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Political Learning from Presidential DebatesAuthor(s): Thomas M. HolbrookReviewed work(s):Source: Political Behavior, Vol. 21, No. 1 (Mar., 1999), pp. 67-89Published by: SpringerStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/586586 .

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Political Behavior, Vol. 21, No. 1, 1999

POLITICALEARNINGROMPRESIDENTIALDEBATES

Thomas M.Holbrook

This paper focuses on an important aspect of presidential debates: the degree towhich voters are able to glean candidate information from them. Using an open-ended measure of candidate information, the analysis tests hypotheses concerningthe impact of debates on information acquisition among the mass public for all de-

bates from 1976 to 1996. The findings indicate that people do learn from debates and

that learning is affected by the context in which the information is encountered.

Specifically, early debates generate more learning than do subsequent debates, and

the public tends to learn more about candidates with whom they are relatively unfa-

miliar than about better-known candidates.

An area of increasing interest among students of electoral politics is theimpact of political campaigns on voting behavior and elections. A number of

analyses, looking at many different aspects of campaignsand using many dif-

ferent types of data, have illustrated that campaigns have considerable influ-

ence over the contours of candidate support (Bartels, 1993; Campbell et al.,

1992; Finkel, 1993; Geer, 1988; Holbrook, 1996; Lanoue, 1991, 1992; Shaw,1995; Shelley and Hwang, 1991). This is not to say that campaigns alone

determine election outcomes, or even that they are the most importantdeter-minant of election outcomes, only that campaigns are one of the important

factors that help to shape the eventual outcome.While it is clear that campaigns influence public opinion, the process thatunderlies this influence remains somewhat a mystery.The most reasonable

explanationfor campaign effects is that campaigns influence public opinionby generating persuasive information-information that, once acquired, has

potential to move the electorate in one direction or the other. Popkin (1991)

argues that the typical voter is not very sophisticated and is in great need ofthe informationproduced by campaigns, and it is this need for informationthat makes voters susceptible to persuasion by the campaigns. Gelman and

Thomas M. Holbrook, Department of Political Science, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee,P.O. Box 413, Milwaukee,WI 53201.

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1999 Plenum PublishingCorporation190-9320/99/0300-0067$16.00/0

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King (1993) also point to the information-producing unction of the campaignas an important explanationfor why elections are so predictable.Accordingto

Gelman and King, as campaignsunfold, they provide voters with informationthat enables them to make "enlightened"decisions-decisions that reflect theinfluence of fundamental variables such as partisanship and retrospectivejudgments.

It is this assumption-that voters learn from campaigns-that is investi-

gated in this paper. Specifically,this analysisdocuments the amount of infor-mation acquisition that takes place following presidential debates and spe-cifies the conditions under which information acquisition is most likely tooccur.

INFORMATION ROCESSINGDURINGPRESIDENTIALAMPAIGNS

For the purposes of this paper, political learning is defined as the acquisi-tion of political information as a consequence of exposure to the campaignprocess. The focus of this definition is on informationacquisition, which is

very similar to what Zaller (1992) refers to as the "reception"of politicalinformation in his work on attitude formation. According to Zaller, the "re-

ception"of information has two stages: In order for voters to receive informa-

tion they must (a) be exposed to it and (b) comprehend it (Zaller, 1992, p. 42;see also Zaller and Price, 1993). This analysistreats informationacquisitionas

something analogous to "comprehension"and focuses on a very simple re-search question: Do voters possess, or are voters able to recall, more candi-date informationfollowing major campaignevents, such as debates, than theypossessed prior to that event? In other words, does the electorate learn fromdebates?

Alternative Models of Information AcquisitionDifferent informationprocessing models have different implicationsfor the

amount of informationacquisition one might expect during a political cam-

paign. Generally speaking, informationprocessing models can be placed intoone of two different categories: memory-based and on-line models (Hastieand Park, 1986). Briefly, memory-based models assume that voters acquireand store information over the course of a campaign and then search their

long-term memory for relevant pieces of informationat the moment of deci-

sion. On-line models, on the other hand, assume that voters integrate infor-

mation into evaluations of the candidates as the information is encountered,makingadjustmentsin something analogous to a "runningtally"of candidate

evaluations,and have little need to store information n their long-term mem-

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POLITICALEARNINGROMPRESIDENTIALEBATES

ory (Lau, 1995; Lodge et al., 1989; Lodge and Stroh, 1993; Lodge et al.,1995).

Zaller (1992) offers what he calls a "bounded"on-line model as an alterna-tive to the on-line/memory-baseddichotomy.In essence, the bounded on-linemodel does not argue with the idea of a running tally, but suggests insteadthat there is no reason to assume that new information is used to update allrelevant attitudes or that people do not still have a need to store politicalinformation that can be used at some later point.

If the on-line model accurately describes information processing duringpresidentialcampaigns,it would be expected that voters will hold very little interms of specific informationabout the candidates (Lodge et al., 1989). As a

result, we may not see significantpatterns of information acquisitionfollow-ing important campaign events, because voters have little incentive to storeinformationin their long-term memory.On the other hand, to the degree thatthe memory-basedor "bounded"on-line models apply to voter decision mak-

ing, we might expect to see clearer patternsof informationacquisitionfollow-

ing the debates.

