Rawlson Justice

8/12/2019 Rawlson Justice

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hilosophical Review

Rawls on JusticeAuthor(s): Thomas NagelSource: The Philosophical Review, Vol. 82, No. 2 (Apr., 1973), pp. 220-234Published by: Duke University Presson behalf of Philosophical ReviewStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2183770.

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RAWLS ON JUSTICEATHEORY OF JUSTICE' is a rich, complicated, nd funda-mental work. It offers n elaborate set of arguments ndprovidesmany issues for discussion.This reviewwill focus on itscontributiono themore abstractportions f ethical theory.The book contains three elements.One is a vision of men andsociety s they hould be. Another s a conception f moral theory.The third s a constructionhat attempts o derive principles x-pressive f the vision, n accordancewith methodsthat reflect heconception fmoral theory.n that constructionawls has pursuedthe contractarian radition n moral and politicalphilosophy.Hisversionof the social contract, hypotheticalhoice situation alledtheoriginal osition,was first resentedn 1958 and isheredevelopedin great nd explicit etail.The aim is to provide way oftreatinghebasic problemsof social choice,for which no generally ecognizedmethodsof precisesolutionexist, through he proxy of a speciallyconstructedparallel problemof individual choice, which can besolved by the more reliable intuitions nd decisionproceduresofrationalprudence.If this enterprises to succeed, and the solutionto the clearerprudential problemis to be accepted as a solution to the moreobscuremoralone,thenthealleged correspondenceetween hetwoproblemsmustbear a greatdeal ofweight.Critics f the theory avetended to take issue with Rawls over what principleswould bechosen n the originalposition, ut it is also necessary o examinethosefeatures f the positionthat are thought o support he mostcontroversialhoicesand to ask whytheresults f a decisiontakenunder these highly specificand ratherpeculiarconditionshouldconfirm hejustice of the principles hosen.This doctrineof cor-respondence s both fundamental nd obscure,and its defense snoteasyto extract rom hebook.A propertreatment fthesubjectwill have to cover considerable round,and it is probablybest tobeginwithRawls'smoralepistemology.Rawls believesthat it will be moreprofitable o investigate hefoundationsfethicswhenthere re more substantivethicalresults

' A TheoryfJustice.y JohnRawls. (Cambridge,Mass.,HarvardUniver-sityPress, 1971. Pp. xv, 607.)220

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RAWLS ON JUSTICEto seekthe foundationsf.Nevertheless,n Section9 he expoundsgeneral positionthat helps to explain his method of proceeding.Ethics,he says,cannotbe derivedfrom elf-evidentxiomsnor fromdefinitions, ut must be developed, ike any other cientificubject,throughthe constant nteraction etween theoretical onstructionand particular bservation. n thiscase, the particular bservationsare notexperimentsut substantivemoral udgments.t is a bit likelinguistics: thics xplores ur moral sense as grammar xplores urlinguistic ompetence.2Intuitionism ttempts o capture the moralsense by summarizingour particularmoral ntuitionsn principles f maximumgenerality,relying n furtherntuitions o settle onflictsmong thoseprinciples.This is notwhat Rawls means. He intends ather hattheunderlyingprinciples hould possess ntuitivemoral plausibility f theirown,and thatthe totaltheoryhouldnotmerelyummarize ut lluminateand make plausible the particular udgments that it explains.Moreover, ts intrinsic lausibilitymay persuadeus to modify rextend ur ntuitions,herebychieving reater heoreticaloherence.Our knowledge fcontingentacts bout human nature and societywill play a substantial art in theprocess.When this nterplay etweengeneraland particularhas produceda relatively table outcome,and no immediate mprovementsneither evelsuggest hemselves,henour udgments re said to be ina stateofreflectivequilibrium.ts nameimplies hat thestate s alwayssubjectto change,and thatour current est approximation o thetruthwilleventually e superseded. he indefiniterticle n Rawls'stitle s significant: e believesthat all presentmoral theories areprimitive nd have grave defects (p. 52). His own resultsareprovisional. I doubt, he says p. 58I), thattheprinciplesfustice(as I have defined hem)will be thepreferredonception n anythingresembling complete ist.If theprinciples nd judgments f a theory re controversialnddo not command mmediate ntuitive ssent, hen the support heyreceivefrom heunderlyingmoralconception ssumes pecial mpor-

