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+ UK General Election 2015 Data Analysis David Freeborn [email protected]

Election Analysis 2015

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Short data analysis of 2015 UK General Election: study of Conservative, Labour, Liberal Democrat, UKIP, SNP and Green vote shares

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  • +UK General Election 2015 Data Analysis David Freeborn [email protected]

  • +Contents n Slide 3 Introduction

    n Slide 4 Is there a Labour Low Turnout Effect?

    n Slide 13 How strong was the Green Spoiler Effect?

    n Slide 14 Liberal Democrats: where did they collapse or survive?

    n Slide 22 Is Scotland Exceptional?

    n Slide 26 Is UKIPland Exceptional?

    n Slide 30 Which seats saw the largest Labour increases?

    n Slide 32 Did Labour lose Middle England?

    n Slide 33 Key Conclusions

    n Bonus Slides n Slide 34 Interesting seats n Slide 40 Multipartiness and Onepartiness

    2

  • +Introduction n For the most part, Im using the data gathered here:

    http://www.britishelectionstudy.com/bes-resources/2015-general-election-results-data-released-by-the-bes/#.VV4rZVnBzGd

    n This contains data from the Census of 2011 as well as the election results for 2015 and 2010

    n The election for Thirsk and Malton in 2010 was postponed for a few weeks due to the death of the Conservative PPC. Where I need 2010 data for this seat, I use the data from the wikipedia page, for the postponed election: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Thirsk_and_Malton_%28UK_Parliament_constituency%29#Elections_in_the_2010s

    n I am excluding the results for Buckingham, the Speaker, John Bercows seat, as this was not contested by the main parties (Labour, Liberal Democrats)

    n I have not checked this spreadsheet for errors: I cannot guarantee that it does not contain any!

    n Wherever else I need data, Ive taken it from wikipedia: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Main_Page

    n This is not a detailed big data analysis: this is a quick look at the results. I think theres a lot of scope for a more rigorous analysis, and there are a lot more questions that I would like to have a look at answering!

    n I am happy for anybody to use this analysis freely, but it would be kind if you cite my contribution, and let me know how you have used the data.

    3

    Introduction

  • +What correlates with Labour vote?

    n As expected, Labour vote correlates with unemployment, deprivation, ethnicity, population density, working-age population and low home ownership. These factors are also highly correlated with each other.

    n There are plenty of other factors that also give comparable correlations with the Labour vote

    * The Census uses a four dimensional measure of deprivation, which you can read about here: http://census.ukdataservice.ac.uk/get-data/related/deprivation.aspx . Not deprived refers to the population who do not meet any of the four deprivation criteria. The Census does not provide this data for Scotland.

    4

    Who votes for whom?

    y"="0.0647x"+"2.2853"R"="0.56375"

    0.00"

    1.00"

    2.00"

    3.00"

    4.00"

    5.00"

    6.00"

    7.00"

    8.00"

    9.00"

    10.00"

    0" 10" 20" 30" 40" 50" 60" 70" 80" 90" 100"

    Une

    mploy

    men

    t*(%)*

    Labour*vote*(%)* y"="$0.2947x"+"52.129"R"="0.4922"

    20.00"

    25.00"

    30.00"

    35.00"

    40.00"

    45.00"

    50.00"

    55.00"

    60.00"

    65.00"

    70.00"

    0" 10" 20" 30" 40" 50" 60" 70" 80" 90" 100"Not$Dep

    rived

    $(%)$

    Labour$vote$(%)$

    Unemployment Deprivation * R2 = 0.56 R2 = 0.49

  • +What correlates with Labour vote?

    5

    Who votes for whom?

    y"="0.0647x"+"2.2853"R"="0.56375"

    0.00"

    1.00"

    2.00"

    3.00"

    4.00"

    5.00"

    6.00"

    7.00"

    8.00"

    9.00"

    10.00"

    0" 10" 20" 30" 40" 50" 60" 70" 80" 90" 100"

    Une

    mploy

    men

    t*(%)*

    Labour*vote*(%)* y"="$0.2947x"+"52.129"R"="0.4922"

    20.00"

    25.00"

    30.00"

    35.00"

    40.00"

    45.00"

    50.00"

    55.00"

    60.00"

    65.00"

    70.00"

    0" 10" 20" 30" 40" 50" 60" 70" 80" 90" 100"

    Not$Dep

    rived

    $(%)$

    Labour$vote$(%)$

    Unemployment Deprivation Not retired

    Not White-British High Denisty Low Home Ownership

    y"="$0.4056x"+"77.209"R"="0.34387"

    20.00"

    25.00"

    30.00"

    35.00"

    40.00"

    45.00"

    50.00"

    55.00"

    60.00"

    65.00"

    70.00"

    0" 10" 20" 30" 40" 50" 60" 70" 80" 90" 100"

    Home%Owne

    rship%(%

    )%

    Labour%vote%(%)%

    y"="$0.1046x"+"17.66"R"="0.21023"

    0.00"

    5.00"

    10.00"

    15.00"

    20.00"

    25.00"

    30.00"

    0" 10" 20" 30" 40" 50" 60" 70" 80" 90" 100"

    Re#r

    ed&(%

    )&

    Labour&vote&(%)&

    y"="0.8321x"+"6.659"R"="0.28601"

    +20.00"

    0.00"

    20.00"

    40.00"

    60.00"

    80.00"

    100.00"

    0" 10" 20" 30" 40" 50" 60" 70" 80" 90" 100"

    Popu

    la'o

    n)De

    nsity

    )

    Labour)vote)(%))y"="$0.5311x"+"100.17"R"="0.22973"

    0.00"

    10.00"

    20.00"

    30.00"

    40.00"

    50.00"

    60.00"

    70.00"

    80.00"

    90.00"

    100.00"

    0" 10" 20" 30" 40" 50" 60" 70" 80" 90" 100"

    Ethn

    icity

    ((White(Bri-

    sh((%

    )(

    Labour(vote((%)(

    R2 = 0.56

    R2 = 0.49 R2 = 0.21

    R2 = 0.23

    R2 = 0.28

    R2 = 0.34

  • + These correlations change little if we exclude Scotland 6

    Who votes for whom?

    y"="$0.2947x"+"52.129"R"="0.4922"

    20.00"

    25.00"

    30.00"

    35.00"

    40.00"

    45.00"

    50.00"

    55.00"

    60.00"

    65.00"

    70.00"

    0" 10" 20" 30" 40" 50" 60" 70" 80" 90" 100"

    Not$Dep

    rived

    $(%)$

    Labour$vote$(%)$

    Unemployment Deprivation * Not retired

    Not White-British High Denisty Low Home Ownership

    y"="0.8299x"*"6.2241"R"="0.2792"

    *20.00"

    0.00"

    20.00"

    40.00"

    60.00"

    80.00"

    100.00"

    0" 10" 20" 30" 40" 50" 60" 70" 80" 90" 100"

    Popu

    la'o

    n)De

    nsity

    )

    Labour)vote)(%))

    y"="$0.1055x"+"17.7"R"="0.21237"

    0.00"

    5.00"

    10.00"

    15.00"

    20.00"

    25.00"

    30.00"

    0" 10" 20" 30" 40" 50" 60" 70" 80" 90" 100"

    Re#r

    ed&(%

    )&

    Labour&vote&(%)&y"="0.067x"+"2.1145"R"="0.62139"

    0.00"

    1.00"

    2.00"

    3.00"

    4.00"

    5.00"

    6.00"

    7.00"

    8.00"

    9.00"

    10.00"

    0" 10" 20" 30" 40" 50" 60" 70" 80" 90" 100"

    Une

    mploy

    men

    t*(%)*

    Labour*vote*(%)*

    y"="$0.5311x"+"99.701"R"="0.22364"

    0.00"

    10.00"

    20.00"

    30.00"

    40.00"

    50.00"

    60.00"

    70.00"

    80.00"

    90.00"

    100.00"

    0" 10" 20" 30" 40" 50" 60" 70" 80" 90" 100"

    Ethn

    icity

    ((White(Bri-

    sh((%

    )(

    Labour(vote((%)( y"="$0.4243x"+"78.337"R"="0.37861"

    20.00"

    25.00"

    30.00"

    35.00"

    40.00"

    45.00"

    50.00"

    55.00"

    60.00"

    65.00"

    70.00"

    0" 10" 20" 30" 40" 50" 60" 70" 80" 90" 100"

    Home%Owne

    rship%(%

    )%

    Labour%vote%(%)%

    R2 = 0.62

    R2 = 0.49 R2 = 0.21

    R2 = 0.28

    R2 = 0.37 R2 = 0.22

  • + These factors also correlate with low turnout 7

    Who votes for whom?

