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CHAPTER 4 - U. S. I NTERESTS I N I RAN

Bef or e Wor l d War I I . t het he Uni t ed St at es i n I r an wer e

st rat egi c and econom c i nt er est s ofsl i ght . Cont act between t he Uni t ed

St at es and I r an consi s t ed mai nl y of m ssi onar y act i vi t y. ar chae-l ogi cal expedi t i ons. and t he Shust er and M l l spaugh advi sor ym ssi ons. I sol at i oni s t sent i ment s and t he t radi t i onal st rengt h oft he Br i t i sh i n t he M ddl e East kept I r an wel l out of U. S. st r at e-gi c consi der at i ons. Oi l concessi ons i n I r an wer e of some i nt er estt o U. S. oi l compani es i n t he 1920s and 19305, but t hese pr oved t obe i mpr act i cal because of t he dom nant r ol e of t he AI OC. U. S.cont r act or s pl ayed a smal l par t i n t he const r uct i on of t heTr ans- I rani an Rai l r oad. and t he vol ume of U. S. t r ade w t h I r anr eached sever al m l l i on dol l ar s per year i n t he l at e 19305. Howev-er . U. S. commer ci al i nvest ment s i n I r an wer e negl i gi bl e. bei ng f arover shadowed by t he hol di ngs of t he var i ous U. S. m ssi onar y or gan-i zat i ons i n bui l di ngs. equi pment . et c. Di pl omat i c r el at i onsbet ween t he Uni t ed St at es and I r an wer e evi dent l y of such l i t t l ei mpor t ance t hat t hey wer e br oken bet ween 1936 and 1939 over der og-at or y st at ement s made i n t he Amer i can pr ess about Reza Shah.1

The Uni t ed St at es was i ni t i al l y dr awn i nt o I r an by i t s r ol e i nt he ef f or t t o suppl y t he Sovi et Uni on t hr ough t he Per si an Cor r i dordur i ng Wor l d War I I . The f i r st l ar ge cont i ngent of U. S. t r oopsar r i ved i n I r an i n December 1942, and by ear l y 1944 near l y 30, 000U. S. sol di er s wer e t her e manni ng t he suppl y op~rat i on. The Uni t ed

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PAGE 89

St at QS undQr t ook Qxt Qnsi vQ i mprovQmQnts t o I ran' s t r anspor tat i onsyst em and t o t he Al Oe f aci l i t i Qs dur i ng t hQ cour se of t he war .Pl ant s f or assembl i ng ai r craf t , t r ucks, and oi l dr ums were al sobui l t . Ar t hur M l l spaugh was br ought back t o I r an and gi ven br oadaut hor i t y t o set pr i ces, super vi se ci vi l i an t r anspor t at i on. r ai sQt axes. and manage t he nat i onal budget . M l i t ar y ms si ons underCol onel Horman Schwar t zkopf and General Cl ar ence Ri dl ey wer ebr ought i n t o t r ai n and super vi se t he Gendarmer i e ( a r ur al pol i cef or ce) and t he I rani an army. Lend l ease ai d was extended t o I r ani n Mar ch 1942. consi st i ng of bot h m l i t ar y and non- m l i t ar y i t ems.By December 1946 t he t ot al val ue of l end l ease ai d had r eached$8.5 miLlion c "

Dur i ng Wor l d War I I and i n t he f i r st year af t er t he war . t womaj or concerns emerged whi ch wer e t o dom nat e subsequent U. S.pol i cy t owar d I r an. ThQ f i r st was a dQsi r Q t o i ncr ease and protectM ddl e East oi l product i on. Whi l e t he posi t i on of ARAMCO i n SaudiAr abi a made t hat count r y t he mai n f ocus of t he M ddl e East oi lpol i cy of t he Uni t ed St at es, I r an r emai ned t he l argest pr oducer i nt he r egi on unt i l 1951 and served as a cr uci al buf f er bet ween t heSovi et Uni on and Per si an Gul f r eser ves. Secondl y. as Col d Wart ensi ons mount ed, U. S. pol i cymaker s i ncr easi ngl y vi ewed I r an as ani mpor tant pawn i n t hei r st r at egy of cont ai ni ng t he Sovi et Uni on.Cont ai nment of t he Sovi et Uni on i n I r an was i next r i cabl y l i nkedw t h t he pr ot ect i on of Per s i an Gul f oi l . However . U. S. pol i cymak-er s al so f ear ed t hat cont r ol over I r an woul d enabl e t he Sovi et s t oi ncr ease t hei r pr essur e on Tur key and br i ng ot her count r i es i n t hearQa undQr t hei r dom nat i on as wel l .

These concer ns l ed U. S. pol ~cymaker s t o mai nt ai n cl oser el at i ons w t h I ran and gi ve i t cruci al di pl omat i c suppor t i n t heyear s i mmedi at el y af t er Wor l d War I I . HowQver . i t was not unt i l1950 ~ha~ ~he Uni ~ed S~a~es ext ended l ar ge amount s of ai d t o I r an.and onl y i n 1953 di d i t begi n t o under t ake t he ki nd of comm tment s

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PAGE 90t o I r an whi ch embody a cl i ency r el at i onshi p.

1) OI L AND U. S. POLI CY TOWARD I RAN

MI DDL E EAST OI L DURI NG WORLD WAR I I

Al t hough oi l had been pl ent i f ul i n t he Uni t ed St at es i n t he1930s ( sel l i ng f or as l i t t l e as t en cents per bar r el i n 1931) .Wor l d War I I pl aced heavy demands on U. S. pr oduct i ve capaci t y. By1943 ser i ous quest i ons were bei ng r ai sed about t he adequacy ofU. S. oi l suppl i es f or t he dur at i on of t he war and f or t he postwarper i od. The U. S. Senat e hear d t est i mony i n J une 1943 t hat ser i ousshort ages woul d appear by ear l y 1944. Concern was near l y uni ver salamong gover nment pol i cymaker s and oi l i ndust r y anal yst s t hatdomest i c suppl i es woul d not be suf f i ci ent i n t he postwar er a f orpeacet i me r equi r ement s or f or t he needs of anot her war . 3

These concer ns l ed t he Roosevel t admni st r at i on t o under t ake avar i et y of measur es t o i ncr ease domest i c oi l suppl i es. I n May 1941t he Of f i ce of Pet r ol eum Coordi nat or f or Nat i onal Def ense ( l at erknown as t he Pet r ol eum Admni st r at i on f or War ) was est abl i shed andgi ven br oad power s t o r egul at e U. S. oi l pr oduct i on and di st r i b-ut i on. Gasol i ne and f uel oi l r at i oni ng wer e i nt r oduced i n May 1942af t er a ser i es of suppl y r educt i ons pr oved t o be unwor kabl e.Numer ous ot her act i ons were t aken by t hi s body as wel l . such ast he pr omot i on of pi pel i ne and tanker const r uct i on. measur es t ocoordi nat e r ef i ni ng and di s t r i but i on, and ef f or t s t o st i mul at edomes t i c expl orat i on and pr oduct i on. 4

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PAGE 91Despi t e t hese act i ons, i t I soon became cl ear t hat domest i csour ces of cr ude oi l woul d not be suf f i ci ent t o meet war t i me or

postwar needs. Because of i t s vast r eser ves, t he M ddl e Eastbecame t he obj ect of par t i cul ar i nt er est by U. S. pol i cymaker s.The Roosevel t adm ni s1: r at i on est abl i shed t he gover nment - ownedPetr ol eum Reserves Corpor at i on ( PRC) i n J une 1943, whi ch sought t ogai n publ i c cont rol over f or ei gn sour ces of cr ude by at t empt i ng t opur chase t he Cal i f or ni

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PAGE 92concessi ons wer e br oken of f by t he I r ani an gover nment I n Oct ober1944. 6

OI L I N POSTWAR U. S. FOREI GN POLI CY

As war t i me demand f el l of f I n 1945. concer n about oi l suppl i esbr i ef l y decl i ned as weI l l . Oi l i ndust ry anal yst s t est i f yi ng bef or ea Senat e subcomm t t ee i n Oct ober 1945 pr edi ct ed t hat u. S. pet r ol e-um consumpt i on woul d r esume t he st eady gr owt h r at e i t had f ol l owedbef or e t he war and t hat suppl i es woul d be adequat e and i mpor tsf r om t he M ddl e East unnecessar y t hr ough 1965. However , decl i ni ngcoal pr oduct i on. r api d conver si on t o oi l f or home heat i ng, andpost war r ecover y i n gener al qui ckl y pushed U. S. consumpt i on pasti t s war t i me peak. despi t e subst ant i al pr i ce i ncr eases. Thi s gr owt hi n U. S. consumpt i on was exacer bat ed by i nsuf f i ci ent t anker capaci -t y and by shor t ages of t he st eel pi pe needed f or dr i l l i ng newwel l s. Spot oi l shor t ages i n t he w nt er s of 1946. 1947. and 1948l ed t o Senat e i nvest i gat i ons and t al k of r at i oni ng. Al t hough shor -t ages di d not r eappear unt i l t he 1970s, t he Uni t ed St at es became anet oi l i mpor ter i n 1948. and has r emai ned so ever si nce. 7