2This seems omea false nalogy,because the ntuitions fnative peakersare decisive as regards grammar. Whatever native speakers agree on isEnglish,but whatever rdinarymen agree in condemning s notnecessarilywrong.Therefore he intrinsic lausibility f an ethical theory an impelachange in our moral intuitions.Nothing corresponds o this in linguistics(pace Rawls's suggestion n p. 49), where he final est f a theorys itsabilityto explain the data.221



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THOMAS NAGELtance. To a certain xtent hat conceptionmay reveal tself irectlyin thebasicprinciples fthe theory, ut t is moreclearly isiblewhenthe theory ontainsa model or constructionhat accounts fortheprinciples nd fortheirrelation o one another.Alternative heoriesofjustice re ntuitivelyepresentedy differentodels utilitarianism,forexample,by the impartial ympatheticbserver).Rawls's modelis theoriginalposition, nd the principlest is used to support recontroversial.o enhance their ppeal, theconstruction ust xpressan intuitive dea that has independentplausibility. efore turningto the modelitself,t will be useful o reviewbrieflyhesubstantiveconclusions f thetheory,dentifyingheir ontroversiallementsndthus herespectsnwhich hey re mostnneedof ndependentupport.Rawls's substantive octrine s a ratherpure formof egalitarianliberalism,whose controversial lements re its egalitarianism,tsanti-perfectionismnd anti-meritocracy,he primacyit gives toliberty, nd the fact thatit is moreegalitarian bout liberty hanabout othergoods.The justiceof social institutionss measurednotby their endencyo maximize he sum or averageof certain dvan-tages, but by theirtendency o counteract he natural inequalitiesderiving rom irth, alent, nd circumstance,ooling hoseresourcesin the service f the commongood. The commongood is measuredin termsof a veryrestricted, asic set of benefits o individuals:personal and political liberty, economic nd social advantages,and self-respect.The justice of institutionsepends on theirconformityo twoprinciples.The first equiresthe greatest qual liberty ompatiblewith a like libertyfor all. The second (the differencerinciple)permitsnly hosenequalitiesn thedistributionfprimaryconomicand social advantagesthat benefit veryone,n particular heworstoff. ibertyspriorn the ense hat t cannotbe sacrificedor conomicand social advantages,unlesstheyare so scarce or unequal as topreventthe meaningful xercise of equal libertyuntil materialconditionshave improved.The view s firmly pposedto mere equalityofopportunity,hichallows too much influence o the morally rrelevant ontingenciesofbirth nd talent; t is also opposedtocounting society'sdvancedcultural r ntellectualchievementsmongthegainswhich an makesacrifice fthemoreprimary oods ust.Whatmatterss that veryonebe providedwiththe basic conditions orthe realization fhis ownaims, regardlessof the absolute level of achievementthat mayrepresent.

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RAWLS ON JUSTICEWhen the social and political mplicationsf thisviewareworkedout in detail, as is done in Part Two of the book, it is extremely

appealing, but far fromself-evident.n consideringts theoreticalbasis, one shouldthereforeskwhether he contractarianpproach,realized in termsof the originalposition,dependson assumptionsany less controversialhan the substantiveonclusionst is adducedto support.The notion that a contracts the appropriatemodel for theoryofsocial ustice dependson theviewthat t is fairto requirepeopleto submit o procedures nd institutionsnly f,given heopportunity,theycould in some sense have agreedin advance on theprinciplesto which theymust submit. That is why Rawls calls the theoryjusticeas fairness. Indeed, he believesthat a similar ontractualbasiscan be found or heprinciplesf ndividualmorality, ieldingtheoryof rightness s fairness.)The fundamental ttitude towardpersonson which ustice as fairness ependsis a respectfortheirautonomy r freedom.3 ince social institutionsre simply here ndpeople are born ntothem, ubmission annotbe literally oluntary,but (p. I3) A society atisfyingheprinciples f usticeas fairnesscomesas close as a society an to beinga voluntary cheme,for tmeets the principleswhichfree and equal personswould assent tounder circumstanceshat are fair.Before consideringwhetherthe original position embodiestheseconditions,we must ask whyrespectforthefreedom fothers, ndthe desire to make society s near to voluntary s possible, houldbe takenas themainspringf the sense of ustice.That gives ibertya position fgreat mportancerom hevery eginning,n importance

