SOMALIA TRANSITIONAL FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

FINAL DRAFT

NATIONAL SECURITY AND STABILIZATION PLAN

(NSSP)

2011 to 2014

18 OCTOBER 2011

TABLE OF CONTENT

Abbreviations/Acronyms ……………………………………………………..…. i Foreword ………………………………………………………………………… ii EXECUTIVE SUMMARY.................................................................................... 3 1 INTRODUCTION

• Defining the purpose of the NSSP…………………………………………… 5 • Strategic Environment Analysis …………………………………………….. 6 • Threats and Risks Analysis …………………………………………………. 8 • Important ‘gaps’ and ‘challenges’ to the Somalia security and justice

Sectors ………………………………………………………………………. 9 2 National Security Vision ……………………………………………………. 11

3 Strategic Objectives of the NSSP ………………………………………….. 11 4. Guiding Principles to support the realization of the Vision through the

NSSP…………………………………………………………………………. 15 5 Priority Actions and Interventions ………………………………………… 20 6. Implementation, Monitoring and Evaluation Mechanisms Implementation and Management Frameworks …………………………… 20 Monitoring and Evaluation Mechanisms ………………………………….. 23 7 Funding and Resource Mobilization Mechanism ……………………………. 23 8 Risks and Critical Assumptions ……………………………………………… 24

ANNEXES

• NSSP Implementation Action Plan ……………………………………..… 26 • Costing and Budgeting Plan ………………………………………………. • Monitoring, Reporting and Evaluation Plan ……………………………… • Communication Plan ………………………………………………………

Abbreviations/Acronyms AMISOM. ..................................................................... African Union Mission in Somalia ASWJ .......................................................................................... Ahlu Sunna Wal Jama’a AU ................................................................................................................. African Union AVR. ........................................................................................ Armed Violence Reduction CONOPS. ........................................................................................... concept of operations CSOs. ....................................................................................... Civil Society Organizations DDR. ...................................................... Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration EASFCOM. ..................................................................................... East African Command EU. ............................................................................................................. European Union IC. ................................................................................................. International Community ICG. ......................................................................................... International Contact Group IHL. ................................................................................... International Humanitarian Law JNA. ............................................................................................... Joint Needs Assessment JSC. ............................................................................................. Joint Security Committee LAS. .................................................................................................. League of Arab States NSA. ............................................................................................ National Security Agency NSC. ............................................................................................ National Security Council NSF. ............................................................................................... National Security Force NSSP. ..................................................... Somalia National Security and Stabilization Plan PPP. ............................................................................................... purchasing power parity SNF. ................................................................................. Somalia National Security Force SOPs. ............................................................................... Standard Operational Procedures SPF. .................................................................................................... Somalia Police Force SSA. ......................................................................................... Security Sector Assessment SSD. ...................................................................................... Security Sector Development SSI. ............................................................................................. Security Sector Institution SSR. ................................................................................................ Security Sector Refrom TFG. ................................................................................ Transitional Federal Government TFP. .................................................................................... Transitional Federal Parliament TWG. ......................................................................................... Technical Working Group UK. ............................................................................................................ United Kingdom UNPOS United Nations Political Office for Somalia UNSCR. ......................................................... United Nations Security Council Resolution USA. ............................................................................................. United States of America

 

