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AbstractRecent advances in theory

and research on the relationsamong mental simulation, af-fect, and personality are sum-marized and combined. Re-search has shown that (a) affectand mental simulations can in-fluence each other, (b) mentalsimulations can serve diverseself-motives, and (c) personal-ity characteristics are related to

divergent functions of mentalsimulations. Findings in thesethree areas are synthesizedinto a conceptual frameworkon the basis of three attributesof mental simulations: (a) time,whether simulations are pro-spective or retrospective; (b)direction, whether simulations

are upward or downward; and(c) focus, whether simulationsare contrasted or assimilated.This integrated framework notonly may enable a greater un-derstanding of existing find-ings, but also suggests noveland unique predictions for fu-ture research on understand-ing personality processes, au-tomaticity in simulations, andcoping with life events.

Keywordsmental simulation; affect; self-motives; personality processes

Mentally simulating alternativeoutcomes, before and after events,is a ubiquitous aspect of peoplesexistence and has broad theoretical

and practical significance. Contem-plating an imminent exam in animportant college course, prepar-ing for a business meeting with avalued client, and anticipating atennis match against a vaunted ri-val are but a few examples of com-mon situations that are likely toevoke mental simulations of alter-natives. Mental simulations areimitative cognitive constructions ofhypothetical events or reconstruc-tions of real events. They includeanticipations about the future (e.g.,thinking about what might happenon a date later this evening) andretrospections about the past (e.g.,thinking about a disagreement atyesterdays committee meeting).

This review summarizes and

synthesizes recent findings in threeareas of theory and research: theinteraction between mental simula-tions and affect, how mental simu-lations can be used in the service ofvarious self-motives, and how per-sonality characteristics are associ-ated with diverse functions of men-tal simulations. Although theseareas have developed separate lit-

Mental Simulation, Affect, andPersonality: A Conceptual FrameworkLawrence J. Sanna1

Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan

168 VOLUME 9, NUMBER 5, OCTOBER 2000

Published by Blackwell Publishers Inc.

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eratures, I argue that they are con-ceptually related. In addition tosummarizing advances, I combinefindings within a framework thatorganizes them and affords new in-sights. Viewing the research in thisway makes it possible to make

novel and unique predictions forfuture research.

RELATIONS BETWEENMENTAL SIMULATION

AND AFFECT

Initial research demonstratedthat mental simulations can influ-ence affect. However, recent re-search now indicates that the influ-ence can also work in the oppositedirection: Affect or moods can in-fluence mental simulations (Sanna,1996, 1998; Sanna, Meier, & Turley-Ames, 1998; Sanna, Turley-Ames,& Meier, 1999).

Research oncounterfactualsimu-lations provides an example ofhow mental simulations can influ-ence affect. Counterfactual simula-tions are mentally simulated paststhat did not actually happen butthat easily could be imagined hav-

ing happened; they are thoughts ofwhat might have been and aretypified by if only, at least, orsimilar conceptions. Upward coun-terfactuals simulate better realities(e.g., If only I studied harder, Imight have been admitted to medi-cal school); downward counterfac-tuals simulate worse realities (e.g.,At least I was wearing my seat-

belt, or I might have been more se-riously injured). Counterfactualscan influence affect via contrast:

Through a contrast with reality,upward counterfactuals elicit nega-tive affect (e.g., feeling bad aboutnot being admitted to medicalschool), and downward counter-factuals elicit positive affect (e.g.,feeling thankful about not being se-riously injured; Markman, Gavan-ski, Sherman, & McMullen, 1993).

Counterfactuals can also influ-

ence affect via assimilation: If focusis placed solely on the simulatedalternative without regard to real-ity (McMullen, 1997), or if thesimulated alternative will or cantranspire (Sanna, 1997), upwardsimulations produce good moods

(e.g., imagining actually being ad-mitted to medical school may makeyou feel happy) and downwardsimulations produce bad moods(e.g., imagining actually receivinga serious injury may make you feelsad or even fearful).