3Expanding on this point, Rawls submits that his view is susceptible toa Kantian interpretation, but the details of the analogy are not alwaysconvincing. See, e.g., the claim on p. 253 that the principles of justice arecategorical imperatives, because the argument for them does not assume thatthe parties to the agreement have particular ends, but only that they desirethose primary goods that it is rational to want whatever else one wants.First of all, the desire for those primary goods is not itself the motive forobeying the principles of ustice in real life, but only for choosing them in theoriginal position. Secondly, imperatives deriving from such a desire wouldbe hypothetical and assertoric in Kant's system, not categorical. But sinceour adherence to the two principles is supposed to be motivated by a senseofjustice growing out ofgratitude for he benefits eceived from ust institutions,the imperatives ofjustice as fairnesswould in fact appear to be hypotheticalandproblematic (Foundation f theMetaphysics f Morals, pp. 4 I5-4 6 of the PrussianAcademy Edition).223



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THOMAS NAGELthat t retains n the resultingubstantiveheory.But we mustaskhowtherespect or utonomy y tselfan be expected oyieldfurtherresults s well.Whenone ustifies policyon theground hattheaffected artieswouldhave (or evenhave) agreed toit, muchdependson thereasonsfortheir greement. f it is motivated y ignorance r fearor help-lessnessor a defective ense of what is reasonable,then actual orpossibleprioragreement oes not sanction nything.n othercases,prioragreement ortheright easonscan be obtainedor presumed,but it is not the agreement hat ustifieswhat has been agreed to,but ratherwhateverustifies he agreementtself. f, forexample,certain rinciples ouldbe agreedtobecausethey re ust,that annotbe whatmakes themust. In manycases theappeal to hypotheticalprior greements actuallyofthis haracter. t is nota finalustifica-tion,not a mark frespect or utonomy, utmerely wayofrecallingsomeone o thekindofmoraludgmenthewouldmake n theabsenceof distortingnfluences erivedfromhis special situation.Actual or presumable onsent an be the sourceof a justificationonly f t is already cceptedthattheaffectedarties re tobe treatedas certainreasonswouldinclineeach ofthemtowantto be treated.The circumstancesf consentare designedto bringthosereasonsinto operation, uppressingrrelevant onsiderations,nd the factthatthechoicewouldhave beenmade becomes a furthereasonforadhering o theresult.When the interests f the partiesdo not naturallycoincide, aversion fconsentmaystillbe preserved fthey re able to agree nadvance on a procedurefor settlingconflicts.They may agree

unanimously hat the proceduretreatsthem equally in relevantrespects,hough heywouldnotbe able to agreein advance to anyof the particulardistributions f advantagesthat it mightyield.(An examplewould be a lotteryo determineherecipient fsomeindivisible enefit.)For the result of such a choice to be morallyacceptable, twothingsmust be true: (a) the choice must be unanimous; (b) thecircumstances hat make unanimitypossiblemust not underminethe equalityof theparties n otherrespects. resumably heymustbe deprivedof some knowledge forexample,ofwho will win thelottery) n orderto reachagreement, ut it is essential hattheynotbe unequallydeprived as would be the case, forexample, f theyagreed to submit disputeto an arbitratorwho, unknown o anyof them,was extremely iased).

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RAWLS ON JUSTICEThe more disparate the conflictingnterests o be balanced,however, hemoreinformationhe partiesmustbe deprivedof toinsureunanimity, nd doubtsbegin to arisewhether nyprocedurecan be reliedon to treateveryone qually n respect ftherelevantinterests. here is thena real questionwhetherhypotheticalhoiceunderconditions f gnorance, s a representationfconsent, an byitselfprovidea moral ustificationoroutcomesthat could not beunanimously greed to if theywere known n advance.Can such a procedurebe used to justify rinciples orevaluatingthe basic structuref social institutions? learlythe preferencesfindividuals re so divergenthattheywould notvoluntarilygreeona common etofprinciplesf ll weregiven n equal voice.Accordingto thetheory ftheoriginalposition, heappeal to prioragreementcan be utilizednevertheless,y requiring hehypotheticalhoicetobemadeonthebasis ofreasons hat llmenhave ncommon, mittingthosewhichwould lead themto selectdifferentrinciples nd insti-tutions. y restrictinghebasis ofthehypotheticalgreementn thisway,however, ne may lose some of its ustifyingower. We mustthereforeookcarefully t theconditionsmposedon a choice n theoriginalposition. inceRawls doesnot, n anycase,offern abstractargument orthecontractarianpproach, tsdefensemustbe foundin its application.The originalposition s supposedto be the mostphilosophicallyfavored nterpretationf a hypotheticalnitialstatusquo in whichfundamental greementswould be fair.The agreements an thenbe appealed to in disputes verthe ustice of nstitutions.he partieshave an equal voiceand they hoosefreely:nfact, hey an all arrive