Conditions for Information Acquisition

Whether the

processis on-line or

memory-based,there are other

expecta-tions concerning the conditions under which one might expect a given pieceof campaign information to be most useful and, hence, likely to be acquired.In particular,the value of a given piece of information is likely to be a func-tion of the relative scarcityof, and demand for, informationat the time it isencountered. If voters have been exposed to relativelylittle information abouta particularcandidate, each additional piece of information is not likely tohave been previouslyencountered and may be deemed relevant to the candi-date evaluation and incorporatedinto long-term memory.On the other hand,if voters have alreadybeen exposed to large amounts of informationabout a

candidate, the likelihood of an additional piece of information being rele-vant-or new-is relatively low. The demand for information should alsoaffect its value. Informationmay be available for consumption, but if demandis low, it is of very little value. For instance, campaigninformationis likely tobe more useful to undecided voters than to people who have alreadydecidedhow they will vote. If this is the case, then as the campaign progresses andmore people decide how to vote, there should be less demand for informa-tion, even though it is in plentiful supply.

Based on these assumptions,one might expect campaign informationto be

most useful and demonstratethe greatest impact (a) duringthe earlystages ofthe campaign, when there is relatively little information available and whenthere is a larger stock of undecided voters, who should be seeking informa-

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tion, and (b) when the informationpertains to candidates about whom votershave relativelylittle information and less clearly formed impressions-usually

the candidate from the challenging party (all elections since 1956 have in-volved an incumbent president or vice president). These assumptions find

partial support in the work of Brady and Johnston (1987), who examined

political learning during the 1984 primary campaign and found that peoplelearned much more about lesser-known candidates than about Reagan and

Mondale, as long as information about the lesser knowns was available.

Althoughthe emphasis in this analysisis on informationacquisition,studies

of the persuasive impact of campaignsalso suggest that the conditions underwhich information is encountered affect the way it is processed. Although

these studies focus on persuasionratherthan on informationacquisition,theybear directly on the connection between context and informationacquisition

by virtue of the fact that information acquisition is an importantpart of the

process of persuasion (though not all informationwill be persuasiveonce it is

acquired).Indeed, the propositionsoutlined above find furthersupportin the

work of Bartels (1993), who noted that exposure to the media during the

presidentialcampaigns appearsto have the greatest impact "whenprior opin-ions are weak, most notably for 'new' candidates or issues"(p. 275). In addi-

tion, Campbell et al. (1992) and Holbrook (1996) used similarlogic to explain

whythe

party holdingthe first convention (the

challengingparty)almost al-

ways enjoys a larger postconvention bump than the party holding the second

convention.

RESEARCHON DEBATES ND POLITICALEARNING

The clearest evidence of learning during presidential campaigns comes

from studies of primaryelections, where it has been shown that voters learn a

great deal about the candidates as they are exposed to campaigninformation

(Bartels, 1988; Brady and Johnston, 1987; Popkin, 1991). But primaryelec-

tions represent situationsin which one might expect campaigninformationtobe most important to voters and, hence, in which learning is most likely to

take place: They usually involve several candidates about whom voters have

very little information.General elections pose a more imposing test for theories of political learn-

ing, since one candidate is usually the incumbent president or vice presidentand the other has usually come through a contested primaryseason. Given

that people are likely to have more informationabout the candidates at the

beginning of the general election campaign (postprimaries),one might not

expect to find as much learning takingplace as is found in primaryelections.However, one of the earliest studies of campaign dynamics found that expo-sure to the campaign via the mass media was directly linked to the level of

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information people held about the candidates (Berelson et al., 1954). This

finding was buttressed by Patterson'sexhaustive analysisof the impact of the

media on the 1976 campaign, although the impact was found to vary some-what by medium of exposure (Patterson, 1980).

Presidentialdebates represent one of the most stringenttests for the effect

of campaignson political learning,because they are held relativelylate in the

campaign. Nevertheless, debates are still one of the most visible forms of

campaign activityand should be expected to generate useful informationfor

the electorate. Indeed there is some evidence from previous research to sup-

port the idea that debates perform an important teaching function. A number

of early studies focused on the impact of the 1976 debates. Chaffee and

Dennis (1979) found that, if nothing else, debate viewers at least say theylearned something from the debates. Chaffee (1978) also found that the de-

bates appearedto increase the abilityof Wisconsin voters to answerquestionsabout the candidates and their issue positions. Miller and MacKuen, using a

national sample of voters, confirm this in their conclusion that "the 1976debates produced a better informed electorate than would have existed if thedebates had not been held" (1979, p. 292). This finding is buttressed by thework of Bishop, Oldendick, and Tuchfarber (1978), who concluded in their

study of Cincinnati area respondents that exposure to the 1976 debates in-creased the level of issue awareness.

Similarly,Becker, Sobowale,

Cobbey,and Eyal (1978) found that the debates increased the level of understandingof the candidates and issues among a sample of voters from upstate NewYork.

Sears and Chaffee (1979) provided a comprehensive review of the researchon the 1976 debates and concluded that the debates were successful at com-

municating candidate issue positions. One additional finding from their re-view that is particularlyrelevant to this analysis is that voters appeared tohave learned more from the first debate than from the subsequent debates.Lanoue and Schrott suggested that this "primacy"effect is probably due to

the fact that the uninformed are most likely to encounter new informationfrom the firstdebate, and that the subsequent debates are likelyto repeat thethemes of the first debate (1991, p. 110). This explanation,of course, fits verywell with the expectations of this analysis.

More recent work also supports the learning function of debates. Lemert

(1993) found that the 1988 debates produced gains in voters' knowledge ofissues in the campaign,but that these gains were not equallyfelt-in general,the debates increased the "knowledge gap"between high and low informationvoters. Drew and Weaver (1991), using surveys of voters in Indiana, con-

cluded that people who watched the 1988 debates had more knowledge aboutthe candidates' issue positions than those who did not watch the debates, butthat exposure to the 1992 debates had no discernible impact on knowledge of

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candidate issue positions (Weaver and Drew, 1995). Lanoue (1991), using a

student sample, found that although the second debate of 1988 had no per-

suasive impact, it did increase the level of information held by viewers, espe-cially in the short term. Lanoue (1992) also found that low-informationvoters

made greatest use of the informationgenerated by the 1980 Carter/Reagandebate. In addition, Lenart's(1994) experimental study of the 1988 debates

found evidence of learning in response to media coverage and, to a lesser

extent, interpersonalcommunicationsabout the debates.

