Perler_LateMedievalPerspectivesEssentialismDirectRealism_2000

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1.

Mental states such as thinking, remembering, and

hoping share a common feature: they are all about

something, i.e., they are intentional. But what are they

about? Attempts to answer this tricky question dividephilosophers into at least two camps. Direct realists

claim that intentional states are normally directed

towards things in the extramental world and that they

have these things as their immediate objects. Thus,

when I am thinking about a friend, my thinking is

directed towards a human being of flesh and blood. And

when I am remembering my childhood home, my

remembering is directed towards the house made of

bricks and roofing tiles. In order to remember the house,

I may need some cognitive items (concepts, mental

images, etc.) that enable me to visualize the house andto make it present to my mind. But these items are

nothing more than special means I use in a cognitive

process. They are that by which something is remem-

bered (or thought of, hoped for, etc.), not that which is

primarily remembered.

Against this view, representationalists claim that

intentional states are primarily directed towards mental

items (concepts, ideas, mental images, Vorstellungen,

etc.). Only secondarily are they directed towards extra-

mental things represented by these items. Thus, when I

am remembering my childhood home, my remembering

is primarily about the idea of this house. For I can

direct my act of remembering towards something even

if the house made of bricks and roofing tiles does no

longer exist. And even if it still exists, it is cognitively

mediated by the idea in my mind. It would be erroneous

to suppose that an intentional state can by itself “hook

onto” an object in the extramental world.

It is commonly assumed that representationalism is

a distinctively modern phenomenon – a phenomenon

closely related to the Cartesian and Lockean theory of

ideas. In his Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man

(originally published in 1785), Thomas Reid made this

point clearly, remarking:

“Modern philosophers [. . .] have conceived that external objects

cannot be the immediate objects of our thought; that there must

be some image of them in the mind itself, in which, as in a mirror,

they are seen. And the name idea, in the philosophical sense of

it, is given to those internal and immediate objects of our

thoughts. The external thing is the remote or mediate object; but

the idea, or image of that object in the mind, is the immediate

object, without which we could have no perception, no remem-

brance, no conception of the mediate object.”1

Obviously, Reid took the modern theory of ideas to

be a theory that leads straight into the terrain of repre-

sentationalism – a terrain he judged to be muddy and

dangerous. For how can we be certain, he asked, that

the ideas in our mind are accurate representations of external things? Given that we have no immediate epis-

temic access to the extramental world, we cannot

compare our ideas with the things themselves. And how

can we be sure that there are external things at all if

the ideas in our mind are the only items immediately

accessible to us? Does representationalism not lead to

skepticism about the external world?

Following in Reid’s footsteps, a large number of

philosophers and scholars assumed that representation-

alism is indeed a modern doctrine, deeply rooted in the

theory of ideas, and that critical questions concerning

representationalism should be asked within the frame-

work of this theory.2 In contrast to this standard account,

some specialists in medieval philosophy have recently

claimed that representationalism is already to be found

in thirteenth and fourteenth-century authors who

introduced so-called “intelligible species” (species intel-

ligibiles) as immediate objects of our mental states.

Thus, L. Spruit holds the view that some late medieval

authors committed themselves to a “veil of species”

theory, comparable to the early modern “veil of ideas”

Essentialism and Direct Realism:Some Late Medieval Perspectives Dominik Perler

Topoi 19: 111–122, 2000.

© 2000 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.



theory, in positing species as representational entities.3

Likewise, C. Panaccio thinks that the species-theory as

it was defended (among others) by Thomas Aquinas

contains crucial elements of representationalism.4 R.

Pasnau even goes so far as to claim that “[t]here is no

radical conceptual difference between the role of early

modern ideas and the role of Aquinas’s species. Aquinas

shares the presupposition, characteristic of seventeenth-

century philosophy, that the immediate and direct

objects of cognitive apprehension are our internal

impressions. His position on this question is subtle and

interesting. But it is not radically distinct from modern

theories.”5

In light of these recent assessments, which clearly

contradict the characterization of representationalism as

a distinctively modern doctrine, I propose to reexamine

two medieval versions of the species-theory. Given thatboth Panaccio and Pasnau consider Aquinas to be a

leading defender of representationalism, I will first look

at the main elements of his theory. Then I will turn to

Peter John Olivi, a Franciscan author who studied and

lectured on the Sentences (yet without ever becoming a

master) in Paris shortly after Aquinas.6 In my recon-

struction and discussion of their theories, I will not

confine myself to epistemological theses and arguments.

Instead, I will try to point out the close connection

between epistemological and metaphysical issues. For

it was a specific conception of the identity and essenceof a thing which led medieval authors to give a certain

account of how a thing can be present to the mind.

2.

Aquinas’s explanation of the objects of our mental states

is embedded in a comprehensive theory of cognition.

According to this theory, a person cannot acquire a cog-

nition of a thing unless her intellect “takes in” or

“assimilates” the form of that thing.7 There are at least

three main steps in such a process of assimilation. First,the person needs to receive the sensory forms of a thing

in an act of seeing, touching, hearing, etc. Second, she

has to form a phantasm, i.e. a kind of sensory image of

the thing, on the basis of sensory forms. Third, she

needs to abstract an intelligible species, i.e. a special

cognitive entity, from the phantasm. Cognition is

possible only when a person has gone through all three

steps.

Let me illustrate these steps by means of an example.

When I am looking at a tree, my eyes receive the

sensory forms (e.g. the colors green and brown) of the

tree, thus undergoing a certain change. Of course, my

eyes do not turn green and brown simply because of this

change. Aquinas hastens to add that the eyes undergo a

mere “intentional change”, not a “natural change”, when

receiving the forms.8 That is, they receive the forms (in

modern terminology: the mere patterns or structure of

various colors) without the matter they have in the tree.

That is how the eyes differ from a wall that is painted

green and brown. Having received the sensory forms, I

am able to form a phantasm, which enables me to visu-

alize the individual tree with all its particular features.

On that basis, I am finally able to abstract an intelligible

species, which makes the pure form of the tree present

to my intellect.