FOREWORD

Since elected in January 2009 as President of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) of Somalia, my government’s primary focus has been to end the internal armed conflict that has engulfed my beloved country for over two decades. A conflict that has been characterised by different threats and risk factors such as Al-shabaab linked to international terrorists networks, proliferation of arms and ammunition, including landmines, transnational economic crime, and piracy. Indeed, years of prolonged war in Somalia has caused the loss of many lives, humanitarian disaster, and displacement of over millions of Somalis now settled in various parts of the world either as displaced persons or refugees. My government currently has limited resources (human, financial and institutional) to reinforce the national security institutions in order for them to effectively tackle threats outlined above. Therefore, rebuilding of our nascent national security sector institutions, particularly the Somalia National Force (NSF), the National Security Agency (NSA) and the Somalia Police Force (SPF) remain critical tasks for my government. The good is to make them more responsive and in better compliance with international humanitarian law (IHL) and respect for human rights, as they work to defend and secure the state and its citizenry. This will create the enabling environment for protection of civilians, delivery of humanitarian assistances, completion of the remaining transitional political tasks such as the constitution, political outreach and reconciliation and the conduct of peaceful free, fair and transparent elections. The underlying tenet is that without security there can be limited scope for sustaining the political peace process: “Peace needs security just as security needs peace”. While the process for planning and drafting this revised three-year National Security and Stabilization Plan (NSSP) (2011 to 2014) has been a strenuous one, it is an important achievement by all involved given the short time allotted for this task to be accomplished. The credit for this must be given to the Transitional Federal Institutions (TFIs), including regional entities such Puntland, Galmudug, and Al Sunna Wal Jamaa (ASWJ), to our numerous international partners, whose representatives participated with openness and honesty, in an unfamiliar and ambitious integrated planning, mutual trust and confidence building exercise. The document has evolved as result of several confidence building steps and consultative processes, which I commissioned following my interaction with former Somali Senior Military Officials in Washington D.C in August, 2010. There, I had requested the former officials to travel to Somalia to conduct a Somalia-owned Security Sector Assessment (SSA) to complement an early version produced in 2010. The findings and recommendations of their SSA reports form the basis for the revision of this NSSP for Somalia. To further demonstrate the level of political commitment the NSSP process deserved, I consulted Prime Minister Abdiweli Mohamed Ali to appoint a strategic planning team from across all relevant ministries, the transitional parliament and civil society. Under the leadership of Honourable Abdihakim E. Guleh the Deputy Minister of Interior and National Security, the review process has been successfully completed. The NSSP provides the immediate, medium to long-term priority actions required to strengthen the security and justice sector institutions in Somalia; it will help defend and secure the state and its citizens respecting and promoting human rights and the rule of law. Likewise, the fighting in Somalia has been marked by widespread and systematic use of children as soldiers. Following allegations of the use of child soldiers by TFG security forces, the TFG investigated allegation in June 15, 2010. A high level committee which conducted an investigation has issued strict

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guidelines to all security forces not to allow the recruitment of children under the age of eighteen and anyone under eighteen found in the arm to be immediately released. My Government is aware of its international obligations prohibiting the use of children in hostilities and is committed to ratifying the Convention on the Rights of the Child. The NSSP reflects our policy of no recruitment of children into its security forces. Under the NSSP, Somalia is committed to ensuring that gender perspectives are integrated in all security sector development activities, the practice of child soldering is eradicated and the protection of civilians in Somalia is enhanced. In a similar vein, through the NSSP, we will seek assistance to reform the Somalia military penal codes of war and peace both of which predate the 1949 Geneva Conventions. We have reconstructed our national security vision as follows: “A secure and enabled federated Somalia which is in lasting peace with itself and with its neighbours; ensuring the restoration of security, access to justice and the rule law institutions such as police, judiciary and custodial corps); upholding of the human rights of its citizens; accountable, and able to defend its constitution, people, territorial unity and integrity”. The ‘restoring of security’ here refers to the creation a safe environment where local communities and citizens can foster a positive and thriving economic base, underpinned with strong security guarantees that can cultivate and sustain peace, access to justice, trust and confidence both at home and overseas. The net effect will be to create the condition where political transformation in line with the Djibouti peace agreement and the Kampala Accord can be sustained. On that note, I wish to send out special messages about the NSSP, and the subsequent implementation process: First, to all Cabinet and National Security Council Colleagues: the NSSP will assist our government to achieve two immediate central objectives. First, it will strengthen our security and justice institutions in order to sustain our recent military and security gains against Al-shabaab in Mogadishu and the rest of Somalia. Second, it will ensure a safe and enabling environment is established to complete the remaining transitional political tasks during our tenure, particularly the constitution making process. I believe a successful implementation of the five core elements (policy development, professionalism, partnership building, inclusive and participation of parliament and civil society, and enhancing international support for consolidation of stabilization efforts e.g. AMISOM) of the NSSP will increase public trust and confidence in the security sector institutions and improved livelihoods for the people. Second, to the international community and donor partners: I believe the NSSP directly supports the first priority benchmark of the Kampala Roadmap: Improved Security in Mogadishu and the rest of Somalia. Hence, it is expected that the NSSP will serve as the main conduit for creating a safe and enabling environment for a peaceful end to the transitional process in Somalia. It will ensure that security and justice assistance are well coordinated through the work of the Joint Security Committee (JSC) from 2011- 2014. The NSSP implementation must be seen as an enabler for the pursuance of the other benchmarks of the Roadmap: the constitution, political outreach and reconciliation and good governance. It provides a unique harmonization of priorities for the development of affordable security and justice sector institutions. The broad consultative and inclusive nature of the NSSP process and the resulting key priority actions outlined in the Strategic Implementation Matrix serves as a real menu of options to consider in rebuilding the Somalia security sector in Somalia.