    Unemployment Deprivation * Not retired

    Not White-British High Denisty Low Home Ownership

    y"="0.2128x"+"0.1781"R"="0.09749"

    0.00"

    5.00"

    10.00"

    15.00"

    20.00"

    25.00"

    30.00"

    0" 10" 20" 30" 40" 50" 60" 70" 80" 90" 100"

    Re#r

    ed&(%

    )&

    Turnout(%)&y"="$0.1783x"+"16.189"R"="0.47915"

    0.00"

    1.00"

    2.00"

    3.00"

    4.00"

    5.00"

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    7.00"

    8.00"

    9.00"

    10.00"

    0" 10" 20" 30" 40" 50" 60" 70" 80" 90" 100"

    Une

    mploy

    men

    t*(%)*

    Turnout(%)* y"="1.0115x")"24.144"R"="0.57884"

    20.00"

    25.00"

    30.00"

    35.00"

    40.00"

    45.00"

    50.00"

    55.00"

    60.00"

    65.00"

    70.00"

    0" 10" 20" 30" 40" 50" 60" 70" 80" 90" 100"

    Not$Dep

    rived

    $(%)$

    Turnout(%)$

    y"="$1.7525x"+"136.34"R"="0.14204"

    0.00"

    20.00"

    40.00"

    60.00"

    80.00"

    100.00"

    120.00"

    140.00"

    160.00"

    0" 10" 20" 30" 40" 50" 60" 70" 80" 90" 100"

    Popu

    la'o

    n)De

    nsity

    ))

    Turnout(%)) y"="1.076x"*"7.1778"R"="0.27077"

    0.00"

    10.00"

    20.00"

    30.00"

    40.00"

    50.00"

    60.00"

    70.00"

    80.00"

    90.00"

    100.00"

    0" 10" 20" 30" 40" 50" 60" 70" 80" 90" 100"

    Home%Owne

    rship%(%

    )%

    Turnout(%)%

    R2 = 0.58 R2 = 0.21 R2 = 0.48

    R2 = 0.14

    R2 = 0.27

    y"="1.0033x"+"16.54"R"="0.09183"

    0.00"

    10.00"

    20.00"

    30.00"

    40.00"

    50.00"

    60.00"

    70.00"

    80.00"

    90.00"

    100.00"

    0" 10" 20" 30" 40" 50" 60" 70" 80" 90" 100"

    Ethn

    icity

    (White(Bri-

    sh((%

    )(

    Turnout((%)(

    R2 = 0.09

  • +Result: the Labour low turnout effect

    n These correlations between Labour vote and turnout are incredibly strong

    n Is this solely due to demographic factors, or is there a Labour effect?

    n Are voters less likely to turnout in Labour areas due to the lack of vision in Labour; as John Cruddas says, have voters lost their emotional connection to Labour?

    8

    Who votes for whom?

    Turnout : Whole UK Turnout : Scotland not included

    y"="$0.2111x"+"73.078"R"="0.39774"

    0"

    10"

    20"

    30"

    40"

    50"

    60"

    70"

    80"

    90"

    100"

    0" 10" 20" 30" 40" 50" 60" 70" 80" 90" 100"

    Turnou

    t'(%)'

    Labour'vote'(%)' y"="$0.2041x"+"72.529"R"="0.4147"

    0"

    10"

    20"

    30"

    40"

    50"

    60"

    70"

    80"

    90"

    100"

    0" 10" 20" 30" 40" 50" 60" 70" 80" 90" 100"Tu

    rnou

    t'(%)'

    Labour'vote'(%)'

    R2 = 0.40 R2 = 0.41

  • +Party strength and turnout

    9

    Who votes for whom?

    Labour Conservatives

    Liberal Democrats Majority

    y"="$0.0118x"+"66.056"R"="0.00102"

    0"

    10"

    20"

    30"

    40"

    50"

    60"

    70"

    80"

    90"

    100"

    0" 10" 20" 30" 40" 50" 60" 70" 80" 90" 100"

    Turnou

    t'(%)'

    Majority'(%)'

    R2 = 0.00

    y"="0.2384x"+"63.891"R"="0.12684"

    0"

    10"

    20"

    30"

    40"

    50"

    60"

    70"

    80"

    90"

    100"

    0" 10" 20" 30" 40" 50" 60"

    Turnou

    t'(%)'

    LibDem'vote'(%)'

    R2 = 0.12

    y"="0.2289x"+"56.834"R"="0.41745"

    0"

    10"

    20"

    30"

    40"

    50"

    60"

    70"

    80"

    90"

    100"

    0" 10" 20" 30" 40" 50" 60" 70" 80" 90" 100"

    Turnou

    t'(%)'

    Conserva0ve'vote'(%)'

    R2 = 0.41

    y"="$0.2041x"+"72.529"R"="0.4147"

    0"

    10"

    20"

    30"

    40"

    50"

    60"

    70"

    80"

    90"

    100"

    0" 10" 20" 30" 40" 50" 60" 70" 80" 90" 100"

    Turnou

    t'(%)'

    Labour'vote'(%)'

    R2 = 0.41

    n No other party vote correlates to low turnout

    n I was astonished to see the size of the majority does not correlate with turnout: voters are (overall) as likely to turnout to vote in extremely safe seats as super marginals

  • +Why is there a Labour low turnout effect? n We can test whether there is a Labour effect independent of

    demographics in a simple way.

    n Using the result for the other demographic factors (in this case, I will choose unemployment, which had the strongest correlation with Labour vote, and the second strongest with turnout), and calculate an expected turnout from the best linear fit: n Unemployment (%) = -0.18 x Expected Turnout (%) + 16.2%

    n We can then see whether the difference: Actual Turnout Expected Turnout correlates with Labour vote

    n If there is no correlation, then these demographic factors are sufficient to explain the low turnout in seats where the Labour vote is strong

    n I will look at results excluding Scotland, to avoid the possibility of a special Scottish exceptionalism effect

    10

    Who votes for whom?

  • +Why is there a Labour low turnout effect?

    n We see (effectively) no correlation: demographic factors are sufficient to explain low turnout in Labour seats

    n However, Labour should not be too comforted by these results. The fact remains, turnout is in long-term decline among the poorest and most vulnerable voters: as the results showed, these are still demographics that lean strongly toward Labour. Labour is hurt by this effect.

    n It seems likely that these demographics feel either too disenfranchised or too disinterested to turn out to vote. It is still possible that these demographics do not vote because they feel uninspired by Labour (but it is a demographic effect nonetheless).

    11

    Who votes for whom?

    Turnout (Actual Expected) Scotland not included

    y"="$0.0817x"+"3.149"R"="0.03004"

    $30"

    $20"

    $10"

    0"

    10"

    20"

    30"

    40"

    0" 10" 20" 30" 40" 50" 60" 70" 80" 90" 100"

    Actual'Turno

    ut','Ex

    pected

    'Turno

    ut(%

    )'

    Labour'vote'(%)'

    R2 = 0.03

  • + The Labour low turnout effect

    n If did not vote were a party, Labour would have been almost wiped out across the country

    (I cannot find a source for this map: if I find such a source, I will add it here)

    12

    Who votes for whom?