independentlyt the same conclusions. ach of us, moreover, anenter heoriginalposition t any timesimply yobservingtsratherspecial restrictionsn arguments,nd choosingprinciples rom hatpoint ofview.All this is possiblebecause the groundsof choice are severelyrestricteds follows. he parties re mutuallydisinterested-thats,neitheraltruisticnor envious.About theirown desirestheyknowonlywhatis trueofeveryone: hattheyhave some lifeplan or con-ception of the good and a personalcommitmento certainotherindividuals.Whateverthe details,theyknowthese nterests an beadvanced by the employment f very basic primarygoods underconditionsof liberty.They also possessgeneral knowledgeabouteconomics, olitics, ndsociologyndthey now hat he ircumstancesof ustice,conflictingnterestsnd moderate carcity,btain.Finally,

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THOMAS NAGELtheybelievethattheyhave a senseof usticewhichwill help themto adhere to the principles elected,but theyknowenoughaboutmoralpsychologyo realize thattheir hoicesmusttake ntoaccountthestrains fcommitmenthichwill be feltwhentheprinciples reactually adopted, and the importanceof choosingprinciples hatwill,whenputintoapplication, voketheir wnsupport nd therebyacquire psychological tability. verything lse theirtalents, heirsocial position, ven the generalnatureor stageofdevelopment ftheir articularociety-is covered verwith thick eilof gnoranceon the groundthat it is morally rrelevant. he choice shouldnotbe influenced y social and naturalcontingencies hatwould leadsomepartiesto pressforspecial advantages,or give some of themspecial bargainingpower.Rawls contends p. 2I) that theserestrictionscollect togetherinto one conception number of conditions n principles hatwearereadyupondue considerationorecognize s reasonable. .. Oneargues, he says (p. i8), fromwidelyaccepted but weak premisesto more specific onclusions.Each of the presumptionshould byitself e naturaland plausible; some of themmay seem innocuousor even trivial.The aim of the contract pproach is to establishthat taken together heyimpose significantounds on acceptableprinciples f ustice.I do not believe thatthe assumptions f the originalposition reeitherweak or innocuousor uncontroversial.n fact,the situationthusconstructedmaynotbe fair.Rawls says that the aim ofthe veilof gnorances to ruleout thoseprincipleshat twouldbe rationalto proposefor cceptance,however ittle hechanceofsuccess, nlyif one knewcertainthings hat are irrelevant rom he standpointof ustice (p. i8). Let us grant hat theparties houldbe equal andshouldnot be in possession f nformationhichwould lead them oseek advantages on morally irrelevantgrounds like race, sex,parentage,or natural endowments. ut theyare deprived also ofknowledge f theirparticular onception f thegood. It seems oddto regardthatas morally rrelevant rom he standpoint f ustice.If someonefavors ertainprinciples ecause ofhis conception f thegood, he will not be seeking pecial advantagesfor himself o longas he does notknowwho n thesociety e is. Ratherhewill be optingforprincipleshatadvance thegoodfor veryone,s defined y thatconception. I assume a conception f thegood is ust that, nd notsimply systemftastes rpreferences.)et Rawlsappearstobelievethat twouldbe as unfair o permit eopletopressfor herealization

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RAWLS ON JUSTICEof theirconception f the good as to permit hemto pressfor theadvantage of their social class.

It is true thatmen'sdifferentonceptionsf thegood dividethemand produceconflict,o allowing hisknowledge o the parties n theoriginalpositionwouldprevent nanimity. awls concludes hat theinformation ustbe suppressednd a common dea substituted hichwill permit greementwithout electing ny particularconceptionofthe good. This is achievedby meansof the classof primary oodsthat t s supposedly ational o wantwhatever lseone wants.Anotherpossible onclusion, owever,s thatthe model oftheoriginal ositionwill not workbecause in orderto secure pontaneous nanimityndavoid thenecessity fbargaining ne must uppressnformationhatis morally elevant, nd moreover uppresst in a way that does nottreat the partiesequally.What Rawls wishesto do, by usingthe notionofprimary oods,is to provide n Archimedean oint, s he calls t,fromwhichchoiceis possiblewithoutunfairnesso any of the fuller onceptions f thegood that ead people to differ. theoryfthegood is presupposed,but it is ostensiblyeutralbetweendivergent articular onceptions,and supplies least commondenominatorn whicha choice n theoriginalpositioncan be based withoutunfairness o any of theparties.Only later,whenthe principles f usticehave been reachedon thisbasis,will t be possible o ruleout certainparticularnterestsor aims as illegitimate ecause theyare unjust. t is a fundamentalfeature fRawls's conception f thefairness fthe originalpositionthat t shouldnot permit he choiceof principles f usticeto dependon a particular onception f thegood over whichthepartiesmaydiffer.The construction oesnot, think, ccomplish his, nd there rereasons to believe that it cannot be successfullyarriedout. Anyhypotheticalhoice situationwhich requires agreement mong thepartieswill have to impose strongrestrictionsn the groundsofchoice,and theserestrictionsan be justified nly n terms fa con-ception f hegood. It is one of hose ases n which here snoneutral-ity to be had, because neutrality eedsas much ustifications anyotherposition.Rawls's minimalconceptionof the good does not amount to aweakassumption:tdependson a strong ssumptionf thesufficiencyof thatreduced conceptionfor the purposesof ustice. The refusalto rankparticular onceptions f the good impliesa verymarkedtolerancefor ndividual nclinations.Rawls is opposed not only to