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Third, to supporting Ministries: Indeed, the NSSP is a nationally owned programme for mitigating threats of serious and transnational crime, directly linked to underdevelopment, political instability and humanitarian crisis in Somalia. In effect, improving security should greatly assist development and political stability in Somalia. The implementation of the NSSP priority actions must be seen as a team effort and capacity building opportunity, which must be recognised favourably as such by donors and external institutions alike. The NSC will provide executive oversight of the implementation of the NSSP. The Joint Security Committee (JSC) will continue to direct and monitor progress in the implementation of immediate priorities in the NSSP. Fourth, to Senior Security Military and Justice Sector Officials: Under the direction of the NSC, the JSC and its Technical Working groups, the NSSP Secretariat and all related senior officials and Ministries will work as one body. The inclusive, consultative process of planning and drafting this revised NSSP will continue during implementation and beyond. We will all be included in the information and communication flow during the NSSP roll-out and implementation in an accountable, transparent way. Fifth, to the Transitional Federal Parliament (TFP) Sub-committees on defence, national security and justice: I will like you to feel able to play your vital role in legislating laws and providing oversight of the security services of Somalia on behalf of the electorate and your constituencies. Finally, to the regional entities, including Civil Society, Media and the Public: There is a key role for you in the NSSP implementation process. Regional authorities such as Puntland, Galmudug, and Al Sunna Wal Jamaa’s and the public have greatly been involved in the process of revising and adopting this NSSP; we will continue to involve and include you now and during implementation. The NSSP and the resulting improved security and justice sectors is there to serve you, the citizens. Security is no longer a ‘Secret’; it must be a public service, requiring public support and increased confidence. On behalf of my Government and my personal behalf, I wish to express my sincere gratitude to Dr. Augustine P. Mahiga, the Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) for the United Nations Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS) for providing the support deserved to the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) to have completed this work in the shortest possible time. Similarly, I wish to commend the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM), IGAD, United Nations agencies and programmes, the European Union, United States of America Embassy Security Sector Development (SSD) staff, the United Kingdom, Japan, Egypt, and various international partners, who through the work of the Joint Security Committee (JSC), provided the needed professional guidance and for facilitating the process, and many people, including former senior Somalia military officials who made the production of a revised three years NSSP document possible. I wish, to conclude by reiterating, ‘Peace needs Security just as Security needs Peace”. The successful implementation of the NSSP must be a priority for all Somalis. WITH THE COMPLIMENT OF H.E PRESIDENT SHEIK SHARIF SHEIKH AHMED CHAIRMAN, NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL (NSC) AND COMMANDER IN CHIEF OF THE ARMED FORCES, OF TRANSITIONAL FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF SOMALIA

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY This revised Somalia National Security and Stabilization Plan (NSSP) 2011 to 2014, has been developed to ensure priority security tasks and benchmarks identified in the Kampala roadmap are implemented in a holistic, timely and well coordinated manner across various TFG ministries, departments, parliament, regional, districts and local communities in Somalia1. The plan is designed to serve as the main conduit for alignment of both national and international assistances for the implementation of prioritized, coherent, harmonized and sustained security, access to justice and stabilization interventions in Somalia. The document defines the process by which the Federal Government of Somalia will lead in re-orienting the policies, structures and operational capacities of security and justice institutions and groups in Somalia, in order to make them more effective, efficient and responsive to the provision of security and justice needs of its people. Its main focus is to consolidate military and security gains in the South Central region of Somalia, particularly in Mogadishu, Puntland and Galmudug; while concurrently creating the enabling environment for completion of the remaining transitional political tasks: the constitutional making process, political outreach and reconciliation, and good governance as envisaged in the Kampala Accord2. This revised NSSP is a product of a series of integrated strategic planning and consultative processes. The actors involved include representatives from the Office of President, Prime Minister, Transitional Federal Parliament(TFP), senior TFG civil and public officials, strategic advisors, Civil Society Organizations (CSOs), Puntland State of Somalia, Galmudug State of Somalia, Ahlu Sunna Wal Jama’a (ASWJ) and international partners such as United Nations, African Union (AU), IGAD, European Union (EU), United States of America (USA), Italy, United kingdom(UK), East African Command (EASFCOM), League of Arab States (LAS), Egypt, Japan, members of the Joint Security Committee (JSC) and the International Contact Group (ICG) on Somalia. Building on the findings and recommendations of the reports of 2010 and 2011 Somalia Security Sector Assessment (SSA), this revised Somalia NSSP clearly articulates an envisioned National Security Vision for Somalia; sets out strategic objectives for achieving the vision, shaped by specific guiding and operational principles; identifies priorities; outline roles and responsibilities of each actors, as well as specific set of benchmarks, resource mobilization, tracking and monitoring processes.