  • +Was there a Green spoiler effect?

    13

    Was there a Green spoiler effect?

    Constituency Winner Majority,(%) Green,vote,(%) Green,vote,2,Majority,(%)Brighton,*Pavilion Green 14.5 41.8 27.3Bristol*West Labour 8.9 26.8 17.9Cambridge Labour 1.1 7.9 6.8Plymouth,*Sutton*and*Devonport Conservative 1.1 7.1 6Brighton,*Kemptown Conservative 1.5 7 5.5Hove Labour 2.4 6.8 4.4Bath Conservative 8.1 11.9 3.8Derby*North Conservative 0.1 3.6 3.5Lewes Conservative 2.1 5.5 3.4Ealing*Central*and*Acton Labour 0.5 3.6 3.1Brentford*and*Isleworth Labour 0.9 3.7 2.8Gower Conservative 0.1 2.7 2.6Croydon*Central Conservative 0.3 2.7 2.4Hampstead*and*Kilburn Labour 2.1 4.4 2.3Lancaster*and*Fleetwood Labour 3.1 5 1.9Bury*North Conservative 0.8 2.5 1.7Morley*and*Outwood Conservative 0.9 2.6 1.7Halifax Labour 1 2.6 1.6NewcastleJunderJLyme Labour 1.5 2.9 1.4St*Ives Conservative 5.1 6.3 1.2Eastbourne Conservative 1.4 2.6 1.2Ilford*North Labour 1.2 2.1 0.9Barrow*and*Furness Labour 1.8 2.5 0.7Twickenham Conservative 3.3 4 0.7Bedford Conservative 2.4 3.1 0.7Weaver*Vale Conservative 1.8 2.5 0.7Wolverhampton*South*West Labour 2 2.6 0.6Berwickshire,*Roxburgh*and*Selkirk Scottish=National=Party 0.6 1.1 0.5Enfield*North Labour 2.3 2.8 0.5Telford Conservative 1.8 2.3 0.5Leeds*North*West Liberal=Democrat 6.7 7 0.3Dumfriesshire,*Clydesdale*and*Tweeddale Conservative 1.5 1.6 0.1

    n Green vote exceeded the winners majority in 32 seats

    n Of these, 16 were won by Conservatives

    n Without these seats, Cameron would have only 315 sets: he would have no majority and need two of the Liberal Democrats, DUP or UKIP in order form a majority

    n However, the Green vote is an important component (above 8%) in around 35 seats, and above 5% in around 130 seats

  • +What predicts the Liberal Democrat Vote?

    n Liberal Democrat vote fell in every single seat

    n One of the best predictors of how much the LibDem vote fell was their previous vote in 2010

    n In other words, the fall in the Liberal Democrat vote was not a uniform swing: the swing was so large that the vote would fall by a similar proportion in every constituency, related to their previous vote

    n The trend is extremely strong, but it would be interesting to understand those seats that are exceptions

    14

    Liberal Democrat: Where did they collapse or survive?

    Change in LibDem vote against LibDem vote in 2010

    y"="$0.0817x"+"3.149"R"="0.03004"

    $30"

    $20"

    $10"

    0"

    10"

    20"

    30"

    40"

    0" 10" 20" 30" 40" 50" 60" 70" 80" 90" 100"

    Actual'Turno

    ut','Ex

    pected

    'Turno

    ut(%

    )'

    Labour'vote'(%)'

    R2 = 0.03

    y"="$1.2454x"+"4.0449"R"="0.37266"

    0.0"

    10.0"

    20.0"

    30.0"

    40.0"

    50.0"

    60.0"

    70.0"

    $40.0" $35.0" $30.0" $25.0" $20.0" $15.0" $10.0" $5.0" 0.0"

    LibD

    em'201

    0'(%

    )'

    LibDem'2015'/'LibDem'2010'vote'(%)'

    R2 = 0.37

  • + Did the Liberal Democrats hold out better in Scotland?

    n Some have argued that the Liberal Democrat vote held out better in Scotland, compared to the rest of the country. Ive coloured the Scottish constituencies in Green.

    n Comparing against the Liberal Democrat vote in 2010, we see the Liberal Democrat vote in Scotland did not hold out any more strongly: if anything the trend is slightly worse

    n A handful of constituencies seem to have held out more strongly: lets try to find out why.

    15

    Liberal Democrat: Where did they collapse or survive?

    Change in LibDem vote against LibDem vote in 2010

    y"="$0.0817x"+"3.149"R"="0.03004"

    $30"

    $20"

    $10"

    0"

    10"

    20"

    30"

    40"

    0" 10" 20" 30" 40" 50" 60" 70" 80" 90" 100"

    Actual'Turno

    ut','Ex

    pected

    'Turno

    ut(%

    )'

    Labour'vote'(%)'

    R2 = 0.03

    y"="$1.2452x"+"4.0554"R"="0.37301"

    $10.0"

    0.0"

    10.0"

    20.0"

    30.0"

    40.0"

    50.0"

    60.0"

    70.0"

    $40.0" $35.0" $30.0" $25.0" $20.0" $15.0" $10.0" $5.0" 0.0"

    LibD

    em'201

    0'(%

    )'

    LibDem'2015'/'LibDem'2010'vote'(%)'

    R2 = 0.37

  • + The incredible Liberal Democrat incumbency bonus 16

    Liberal Democrat: Where did they collapse or survive?

    Change in LibDem vote against LibDem vote in 2010

    y"="$0.0817x"+"3.149"R"="0.03004"

    $30"

    $20"

    $10"

    0"

    10"

    20"

    30"

    40"

    0" 10" 20" 30" 40" 50" 60" 70" 80" 90" 100"

    Actual'Turno

    ut','Ex

    pected

    'Turno

    ut(%

    )'

    Labour'vote'(%)'

    R2 = 0.03

    y"="$1.3898x"$"0.3815"R"="0.77825"

    y"="$0.3941x"+"39.761"R"="0.19016"

    0.0"

    10.0"

    20.0"

    30.0"

    40.0"

    50.0"

    60.0"

    70.0"

    $40.0" $35.0" $30.0" $25.0" $20.0" $15.0" $10.0" $5.0" 0.0"

    LibD

    em'201

    0'(%

    )'

    LibDem'2015'/'LibDem'2010'vote'(%)'

    I have coloured seats with a Liberal Democrat incumbent in Yellow This huge incumbency bonus can explain almost all of those results that did better than the trend Really we have two different data sets here: one for non-Liberal Democrat incumbent seats, and

    one for seats with a Liberal Democrat incumbent: these faired far better. In incumbent seats, Liberal Democrat vote not only fell by less, but it decreased less steeply

    based on existing vote. No other party sees anything like this sort of incumbency bonus

    R2 = 0.78

    R2 = 0.19

  • +Who benefitted from a falling Liberal Democrat vote? 17

    Liberal Democrat: Where did they collapse or survive?