Affect also influences mentalsimulations. The strongest evi-dence comes from direct mood ma-nipulations. My colleagues and I(Sanna et al., 1998, 1999) had par-ticipants watch films or listen tomusic in order to induce happyand sad moods. Bad and goodm o o d s i n d u c e d u p w a r d a n ddownward counterfactuals, respec-tively, mirroring simulations in-fluences on moods. This pattern isnot limited to counterfactuals. Re-search on prefactual thoughts,thoughts of what may be (Sanna,1998), found that bad moods in-duced upward simulations (e.g.,If only I had more study time, I

could do better on tomorrowsexam) and good moods induceddownward simulations (e.g., Atleast I bought the study guide, ormy grade on tomorrows exammight be worse).2 Related evi-dence comes from research inwhich people were told that theyperformed well or poorly afterplaying a card game (Markman etal., 1993). Being told that one didwell produced good moods anddownward simulations, and being

told that one did poorly producedbad moods and upward simula-tions. It is possible that the successand failure manipulations influ-enced mental simulations throughmoods, just as has been foundwhen moods have been manipu-lated directly via films and music.

Like counterfactuals, prefactualsmay influence affect via assimila-

tion and contrast, although thereare few studies that have examinedthis possibility. People who con-trast upward prefactuals with real-ity may feel bad, whereas peoplewho contrast downward prefactu-als may feel good. People who as-

similate upward prefactuals mayfeel good, but those who assimilatedownward prefactuals may feel bad.

SELF-MOTIVES ANDSIMULATION DIRECTION

Although several motives con-ceivably are relevant to mentalsimulation, research has centeredon self-improvement and self-enhancement (Taylor & Schneider,1989). Self-improvement empha-sizes problem solving and peoplesdesire to better themselves or theircurrent lives; self-enhancementemphasizes regulation of affect andpeoples desire to repair, maintain,or protect a favorable self-concept.

It was initially assumed thatself-improvement (or preparative)motives were served by upwardsimulations, and self-enhancement(or affective) motives were served

by downward simulations. How-ever, recent evidence suggests thelinkages are more varied (see Table1). Upward simulations can indeed

be us ed for se lf-impro ve me nt .Thinking about how things might

be better can be a first step in plan-ning to obtain superior outcomes.Moreover, if bad moods signaltrouble, upward simulations cansuggest routes for alleviating prob-lems. Self-enhancement motivesmay be more complex, however.

There are at least three varietiesof self-enhancement (Sedikides &Strube, 1997): People can repair,maintain, or protect a positive self-concept. Past research focused onlyon the restorative role of mentalsimulations. Although negative af-fect can lead to upward simula-tions, there are times when it canlead to downward simulations.

169CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE

Copyright 2000 American Psychological Society

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When people are in bad moods, or

have experienced negative events,thinking about how things might

be worse (i.e., downward simula-tions) allows them to feel good bycomparison, or serves the functionof mood repair (Sanna et al., 1998,1999). However, people often wantto prolong their pleasant affectivestates, and other research now in-dicates that mood maintenance canalso be achieved by downwardsimulations (Sanna, Meier, & Weg-ner, in press). Self-enhancement

may be accomplished further byprotecting the self from threats.Meier and I recently showed thatpeople can use upward simula-tions to buffer or brace for theworst (Sanna & Meier, 2000). Up-ward simulations allow one to think,I knew it all along, lessening the

blow if the worst does transpire.

PERSONALITY AND ACONCEPTUAL

FRAMEWORK

Knowledge about relations be-tween mental simulations and af-fect, and between self-motives andsimulation direction, can be com-

bined with advances in knowledgeabout personality and mentalsimulations. Although studies exist

in isolation, I propose a framework

that is built upon three attributes ofme ntal simulatio ns: (a) t ime ,whether simulations are prospec-tive (prefactual) or retrospective(counterfactual); (b) direction,whether simulations are upward ordownward; and (c) focus, whethersimulations are contrasted with re-ality or expectations or are assimi-lated (see Table 2). This frameworknot only organizes recent ad-vances, but affords new insights bysuggesting when mental simula-

tions are contrasted or assimilated,and what self-motives are served.