The NSSP, in the main, provides for strengthening higher level security and justice policy and strategy development and coordination mechanisms to make security and justice service delivery more equitable, transparent, effective and better co-ordinated; rebuilding affordable, accountable, representative and professional defence, army, security, intelligence, immigration, maritime police/coastal guards, custodian corps, justice

1 Kampala roadmap for ending the transition was adopted in Mogadishu on 6th of September, 2011 2 Priority Tasks for ending the Transition before 20 August, 2012

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agencies and institutions, from the provision of a uniformed response to serious crime, piracy, insurgency and international terrorism; ensuring effective partnerships and coordination between state and non-state security and justice agencies and institutions; creating substantial parliamentary and civil society inclusion and public participation in security and justice sector issues; enhancing and sustaining international support for AMISOM in consolidating stabilization interventions, to include Mine Action, small arms and light weapons control, armed violence reduction, and DDR related interventions in Somalia.

The rest of the NSSP is structured as follows: Section 1 provides a brief background, the political and strategic environmental security context of the NSSP, defines its rationale or purpose, identifies generic threats, risks and important challenges to the security and justice sectors of Somalia; Section 2 briefly describes the strategic national security vision reconstructed for Somalia as envisioned in the NSSP; Section 3 outlines the strategic objectives to achieve the national security vision; Section 4, advances the guiding and operational principles envisaged in order to realize the strategic national security vision; Section 5 focuses on the NSSP’s priority actions and interventions that will support the strategic vision and objectives; Section 6, briefly describes the implementation, management, monitoring and evaluation mechanisms; Section 7 refers to the funding and resource mobilization mechanisms to support the implementation of priority actions outlined in chapter 5; Section 8, examines the potential risks and assumptions that will impact on the NSSP implementation process. An implementation action plan for the NSSP, 2011 to 2014, in the form of a Results Framework with benchmarks, timelines, costing, and measurable indicators is annexed.

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1. INTRODUCTION The Djibouti Agreement of 2008 succeeded in bringing together opposing political groupings which led to the formation of a Transitional Federal Government (TFG) of national unity in January 2009. Its function is underpinned by the Transitional Federal Charter of 2004, which provides direction on constitutional matters. The International Community (IC) recognizes TFG as a credible partner to move the peace process forward and restore stability in Somalia, but that the TFG requires substantial assistance in developing capacity to restore security and stability. In June 2011, the Kampala Accord permitted a 12-month extension to the TFG’s mandate to enable completion of the transition tasks and also directed the permanent establishment of the Joint Security Committee (JSC) in Mogadishu. The TFG had developed National Security and Stabilization Plans (NSSPs) in 2006 and 2009, respectively, but substantial changes in the military and security dynamics have prompted a requirement for a fresh version. This current NSSP provides the framework for describing how the TFG will continue to respond to the security sector stabilization and justice/rule of law needs of its people and the State.

1.1 Purpose The desired end-state of this current NSSP is to create an environment that meets internal security needs and securing basic functioning of criminal justice system, while promoting recovery from conflict. Any sustainable security and stabilization plan has to meet citizen’s expectations of provision of basic services. The NSSP is also intended to provide the foundation for building capacity in order to restore stability to the country. It is an articulation of shared responsibility, pointing the way for the TFG and its national and international partners to work together towards the realization of a shared national and regional security vision, and to monitor the consolidation of political, peace and stability throughout Somalia.

1.2 Scope The TFG’s mandate was extended by 12 months in July 2011, but the requirements of a NSSP necessarily need a longer-term planning horizon. Therefore, there is an implicit understanding that a revision will be required in the post-TFG era and that the document should be living and dynamic, to take advantage of changing situations. The plan covers the Offices of the President, Prime Minister, Ministries of Defence, Interior and National Security and Justice and Corrections institutions, the transitional federal parliament, regional and district security committees, and civil society organizations. It recognizes that the ministries and their associated primary forces are engaged in security operations whilst concurrently developing their organizational capacity, posing significant challenges to a nascent organization with limited resources. Additionally, it recognizes that this is not a post-conflict policy document, as there is no widespread cease-fire yet. Accordingly, some traditional models of such a policy document are not so appropriate in the Somali context. Thus, this document seeks to balance the requirements to improve performance on operations, and organizational development and democratic governance and oversight.