There is, then, a considerable body of research indicating an important

learningfunction for presidentialdebates. But there is still much to be gainedfrom the structure and approachof this study. First, this analysisfocuses on

the impact of fifteen debates acrosssix different election years, thus providinga more general picture of debates than has previouslybeen offered. Second,this study emphasizes an aspect of political learningthat has heretofore been

relatively unexplored: the impact of the context (timing and level of previ-

ously held information) in which the information is provided. Focusing on

several debates acrossseveralyears, involvingseveral different candidatesen-

hances the abilityto consider the impact of context.

Based on the existing literature, as well as the earlier discussion of the

value of information,this analysis tests the following propositions:(a) presi-dential debates increase the level of informationvoters have about

presiden-tial candidates;(b) debates held relativelyearly in the fall campaignresult in

greater informationgains than those held later in the campaign;and (c) de-

bates are more likely to increase the amount of informationvoters have about

the lesser-knowncandidates than about better-knowncandidates.

MEASURINGCANDIDATENFORMATION

The dependent variablein this analysis s the amount of candidateinforma-

tion held

by

the

generalpublic, as articulatedthrough open-ended candidate

evaluation questions asked in the biennial National Election Study (NES).

Althoughclose-ended factualand issue position questions are frequentlyused

in studies of voter knowledge and have been used to study informationacqui-sition during campaigns (Brady and Johnston, 1987), open-ended questionsoffer a number of advantagesfor this study. First, as useful as close-ended

questions are for many purposes, it is difficult for the NES (or anybodyelse)to anticipate which issues are likely to be important in the campaign, and

especially difficult to anticipatewhich issues will be discussed duringthe de-

bates. As a consequence, close-ended questions may or may not be related to

the content of the debates. Second, although there is some over-time con-sistency in the close-ended questions used by the National Election Study(NES), the formatof the open-ended questions is identical fromyear to year,

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makingit easier to create measures of candidate informationthat are compa-rable over time. Finally, open-ended questions allowthe respondent to define

what he or she sees as relevant pieces of candidate information. For instance,it is very likelythat voters arejust as interested in, and campaignsprovide justas much information about, many candidate characteristics other than issue

positions (affability, integrity, honesty, leadership, etc). Indeed, Miller andMacKuen (1979, p. 47), using essentially the same measure of informationused here, found that while the 1976 debates increased the amount of issue-based information voters had about the candidates, they had an even greaterimpact on levels of partisan and personality-basedinformation.Using open-ended candidate evaluation questions allows the respondents to articulate

those aspects of the candidates that they find most relevant to their votechoice, whether issue based or not.

The specific items used to measure candidate information are derived fromthe candidate likes and dislikes questions from the NES preelection surveys.'The text of these questions is:

Now I'd like to ask you about the good and bad points about the majorcandidates for president. Is there anything in particularabout <candidatename> that might make you want to vote for him?

If respondents answer in the affirmative, they are then probed further andallowed to list up to five reasons why they might want to vote for the candi-date. Then they are given an opportunity to list up to five reasons why theymight want to vote againstthe same candidate. In total, these questions allow

respondents to articulateup to ten reasons why they would either vote for or

against a candidate. The specific measure used here is the total number ofarticulations,positive and negative, about the candidatesprovided by the re-

spondent. For a single candidate, this variable can range in value from 0

(nothing to say about the candidate) to 10 (tenaspects

of the candidatewerementioned). Although this may not be a perfect measure of candidate infor-mation, it clearly captures the amount of informationrespondents are able toaccess and articulate when making judgements about the candidates. Thismeasure of candidate informationhas a rich research traditionand has beenused to measure the structure of political information(Lau, 1986, 1995; De-Sart, 1995), as well as levels of political sophistication (Smith, 1989; Zaller,1989; but see also Rahn et al., 1994).

THE MPACTOF DEBATESON CANDIDATE NFORMATIONIn order to measure the influence of debates on candidateinformation, t is

necessary to compare informationheld prior to the debates with information

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held following the debates. Fortunately, the design of the NES lends itself

quite well to this type of analysis:During presidential election years, there is

both a preelection and a postelection component to the survey,with the pre-election survey going into the field in early September and continuing until

just before election day. Because the focus here is on learning during the

campaign,all of the items used in the analysisare taken from the preelectionwave of the survey. Since respondents are asked the candidate likes/dislikes

questions in the preelection wave, it is possible to compare the level of infor-

mation of those interviewed before the debates with that of those interviewed

followingthe debates. If debates produce an increase in the amount of candi-

date information held by the public, the postdebate respondents should hold

more information than the predebate respondents, all else held equal. Tocapture the impact of debates on political learning, debate dummy variables

were created and scored 0 for those interviewed prior to a presidential de-

bate, and 1 for those interviewed after the debate. A positive coefficient for

this variable would indicate that levels of information are higher after the

debate than before.2Of course there are a number of other factors that might contribute to the

amount of candidate information held by both pre- and postdebate respon-dents. First, since the ability to articulate reasons for supportingor oppos-

ing a candidate can also be considereda measure of

political sophistication(Smith, 1989), it is necessary to control for factors typicallyassociated with

political sophistication. To this end, a number of control variables are in-

cluded in the model: number of years of education (Education), interest in

the campaign(Interest), the interviewer'sestimate of the respondent's evel of

intelligence (Intelligence), a dichotomous variable for race (White), and a

dichotomous variable for gender (Female). These variables all have a longtradition of demonstrated salience in studies of political knowledge and so-

phistication (Bennett, 1988, 1989; Luskin, 1990; Smith, 1989). In addition,one could

arguethat the

abilityto articulatecandidatelikes and dislikescould

be driven by personality;that is, some people are much chattier than others

and will provide more responses to any kind of open-ended question, simplydue to magniloquence. In an effort to control for this influence, a variable

measuring the length of the interview in minutes (Verbosity)is included in

the model (see Appendix for a complete description of how the variablesare

coded and their anticipated relationshipwith the dependent variable).