    Labour Conservatives

    y"="$0.2902x"$"14.942"R"="0.20114"

    $40.0"

    $35.0"

    $30.0"

    $25.0"

    $20.0"

    $15.0"

    $10.0"

    $5.0"

    0.0"$40.0" $30.0" $20.0" $10.0" 0.0" 10.0" 20.0" 30.0"

    LibD

    em'201

    5','L

    ibDe

    m'201

    0'vo

    te'(%

    )'

    Labour'2015','Labour'2010'vote'(%)' y"="$0.5202x"$"14.818"R"="0.15514"

    $40.0"

    $35.0"

    $30.0"

    $25.0"

    $20.0"

    $15.0"

    $10.0"

    $5.0"

    0.0"$20.0" $15.0" $10.0" $5.0" 0.0" 5.0" 10.0" 15.0"

    LibD

    em'201

    5','L

    ibDe

    m'201

    0'vo

    te'(%

    )'Conserva8ve'2015','Conserva8ve'2010'vote'(%)'

    n Both Conservatives and Labour votes increased, in proportion to the fall in the Liberal Democrat vote

    n The correlation is stronger for Labour: they were more dependent on a falling Liberal Democrat vote than the Conservatives

    R2 = 0.20 R2 = 0.15

  • +y"="$0.5789x"$"13.63"R"="0.11261"

    $40.0"

    $35.0"

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    LibD

    em'201

    5','L

    ibDe

    m'201

    0'vo

    te'(%

    )'

    Conserva8ve'2015','Conserva8ve'2010'vote'(%)'y"="$0.6035x"$"12.439"R"="0.17835"

    $40.0"

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    LibD

    em'201

    5','L

    ibDe

    m'201

    0'vo

    te'(%

    )'

    Labour'2015','Labour'2010'vote'(%)'

    Lets exclude Scotland, where both the Liberal Democrat and Labour votes collapsed to the SNP. Who benefitted most from the Liberal Democrat fall?

    18

    Liberal Democrat: Where did they collapse or survive?

    Labour Conservatives

    n Labour were still the biggest beneficiaries, but the Conservatives did increasingly well where the Liberal Democrat vote fell the most (were the Conservatives targeting these seats?)

    n A 15% fall in LibDem vote correlated with a 4.2% rise in Labour vote A 15% fall in LibDem vote correlated with a 2.4% rise in Conservative vote

    n A 20% fall in LibDem vote correlated with a 12.7% rise in Labour vote A 20% fall in LibDem vote correlated with an 11.0% rise in Conservative vote

    R2 = 0.18 R2 = 0.11

  • + Two good predictors of Conservative vote share 19

    Liberal Democrat: Where did they collapse or survive?

    Unemployment Deprivation

    n Just as Labour vote is highest in seats with high unemployment and deprivation, Conservative vote is lowest, and vice versa

    n But what accounts for those seats where the Conservative vote looks spuriously low, given the low unemployment and deprivation?

    y"="$0.0592x"+"6.5453"R"="0.45393"

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    Une

    mploy

    ed*(%

    )*

    Conserva3ve*vote*(%)*

    R2 = 0.20

    y"="0.3489x"+"28.765"R"="0.54862"

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    rived

    $(%)$

    Conserva3ve$vote$(%)$

    R2 = 0.15

  • +Where Liberal Democrats hold seats, Conservatives do worse 20

    Liberal Democrat: Where did they collapse or survive?

    Unemployment Deprivation

    n In seats with a Liberal Democrat incumbent (orange) and held by the Liberal Democrats in 2015 (yellow), the Conservative vote is usually substantially worse than one would expect from demographic factors

    n Is this due to anti-Labour tactical voting by Coalition supporters? Or due to a successful soft-Tory squeeze by the Liberal Democrats in the seats they were defending? Or something else?

    R2 = 0.20

    R2 = 0.15

    y"="$0.0592x"+"6.5453"R"="0.45393"

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    Une

    mploy

    ed*(%

    )*

    Conserva3ve*vote*2015*(%)*

    LibDem"in"2010"

    LibDem"held"2015"

    y"="0.3489x"+"28.765"R"="0.54862"

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    rived

    $(%)$

    Conserva3ve$vote$2015$(%)$

    R2 = 0.20 R2 = 0.15

  • +Where Liberal Democrats hold seats, Conservatives do worse 21

    Liberal Democrat: Where did they collapse or survive?

    Unemployment Deprivation n We see almost exactly

    the same pattern in 2010 and in 2015: it is not a Coalition effect

    n So it is probably due to demographics: both Liberal Democrats and Conservatives have a similar, middle class voter base

    n In seats where these types of voters vote Liberal Democrat, they dont vote Conservative

    y"="$0.0592x"+"6.5453"R"="0.45393"

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    Une

    mploy

    ed*(%

    )*

    Conserva3ve*vote*2015*(%)*

    LibDem"in"2010"

    LibDem"held"2015"

    y"="0.3489x"+"28.765"R"="0.54862"

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    Not$Dep

    rived

    $(%)$

    Conserva3ve$vote$2015$(%)$

    y"="0.3616x"+"28.735"R"="0.47741"

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    Not$Dep

    rived

    $(%)$

    Conserva3ve$vote$2010$(%)$y"="$0.0625x"+"6.6057"R"="0.41059"

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    Une

    mploy

    ed*(%

    )*

    Conserva3ve*vote*2010*(%)*

    2015 2015

    2010 2010

  • + Scottish Turnout: uniformly higher than England? 22

    Is Scotland Exceptional?

    Turnout vs. Unemployment

    n I have coloured Scottish seats Green

    n Turnout in Scotland was 71.1%, higher than the UK as a whole (66.1%)

    n This is a new effect (probably a result of the referendum and Scottish spring- the surge in Nationalist enthusiasm and support.

    n In 2010, Scottish turnout, for a given unemployment, was typical of the UK. In 2015, Scottish turnout was higher, for a given unemployment.

    y"="$0.0592x"+"6.5453"R"="0.45393"

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    Une

    mploy

    ed*(%

    )*

    Conserva3ve*vote*2015*(%)*

    LibDem"in"2010"

    LibDem"held"2015"

    y"="$0.1783x"+"16.189"R"="0.47915"

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    Une

    mploy

    men

    t*(%)*

    Turnout(%)* y"="$0.1946x"+"17.067"R"="0.5924"

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    mploy

    men

    t*(%)*

    Turnout*2010*(%)*

    R2 = 0.48 R2 = 0.59 2015 2010

  • + Scottish Turnout: uniformly higher than England? 23

    Is Scotland Exceptional?

    Turnout vs. Young voter (18-24) proportion

    n Young voters (18 24) are in general less likely to vote than older voters

    n In 2010, Scottish turnout, for a given proportion of young voters, was lower than the UK average. In 2015, Scottish turnout was higher, for a given proportion of young voters had risen to about typical of the UK average.

    n (Scottish seats are in general older than the UK average, so other things being equal, one would expect higher turnout: until 2015, this is not what we saw)

    y"="$0.0592x"+"6.5453"R"="0.45393"

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    Une

    mploy

    ed*(%

    )*

    Conserva3ve*vote*2015*(%)*

    LibDem"in"2010"

    LibDem"held"2015"

    y"="$0.2239x"+"24.131"R"="0.11856"

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    0" 10" 20" 30" 40" 50" 60" 70" 80" 90" 100"

    Age$18

    '25$(%

    )$

    Turnout(%)$ y"="$0.2685x"+"26.811"R"="0.17678"

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    e$18

    '25$(%

    )$Turnout$2010$(%)$

    R2 = 0.12 R2 = 0.18 2015 2010

  • + Scotland: UKIP not welcome here? 24

    Is Scotland Exceptional?

    Retired

    y"="0.2378x"+"11.049"R"="0.14912"

    0.00"

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    0" 5" 10" 15" 20" 25" 30" 35" 40" 45" 50"

    Re#r

    ed&(%

    )&

    UKIP&vote&(%)&

    R2 = 0.15

    y"="1.0829x"+"68.138"R"="0.13082"

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    0" 5" 10" 15" 20" 25" 30" 35" 40" 45" 50"Ethn

    icity

    (White(Bri-

    sh((%

    )(UKIP(vote((%)(

    R2 = 0.13

    White-British

    n Two of the best predictors of UKIP vote are the proportion of the popualtion who is retired and white-British

    n The Scottish seats are the largest exception to this: the UKIP vote is almost uniform with both, between about 1 and 4 %, lower than almost any other seats, including London

    n Labour, Liberal Democrats and Conservatives also performed worse in Scotland, but by a smaller amount

  • + Scotland: Labour implosion and Conservative survival 25

    Is Scotland Exceptional?

