eu conflicte est.pdf

7/25/2019 eu conflicte est.pdf

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EU`srole

in

conflict

resolution:

thecaseoftheEasternenlargement

andneighbourhoodpolicyareas

GeorgiKamov

Underthedirectionof:Matthias

Waechter

(DirectorofDHEEI)

InstitutEuropendesHautesEtudesInternationales

June2006


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C

Contents

I. Introduction..................................................... 3

II. EU`sengagementwithconflicts:thekey

isintheEasternneighbours................................. 5

TheEU`spoliciestowardsitseasternneighboursandtheirinfluenceontheconflicts..............................5

EU`sconflictresolutionmechanismsevolution,structures,capabilities.............................. 16

III. EUandconflictresolutioninthe

enlargementarea..............................................24

Theenlargementprocessandconflictresolution............. 24

WesternBalkansKosovo......................................27 TurkeyCyprusandtheKurdishconflict.................... 32 EvaluationofEU`sroleinconflictresolutioninthearea.... 45

IV. EUandconflictresolutionintheEastern

neighbourhoodpolicyarea.................................49

Theneighbourhoodpolicyandconflictresolution............49 MoldovaTransnistria......................................... 52 SouthCaucasusAbkhazia,SouthOssetia,

NagornoKarabakh...............................................56 EvaluationofEU`sroleinconflictresolutioninthearea.... 67

V. Conclusion..................................................... 71

B Bibliography................................................... 73A Appendixes.................................................... 79

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I

Introduction

InJune1991,theLuxembourgForeignMinisterandthenPresidentoftheEuropeanCouncilJacquesPoosannounced:ThisisthehourofEurope1.This phrase canbe seen in almost any analysis dealing with the foreignand security policy of the European Union. The occasion was the

beginningoftheYugoslavcrises,whicharewidelyregardedasthebiggestfailureoftheUnionasaninternationalactor.Theymarkedthebeginningofaprocess,inwhichtheEUslowlystartedtorealizethatprovidingpeaceoutsideitsbordersisasimportantasprovidingitinsidethem.

This study tries to explore the role of the European Union in conflictresolution, particularly in the case of the two main policies of the EUtowards its Eastern neighbours: enlargement and neighbourhood policy.The first chapter looks at the membership/partnership approaches in the

Union`srelationswithitsimmediateneighboursandtheinfluenceoftheseapproaches towards the existing conflicts. It is argued that through theprocessofEuropeanization,theEUisabletoparticipateintheresolutionof a given conflict in two ways: as an actor and as a framework.Furthermore, the analysis examines the evolution of EU`s foreign andsecurity policy, its structures and institutions, as well as its military andciviliancapabilities.Thislaysdownthebasisforthenexttwochapters.

The second chapter deals with the EU`s conflict resolution role in the

enlargement area. First of all, it contains a short overview of theenlargement process as a tool forconflict resolution. It is followedby ananalysis of the three conflicts in the enlargement area Kosovo, CyprusandtheKurdish(PKK)conflictandtheEU`sroleintheirresolution.Thefinal part of the chapter is a general assessment of the successes and thefailures of the Union, while dealing with conflicts in countries with amembershipperspective.

1QuotedinZucconi,M.(1996)TheEuropeanUnionintheFormerYugoslaviainChayes,

A.(ed.)PreventingConflictinthePostCommunistWorld:MobilizingInternationalandRegionalOrganizations,WashingtonD.C.:TheBrookingsInstitution.

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The third chapter has a structure, similar to the second: a first part,describing the role of the neighbourhood policy as means for resolving

conflicts;second,thefourexistingconflictsintheEasternneighbourhoodpolicy area Transnistria, Abkhazia, South Ossetia and NagornoKarabakh; and a third part, evaluating the role of the Union in theneighbourhoodpolicyconflicts.

Theanalysistriestoshowthat,despitethesuccessoftheenlargement,thegreatexpectationsfortheneighbourhoodpolicy,andthedevelopmentofmilitaryandciviliancapabilities,theEuropeanUnionisstillnotfullyabletoanswerall thechallenges,coming from its Easternneighbours.This isespecially true for the conflicts,ranging from theWesternBalkans to theSouth Caucasus. The growing responsibilities of the Union for ensuringpeace in its neighbours are evident; in the enlargement area, the Unionneeds to resolve the conflicts prior to the accession of the countries, if itdoes not want tobecome part of them. In the neighbourhood area, itengagesinconflictresolutionbecausetheconflictsaregettingcloserwitheachnewcountryjoiningtheEU.Moreover,thereisagroupofcountrieswilling to receive a membership perspective and demanding greaterengagement from Brussels, especially in terms of its role in the conflicts.The experience so far shows that the Union needs to adopt a strategic

approachtotheconflicts,ifitwantstobesuccessfulintheirresolution.

Before starting, the differencebetween conflict prevention, conflict/crisismanagementandconflictresolutionshouldbeclarified2: conflictprevention looks to prevent violence from evenbreaking out,

and isnecessarilya longtermproject,although itmayrequireurgentinterventionsatthelastminute;

conflict (crisis) management is directed towards preventing escalationonceconflicthasbegun,andisashorttermoperation;

conflict

resolution

is concerned with the reestablishment of

peace,preferably on a permanentbasis, after the failure of prevention andmanagementstrategies.Itislargelyamatterofthemediumterm.

In most of the cases of this study conflict resolution is used as a term,encompassing all three dimensions, described above, and meaning toaddressagivenconflictinallitsaspectsinacoordinatedway3.

2Hill,C.(2001)TheEU`sCapacityforConflictPrevention.EuropeanForeignAffairs

Review6:315333.3Conflict settlement could as well be used as a synonym.

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II

EU`sengagementwithconflicts:

thekeyisintheEasternneighbours

TheEU`spoliciestowardsitsEasternneighboursandtheirinfluenceontheconflicts

The foreign and security policy of the European Union takes severaldistinctforms4:integration inthecoreareaofEurope;stabilizationintheneighbourhood;bilateral relations with major powers (like the UnitedStates and Russia); and interregionalism with respect to other organizedregions (like the ACP countries, which represent some sort of ahistorical EU neighbourhood as opposed to the geographical one5).Takingintoaccountthescopeandtheimportanceofallthesepolicies,itisevident that the Union has concentrated its attention primarily on the

immediateneighbourhood,andparticularlyontheEasternpartofit.Thisis confirmed by the view that the EU`s range of interests andpartnerships isstill rather selective and corresponds to thatofaregionalpowerwithsomeclearlyidentifiableoverseasinterests6.

The relations of the European Union with its neighbourhood couldbeexplainedwith theconcentriccircles model. It isahierarchicalsystem,where the power of the centre diminishes the farther away the actorstandsfromit7.InthecaseoftheEU,thedistanceofthedifferentcountries

4Hettne,B.andSoderbaum,F.(2005)CivilianPowerorSoftImperialism?TheEUasaGlobalActorandtheRoleofInterregionalism.EuropeanForeignAffairsReview10:535552.5Missiroli,A.(2004)TheEUanditschangingneighbourhood:stabilization,integrationandpartnership.inDannreuther,R.(ed.)(2004)EuropeanUnionForeignandSecurityPolicy TowardsaNeighbourhoodStrategy.NewYork:Routledge.6Missiroli,A.(2003)TheEUanditschangingneighbourhoods: Stabilisation,integrationandpartnership.inJ.Batt,D.Lynch.A.Missiroli,M.Ortega,andD.Triantaphyllou,PartnersandNeighbours:ACFSPforaWiderEurope.ChaillotPaper64Paris:EUInstituteforSecurityStudies.7

Tassinari,F.(2005)SecurityandIntegrationintheEUNeighbourhood:TheCaseforRegionalism. CEPSWorkingDocumentNo.226.

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andregions ismeasuredbythe leveloftheir integrationwiththeUnion.Althoughthereareseveraldifferentcirclesthemaindifferenceisinthecountrieswhoareinsideandwhoareoutside,e.g.thedifferencebetween

membershipandpartnership.Sometimesthedifferenceisnotsoclearagroupofcountriescouldbepartially integrated intheUnionwithoutfull membership, as in the case of the European Economic Area (EEA).Nevertheless, it couldbe argued that the two approaches have differentaimsthefirstoneenvisagesintegratingagivengroupofcountrieswiththeir membership as a final goal, and the second one stabilising themwithout a membership prospect8. It is often mentioned that the twoapproaches have corresponded to policies that havebeen more reactivethanproactive,andacertainambiguityoverthefinaloutcomehasalwaysexisted9.

Inthecaseof itsEasternneighbours, theUnion often pursuedastrategywhichfirstemployedstabilisationpriortointegration.Thisapproachwassuccessfully used with the countries from Central Europe and the threeBaltic states through the socalled Balladur Pact (19931995). It workedwell mainly because from the beginning it overlapped with theperspective for membership in the Union. For the same reason, theapproachdidnotworkwellwiththecountriesfromSoutheasternEurope,untilitwaslinked(althoughnotexplicitly)withtheintegrationapproach

through the socalled Stability Pact. In other cases, the stabilizationapproach remained as such and did not envisage integration later on.There are two main examples for this. In the middle of the 90s the EUsignedPartnershipandCooperationAgreements(PCAs)withRussiaandthe former Soviet Union republics,based onbilateral cooperation anddialogue. In 1995, the EU initiated the EuroMediterranean Partnership(EMP)orthesocalledBarcelonaprocessforthecountriesofNorthAfricaand the Middle East, which previewed mainly economic, and to a lesserextentpoliticalcooperation,butagainwithoutamembershipperspective.

In that respect, the integration approach is widely regarded as the mostsuccessful foreignpolicymechanismoftheEU.Tosomedegree, thishasbeenajointprojectlooselycoordinatedwiththeEasternexpansionofthe

8Missiroli,A.(2003)TheEUanditschangingneighbourhoods: Stabilisation,integrationandpartnership.9

Dannreuther,R.(ed.)(2004)EuropeanUnionForeignandSecurityPolicy TowardsaNeighbourhoodStrategy.

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North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 10. Historically, the CentralEuropeancountriesfirstsignedAssociation(Europe)Agreementsin1992,followedby Romania and Bulgaria, the Baltic States and Slovenia (with

Malta and Cyprus signing Association Agreements in the 70`s). At theCopenhagen European Council of June 1993 a direct link betweenassociation and (future) membership was established, together with themechanism of conditionality. This mechanism forms thebasis of the socalled Copenhagen criteria, which set a series ofbenchmarks from theopening to the successful completion of entry negotiations11. Suchbenchmarks were later incorporated in Art.49of theTreatyon EuropeanUnion (TEU). The EU previewed a rather differentiated process ofenlargementwithso manycandidatesonthe line; thus, theLuxembourgEuropean Council in December 1997 marked only six applicants for theopeningofaccessionnegotiations:Poland,Hungary, theCzechRepublic,Estonia, Slovenia, and Cyprus. Two years later, the Helsinki EuropeanCouncil extended the procedure to the five remaining applicants plusMalta.Asalreadymentioned,italsoawardedTurkey(thelongestwaitingassociate country) the status of candidate though without a plan foropeningaccessionnegotiations.