All three steps require detailed analysis, but it is onlythe third step I will examine at present.9 What exactly

are the intelligible species: immediate objects of the

intellect or mere cognitive means? And how do they

make the form of a thing present to the intellect? By

representing it or in some other way? In a famous

passage in the Summa theologiae, Aquinas gives a clear

answer to these questions.10 He points out that in normal

cases the species are not the immediate objects of our

mental acts. They are that by which (the id quo) some-

thing is made present to the intellect and cognized, not

that which (the id quod ) is cognized. Only when wereflect upon the way we cognize something do the

species become the objects of our intellectual acts.

According to Aquinas, at least two arguments can be

adduced against an identification of the species with the

immediate objects of the intellect. First, if the species

were the immediate objects, every person would pri-

marily apprehend something in his or her intellect.

Given that the sciences deal with the objects we

primarily apprehend, all sciences – not just psychology

– would deal with objects in the intellect. This

clearly contradicts the widely shared opinion that most

sciences, in particular the natural sciences, deal withobjects outside the intellect. Second, Aquinas thinks that

relativism would be inevitable if the species were taken

to be the immediate objects. For the judgments a person

makes are about what she primarily apprehends. If she

were primarily apprehending the species, all her judg-

ments would be about these somewhat private entities.

And all her judgments would be true insofar as they

would be about these entities which are present to her

intellect only. She could never be corrected by another

112 DOMINIK PERLER



person, even if this person were making seemingly con-

tradictory judgments, because each person’s judgments

would be about his or her own species. There would be

as many true judgments as there were people dealing

with their private entities.

In order to avoid these odd consequences, Aquinas

insists that the immediate objects of our mental states

cannot be mere items in the intellect. Rather, they must

be items outside the intellect, accessible to many people.

In his view, these items are the forms of extramental

things – forms that are present in hylomorphic com-

pounds (e.g. in this or that material tree) but that can

be grasped by many people and abstracted from indi-

viduating matter. Of course, grasping forms is a com-

plicated process involving several steps. The intellect

cannot mysteriously reach out for forms and simply

“hook onto” them. In the last step of the cognitiveprocess, the intellect needs to produce and use intelli-

gible species, which enable it to apprehend the pure

forms. But these entities are nothing more than cogni-

tive means: they are that by which the forms are appre-

hended. Let me illustrate this crucial point with a

modern example. When we make a blood test in order

to find out a person’s DNA-structure, we need a great

number of technical devices. We cannot grasp the DNA-

structure right away simply by looking at the blood. But

no matter how many devices we use and no matter how

many steps we go through in our laboratory test, whatwe grasp and schematically describe in the end will be

the DNA-structure itself, not the technical devices.

Likewise, it will be the form itself we grasp at the end

of the cognitive process, no matter how many means

we need in order to abstract it from individuating

matter.11

This explanation shows that Aquinas’s account of the

cognitive process is a version of direct realism – not a

naive version, of course, because he does not hold the

simple view that the intellect immediately grasps forms

by sending out mysterious cognitive rays. He rather

defends a modified version of direct realism: the imme-diate objects of the intellect are the forms, which do not

become present unless the intellect uses cognitive means

that are produced on the basis of sensory inputs. It is

obvious that such a version of direct realism is founded

upon a strong metaphysical thesis, namely the thesis that

things have a form (regardless of whether or not it

is grasped) which, in the extramental world, is com-

pounded with matter but can be detached from it. In

addition, there is a second metaphysical thesis lurking

in the background of Aquinas’s direct realism. He

assumes that the form (sometimes also called “nature”)

of a thing can have two kinds of existence. “But this

very nature”, he claims, “namely the nature of human

being, has a double existence: a material one, according

to which it is in natural matter, and an immaterial one,

according to which it is in the intellect.”12 The crucial

point is that it is one and the same form (or nature) that

can exist both in extramental reality and in the intellect.

This double existence is possible because the form,

taken in itself, is something common that can be instan-

tiated in various places. It is individuated only when it

is present in this or that piece of matter.

The metaphysical “double existence thesis”, as I will

call it, has important consequences for Aquinas’s entire

cognitive theory. Given that the very same form that is

present in a material thing can also exist in the intellect,Aquinas is entitled to say that a person apprehends a

form in the intellect without thereby claiming that such

a person grasps an item existing in the intellect only.

“Apprehending a form in the intellect” simply means

“apprehending a form insofar as it has an intellectual

(or immaterial, intelligible) existence”. But the very

same form can also have a material existence. In

Aquinas’s theory, we are not confronted with two types

of entities, a form outside the intellect and a proxy or

“doppelgänger” inside. We are rather dealing with two

ways of existing. This claim may look puzzling to amodern reader, but the example with the DNA-structure

might help to clarify it. When we have finished the

blood analysis and printed out the structure on a piece

of paper, we may say: “Look, this is John’s DNA-

structure!” In making this claim, we do not say that we

are looking at a mere “doppelgänger” of John’s DNA-

structure. We rather intend to say that we are looking

at the structure itself – not at the structure as it exists

in John, where it has a natural (or embodied) form of

existence, but at the structure as it exists in an encoded

form on the piece of paper. One and the same DNA-

structure has a double way of existing: a natural one andan encoded one. Likewise, one and the same form has

a double existence: a natural (or material) one in the

hylomorphic compound and an encoded (or immaterial)

one in the intellect.

The crucial point is that the form can have an imma-

terial existence only when there is an appropriate cog-

nitive device in the intellect, just as the DNA-structure

can have an encoded existence only when there are

appropriate technical devices. In the case of the form,

ESSENTIALISM AND DIRECT REALISM 113



the intelligible species is such a device: it makes the

form immaterially present to the intellect.

At this point a difficulty arises. Aquinas does not

only say that the species is a device or cognitive means.

He also claims that “the intelligible species is the form

according to which the intellect cognizes”13 or that “the

intelligible species is in some way the quiddity and

nature of a thing according to its intelligible existence,

not according to the natural existence it has in the

things.”14 How can he affirm (i) that the species is a

mere cognitive means, and (ii) that the species is the

form itself? These two claims hardly seem compatible.

For it is one thing to say that x is a cognitive means

making the form F present, quite another to claim that

x is identical with F.