    Labour

    Conservatives

    n Unlike the Liberal Democrats, the Conservatives and Labour mostly did not see a correlation between the 2010 vote share and the change in the 2015: close to a uniform swing

    n The Labour Scottish vote is an exception: their vote share fell in proportion to the 2010 vote: a Liberal Democrat style collapse

    n The conservative vote share in Scotland fell by a little less than expected, but mostly from a low base

    Change in vote share 2015 against 2010 vote share

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    Labo

    ur'201

    0'(%

    )'

    Labour'2015'/'Labour'2010'vote'(%)' y"="1.0938x"+"34.584"R"="0.08643"

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    nserva

    )ve*20

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    )*Conserva)ve*2015*2*Conserva)ve*2010*vote*(%)*

  • +UKIPland: the top 40 UKIP seats

    26

    Was there a Green spoiler effect?

    ConstituencyNameClactonBoston*and*SkegnessSouth*ThanetHeywood*and*MiddletonThurrockCastle*PointRochester*and*StroodRotherhamDagenham*and*RainhamRother*ValleyHartlepoolSouth*Basildon*and*East*ThurrockNorth*ThanetHornchurch*and*UpminsterWest*Bromwich*WestMansfieldGreat*GrimsbyWentworth*and*DearneSittingbourne*and*SheppeyStokeFonFTrent*NorthBradford*SouthDoncaster*CentralDudley*NorthBolton*South*EastDon*ValleyBarnsley*EastSouth*West*NorfolkGreat*YarmouthPenistone*and*StocksbridgeRomfordFolkestone*and*HytheStokeFonFTrent*CentralDoncaster*NorthNorth*East*CambridgeshireMakerfieldKingston*upon*Hull*EastRayleigh*and*WickfordBlyth*ValleyBarking

    Region Winner15 UKIP/vote/(%) Con/vote/(%) Lab/vote/(%) LD/vote/(%)East%of%England UKIP 44.4 36.7 14.4 1.8East%Midlands Conservative 33.8 43.8 16.5 2.3South%East Conservative 32.4 38.1 23.8 1.9North%West Labour 32.2 19.1 43.1 3.3East%of%England Conservative 31.7 33.7 32.6 1.3East%of%England Conservative 31.2 50.9 13.8 1.8South%East Conservative 30.5 44.1 19.8 2.4Yorkshire%and%The%Humber Labour 30.2 12.3 52.5 2.9London Labour 29.8 24.4 41.4 1.7Yorkshire%and%The%Humber Labour 28.1 23.3 43.6 4.2North%East Labour 28 20.9 35.6 1.9East%of%England Conservative 26.5 43.4 25.2 3South%East Conservative 25.7 49 17.9 3.5London Conservative 25.3 49 20.1 2.7West%Midlands Labour 25.2 23.9 47.3 1.6East%Midlands Labour 25.1 28.2 39.4 3.5Yorkshire%and%The%Humber Labour 25 26.3 39.8 5Yorkshire%and%The%Humber Labour 24.9 14.9 56.9 2.6South%East Conservative 24.8 49.5 19.6 3.2West%Midlands Labour 24.7 27.4 39.9 2.9Yorkshire%and%The%Humber Labour 24.1 26.3 43.4 2.9Yorkshire%and%The%Humber Labour 24.1 20.7 49.1 4.2West%Midlands Labour 24 30.8 41.8 1.3North%West Labour 23.6 20.3 50.5 2.6Yorkshire%and%The%Humber Labour 23.5 25.3 46.2 3.5Yorkshire%and%The%Humber Labour 23.5 14.6 54.7 3.1East%of%England Conservative 23.3 50.9 17.3 4.4East%of%England Conservative 23.1 42.9 29.1 2.3Yorkshire%and%The%Humber Labour 22.9 27.7 42 6.3London Conservative 22.8 51 20.9 2.9South%East Conservative 22.8 47.9 14.4 8.9West%Midlands Labour 22.7 22.5 39.3 4.2Yorkshire%and%The%Humber Labour 22.6 18.3 52.4 2.5East%of%England Conservative 22.5 55.1 14.4 4.5North%West Labour 22.4 19.5 51.8 3.7Yorkshire%and%The%Humber Labour 22.4 15.9 51.7 6.5East%of%England Conservative 22.3 54.7 12.6 3North%East Labour 22.3 21.7 46.3 5.9London Labour 22.2 16.3 57.7 1.3

    n More of these Labour seats (23) are at threat to UKIP than Conservative seats (15)

    n For both Labour and Conservatives, average majority = 20 points

    n All UKIPland seats are in England, only 4 in London

    n Labour seats typically midlands & North, Conservative seats in the South

  • + Scotland: Labour implosion and Conservative survival 27

    Is UKIPland Exceptional?

    Labour

    Conservatives

    n I have coloured UKIP top-40 seats pink

    n Labour do worse than expected (given demographic factors like unemployment) in UKIP top-40 seats

    n Conservatives do better than expected (given demographic factors like unemployment) in UKIP top-40 seats

    n This can mostly be attributed to the fact that UKIP top-40 seats are more white-British and older than the population as a whole: these factors also benefit the Conservatives as well as UKIP

    Vote share against Unemployment

    y"="1.0938x"+"34.584"R"="0.08643"

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    nserva

    )ve*20

    10*(%

    )*Conserva)ve*2015*2*Conserva)ve*2010*vote*(%)*y"="0.0647x"+"2.2853"

    R"="0.56375"

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    Une

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    men

    t*(%)*

    Labour*vote*(%)* y"="$0.0592x"+"6.5453"R"="0.45393"

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    mploy

    ed*(%

    )*Conserva3ve*vote*(%)*

    R2 = 0.56 R2 = 0.45

  • + Scotland: Labour implosion and Conservative survival 28

    Is UKIPland Exceptional?

    Labour

    Conservatives

    n I have coloured UKIP top-40 seats pink

    n Labour do better than expected (given retired population) in UKIP top-40 seats: those UKIP seats tend to have higher unemployment, deprivation et cetera

    n Conservatives do worse than expected (given retired population) in UKIP top-40 seats:

    n Overall, UKIP seats can be summarised as poorer, whiter and older than the UK as a whole: with mixed opportunities for the two largest parties

    Vote share against Retired population proportion

    y"="1.0938x"+"34.584"R"="0.08643"

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    nserva

    )ve*20

    10*(%

    )*Conserva)ve*2015*2*Conserva)ve*2010*vote*(%)*y"="$0.1046x"+"17.66"

    R"="0.21023"

    0.00"

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    Re#r

    ed&(%

    )&

    Labour&vote&(%)&y"="0.0597x"+"12.086"

    R"="0.06601"

    0.00"

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    #red

    &(%)&

    Conserva#ve&vote&(%)&

    R2 = 0.21 R2 = 0.07

  • + Turnout in UKIPland 29

    Is UKIPland Exceptional?