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THOMAS NAGELteleological onceptionsccording o whichustice requires dherenceto the principles hat willmaximizethegood. He is also opposedtothe naturalpositionthat even in a nonteleological heorywhat isjustmustdependon what s good,at leastto the extent hat correctconception f thegood mustbe used in determining hat counts san advantage and what as a disadvantage, nd how much, forpurposes fdistributionnd compensation. interpret imas sayingthat the principlesof justice are objective and interpersonallyrecognizable n a way that conceptions f the good are not. Therefusal o rank individualconceptions nd the relianceon primarygoodsare intended o insure hisobjectivity.Objectivitymay not be so easily achieved.4The suppression fknowledgerequiredto achieve unanimitys not equally fairto allthe parties,because the primarygoods are not equally valuablein pursuit fall conceptions f the good. Theywill serveto advancemanydifferentndividual ife lans somemore fficientlyhanothers),but they re lessuseful n implementingiewsthathold a good lifeto be readilyachievable only n certainwell-definedypesofsocialstructure,ronly n a societyhatworks oncertedlyor herealizationofcertainhigherhumancapacities nd thesuppressionf baserones,or onlygivencertaintypesof economicrelations mongmen. Themodelcontains strongndividualisticias,which sfurthertrength-enedbythemotivationalssumptionsfmutualdisinterestndabsenceofenvy.These assumptions ave theeffectfdiscountingheclaimsof conceptionsof the good that depend heavily on the relationbetweenone's own positionand that of others thoughRawls isprepared o allowsuchconsiderationso entern so faras they ffectself-esteem). he originalpositionseemsto presupposenot just aneutral theory fthegood, but a liberal, ndividualisticonceptionaccordingto whichthebestthatcan be wishedforsomeone s theunimpededpursuitofhis own path, provided t does not interferewiththerights f others.The view is persuasively eveloped n thelater portions f the book, but without senseof its controversialcharacter.Amongdifferentife plans of this generaltypethe constructionis neutral.But giventhat manyconceptions f thegood do not fitinto theindividualistic attern, ow can thisbe describedas a fairchoice situation orprinciples f ustice?Why shouldparties n theoriginalposition e prepared o commit hemselveso principleshat

4 For the deas n this aragraph am indebtedoMaryGibson.228



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RAWLS ON 7USTICEmay frustrate r contravene heirdeepestconvictions,ust becausethey are deprivedof the knowledge f thoseconvictions?