I n addi t i on t o concer n about domest i c oi l suppl i es. U. S. pol i -cymaker s wer e al so concerned i n t he l at e 19405 and ear l y 19505about t he wor l d oi l si t uat i on and M ddl e East pr oduct i on i npar t i cul ar . One r eason Tor t hi s concer n was t he gr ow ng awar enesst hat oi l woul d pl aya key r ol e i n Eur opean r ecover y. West er nEur ope pr oduced l ess t han t hr ee per cent of i t s oi l needs i n 1948and 1949. w t h most of i t s i mpor t s com ng f rom t he Uni t ed st at esand t he Car i bbean. Dol l ar shor t ages i n post war Eur ope and i ncr eas-i ng U. S. demand f or west er n hem spher e pr oduct i on made sour ces i nt he M ddl e East i ncr easi ngl y at t r act i ve t o Eur opean consumer s. s

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PAGE 93Of mor e di r ect i nt er est t o U. S. pol i cymaker s as t he Col d War

deepened was concern about t he adequacy of oi l suppl i es f or af ut ur e war . As ear l y as Oct ober 1946, t he U. S. J oi nt Chi ef s ofSt af f ( J CS) consi der ed I r an and i t s oi l suppl i es t o be "of maj orst rat egi c i nt er est . " By ear l y 1948 U. S. m l i t ar y pl anner s bel i evedt hat t he M ddl e East and i t s oi l f i el ds shoul d be hel d as l ong aspossi bl e i n t he event of war , " r egar dl ess of t he r i sk i nvol ved. "J oi nt U. S. - Br i t i sh pl ans wer e dr awn up f or t he def ense of M ddl eEast oi l , i ncl udi ng pr epar at i ons f or t he demol i t i on of oi l wel l s ,pi pel i nes, and r ef i ner i es. By November 1951 t he Nat i onal Secur i t yCounci l f ~ t t hat an al l - out war w t h t he Sovi et Uni on coul d notbe f uel ed f or mor e t han si x mont hs w t hout hol di ng Saudi Ar abi a,Bahr ei n, and Qat ar . The si t uat i on was expect ed t o be even wor se by1956, and numerous cont i ngency pl ans wer e dr awn up. Si m l ar i deaswer e expr essed i n 1952 and 1953. 9

I t i s evi dent t hat , except when i t t r i ed t o obt ai n concessi onsi n I r an f or Amer i can oi l compani es i n 1943 and 1944, t he U. S.gover nment f ocused pr i mar i l y on Saudi Ar abi a r at her t han I r an i ni t s ef f or ts t o expand M1ddl e East oi l pr oduct i on. Thi s was mai nl ybecause I r ani an oi l was cont r ol l ed by t he Br i t i sh t hr ought t heAI OC whereas Saudi oi l was cont rol l ed by U. S. compani es. Theexcl usi on of U. S. oi l compani es f rom I r an di d not keep I r an out ofU. S. st rat egi c consi der at i ons. U. S. pol i cy i n t he M ddl e East wasf undament al l y regi onal I n nat ur e, and was cl osel y coor di nat ed w t hBr i t i sh pol i cy. Never t hel ess. whi l e U. S. pol i cymaker s mai nt ai nedcl ose t i es w t h I r an i n t he l at e 1940s and ear l y 1950s. t heabsence of t angi bl e U. S. i nt er est s i n I r an gave t hem l i t t l e i ncen-t i ve t o subst ant i al l y st r engt hen t hese t i es or become deepl yi nvol ved i n I r an' s domest i c pol i t i cs.

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PAGE 94THE ROLE OF THE STATE I N U. S. OI L POLI CY

I t i s i mpor t ant t o emphasi ze her e t hat whi l e U. S. pol i cy t owar dI r an i n t hi s per i od was mot i vat ed i n par t by concer n about t hesecur i t y of M ddl e East oi l . t hi s concer n i nvol ved mor e t han j usta desi r e t o pr ot ect pr i vat e U. S. i nt er est s i n t he r egl on. Sever alkey pol i cy deci si ons can be ci t ed whi ch i ndi cat e t hat U. S. pol i cywas based on br oad consi der at i ons of U. S. nat i onal secur i t y r at hert han si mpl y a desi r e t o pr ot ect t he i nt er est s of Amer i can oi lcompani es.

As ment i oned above, t he Roosevel t adm ni s t r at i on est abl i shed astate-owned oi l company (t he PRe) and ent er ed i nt o an agr eementw t h Br i t ai n t o manage wor l d oi l suppl i es. These ef f or t s wer evi gor ousl y opposed by t he u. S. oi l i ndust r y, and col l apsed onl yaf t er t hey had become unnecessar y. Af t er t he war r ecommendat i onswer e made t hat some domest i c f i el ds be i mpounded and that domest i cproducer s mai nt ai n a 10- 15 per cent excess capaci t y. For ei gnproduct i on was encouraged i n or der t o conser ve U. S. r eser ves andease t he Eur opean dol l ar shor t age. Thi s hur t domest i c pr oducer sand cont r i but ed t o a decl i ne i n domest i c expl or at i on. I t al soboost ed t he sal es of Eur opean compani es and l ed t o per i ods ofexcess capaci t y f or U. S. over seas pr oducer s. Eur opean r ef i ner yconst r uct i on was f i nanced under t he Mar shal l Pl an, weakeni ng t heshar e of U. S. compani es i n t he Eur opean mar ket . Dur i ng t he1946- 1947 Sovi et - I r ani an i mbr ogl i o, t he st at e Depar tment sought t oprevent u. S. compani es f r om obt ai ni ng oi l concessi ons i n I r an, butdi d not oppose a Sovi et concessi on. 10

These t ensi ons bet ween t he U. S. gover nment and t he U. S. oi li ndust ry i ndi cat e t hat pr i vat e i nt er est s wer e f r equent l y sacr i -f i ced i n t hi s per i od f or br oader consi derat i ons of nat i onal secu-

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PAGE 95r i t y. At ' l east t hr ee nat i onal secur i t y concer ns Wer e evi dent l ymore i mpor t ant t o U. S. pol i cymaker s at t hi s t i me t han pr i vat ei nt ~r ~st s. Fi r st . t h~ paramount conc~r n of U. S. pol i cymaker s i nt he 1940s was t o ensur e t hat suf f i ci ent suppl i es of oi l woul d beavai l abl ~ f or war t i m~ n~eds or f or t h~ needs of a f ut ur e war .Second. U. S. pol i cymaker s i nt er vened i n t he i nt er nat i onal oi lmar k~t i n or der t o pr omot e post war r ecover y i n Eur ope. Fi nal l y.t he i nt er est s of U. S. oi l compani es were sacr i f i ced i n 1946 and1947 i n an at t empt t o l essen t ensi ons bet ween I r an and t he Sovi etUni on.

I nasmuch as U. S. pol i cy t oward I r an i n t hi s per i od and 1n t hesubs~quent er a was based on secur i t y concer ns such as t hese r at hert han t he i nt er est s of U. S. oi l compani es, t he r el at i onshi p t hatr~sul t ed bet ween t he Uni t ed St at es and I r an const i t ut es a ver ydi f f er ent ki nd of i nt er nat i onal r el at i onshi p t han t hat embodi ed 1nt he concept s of dependency and i mper i al i sm di scussed i n chapt er 1.