    Turnout vs. Unemployment

    Turnout vs. Not Deprived

    n Turnout is completely typical in the top 40 UKIP seats, when comparing against other demographic factors

    n There was no observable UKIP turnout effect

    0.0#

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    Labo

    ur'201

    0'(%

    )'

    Labour'2015'/'Labour'2010'vote'(%)' y"="1.0938x"+"34.584"R"="0.08643"

    0.0"

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    nserva

    )ve*20

    10*(%

    )*Conserva)ve*2015*2*Conserva)ve*2010*vote*(%)*y"="$0.1783x"+"16.189"

    R"="0.47915"

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    Une

    mploy

    men

    t*(%)*

    Turnout(%)* y"="1.0115x")"24.144"R"="0.57884"

    20.00"

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    0" 10" 20" 30" 40" 50" 60" 70" 80" 90" 100"Not$Dep

    rived

    $(%)$

    Turnout(%)$

    R2 = 0.48

    R2 = 0.58

  • +Which seats saw the largest Labour increases? 30

    Which seats saw the largest Labour increases?

    n The largest Labour swings were often in seats of very high ethnical diversity

    n However it is unsurprising that such seats represent special cases

    n In 4 of these seats, the large swing was due to the collapse of the Respect vote (Birmingham Hall Green, Poplar & Limehouse, Bethnal Green & Bow, and Bradford East)

    n In other cases, it was due to a reversion back to Labour in Liberal Democrat seats: Brent Central, Redcar, etc

    n In most cases, they were due to particularly strong falls in Liberal Democrat votes, especially in urban, northern seats, hit hard by the recession and where the Coalition is unpopular

    Constituency Region Labour,vote Labour,increase White,British,(%)Birmingham,*Hall*Green West*Midlands 59.8 26.88 30.50Brent*Central London 62.1 20.88 17.56Sheffield,*Hallam Yorkshire*and*The*Humber 35.8 19.71 89.24Poplar*and*Limehouse London 58.5 18.5 28.82Bethnal*Green*and*Bow London 61.2 18.26 33.61Birmingham,*Ladywood West*Midlands 73.6 17.93 21.34Walthamstow London 68.9 17.06 29.11Manchester,*Gorton North*West 67.1 16.97 44.93Hornsey*and*Wood*Green London 50.9 16.89 47.29Birmingham,*Hodge*Hill West*Midlands 68.4 16.42 33.13Liverpool,*Wavertree North*West 69.3 16.2 79.51Leyton*and*Wanstead London 58.6 15 31.38Ilford*South London 64 14.58 17.30Leicester*South East*Midlands 59.8 14.22 43.96Bermondsey*and*Old*Southwark London 43.1 13.85 40.68Bradford*East Yorkshire*and*The*Humber 46.6 13.79 49.41Sheffield*Central Yorkshire*and*The*Humber 55 13.67 67.06Kingston*upon*Hull*North Yorkshire*and*The*Humber 52.8 13.62 86.98Ealing,*Southall London 65 13.49 19.75Manchester,*Withington North*West 53.7 13.25 68.59Ealing*Central*and*Acton London 43.2 13.06 39.34Lewisham*East London 55.7 12.64 45.28Sefton*Central North*West 53.8 11.9 96.36Cambridge East*of*England 36 11.72 65.81Hampstead*and*Kilburn London 44.4 11.59 40.34Cardiff*Central Wales 40 11.23 74.53Redcar North*East 43.9 11.15 97.42Liverpool,*West*Derby North*West 75.2 11.06 91.53Middlesbrough North*East 56.8 10.91 81.72

  • +n Labour saw much larger increases in areas of greater ethnic diversity (lower White British population). These areas will increase in importance in future elections

    n Despite that, the Labour vote increases were only very weakly correlated (if at all) with previous Labour vote: increases in vote were not exclusively confined to heartlands

    n This may be due to Labour facing threats from UKIP and the Greens in traditional heartland areas, whilst winning Liberal Democrat votes seats across the country

    n The previous Liberal Democrat vote was a fairly good predictor of how much Labour the vote would increase

    31

    Which seats saw the largest Labour increases?

    Not White British Labour vote 2010

    Where did the Labour vote increase?

    y"="$2.0336x"+"88.883"R"="0.24837"

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    Ethn

    icity

    ((White(Bri-

    sh((%

    )(

    Labour(2015(;(Labour(2010(vote((%)( y"="0.5166x"+"28.137"R"="0.02394"

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    ur'201

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    )'

    Labour'2015'/'Labour'2010'vote'(%)' y"="0.7341x"+"21.142"R"="0.11524"

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    em'201

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    Labour'2015'3'Labour'2010'vote'(%)'

    LD vote 2010

    R2 = 0.25 R2 = 0.02 R2 = 0.12

    (To give a clearer correlation, Scotland excluded in above 3 plots)

  • +n Labour vote increases were mostly confined to urban areas and regions that did badly under the Coalition

    n Labour vote decreased in areas of high home ownership, and increased in areas of low home ownership

    n Labour vote decreased in areas of low population density and increased in the boroughs

    n As we have already seen: these are groups with low turnout. Labour is becoming increasingly reliant on low turnout demographics.

    n However Labour vote change did not correlate with the 2010 majority: the effects of targeting marginals by all parties probably roughly cancels out.

    32

    Did Labour fail to win Middle England?

    Home Ownership Population Density

    Did Labour fail to win Middle England?

    y"="0.7341x"+"21.142"R"="0.11524"

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    em'201

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    Labour'2015'3'Labour'2010'vote'(%)'

    2010 Majority

    (To give a clearer correlation, Scotland excluded in above 3 plots)

    y"="$1.1512x"+"68.121"R"="0.21088"

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    Labour%vote%2015%;%2010%(%)% y"="2.6043x"+"12.586"R"="0.20816"

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    pula'o

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    nsity

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    Labour)vote)2015)8)2010)(%)) y"="$0.0717x"+"18.041"R"="0.00081"

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    )201

    0)(%

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    Labour)vote)2015)6)2010)(%))

    R2 = 0.21

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    R2 = 0.00

  • +Key Conclusions n Labour is increasingly reliant on demographics that are increasingly unlikely to turn out to vote

    n The Green spoiler effect was critical in winning the Conservatives 16 seats and their vote is important (above 5%) in around 130 seats

    n Liberal Democrat survival was dependent on a huge incumbency bonus in every seat, as well as squeezing the Conservative vote

    n Every Liberal Democrat seat is unusual: none of these seats are safe, especially not after boundary changes

    n Labour still benefitted more than the Conservatives from Liberal Democrat collapse, but Conservative gains were very well targeted in crucial seats

    n Scottish turnout is a little higher than expected from demographics; turnout in seats where UKIP is strong is typical given the demographics

    n The risks to Labour from UKIP are as great or greater than the risks to the Conservatives

    n Labour vote increases were not confined only to traditional Labour seats

    n However, Labour did do badly in wealthier, suburban, less ethnically diverse areas:middle England. The reasons are probably complex, including a rise of UKIP and the Greens, and Conservatives successfully squeezing Liberal Democrat voters.

    33

  • +Bonus Slides 1: Interesting Seats

    n In the following slides, I will take a look at those seats that seem to stand out against the trends I have been describing

    n We can learn a lot by understanding why some seats behave differently: not all the important information is contained within the Census data and voting figures

    n Where relevant, I will discuss the previous electoral history of these seats, before 2010

    34

  • +n Labour vote lower than expected from demographic factors in: n Birmingham Hodge Hill the reason is not clear. It may be due to the local unpopularity of Liam Byrne

    MP, who is associated with New Labour in this seat (the highest Muslim proportion in the country, at 52.1%). Byrne was almost defeated in his first by-election, after the Iraq War in 2004

    n Birmingham Ladywood a similar constituency, however it was previously held by Clare Short n Clacton, Boston & Skegness and Great Yarmouth: these are three of the UKIPiest constituencies, with a

    population deeply concerned about immigration. Clacton is held by the highly popular UKIP MP, Douglas Carswell. Boston and Skegness is home to a higher proportion of Eastern European migrants (mostly very low wage) than anywhere else in the UK.