Levels of Information

Figure 1 illustratesthe amount of candidate informationheld by the public

duringthe fall campaignsfrom 1976 to 1992.3A number of findingsjump out

from this figure. First, the typical respondent does not hold much informa-

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*4-

1 1 I I I I1976 1980 1984 1988 1992 1996

IIncumbent * ChallengerL ThirdParty

FIG. 1. Candidatenformationn presidentiallections,1976-1996.

tion about the candidates. When given an opportunityto express up to tenreasons for voting for or against each of the candidatos, the average respon-dent was unable to list more than three reasons and frequently listed fewer.

In addition, in most years respondents had more information about somecandidates than about others. In general, this pattern fits the expectationslisted earlier: The public holds more informationabout incumbent candidatesthan about challengers.This is clearlythe case in 1980, 1984, 1992, and 1996but less so the case in 1976 and 1988, when the public held roughly equallevels of information about the candidates.This pattern is remarkablysimilarto the patternof candidate uncertaintyuncovered by Alvarez and supportshisconclusion that "the candidate from the party challenging an incumbent al-

ways has greater uncertainty associated with their policy stands" (Alvarez,

1997, p. 163). It is also quite clear from Figure 1 that voters have much lessinformation about third-partycandidates than about their major party oppo-nents.

While it is importantto acknowledge that voters hold relativelylittle infor-

mation about presidential candidates,what is more importantfor this analysisis that respondents hold predictablydifferent levels of information about dif-

ferent candidates. According to the expectations discussed earlier, this asym-metry of information is expected to influence the amount of information ac-

quisition that takes place. Specifically, debates should be more useful

for providing information about lesser-known candidates than about better-known candidates.

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Determinants of Candidate Information

The first part of the analysisof the impact of campaignson political learn-

ing is presented in Table 1. The dependent variable in the model is the levelof information (total number of candidate comments) held by respondentsabout the majorparty candidates running in a given year. Although they areincluded in later analyses, comments about John Anderson and Ross Perot

are not included in this part of the analysis.4The 1992 analysisalso includes

only variables measuring the impact of the first and third debates, and ex-

cludes the second debate. Because the three debates took place within an

eight-day period, there was a high level of collinearity among the three de-

bate variables, with the second one being the most collinear (tolerance =

.21). Therefore, it was decided that two debate variables would suffice.5

TABLE 1. The Impact of Debates on Information Acquisition DuringPresidential Campaigns

1976 1980 1984 1988 1992 1996b b b b b b

(S.E.) (S.E.) (S.E.) (S.E.) (S.E.) (S.E.)

Constant 2.920 2.980 4.11* 4.59* 2.51* 1.12*(.65) (.76) (.66) (.76) (.67) (.83)

1st Debate .45* -.03 .19 .56* .22 .41*

(.18) (.16) (.16) (.18) (.17) (.21)2nd Debate .40* .51? .18 .34** -.18

(.14) (.23) (.19) (.18) -(.22)3rd Debate .08 -.28

(.09) - - - (.20) -

Intelligence -.72 -.70* -.96* -.84* -.86* -.83*

(.09) (.12) (.10) (.11) (.10) (.12)Education .17* .25* .27* .24* .26* .28*

(.02) (.03) (.03) (.03) (.03) (.03)Interest -.47? -.48* -.59* -.73 - .69? -.54?

(.04) (.05) (.05) (.05) (.05) (.06)

Verbosity .04* .03* .03* .02* .04* .04*

(.003) (.004) (.003) (.004) (.003) (.004)White .37* .50* .32 .83* .57* .85*

(.18) (.22) (.20) (.21) (.18) (.22)Female -.39* -.26?* -.44* -.70* .11 .10

(.12) (.14) (.13) (.15) (.14) (.16)N 1975 1433 2056 1650 2192 1643

R2 .30 .33 .33 .33 .33 .28

Note:The dependentvariables the totalnumberof majorpartycandidatementionsn re-

sponse o the likes/dislikesuestions.?p< .05 (two-tailed);?p< .10 (two-tailed).

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The results in Table 1 offer some signs, albeit mixed, of informationgainsin the wake of presidential debates. First, five out of the thirteen debate

coefficients are significant(p < .05) and in the anticipateddirection, and onecoefficient is significant if a less stringent standard(p < .10) is applied. But

the debates are more useful in some years than in others: The first two de-

bates of 1976 were significantlyrelated to candidate information;the second

debate of 1980 (the first one with the two major party candidates) had a

significanteffect; neither of the debates in 1984 had an impact on learning;both debates in 1988 increased information;neither debate had an impact in

1992; and the first debate had an impact in 1996.

A closer examinationof these results lends support to the "primacy" rgu-

ment made earlier in this paper: that early debates are more important tolearningthan are later debates. With the exception of 1980 and 1984, the first

debate in each year was either the only debate to demonstrate a significantinfluence on learningor had a largercoefficient than the subsequent debates.