There does not seem to be any way of redesigning he originalposition o do away with a restrictivessumption fthiskind.Onemightthink t would be an improvemento allow the parties fullinformationbouteveryone's referencesnd conception fthegood,merely eprivinghemoftheknowledge fwho theywere.But this,as Rawls pointsout (pp. 173-I74), wouldyieldno result t all. Foreither the partieswould retain theirconceptions f the good and,choosingfromdifferentointsofview,would not reach unanimity,or else theywouldpossessno aims of their wn and wouldbe askedto choosein terms fthe aims of all thepeople theymightbe-anunintelligibleequestwhichprovidesno basis for a unified hoice,in theabsenceofa dominant onception. he reduction o a commongroundofchoice s thereforessential or hemodel to operate t all,and the selectionof that ground inevitablyrepresents strongassumption.Let us now turnto theargumenteadingto thechoiceof thetwoprinciples n the originalposition s constructed. he core of thisargument ppears in Sections 6-29, intertwined ith an argumentagainstthechoiceof theprinciple faverageutility. awls has goneto some engths o defendhiscontroversiallaimthat n theoriginalposition t is rational o adopt themaximin ule whichleads one tochoose principlesthat favor the bottom of the social hierarchy,instead of acceptinga greaterrisk at the bottom n return orthepossibility f greaterbenefits t the top (as mightbe prudentiallyrational fone had an equal chanceofbeinganyone n thesociety).Rawls states p. 154) thatthree onditionswhichmake maximinplausible hold in theoriginalposition o a highdegree. i) Theremustbe somereason forsharplydiscountingstimates f. .. prob-abilities. (2) The personchoosinghas a conception f the goodsuch thathe cares very ittle, f anything, or what he mightgainabove the minimum tipendthat he can, in fact,be sure of byfollowing he maximinrule. (3) The rejected alternativeshaveoutcomes hatone can hardly ccept. Let us consider hese n turn.The first ondition s very mportant, nd theclaim that t holdsin theoriginalpositions notbased simply n a generalrejection ftheprinciple f insufficienteason (that s, theprinciple hatwhereprobabilities re unknowntheyshould be regarded s equal). Forone could characterize he originalposition n such a way that thepartieswould be prudentially ationalto chooseas iftheyhad an

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THOMAS NAGELequal chance of beinganyone n the society, nd the problem s toseewhythiswould be an inappropriateepresentationf thegroundsfora choice of principles.One factormentioned y Rawls is thatthesubjectmatter f thechoice is extremelyerious,since it involves nstitutionshat willdetermine he total lifeprospects or the partiesand those close tothem. t is not ust a choice of alternatives or single ccasion.Nowthiswould be a reasonfor conservativehoice even ifone knew therelativeprobabilitiesf differentutcomes. t would be irresponsibleto accept even a smallriskofdreadful ifeprospects oroneself ndone's descendantsn exchangefor good chance of wealth orpower.But what sneeded s an accountofwhyprobabilitieshouldbe totallydiscounted,nd not ust with regard to the most unacceptableout-comes.The difference rinciple, or example, s supposedto applyat all levelsof social development,o it is not ustifiedmerely y thedesireto avoid grave risks.The factthat total ifeprospects re in-volveddoes notseeman adequate explanation.There mustbe somereason againstallowingprobabilities proportional,or nstance, othenumber fpersonsn each social position) o enternto the choiceof distributionsbove an acceptableminimum.Let mestresshatam posing questionnot about decision heory ut about the designof the original positionand the comprehensivenessf the veil ofignorance.Why hould t be thought hat just solutionwillbe reachedonly fthese considerationsre suppressed?Their suppressions ustified, think, nly on the assumptionhattheproportionsf people in varioussocial positions re regarded smorallyirrelevant, nd this must be because it is not thoughtacceptable to sum advantagesand disadvantages ver persons, othat a lossfor ome s compensated y a gainforothers.This aspectof hedesign f heoriginal osition ppears, herefore,o be motivatedby thewish to avoid extendingo society s a wholetheprinciple frational choiceforone man. Now this s supposedto be one of theconclusionsf the contract pproach, not one of its presuppositions.Yet theconstraintsn choice n Rawls'sversion ftheoriginal ositionare designed o rule out the possibilityf such an extension,5y re-quiringthatprobabilities e discounted. can see no way to avoidpresupposingomedefinite iew on thismatter n the designof acontract ituation. f that s true,then a contract pproach cannotgive any particular iewverymuch support.

5 I.e., they o not ustrefuseo assume hat heextensions acceptable:they ssume hat t is unacceptable.230



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RAWLS ON JUSTICEConsidernext the second condition.Keeping in mind that theparties n theoriginal osition o not knowthestageofdevelopment

of their ociety, nd thereforeo not know whatminimumwill beguaranteedby a maximin trategy,t is difficulto understand owan individualcan know thathe cares very ittle, f anything, orwhat he mightgain above the minimum. The explanationRawlsoffersp. I56) seemsweak. Even ifparties n the originalpositionaccept thepriorityf iberty,nd even fthe veil of gnoranceeavesthemwith a skeletal onception f thegood, t seems mpossible hatthey should care very ittlefor ncreases n primary conomicandsocial goods above what the differencerincipleguarantees t anygiven stageof social development.Finally, the thirdcondition,that one should rule out certainpossibilitiess unacceptable, s certainly groundforrequiringsocialminimum nd thepriorityf basic personal iberties, ut it isnot a groundfor adoptingthe maximinrule in that generalformneeded to justify he choice of the differencerinciple.That mustrelyon strongergalitarianpremises.6Some of these premisesreveal themselvesn otherparts of theargument.For example,the strongly galitarian dea that sacrificeat thebottoms alwaysworse han sacrificet thetop playsa centralrole n theappeal tostrains f ommitmentndpsychologicaltability.It is urged against the utilitarianalternativeto the differenceprinciple, for example, that the sacrificesutilitarianismmightrequirewouldbe psychologicallynacceptable.