The framework also suggests pos-

sibilities for future research.

Fit of Existing Findings

Defensive pessimism and opti-mism, which are opposite ends of apersonality continuum, present acontrast in the use of prospectiveand retrospective mental simula-tions (Sanna, 1996, 1998): Defensivepessimists mainly use simulationsprospectively, whereas optimists

mainly use simulations retrospec-tively. Defensive pessimists enter

Table 2. A conceptual framework of individual differences in mental simulations

Simulation directionand focus

Time of simulation

Prospective(prefactual)

Retrospective(counterfactual)

UpwardContrast Defensive pessimism Low self-efficacy

Low self-esteem

Assimilate High self-esteem High self-efficacy

DownwardContrast Naive optimism(?) Optimism

High self-esteemAssimilate True pessimism(?)

Note. For upward simulations, contrast is associated with negative affect andassimilation with positive affect; for downward simulations, contrast is associatedwith positive affect and assimilation with negative affect. Characteristics whose fit inthe framework is speculative appear in italics.

Table 1. Summary of research evidence on linkages between self-motives and direction of mental simulations

Self-motive Simulation direction Functional uses

Self-improvement Upward Thinking about how things might be better can be a first step inrealizing those outcomes; self-improvement can result from neededpreparation or finding routes for alleviating problems.

Self-enhancementMood repair Downward Thinking about how things might be worse can help to restore apositive sense of self; mood repair can occur in response tonegative events or when one is in a bad mood.

Mood maintenance Downward Thinking about things worse than actuality can help to maintain orprolong positive affective states; mood maintenance can occur inresponse to positive events or when one is in a good mood.

Self-protection Upward Thinking about how the worst may transpire can brace one forpotential failure; self-protection can occur in anticipation ofnegative outcomes or when tests of important self-attributes areclose at hand.



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performance situations (e.g., aca-demic settings) expecting theworst, even though they have ahistory of success. They use pro-spective strategies. Their negativeoutlook serves two purposes: Itcushions them in the event of fail-

ure (self-protection), and it moti-vates them to ensure that they willdo well (self-improvement). Up-ward prospective simulationsserve both self-protection and self-improvement functions for defen-sive pessimists. In contrast, opti-mists use retrospective strategies.They reinterpret outcomes posi-tively after the fact, especially fol-lowing poor outcomes. One wayoptimists do this is by downwardcounterfactual thinking, a self-enhancing mood-repair strategyused after negative outcomes.These patterns have been obtainedin recent research (Sanna, 1996,1998), and can be fit into Table 2.

Although differing in timingand direction, both defensive pes-simists and optimists strategiesare based on contrasting mentalsimulations with reality. Defensivepessimists contrast upward prefac-tuals with current perceptions of

themselves, and they experiencenegative moods and anxiety; opti-mists contrast downward counter-factuals with current perceptions ofthemselves, and they experiencepositive moods and emotions.

Self-esteemhas also been relatedto both prospective and retrospec-tive mental simulations. Self-esteem refers to peoples percep-tions of self-worth. Individualswith low self-esteem are governed

by self-protective motives; indi-

viduals with high self-esteem aregoverned by self-enhancing mo-tives. Much like optimists, peoplewith high self-esteem use down-ward co unte rfactuals to se lf-enhance (repair mood) when nega-tive outcomes, such as bad moods,occur (Sanna et al., 1998, 1999).People with low self-esteem do notuse mental simulations this way.