2) THE EVOLUTI ON OF THE U. S. CONTAI NMENT STRATEGY I N I RAN

Cont ai nment of t he Sovi et Uni on became an i mpor t ant el ement i nU. S. pol i cy t owar d I r an af t er t he est abl i s hment of t he aut onomousr epubl i cs of Azer bai j an and Kur di st an i n l at e 1945 and af t er t hepost war di al ogue bet ween t he Uni t ed St at es and t he Sovi et Uni oncame t o a vi r t ual st andst i l l i n ear l y 1946. I ndeed. t he cr i si spr eci pi t at ed by t he f ai l ur e of t he Sovi et Uni on t o w t hdr aw i t st roops f rom I r an i n Mar ch 1946 was somet hi ng of a t est case f ort he Tr uman adm ni st r at i on i n usi ng a t ough appr oach t o st op Sovi etexpans ioni sm Al though t he 1946 cr i si s ser ved i n some ways as amodel f or subsequent U. S. act i ons i n Greece and Tur key, I r an wasnot i ncl uded w t h t hese count r i es under t he Tr uman Doct r i ne. U. S.

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PAGE 96ai d t o I r an was al most negl i gi bl e bef or e 1950, and onl y r eachedhi gh l evel s af t er t he over t hr ow of Mossadeq i n 1953. Consequent l y,al t hough I r ani an and Per si an Gul f oi l was of gr eat i nt er est t oU. S. pol i cymaker s and whi l e I r an ~as an i mpor tant cor ner st one 1nt he U. S. cont ai nment st r at egy, t hese i nt er est s wer e not suf f i ci entbef or e 1953 t o war r ant t he est abl i shment of a cl i encyrel at i onshi p.

U. S. POLI CY DURI NG THE 1946 CRI SI S

As di scussed i n chapt er 3, t he Sovi et Uni on began t o pr essur eI r an f or an oi l concessi on af t er t he Per si an Cor r i dor ceased t o bean essent i al suppl y l i ne i n l at e 1944. Thi s was accompani ed byst r ong Sovi et suppor t f or t he aut onomy movement s i n Azer bai j an andKur di st an and by i ncr easi ng f r i ct i on w t h t he Uni t ed St at es overt he pr esence of U. S. t r oops i n I r an w t hout a f ormal mandat e.Al t hough some U. S. pol i cymaker s advocat ed ef f or t s t o f ree I r anf rom Sovi et ( and Br i t i sh) dom nat i on at t hi s t i me, I I t he desi r e t omai ntai n harmony among the war t i me al l i es appar ent l y over shadowedconcer n i n Washi ngt on about Sovi et i nt ent i ons i n I r an. The Roose-vel t adm ni st r at i on made no ser i ous at t empt t o bl ock Sovi etef f or ts t o obt ai n an oi l concessi on and weaken t he posi t i on of t hecent ral gover nment i n Azer bai j an. Roosevel t , i n f act , sought t oaccommodat e t he Sovi et Uni on at I r an' s expense by suggest i ng t hatt he I rani an r ai l road and a Per si an Gul f por t be pl aced underi nt er nat i onal cont rol t o ser ve as a warm wat er out l et f or Sovi etexport s. 12

As t he war i n Eur ope came t o an end, and especi al l y af ter t hedQat h of RoosevQl t , U. S. - Sovi et r el at i ons began t o det er i or at er api dl y. The mai n i s sues of cont ent i on bet ween t he West er n Al l i es

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P AGE 97

and t he Sovi et Uni on wer e t he f ut ur e st at us of Ger many and East er nEurope (par t i cul ar l y Pol and) , t he quest i on of German r9parati ons,and t he i nci pi ent ci vi l war i n Greece. Sever al maj or di sput es wer el ef t unr esol ved at t he Pot sdam conf 9r 9nce i n J ul y 1945. and other swer e mer el y paper ed over . I n t he l at e summer and f al l of 1945 anew r eal i t y of conf r ont at i on b9gan t o ~mer ge i n U. S. - Sovi etr el at i ons. Domest i c pol i t i cal pr essur es al so began t o af f ect t heTruman admni st r at i on as t he 1946 el ect i on year approached. TheRepubl i can par t y accused i t of "bet rayal " and "appeasement . " andpubl i c opi ni on i ncr easi ngl y f avor ed a t ougher at t i t ude t owar d t heSovi et Uni on.13

As a r esul t of t hese conf l i ct i ng pr essur es, a much har der l i newas t aken by t he Tr uman adm ni st r at i on i n t he f i r st mont hs of1946. Tr uman' s new appr oach t owar d t he Sovi et Uni on was pr eci pi -t at ed i n par t by t he agr eem r eached at t he December 1945Moscow For ei gn M ni s ter s' Con whi ch he r egar ded as "anempt y pr om se. " I n a meet i ng Secr et ar y of St at e Byr nes ( whohad j ust r et ur ned f r om negot i at i ng t hese agr eements ) . Truman spokever y har shl y of t he Sovi et s f urther compromse. I nFebruar y 1946 t hi s t ough n9W a pr oach was gi ven a coh9r ent anal yt -i cal f r amewor k i n t he w del y- i r cul at ed and much- publ i c; sed " l ongtel egr am" sent f r om Moscow by Geor ge Kennan. Kennan i nt er pr etedSovi et pol i cy i n t erms of r i i d Marxi st- Leni ni st pr i nci pl es andt r adi t i onal Russi an t er r i t or i al aspi r at i ons. I n ear l y Mar ch 1946t he f i r st publ i c expr essi on of t hi s new har d l i ne came i nChur chi l l ' s f amous " i r on cur t ai n" speech. Whi l e Tr uman di d notpubl i cl y embrace Chur chi l l ' s i deas, he and ot her U. S. of f i ci al shad r ead t he speech bef or ehand and cl ear l y appr oved of i t . 14

The cont i nued occupat i on 0 I r an by Sovi et t roops soon becamet he mai n f ocus of t he Tr uman admni st r at i on' s new hard l i ne.Sev9r al at t empt s wer e made i n t he summer and f al l of 1945 t oconvi nce t he Sovi et s t o w t hdr aw t hei r t r oops. These had l i t t l e

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PAGE 98ef f ect . Tr uman had i nt ended t hat I r an be a maj or t opi c of conver -sat i on at t he December 1945 Mos: cow conf er ence. I nst ead, Byr nes hadf ocused on agreement s r egar di ng t he Bal kan si t uat i on, at om c ener -Igy, and East Asi a, f ai l i ng t o ~ake any pr ogr ess on I r an. Fur t her -mor e, St al i n suggest ed f or t he ~ r st t i me at t he Moscow conf er encet hat Sovi et t r oops m ght r emai ~ i n I ran past t he Mar ch 2 deadl i neest abl i shed i n t he 1942 Tr i par t i t e Tr eat y. Tr uman subsequent l yber at ed Byr nes on t he I r an i ssue. whi ch he descr i bed as an "out -r age. " I n J anuar y 1946 I r an br o~ght t he quest i on of Sovi et t r oopsbef or e t he UN Secur i ty Counci l . ! Af t er heat ed debi 3t e i t was deci ded

It hat di scussi on of t hi s i s sue woul d be post poned. pendi ng f ur thernegot i at i ons between I r an and t~e Sovi et Uni on. I S

Tensi ons escal at ed r api dl y ar t he Mar ch 2 deadl i ne passed w t h-out compl i ance by t he Sovi et s. I r ani an Pr i me M ni s t er Qavam was

It ol d by St al i n t hat Sovi et t r 06ps woul d r emai n i n I r an, "pendi ngI

exam nat i on of t he si t uat i on. " U. S. not es del i ver ed i n Moscow onIMar ch 6 and 9 pr ot est i ng t he cont i nued occupat i on wer e i gnor ed.