6A factor ot consideredn Rawls's rgument,hich uggestshatthedifferencerinciple aybe tooweak, s thefollowing.fdifferentialocialand economic enefitsre allowed o providencentives,hen hepeopleat thetopwill tend o be thosewith ertain alents nd abilities,nd thepeople t thebottom,venthough hey re betterff han heywouldbeotherwise,illtendto lackthose ualities. ucha consistentchedule frewardsnevitablyffectseople's enseof their ntrinsicorth,nd anysociety peratingn thedifferencerinciple illhavea meritocraticlavor.This is verydifferentrom he case where n unequaldistributionhatbenefitsheworstffsnotvisiblyorrelatedith ny ndependentualities.Rawlsdoes uggestp. 546) that excusablenvy maybe giventsdueinthe operationf the differencerinciple y including elf-esteemmongtheprimaryoods. uthe doesnot tresshebasesf ncomenequality.hephenomenonhavedescribeds not nvy.awls s toowillingorely nequallibertys thesupportfself-esteem;his eadshimtounderratehe effectofdifferentialewardsnpeople's onceptionfthemselves. rewardhatis consistentlyttachedo a certain uality topsbeingperceiveds meregood uck.

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THOMAS NAGELThe principles f ustice apply to the basic structure f the social system ndto the determination f life prospects.What the principleof utility sks isprecisely sacrifice fthese rospects.We are to accept the greater dvantagesof others s a sufficienteason for ower expectations ver the whole courseofour ife.This s surely n extreme emand. n fact,when ociety s conceivedas a system f cooperation esigned o advance the good of its members, tseemsquite incredible hat some citizens hould be expected, n the basis ofpolitical rinciples,o accept owerprospects f ife or he ake fothersp. I78].Notice that if we substitute the words difference principle forprinciple ofutility, we getan argumentthatmightbe offered gainstthe differenceprinciple by someone concentratingon the sacrifices trequires of those at the top of the social order. They must live underinstitutions hat limit their ife prospects unless an advantage to themalso benefits those beneath them. The only differencebetween thetwo arguments is in the relative position of the parties and of theirsacrifices.7 t is of course a vital difference,but that depends on amoral judgment-namely, that sacrificeswhich lessen social inequalityare acceptable while sacrifices which increase inequality are not.This appeal to psychological stability nd the strainsof commitmenttherefore dds to thegrounds of choice in the original position a moralview that belongs to the substantive theory. The argument mayreceive some support fromRawls's idea about the natural develop-ment of moral sentiments,but they in turn are not independent ofhis ethical theory. If a hypothetical choice in the original positionmust be based on what one can expect to find morally acceptablein real life, then that choice is not the true ground of acceptability.8

7 Exactlythe same sacrifice ould,after ll, be either t the bottom r atthe top, dependingon the stageof advancement f the society.8 A similarobjectioncould be made to Rawls's claim that the differenceprincipleprovides condition freciprocal dvantagethat allows everyoneto co-operatewillinglyn the social order.Obviously, hose at the bottomcould not prefer ny otherarrangement,ut what about those at the top?Rawls saysthefollowing:To beginwith,t is clearthat thewell-being feach depends n a scheme fsocial cooperation without which no one could have a satisfactoryife.Secondly,we can ask for the willing cooperationof everyone nly if theterms f the scheme re reasonable.The differencerinciple, hen, eemstobe a fairbasis on whichthose better ndowed,or morefortunaten theirsocialcircumstances,ould expectothers o collaboratewith hemwhen omeworkable rrangements a necessary onditionof thegood of all [p. I03].But if some schemeof social cooperation s necessary oranyoneo have asatisfactoryife, everyonewill benefit rom a wide range of schemes.Toassumethat the worst ffneed furtherenefitso co-operatewillingly hilethe best off o not s simply o repeattheegalitarian rinciple.