The exceptions do not really detract from the general pattern: In 1984 nei-

ther debate was significant, and in 1980 the second debate was the only one

involving both Carter and Reagan (recall that the first debate was between

Anderson and Reagan) and represented the first chance voters had to com-

pare the two majorpartycandidates.These results, then, support the hypoth-esis that the

earlydebates

representthe best

opportunityfor voters to

acquireinformation about the candidates. This may indicate that by the time the

second and third debates roll around later in the campaign,voters have less

use for the information,either because they have heard it all before (perhapsin the first debate) or they have decided how to vote and are closed off to

new information.6The candidate-by-candidate analysis in Table 2 allows for a further exam-

ination of the timing hypothesis, as well as an examination of the impact ofrelative levels of candidate informationon the degree of informationacquisi-tion following debates. The dependent variable is still the total number of

comments respondents are able to make about specific candidates whenasked for their likes and dislikes. The pattern of results in Table 2 buttressesthe findings from Table 1 concerning the timing of debates. When the anal-

ysis is broken down by candidate, there is still a strong tendency for the firstdebate to have the greatest impact on learning: Nine of fifteen (60%) firstdebate coefficients are significant and in the anticipated direction, whereas

only five of the seventeen (29%)coefficients for the subsequent debates sup-port the learning hypothesis. Again,the implicationis that timing is an impor-tant determinant of mass political learning.

A potential problem with the findings regardingtiming is that the signifi-cant first debate coefficients could be picking up a general learning effect

early in the campaign, as anticipated in the earlier discussion, and the less

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TABLE 2. The Impact of Debates on the Acquisition of Candidate-Specific Information Dur1976-1996

1976 1980 1984 1988

Ford Carter Carter Reagan Anderson Reagan Mondale Bush Dukakis Bush

Constant 1.61' 1.30? 1.54? 1.49' .38 .33* 2.13' 1.92* 2.73* 1.570

(.38) (.37) (.43) (.45) (.42) (.12) (.37) (.44) (.42) (.40)1st Debate .20?* .21? .01 -.03 .190 .01 .190 .23* .32* .06

(.11) (.10) (.09) (.10) (.09) (.09) (.09) (.10) (.1) ((.11)2nd Debate .290 .13 .24?* .29* -.02 .10 .07 .12 .24*

(.08) (.08) (.14) (.14) (.13) (.12) (.11) (.10) (.10)3rd Debate .04 .05 -.16

(.05) (.05) - - - - (.12)

Intelligence -.38? -.34* -.29? -.39? -.32* -.49' -.46 -.43 -.41 -.47*

(.05) (.05) (07(07) ( .07) (06) ( .06) (.06) 07) (.06) (.06)Education .08* .090 .12? .14 .10* .16? .110 .12 .110 .12?

(.01) (.01) (.02) (.02) (.02) (.02) (.01) (.02) (.02) (.02)Interest -.24* -.24* -.240 -.25* -.190 -.27? -.310 -.340 -.39* -.35*

(.02) (.02) (.03) (.03) (.03) (.03) (.03) (.03) (.03) (.03)

Verbosity .02* .02* .02* .01* .010 .02* .010 .01* .01* .02*

(.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.003) (.003) (.002)White .23" .14 .12 .37* .380 .33* .003 .64? .19 .410

(.11) (.11) (.13) (.13) (.12) (.12) (.11) (.12) (.12) (.11)Female -.250 -.15? -.10 -.15?* -.23? - .490 -.16? -.26? -.43* .002

(.07) (.07) (.08) .08) (.08) (.06) (.07) (.09) (.09) (.02)N 2048 2030 1509 1455 1317 2146 2103 1693 1690 2237R2 .23 .24 .22 .25 .22 .27 .25 .26 .27 .27

Note: The top entries represent the unstandardizedregression coefficients, and the parentheticalentries recoefficients. The Perot equation is based on fewer respondentsbecause the NES did not ask respondents for rPerot until after Perot entered the race on the first of October.

?p < .05 (two-tailed);*"p< .10 (two-tailed).

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significant second and third debate coefficients could reflect the fact that

people are generally less likely to acquire new information late in the cam-

paign. Two important pieces of evidence tend to negate this argument,how-ever. First, if it were the case that the debate coefficients were simplymeasuringthe passage of time, it would be expected that they would be signi-ficant even for those candidates who did not participate in certain debates

(Carter,first debate, 1980; Anderson, second debate, 1980; Perot, both de-bates in 1996). Yet, there is no evidence in Table 2 of informationgains forcandidates who did not participate in the debates. Second, when variables

measuringdate of interviewwere added to the analysisin Table2, none were

significant,though most of the debate coefficients retained their significance.7

Still, due to the limitations inherent in these data, one must recognize thepossibility that the debate-induced patterns of learning found here could re-flect other sources of learning during the campaign.

Turningto the question of how the relative level of candidate informationinfluences informationacquisition, the results in Table 2 once again providesupport for the information context hypothesis. A close examinationof thecoefficients reveals that in every year the debates produced much more sig-nificantamountsof informationfor the lesser-knowncandidate(s)than for thebetter-knowcandidate. In 1976, knowledge about Ford was increased by thefirst and second

debates,but

knowledgeabout Carterwas

only influenced bythe first debate. In 1980, the Reagan/Andersondebate only increased knowl-

edge about Anderson, and the Carter/Reagandebate increased informationabout both participants, although the coefficient for Reagan is somewhat

largerand reaches a higher level of significance.The first debate of 1984 onlyaffected knowledge of Mondale, and the second debate had no impact. In1988, the first debate increased knowledge about both candidates, althoughthe effect was stronger for Dukakis, and the second debate only influenced

knowledge about Dukakis.Although there is no statisticallysignificantdiffer-ence between the overall levels of information about the two candidates in1988 (see Figure 1), it might be assumed that the debates represented abetter opportunity to learn about Dukakis because Bush, as vice president,had more noncampaignavenues of providing information.The 1992 debatesdid nothing to increase informationabout Bush, whereas the first debate af-fected the level of informationabout both Clinton and Perot, and the thirddebate only influenced the level of Perot information.Finally,the firstdebateof 1996 increased the level of information about Dole, but neither of thedebates had an impact on levels of informationabout Clinton, the best knownof the candidates, or Perot, who did not participate in the debates.