The Copenhagen circle was closed in 2002, when the EU decided toinvite10newmembers.Theyofficiallyjoined theUnion in2004.Theso

calledbigbangenlargementwasunprecedentedbyscopeandcharacterand it could easily have served to hinder any further expansion of theUnionasexistingmembersstruggledtocometotermswiththefirstwaveof newcomers12. Phrases like enlargement fatigue and la finalitgographiqueoftheUnionbecameoneofthemostusedtermsrelatedtothe enlargement and thus raised seriousconcerns for the continuation ofthe process. Moreover, the negative referenda on the proposedConstitutionalTreaty inFrance and the Netherlandswerepartly a resultoffearsoffurtherenlargementandagainraisedthetension13.Facedwith

two major developments thebig enlargement and the deadlock of theConstitutionalTreatytheEUincreasinglyemphasizesontheimportance

10Dannreuther, R.(ed.)(2004)EuropeanUnionForeignandSecurityPolicy TowardsaNeighbourhoodStrategy.11Missiroli,A.(2003)TheEUanditschangingneighbourhoods: Stabilisation,integrationandpartnership.12Smith,J.(2005)EnlargingtheEuropeanUnion.JournalofCommonMarketStudies,AnnualReview,Volume43,pp.12730.13

Moore.P.(2005)WorriesOverEUEnlargement.RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty,http://www.rferl.org.

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of its absorption capacity. This, in fact, is the socalled fourthCopenhagen criteria: The Unions capacity to absorb new members,while maintaining the momentum of European integration, is also an

importantconsiderationinthegeneralinterestofboththeUnionandthecandidatecountries14.

Therearetwocountries leftoutofthe2004accessionbutstillpartofthefifthwaveofenlargement BulgariaandRomania.Thewayinwhichtheywill enter the Union will probably shape the nature of the enlargementprocess for the prospective candidates namely, the countries from theWesternBalkansandTurkey.ThereareincreasingworriesinBrusselsthatSofiaandBucharestareunpreparedforaccession,especiallyaftertheMayreport of the European Commission15. The next one is expected in late2006,determiningwhenandhowthetwocountrieswillentertheEU.Thenewmomentsinthiswaveofaccessionare:(1)thepossibilitytopostponethe entry with one year until 2008; and (2) the socalled safeguardclauses,whichareprotectivemeasuresagainstBulgariaand/orRomaniainmattersof theeconomy, the internalmarketand in theareaofjustice,securityandliberty.Theycouldbeappliedforthreeyearsafteraccession.Infact,thesafeguardclausesarepartoftheAccessionTreatiesofthenewmemberstatesfromCentralandEasternEuropetoo,butitisarguedthatthe possibility for invoking them in the context of the big bang

enlargementwasneverseriouslydiscussed16.

AftertheintroductionoftheStabilityPactmentionedabove,thegroupofcountries from the Western Balkans (an EUgiven name to the part ofSoutheastern Europe encompassing Croatia, Albania, Bosnia &Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro and Macedonia) moved on theenlargementtrack.Onemainreasonwasthecontinuing instability intheregion,provokedmainlybythewarinKosovo.Since2000theUnionhasset in motion a Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP). It sets out

elements of a policy that by resorting to a contractual relationshipbetweentheEUandtherelevantstatesorentities(plusKosovo)triesto

14EuropealCouncil(1993).EuropeanCouncilinCopenhagen2122June1993,ConclusionsofthePresidency.http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/72921.pdf15EurActiv(24.05.2006)CommissionkeepsBulgariaandRomaniainlimbo.16

Noutcheva,G.(2006)BulgariaandRomaniasAccessiontotheEU:Postponement,SafeguardsandtheRuleofLaw.CEPSPolicyBriefNo.102.

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bridge the gapbetween simple stabilisation and full integration17.They are modelled after the Europe Agreements and their successfulimplementation is a prerequisite for a further integration. To date, two

countries (Macedonia/FYROM and Croatia,both in 2001) have signedStabilisation and Association Agreements (SAA) with the EU; AlbaniasSAA is tobe signed this year, while Bosnia, Serbia and Montenegro arestillnegotiating theiragreements.Amajorprerequisite forthesigningoftheagreementsisthecooperationwiththeInternationalCriminalTribunalforFormerYugoslavia (ICTY).During the2003Thessalonikisummit, theEU decided to enrich the SAP process with instruments from theenlargement process18. As a result, the Western Balkan countries wereoffered European partnerships agreements that mirrored the Accessionpartnerships for CEE states. Subsequently, Croatia received candidatestatus in2004andopenedupnegotiationswithEU inOctober2005aftercomplying with the ICTY`s demand to bring Ante Gotovina to theHague19. In December 2005, Macedonia as well was granted candidatestatus.

TurkeyisthelongestwaitingcountryontheEUaccessionlist.ItsignedanAssociation Agreement with the European Community as early asSeptember 1963, which explicitly opened up the prospect of Turkishmembership in the then EC. In April 1987, Turkey formally applied for

membership,but after two years the European Commission rejected it.Tenyears later, theLuxembourgEuropeanCouncilgaveTurkeyastatuscandidateinDecember1997(meanwhiletheEUandTurkeyestablishedacustomsunion).TheEUstartednegotiationswiththecountry inOctober2005, together with Croatia. The negotiating framework explicitly statesthat the an openended process, the outcome of which cannot beguaranteedbeforehand20. This reflects, on one hand, the controversiesover the Turkish membership in the EU which are quite serious andconcernissuessuchastheimpactofthecountryontheinstitutionsofthe

Union, fears of immigration waves, the economic performance of thecountry,aswellasitsculturalprofile.ManyEuropeanleaders,suchasthe

17Missiroli,A.(2002)TheEuropeanUnionandItsChangingPeriphery:Stabilisation,Integration,Partnership.GCSPOccasionalPaperSeries,No.32.18Noutcheva,G.(2004)TheEUandtheWesternBalkans:ATaleofMutualMistrust.EuropeanPolicyCentre.19EUbusiness(03.10.2005)CroatiastartsEUtalksafterprosecutorsgreenlight.20EuropeanUnion(2005)NegotiatingframeworkforTurkey`saccessionintheEU.Luxembourg,3October.

http://ec.europa.eu/comm/enlargement/turkey/pdf/st20002_en05_TR_framedoc.pdf

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German chancellor Angela Merkel, favour a closer associationarrangement (privileged partnership) with Turkey, but not fullmembership. InFranceNicholasSarkozy,who ispositionedas a leading

presidentialcandidateforthe2007elections,isonthesameopinion21

.Ontheotherhand,Turkeyneedstoundertakemajorinternalreformsinmanyareas, as well as to deal with security issues such as Cyprus and theKurdish(PKK)conflict.Thetalkswiththecountryareexpectedtolastnolessthanadecade.

ThebudgetaryconstraintsoftheUnionforthe20072013financialperiodwill inevitably influence the enlargement process. Yet, the EU tries tostreamlinethepreaccessionfundsandtoputtheminasingleframeworkunder the new Instrument of PreAccession (IPA)22. It will combine andreplaceasetofprogrammes, includingPHARE,ISPA,SAPARD,CARDSandpreaccessioninstrumentsforTurkey.

However, the impact of EU enlargement is not only limited to theaccessionofnewmembersbutinvolvesthedefinitionofnewbordersandthe creation of new neighbours with their particular demands andinterests23. In the case of the Eastern enlargement, this includes Belarus,Ukraine and (after the accession of Romania) Moldova, the countries inthe South Caucasus and last but not least, Russia. These countries

representa significantchallenge to the enlargedUnion. First of all, therearesomewishfulcandidatesformembershipamongstthemUkraine,Moldova and Georgia. The Orangeand Rose revolutions in Ukraine andGeorgia have further strengthened their longterm membershipaspirations, while the EU itself got involved in the events in Ukraine,supporting Victor Yushchenko. However, in the subsequent months theExternal Relations Commissioner Mrs. FerreroWaldner commented thatfor Ukraine the door is neither open nor shut24. The same applies toMoldova and Georgia. Meanwhile, Armenia and Azerbaijan have also

expresseddesireforcloserrelationswiththeEU.

21BBCNews(30.09.2005)EUviewsonTurkishbid.22SoutheastEuropeanTimes(03.2006)EUtograntassistancetoSEECountriesundernewinstrument.23Dannreuther, R.(ed.)(2004)EuropeanUnionForeignandSecurityPolicy TowardsaNeighbourhoodStrategy.24Emerson,M.(2005)TheBlackSeaasEpicentreoftheAfterShocksoftheEUsEarthquake.TheUnitedStatesandtheEuropeanUnion:ShapingaCommonGeo

Strategy,SymposiumofTheGermanMarshallFundoftheUnitedStates,WashingtonDC,2930June.

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For now, these countries form the Eastern dimension of the newestaddition to the Union`s policies towards its neighbours the EuropeanNeighbourhood Policy (ENP)25. The ENP originated to address the fact

that upcoming enlargement would make Ukraine, Belarus and later onMoldova new land neighbours. This raised concerns about security,immigrationandpoliticalandeconomiccooperation.The issue formallyarose in late 2002 in the General Affairs and External Relations CouncilandattheCopenhagenEuropeanCouncilasaproposalforanewWiderEurope policy26. The EU wanted to use the new situation to promotereformsbasedthevaluesofhumanrights,democracyandtheruleoflaw.The ENP therefore was createdbecause of the historical enlargement ofthe Union,but also in the light of the relative weakness of past policiestowardstheseENPcountriesinpromotingthesevalues27.Thepolicywasaimed as well for the Southern Mediterranean countries, where itcomplements the Barcelona process. InJune 2004, the Council extendedthe policy to the three Caucasian republics, Armenia, Azerbaijan andGeorgia. Russia refused participation, preferring to develop cooperationwiththeEUonamoreequalbasis.Subsequently,theEURussiarelationsevolved to a strategic partnership in the Four Common Spacesframeworkofrelations.

Althoughitisapolicy,whichencompassesawidearrayofcountriesina

singleframework,itisaimedatdifferentiation.TheENPhopestoachievethisthroughbilaterallynegotiated,countryspecificActionPlansfor3to5years. They are described as political documents,building on existingagreements and setting out clearly the overarching strategic policytargets, common objectives, political and economicbenchmarks used toevaluate progress in key areas, and a timetable for their achievementwhich enable progress to be judged regularly28. In 2007, the newEuropean Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument will replace theprevious financing programmes (like TACIS for the Eastern neighbours)

andwillfinanceactionsbothinsideandoutsidetheUnion.