There seems to be such an incompatibility because

Aquinas often vacillates between two different aspectsof the species without, unfortunately, clearly distin-

guishing them. In a passage in his early Commentary on

the Sentences, however, he makes the required distinc-

tion, saying that “the understood species can be con-

sidered in two ways: either with respect to the existence

it has in the intellect (then it has a singular existence)

or with respect to the fact that it is a similitude of a

cognized thing, i.e. that it provides a cognition of the

thing (looked at from that side it has a universality).”15

Let me spell out this important distinction. On the one

hand, we can look at the species as an entity existingin this or that intellect. Considered in this way, the

species is something singular (to be more precise: a

singular accident of the intellect) and can never be more

than a cognitive means. If we were able to inspect the

intellect in a laboratory (which, of course, we cannot do

because the intellect is immaterial) we would see

the species under the microscope. On the other hand,

we can also look at the species as a “similitude”.

Considered in this second way, the species is not just

an entity existing in a single individual intellect. It is

rather something displaying a content – a content that

cannot simply be seen, as it were, under the microscope,but that can only be grasped or apprehended by the

intellect. And what is apprehended is nothing but the

universal form of a thing, assimilated in the cognitive

process.

If we take into account such a twofold way of looking

at the species, claims (i) and (ii) mentioned above turn

out to be compatible. For claim (i) concerns the species

understood as a mere cognitive means, whereas claim

(ii) applies to the species understood as the content of

such a means. Considered in the second way, the species

is indeed identical with the form or nature of a thing.

Let me briefly return to the DNA-example in order to

illustrate this point. When we have printed out John’s

DNA-structure on a piece of paper, we can also look at

it in two different ways. On the one hand, we can

inspect it as a mere print-out consisting of ink marks.

Considered under this strictly material aspect it is, of

course, of little interest to us. What we are interested

in when we intend to learn something about genetics is

the content of the print-out. And this content is nothing

but the DNA-structure, to be more precise: it is the

DNA-structure insofar as it is present to us in an

encoded way. Even if we had ten or twenty print-outs

of John’s genetic structure, it would always be the same

DNA-structure that would be present to us. Likewise,

what we are interested in when we are looking at thespecies is its content. It is exactly the content that makes

the species to be about something. Given that the

content is nothing but the universal form of a thing,

numerically different species in different intellects can

have the same content. Even if we possessed ten or

twenty species of, say, a tree, we would always have the

same content and apprehend the same thing: the form

of the tree.

I hope it has become clear that Aquinas defends an

elaborate version of direct realism that relies upon two

fundamental theses: the “double existence thesis” (oneand the same form can have material and immaterial

existence) and the “double aspect thesis” (a species can

be considered as a mere cognitive means or as a cog-

nitive content). It is his use of these two theses that

enables him to introduce intelligible species without

thereby committing himself to representationalism.16 For

species are not ideas in a Cartesian or Lockean sense,

and they do not constitute any veil or mirror between

the intellect and the extramental world. They are rather

indispensable means the intellect needs in order to make

the forms present in an immaterial way.

Why then do a number of recent commentators holdthe view that Aquinas was a representationalist? Why

do they think that he subscribed to a “veil of species”

theory? In their view, there are at least two pieces of

textual evidence favoring a representationalist reading.

First of all, they point out that Aquinas character-

izes intelligible species as “similitudes” (similitudines)

of external things. Thus, he says that “every cognition

occurs according to the similitude of the cognized thing

in the cognizing person”,17 and he points out that “for

114 DOMINIK PERLER



a cognition, a similitude of the cognized thing is

required in the cognizing person, as it were as its

form”.18 In some passages he even explicitly identifies

the intelligible species with a similitude.19 In light of

these statements, it seems to be evident that the imme-

diate object a person apprehends is not the thing itself

(or its form), but some likeness or similitude in his or

her intellect. The thing itself can be cognized only

insofar as it is mediated by the similitude.

At first sight, the impressive number of passages

where Aquinas speaks about similitude seem to endorse

such a representationalist interpretation.20 A closer look

at these passages reveals, however, that similitudo is a

technical term that should not be understood in the sense

of “pictorial likeness” or “mental image”. For Aquinas,

x is a similitude of y if and only if x and y share

the same form. He holds the view that “similitudeis grounded in an agreement or sharing of forms.

Therefore, there are many kinds of similitude, according

to the many ways of sharing forms.”21 On his account,

at least three types of similitude need to be distin-

guished:

Similitude1: x and y share the same form with regard to

the same aspect and in the same way.

Similitude2: x and y share the same form with regard to

the same aspect, but not in the same way.

Similitude3: x an y share the same form, but not with

regard to the same aspect and not in thesame way.

Aquinas himself illustrates this threefold classification

with some examples. Two white things displaying

exactly the same degree of whiteness are similar to each

other according to similitude1, because they share the

same form (i.e. the accidental form of whiteness) with

regard to the same aspect (i.e. their surface) in the same

way (i.e. with the same intensity). Two white things

having different degrees of whiteness are similar to each

other according to similitude2, because they share the

same form with regard to the same aspect, but in dif-ferent ways (with more or less intensity). Finally, a thing

acting upon another thing, say a hot fire heating up a

house, is similar to the other thing according to simili-

tude3, because the two share the same form (i.e. of heat),

but with regard to two different aspects (the inner con-

stitution of the fire as opposed to a property of the air

in the house) in two different ways (with more or less

intensity).

What is common to all types of similitude is the

sharing of a form, not the existence of a pictorial

representation. This has an immediate consequence for

an adequate understanding of the species characterized

as similitude of the external thing: the species is not

some kind of inner image, mental likeness or “doppel-

gänger” of the external thing.22 It is a similitude of that

thing insofar as both the species and the thing have the

same form. (Compare: The print-out of John’s DNA is

a similitude of the DNA in John himself, because both

share the same form, i.e. display the same pattern or

structure.)

Given this technical understanding of the Latin term

similitudo, it would be quite erroneous to ascribe a rep-

resentationalist position to Aquinas on the basis of his

statements about similitude. On the contrary, these state-

ments clearly speak in favor of a modified version of

direct realism. For what is immediately present to theintellect when it apprehends a species qua similitude,

is the form of a thing – the very same form that is also

present in the material thing. It is indeed this identity

relation, not a similarity relation, that makes a species

a similitude. The species functions as a similitude and

is thus about something because the very same form is

instantiated in two different places: inside and outside

the intellect.

Let me now turn to the second argument that is some-

times adduced in favor of a representationalist reading.