Overall, the pattern of relationships is quite striking:Only three of thethirteen (27%) coefficients for the better-known candidates (this treats Bushas the better-knowncandidate in 1988) were significantand in the anticipated

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direction, whereas eleven of nineteen (58%)coefficients for the lesser-knowncandidates were positive and significant. This pattern strongly suggests that

informationgenerated by debates is more likely to fill gaps in the electorate'sknowledge of the lesser-known candidate than the better-known candidate.This does not necessarilymean that the lesser-knowncandidate benefits polit-ically from the debates, since the new information could just as likely be

negative information as positive. Instead, these findings indicate that peopleare more likely to learn about lesser-knowncandidatesfrom the debates thanabout alreadyfamiliar candidates.

The Impact of Exposure

Thus far the emphasis has been on the impact of debates on information

acquisition for the entire electorate, regardless of individual differencesin debate exposure. Although it is probably safe to assume some minimal

amount of general exposure to major events such as debates, not all voters

will avail themselves of the opportunity to be exposed to the debates either

directly or indirectly.The question, then, is to what degree does exposureinfluence learning from presidential debates? Surely,events such as debates,which

generateinformation and sound bites well

beyondthe

night theyoccur,

can be useful sources of information even for those who do not watch them.

However,while voters can certainly pick up informationabout the debate via

the mass media (Lanoue and Schrott 1991; Lemert et al., 1991; Lenart, 1994)and from interpersonalcommunications(Lenart, 1994), it should be expectedthat debates are more useful sources of information to those who actuallywatch them than to those who pick up the informationsecondhand.

Unfortunately, the NES has not always asked respondents whether theywatched the debates; and when they have asked, they have not alwaysused

the same question format. Nonetheless, the 1976, 1984, and 1996 election

studies do afford an opportunityto examine the impact of debate viewing oninformation acquisition. In 1976, respondents were asked how many of the

debates they watched (some respondents listed more debates than actuallytook place), and in 1984 and 1996 respondents were asked specificallywhich

of the debates they had watched. From these variablesit is possible to assess

the general level of debate exposure in 1976 and exposure to specific debates

in 1984 and 1996. To gauge the impact of debate exposure, new dummyvariableswere created and coded 0 for those who did not watch the debate,or who were interviewed prior to the debate, and 1 for those who did watch

the debate and who were interviewed after the debate.8These variables,then,identify debate viewers who were interviewed following the debates. The co-

efficients for these variablesreveal the amount of postdebate learning(if any)

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POLITICAL EARNINGFROM PRESIDENTIALEBATES

that accrues to debate viewers above and beyond the amount that accrues to

all respondents.

The analysis of the impact of debate viewing on political learning is pre-sented in Table 3. These results provide some support for the argument thatdebates are more useful sources of information to those who actuallywatchedthem than to those who did not; however, they also supportthe argumentthatthose who did not watch the debate were still able to garer useful informa-tion from them. In 1976, the first debate only had an impact on those who

reported watching the debate, and the second debate influenced all respon-dents regardlessof level of exposure; in 1984, the first debate had an impacton levels of candidate information but only for those who reported having

TABLE 3. The Impact of Direct Exposure on Information AcquisitionFollowing the 1976, 1984, and 1996 Debates

1976 1984 1996

Constant 2.84* 3.99* 1.18*

(.73) (.68) (.83)1st Debate -.19 -.13 .60*

(.38) (.21) (.25)

2nd Debate .61* .05 -.60*(.29) (.29) (-.28)

3rd Debate .13

(.14) -

Watched * 1st Debate .95* .64* -.23

(.42) (.22) (.25)Watched * 2nd Debate -.23 .15 .86?

(.33) (.33) (.33)Watched * 3rd Debate -.03

(.12) -

Intelligence -.70? -.97? -.85?

(.10) (.10) (.13)Education .17* .27* .29*(.03) (.03) (.04)

Interest -.44* - .56* - .52*

(.05) (.05) (.06)Verbosity .04? .03* .04*

(.003) (.003) (.004)White .29 .30 .84*

(.22) (.20) (.23)Female -.41? -.47* .12

(.13) (.14) (.16)

N 1663 1936 1539R2 .30 .33 .28

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op < .05; **??p .10.

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watched the debate; and in 1996, the first debate had an impact on all re-

spondents, but the second debate had a positive impact only on those who

reported watching it.9Again, these findings suggest that debates generate thelargest information gains for those who actuallywatched them, but can also

be an importantsource of informationfor those whose exposure is only indi-

rect.These findings also bear directly on an issue raised earlier concerning the

difficultyof separatingdebate-induced learningfrom the general effect of the

campaignon learning. One way of interpretingthe interactionterms in Table

3 is that they represent the impact of direct exposure to the debates while

controlling for indirect exposure and all other sources of campaign news in

the postdebate period. Although not definitive, this does provide more directevidence in support of the proposition that debates have an important inde-

pendent influence on informationacquisitionduringpresidentialcampaigns.

Watchingthe debates is the most direct way of deriving informationfrom

them, but there are many other indirect avenues of informationgathering.In

particular,media coverage of the debate and political discussions seem to be

likely paths of indirect exposure to the debates. It might be expected that the

politicallyawareand interested would be the most likelyto expose themselves

to these indirect sources of information,just as they are more likely to take

advantageof direct

exposure.As a result, one

might expectto find a relation-

ship between general access to political information and the likelihood of

acquiringnew informationfrom debates.