25TheSoutherndimensionofthepolicyencompassesthecountriesfromtheSouthernMediterranean.26Tassinari,F.(2005)SecurityandIntegrationintheEUNeighbourhood: TheCaseforRegionalism.27Kelley,J.(2006)NewWineinOldWineskins:PromotingPoliticalReformsthroughtheNewEuropeanNeighbourhoodPolicy.JCMS,Volume44,Number1,pp.2955.28

J.Batt,D.Lynch.A.Missiroli,M.Ortega,andD.Triantaphyllou(2003),PartnersandNeighbours:ACFSPforaWiderEurope.

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The neighbourhood policy combines elements of stabilization andintegration. It aims at blurring the lines between partnership andmembership,butatthesametimeisestablishingitselfasclearalternative

toafullmembership.ItisdescribedbytheformerCommissionPresidentRomanoProdiasgrantingtheneighbourseverythingbutinstitutions29.In sum, the ENP tries toblend elements from the enlargement strategywith those of previous partnership strategies such as the Barcelonaprocess,withoutaimingatfullmembership.Thus,theUnionappliessomeformofconditionality,whilenotofferingitsgoldencarrot membership inreturn.ThisisespeciallyproblematicintheEasterndimensionofthepolicy,because of the existence of states that see their accession in theUnionastheirfinalobjective(theabovementionedUkraine,MoldovaandGeorgia). For them, the ENP is a temporary substitute for a futuremembership in the longterm. Furthermore, the policy instrumentsavailabletotheEUmayinfactbeinadequatetoconvincetheneighbourstocarryoutthereforms theEUwants;forexample, theCommissiondidnotofferafacilitationofthevisaregimes30.Infact,fortheEUtheENPisnot analternative to theenlargement,becauseof theunrealisticprospectofthesecountriesjoiningtheEUinashortormediumtermtimeframe,asput by a Commission official31. Thus, the Union emphasises on thetransition as a goal in its own right, aiming at increasing theprosperity,stabilityandsecurityofitsneighbours.

The above picture clearly shows that EU`s busiest agenda concernedand still concerns its immediate neighbourhood, and in particular theEastern part of it. This agenda is materializedby two main processes enlargement and neighbourhood policy, while the relations with Russiaare developed on abilateralbasis. The two processes have importantinternalnuances.Inthecaseoftheenlargement,BulgariaandRomaniaareset tojoin in a year or two,but with several precaution mechanisms;CroatiaandMacedoniaobtainedcandidatestatus,withtheformeralready

starting negotiations and the other Western Balkan countries waiting ontheline;Turkeybegannegotiationsaswell,buttheyareexpectedtolastadecade, having in mind the controversies around the membership of thecountry.IntheEasterndimensionoftheneighbourhoodpolicytheEUdid

29Grabbe,H.(2004)HowtheEUshouldhelpitsneighbours.CentreforEuropeanReform.30Smith,K.(2005)TheEUandCentralandEasternEurope:TheAbsenceofInterregionalism.EuropeanIntegration,Vol.27,No.3,347364.31

Landaburu,E.(2006)FromNeighbourhoodtoIntegrationPolicy.Arethereconcretealternativestoenlargement?CEPSPolicyBriefNo.95.

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not start negotiations with Belarus because of Lukashenkos regime;Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia see the policy as a step towards (ordivergence from) their membership aspirations, while Armenia and

AzerbaijanarecurrentlynegotiatingActionPlanstogetherwithGeorgia.

The policies of the EU towards its Eastern neighbours are only a partialdimensionofthetotalityoftheEU`sforeignandsecuritypolicy.However,it is a critical one, since it is often argued that the ultimate purpose orvisionoftheEuropeanprojectistoensurethegeopoliticalstabilizationofEurope and the spread of economic and political governance,based ondemocratic ideals32. The extent to which this couldbe gradually spreadfrom itshistoricalbase inWesternEuropewillbeaclear indicatorofthesuccessorfailureoftheEUontheinternationalsceneasawhole.

Lookingfromasecuritypointofview,theEUanditsneighbourhoodcanbe considered a security complex, which is definedby Buzan as agroupofStateswhoseprimarysecurityconcernslinktogethersufficientlyclosely that their national securities cannot realistically be consideredapart from one another33. This means that the EU`s role in promotingpeace and security in its neighbourhood is crucial and is a necessity for

Europesownsecurity34.Ontheotherhand,thisenablestheUniontousethe full range of its instruments (economic, political and more recently,military) in its immediate neighbourhood, rather than on thebroaderinternationalstage35.Anadditionalfactor,increasingtheresponsibilityoftheEUforthesecurityofitsneighbouringregions,isthechangeintheUSpriorities after the end of the Cold war, moving beyond Europesneighbourhood.

During the development of the membership/partnership policies to the

East, theUnionhadtofaceseveralsecuritychallenges,whichdemandedaneffectivecrisismanagementcapability.Themostseriousofthemsofar

32Dannreuther, R.(ed.)(2004)EuropeanUnionForeignandSecurityPolicy TowardsaNeighbourhoodStrategy.33Buzan,B.(1991)People,StatesandFear.AnAgendaforInternationalSecurityStudiesinthePostColdWarEra,2ndEdition,HarvesterWheatsheaf,HemelHempstead.34Biscop,S.(2005)TheEuropeanSecurityStrategyandtheNeighbourhoodPolicy:ANewStartingPointforaEuroMediterraneanSecurityPartnership?EUSANinthBiennialInternationalConferenceAustin,Texas,31March2April2005.35

Dannreuther, R.(ed.)(2004)EuropeanUnionForeignandSecurityPolicy TowardsaNeighbourhoodStrategy.

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were the conflicts after the dissolution of former Yugoslavia, which firstexposedthisneedforsuchacapacityanddemonstratedthecompletelackof preparedness of the EU. Moreover, the Eastern Mediterranean, the

Middle East and the former USSR are rife with old and new ethnopolitical conflicts36. In thecaseofBosnia andKosovo, theconflicts havebeenmanagedthroughandexternalinterventionandtheestablishmentofinternational supervising institutions. The postSoviet conflicts ofTransnistria, Abkhazia, South Ossetia and NagornoKarabakh, togetherwiththeCyprusconflictareusuallydescribedasfrozenconflicts,withnoclearmovementtowardsfinalresolutioninthelastseveralyears37.Theonly conflict with continuing violence on the Eastern EUborderlines isbetweenTurkeyand theKurdishPKK/KongraGel,whichwaswonbytheTurkishstatebutrecentlywitnessedanupsurgeofviolence.

In addition, the EU`s neighbouring states and regions are viewedby EUmember states as the primary source of many of the nontraditionalsecuritythreats,suchasterrorism,migration,traffickingandtransnationalorganizedcrime38.AnotherreasonfortheactivepresenceoftheEUintheneighbourhood is energy; it is described as the umbilical cord39,connectingtheUniontoitseasternandsouthernneighbours,mostnotablytoRussia,CaucasusandCentralAsia,theMiddleEastandNorthAfrica.Itis the key economic resource that the EU needs and for which it will

becomeincreasinglydependentonitsimmediateneighbourhood.

The above mentioned policies membership and partnership caninfluenceinadifferentwaytheresolutionoftheconflictsinthecountries,whicharesubjectofthesepolicies.ThiscouldbeexplainedbythelevelofEuropeanization theyprovide.The termEuropeanization isoften usedin the internal EU context and signifies the process in which memberstatesaffectedbytheEUintegrationareatthesametimetheplayerswhoinitiate and shape this process. However, in the case of EU`s immediate

neighbourhood the stateshave different typesof institutional integrationorrelationswiththeUnion,inwhichtheUnionitselfdecidesthedegreeof

36Tocci,N.(2004)ConflictResolutionintheEuropeanNeighbourhood: TheRoleoftheEUasaFrameworkandasanActor.RobertSchumanCentreforAdvancedStudies,MediterraneanProgrammeSeries,EuropeanUniversityInstitute,RSCASNo.2004/29.37Ithastobenoted,though,thatthetermfrozenconflictisincreasinglylosingitscorrectness,giventhedevelopmentsaroundtheseconflictsinthelastyears.38BertelsmannFoundationandCenterforAppliedPolicyResearch(eds.)(2001)ThinkingEnlarged.TheAccessionCountriesandtheFutureoftheEuropeanUnion.39

Dannreuther, R.(ed.)(2004)EuropeanUnionForeignandSecurityPolicy TowardsaNeighbourhoodStrategy.

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involvement with them40. Therefore, the Europeanization outside theUnionisconsideredaforeignpolicyinstrument.

Thedefinitionoftheconcept,givenbyagroupofanalystsfromtheCentreforEuropeanPolicyStudies(CEPS)isasfollows:

Europeanization in thefield of secessionist conflict settlement and

resolution should be understood as aprocess which is activated and

encouragedbyEuropeaninstitutions,primarilytheEuropeanUnion,

by linking thefinal outcome of the conflict to a certain degree of

integrationofthepartiesinvolvedinitintoEuropeanstructures41.

ThisdefinitionencompassestwodimensionsfortheEUasanactorandasaframework. Thefirstdimension theEUasanactor looksattheways inwhich

the EU could influence the shortterm strategies of the parties in aconflict and lead them to an agreementby providing the necessarystimulusforthesettlementoftheconflict.Thiscouldbereachedwithtwomechanisms:conditionalityandsociallearning.= Conditionality, or the carrot and stick approach. Together with the

direct involvement of the EU as a mediator in a given conflict,conditionality constitute[s] the core of its potential for exerting

influence42. The strongest incentive the EU can provide for aconflict settlement is the prospect of EU membership. Theneighbourhood policy tries to explore other forms of partnershipwiththeEU,whichcouldalsobeanoption,likepartialintegrationinsomeoftheEU`spolicies.

= Social learning. While conditionality operates mostly in the shortrun, socialization (i.e. affecting the underlying strategies of theplayers)haslongtermeffects.

The second dimension EU as a framework offers alternative

institutional solutions for the conflict, such as federal statearrangements, based on the EU`s own model of multilevelgovernance.

In most of the conflicts in EU`s neighbourhood, the role of the EU as anactor is essential. Yet a change in the structure, providedby theEU asa

40Coppieters,B.etal.(2005)EuropeanizationandConflictResolution:CaseStudiesfromtheEuropeanPeriphery.JournalonEthnopoliticsandMinorityIssuesinEurope(JEMIE).41

Ibid.42Ibid.

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framework, is also important because it transforms the underlyingconditionsthatgaverisetotheconflict43.

EU`sconflictresolutionmechanismsevolution,structures,capabilities

The process of Europeanization, described above, sets the broadframework,inwhichtheEUoperates.ButhowdidtheroleoftheEUasasecurity actor evolve and what are the concrete capabilities andinstruments, which the EU can use to influence the resolution of theconflictsinitsEasternneighbourhood?