R. Pasnau has pointed out that there are some passagesin the early Commentary on the Sentences where

Aquinas clearly states that the species is the first

object apprehended by the intellect. Drawing a parallel

between seeing and cognizing, Aquinas says: “Likewise,

the first thing cognized is the similitude of the thing,

which is in the intellect, and the second thing cognized

is the thing itself, which is cognized through that

similitude.”23 Is Aquinas not granting representation-

alism by saying that the species is the first thing

cognized? Does his distinction between first and second

object not commit him to some kind of “mirror of

nature” doctrine?Although it may be tempting to understand Aquinas

in that way, it would hardly be a correct interpretation,

because he explicitly characterizes the first thing

cognized as a similitude. As it has become clear, a simil-

itude is not an inner picture, but an item which shares

a form with some other item. And what matters when

we deal with a similitude is always the common

form. Therefore, Aquinas’s distinction between first and

second thing cognized is not to be understood as an




attempt to set apart an inner object from an outer. It is

rather to be taken as an emphasis on grasping two ways

of being of one and the same form: the first thing

cognized is the form insofar as it is present in the intel-

lect, the second thing is the very same form insofar as

it is present in the material thing. The cognizing person

does not start with an inspection of an inner mirror

image and then shift her attention to the thing in front

of the mirror. She rather turns her attention from the

form as it is in the intellect to the same form as it is in

the thing. (Compare: A specialist in genetics who first

looks at the print-out of John’s DNA-structure and then

at John’s blood does not move from a first to a second

object. He rather moves from the DNA-structure looked

at in an encoded way to the very same structure looked

at in an embodied way.)

Why, then, does Aquinas speak about a first and asecond thing, if he does not intend to set apart two

distinct objects? Why does he not say straight away that

the cognizing person grasps the form of a thing, which

is the first and proper object? In later works he does

indeed make this straightforward statement.24 His

insistence on distinguishing two things in the early

Commentary on the Sentences may be motivated by two

reasons. First, he may be taking into account the fact

that we sometimes cognize things that do not exist. If

I cognize, say, a dinosaur, I am not entitled to claim that

I grasp the form of an animal that is present in thematerial world. I should content myself with saying that

I grasp this form insofar as it is present in my intellect.

Whether or not the form is also present in a living

animal is something I have to find out by doing empir-

ical research. Since we can never suppose a priori that

a form is present in a living, material thing (it is not

only an empirical question whether there are living

dinosaurs, but also whether there are living dogs, cats,

trees, etc.) we should always be cautious enough to say

that the first thing we cognize is just the form insofar

as it is in our intellect. The existence of the second

thing, namely the form insofar as it is in a materialthing, needs empirical proof. But even such a distinc-

tion between first and second thing does not compel us

to set two objects apart. It simply helps us to differen-

tiate between two ways of being of a form so that we

can distinguish a statement like “I understand what a

dinosaur is” from “I understand that there is a living

dinosaur in the material world”.

Second, Aquinas’s insistence on a distinction

between two things may also be motivated by another

problem, namely the cognition of individual things. For

according to his general theory, there can be intellectual

cognition of universal forms only. When I grasp the

form of a tree I cognize the universal form of a tree,

not this or that tree in my neighbor’s garden. In order

to cognize an individual tree, I also need a phantasm I

have acquired on the basis of sensory inputs stemming

from this or that tree. It is just such an attention to phan-

tasms (or in Aquinas’s own terminology: a “return to

phantasms”) that is required for a cognition of individ-

uals.25 Given this distinction between grasping the uni-

versal form and cognizing the individual thing, it makes

good sense to speak about a first and a second object.

For the first thing cognized is the universal form as it

exists in the intellect; the second thing is the form as it

is individuated in a material thing. But here again, we

are not dealing with two separate objects. We are ratherconfronted with two ways of being of one and the same

form: we first grasp the form in a universal way and

then, shifting our attention to the material thing, we

cognize the form in an individuated way. In both cases,

however, we cognize the same form that is present to

us. There is no transition from a representational to a

represented entity.

3.

Given that Aquinas did not succumb to representation-

alism by introducing intelligible species into his cogni-

tive theory, one may wonder why there was such a

heated debate about species in the late thirteenth and

early fourteenth century. Why did Henry of Ghent,

Durandus of St. Pourçain and many others criticize the

species-theory?26 And why did some of the critics, most

prominently William Ockham and Adam Wodeham,

state that they did not want to introduce species as

ghostly entities posited between the intellect and the

extramental world?27 It seems as if they had been using

all their argumentative force to attack a straw man. Forif the species-theory did not introduce inner objects,

and if it was not committed to representationalism,

refutations of representationalism would seem to be

pointless.

Yet a closer look at thirteenth-century discussions

reveals that later critics did not simply attack a philo-

sophical ghost. Shortly after Aquinas, there were some

reinterpretations of the species-theory which turned it

into a representationalist theory. One of the most radical

116 DOMINIK PERLER



and serious reinterpretations was developed by Peter

John Olivi. This Franciscan author did indeed take the

species to be entities posited somehow between the

intellect and the external world – entities that would

prevent the intellect from having direct access to

material things. Olivi explicitly used the veil metaphor,

saying that “if something else were posited between the

attention of the [intellectual] power and the object itself,

this would veil (velaret ) the thing and impede its being

attended to in itself as something present, rather than

help in attending to it.”28 Why did Olivi think that intel-

ligible species constitute an inner veil? Why did he not

try to interpret the species-theory within the framework

of modified direct realism?

A number of arguments led Olivi to give a repre-

sentationalist account of intelligible species. The most

fundamental argument is closely related to his generalaccount of cognition. All that is required for a cogni-

tive act, he claimed, are (i) an object present to a cog-

nitive power and (ii) the attention that power pays to

the object.29 Thus, whenever a tree is present to my

intellect and whenever I am drawing my attention to the

tree, I will be able to cognize it; no additional entities

are required. Of course, the mere existence of an object

and the mere existence of a cognitive power will not

suffice to bring about an act of cognition. The object

needs to be present to a certain cognitive power and that

power, in turn, needs to pay attention to the object. Nocognitive act will arise if there is a tree standing some-

where, but far away from me, or if I have a cognitive

power but do not use it in order to fix my attention on

the tree. The tree needs to be present to me, and my

intellect needs to be oriented towards the tree. Only if

both conditions are fulfilled will I be able to have a cog-

nition of the tree.