People with high and low self-esteem also differ in their prefac-tual simulations. People with lowself-esteem contrast upward pre-factuals with their most-expectedoutcome in a self-protective fash-ion (Sanna & Meier, 2000), as do

defensive pessimists. That is, theymight expect to fail, but upwardprefactuals present alternatives(e.g., If only I had more studytime, I could do better on tomor-rows exam), suggesting ways toavoid failure. In the event that fail-ure does occur, this strategy may

be self-protective in at least twoways: They have thought about thepossibility of failure beforehand sothat it is not unexpected, and theyhave already thought about waysin which they might do better nexttime. In contrast, people with highself-esteem assimilate upwardprefactuals, resulting in consis-tently positive affect and high con-fidence before performing.

Research on self-efficacy (Sanna,1997) has tested only retrospective(co unte rfactual) simulatio ns.Nonetheless, these findings also fitthe pre sent frame wo rk. Se lf-efficacy refers to peoples expecta-

tions about whether they will com-plete a task successfully. Peoplewith high self-efficacy interpret up-ward counterfactuals as achievablestandards, assimilating them (e.g.,that could be me), whereaspeople with low self-efficacy con-trast upward counterfactuals withreality, resulting in negative affect.It is possible that people with highself-efficacy can better take advan-tage of the self-improvement func-tion of upward counterfactuals.

Possible Fit of OtherCharacteristics

The present framework mayalso inform an understanding ofother individual differences. Forexample, other affect-related char-acteristics might be similarly con-ceptualized. These could include

broad traits corresponding to theexperience of positive and negativeaffect (e.g.,affectivity), specific traits(e.g., trait anxiety), and characteris-tics related to the regulation ofemotions (e.g., expectations thatone can change ones moods),

among many others (Rusting,1998). The present frameworkmakes it easy to identify method-ological and theoretical gaps. Someexamples of people who may tendto use downward prefactuals arelisted in italics in Table 2.

Little attention has been paid todownward prefactuals. However,it is possible that true pessimistsmay assimilate downward prefac-tuals. True pessimists are unlikedefensive pessimists; they believethe worst will happen, but theirhistory of failure does not allowthem to use simulations strategi-cally.3 Naive or passive optimistsalso may use downward prefactu-als. These persons are the oppositeof true pessimists. They believethey are in the best of all possibleworlds, and everything is as goodas it can be. Ironically, they nevertake action to bring about goodthings, and their passivity may be a

result of contrasting downwardprefactuals. Mental simulationsthus may be one underlying pro-cess that can help researchers todistinguish among a myriad of in-dividual differences.4 Future re-search, however, is necessary to di-rectly test these possibilities, and tocontinue to link motives with men-tal simulations.

CONCLUSIONS AND

FUTURE DIRECTIONS

In addition to summarizing re-cent advances and conceptualizingindividual differences, the presentframework has implications forpeoples coping and well-being.Moods and motives may have bothautomatic and effortful influenceson mental simulations. Good and



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bad moods may automatically ac-tivate downward and upwardsimulations, respectively (see thewhite arrows in Fig. 1). Moods in-form peoples perception of currentstates (e.g., reality or most-ex-pected reality; Schwarz & Clore,

1996). People in good moods inter-pret their lives positively (e.g., Iam a success, Things are fine);people in bad moods interpret theirlives negatively (e.g., I am a fail-ure, There is a problem). Thesefindings can be combined withother research showing that manycomparisons (contrasts) are gener-ated spontaneously and uninten-tionally, but can also be deliber-ate ly undone subseq ue ntly(Gilbert, Giesler, & Morris, 1995).

Although existing research isnot complete with regard to mentalsimulations, it appears that simula-tions are first spontaneously andautomatically contrasted with real-ity. In the case of positive events ormoods, reality is interpreted posi-tively. A contrast with this positivereality is a more negative mentallysimulated alternative reality, or ad o w n w a r d s i m u l a t i o n . C o n -versely, reality is interpreted nega-

tively in the case of negative events

or moods, and contrasting alterna-tives in this instance are more posi-tive, or in an upward direction.This is indicated by the white ar-rows in Figure 1.