Ingeneral,itcouldbearguedthatthesecurityroleoftheEuropeanUnionevolved at three levels: (1) a strong union with one centre (the CFSP)ratherthanapolycentricstructure(withinNATO,WEUortheOSCE);(2)an externalanchor fortheperiphery;and(3)adirectmilitarycapacity44.The Treaty of Maastricht transformed the old European PoliticalCooperation (EPC) into a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).Moreover,thoughtheWesternEuropeanUnion(WEU),forthefirsttimeitaddedamilitarycapabilitytoit45.ButtheactualdevelopmentoftheCFSP

and later on of theEuropean Security and DefencePolicy (ESDP)canbeseen in the lightof its failure in theBalkans,mostnotably in Bosnia andKosovo.

There, the EU fell into the socalled capabilitiesexpectations gap46.TherewerestrongexpectationsontheEUtoact,butitwasabletomatchthese expectations only through a response based on economiccapabilities,because it did not possess political or military ones. The EUwasforcedtorelyonaUNbackedresponseandthepoliticalandmilitarystrengthoftheUnitedStatesinbringingtheconflictstoaclose. Moreover,thenegotiationswereledbyaselfappointedContactGroupoflargerEUmember states (Great Britain, France, Germany and Italy), the US andRussia. The EU was further hamperedbecause of the intergovernmental

43Ibid.44Stefanova,B.(2002)TheEmergingEasternBordersoftheEuropeanUnion:ImplicationsfortheDefinitionofEurope.UniversityofDelaware,USA.45Biscop,S.(2005)TheEuropeanSecurityStrategyandtheNeighbourhoodPolicy:ANewStartingPointforaEuroMediterraneanSecurityPartnership?46

Hill,C.(1993)TheCapabilityExpectationsGap,orConceptualizingEuropesInternationalRole.JournalofCommonMarketStudiesVolume31,No.3.

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nature of the CFSP, which prevented the EU member states fromformulating a common approach47. This made the question clear: shouldthe EUbuild its own capabilities to respond to conflicts, or rely on the

transatlantic relationship whenever a crisis in its immediate neighboursoccurs,thuspreservingitsimageasacivilianpower?

Eventually, the EU member states did not decide to stay civilian.Instead,theyatAmsterdamEuropeanCouncil in1997,theydecidedthatfirst of all the Union should improve its foreign policymakingby theappointmentofaHighRepresentativeforCFSP,occupiedbyJavierSolana(former NATO Secretary General) and the creation of a Policy PlanningUnit48. In addition, they committed themselves to include WEUsPetersberg Tasks in the Unions acquis. The Union reacted to particularevents (again on its Easternborders), rather to some integration logic todevelopapoliticalUnion.

After the Bosnian crisis, there was a great degree of rapprochementbetween the British and the French governments. In the midst of theKosovo conflict, The St. Malo FrancoBritish summit in December 1998stressedthat theEUshouldhavethecapacityfor independentactioninorder that its voicebe heard in the world49. This notion was repeatedduring the Cologne European Council inJune 1999, where then German

ForeignMinisterJoschkaFischerdeclared theneedforarapidbuildupof common EU forces to master crises and conflicts in Europe evenwithout the participation of the United States50. It was decided thatwithout dismissing NATO operations, the EU shouldbe able to takedecisionsandtoactautonomouslyinthefieldsofconflictpreventionandcrisis management51. Thus the European Security and Defence Policy(ESDP) emerged as the military dimension of the Unions CommonForeignandSecurityPolicy(CFSP).

47Dover,R.(2005)TheEUandtheBosnianCivilWar1992/95:TheCapabilities/ExpectationsGapattheHeartofEUForeignPolicy.EuropeanSecurity,Vol.14,No.3,297318.48Treacher,A.(2004)FromCivilianPowertoMilitaryActor:TheEUsResistableTransformation.EuropeanForeignAffairsReview9:4966.49U.K.Francesummit(1998)JointDeclarationonEuropeanDefence.St.Malo,December4.50Fischer,J.(1999)PressconferenceattheBremenWEUsummit,10May.51Biscop,S.(2002)EnlargementasaToolforConflictResolution?inBiggerandBetter?

TheEuropeanUnion,EnlargementandReform,FifthBiennialConferenceoftheEuropeanCommunityStudiesAssociation,Toronto,31May1June.

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Later on, several notable events in the development of these policiesshouldbe mentioned. In 2003, the divisionbetween old Europe andnew Europe over Iraq, as putby the US leadership, led some figures,

such asJacques Delors, to write off any prospect of a real Europeancommonandsecuritypolicyforalongtimeahead52.Iraqclearlywas,andremains, a failure in the common foreign policy of the Union,but it isoftenpointedoutthat it isthewrongbenchmarkforjudging theCFSP53.IraqhadneverbeenontheEU`sforeignpolicyagenda,withtheexceptionofUKandFranceaspermanentmembersoftheUNSecurityCouncil.ItishardlysurprisingthereforethattheEU(again)wastotallyunpreparedforthe situation. Dannreuther argues that the EU failed over Iraq notbecause it failed to implement a previously agreed policybutbecause itneversucceededinformulatingsuchapolicy54.

TheseeventsledtoarethinkingoftheEU`sroleasaninternationalplayerandplayedamajorroleintheformationoftheEuropeanSecurityStrategy(ESS).Itsoriginshaveessentiallythreedimensions:(1)aresultoftheselfreflectionprocess over the performance inYugoslavia; (2)aresponse totheUSNationalSecurityStrategyandthelackofconsensusoverIraq;and(3) a view on the future approaches to regional and global security55. Afourth element, to a lesser extent, concerned the issues surrounding thefuture role of NATO. Thus, the ESS serves as the framework of the

securityinterestsoftheUnionandfocusesonseveralstrategicobjectives:- tacklingtheglobalchallengesandkeythreatsterrorism,proliferation

ofWMD,regionalconflicts,statefailureandorganizedcrime;- extending the zone of security around Europe and stabilizing the

neighbourhood;- strengthening the international order through effective

multilateralism56.

Onerecentdevelopment,whichconcernsnotonlytheforeignpolicyofthe

EUbut theUnion asawhole, is the formationofaTreatyEstablishingaConstitution for Europe (in short, Constitutional Treaty). After the

52Crowe,B.(2006)TowardsaEuropeanForeignPolicy.TheHagueJournalofDiplomacy1,107114.53Ibid.54Dannreuther, R.(ed.)(2004)EuropeanUnionForeignandSecurityPolicy TowardsaNeighbourhoodStrategy.55Ellner,A.(2005)TheEuropeanSecurityStrategy:MultilateralSecuritywithTeeth?Defense&SecurityAnalysisVol.21,No.3,pp.223242.56

Quille,G.(2004)TheEuropeanSecurityStrategy:AFrameworkforEUSecurityInterests?InternationalPeacekeeping,Vol.11,No.3,pp.422438.

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negativereferendaontheTreatyinFranceandtheNetherlands,therearemanydoubtsthatitcouldbeimplementedinitscurrentform.However,itincludes several important institutional changes and innovations, which

should be mentioned. The first one is the abolishment of the pillarstructure and the creation of catalogue of competences. This is quiteimportant for the EU`s foreign actions, especially in the field of conflictresolution and prevention,because now the competences are dividedbetweentheCommissionandtheCouncil,i.e.betweenthesupranationaland the intergovernmental institution. This creates rivalrybetween thetwo institutions and lack of coordination57. The Treaty also proposes thecreation of a European Foreign Minister, who will serve more as aconsensusbuilder rather as an independent actor because of theremaining intergovernmental character of the CFSP58. According to theConstitution, the EU`s Foreign Minister shouldbe electedby a qualifiedmajorityintheEuropeanCouncil,whileatthesametimeservingasavicepresident of the Commission a sort of a doublehatted figure. TheConstitution envisages as well the creation of an External Action ServicestaffedbycivilservantsfromboththenationaldiplomaticservicesandtheEuropean Commission delegations in order to support the ForeignMinister.

The second major proposition was to give the EU a single legal

personality.WithittheEUwillbecomeasubjectofinternationallawandthusabletosigntreatiesorjoin internationalconventionsbindingontheUnionasa whole. Moreover, the Commission delegations abroad wouldbecome representation offices of the Union as a whole, with power andresourcestodealbothwithCommunityandCFSP/ESDPpolicies59.

The above mentioned evolution of the Union`s CFSP/ESDP policies has

led to a comprehensive and rather complex structure of the crisismanagement and conflict prevention policies of the EU. The first thingthatshouldbenoted isthat theEU`sforeignpolicy ingeneral isbroaderthan theCFSP itself,andemerges from threedistinctbut interdependentsystems of decision making: first, the coordination of national foreignpolicies; second, the policies, principally focused on the economic and

57InternationalCrisisGroup(2005)EUCrisisResponseCapabilityRevisited.EuropeReportN160.58

Ibid.59Ibid.

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trade sphere, promotedby the European Commission or from the firstpillar; and third EU policies centred on the CFSP or second pillar60.Moreover,thesethreecentresofforeignpolicydonotencompassallthat

canbe considered foreign policy large Europeanbusiness firms andcorporationsarealsoforeignpolicyactors.

Conflict prevention and resolution capacities canbe categorized as (1)longterm (structural) policy aimed at addressing root causes of conflict,(2) mediumterm early warning and planning/analysis competences, and(3)shortertermcivilianand/ormilitarycrisismanagement(operational)61.The EU has developed mechanisms in each of these areas. In the EUProgramme for the Prevention of Violent Conflicts, adopted at theGteborg European Council inJune 2001, the Union committed itself topursue conflict prevention as one of the main objectives of the EU`sexternalrelations62.

The policy making in this domain is divided between the EuropeanCommission and the Council of the EU, while the role of the EuropeanParliament and the member states should alsobe mentioned. In general,the European Commission is largely responsible for structural, or longterm conflict prevention,being in charge of managing the EU`s externalaid and development programmes. While the Commission and the

Councilboth have competences in mediumterm crisis management, theCouncil has the decisionmaking power. Shortterm capacities remainlargelyunderthecontrolofmemberstatesandtheinstitutionalprimacyoftheCouncil.

Twomoreelementsintheconflictprevention/managementsystemoftheEUshouldbementioned.ThefirstistheEuropeanParliament,whichhasa limited role of a consultative institution in the CFSP/ESDP. The otherelement consists of the foreign policies of the individual member states,

which in principle shouldbe coordinated with the common EU policy.However,it isclearthat ifacertaindecisioncontradictsthe interestsofagiven member state, it will prefer to decide on its own. Moreover, thecountries have different strategicbackgrounds and capabilities, whichoften creates difficulties in their cooperation. This explains the fact that

60Dannreuther, R.(ed.)(2004)EuropeanUnionForeignandSecurityPolicy TowardsaNeighbourhoodStrategy.61Stewart,E.(2004)TheEUsConflictPreventionPolicy:AUniqueContributiontoa

GlobalProblem?LoughboroughUniversity,UK.62Ibid.

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some members emphasize on the importance of a certain region orparticipatemoreactivelyintheresolutionofagivenconflict,whileothershaveprioritiesandinterests,pointingelsewhere63.