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RAWLS ON JUSTICEAnother trong onclusion f the theory s the priority f equalliberty, xpressed n'the lexicalordering f the two principles. he

argument orequal liberty s a naturalgoal is straightforward.oanalogue ofthedifferencerinciple an apply permanentlyo libertybecause it cannotbe indefinitelyncreased.There will come a pointat which ncreases n the iberty f the worst ff an be achievednotby furtherncreasing he liberty f the bestoff, ut only by closingthe gap. If one tries to maximizeforeveryonewhat really has amaximin, he result s equality.The priority f iberty verothergoods,however,s chosen n theoriginal position on the basis of a judgmentthat thefundamentalinterestn determining ne's plan of life assumesprioritynce themost basic materialneeds have beenmet,and thatfurtherncreasesin other oodsdependfor heir alueprimarilyn the bility oemploythemunder conditions f maximum iberty.Thus the desireforliberty s the chiefregulative nterest hat the partiesmust supposetheyall will have in common n due course.The veil ofignoranceforceshem oabstract romheparticularsf heir lansof ife herebyleadingto thisconclusion.The serialordering fthetwoprinciplesthen follows p. 543). The parties also reflect hat equal libertyguaranteesthem all a basic self-esteemgainstthe backgroundofwhich omedifferencesn socialpositionndwealthwillbe acceptable.Here again an explicitlyiberalconception f ndividual ood is usedto defend choice in the originalposition.I have attempted o argue thatthe presumptionsf the contractmethod Rawls employsare ratherstrong, nd that the originalpositionthereforeffersess independent upport o his conclusionsthan at first ppears. The egalitarian iberalismwhichhe developsand the conception f thegood on which t dependsare extremelypersuasive, ut the originalposition erves o model rather han tojustifyhem.The contractpproachalliedwith non-liberaloncep-tion of the good would yield differentesults,nd some conceptionsof the good are incompatiblewith a contract pproach to justicealtogether. believe hatRawls's conclusions an be morepersuasivelydefendedby directmoral arguments or iberty nd equality, omeofwhichhe provides nd some ofwhichare indirectly epresentedin hispresent ccount through hegrounds nd conditions f choicein the original position.He remarks hat it is worthnotingrom heoutset hat ustice s fairness,ikeother ontractiews,consistsftwoparts: i) an interpretationftheinitial ituation nd oftheproblem f choice osedthere,nd (2) a set ofprinciples hich,t is

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THOMAS NAGELargued,wouldbe agreed o. Onemay ccept hefirstart f he heoryorsome arianthereof),utnot he ther,ndconverselyp. 15].He suggestshat heprinciplesremore ikely obe rejected hantheircontractual asis,but I suspect hereverse.t seems ome likely hatoverthelongterm hisbookwillachieve tspermanent lace in theliteraturef politicaltheory ecause ofthesubstantive octrine hatit developsso eloquently nd persuasively. he plausibility f theresultswillno doubtbe takento confirmhevalidity fthemethod,butsuch nferencesrenot lways orrect.t ispossible hat he olutionto the combinatorial roblemsof social choice can be reachedbymeansofa self-interestedndividualchoiceundercarefullypecifiedconditions funcertainty,ut thebasis ofsucha solutionhas yettobe discovered.This is alreadya famous nd influential ook,and inevitably ora certain ime t will engagetheattention fstudents fphilosophy,politics,aw,and economics. he longer ife fa work nd itsbroaderimpact on the habitsof thought freflectiveersons an neverbepredictedwith certainty,ut it is an interestinguestion.AlthoughA TheoryfJusticesfor hemostpartvery eadable, tdoesnotpossessthe literarydistinction hat has helped to make otherimportantpoliticalworks-thoseof Hobbes or Mill, forexample-part of thecommon ntellectual roperty fmankind. t does, however, ossessanotherfeature fgreat mportance.Reading it is a powerfulxpe-rience,becauseone is in direct ontact t everypointwitha strikingtemperamentnd cast ofmind. It is in thatsensea verypersonalwork,and the perceptions nd attitudes ne finds n it are vivid,intelligent,nd appealing.The outlook xpressed y thisbookis notcharacteristicf tsage, for t is neither essimisticoralienatednorangrynor sentimental or utopian. Instead it conveyssomethingthat todaymay seem incredible:a hopefulaffirmationf humanpossibilities.et thehopehas a basis,forRawlspossesses deep senseofthemultiple onnections etween ocial institutionsnd individualpsychology.Without llusionhe describes pluralistic ocial orderthat will call forth he supportoffreemen and evokewhat is bestin them.To have made sucha visionprecise, live, and convincingis a memorable chievement.

THOMAS NAGELPrincetonniversity

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Rawlson Justice