However, certain people, suchas those with high self-esteem, can

repair their bad moods by effort-fully overriding their initial up-ward simulations with downwardsimulations (Sanna et al., 1999).The fact that initially and automati-cally activated mental simulationscan be subsequently overridden byself-motives is depicted by the

black arrow in Figure 1.The reciprocal relation between

affect and mental simulations canresult in vicious cycles of badmoods, which individuals with in-ept coping skills find difficult tostop. However, those with more ef-ficacious strategies (e.g., high self-esteem, optimism) can break thecycle more easily. More broadly, ifself-motives suggest mental simu-lations that are inconsistent withsimulations activated automati-cally, then greater effort is requiredto pursue those motives (e.g., coun-teracting upward with downwardsimulations to repair mood). How-

ever, if self-motives suggest simu-

lations consistent with those acti-vated automatically, then littleadditional effort is needed (e.g.,mood maintenance when a personis in a good mood). The possibilitythat mental simulations may be au-tomatically and effortfully acti-

vated with regard to the full rangeof self-motives depicted in Figure 1is a question for future research.

When the present proposals areconsidered within the general con-text of coping and well-being, theycan augment laboratory findings.In classrooms, mental simulationsrelate to confidence as exam timeapproaches (Sanna & Meier, 2000).Simulations also relate to motiva-tion in such diverse domains asweight loss, recovery from ill-nesses, and romantic and profes-sional success. It is not only thesimulations that are important, buthow people use them. Positive af-fect brought about by fantasizingover success can sometimes actu-ally reduce motivation (Oettingen,1996). In this case, upward (suc-cess) simulations may be assimi-lated prematurely, resulting incomplacency. However, usingpositive fantasies (upward simula-

tions) as a comparison (contrast)facilitates success. The presentframework thus makes sense ofsometimes counterintuitive find-ings, explaining, for example, whya person might have reduced mo-tivation when thinking about bet-terupwardalternatives.

In this review, I have summa-rized and integrated recent ad-vances in what have been viewedas somewhat separate literatures. Itis my hope that this new frame-

work can serve as a basis for mov-ing discussion and research alongproductive routes. In this regard,although mental simulation, affect,and personality are intricately re-lated, it is useful to explore pos-sible directions of influence morefully. Does personality predisposepeople to certain mood states,which then influence mental simu-

Fig. 1. Possible automatic and effortful influences on mental simulations. The whitearrows represent automatically activated mental simulations; the black arrow rep-resents mental simulations that could be effortful (if mental simulations suggestedby motives are inconsistent with those automatically activated) or automatic (ifmental simulations suggested by motives are consistent with those automaticallyactivated).



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lations? Does personality lead tomental simulations, which thenproduce certain mood states? Or ispersonality actually the result ofparticular moods and mental simu-lations? These are interesting ques-tions, and may provide a basis for

further understanding the relationsbetween personality and emotion(Rusting, 1998) more generally.During such research, no doubt therelevance of other self-motives inaddition to self-improvement andself-enhancement will become ap-parent (Sedikides & Strube, 1997),as will the relevance of other typesof mental simulations.

Recommended Reading

Baumeister, R.F. (Ed.). (1993). Self-esteem: The puzzle of low self-regard.New York: Plenum Press.

K a hn e ma n , D . , D i en e r, E . , &Schwarz, N. (Eds.). (1999). Well-being: The foundations of hedonicpsycholog y. New York: RussellSage Foundation.

Roese, N.J., & Olson, J.M. (Eds.).(1995). What might have been: Thesocial psychology of counterfactualthinking. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.

Sanna, L.J. (1999). Mental simula-tions, affect, and subjective confi-dence: Timing is everything.Psy-

chological Science, 10, 339345.Sanna, L.J., Turley-Ames, K.J., &

Meier, S. (1999). (See References)

AcknowledgmentsThis article wascompleted while I was on leave from theDepartment of Psychology, WashingtonState University. I thank an anonymousreviewer for constructive feedback on anearlier version of this article.

Notes

1. Address correspondence toLawrence J. Sanna, Department of Psy-chology, CB #3270 Davie Hall, Univer-sity of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, NC27599-3270.