TheEuropeanSecurityStrategydocumentrecognizes that theEU,whichduring the Cold War was primarily a security consumer , hasincreasinglyassumedtheroleofasecurityprovider.Tofulfilthisrole,itneeds to acquire not only greaterbut changing capabilities from largearmies and land forces to more rapidly deployable, technologicallyequipped,andintelligencebasedforcesthatcanperformawiderangeoftasks64. The transatlantic relations have been another factor pushingforwardtheargumentaboutEuropeancapabilities.

The hard security aspects, introduced in the Treaty of Amsterdam in1997 are defined as humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasksand tasks of combat forces in crisis management, includingpeacemaking65. These are the socalled Petersberg tasks, whoseimplementation was takenby the Union from the Western EuropeanUnion(WEU),whichceasedtofunctionastheEU`smilitaryarm.

At the Helsinki European Council in December 1999 the EU MemberStates committed themselves to the Headline Goals of creating a

functioning Rapid Reaction Forceby 2003 as the instrument to act uponthe Petersberg Tasks. This should have enabled the Union,by 2003, todeploy within 60 days a force of up to 60000 troops that could besustainableinthefieldforatleastayear.However,thisgoalhasnotbeenreached and at the present time, the EU is able to intervene externallythrough units known as battle groups (1,500 troops deployable for averyshorttimeandforshortoperations).Uptothirteenbattlegroupsareenvisaged,whiletwoorthreearealreadyavailable66.

AlreadyinNovember2003,theEUdefenceministersagreedtorevisitthePetersberg tasks in 2004 under a new Headline Goal, tobe metby 2010.This involves the ability to respond across the entire spectrum of crisisresponse operations through concrete military objectives: an operationalEuropeanDefenceAgency,implementationby2005ofanEUstrategiclift

63Pace,M.(2005)EUPolicyMakingTowardsBorderConflicts.EUBORDERCONF.64InternationalCrisisGroup(2005)EUCrisisResponseCapabilityRevisited.65TreatyofAmsterdam,TitleV,ArticleJ.7(2).66

Andersson,J.J.(2006)ArmedandReady?TheEUBattlegroupConceptandtheNordicBattlegroup.SIEPS

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joint coordination, complete development of rapidly deployablebattlegroupsby 2007, and availability of an aircraft carrier and associated airwing and escort by 200867. The range of Petersberg tasks has been

upgraded to includejoint disarmament operations and support for thirdcountriesincombatingterrorismandsecuritysectorreform.

Another development in the hard end of the EU`s capacities includesthe socalled BerlinPlus Agreements. After the WEU capacities in crisismanagement were transferred to the EU, a dialoguebeganbetween theEU and NATO for the utilization of Alliances assetsby the Union. Thedialoguebegan in 1999 and led to an agreement with NATO in 2002,known as the BerlinPlus arrangements. In March 2003, the first BerlinPlusmilitaryoperation,namedConcordiawas launched inMacedonia(FYROM).

At the Feira European Council inJune 2000, member states pledged toprovide soft power capabilities in four priority areas for civilian crisismanagementmissions68.- Policeoperations upto5000policeofficersforinternationalmissions,

with1000tobedeployablewithinaperiodof30days.- Ruleoflaw acommitmentwasmadetoprovideupto200officialsin

the field of law by 2003. The rule of law missions are generally

envisagedassupportingpolicemissions,buttheycouldbecarriedoutautonomouslyaswell.Upto60officialsareavailablewithin30days.

- Civil administration as the rule of law missions, civilianadministration missions carry out advisory, training, monitoring andexecutiveservicesinvariousfieldssuchascustomservices,education,healthand infrastructurefunctions,suchaswaterandenergysupply,telecommunications and transport. By the end of 2003, around 250officialswereavailableforsuchmissions.

- Civilprotectionthesemissionsaimattheprotectionofpeopleinthe

event ofmajor emergencies. Such missions could alsobedeployed toarmed conflict zones, for search and rescue tasks, construction ofrefugeecamps,andtoassisthumanitarianactors.Commitmenttargetsincludesmallteamsofupto2000personnel.

Since2003,theESDPhasbeen inoperationforbothcivilianandmilitarycrisis management. Thus the EU hasbeen able to intervene in various

67InternationalCrisisGroup(2005)EUCrisisResponseCapabilityRevisited.68

Stewart,E.(2004)TheEUsConflictPreventionPolicy:AUniqueContributiontoaGlobalProblem?

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waysinBosniaHerzegovina,Macedonia,theCongo,Georgia,Sudan,Iraq,Indonesia,inPalestineandGazaandontheborderbetweenUkraineandMoldova.Theoperationsrelevanttothisanalysiswillbediscussedinbrief

inthesubsequentchapters.

It should be mentioned that this is only a general overview of thecapabilities and the structures of the Union dealing with conflicts,but itgivesanideaonthelevelofdevelopmentinthisfieldandonthepossibleproblems arising from such a system. It is evident that the EU needs todevelop both military and civilian capabilities, in an integrated andcoordinatedway(withoutaCouncilCommissioncompetition),inordertoconsider itself able to undertake the full range of conflict prevention/resolutiontasks.ThisgoesintothepopulardebateiftheUnionremainsacivilian power, while already possessing some form of militarycapabilities.IncouldbearguedthattheUnion`sexperiencefromthepast,mostnotably in theBalkans,calls for certain militarycapacity.The morerelevant question is whether this hard power capacity will seek tocomplementorreplacetheEU`scivilianandsoftpowermechanisms.SofartheactionsoftheUnion in its immediateneighbourhoodandbeyondsuggestthatthefirstoptionismorelikelytobefollowed69.Moreover,itisargued that the main task for EU`scrisis managementpolicies willbe toto handle the grey area which exists between the hard security

guaranteesofNATO,thesoftsecurityassuredbyEUmembershiporitsprospect70.

Thischapteraimedattwothings:lookingatthepartnership/membershipapproach that the EUpursued in therelationswith its neighbours to theEast and its influence on the conflicts in terms of Europeanization; andexamining thestructuresand the capabilities of theUnion in the field of

conflictresolution.Thenexttwochapterswillfocusonseveralissues:theenlargement and neighbourhood policies as tools for conflict resolutionand the level of Europeanization they provide; the performance of theUnioninconcreteconflictsintheenlargementandEasternneighbourhoodpolicy areas; and the general prospects for resolution of the conflictsbytheUnion.

69Stavridis,S.(2001)WhytheMilitarisingoftheEuropeanUnionisstrengtheningtheconceptofaCivilianpowerEurope.RobertSchumanCentreforAdvancedStudies,EUI,

RSCNo.2001/17.70Hill,C.(2001)TheEU`sCapacityforConflictPrevention.

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III

EUandconflictresolutioninthe

enlargementarea

Theenlargementprocessandconflictresolution

TheprocessofEuropeanization,determiningthebroadinvolvementoftheUnion in conflict resolution was laid down in the first chapter. Its twomain features the EU as an actor and as a framework couldbeobserved intheirfullforce intheenlargementarea71.Here,theEUcouldemployboththeinstrumentofconditionalityandtoparticipatedirectlyintheconflictresolutionprocess,aswellastoexecutemissionsofmilitaryorcivilcharacter.ThisispossiblebythefactthatintheenlargementareatheEUcanprovideitsstrongestincentiveforconflictresolutiontheprospectofmembership.

ThisisoftenreferredtoasthethepowerofattractionoftheUnion72:theprospect of membership in the Union creates a process, in which thecountries willing to join the EU comply with certain political andeconomic criteria,based on democratic values. This reflects twobroadtypesofliberalism,ofwhichthemostrecentandrelevantoneistheideaof the democratic peace73. On EU level, the assumption that democraticstates do not fight each other is reflected in the enlargement process,which (1) adds into the Union countries which have fulfilled itsdemocraticcriteriaand (2)hopes thatthiswillcreateaspillovereffect toothernonmemberstates74.

Thisbecomes evident throughout the history of the EC/EU. Consideringthe stimulus to create the European Communities and later on the

71Coppieters,B.etal.(2005)EuropeanizationandConflictResolution:CaseStudiesfromtheEuropeanPeriphery.72CitedinHill,C.(2001)TheEU`sCapacityforConflictPrevention.73Christou,G.(2002)TheEuropeanUnionandCyprus:ThePowerofAttractionasa

SolutiontotheCyprusIssue.JEMIE.74Ibid.

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European Union, it could be argued that the Union itself is a quitesuccessful form of longterm conflict prevention and conflict resolutionsystem75.BeforethestartoftheEasternenlargement,EC/EUencountered

fewconflicts,themostnotableexceptionsbeingNorthernIrelandandtheBasquecountry.ButthepoliciestowardsCentralandEasternEuropewereexplicitlylinkedwiththecrisesinYugoslavia.Theargumenttoinvitethecountrieshadclearsecurity logicandstated that thiswouldprovideanelementofstabilityagainstthebackgroundofcontinuingturbulenceintheformer Soviet Union and the tragedy unfolding in the formerYugoslavia76.

The Copenhagen Criteria, although not explicitly, demanded thataccession countriesshouldsettlepoliticalconflictswith their neighbours.This was more clearly defined in 1995 at the Essen Council, whichunderlined that candidate countries wishing tojoin the EU should notonly embrace democratic values and respect human rightsbut must notbring unresolved problems concerning the treatment of minorities orfrontier disputes into the EU77. This canbe regarded as the first direct

encouragement by the Union to settle conflicts in the region as aprecondition

formembership.

Lateron,aftertheKosovocrisis, theBalkancountrieswereproposedthe

Stabilization and Association Agreements with the EU, which envisagedtheprospectofmembership,althoughinthelongterm.Thisactiontakenby theEUwasmainlydrivenbythegrowingsensewithin theEU thatapreventivemeasurewasneededifEuropewishedtoavoidethnicconflictslike Kosovo to spread to the rest of the Balkan region. This changed theconnectionbetween security and enlargement. Before Kosovo, the mostwidespread idea was security as a condition, i.e. that the candidatesshould achieve peace and security within andbetween themselves, andthen the EU could enlarge. After Kosovo, it was turned around: the

promisesforfutureenlargementshouldbegiveninthefirstplace,sothatthe EU could play a role in achieving peace and security78. Initiatingaccession negotiations with those candidate countries which were

75CitedinHill,C.(2001)TheEU`sCapacityforConflictPrevention.76Higashino,A.(2004)FortheSakeofPeaceandSecurity?TheRoleofSecurityintheEuropeanUnionEnlargementEastwards.CooperationandConflict,Vol.39(4):347368.77Dannreuther, R.(ed.)(2004)EuropeanUnionForeignandSecurityPolicy TowardsaNeighbourhoodStrategy.78

Higashino,A.(2004)FortheSakeofPeaceandSecurity?TheRoleofSecurityintheEuropeanUnionEnlargementEastwards.