    35

    Interesting seats

    y"="0.0647x"+"2.2853"R"="0.56375"

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    Unemployment Deprivation

    Birmingham Hodge Hill Birmingham Ladywood

    Sheffield Hallam

    Clacton Boston & Skegness

    Great Yarmouth

    Liverpool Walton (safest seat in the UK)

    n Labour vote higher than expected from demographic factors in:

    n Sheffield Hallam: where Labour came second in spite of demographics, due to the unpopularity of Nick Clegg, and a very strong campaign by Oliver Coppard.

  • + 36

    Interesting seats

    Retired

    y"="0.2378x"+"11.049"R"="0.14912"

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    UKIP&vote&(%)& y"="1.0829x"+"68.138"R"="0.13082"

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    Clacton Clacton

    Thurrock

    Barking

    Rotherham

    Rochester & Strood

    Heywood & Middleton

    Dagenham & Rainham

    North Norfolk

    Christchurch Louth & Horncastle

    Thurrock

    Dagenham & Rainham

    Barking

    n UKIP vote lower than expected from demographic factors in: n Clacton presumably due to to the massive local popularity of Douglas Carswell n Rochester & Strood presumably due to the Mark Reckless effect n Hewood and Middleton an area of huge local anger after the abuse scandal in Haywood. UKIP were

    only 2% short of winning the 2014 by election, in the wake of the scandal n Rotherham site of another child grooming scandal, leading to huge public anger n Barking and Dagenham and Rainham although little commented on, these were seats where UKIP did

    well. Formerly, they were BNP strongholds, including Nick Griffins former seat. In both, the BNP previously polled above 10%, and were sites of ethnic tension.

    The UKIP vote neatly tracks the white flight from East London, and into the Thames estuary and Essex. Barking & Dagenham are areas of white emigration: the white British population fell by 30.6% in 10 years

    n UKIP did surprisingly poorly in North Norfolk, Cristchurch, and Louth and Horncastle, all of which look like ideal UKIP seats from the demographics.

  • + 37

    Interesting seats

    Unemployment Deprivation Not retired

    Not White-British High Denisty Low Home Ownership

    y"="0.2128x"+"0.1781"R"="0.09749"

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    Turnout(%)* y"="1.0115x")"24.144"R"="0.57884"

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    y"="$1.7525x"+"136.34"R"="0.14204"

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    Turnout(%)) y"="1.076x"*"7.1778"R"="0.27077"

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    R2 = 0.58 R2 = 0.21 R2 = 0.48

    R2 = 0.14

    R2 = 0.27

    y"="1.0033x"+"16.54"R"="0.09183"

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    Manchester Central

    Manchester Central

    Manchester Central

    Manchester Central

    Manchester Central

    Manchester Central

    n Manchester Central has the lowest turnout in the country: surprisingly low even when demographics are taken into account. It is unclear why the turnout is so low in this constituency

    n It has a high student population (29%), but 6 seats have even more students, and higher turnout.

    n In the 2012 by-election, it saw the lowest turnout in postwar Britain, at just 18%

  • + 38

    Interesting seats

    Change in LibDem vote against LibDem vote in 2010

    y"="$0.0817x"+"3.149"R"="0.03004"

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    'Turno

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    Labour'vote'(%)'

    R2 = 0.03

    y"="$1.3898x"$"0.3815"R"="0.77825"

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    LibDem'2015'/'LibDem'2010'vote'(%)'

    Liberal Democrats experienced no incumbency bonus in Brent Central. They had won the seats main predecessor, Brent East, in a shock by-election in 2003, after the Iraq War: voters were angry in this otherwise solidly Labour area: 21% of residents are Muslims. There was strong opposition to the Coalition here, and incumbent MP Sarah Teather was retiring

    Liberal Democrats saw virtually no incumbency bonus in Norwich South. They won the previously safe Labour seat in 2005, probably due to unpopularity of Labour MP Charles Clarke. This result also looks like reversion to the mean

    In Oxford West and Abingdon and Montgomeryshire, the Liberal Democrats were not incumbent but did almost as well (or rather less badly) as in incumbency seats. Both were surprise Liberal Democrat losses in 2010: both results could be a partial reversion to the mean.

    Orkney and Shetland voters are seen as the most hostile to independence, seeing Edinburgh as isolated from them as London. This seat, with a historic Liberal tradition (once held by Jo Grimmond), saw the strongest no vote in the referendum. Even so, the SNP came within 5 points of taking it.

    Tim Farron, of Westmorland and Lonsdale is universally seen as a formidable local campaigner. His spectacular result seems to cast that beyond doubt!

    R2 = 0.78

    R2 = 0.19

    Brent Central

    Norwich South

    Orkney and Shetland Westmorland & Lonsdale

    Oxford West and Abingdon

    Montgomeryshire

  • + 39

    Interesting seats

    n As I have already discussed, in Liberal Democrat seats of 2010, the Conservative vote was already lower than expected

    n In seats where the Liberal Democrats were threatened by Labour , the Conservative vote was squeezed even further: from 23.6% to 13.6% in Sheffield Hallam from 26.6% to 18.6% in Leeds North West from 25.6% to 15.7% in Cambridge

    n In others, like Vince Cables seat of Twickenham, the Conservative vote actually rose, losing the Liberal Democrats the seat

    Deprivation

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    2015 2010

    Sheffield Hallam Sheffield Hallam Twickenham Twickenham

    Leeds North West Leeds North West Cambridge

  • +Bonus Slides 2: Multipartiness & Onepartiness n This is widely seen as the most multiparty election in

    British history: it would be useful to have a variable by which to measure this

    n Newspapers typically report the proportion of the vote held by e.g. the two main or three main parties

    n It is not which to use: the share held by the three main parties fell sharply, whilst the vote held by the two main parties increased slightly

    n If we had a variable to use, we could test different seats for multipartiness, study the result in different elections over time and even draw comparisons between different countries

    40

    Multipartiness and Onepartiness

  • + Introducing the Multipartiness variable n One variable that would be sensitive to what we want would be:

    n Multipartiness =( i(vote share of party i) )/ ( (100) ) n This variable will increase the more parties there are, with an

    evenly divided vote share

    n As vote share of party approaches zero, so too does its contribution to multipartiness, so we can approximate for very small parties by grouping their vote together under other

    n In subsequent slides, I make this approximation for parties with a vote share < 1%

    n This variable is abitrary, but gives one way to measure multipartiness. There are infinitely many other variables I could have defined. It is in no sense the best or only measure that one could use, and is only meaningful in comparison to other uses of this measure.

    41

    Multipartiness and Onepartiness

  • + Introducing the Multipartiness variable n For a purely one party state,

    multipartiness = 1 With 2 parties, both getting 1/2 of the vote share, multipartiness = 1.41 With 3 parties, all getting 1/3 of the vote share, multipartiness = 1.72 With 10 parties, all getting 1/10 of the vote share, multipartiness = 3.16

    n In principle, the variable ranges between 1 and infinity

    n However, if we have 6 parties, one getting 1/2 of the vote share, and the other 5 getting 1/10, multipartiness = 2.23 A fairly high number, even though the state would be dominated by a single party, because there are a plurality of viable parties.

    n I could devise an alternative measure that would take one party dominance more fully into account

    42

    Multipartiness and Onepartiness

  • + Introducing the Onepartiness variable n I define:

    n Onepartiness = ( (100) ) / ( i(vote share of party i) ) * 100 n Onepartiness = 100 / multipartiness

    n Onepartiness ranges between 0 and 100; a pure one party state would have a onepartiness of 100.

    n However, it is not a percentage. I choose the scale of 0 100 for convenience only.

    n Even small deviations from a one party state will have a large effect

    n For a purely one party state, onepartiness = 100 With 2 parties, both getting 1/2 of the vote share, onepartiness = 70.9 With 3 parties, all getting 1/3 of the vote share, multipartiness = 58.1 With 10 parties, all getting 1/10 of the vote share, multipartiness = 31.6