Sovi et t roop movement s i n t he Bal kans and i n Azerbai j an i n ' l at eFebr uar y and ear l y Mar ch l ed Tr uman t o bel i eve t hat an at tack onTur key was i mm nent . On Mar ch 8 i t was announced t hat t he bat t l e-shi p M ssour i woul d Si 3i l t o I st anbul t o r et ur n t he body of t heTur ki sh Ambassador t o t he Uni t ed St at es. who had di ed i n November

I1944. 16

The i ssue was agai n br ought bef or e t he Secur i t y Counci l onMar ch 18. Sovi et Ambassador Gr omyko i mmedi at el y at t empt ed t o enddebat e on t he i ssue. Secr et ar y of St at e Byr nes f or cef ul l y def endedI r an, and Gr omyko st or med out of t he meet i ng. A not e was del i ver edt o Qavam i n Tehr an on Mar ch 24 decl ar i ng t he Sovi et s' i nt ent i on t o

Iw t hdr aw, but i mpl i ci t l y l i nki n~ w t hdr awal t o an oi l concessi on.I

Thi s was f ound t o be unaccept abl e by t he Uni t ed St at es, and Byr nesr ef used t o end t he Secur i t y Counci l debat e. I n ear l y Apr i lr epor ts began t o ci r cul i 3t e t hat Sovi et t r oops hi 3d begun t o evacu-

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PAGE 99at e . I t s oon became c l ear t hat t he Sovi e t s wer e backi ng down. OnApr i l 4 Byr nes agr eed t o pos t pone f ur t her debat e f or a mont h t oal l ow f or bi l at er al negot i at i ons be t ween I r an and t he Sov i etUni on. T he evac uat i on of Sovi e t t r oops was compl e t ed i n ear l y May,al t hough t he i s sue r emai ned on t he Sec u r i t y Counc i l agenda. 17

Des pi t e t he compl et e evacuat i on of Sovi et t r oops i n May, i ts oon became appar ent t hat Sovi et non- m l i t ar y per s onnel s t i l lr emai ned i n Az er bai j an. At t empt s by Qavam i n t he s ummer and f al lof 1946 t o br i ng t he au t onomou s r epubl i cs u nder t he cont r ol ofT ehr an wer e uns ucc es s f u l . I ns t ead, Qavam was f or ced t o make anumber of conces s i ons t o t he Sov i et s and t he i r I r ani an al l i es ,i nc l udi ng negot i at i ons f or Sovi et c ont r ol of oi l and ai r l i ner i ght s i n t he nor t her n pr ovi nces and T udeh r epr es ent at i on i n t hecabi ne t . I n J ul y a T udeh- l ed s t r i ke by oi l wor ker s t u r ned i nt o abl oody r i ot . I n Sept ember t he , s ou t her n Qas hqai t r i be r evol t ed andl ai d s i ege t o Shi r az over gr owi ng T udeh and Sov i et i nf l uenc e i nT ehr an. I n ear l y Oc t ober t he I r ani an ambas s ador i n Was hi ngt on t ol dt he S t at e Depar t ment t hat I r an " had ar r i ved at a c r os s r oads wher ei t mu s t c hoos e bet ween exc l u s i v e or i ent at i on t owar d Rus s i a and amor e bal a nced pol i c y. " A r eques~ f or $250 m l l i on i n ai d was madei n Sept ember t o t he U. S . Embas s~ i n T ehr an, and r epeat ed i n Oc t o-ber and November . IS

T hes e al ar m ng event s l ed t he s t at e Depar t ment t o under t ake at hor ough r evi e w of U. s . pol i cy I ~owar d I r an i n Sept ember and Oc t o-ber of 1946. T he v i ews of t he CS on U. S. s t r at egi c i nt er es t s i nI r an wer e s ol i c i t ed. However , des pi t e t he gr avi t y of t hes i t u at i on, no f u ndament al c hang

l

s i n U. S . pol i c y emer ged f r om t hi spr oces s . Al t hough t he J CS cons i der ed I r an t o be an ar ea " of maj o rs t r at egi c i nt e r es t , " i t r ecomm~nded onl y t oken m l i t ar y ai d. T heS t at e Depar t ment s ugges t ed onl y t hat I r an wbe encou r aged t o hope"f or U. S . ai d. I n f ac t , a S10 m l l i o~ l oan f or I r an had b~~ncont empl a t ed as ear l y as J u ne 1946 and had s t i l l not been appr oved

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PAGE 1001n l at e November . Whi l e an agr eement i n pr i nci pl e cover i ng t hi sl oan was r eached i n December 1946 i t was not f ormal l y si gned unt i lJ une 1947 and was r enegot i at ed i n May 1948. Af t er i ni t i al l y hedg-i ng on t he quest i on, t he St at e Depar tment i n ear l y Oct obercaut i ousl y of f er ed U. S. suppor t f or an appeal by I r an t o t he Secu-r i t y Counci l . Geor ge Al l en, t he U. S. ambassador i n Tehr an, l at erl ament ed t hat Qavams appeal s f or U. S. hel p wer e answer ed onl Yw t h advi ce t o depend on t he Uni t ed Nat i ons. As l at e as Oct ober 30t he St at e Depar i : ment cont i nued t o pr essur e Qavam not t o hol dMaj l es el ect i ons, f ear i ng t hat t hey woul d st r engt hen t he Tudehpart y. 19

These el ect i ons wer e announced by t he shah on Oct ober 5, af t erheavy Sovi et pressur e. On Oct ober 10 Ambassador Al l en r ecei vedi nf ormat i on t hat t he Tudeh cabi net member s had been engaged i nsecr et negot i at i ons w t h t he Sovi et s. He br ought t hi s t o t heat t ent i on of Qavam and t he shah, who f or ced Qavam t o di sm ss t heTudeh m ni s ter s. Thi s enraged t he Sovi et s and br ought an end t oQavam s pol i cy of bal anci ng Sovi et and Tudeh pr essur es w t h conCl -l i at or y gest ur es and m nor concessi ons. Qavam t hen began t o ser i -ousl y cont empl at e usi ng f or ce t o l i qui dat e t he aut onomy movement s.He expr essed hi s i nt ent i ons t o Al l en i n l at e Hovember and r ecei vedassurances of U. S. suppor t i n t he Secur i t y Counci l . Under t hepret ext of secur i ng Azer bai j an f or t he el ect i ons t he I rani an armymar ched on Tabr i z i n ear l y December . Spont aneous upr i si ngs i nTabr i z overthr ew t he Pi shevar i gover nment whi l e t he army was st i l l100 m l es out si de of t he ci t y. 2o

Al t hough U. S. pol i cymaker s were deepl y concer ned about t heseevent s t hei r act i ons wer e l i m t ed t o pr om ses of t oken m l i t ar yand econom c ai d, guarded assurances of Secur i t y Counci l suppor t .and i nf ormal r epr esent at i ons made by Ambassador Al l en on hi s owni ni t i at i ve. 21 I n t he di sput e over Sovi et t r oops i n I r an i n t hef l r st hal f of 1946 t he Uni t ed St at es had gi ven I r an i mpor t ant

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PAGE 101suppor t i n t he Secur i t y Counci l but had not comm t t ed i t sel ff ur t her . The two U. S. m l i t ar y m ssi ons establ i shed dur i ng Wor l dWar I I wer e mai nt ai ned t hr oughout t hi s per i od, but m l i t ar y andeconom c ai d were not pr ovi ded on even a moder at e scal e. Thi spol i cy of l i m t ed U. S. assi s t ance t o I r an cont i nued i n 1947.

THE TRUMAN DOCTRI NE AND I TS AFTERMATH

I n r esponse t o appeal s f r om Br i t ai n i n Febr uar y 1947, t heTruman adm ni st r at i on embar ked on a maSSl ve pr ogr am of ai d f orGr eece and Tur key. Thi s pr ogr am whi ch became known as t he Tr umanDoct r i ne, est abl i shed as a cor ner st one of U. S. pol i cy t owar dunder devel oped count r i es t he use of econom c ai d t o achi eve secu-r i t y goal s. 22 As di scussed above, t he 1946 cr l S1S i n I r an hadser ved as somet hi ng of a pr ecedent f or t he act i ve appr oach t oSovi et expansi oni sm begun by t he Tr uman adm ni st r at i on i n ear l y1946 and l at er epi t om zed by t he Truman Doct r i ne. Bot h Tr uman andUnder Secret ar y of st at e Dean Acheson ( who pl ayed a key r ol e i nt he f ormul at i on of t he Truman Doct r i ne) f ear ed t hat I r an and ot hercount r i es i n t he M ddl e East woul d f al l i nt o Sovi et hands i f t heUni ted States f ai l ed t o ai d Gr eece and Tur key. Despi t e Congr es-si onal t est i mony by Acheson t o t he cont r ar y, i t i s cl ear t hat t heTruman Doct r i ne was meant t o appl y t o ot her count r i es as wel l . TheMar shal l Pl an and ai d pr ogr ams f or a number of underdevel opedcount r i es wer e f ormul at ed and i mpl ement ed concurr ent l y ( see t abl e2) . Never t hel ess. al t hough I r an was cl ear l y a pr i me candi dat e f orsuch an ai d pr ogr am U. s. assi st ance t o i t cont i nued t o be l i m tedi n 1947. ZJ

- t abl e 2 about her e-

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J J

Tabl e 2 - Maj or Re ci pi ent s of U.S. Mi l i t ar y and Econom c Ai d, 1946- 1952( m l l i ons of U. S . dol l ar s )

count r y 1946 1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952Gr eat Br i t ai nFranceWes t Ger manyI t al yGr eeceTur ke yI r anChi na ( Tai vl an )J apanSout h Kor eaPhi l i p pi nes

79 . 9302. 6195. 8423. 3195. 26. 13. 3128 . 7106 . 75. 631 . 4

3757. 042. 8298. 3416. 7180 . 92. 622. 5464. 1389. 375.5161. 5

o363. 7850 . 3331. 0332. 872. 1o50 . 9483 . 7100 . 1136. 4

1613. 71313. 31257. 6684. 1362. 0117. 3o344. 6501. 5141 . 8237 . 7

1008 . 91162. 3733 . 4445. 7256. 6182. 211. 851. 1365. 3102. 6154. 8

551. 41726 . 9652. 8665. 9317. 3219. 827. 8193. 829 0. 393 . 9158. 8

634. 51698. 5310. 3567.l351 . 2259. 044. 1275. 863 . 6159. 8161. 2

source : U. S . Depar t ment of S t at e, Agency f or I nt er nat i onal Devel op-ment , u npu bl i s he d wor ksheet s f or U. S . Over seas L oans and Gr ant s andAs s i s t ance f r om I nt er nat i onal Or gani z at i ons , J u l y 1, 1945- Se pt embe r 30,1980 ( Was hi ngt on, 1981) .