Now one may expect that Olivi would explain how

a cognitive act arises, provided the two conditions are

fulfilled. One may assume that he would spell out the

sensory or intellectual processes and the cognitive

means that are required for a concrete cognitive act tooccur. Yet one looks in vain for such an explanation. On

Olivi’s account, no special process of abstraction and

no use of cognitive means is required. In particular, no

intelligible species is needed. “Therefore”, he concludes

his account of cognition, “without such a species and

without its representation a cognitive act can be

produced, because an object can be present to the power

without a species.”30 If the tree is present to me and if

I pay attention to it, that alone will enable me to bring

about a cognitive act directed towards the tree. Olivi

defends a theory which may be labeled a “simple act

theory”: given a relation established between a cogni-

tive power and an object immediately present to it, a

cognitive act will arise. And this act will by itself be

directed towards the object, without there being any

intermediaries. Obviously, such a theory stands in sharp

contrast to any theory claiming that an act cannot be

directed towards an object unless there are causal or

representational intermediaries.

Olivi concedes that in some cases there is a need

for an intermediary, namely when no external object

is immediately present to the cognitive power. For

example, when I try to remember the Empire State

Building I saw on my last trip to New York, I do indeed

need a “memory species”.31 Unfortunately, Olivi does

not explain in detail how such a species is formed andstored.32 Presumably he takes it to be some kind of by-

product of a cognitive act. For instance, the first time I

saw the Empire State Building my act was immediately

directed towards that object, and at the same time I

formed a little replica in my intellect. This replica is

what I am using now as my cognitive object when I am

no longer standing in front of the real building. The

important point is, however, that I turn towards an

internal memory species only when there is no external

object I can attend to. Whenever such an object is

present to me, my intellect is able to focus on the objectitself; no proxy in the intellect is needed.

What are the consequences of such a “simple act

theory”, which makes room for species in the case of

memory only, for a theory that introduces species in

every case of cognition? For Olivi, the answer is clear.

A theory positing species when an external object is

immediately present will end up with two objects, an

inner and outer one. And it will have to admit that the

intellect first turns to the inner object. Olivi states: “But

that to which the power’s attention is directed has the

character of an object, and that to which it is first

directed has the character of a first object. Therefore,these species will have the character of an object more

than the character of an intermediate or representative

principle.”33 No doubt, this statement looks puzzling to

a reader who bears in mind Aquinas’s explanation of

species. Why should a defender of the species-theory

assert that the species has the character of an object?

Wouldn’t it be more sensible to say that the species is

not an object, but that by which an object is grasped?

And why should the species be characterized as the first




object? If one wants to make a distinction between first

and second objects at all, one should rather say that the

first object is the thing (or its form) insofar as it is in

the intellect.

These options, obvious as they may seem within the

framework of Aquinas’s theory, are not open to Olivi.

For according to his extremely parsimonious theory,

there is no room for a cognitive means. Whenever a cog-

nitive power is turning its attention to something imme-

diately present to it, be it a thing inside or outside the

intellect, it is apprehending this thing as its object. And

if two objects are immediately present, one inside the

intellect and one outside, the cognitive power first

apprehends the object inside, because that object is even

more immediately given than the external one. Thus, if

there is not just a tree standing in front of me, but also

a species of a tree somehow “engraved” in my intel-lect, I first apprehend the species because it is even more

immediately and more intimately present to me than the

tree in the garden. Only secondarily, mediated by the

species, do I apprehend the material tree. Therefore,

introducing a species will compel me to accept an inner

object as my first object of cognition.

Rejecting such a conclusion, a defender of the

species-theory may object that Olivi does not give a

correct account of the relation holding between a cog-

nitive power and the species when he says that the

species is “apprehended and cognized by that power asits object”.34 One needs to distinguish between at least

two senses of “to apprehend”. In one way, “to appre-

hend” can indeed be used with a very strong cognitive

connotation, i.e. in the sense of “to grasp something as

an object”. Understood in that way, whatever is appre-

hended is also immediately cognized. Thus, whenever

a cognitive power p apprehends x, x is eo ipso the

immediate object of cognition for p. In another way,

however, “to apprehend” can also be used with a weaker

cognitive connotation in the sense of “to grasp in order

to cognize something”. Then the apprehended thing is

not identical with the cognized thing. What is appre-hended may only serve to make the cognized thing

accessible to the cognitive power. For instance, when I

look at the photographs I took on my last vacation, I

need to apprehend the various color patches on the

pieces of paper, and I also need to apprehend the way

these patches are arranged. Were I blind or unable to

distinguish between different colors and different ways

of arranging them, I could not cognize anything. But

what I cognize is not just an arrangement of color

patches. I rather cognize the things and persons depicted

by these patches. Looking at the photographs, I may say:

“This is the beach belonging to our hotel” or “This is

John dozing in the sun”. It is the beach, John and

various other objects I am cognizing by apprehending

the color patches on the pieces of paper. Thus, if we

understand “to apprehend” in this weaker sense, we may

say that a cognitive power p apprehends x in order to

cognize an object y that is made accessible to p through

x. (How exactly y is made accessible through x – by a

similarity relation, a relation of structural identity or

some other kind of relation – is a separate issue that

needs detailed analysis.) Does Olivi not overlook this

second way of understanding “to apprehend” when he

says that what is apprehended is eo ipso cognized?

Olivi would hardly accept such an objection. For

according to his account of cognition, there cannot bea means or device in the cognitive process that makes

an object accessible, without thereby becoming a cog-

nitive object itself. If x makes y accessible to p, that is

only because x is the first object for p. Thus, if my

photograph of John lying on the beach makes John

accessible to me, it can do so only because it is the first

object I cognize. I first see the depiction of John and I

am only secondarily, as it were through the photograph,

grasping John himself. Olivi’s general framework, which

posits only two relata in a cognitive relation, prevents

him from accepting any intermediaries that would becausal only, and not representational. Consequently, his

framework also precludes him from understanding “to

apprehend” in the weaker sense. Whenever there is a

cognitive power apprehending something, i.e. whenever

there are two relata required for a cognitive relation, the

second relatum must be the object of cognition. That is

why the species cannot be apprehended in the sense of

“being grasped as something making the external object

accessible”. The species itself must be the first object

of cognition the intellect has access to.

This reply along Olivi’s lines shows that a deep trans-

formation occurred in late thirteenth-century cognitivetheory. Whereas Aquinas had thought that a cognitive

relation requires at least three relata (a cognitive

power, an external object, and a cognitive means), Olivi

accepted only two. In his theory, the third relatum is

superfluous, and if one were positing such a relatum one

would introduce an additional object – an inner thing

put between the cognitive power and the external object.