The data in Table 4 represent the impact of the debates (regressioncoeffi-

cients) on information acquisition during each of the six elections, broken

down by level of political information, interest in the campaign, and parti-

sanship, all of which can reasonablybe expected to influence the degree to

which people expose themselves to campaign information.'0In general, al-

though it is not a strong monotonic pattern, there is some indication that

those who are alreadypoliticallyengaged are the most likely to gain informa-

tion from debates. There is a positive relationshipbetween level of political

knowledge and amount of information acquired from the debate, with the

most knowledgeable being most strongly affected by the debates. A similar

pattern is found when the sample is broken down accordingto partisanship,with partisans more strongly influenced by debates than are independents.The pattern for political interest is somewhat less clear, with those who said

they were somewhat interested in the campaign being most strongly influ-

enced by the debates.These results indicate that althoughthe information-pooroccasionallyben-

efit from the debates, the general pattern is for the information-richto geteven richer. This pattern is consistent with the general finding from the

"knowledge gap" literature-that increases in the flow of information fre-

quently increase the gap in the amount of informationheld by high- and low-

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TABLE 4. Access to Information and Information Acquisition FollowingPresidential Debates

Level of PoliticalInformation Interest in the Campaign Partisanship

Not VeryDebate Low Average High Much Somewhat Much Independent Partisan

1976First -.05 .39 .92* -.49 .89* .44 .18 .69*

Second .21 .43** .52* .46 .24 .55* .58* .30**

Third -.03 .19 .11 -.05 .09 .17 .18 .03

1980First .71*? .46 .01 .50 .52 -.32 .65 .14

Second .67 .00 .95 .57 .51 .04 .41 .36

1984First .27 .04 .13 .17 .37 -.08 .31 .10

Second .07 .34 .21 .15 .24 .01 -.29 .47**1988

First .19 .26 .81* .37 .60* .67* .57** .52*

Second .25 .82* .42 .52** .56* -.16 .08 .46*

1992First .10 .002 .37 .35 .10 .28 .55* .05Third -.19 0.02 -.35 -.70 -.29 -.10 -.91' .10

1996First 1.05' .06 .25 1.07*0 .35 -.08 .54 .34

Second -.23 .24 -.42 -.60 -.05 -.08 -.34 -.17Number

signifi-cant andin theantici-

pated di-rection 2 2 3 2 3 2 3 5

Note: The level of political informationis taken from the interviewer'sperception of the levelof knowledge the respondent demonstratedabout politics and public affairs(veryhigh/fairlyhigh= high, average = average, fairlylow/verylow = low); campaigninterest is taken in its original

categories from the standard NES interest question; and partisanshipis based on the standardNES partyidentificationquestion (independents/leaners = independents, weak and strongparti-sans = partisans).

*p < .05; *p < .10.

information people (Gaziano, 1983; Tichenor et al., 1970; Donohue et al.,1987)-as well as the specific finding that presidential debates can lead to a

widening knowledge gap (Lemert, 1993).

CONCLUSIONSThe focus of this paper has been on the extent to which the electorate

acquires information-or learns-from presidential campaigns. Relying ondebates as the measurable campaign stimulus, the analysisproduced a num-

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ber of important findings. First, major events such as debates do stimulate

information acquisition among the mass public. Generally speaking, respon-

dents interviewed after a debate were able to retrieve more informationabout the presidential candidates than those interviewed prior to the debate,all else held constant. This effect was not always present and it varied in

terms of magnitude but, on balance, the evidence points to debates as an

importantsource of candidate informationduring presidentialcampaigns."The second major conclusion of this analysis is that the context in which

informationis presented affects the degree to which it is acquired. The evi-

dence overwhelmingly indicates that the most important debate, at least in

terms of information acquisition, is the first debate. In virtually every in-

stance, subsequent debates either had weaker or nonexistent effects. Thispattern is best explained by the value of the information at the time it is

encountered. The first debate is held at a time when voters have less informa-

tion at their disposal and a larger share of voters are likely to be undecided.

In addition, as Lanoue and Schrott (1991, p. 110) point out, much of the

informationpresented in subsequent debates may also have been presentedin the first debate. As a consequence, each piece of informationprovided in

the first debate is likely to be of more value than informationprovided in the

remaining debates.Another

finding regardingcontext is that the

impactof information de-

pends upon the subject of the information.Following virtuallyevery debate,

respondents were more likely to have learned something about the lesser-

knownof the candidatesthan about the better-knowncandidate.The explana-tion for this pattern is similarto that given for the influence of debate timingon information acquisition: If information about one candidate is relativelyscarce, each additionalpiece of informationabout that candidate is less likelyto have been previouslyencountered and will be more useful than would an

additional piece of informationabout better-known candidates. Once again,the value of informationhelps to determine whether it is acquired.

Finally,those who are most directly exposed to political information are themost likely to benefit from the information.This findinghighlightsthe impor-tance of political engagement and the problem inherent in efforts to get polit-ical information to the masses. Simplyput, even for high-visibilityevents such

as debates, the learningbenefits that accrue go most directlyto those who are

already politically engaged. Uninformed and disengaged voters-those who

could potentiallybenefit the most from campaigninformation-are not suffi-

ciently exposed to the political messages and therefore do not gain as much

informationfrom the campaignas do the politicallyengaged.

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POLITICAL EARNINGFROM PRESIDENTIALEBATES

APPENDIX: ESCRIPTIONF INDEPENDENTARIABLESNDANTICIPATEDELATIONSHIPSOCANDIDATENFORMATION

Debates Dichotomous variablescoded 0 for all respondents interviewed prior tothe debate and 1 for all respondents interviewed following the debate

(positive relationshipto candidate information).