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PAGE 102Two weeks af t er Tr uman' s Mar ch 12 speech t o Congr ess cal l i ngf or ai d t o Gr eece and Tur key t he shah compl ai ned t o Ambassador

Al l en t hat U. S. t r eatment of I r an was Hsever eH i n compar i son w t hU. S. t reatment of Tur key because i t i nvol ved a l oan w t h i nt er estr at her t han a gr ant . Al l en r epl i ed t hat t he hi gh l evel s of U. S.ai d gi Ven t o Gr eece and Tur key wer e j ust i f i ed by t he i mmedi at eSovi et t hr eat f aced by t hose count r i es. I n an Apr i l 14 di scussi onabout t he pr oposed m l i t ar y cr edi t s f or I r an t he I r ani an ambassa-dor i n Washi ngt on was t ol d t hat I r an "shoul d keep t he best possi -bl e r el at i ons w t h t he Sovi et Uni on. " Fur ther r equest s wer e madeby I r ani an of f i ci al s i n t he f ol l ow ng mont hs t hat payment s on t hepr oposed l oan be wai ved and t hat a gr ant of $100 m l l i on be madet o I r an. Whi l e U. S. suppor t f or I r ani an i ndependence was r eaf -f i r med, t hese r equest s wer e deni ed. The J CS vi ewed Sovi et m l i -t ar y act i on t owar d I r an as unl i kel y at t he t i me. Fur t her U. S. ai dwoul d be seen as pr ovocat i ve by t he Sovi et s, and woul d not appr e-ci abl y enhance I r an' s s8cur i t y. 24

The pat ter n of r el at i ons est abl i shed i n 1946 and 1947 bet weent he Uni t ed St at es and I r an cont i nued t o hol d i n 1948 and 1949.The Uni t ed St at es cont i nued t o expr ess st rong suppor t f or I r an' si ndependence and r emai ned i n cl ose cont act w t h I rani andeci s i on- maker s. However , asi de f rom a SI D m l l i 6n " t oken" m l i -t ar yai d gr ant made i n 1949, subst ant i al m l i t ar y and econom cassi st ance f or I r an was not f or t hcom ng. The shah, t he I r ani anamb~ssador i n Washi ngt on, and t he var i ous pr i me m ni s t er s madef r equent r equest s t hat t he exi st i ng ai d agr eement s be expanded andt hat as much as $500 m l l i on i n ai d be gr ant ed. I ran al so madesever al ot her at t empt s t o engage t he Uni t ed St at es and Br i t ai n i nf or mal and i nf or mal secur i t y agr eement s. These wer e r ej ect ed aswel l . The i ssues of ai d and a secur i t y agr eement wer e r ai sed agai nby t he shah dur i ng hi s f i r st vi s i t t o Washi ngt on i n November 1949.Al t hough t hi s t r i p ended am cabl y, t he shah' s i nabi l i t y t o obt ai na st r onger U. S. comm tm~nt t o I r an l ef t hi m deepl y di sappoi nt ed

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PAGE 103and f uel ed gr ow ng ant i - Amer i can sent i ment s i n I r an. ~s

U. S. pol i cymaker s gave t hr ee mai n r easons i n r ebuf f i ng I r an' sr equest s f or a cl oser r el at i onshi p i n t hi s per i od. Fi r st , af tert he Sovi et Uni on backed down dur i ng t he cr i ses of 1946 i t becameappar ent t hat Sovi et l eader s wer e unw l l i ng t o r i sk t he pol i t i calconsequences of an out r i ght i nvasi on of I r an. U. S. pol i cymaker st hus had no compel l i ng r eason t o enhance I r an' s abi l i t y t o r esi sta Sovi et i nvasi on, and f ear ed t hat i ncr eased m l i t ar y ai d woul d beseen as pr ovocat i ve. Second, i t was f el t t hat Sovi et subver si onwas t he gr eat est t hr eat t o I r an, pr i nci pal l y i n Azer bai j an andt hr ough t he Tudeh par t y. The l ow l evel s of m l i t ar y ai d ext endedt o I ran i n 1947 and 1949 wer e i nt ended t o meet t hi s t hr eat bypromot i ng domest i c order . Concer n about Sovi et subver si on al so l edU. S. pol i cymaker s t o advocat e econom c devel opment and pol i t i calr ef or m i ncl udi ng a cr ackdown on cor rupt i on and opposi t i on t o t heshah' s at tempt s t o expand hi s const i t ut i onal power s. Fi nal l y, i twas ar gued t hat I ran' s r el at i ve econom c st abi l i t y and st r ongbal ance of payment s posi t i on qual i f i ed i t f or l oans f r om t heI nt er nat i onal Bank r at her t han t he sor t of ai d t hat had beenextended to Greece and Tur key. 26

Pr i vat el y, sever al ot her r easons wer e expr essed f or r est r i ct i ngU. S. ai d t o I r an. For one t hi ng, i t was f el t t hat Congr ess and t heAmer i can publ i c woul d not r egar d I r an as suf f i ci ent l y i mpor tant t owar r ant hi gh l evel s of U. S. ai d. U. S. pol i cymaker s al so f ear ed( w t h gr eat pr esci ence) t hat ai d m ght be used by t he shah or byt op m l i tar y l eader s t o est abl i sh a di ct at or shi p r at her t hanpr omot e devel opment and pol i t i cal r ef orm 27

However , per haps t he most i mpor t ant r eason why t he Uni t edSt at es avoi ded a cl oser r el at i onshi p w t h I r an i n t hi s per i od i st hat I r an ( and t he M ddl e East gener al l y) was st i l l r egar ded aspr i mar i l y a Br i t i sh m l i t ar y r esponsi bi l i t y. Br i t ai n had as much

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PAGE 104as 500 m l l i on pounds i nvest ed i n I ran, and more i n I raq andKuwai t . By cont r ast , U. S. i nvestment i n t he r egi on was st i l l qui t esmal l . The M ddl e East was consi der ed "vi t al " t o Br i t i sh i nt er est si n t he sense t hat i t s l oss woul d pr esent a "mor t al danger . " U. S.pol i cymaker s al so consi der ed t he M ddl e East vi t al , but used t hi st erm much mor e l oosel y. The J CS di d not i ncl ude I r an on i t s Apr i l1947 l i st of st rat egi cal l y- i mpor tant count r i es t ar get ed f or ai d.Br i t ai n had some 80, 000 t r oops st at i oned i n t he M ddl e East , and anaval base w t h 8 shi ps on Bahr ei n I sl and i n t he Per si an Gul f .U. S. m l i tar y pl ans di d not cal l f or t he use of f or ce i n I r an,whi l e Br i t i sh pl ans cal l ed f or t he i nt r oduct i on of army and ai rf or ce uni t s i nt o I r aq and sout her n I r an i n t he event of a Sovi eti nvasi on. Bot h t he Uni t ed St at es and Br i t ai n consi der ed t he M ddl eEast t o be secondar y i n i mpor t ance t o Eur ope. I n t he M ddl e Eastbot h count r i es gave t he hi ghest pr i or i t y t o def endi ng t he " i nnerr i ng" of count ri es cent er ed ar ound Egypt r at her t han t he "out err i ng" i ncl udi ng most of I ran and Turkey. ~s