This radical transformation has its origin in Olivi’s

rejection of Aristotelianism. He repeatedly criticized

118 DOMINIK PERLER



Aristotle, complaining “that it was without any reason

that he was thought to be the god of his age.” 35 In

particular, Olivi harshly criticized his predecessors

and contemporaries for blindly following Aristotle’s

authority in assuming that one would need to explain

how the intellect can “take in” or “assimilate” external

things. Such a conception of cognition as a passive

process is wholly mistaken in Olivi’s view. For cogni-

tion should be explained as something active: as the way

the intellect, an active power, reaches out for things in

the world and “hooks onto” them.36

However, a defender of the species-theory may still

be dissatisfied with such a sweeping rejection of the

Aristotelian framework. I agree, he may say, that the

intellect reaches out for things, and I also agree that we

should explain how the intellect makes the external

things its immediate objects. But we cannot work outsuch an explanation unless we give an account of how

exactly the intellect reaches out for things, for the intel-

lect does not send out mysterious noetic rays, nor do

material objects simply jump into the intellect. It is just

such an account I want to give with the species-theory.

In claiming that the intellect produces and uses species,

I am simply saying that the intellect makes use of

entities that enable it to establish a relation with external

things. The important thing about these entities is that

they have a certain content : universal forms. And this

content is nothing but the forms that also exist inmaterial things.

However, such a line of reasoning, which is charac-

teristic for Aquinas and a number of other thirteenth-

century authors, relies upon a strong metaphysical

thesis, namely the “double existence thesis” exposed in

section II above. The defender of the species-theory

assumes that one and the same form can exist both

inside and outside the intellect and that it can be appre-

hended both as the content of a species and as the struc-

ture of a material thing. As soon as one gives up this

thesis (and Olivi seems to have given it up, although

he never says it explicitly) one has to concede that thespecies in the intellect is indeed an entity cut off from

the material thing. Of course, one may still hold the

thesis that this species has a content and that it is exactly

the content that matters. But without the “double exis-

tence thesis”, this content cannot be identified with the

form that is also to be found in material things. It must

be something different: an inner representation. Yet

introducing such a representation will create a host of

new problems. For one then has to explain what makes

this representation to be about the external thing. Is it

some kind of inner imprint, a mental picture, a linguistic

sign, or something else? And one also has to explain

how, by grasping the inner representation, the intellect

can be certain that there actually is an external thing.

Does the inner representation not “veil” the external

thing, as Olivi says? How then can the intellect look

behind the veil and become aware of the thing itself?

4.

I hope it has become clear that representationalism

threatens only when intelligible species are taken to be

inner objects. But not every medieval defender of the

species-theory understood them in that way. In fact,

Aquinas (and after him a number of other authors)37

were eager to rule out such an understanding by pointing

out that species are nothing but cognitive means with a

certain content. It was not the species-theory in itself

that led to representationalism, but the shift from a

content theory of species to an inner object theory.

It should also have become clear that the content

theory is not just an innocuous, metaphysically neutral

cognitive theory. Rather, it is a theory that makes strong

use of the double existence thesis, which is obviously

a far-reaching metaphysical thesis. Thus, the entire

debate about cognition proves to be closely related to,or even motivated by, a fundamental discussion in meta-

physics. For the content theory can be defended as a

direct realist theory only when the content of a species

is taken to be the very same form that also exists (or at

least can exist) in material things. And the inner object

theory can be developed as an alternative to that theory

(and eventually be dismissed) only when the double

existence thesis is rejected.

The double existence thesis itself relies upon other

metaphysical theses. Two of them are of particular

importance. (i) There are forms in reality and some of

them, namely the substantial forms, are responsible forthe identity and the essence of a thing. Were there no

form, a material thing could not have a number of essen-

tial features and it could not be distinguished from other

things. (ii) Forms are universal and can be instantiated

in many things, both outside and inside the intellect.

Were there no such universality, two numerically

distinct but specifically identical things could not have

the same form, and the intellect could not assimilate the

same form that is also present in material things.




These two theses are, of course, quite controversial

and were already subject to heated debates in the later

middle ages. It is well known that the second thesis in

particular was vigorously rejected by all those who did

not accept a realist theory of universals. But I do not

wish to enter into the details of these debates. My point

is only that one should always bear in mind the under-

lying metaphysical theses when considering the species-

theory. This theory was developed within an Aristotelian

context in which the theory of forms – a theory

explaining the identity and essence of a thing – played

a crucial role. That is why it is hardly possible to equate

the species-theory with the early modern theory of ideas

as it can be found, for instance, in Locke. Being an Anti-

Aristotelian, Locke clearly rejected the theory of forms,

and he therefore dismissed the claim that was so crucial

for many defenders of the species-theory, namely thatthe form of a thing can become present to the mind by

means of the species.38

Now one may have the impression that a theory

claiming that the form of a thing can be somehow

assimilated is indeed deeply rooted in Aristotelianism

and that it disappeared as soon as Aristotelianism lost

its predominant position in philosophical debates, some-

where in the seventeenth century. Yet such an impres-

sion would be quite misleading. In a recent paper, H.

Putnam pointed out that one could and should still

appeal to the theory of forms when dealing with theproblem of intentionality. For when we ask what makes

a mental state be about something and thus makes it

have a certain content, we cannot give a fully satisfying

answer by offering a causal story. A person may be

causally related to different things or states of affairs

and have a mental state with the same content, or she

may be causally related to one single state of affairs and

come up with various mental states that have various

contents. The causal relation alone will not fix one

single content. That is why we need something in

addition to the causal story when we want to explain

intentionality. “In short”, Putnam says, “what we aremissing is precisely the notion that events have a form.

Efficient causation, as presently conceived, will not

provide us with enough form .”39 This is, of course,

exactly Aristotle’s and Aquinas’s point: what we need

in addition to a causal relation between the cognizing

person and the cognized thing is the “taking in” of a

form. It is the identity of forms (or in modern termi-

nology: the identity of structure) inside and outside the

mind that makes a mental state have a certain content.