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seriouslyaffectedbythecrisiscametoberegardedasthemostpowerfultooltoprovidesuchperspectives,andthustocreatesecurityandstabilityintheregion.

In general, the performance of the EU in conflict resolution in theenlargementareadependsonseveralfactors79: ThecoherenceoftheEUasanactorthedivisionoflabourbetween

CommissionandCounciloftenmakestheexternalactionsoftheUnionuncoordinated. Moreover, in the Council the member states control asubstantialpartoftheconflictresolutionpoliciesoftheEU;thisisthesecondlevelwhichneedsstrongcoordination.

The perception of the EUby the different parties in a conflict theEU`s strength dependson its image perceivedby the parties in theconflict. Another important factor is the way the membership is seenby the actors as a means to achieve their own goals (such as to keeptheminpower).

The viability of the membership perspective if the prospect ofaccession is too far away, thisbrings uncertainty; if the possibility ofaccession is given too early, this could diminish the stimulus for theresolutionofagivenconflict.

TherangeofinstrumentsappliedtheeffectivenessoftheEUdependson the combination of longterm and shortterm instruments for

conflictresolution. Cooperationwithotheractorsandtheirroleintheconflict duringthe

Cold war, NATO was the organization providing security on theWesternpartof the European continent. With the startof the Easternenlargement, the EU membershipof the countrieswas precededby amembership in NATO (with the notable exception of Malta andCyprus). Moreover, the UN is also involved as a peacekeeper in theWestern Balkans and Cyprus. Russia and the USA also have stronginterests,whichshouldbetakenintoaccount.

Thenextsubchapterswillexplorethedevelopmentofthesefactorsintheconcrete conflicts, which the EU faces in the enlargement area: Kosovo,CyprusandtheKurdish(PKK)conflict.

79

ThebasisforthelistoffactorsistakenfromCoppieters,B.etal.(2005)EuropeanizationandConflictResolution:CaseStudiesfromtheEuropeanPeriphery.

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TheWesternBalkans/Kosovo

The EU`s role in the Western Balkans couldbe summarized in the two

broadobjectives,definedinthefirstchapterstabilization(statebuilding,postconflictmanagement)and integration.While in Central andEasternEurope (CEE) the phases of stabilization and integration followed oneanother,intheWesternBalkans,asitwasarguedabove,EUintegrationisaconditionforstabilizationratherthattheotherwayround80.

Intermsofsecurity,theWesternBalkansserveasatestinggroundforthe ESDP operations of the EU81. A military operation named Concordiawas active in Macedonia (FYROM)between 31 March and 15 December

2003followingNATOsoperationAlliedHarmony.OnDecember2003,theEUlaunchedthemilitarymissionProximainFYROM,inwhichsome1,000 troops were involved. Also, in December 2004, the EU MilitaryOperation in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Althea / EUFOR) took over fromNATOs Stabilization Force (SFOR). This operation involves some 7,000troops, the overwhelming majority of which come from EU memberstates.

YetthemostserioussecuritychallengeintheWesternBalkansKosovo stillremainstoberesolved.Despitethecrucial importanceofKosovoforthedevelopmentofthewholeregion,this isthe issueinwhichtheEU isleast (directly) involved. NATO led the military campaignagainst Serbiaand after the ceasefire played the main role in the KFOR mission. Since1999, the province is governedby a United Nations mission (UNMIK),which established a standardsbefore status policy. This meant thatunder the UN supervision, the authorities in Kosovo should covernumerousstandards(fromruleoflawtominorityrights)beforeengaging

into final status talks. Later on, the Contact Group announced that ifprogressisachieved,inthemiddleof2005areviewofthestandardscouldbeconcludedandtalksonthefuturestatuscouldstart.Infact,theimpetusforthetalkswasnottheimprovement,buttheworseningofthesituation.The events of 1719 March 2004 and the violent clashesbetween ethnicAlbaniansandSerbs,aswellaswiththeinternationalpeacekeepingforces

80Batt,J.(ed.)(2004)TheWesternBalkans:movingon.ChaillotPapern70,InstituteforSecurityStudies.81

Tziampiris,A.(2005)KosovosFutureSovereignty:ARolefortheEuropeanUnion.SoutheastEuropeanandBlackSeaStudies,Vol.5,No.2,pp.285299.

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in Kosovo, UN Police and KFOR, left 30 people dead82. The situationexposed the inadequate reactions of the international forces and showedthatthecurrentapproachisnotworkingandthestatusquestionshouldbe

movedforward.Thishappenedin2005,aftertheUNenvoyEide`sreportrecommended that Kosovo was ready for final status talks and theSecurity Council decided to open the process. It is argued that animportantfactorforstartingthetalkswasthesupportoftheUnitedStatesfor the main role of the talks of the largest party in Kosovo theDemocraticLeagueofKosovo(DLK).ThestrongpositionsoftheLDK intheAlbaniandiasporaintheUSarealsomentioned83.

Thespecial UN envoy who leads the talks is MaartiAhtisaari. There aretwomainissuesonthetable:todealwiththepositionsofSerbiaandtheKosovo Albanians, which at the moment exclude each other; and tocomplete the transition of Kosovo to selfgovernance84. Some of theconcrete problems to be resolved prior to the status include thedecentralization of Kosovo, the return of the refugees, the status andprotection of the Serbian population, securing the Serbian property andtheprotectionoftheSerbianculturalheritageinKosovo.

The current situation couldbe described as a zerosum game, having inmind the Kosovo Albanian demands for independence and Belgrades

categorical rejection of an independent Kosovo with the formula morethan autonomy, less than independence. Proposals that lean towardindependenceevenconditionalindependenceinvolvingthelongtermpresence of international security forces,judicial officials and monitors havebeen rejectedby the Serbs. Similarly, proposals that seek to keepKosovowithintheboundariesoftheSerbianstateareunacceptablefortheKosovoAlbanians.

A situation whereboth sides agree on a negotiated settlement is highly

desirable, but unrealistic. At the same time, the positions of all thecountries in the Contact Group appear to lean towards some form ofconditional independence. A model for such kind of solution isproposed by the International Commission for the Balkans85 and it

82Schenker,H.(2004)ViolenceinKosovoandtheWayAhead.ECMIBrief#10.83Pettifer,J.(2006)KosovaNegotiations BackgroundandPerspectives.ConflictStudiesResearchCentre.84InternationalCrisisGroup(2006)Kosovo:theChallengeofTransition.EuropeReport

N170.85InternationalCommissionontheBalkans(2005).TheBalkansinEuropesFuture.

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includesfourstages:(1)defactoseparationofKosovofromSerbia(moreor less the current situation); (2) independence without full sovereigntyand under international supervision; (3) guided sovereignty (Kosovo

becomes an EU candidate); (4) full and final sovereignty (Kosovo in theEU).

HavinginmindtherefusaloftheSerbiansideforsuchanoutcome,manyanalystsanddiplomatsproposeanenforcedsettlementifBelgraderefusestorecognizeKosovo`s independence. It isargued that this isnotentirelynegativeforSerbia,asitwouldallowBelgradetocomeoutcleanofthesituationandtoclaimthatitdideverythingitcouldtopreventit86.Serbiais advised on many occasions to stop fighting for territory and to try tosecureasmuchrightsasitcanfortheSerbianpopulationinKosovo.

For now, despite the fact that the Kosovo conflict developed on itsborderlines, the EU`s involvement is still quite limited and encompassessoft activities. The Union plays a role in the funding of Kosovo,particularly through the administration of UNMIK`s Pillar IV(Reconstruction,RecoveryandEconomicDevelopment).TheEUisstillthelargest international donor in the province, although the financialassistance it provides starts to decline, reflecting the tendency for theWesternBalkansasawhole.Despite this, theEU`spoliticalroleso far is

restrictedtostatementssuchas:whateverKosovosfinalstatus,itsplacebelongstoEurope87.EventhoughtheEUwillobservethediscussionsonthe final status, it can actually play a limited role in the outcome of thetalks. This isbecause the status has tobe decidedby the UN SecurityCouncilanditspermanentmemberswithanewresolution,replacingthepreviousResolution1244.TheEUhasaspecialenvoyforthetalksStefanLehne,but he plays a supporting role in the Contact Group. The UnionhasaclearinterestofwhatKosovoshouldlooklikeaftertheconclusionofthetalksinordertobeabletoworkwithitinaneffectivemanner,butat

thesametimeithasalimitedcapacitytoinfluencetheprocess88.

However, the Union is regarded as the key player for the post1244situationinKosovo.Itspresencecouldtakeseveralforms.Onepossibilityis tousetheBosniamodeland toestablishanEUSpecialRepresentativewith broad powers, including the ability to dismiss local officials89.

86InternationalCrisisGroup(2006)Kosovo:theChallengeofTransition.87Patten:KosovosFutureLiesInEurope.(30.03.2004)http://www.eurunion.org/.88

InternationalCrisisGroup(2006)Kosovo:theChallengeofTransition.89LiketheoneinBosniaandHerzegovina.

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Another possible option for the EU is to play a role in strengtheningKosovo`s legal system and framework90. The Union already hasexperienceinthisfield,afterconcludingaruleoflawmissioninGeorgia.

Inadditiontothat,someEUjudgescouldbegivenjurisdictioninKosovofor sensitive cases. The EU could as wellbe engaged in the plans forputting the northern Kosovo municipalities, including Mitrovica, underinternationaladministration91.

The only official engagement on EU`s side so far is the engagement toestablishpolicemissioninKosovoafterthestatustalks.InApril2006,theEUforeignministersagreedtocreateanEUPlanningTeamtodesigntherole of the mission, which apart from policing activities could include aruleof lawelement92.Thismission isbelievedtobeEU`smostextensive(andexpensive)crisismanagementmissionsofar.

ThereareseveraldifferencesbetweentheCommissionandtheCouncilonthe exact role that the EU should play once the status is resolved. TheCouncil places the emphasis on grantingbroad powers for a future EUSpecial Representative for Kosovo (similar to the Bosnian case) andfocusing on the abovementioned police and rule of law missions. TheCommission on its side prefers to restrain from the possibility of directgoverningpowersandfavoursaconditionalityapproach,combinedwith

financialassistance93.Thisreflectsabroaderproblem:iftheEUholdskeyexecutive powers, it will practically have to negotiate with itself theintegration of Kosovo and to determineby itself its preparedness for aneventualaccession.Nevertheless,especiallyinthefieldofsecurity,theEUneeds to closely cooperate with NATO, which plans to maintain acontingentinKosovoforseveralyears.

One important question for the EU is how to compensate Serbia if itlosesKosovoorpunish if itdoesnot formallyrecognizesuchoutcome

ofthestatustalks.2006isatoughyearforBelgrade;first,inMarchtheEUstopped negotiations on a SAAbecause Serbia could not deliver RatkoMladic in Haguebefore the deadline givenby the EU; second, in MayMontenegro voted for independence from Serbia in a referendum, thus

90Tziampiris,A.(2005)KosovosFutureSovereignty:ARolefortheEuropeanUnion.91Serwer,D.(2005),Kosovo:CurrentandFutureStatus,CongressionalTestimony,UnitedStatesInstituteofPeace,May18.92

EUobserver(04.2006)EUpreparesitsbiggesteversecuritymissioninKosovo.93InternationalCrisisGroup(2006)Kosovo:theChallengeofTransition.