THE REORI ENTATI ON OF U. S. POLI CY TOWARD I RAN: 1950

By ear l y 1950, sever al maj or changes had begun t o t ake pl ace i nbot h U. S. f or ei gn pol i cy and i n I r an' s domest i c and i nt er nat i onalaf f ai r s whi ch soon l ed U. S. pol i cymaker s t o si gni f i cant l y r eor i entt hei r pol i cy t oward I r an. The f i r st was a f undament al r eeval uat i onof over al l U. S. f or ei gn pol i cy. Thi s r eeval uat i on was pr ompt ed byt he Sovi et at om c t est of Sept ember 1949 and t he est abl i shment oft he Peopl e' s Republ i c of Chi na i n t he f ol l ow ng mont h. Theseevent s, t oget her w t h t he f i r st r umbl i ngs of McCar thyi t e at t ackson t he St at e Depar tment , l ed t o t he emer gence of a mor e aggr essi veU. S. gl obal st rat egy. Thi s new st r at egy was codi f i ed i n t heNat i onal Secur i t y Counci l paper NSC- 6B, wr i t t en i n l at e Febr uar y

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PAGE 105and Mar ch of 1950. NSC- 68 cal l ed f or a "r enewed i ni t i at i ve i n t heCol d War , " begi nni ng w t h a subst ant i al U. ~. m l i t ar y bui l dup andl ar ge i ncr eases i n U. S. over seas m l i t ar y and econom c ai d. Thef ul l r eal i zat i on of NSC- 68 was t o come i n t he summer and f al l of1950, when t he Uni t ed St at es sent t roops t o def end Sout h Kor ea andthen i nvaded Nor th Kor ea. 29

U. S. pol i cy t owar d I ran at t hi s t i me was al so af f ect ed byi ncr easi ng concer n about i t s domest i c st abi l i t y. As di scussed i nchapt er 3 I r an had ent er ed i nt o a ser i ous depr essi on by ear l y1950. Thi s was caused mai nl y by t he bad har vest of 1949, whi chwas f ol l owed by a decl i ne i n pr i vat e consumpt i on and consequent l yhi gher unempl oyment and numerous busi ness f ai l ur es. Fur thermore,br oad publ i c opposi t i on had emer ged t o t he oi l agr eement negot i -at ed by t he I r ani an gover nment w t h t he AI OC. These t wo f act or sand t he gr ow ng st r engt h of t he Tudeh par t y l ed t o f ear s ofi ncreasi ng unr est . A t op St at e Depar tment of f i ci al vi si t i ng I r ani n l at e Mar ch descr i bed t he si t uat i on as "danger ous andexpl osi ve. " Af t er a si m l ar vi si t i n ear l y Apr i l . t he U. S. ArmyChi ef of St af f warned t hat I r an m ght become a "second Chi na. "Pol i cymaker s i n t he St at e Depar t ment cr i t i ci sed t he shah' s l eader -shi p as i nef f ect i ve, and cal l ed f or i ncr eased U. S. ai d and pr es-sur e on t he shah t o i nst al l a mor e capabl e government . At t heLondon For ei gn M ni s t er s' Conf er ence i n May 1950 t he Br i t i sh wer epr essur ed t o make gr eat er concessi ons t o I r an i n or der t o r esol vet he oi l di sput e and t hus pl acat e t he I r ani an publ i c. 30

These changes i n t he i nt er nat i onal si t uat i on and i n I r an i t sel fdi d not change t he basi c pr i nci pl es whi ch had gui ded U. S. pol i cyt owar d I r an 1n 1948 and 1949. Rat her , t hey changed t he pol i cypr escri pt i ons whi ch f ol l owed f r om t hese pr i nci pl es. A Sovi etat t ack on I r an was st i l l consi der ed unl i kel y, and I r an was st i l lassumed t o be a Br i t i sh r esponsi bi l i t y. The det er i or at i ng econom csi t uat i on and r enewed Tudeh act i vi t y had l ed t o i ncr eased f ear s of

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PAGE 106Sovi et - i nspi r ed subver ?i on. As i n t he past . econom c devel opmentwas seen as t he best means of combat t i ng subver si on. However .I r an' s deepeni ng depr essi on now r equi r ed f or ei gn ai d t o st i mul at e9conom c dQv9l opmQnt . Fur t hQrmor 9. i ncr 9a59d m l i t ar y ai d wasdeemed necessar y t o cont r ol t he gr ow ng unr est and st r engt hen t hegovernment . Whi 19 U. S. pol i cymaker s cont i nued t o pr ess t he shahf or r ef or ms. t he i mmedi acy of t he econom c si t uat i on cl ear l y t ookpr eci denc9 OV9r concer ns about an i nci pi ent di ct at or shi p. Fi nal l y,al t hough Br i t i sh m l i t ar y pr edom nance was st i l l r ecogni zed asl at e as May 1952, 31 t he cont i nui ng f ai l ur e of t he Br i t i sh t or 9sol ve t h9 oi l di sput 9 was cl ear l y f r ust rat i ng and undoubt 9dl yl ed U. S. pol i cymaker s t o cont empl at e st rengt heni ng t hei r r ol e i nI r an.

Thi s st r onger U. S. r ol e i n I r an emer ged i n 1950, af t er a t hor -ough St at e Depar tment r evi ew of t h9 cr i si s t her e and of U. S.opt i ons f or deal i ng w t h t hi s cr i si s. I n Maya Mut ual Def enseAssi st ance Agr eement was si gned whi ch pr ovi ded f or an aver age of$23 m l l i on per year i n m l i t ar y ai d t hr ough 1956. I n Oct ober a$25 m l l i on Expor t - I mpor t Bank l oan was gr ant ed and a modest Poi nt4 ai d pr ogr am was begun. The Uni t ed St at es al so suppor ted I r an' sr equest at t hi s t i me f or a $10 m l l i on I nt er nat i onal Bank 10an. 32By t he eve of t he Angl o- I r ani an oi l cr i s i s whi ch began i n May 1951t he Uni t ed St at es had posi t i oned i t sel f t o t ake an act i ve r ol e i nI r an' s af f ai r s. f i r st as an i nt ermedi ar y i n negot i at i ons w t h t heBr i t i sh and l at er as a pat r on power when i t est abl i shed a cl i entst at e under Mohammad Reza Pahl evi .

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PAGE 107FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER 4