    43

    Multipartiness and Onepartiness

  • +What are Britains most multiparty constituencies? 44

    Multipartiness and Onepartiness

    Constituency Region Winner Multipartiness OnepartinessDwyfor'Meirionnydd Wales Plaid'Cymru 2.415513156 41.39907073Pontypridd Wales Labour 2.385926639 41.91243703Preseli'Pembrokeshire Wales Conservative 2.371275462 42.17139746Aberavon Wales Labour 2.369580056 42.2015706Swansea'West Wales Labour 2.363761517 42.30545226Bridgend Wales Labour 2.337400988 42.78256084Cardiff'Central Wales Labour 2.331223465 42.89593061Cardiff'West Wales Labour 2.324977144 43.01117551Ceredigion Wales Liberal'Democrat 2.324602271 43.01811164Cardiff'South'and'Penarth Wales Labour 2.308837481 43.31184018Cynon'Valley Wales Labour 2.308058994 43.32644887Isle'of'Wight South'East Conservative 2.306392519 43.35775423Portsmouth'South South'East Conservative 2.301767316 43.44487791Torfaen Wales Labour 2.297229745 43.53069179Llanelli Wales Labour 2.294446067 43.58350428Newport'East Wales Labour 2.292471597 43.62104208Truro'and'Falmouth South'West Conservative 2.290973955 43.64955778Wrexham Wales Labour 2.290536481 43.65789449Gower Wales Conservative 2.282094147 43.81940163St'Austell'and'Newquay South'West Conservative 2.271363805 44.02641257Merthyr'Tydfil'and'Rhymney Wales Labour 2.270696834 44.03934445Islwyn Wales Labour 2.261856446 44.21147071Caerphilly Wales Labour 2.260991115 44.22839141Camborne'and'Redruth South'West Conservative 2.251046802 44.42377649StokeVonVTrent'Central West'Midlands Labour 2.249848353 44.44744014Southport North'West Liberal'Democrat 2.24963875 44.45158139Neath Wales Labour 2.241148787 44.61997372Richmond'(Yorks) Yorkshire'and'The'Humber Conservative 2.240313043 44.63661911Rochdale North'West Labour 2.238100273 44.68075055

    n Many of the highest multipartiness constituencies are in Wales

    n This may seem surprising: it is a result of there being many competitive parties: the left is split between Plaid Cymru and Labour, neither of which are dominant, whilst Liberal Democrats, Conservatives and UKIP all also receive a respectful vote share. Green votes are also typically non negligible

    n It is very important to note that this measure of multipartiness is arbitrary: a different choice of variable could give very different seats

  • +What are Britains least multiparty constituencies? 45

    Multipartiness and Onepartiness

    n Several of the highest multipartiness constituencies are in Scotland: this is due to the dominance of the SNP after the Scottish surge

    n Others are ultra-safe Labour or Conservative seats, such as Liverpool Walton, the seat of the largest majority in the UK. Buckingham is the speakers seat, not contested by Labour or the Liberal Democrats,

    n However, 2 way marginal seats do give a very low multipartiness, if the other parties are very small

    n It is very important to note that this measure of multipartiness is arbitrary: a different choice of variable could give very different seats

    Constituency Region Winner Multipartiness OnepartinessBuckingham South.East Conservative 1.640435021 60.95943987Glenrothes Scotland Scottish.National.Party1.741806491 57.41165884Cumbernauld,.Kilsyth.and.Kirkintilloch.EastScotland Scottish.National.Party1.751066817 57.10804354Liverpool,.Walton North.West Labour 1.772952712 56.40308359Kilmarnock.and.Loudoun Scotland Scottish.National.Party1.773714154 56.37887016Banff.and.Buchan Scotland Scottish.National.Party1.779206592 56.20482774Knowsley North.West Labour 1.782103959 56.11344922Blackburn North.West Labour 1.799304656 55.57702508West.Dunbartonshire Scotland Scottish.National.Party1.818644842 54.98599711Normanton,.Pontefract.and.CastlefordYorkshire.and.The.Humber Labour 1.828828606 54.67980961Crewe.and.Nantwich North.West Conservative 1.832944311 54.55703122Hertsmere East.of.England Conservative 1.834242697 54.51841252City.of.Chester North.West Labour 1.835021152 54.49528463Coatbridge,.Chryston.and.BellshillScotland Scottish.National.Party1.83535944 54.48524022Paisley.and.Renfrewshire.SouthScotland Scottish.National.Party1.836195954 54.46041845East.Ham London Labour 1.846515463 54.1560588Ilford.South London Labour 1.848670731 54.09292111Bolsover East.Midlands Labour 1.85043309 54.0414028Basildon.and.Billericay East.of.England Conservative 1.85268191 53.97580634South.Ribble North.West Conservative 1.858889421 53.79556141Wirral.West North.West Labour 1.861357685 53.72422551Hendon London Conservative 1.861985347 53.70611543Motherwell.and.Wishaw Scotland Scottish.National.Party1.867815686 53.53847317Finchley.and.Golders.Green London Conservative 1.873888397 53.36497102Wentworth.and.Dearne Yorkshire.and.The.Humber Labour 1.884236224 53.07190189Glasgow.North.East Scotland Scottish.National.Party1.885023742 53.04972971South.Leicestershire East.Midlands Conservative 1.88758736 52.97768047Hayes.and.Harlington London Labour 1.890996905 52.88215954Battersea London Conservative 1.897997438 52.68711011

  • +Britains multipartiness over time

    n We can also look at the multipartiness of the entire country

    n In the postwar period, Britain became close to a two party state, with the Liberal Democrat vote very small, and politics dominated by the Conservatives and Labour: in 1955 to 1.66 (1.41 is the value for a pure two-party state)

    n Multipartiness reached a local peak in the 1974 elections, with an increased vote for the SNP and Liberal Democrats

    n Since the 1950s, multipartiness has been rising: first driven by the rising Liberal Democrat vote, and now by UKIP, Greens and the nationalists

    46

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  • +UK multipartiness in Parliament

    n We do not only have to use multipartiness to look at vote distributions: we could also look at seats

    n It is clear: due to the First Past the Post system, the multipartiness of seats in Parliament has always been much lower than in terms of votes, often close to a pure two-party seat distribution

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  • +German multipartiness over time

    n It is highly instructive to compare with other countries: here I choose postwar East, West and Unified Germany

    n Newly democratic West Germany initially had a wide variety of parties, most with a heritage from the Weimar era

    n Despite the proportional voting system, West Germany also became almost a two party state in the 1960s

    n Since then, multipartiness has been rising, at a similar level to the UK: it has fallen recently due to the dominance of the CDU

    n In East Germany, voters were given a single list to approve, although a few spoilt ballots were recorded (hence a score > 1. The first free election in 1990 saw an explosion of democratic activity

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  • +International Comparisons

    49

    Multipartiness and Onepartiness

    Country Multipartiness OnepartinessAustralia 2.21 45.2Brazil 2.11 47.5Ethiopia 2.24 44.6France 2.16 46.2Germany 2.28 43.8Greece 2.94 34.0India 3.85 26.0Indonesia 3.22 31.1Nigeria 1.51 66.3Pakistan 2.78 35.9Poland 2.27 44.0Russia 2.21 45.3South>Africa 2.10 47.6Turkey 2.13 47.0UK 2.40 41.7Ukraine 3.33 30.0USA 1.64 60.8Venezuela 1.68 59.7

    n Here I look at the most recent elections for the lower house of the legislature in each case

    n It is remarkable how similar the values are for most Western democracies even with very different systems: today most have a multipartiness between 2.10 and 2.40

    n Countries with one dominant party, but a highly divided opposition, such as South Africa and Russia, score relatively highly in multipartiness. We probably need a different variable in order to account for this

    n I am exploring other possible variables to use