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puttinganendtotheEUbrokeredstateunion94.OnKosovo,theContactGroup is determined to finish the talks until the end of the year. Thisshould prompt the EU to adopt a clear strategy towards Serbia,because

fornowtheprospectforitsmembershipintheUnionisamediumtolongterm. This significantly decreases the possibility for Brussels to use themembershipperspectiveforSerbiaasaninstrumentduringandafterthestatusnegotiations.

AserioustestfortheEUwillbetherelationswiththeKosovoleadersandauthorities. One issue is the serious degree of autonomy, given to theKosovoProtectionCorps (KPC). It ispointedout that theirexistencehasbeenasignofweaknessoftheinternationalcommunity indealingwiththedecommissioningoftheKosovoLiberationArmy(KLA)95.Althoughnot publiclyexpressed, the EUdidnotreact enthusiasticallywhen AgimCeku,theKPCcommanderandaformerKLAChiefCommanderbecamethe new prime minister of Kosovo in March 200696. One of Kosovo`sformer prime ministers, Ramush Haradinaj, was indictedby the Haguetribunal,butnowhe isfreetoparticipate inKosovopoliticsthoughhe isstill awaiting trial. Such actions could make the fate of the Serbianpopulation in Kosovo problematic, given the fact that if the provincereceivesindependence,manySerbianswillprefertoleave.

AnotherissueistheinfluenceofthefinalstatusofKosovotothestabilityof the whole region. Some analysts argue than an independent Kosovocould create instability in Macedonia or Bosnia and Herzegovina byprovoking secessionist moods or reviving the idea of a GreaterAlbania97.TheContactGrouphasmade itclear thatKosovowillnotbepartitionedwithonepartgoingtoSerbiaandtheAlbanianpartbecomingindependent,inordernottothreatentheterritorialintegrityofMacedoniaand Bosnia. Another aspect of the influence of Kosovo in the region isKosovos economy, which is widely regarded as a black hole in the

Balkans. Here the major security challenge is to tackle organized crimeand trafficking in drugs and weapons. The region has alsobecome atransit route for illegal migration into the EU and creates favourableconditions for the activities of terrorist groups. Here, the EU shouldenforce a strong regional approach and cooperationbetween the statesandtheirpolice,bordercontrolandjudicialauthorities.

94BBC(05.2006)Montenegrovoteresultconfirmed.95Schenker,H.(2004)ViolenceinKosovoandtheWayAhead.96

EUobserver(02.03.2006)EUwaryasguerrillageneralnamedtoleadKosovo.97Batt,J.(ed.)(2004)TheWesternBalkans:movingon.

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ThefinalresolutionofthestatusofKosovohasrepercussionsnotonlyintheWesternBalkans,butinabroaderscaleaswell.AccordingtoRussia`s

position,whichinthelastmonthsbecameofficial,theapproachtoKosovoshould reflect universal standards98. This in practice means using theKosovoquestionasaprecedentforentitiessuchasTransnistria,Abkhazia,South Ossetia, Nagorno Karabakh and even Northern Cyprus. Thisposition issharedbymanyof thede factogovernmentsof theseentities.However such a conditional independence may also stimulate separatisttendencies in the Northern Caucasus, particularly in Chechnya.Nevertheless,theEUshouldbereadytorespondifafterthefinaldecisiononKosovo`sstatussuchclaimsappear.

The EU`s credibility as an international actor thus depends to a largeextentonitssuccessintheBalkans.Ifitfailstoensurelastingstabilityinthis region, already (after the accession of Bulgaria and Romania completely) surrounded by member states, it could hardly succeedelsewhere.ThemostrecentEUproposalisthecreationofafreetradezoneamongst the Western Balkan countries. However, it was criticizedbyCroatiawiththeclaimthatitrepresentsanewYugoslavia99.Obviously,forthecountriesintheregiontheEUisnotaiminghighenough,whileatthesametimedemandingmorethanenough.

Turkey/CyprusandtheKurdish(PKK)conflict

Turkey is a country which has the potential to change the EU in asignificantmannerbothinternallyandexternally.Itssize,populationandgeographicallocationmakeitachallengingcandidateforEUmembership.Theprospect of Turkish accessionbrings a numberof questions, such asthe borderlines of Europe and how should the European integration

proceed from now on100. It is therefore not surprising that one of thereasons given by the citizens of France and the Netherlands whenrejecting the Constitutional Treaty was fears of further enlargement(althoughithadalmostnothingtodowiththeTreatyitself),especiallyofincluding Turkey as a candidate. For a long time, the EU postponed

98Smith,M.(2006)KosovosStatus:RussianPolicyonUnrecognisedStates.ConflictStudiesResearchCentre.99ISN(04.2006)WesternBalkansmullsfreetradezone.100

Gates,A.(2005)NegotiatingTurkeysAccession:TheLimitationsoftheCurrentEUStrategy.EuropeanForeignAffairsReview10:381397.

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Turkeys bid to join the Union for formal reasons, like the lack offulfilmentof the Copenhagencriteria and especially the fourth one theabsorption capacity of the Union. Respectively, the gradual progress

towardsmeetingthecriteria,albeitcontestedbysomeanalysts101

,allowedthe Union to open negotiations with Turkey in October 2005. There areseveral issues, on which the European Union is focusing during thenegotiations with Turkey and which require the undertaking of farreachingreforms.Manyofthemaredirectlyorindirectlyconnectedwithtwo problems, having the potential to determine the final outcome ofTurkeys aspirations for the EU: Cyprus and the Kurdish (PKK) conflict,with the latterbeing closely connected with the general issue of humanrightsinTurkey102.

Before dealing with the two conflicts, one aspect concerning TurkeysstancetowardstheESDPshouldbeclearedout.InthenegotiationsfortheEUusageofNATOassetsthrough theWEU,Turkeymanaged toextractsufficientguaranteesforitself.ItwasmadeclearthatthecollectivedefenceguaranteesinboththeWEUandNATOTreatiesareconsiderednottobeapplicable to the GreekTurkish disputes and,by extension, the Cyprusissue,norcantheybe invokedinthecaseof internalunrest,suchasthatcausedbytheKurdishmovement103.

Cyprus

The European Union is a side in the Cyprus conflict after the GreekCypriots Republic of Cyprusbecame part of the Union with nine othercountries in 2004. As notedbefore, the resolution of territorial disputesandminorityissuesisanecessarypreconditionfortheEUmembershipofagivencountry.Cyprus,though,becameanexception.

Cypruss engagement with the EU started as early as 1962, when an

independent Cyprus applied tojoin the EEC104. The violent clashes thatbroke out one year laterbetween the Greek and the Turkish Cypriotsmade this impossible. In1974,Turkey invaded the islandon thebasis of

101Minchev,O.(2006)TheCaseofTurkeyintheEU.InstituteforRegionalandInternationalStudies,Sofia.102ByKurdishconflictismeanttheconflictbetweentheTurkishstateandPKK.103Biscop,S.(2002)EnlargementasaToolforConflictResolution?104Yesilada,B.andSozen,A.(2002)NegotiatingaResolutiontotheCyprusProblem:Is

PotentialEuropeanUnionMembershipaBlessingoraCurse?InternationalNegotiation7:261285.

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the Treaty of Guarantee105 andby the end of 1975 the Turkish Cypriotsheldaround37percentofthe island(inthenorthernpart),whilebackedby 30,000 Turkish troops and continuing settlement of this part of the

islandby Turkish population. The Republic of Cyprus, now ledby theGreekCypriots,continuedtoberecognizedasthelegitimategovernmentof the island and not recognizedby Turkey, while the Turkish Cypriotscreated the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), recognizedonlybyTurkey106.DespitethedivisionoftheislandtheEC/EUcontinuedits relations with the Greek Cypriots and in 1973 they evolved into anAssociation Agreement. In 1990 the Greek Cypriots applied formembership and in 1993 the EU recognized the Republic of Cyprus`applicationbid in the name of the whole island. The Turkish CypriotleadershipimmediatelyclaimedthattheGreekCypriotsdidnothavetheright to apply for membership without consulting it. Thebasis for thisclaimwerethetreatiesofLondonandZurichthatfoundedtherepublicofCyprus in 1960, which stipulated that Cyprus cannot enter aninternational organisation without the permission of Greece, Turkey andthe UK107. The Turkish Cypriots thus supported EU membership onlyafterTurkeysaccessionintheEU.Nevertheless,theEUcontinuedtorelyonthemembershipperspectivetoserveasanimpetusfortheresolutionofthe conflict and to make an eventual settlement more attractive for theTurkish Cypriots, who couldbenefit from their accession in the EU. In

1997, the Luxembourg European council confirmed the start of thenegotiationsfor1998andtheTurkishCypriotswereinvitedtoparticipateinthetalks.Despitetheirrefusal,thenegotiationsstartedasplanned.

The membershipbid of Cyprus proved tobe counterproductive. Insteadof facilitating the resolution of the conflict, it led to further polarizing ofthe positions of the parties. Turkey explicitly stated that it would annexthe northern part of the island if EU admits the Republic of Cypruswithoutasettlementoftheconflict108.Greece,onitspart,threatenedtouse

itsveto over thewholeEU enlargement unless theRC is included in the

105The1960TreatyofGuaranteegrantedguarantorpowersGreece,TurkeyandtheUnitedKingdomunilateralrightsofinterventioninCyprustorestoretheconstitutionalstateofaffairsontheisland.In1974TurkeyinvadedtheislandappealingtoitsrightsandobligationsundertheTreaty.106Yiangou,G.(2002)TheAccessionofCyprustotheEU:ChallengesandOpportunitiesfortheNewEuropeanRegionalOrder.JEMIE107LONDONZURICHTREATIESOFFEBRUARY1959,accessedathttp://web.deu.edu.tr/kibris/articles/app.html108

Kadritzke,N.(1998)CyprushostagetoAthensAnkaraconfrontation.LeMondeDiplomatique.

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first wave of enlargement109. The EU adopted a new tactic at the 1999Helsinki European Council; first, it confirmed that the resolution of theCyprusconflictwouldnotbeaprerequisitefortheaccessionofRCinthe

EU; this ensured Greece and placed Turkey in a situation, in which itcouldnolongerblockCyprus`accessionintheEUbyrefusingtonegotiatea settlement of the conflict. Second,by giving Turkey a candidate statusthe EU recognized that Ankaras position on the conflict is crucial andaimed to provide it with a strong incentive. After all, Turkey hadbeenwaitingforrecognitionasacandidatesinceitfirstappliedin1963andhasbeen denied such status several times. Although Turkey has beenreluctant to recognize an explicit linkbetween its own accession and theresolution of the Cyprus conflict, it certainly existed in the eyes of theEU110. Thus the Union established the membership perspective and theinstrumentsof conditionality as its primarystrategy towards the Cyprusconflict.