1) J ohn A. Denovo, Amer i can I nt er est s and Pol i ci QS i n t hQ M ddl QEast , 1900- 1939 ( M nnQupol i s : Uni vQr si t y of M nnesot a Pr ess,1963), ch. 9.2) T. H. Vai l Mot t er , Uni ted St at es Armv i n Wor l d War I I , TheMi d d l e East Theat er , The Per si an Cor r i dor and Ai d t o Russi a ( Wash-i ngt on: Depar tment of t he Army, 1952) , especi al l y chs. 9, 20, 21;U. S. Depar tment of Commer ce, Of f i ce of Busi ness Econom cs, For ei onAi d bv t he Uni t ed St at es Gover nment , 1940-1951 (Washi ngton: U. S.Government Pr i nt i ng Of f i ce, 1952) , p. 88.3) M chael B. St of f , Oi l , War , and Amer i can Secur i t y (New Haven:Yal e Uni ver si t y Pr ess, 1980) , p. 8; U. S. Congr ess, Senate, Subcomm t tee of t he Comm t t ee on Appr opr i at i ons, Suppl ement al Hear i ngLM l i t ar y Est abl i shment Appropr i at i on Bi l l f or 1944, Oi l Suppl v f or~1i l i t ar v Pur poses, 78t h Congr ess, 1st Sessi on, 1944, p , 79 andel sewher e. For ot her cont empor ar y st at ement s of t he oi l si t uat i onsee Har ol d L. I ckes, Fi ght i nW Oi l ( New Yor k: Knopf , 1943) ; Her ber tFei s, Pet r ol eum and Amer i can For ei gn Pol i cy ( St anf or d: FoodResear ch I nst i t ut e, St anf or d Uni ver si t y, 1944) .4) J ohn W Frey and H. Chandl er I de, A Hi st or v of t he Pet rol eumAdmni st r at i on f or War , 1941- 1945 (Washi ngton: U. S. GovernmentPr i nt i ng Of f i ce, 1946) , pp. 118- 126, chs. 11- 12.5) St of f , Oi l , War , and Nat i onal Secur i ~~ pp. 70- S8, chs. 4- 7;Shoshana Kl ebanof f , M ddl e East Oi l and U. S. For ei qn Pol i cy ( NewYor k: Pr aeger , 1974) , ch. 2; Benj am n Shwadr an, The M ddl e East ,Oi l , and t he Gr eat Power s (New Yor k: W l ey, 1973) , chs. 16, 17. Ont he PRC see U. S. Congr ess, Senate, Commt t ae on For ei gn Rel at i ons,Subcommt t ee on Mul t i nat i onal Cor por at i ons, A Document ar v Hi st or yof t he Pet rol eum Reserves Cor por at i on, 1943- 1944, 93r d Congr ess,2nd Sessi on, 1975.6) Mar k Ham l t on Lyt l e, "Amer i can- I r ani an Rel at i ons 1941- 1947 andt he Redef i ni t i on of Nat i onal Secur i t y, " unpubl i s hed Ph. D. di sser -t at i on, Yal e, 1973, ch. 4. On I r an' s r easons f or br eaki ng of f t henegot i at i ons see sect i on 3. 3. 1, above.7) U. S. Congr ess, Senat e, Speci al Subcomm t t ee I nvest i gat i ngPet rol eum Resour ces, Hear i ngs, Pet r ol eum Requi r ement5- Po~twarL79t h Congr ess, 1st Sessi on, Oct ober 3- 4, 1945, pp. 7- 12, 65- 74;U. S. Congress, Senate, Subcommt tee of t he Comm t t ee on I nt er st at eand For ei gn Commer ce, Hear i nq, Oi l and Coal Shor t aqe, 80t hCongr ess, 1st Sessi on, Dec. 12, 1947, pp. 9- 13, 30- 33, 64- 68; U. S .Congress, Senate, Subcomm t t ee of t he Comm t t ee on I nt er st at e andFo r eign Commer ce, Hear i n9, Oi 1 Shor t a~ BOt h Congr ess, 2ndSessi on, J unQ 29, 1948, pp. 14- 22; U. S. Congr ess, House, Speci alSubcomm t t ee on Pet r ol eum Comm t t ee on Armed Ser vi ces, Repor t ofI nvBst i qat i on of Pet rol eum i n Rel at i on t o Nat i onal Def ens~ 80t hCongr ess, 2nd Sessi on, Apr i l 1948. p. 6059; U. S. C6ngr ess, Senat e,Subcomm tt ee of t he Comm tt ee on Appr opr i at i ons, I nt er i or Depar t -ment Appr opr i at i ons f or 1955, 83r d Congr ess, 2nd Sessi on, 1954, p.77.8) Nat i onal Secur i t y Counci l , Nat i onal Secur i t y Pr obl ems Concer n-i nq Fr ee Wor l d Pet r ol eum Demands and Pot ent i al Suppl i es, HSC 138,December 8, 1952. p. 6 and el sewher e; Kl ebanof f , M ddl e East Oi l ,pp. 72-76; Hal f or d L. Hoski ns, M ddl e East Oi l i n Uni t ed St at esFor ei qn Pol i cv (Washi ngt on: U. S. Li br ar y of Congr ess, Legi sl at i veRef er ence Ser vi ce, 1950) , pp. 37- 38, ch. 3.

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PAGE 1089) J ames F. Schnabel , The Hi st or y of t he J oi nt Chi ef s of St af f ,The J oi nt Chi ef s of St af f and Nat i onal Pol i cy, Vol . 1, 1945- 1947( Hi st or i cal Di vi si on, J oi nt Secr et ar i at . J oi nt Chi ef s of St af f .Febr uar y 1979) . pp. 120- 121; U. S. Congr ess. Repor t of I nvest i -9at i on of Pet r ol eum p. 6064; J oi nt Chi ef s of St af f . Revi ew ofPol i cy Reqar di na Per si a, J CS 1714/ 12, 18 Oct ober 1950; Nat i onalSecur i ty Counci l , A Nat i onal Pet r ol eum Pr ogr am NSC 97/ 1, November27, 1951. and i bi d. , NSC 97/ 3, May 20. 1953; J oi nt Chi ef s ofStaf f , Pr epar at i ons f or Demol i t i on of Oi l Faci l i t i es i n t he M ddl eEast , J CS 1833, J anuar y 30. 1948 ( see al so subsequent r evi s i ons oft hi s memo) .10) Hoski ns, M ddl e East Oi l , pp. 43- 56, 111i The Pr esi dent ' sMat er i al s Pol i cy Commssi on ( Pal ey Comm ssi on) , Resour ces f orFr eedom Vol . I I I , The Out l ook f or Ener av Sour ces (Washi ngt on:U. S. Gover nment Pr i nt i ng Of f i ce, J une 1952) . p. 10; U. S. Congr ess,House, Subcomm tt ee on Oi l I mpor t s. Sel ect Comm tt ee on Smal lBus i ness, Repor t , Ef f ect s of For ei gn Oi l I mpor t s on I ndependentDomest i c Pr oducer 2L 81st Congress, 2nd Sessi on, J une 27, 1950, p.145. On U. S. w l l i ngness t o al l ow a Sovi et oi l concessi on i n I r anand ef f or t s t o di scour age U. S. compani es f r om seeki ng concessi onssee FRUS, 1946, VI I , pp. 35- 36, 554; FRUS, 1947, V, Pp. 891, 893,904, 968- 969. A si m l ar ar gument i s made by St ephen D. Krasnerconcer ni ng t he PRe, t he agr eement w t h Br i t ai n. and t he consor t i umest abl i shed i n I ran i n 1954. See Def endi nQ t he Nat i onal I nt er est( Pr i ncet on: Pr i ncet on Uni ver si t y Pr ess, 1978) , pp. 119- 128,188- 213 .11) See, f or exampl e, an i nf l uent i al memo wr i t ten i n J anuar y 1943by J ohn J er negan, t he I r an desk of f i cer , i n FRUS, 1943, I V, pp ,330- 336.12) Ri char d Ant hony Pf au. " The Uni t ed St at es and I r an, 1941- 1947:Or i gi ns of Par t ner shi p, " unpubl i shed Ph. D. di sser t at i on, Uni ver si -t y of Vi r gi ni a, 1975, chs. 6- 7; Geor ge Lenczowski , Russi a and t heWest i n Tr an, 1918- 1948 ( I t haca: Cor nel l Uni ver si t y Pr ess, 1949) ,pp. 279-283; FRUS, 1944, V, p. 483. The St at e Depar t ment washor r i f i ed at Roosevel t ' s pl an, and successf ul l y opposed i t . SeeFRUS, 1945, VI I I , pp. 523- 526.13) Her ber t Fei s , Fr om Tr ust t o Ter ror ( New Yor k: Nor ton. 1970) .pp. 15- 62; J ohn Lew s Gaddi s , The Uni t ed St at es and t he Or i Gi ns oTt he Col d War , 1941- 1947 ( New Yor k: Col umbi a Uni ver si t y Pr ess,1972) , chs. 't, 5, 7, 9, especi al l y pp. 290- 296; Gabr i el A. Al mond,The Amer i can Peopl e and For ei gn Pol i cy ( New Yor k: Pr aeger , 1960) ,pp , 94-98.14) Har r y S. Tr uman, Year of Deci si ons ( New Yor k: Doubl eday,1955) , pp. 549- 552; Dani el Yer gi n. Shat t er ed Peace (Boston: Hough-t on M f f l i n, 1977) , pp. 174- 178.15) Fei s, Fr om Tr ust t o Ter r or , pp. 64- 66; Br uce Robel l etKuni hol m The Or i oi ns of t he Col d War i n t he Near East ( Pr i ncet on:Pr i ncet on Uni ver si t y Pr ess, 1980) , pp. 271- 308; J a~es F. Byr nes,. i &. eaki nClFr ankl y ( Nel . JYor k: Har per , 1947) , pp , 121- 122; Tr uman,Yaar of Deci si ons, pp. 549- 551.16) Kuni hol m Or i gi ns of t he Col d War , pp. 313- 326; Rober t Rossow,J r . , "The Bat t l e of Azer bai j an, 1946, " 11i dpl e East J our nal , Vol .10, Ho. 1, W nt er 1956, pp. 20- 23; FRUS, 1946, VI I , pp. 340- 342,348; Tr uman, Year of Deci si ons, p. 552.17) Kuni hol m Or i oi ns of t he Col d War , pp. 326- 342; FRUS, 1946,VI I . pp. 448- 449. Tr uman st at es t hat Sovi et w t hdr awal f ol l owed ast r ongl y-worded message f rom Byr nes on Mar ch 24. Thi s i s cl ear l yi nconsi s t ent w t h t he evi dence i n cRUS, 1946, VI I , and i n Kuni hol mand ot her secondar y sour ces. See Har r y S. Tr uman, Year s of Tr i aland Hope ( New Yor k: Doubl eday, 1956) , p. 95.

