange rate

in a long-term perspective will mostly depend on “the strengthening of the export-oriented sector of the national economy and an increased foreign currency inflow”.

The choice of the exchange rate regime depends on the situation in which the given economy is finding itself, on its competitive advantages and export capabilities, on the status of its balance of payment, on the amount of its foreign indebtedness, on inflation and other macro-economic parameters over a certain period of time. In our situation of an emphatic competitive drawback and insufficiently capable and technologically obsolete, poorly organised, export-oriented economy, the regime of controlled flexible dinar exchange rate, with regular adjustments by the NBS to the movements on the foreign currency market, allowing for amortisation of exterior economic impacts, for the moment remains the best option for Serbia. NBS is also of the view that this exchange rate regime is adequate, i.e. that it is less inadequate in respect to the possible other alternatives. A slight trend of depreciation should bring the dinar currency closer to its sustainable value and should have beneficial effects on the improvement of international competitiveness of the Serbian economy.