2. These thoughts are called pre-

factual because they are mentally simu-lated alternatives that occur prior tooutcomes (e.g., Sanna, 1996), and henceare before the fact.

3. A related characteristic is de-pression. Depressives share many com-monalities with pessimists, and thusmay engage in similar mental simula-tions. However, it may be that clini-cally depressed people assimilatedownward simulations and contrastupward simulations, and in additionbelieve they have no control over theiroutcomes. Assessing patterns of mentalsimulation associated with individualdifferences such as pessimism and de-pression may present a particularly in-teresting way for future researchers toattempt to disentangle these two char-acteristics.

4. I do not mean to imply that ev-ery individual difference must be asso-ciated with a completely unique pat-tern of mental simulations for theframework to be useful. There is a hugeliterature that already indicates manypersonality measures are correlated.However, it is possible to speculatethat one fruitful method for uncover-ing the commonalities and differencesamong various personality types,

which have not always been well dif-ferentiated in the existing literature, isassessing particular patterns of mentalsimulations.

References

Gilbert, D.T., Giesler, R.B., & Morris, K.A. (1995).When comparisons arise. Journal of Personalityand Social Psychology,69 , 227236.

Markman, K.D., Gavanski, I., Sherman, S.J., & Mc-Mullen, M.N. (1993). The mental simulation of

better and worse possible worlds. Journal ofExperimental Social Psychology,29, 87109.

McMullen, M.N. (1997). Affective contrast and as-similation in counterfactual thinking.Journal ofExperimental Social Psychology,33, 77100.

Oettingen, G. (1996). Positive fantasy and motiva-tion. In P.M. Gollwitzer & J.A. Bargh (Eds.),The psychology of action: Linking cognition and

motivation to behavior(pp. 236259). New York:Guilford Press.Rusting, C.L. (1998). Personality, mood, and cog-

nitive processing of emotional information:Three conceptual frameworks. PsychologicalBulletin,124, 165196.

Sanna, L.J. (1996). Defensive pessimism, optimism,and simulating alternatives: Some ups anddowns of prefactual and counterfactual think-ing. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,71, 10201036.

Sanna, L.J. (1997). Self-efficacy and counterfactualthinking: Up a creek with and without apaddle. Personality and Social Psychology Bulle-tin,23, 654666.

Sanna, L.J. (1998). Defensive pessimism and opti-mism: The bitter-sweet influence of mood onperformance and prefactual and counterfac-tual thinking. Cognition and Emotion, 12, 635

665.Sanna, L.J., & Meier, S. (2000). Looking for cloudsin a silver lining: Self-esteem, mental simula-tions, and temporal confidence changes. Jour-nal of Research in Personality,34, 236251.

Sanna, L.J., Meier, S., & Turley-Ames, K.J. (1998).Mood, self-esteem, and counterfactuals: Exter-nally attributed moods limit self-enhancementstrategies.Social Cognition,16, 267286.

Sanna, L.J., Meier, S., & Wegner, E.A. (in press).Counterfactuals and motivation: Mood as in-put to affective enjoyment and preparation.British Journal of Social Psychology.

Sanna, L.J., Turley-Ames, K.J., & Meier, S. (1999).Mood, self-esteem, and simulated alternatives:Thought-provoking affective influences oncounterfactual direction. Journal of Personalityand Social Psychology,76, 543558.

Schwarz, N., & Clore, G.L. (1996). Feelings and

phenomenal experiences. In E.T. Higgins &A.W. Kruglanski (Eds.), Social psychology:Handbook of basic principles(pp. 433465). NewYork: Guilford Press.

Sedikides, C. , & Str ube, M .J. (1997). Self-evaluation: To thine own self be good, to thineown self be sure, to thine own self be true, andto thine own self be better. In M.P. Zanna(Ed.),Advances in experimental social psychology(Vol. 29, pp. 209269). San Diego: AcademicPress.

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