Should we then conclude that the Aristotelian theory

of forms, lurking in the background of the medieval

species-theory, is still a viable option in the current

debate about intentionality? Could it still be embraced

by contemporary philosophers? Not quite. The problem

with this theory, besides all the details about the various

steps required for abstracting and assimilating the form,

is that it presupposes a strong essentialism. It takes for

granted that each thing has a determinate form, given

by nature, and that this form fixes the identity and

essence of a thing, no matter how we conceive of that

thing. It is exactly this strong essentialism that may be

hard to swallow today. Putnam remarks: “The greatest

difficulty facing someone who wishes to hold an

Aristotelian view is that the central intuition behind that

view, that is, the intuition that a natural kind has a single

determinate form (or “nature” or “essence”) has becomeproblematical.”40 If that intuition has become problem-

atical, the further intuition that a determinate form can

become present to the mind by cognitive means,

whether they are called “species” or otherwise, has

become problematical as well.

Notes

1 Th. Reid, Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man I, ch. 1, in:

Philosophical Works, ed. by W. Hamilton, Hildesheim: Olms, 1967,

vol. 1, 226 (reprint of the 1895 edition).2 The most prominent example is R. Rorty who claims in his influ-

ential Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Princeton: Princeton

University Press, 1979) that the problem of representationalism is the

cornerstone of modern epistemology. Note, however, that Rorty’s

reconstruction of early modern epistemology (which is clearly

inspired by Reid’s reading of the “way of ideas”) has recently come

under attack. See J. W. Yolton, “Mirrors and Veils, Thoughts and

Things: The Epistemological Problematic”, in: A. R. Malachowski

(ed.), Reading Rorty . Critical Responses to “Philosophy and the

Mirror of Nature” (and Beyond ), Oxford: Blackwell, 1990, 58–

73; D. Perler, Repräsentation bei Descartes, Frankfurt a.M.:

Klostermann, 1996, 310–324; M. Ayers, “Theories of Knowledge and

Belief”, in: M. Ayers & D. Garber (eds.), The Cambridge Historyof Seventeenth-Century Philosophy, Cambridge & New York:

Cambridge University Press, 1998, 1003–1061 (in particular 1049f.).3 L. Spruit, Species intelligibilis: From Perception to Knowledge,

Leiden: Brill, 1994, vol. 1, 266. In this passage, Spruit is referring

to Duns Scotus.4 C. Panaccio, “Aquinas on Intellectual Representation”, paper

presented at the conference Ancient and Medieval Theor ies of

Intentionality (University of Basel, June 1999), to be published by

Brill.5 R. Pasnau, Theories of Cognition in the Later Middle Ages ,

Cambridge & New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997, 293.

120 DOMINIK PERLER



6 On Olivi’s intellectual biography, see D. Burr, Olivi and

Franciscan Poverty, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press,

1989. In my textual analysis, I will focus exclusively on the ques-

tions on the second book of the Sentences (probably written between

1281 and 1283) without analyzing problems of doctrinal develop-

ment.7 See De veritate, q. 8, art. 5; ST (= Summa theologiae) I, q. 14,

art. 2, corp.; ibid. q. 85, art. 2, ad 1. All my references to Aquinas’s

works apply to the Marietti edition (Torino & Roma, 1949ff.). In

the case of the Sentencia libri De anima I also refer to the Leonine

edition (Paris & Rome: Vrin & Commissio Leonina, 1984).8 See ST I, q. 78, art. 3, corp.; Sentencia libri De anima II, 24,

Leonina XLV/1, 169 (Marietti edition: II, 24, n. 552f.); Quaest. disp.

De anima, art. 13, corp.; De veritate, q. 21, art. 4, corp.9 For a thorough discussion of the first two steps, see P. Hoffman,

“St. Thomas Aquinas on the Halfway State of Sensible Being”,

Philosophical Review 99 (1990), 73–92; A. Kenny, Aquinas on Mind ,

London & New York: Routledge, 1993, 31–40; R. Pasnau, Theories

of Cognition in the Later Middle Ages, op. cit., 31–60.

10 ST I, q. 85, art. 2, corp. See also Sentencia libri De anima III,2, Leonina XLV/1, 213 (Marietti edition: III, 8, n. 718); Quaest. disp.

De anima, art. 2, ad 5; Summa contra Gentiles II, cap. 75, n. 1550.11 Note that grasping the form is a complex cognitive process

involving several steps, not just a simple act. And although Aquinas

claims that the form is grasped in a correct way (see ST I, q. 85,

art. 6, corp.), given reliable cognitive conditions, he acknowledges

that there are various sources of error. For a detailed analysis, see

N. Kretzmann, “Infallibility, Error, and Ignorance”, in: R. Bosley &

M. Tweedale (eds.), Aristotle and His Medieval Interpreters

(Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Suppl. 7), Calgary: University of

Calgary Press, 1991, 159–194.12 Sentencia libri De anima II, 12, Leonina XLV/1, 116 (Marietti

edition: II, 12, n. 378): “Ipsa autem natura . . . , puta natura hominis,

habet duplex esse: unum quidem materiale secundum quod est in

materia naturali; aliud autem inmateriale secundum quod est in

intellectu.”13 ST I, q. 85, art. 2, corp.: “. . . species intelligibilis est forma

secundum quam intellectus intelligit.”14 Quodlibeta VIII, q. 2, art. 2, corp.: “Unde species intelligibilis

[. . .] est quodammodo ipsa quidditas et natura rei secundum esse

intelligibile, non secundum esse naturale, prout est in rebus.”15 In II Sent ., dist. 17, q. 2, art. 1, ad 3: “. . . species intellecta potest

dupliciter considerari: aut secundum esse quod habet in intellectu,

et sic habet esse singulare; aut secundum quod est similitudo talis

rei intellectae, prout ducit in cognitionem eius, et ex hac parte habet

universalitatem. . . .”

16 Nor does his appeal to sensory species commit him to represen-tationalism. N. Kretzmann convincingly pointed out that these

cognitive entities on a sensory level are to be understood in a

causal rather than in a representational sense. See N. Kretzmann,

“Philosophy of Mind”, in: N. Kretzmann & E. Stump (eds.), The

Cambridge Companion to Aquinas, Cambridge & New York:

Cambridge University Press, 1993, 139.17 Summa contra Gentiles II, ch. 77, n. 1581: “. . . omnis enim

cognitio fit secundum similitudinem cogniti in cognoscente.”18 ST I, q. 88, art. 1, corp.: “. . . requiritur ad cognoscendum ut

sit similitudo rei cognitae in cognoscente quasi quaedam forma

ipsius.”