AftertheHelsinkisummit,theGreekandTurkishpositionsontheconflictbecameincreasinglyconvergent.In20022004theUNledthenegotiationson the conflict under the socalled Annan Plan. The UN SecretaryGeneral Kofi Annan has presented five successive revisions of the Plansince November 2002, the last of which was submitted to separatereferendums in April 2004. The Plan provided for the establishment of a

single United Cyprus Republic (UCR), constitutedby a federal level andtwoconstituentstates(aGreekCypriotandaTurkishCypriotstate).Mostcompetenceswouldbeattributedtotheconstituentstatesandthefederallevel wouldbe responsible principally for foreign relations, monetarypolicy,federalfinance,andUCRcitizenshipandimmigration111.Theplanwas also coherent with the implementation of the EU acquiscommunautaire,meaningthattheEUservedasaframeworkinthedraftingoftheplan.

Thepartiesentered thenegotiationson thebasisof theAnnanPlanwithtotallydifferentperceptionsofwhattheoutcomeshouldbe.FortheGreekCypriots, the desired solution was a single Cypriot State under afederative state structure. The Turkish Cypriot side, on the other hand,

109Yiangou,G.(2002)TheAccessionofCyprustotheEU:ChallengesandOpportunitiesfortheNewEuropeanRegionalOrder.110Ugur,M.(2000)EuropeanizationandConvergenceviaIncompleteContracts?TheCaseofTurkey.SouthernEuropeanSocietyandPolitics.5(2):21743.111

Tocci,N.(2004)EUInterventioninEthnopoliticalConflicts:TheCasesofCyprusandSerbiaMontenegro.EuropeanForeignAffairsReview9:551573.

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proposedaconfederativestructureofCyprus,meaningthecreationoftwoseparate sovereign and politically equal states112. Eventually, the GreekCypriotsidewassatisfiedwiththefactthatthefourfreedomsoftheEU

overlapped with their traditionally advocated three freedoms ofmovement, settlement and property; yet, the Plan specified severaltemporary exemptions in order to preserve the rights of the TurkishCypriotside.TheAnnanPlanalsotriedtocreatebalancebetweenGreeceand Turkey, stipulating equal numbers of Greek and Turkish troops,continuation of the Treaty of Guarantee and exclusion of Cyprus fromeventualESDPoperations.

The positions of the different parties on the Plan saw significantdevelopments. During the20022003 negotiations the Greek Cypriots ledbytheformerpresidentGlafcosCleridesactivelyengagedintheprocess,but at the 2002 Copenhagen European Council the Turkish Cypriots`leaderRaufDenkta rejectedit.Eventually,Clerideslostthe2003electionsandwasreplacedbyTassosPapadopoulos.AtTheHaguenegotiationsinMarch2003,apossibilitytoengagetheGreekCypriotsidetosignthePlanemerged,because the EU accession treaty has not yetbeen signedbythem.However,thePlanwasagainrejectedbytheTurkishCypriots,whorefusedtoputitonareferendum.Whenthepeaceprocesswasresumedinthe beginning of 2004, the RC had already signed the EU Treaty of

Accession and waited to join the Union together with nine othercandidates.ThusthestimulusoftheGreekCypriotsidetoengageactivelyin the negotiations was considerably lowered and the presidentPapadopoulosstartedopenlytocampaignagainstthePlan,supportedbythe largest Greek Cypriot party, AKEL. Thus the whole dynamic of theprocesswaschanged.

A reverse ofpositions occurredon the TurkishCypriotsideas well.Theposition of the leader Denkta throughout the process was quite clear,

given the fact that he rejected the plan twice. However, since 2002 theDenkta became increasingly pressuredby proPlan movements, whicheventuallyledtothewinintheDecember2003parliamentaryelectionsofthe Republican Turkish Party (CTP), ledby Mehmet Ali Talat. This wasmadepossiblenotonlybytheinternaldynamicsinnorthernCyprus,butmainlybecause of the change of power in Turkey. The newly electedJusticeandDevelopmentParty(AKP)agreedthattheAnnanPlanshouldserve as abasis in the conflict negotiations. Despite strong resistance

112Akgn,M.etal.(2005)QuovadisCyprus?TesevWorkingPaper.

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insideTurkeyfromtheoppositionparty,thepresidencyandsomepartofthemilitary,AKPandCTPinitiatedtheresumingofthetalksin2004andstartedayescampaigninnorthernCyprus.Eventually,Denkta leftthe

talks and it was up to Talat as a Prime minister to continue negotiating.After strong pressure from the international actors involved in thenegotiations, it was decided that the 2004 negotiations would end withbothsidesputtingthePlantoreferendum.

On24April2004,daysbefore theplannedaccessionof tennewmemberstates in the EU (including Cyprus), the Greek and the Turkish Cypriotsvoted the Plan in separate referenda. The outcome was a reversal of thewhole negotiating process 65% of the Turkish Cypriots voted yes,while 76% of the Greek Cypriots said no. On the 1st of May Cyprusentered the EU divided, with theacquis

communautaire applying only foritssouthernpart.ThustheEuropeanUnionbecameapartyintheconflictandcannotserveasimpartialmediatorinthefuture.

The fact that the EU changed its position in 1999 and gave the GreekCypriotsideanunconditionalpossibilityforfullmembershipdespitethelack of settlement of the conflict is regarded as a main reason for thefailure of the Annan Plan. Moreover, the Turkish Cypriot side acceptedthePlan,whichlefttheEUinanawkwardposition.Nevertheless,several

daysafterthereferendatheEUdeclareditsdeterminationtoputanendtothe isolation of the Turkish Cypriot community and to facilitate thereunificationofCyprusbyencouragingtheeconomicdevelopmentoftheTurkishCypriotcommunity113.AnotherfailureoftheEUwasthefactthatonlytheCommissionthroughtheenlargementprocessdealtwithCyprus,whiletheCouncilanditssubbodies,dealingwithconflictresolutionandprevention did not participate. Moreover, the position of Brussels wasstrongly influenced by Athens, which threatened to block the wholeenlargementprocessandtheaccessionofalltenapplicants114.Evenbefore

the referenda on the Annan Plan many analysts warned that the EU`spolicy overlooked the fact that security and sovereignty issues were ofhighest importance in the Cyprus conflict, which is why the economicbenefitsofmembershipdidnotserveasamajorincentivefortheTurkishCypriots115.

113Akgn,M.etal.(2005)QuovadisCyprus?114

Batt,J.(ed.)(2004)TheWesternBalkans:movingon.115Biscop,S.(2002)EnlargementasaToolforConflictResolution?

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After the accession of Cyprus, the issuebecame part of the EUTurkeynegotiations. In mid2005, Turkey signed the socalled Ankara protocol,extendingthecustomsagreementwiththeEUtothenewmemberstates,

includingCyprus.TheTurkishgovernmentexplicitlymentionedthatthisactdoesnotleadtotherecognitionoftheRepublicofCyprus.Infact,thiswas a precondition for the opening of membership talks with the EU inOctober and in practice means that Turkey should open its ports andairports tovessels fromCyprus116.Turkey respectively expects theEU toallow direct trade with northern Cyprus. More or less, the future role ofthe Union in the conflict is limited to fostering aid and trade with theTurkish Cypriots (which, after all,backed the Annan Plan), while at thesame time pressing Turkey to recognize Cyprus during the membershiptalks. However, the Republic of Cyprus as a member state with vetopower will play a key role in decisions related to the establishment ofcontactsbetween the EU and the Turkish Cypriots, as well as in thecontinuation of the EUTurkey negotiations. The recent win ofPapadopoulos`party in the parliamentary elections isregardedby manyasareferendumnumbertwoandaclearsignforthecontinuationofhishardlinepolicy117.TheEUneedstofindawayto influencethestanceoftheRepublicofCyprusandthatofGreeceinsearchforafutureresolutionoftheconflict,althoughafterreceivingEUmembership,theGreekCypriotsidehaspracticallynoincentivestosearchforasolution. IftheEUdoes

notact,thiswillonlyleadtoanotherchangeinthepositionoftheTurkishCypriotstowardstheconflict,thistimeresemblingmorethatoftheformerpresidentDenkta.

Kurdish(PKK)conflict

TheKurdsrepresentaround20%ofthepopulationinTurkey118,whiletheotherpartoftheminhabitstheterritoriesofSyria,NorthernIraqandIran.AftertheFirstWorldWar,theOttomanEmpirewasdefeatedanddivided

into several pieces and the Treaty of Sevres from 1920 established anindependent Kurdistan in what today are the territories of SoutheasternTurkeyandNorthernIraq.AlthoughthetreatyneverwentintoforceandMustafaKemalAtatrkdidnotacceptitsconditions,itplayedakeyrolein the socalled Sevres syndrome the suspicion that the EuropeanstatescontinuetounderminetheterritorialintegrityofTurkey.

116EUobserver(05.2006)EUandTurkeyinlimbooverCyprusissue.117Reuters(05.2006)CyprusvotersbackhardlinePapadopoulos.118

DataestimatedbyCIAworldFactbook2006.Thenumbersvaryconsiderablyaccordingtothesource.http://cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/tu.html

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The subsequent treaty of Lausanne from 1924 recognized the Ottomantradition for minority rights for nonMuslims Greek Orthodox,

Armenians andJews but did not extend it to the Muslim population,including the Kurds119. From the 1970s onwards, the fight for therecognitionofaKurdishidentityacquiredamilitarycharacter.ItwasledbytheKurdistanWorkers`PartyanditsleaderAbdullahcalanandhadtwo main goals: establishing an independent Kurdistan and forming aclasslesssociety,withthesecondgoalshowingtheMarxistLeninistrootsof the movement. From 1984 onwards, PKKbegan a campaign againstTurkey frombases in Iraq, attacking government property and officials,Turks living in theKurdishregions,Kurdsaccusedofcollaboratingwiththegovernment,foreignersandTurkishdiplomaticmissionsabroad.TheTurkish side responded with several major operations, thebiggest oneconducted in1995when35,000Turkish troopsmoved intonorthern Iraqto attack PKK rebels. By 1999 it is estimated that around 35,000 Kurdishrebels, Turkish troops, and civilians hadbeen killed as a result of thefightingsince1984.

Thecapturing ofcalan in 1999 marked a newstage in the conflict. ThePKK leader urged for a ceasefire and a continuation of the strugglebynonviolent means. This was respectedby the movement; it withdrew

from the conflict and started to disarm. This represented a shift in theKurdish position which saw and opportunity to use the CopenhagencriteriaoftheEUasawaytoadvancemorerightsfortheKurdsinTurkey.calan received a death sentence,but it was not put into place and waschan

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