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PAGE 10918) FRUS, 1946, V I I , pp. 494- 495, 510- 511, 519, 523-526, 533-534,535- 540, 544- 548; Ri char d Pf au, nCont ai nment i n I r an, 1946: TheShi f t t o an Act i ve Pol i cy, " Di pl omat i c Hi st or y I , Fal l 1977, pp.363- 364.19) FRUS, 1946, VI I , pp. 9, 515- 516, 524- 532, 540, 542, 547;Depar tment of St at e, Bul l et i n, J ul y 6, 1947, p. 47; FRUS, 1948, V,p. 144.20) Kuni hol m Or i qi ns of t he Col d War , pp. 383- 395; George V.Al l en, "M ss i on t o I ran, " unpubl i shed manuscr i pt , George V. Al l enpBp~r s. Manuscr i pt Dgpar tm~nt , Duk~ Uni ver si t y, Durham N. C. , PP.115- 125; FRUS, 1946, VI I , pp. 536, 547; Pf au, "Cont ai nment i nI r an, n pp. 366- 372.21) Pf au i nexpl i cabl y concl udes t hat t hi s per i od mar ked t he begi n-ni ng of a mor e act i ve U. S. pol i cy t oward I r an ( i bi d. , pp.371- 372) . Hi s ane. l ysi s r el i es heavi l y on t he per sonal r epr esent -at i ons made by Al l en, and l ar gel y i gnor es Stat e Depar tment r esi st -ance t o a f i rm comm tment . For evi dence t hat Al l en and t he St at eDepar tment wer e not ah. J BYS i ncompl et e agr eement , see FRUS t 1946,VI I , pp. 513- 514, 540- 543; Al l en, i l M ss i on t o Lr an s." p , 139.22) On t he i mpor t ance of t he Truman Doct r i ne f or subsequent U. S.ai d pol i cy, see Rober t A. Packenham l i ber al Amer i ca and t he Thi r dWor l d ( Pr i ncet on: Pr i ncet on Uni ver si t y Press , 1973) , ch. 1.23) J oseph M J ones, The Fi f t een Weeks ( New Yor k: Vi ki ng, 1955) ,pp. 58, 239- 256; Dean Acheson, Pr esent at t he Creat i on ( New York:Nor t on, 1969) , p. 219; Tr uman, Year s of Tr i al and Hope, p. 101;U. s. Congress, Senat e, Hear i nqs, Assi stance t o Gr e~ce and Tur kev,80t h Congress , 1st Sessi on, Mar ch 24- 31, 1947, pp. 7, 17, 19,27- 30 and el sewher e; U. S. Congress , House of Repr esent at i ves,Hear i nqs, Ass i st ance t o Gr eece and Turkev, BOth Congress, 1stSessi on, 1' 1ar ch20- l \ pr i l 9, 1947, pp. 346- 347; FRUS, 1947, V, pp.45- 47, 58. Tr uman' s or i gi nal speech t o Congr ess announci ng t heTruman Doct r i ne cl ear l y i mpl i ed a need f or assi st ance t o count r i esot her t han Gr eece and Tur key. See U. S. Senat e, Hi st or i cal Ser i es,l eqi sl at i ve Or i gi ns of t he Truman Doctr i ne, J anuary 12, 1973, p.x.24) FRUS, 1947, V, pp. 901- 902, 905, 907, 914- 918, 924- 927.25) Kennet h W Condi t , The Hi st or v of t he J oi nt Chi ef s of St af f ,The J oi nt Chi ef s of St af f and Nat i onal Pol i cy, Vol . I I , 1947- 1949( Hi st or i cal Dl vi si on, J oi nt Secr et ar i at , J oi nt Chi ef s of Staf f ,Febr uar y 1979) , pp. 80- 81. On I r ani an r equest s f or i ncreased ai dand f or a cl oser secur i t y r el at i onshi p w t h t he Uni t ed Stat es andBr i t ai n see FRUS, 1948, V, pp. 170- 171, 175- 177, 182- 184; FRUS,1949, VI . pp. 528- 529, 540- 542. On t he Shah' s 1949 t r i p see i bi d. ,pp. 572- 582; FRUS, 1950, V, p. 511.26) FRUS, 1947, V, pp. 924- 927; FRUS, 1948, V, pp. 88- 90, 118;FRUS, 1949, VI , p. 475; FRUS, 1950, V, pp. 451- 457, 504;Stat e- War - Navy Coor di nat i ng Comm t t ee ( SWNCC) , Speci al Ad HocComm t t ee, Appr eci at i on of t he Si t uat i on Regardi ng U. S. Ai d t oI ran, SWN- 5231, Apr i l 7, 1947, pp. 9- 10.27) FRUS, 1947, V, p. 926; FRUS, 1949, VI , pp. 4- 6.28) U. S. Depar tment of State, Of f i ce of I nt el l i gence and Research,The Br i t i sh Posi t i on i n t he M ddl e East , OI R No. 5980, Oct ober 2,1952, pp. 5- 8, 10- 14; U. S. J oi nt Chi ef s of St af f , DocumentsResul t i nq Fr om Conversat i ons w t h t he Br i t i sh i n Regard t o t heEast er n Medi t er r anean and t he M ddl e East , J CS 1819, November 25,1947, p. 4; FRUS, 1950, V, pp. 190, 231- 238; U. S. J oi nt Chi ef s ofSta f f , "Uni t ed st at es Assi st ance t o Ot her Count r i es f r om t heSt andpoi nt of Nat i onal Secur i t y, " J CS 1769/ 1, Apr i l 29, 1947,

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PAGE 110r epr i nt ed i n Thomas H. Et zol d and J ohn Lew s Gaddi s ( eds) ,Cont ai nment : Document s on Amer i can Pol i cy and St r at egy, 1945- 1950( New Yor k: Col umbi a Uni ver si t y Pr ess, 1978) , p . 79; FRl J S, 1946,VI I , pp. 507- 509; Nat i onal Secur i t y Counci l , The Posi t i on of t heUni t ed Stat es W t h Respect t o I r an, NSC 54, J ul y 21, 1949, pp.3- 4; J CS, Revi ew of Pol i cy Reqardi ng Per si a, pp. 84- 85; Wal t er S.Pool e, The Hi st or y of t he J oi nt Chi ef s of Sta f f , The J oi nt Chi ef sof St af f and Nat i onal Pol i cy, Vol . I V, 1950- 1952 ( Hi st or i cal Di vi -si on, J oi nt Secr et ar i at , J oi nt Chi ef s of St af f , December 1979) ,pp. 368- 372.29) For t hG t Gxt of NSC- 68 SGG Et 20l d and Gaddi s . Cont a i nmGnt :Document s on Amer i can Pol i cy, pp. 385- 442 ( quot a on p. 434) . Ont he Or i gi ns of r el evance of NSC- 68 see Paul Y. Hammond, "NSC- 68!Pr ol ogue t o Rearmament , " i n War ner R. Schi l l i ng, Paul Y. Hammond,and Gl en H. Snyder ( eds) , Strat eqv, Pol i t i cs, and Def ense Budqet s( New Yor k: Col umbi a Uni ver si t y Pr ess, 1962) , pp. 267 578; J ohnLew s Gaddi s, ~Was t he Tr uman Doct r i ne a Real Tur ni ng Poi nt ?"For ei an Af f ai r s, Vol . 52, No. 3, J anuar y 1974, pp. 386-402; Pool e,Hi s t or y of t he J CS, 1950- 1952, pp. 1-19.30) FRUS, 1950, V, pp. 492, 510, 517- 518, 523; Sepehr Zabi h, TheCommuni st f ' 10vemE!nt n I r an ( Ber kel ey: Uni ver si t y of Cal i f or ni aPr ess, 1966) , ch. 5; FRUS, 1950, I I I , p. 487.31) Pool e, Hi st or y of t he J CS, 1950- 1952, pp. 371- 372.32) Depart ment of St at e, Bul l et i n, Vol . 22, No. 570, J une 5, 1950,p . 922; FRLJ S, 1950, V, pp. 509- 529, 551, 604; l diLkiern E. l J ar ne,M ssi on f or Peace: Poi nt 4 i n I r an ( I ndi anopol i s : Babbs- Mer r i l l .1956) , p. 18. The Export - I mport Bank l oan was appar ent l y r ej ect edby I r an ( see t abl e 3, chapt er 5, bel ow) .