19 See ST I, 14, art. 2, ad 2; ibid. q. 85, art. 1, corp.; Summa contra

Gentiles I, 53, n. 444; Quodlib. VIII, q. 2, art. 1, corp.20 An extensive list is provided by C. Panaccio, “Aquinas on

Intellectual Representation”, op. cit.21 ST I, q. 4, art. 3, corp.: “. . . cum similitudo attendatur secundum

convenientiam vel communicationem in forma, multiplex est simil-

itudo, secundum multos modos communicandi in forma.” See also

De veritate, q. 8, art. 8, corp.22 As R. Imbach and F.-X. Putallaz have shown in “Notes sur

l’usage du terme imago chez Thomas d’Aquin”, Micrologus 5 (1997),

69–88, Aquinas scarcely speaks about images in an epistemological

context. And when he occasionally uses the term imago (as for

instance in Summa contra Gentiles IV, cap. 11), he hastens to add

that it is to be understood in the sense of similitudo.23 In I Sent ., dist. 35, q. 1, art. 2, corp.: “Similiter intellectum

primum est ipsa rei similitudo, quae est in intellectu, et est intellectum

secundum ipsa res, quae per similitudinem illam intelligitur.” For

other passages, see R. Pasnau, Theories of Cognition in the Later

Middle Ages, op. cit., 202–208.

24 Most explicitly in ST I, q. 85, art. 5, corp.25 Note, however, that the famous “reversio ad phantasmata” (see

ST I, q. 86, art. 1, corp.) is not to be understood as a return in a

temporal sense. A person does not in a first moment grasp the uni-

versal form and in a later moment the individual. She rather cognizes

an individual by forming an intelligible species and by attending at

the same time to the phantasm. There is a simultaneous use of cog-

nitive means on the intellectual and the sensory level, as both

N. Kretzmann, “Philosophy of Mind”, op. cit., 142, and E. Stump,

“Aquinas’s Account of the Mechanisms of Intellective Cognition”,

Revue internationale de philosophie 52 (1998), 287–307 (especially

303) have convincingly shown.26 For an overview of the controversy, see L. Spruit, Species intel-

ligibilis: From Perception to Knowledge, op. cit., 175–351; K. H.

Tachau, Vision and Certitude in the Age of Ockham. Optics,

Epistemology and the Foundations of Semantics, 1250–1345, Leiden:

Brill, 1988.27 Ockham explicitly says in In II Sent ., q. XII–XIII, opera

theologica V, ST. Bonaventure: The Franciscan Institute, 1981, 268:

“. . . non oportet aliquid ponere praeter intellectum et rem cognitam,

et nullam speciem penitus.” For a discussion of Ockham’s critique,

see D. Perler, “Things in the Mind: Fourteenth-Century Controversies

over ‘Intelligible Species’”, Vivarium 34 (1996), 231–253.28 Quaestiones in secundum librum Sententiarum, ed. by B. Jansen,

Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1924, vol. II, 469: “. . . si

aliquid aliud interponeretur inter aspectum potentiae et ipsum

obiectum, illud potius velaret rem et impediret eam praesentialiter

aspici in se ipsa quam ad hoc adiuvaret.”29 See Quaestiones, q. 58, vol. II, 468 (last paragraph); q. 74,

vol. III, 114 and 122.30 Quaestiones, q. 58, vol. II, 469: “Ergo absque tali specie et

absque sua tali repraesentatione poterit produci actus cognoscendi,

quia absque tali specie poterit obiectum esse praesens ipsi potentiae.”31 On the existence of the memory species, see Quaestiones, q. 74,

vol. III, 115.32 In Quaestiones, q. 74, vol. III, 116, he simply says, alluding

to the famous Aristotelian metaphor, that the memory species is

“impressed” in the intellect as the shape of a ring is impressed in a

piece of wax.




33 Quaestiones, q. 58, vol. II, 469: “Sed illud ad quod convertitur

aspectus potentiae habet rationem obiecti, et illud ad quod primo con-

vertitur habet rationem primi obiecti. Ergo species istae plus habebunt

rationem obiecti quam rationem principii intermedii seu repraesen-

tativi.” R. Pasnau, Theories of Cognition in the Later Middle Ages,

op. cit., 236f., rightly insists on this crucial passage.34 Quaestiones, q. 58, vol. II, 469: “. . . ab ipsa potentia apprehen-

ditur et cognoscitur tanquam eius obiectum.”35 See Quaestiones, q. 58, vol. II, 482. For a detailed list of Olivi’s

complaints against Aristotle’s authority, see vol. III, 578–580.36 This emphasis on the activity of the intellect is mostly motivated

by Olivi’s Augustinianism. See B. Jansen, “Der Augustinismus des

Petrus Johannis Olivi”, in: A. Lang et al. (eds.), Aus der Geisteswelt

des Mittelalters (Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und

Theologie des Mittelalters, Suppl. 3), Münster: Aschendorff, 1935,

878–895. But as R. Pasnau, Theories of Cognition in the Later Middle

Ages, op. cit., 168–181, has pointed out, Olivi never comes close to

giving a determinate account of the way the intellect reaches out for

things in the world. In most contexts, he simply makes this bold claim

without filling in the details.

37 For instance Duns Scotus (for a discussion see my “Things in the

Mind”, op. cit.) or most explicitly John of Reading in his detailed

defense of the species-theory. See G. Gál, “Quaestio Ioannis de

Reading de necessitate specierum intelligibilium. Defensio doctrinae

Scoti”, Franciscan Studies 29 (1969), 66–156.38 That is why I cannot agree with R. Pasnau when he concludes

his otherwise lucid and inspiring study by saying that “[t]here is no

radical conceptual difference between the role of early-modern ideas

and the role of Aquinas’s species” (see note 5 above). There is a

crucial difference: Aquinas’s species make the forms present to the

mind, Locke’s ideas do not, simply because there are no forms in

Locke’s metaphysics.39 H. Putnam, “Aristotle after Wittgenstein”, in idem, Words and

Life, ed. by J. Conant, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press,

1994, 68.40 H. Putnam, “Aristotle after Wittgenstein”, op. cit., 74.

Universität Basel

Switzerland

122 DOMINIK PERLER

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