Intelligence Interviewer'sassessment of respondent's apparent intelligence: 1 = veryhigh, 2 = above average,3 = average,4 = below average,5 = verylow (negative relationshipto candidate information).

Education What is the highest grade of school or year of college you have com-

pleted? Range:0 to 17 (Positive relationshipto candidate information).Interest Some people don't pay much attention to political campaigns.How

about you? Would you say that you have been (1) very much interested,(3) somewhat interested, or (5) not much interested in the politicalcampaignsso far this year (negative relationshipto candidate informa-

tion).

Verbosity Length of interview in minutes (positive relationshipto candidate infor-

mation).White A dichotomous variable coded 0 for all nonwhite respondents and 1 for

all white respondents (positive relationshipto candidate information).Female A dichotomous variable score of 1 for all male respondents and 2 for all

female respondents (negative relationshipto candidate information).

NOTES

1. The studiesusedhere are the 1976,1980 1984, 1988,1992,and 1996AmericanNationalElection Studies (ICPSR studies #7381, #7763, #8298, #9196, #6067, and #6896 respec-tively).Thesedataweremade availableby the Inter-universityorConsortiumor PoliticalandSocialResearch t the Universityf Michigan.

2. Clearly,he idealstrategywould be to use a paneldesignso that a comparisonould bemadeof thepre-andpostdebateevel of informationamong hesamerespondents.histypeof designwouldallowforgreaterconfidencen making tatements bout"changes"n thelevel of information

followingdebate.

Unfortunately,uchdata sets are not

available,t

least not thatare basedon representativeamplesandthat use appropriatemeasures.Nev-ertheless, he strategyused here does allow one to makestatementsabout the impactofdebateson the level of informationeldbythe publicat large: pecificallyhatthose inter-viewedafter he debateholdmore/less/samenformationhanthose nterviewedprior o thedebate,evenwhenstrictcontrolvariables re taken nto account.Statements uchas this

imply hat debates"change"he level of informationeldby the respondents.3. The levels of candidatenformationpresentedn Figure1 are based on responses o the

likes/dislikesquestionsduringSeptember f the electionyears.In 1992,however,he dataforPerotwere taken romOctober ince the NES didnot askaboutPerotuntilhe reenteredthe raceon October1.

4. Andersonomments reexcluded rom he 1980analysis ecause,

whilehe didparticipate

nthe firstdebatewithReagan,he wasnot a participantn the seconddebate,which nvolvedboth Carter ndReagan. n 1992,althoughPerotparticipatedn all threedebates, he NESdid not ask hecandidateikes/dislikesuestionaboutRossPerotuntilhe reentered he race

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on the first of October. Therefore, including Perot in the informationvariablewould cut the

sample size almost in half. Perot is also excluded from the 1996 analysis n order to maintain

the major partyemphasis. Subsequent analyseswill analyzeall candidatesseparately.5. When a variable for the second debate is included in the model, the results for the other two

debates are only slightly affected, but the coefficient for the second debate is marginally

significantand negative, which is a completely counterintuitive result.

6. One potential threat to the validityof this finding is that respondentswho were reluctant or

difficult to contact were, by necessity, interviewed later in the campaign. If these respon-dents were also generally less sophisticated than others, the findings of less information

acquisition later in the campaign may simply reflect a different (less informed) compositionof the sample late in the campaign. To test for this possibility, I also controlled for the

number of callbacks that were required to secure an interview with the respondents (gener-

ally speaking, respondents who required more callbackswere interviewed later in the cam-

paign than were other respondents). The results were encouraging:The variable measuringnumber of callbackswas not significantand in the anticipatingdirection in any of the years.In one case, there was a significant, though counterintuitivefinding, indicatingthat hard-to-

contact respondents had more informationthan other respondents.7. To check for this possibility, I reestimatedall of the equationsin Table2 and added a control

for number of days prior to the election that the respondent was interviewed. Because the

relationshipbetween time of interview and amount of candidate informationis expected to

be curvilinearand indicate diminishingreturns over time, the reciprocal(1/x) and log of this

variable were tested separately.Neither of the days-before-the-electionvariables were signif-icant in anyof the equations. However,the debate coefficients generallyretainedtheir signif-icance (although some of them were diminished due to collinearitywith the days-before-the-election variables).

8. Determining who did and did not watch the debates is an easy matter for 1984 and 1996because the NES asked respondents about each of the debates separately.Therefore, those

who said they did not watch the debate are assigneda score of 0 and those who reporthavingwatched the debate are assigneda score of 1. In 1976, the taskis more difficult,since the NES

only asked respondents how manydebates they watched. The decision rule used is that those

respondentswho reported not watchingthe debates or only havingwatched one debate were

assigneda value of 0 andall others were assigneda valueof 1. While thiscoding makesthe 1976

variableless precise, it is unavoidabledue to the nature of the originalvariable.

9. The negative coefficient for the second debate variable for all respondents at first appearsto

make no sense at all. However, when coupled with the positive coefficient for those who

watched the debate, it indicates a substantial gap in levels of information between viewers

and nonviewers following the debate.10. One might also argue that media usage and political discussion variables could be used in

this analysis.The problem, however, is that the NES did not use a consistent set of media

and discussion variables across the five election studies here, thus preventing comparable

analysisof these variables.When the availablemedia and discussion variablesare used, the

results are not very consistent.

11. As mentioned earlier, this conclusion must be tempered somewhatwith the recognitionthat

with the exception of the analysisof direct exposure to the debates, and despite efforts to

control for other sources of learning, it is still possible that some of the debate effects

uncovered here are influenced by a more general learning process from the campaign.

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