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1.3 Background: Strategic Environment Analysis After the fall of the Mohamed Siad Barre regime in 1991, Somali plunged into a civil war. A period of anarchy has followed. The conflict stems from the dynamics of continuous bad governance during the civilian and/or military rules, characterized by the absence of the rule of law. This bad governance has resulted in nepotism, clanism, embezzlement of the public purse and widespread corruption. Subsequently, the combination of many other contributing factors, such as: the Cold war, the Horn of Africa war of 1977-1978, the proxy war led by clan-militias, armed and supported by neighboring countries, and the economic hyperinflation, had a detrimental effect on the country’s meager economy. Consequently, all state institutions were enormously weakened and incapacitated, including the law enforcement agencies, such as the court-system, the armed forces, police, custodian corps, intelligence services and coast guards. Public confidence and trust in these institutions have been lost; as these institutions became moribund. The people of Somalia have been left at the mercy of clan-based militia groups that proliferated after the ousting of the Barre regime3. With the support of the international community, a peace process was initiated in 2004 based on the IGAD Mbagathi process. This process lead to the adoption of a Transitional Federal Charter in 2004, the signing of the Djibouti Agreement in August, 2008, and recently the Kampala Accord in 2011, respectively. Both the Agreement and Accord pave the way in ending the conflict in Somalia. The 2008 agreement allowed for the establishment of a broad-based TFG incorporating opposition groups, provided hope for the war-ravaged country.

Both the Djibouti Agreement and Kampala Accord provides for security and justice sector development interventions. For example, Article 8c in the Djibouti agreement, and Article 5 of the Kampala Accord calls for the establishment and reform of a Joint Security Committee (JSC); cessation of hostilities and deployment of UN peacekeeping force, and the subsequent withdrawal of Ethiopian troops. The TFG has continued efforts to both consolidate its authority particularly with respect to security sector development. However, limited achievements have been made in reaching out to many groups, including clan-based militias as possible as mandated. This includes their integration into a robust formal security sector structures.

As part of its outreach and reconciliation implementation strategy the TFG signed an agreement with Ahlu Sunna Wal Jama’a (ASWJ) on March 15 2009. ASWJ continue to be described as a moderate Sufi Islamist group formed in 1991 to counter the growing influence of militant reformist movements like Al-Ittihad Al-Islamic. Though a power sharing agreement with the ASWJ had been contentious, the Somalia National Security Force (SNF), the army and ASWJ (although fragmented) still serves as a bulwark against Al Shabaab and other similar groups’ offensive against the TFG. Apart from ASWJ, radical Islamists and other clan and militia forces continue to resist calls by the TFG to join an inclusive administration. 3 Report of a Security Sector Assessment Scoping Mission in Somalia, prepared by Former Somalia Senior Military and Security Officials ( June 2011), pp 20

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Apart from the lack of an adequately articulated and clear reconciliation framework and of a determined effort on the part of the TFG leadership, the TFG has also not established an effective security sector development legal and policy framework, executive and legislative oversight mechanisms, as well as an effective communication strategy. TFG’s public relations campaign and outreach strategy to mobilize support from Somalis within and outside Somalia has therefore been inadequate to counter Al Shabaab’s more radical messages. There has been little if any effort to reach out to various Somali constituencies. Consequently, the TFG is less engaged with the Somali public. TFG needs to continue to work towards building trust and confidence of the public4. At the operational level, the primary defence and security forces are still weak to sustain the military gains already made after Al-shabaab’s organized withdrawal from Mogadishu on 6th of August, 2011. The National Security Force (NSF) for example lacks sufficient training, equipment, and logistics to face the non-state actor’s insurgent groups, which have grown powerful over time. There is significant necessary reliance on the African Union - the AMISOM stabilization force. Together with the AMISOM forces TFG forces now control Mogadishu. Efforts to initiate dialogue and relations with the Jihadists are proving a daunting task. That said, it is clear that support for the Jihadists or Islamic ideological groups is diminishing from a significant section of Somalis opposed to the foreign nationals forces linked to Al Qaeda. Al-shabaab’s withdrawal from Mogadishu in early August 2011 is an opportunity which, if not seized promptly, could be lost if warlords and their militias moved in to fill the vacuum. This could results in inter-factional fighting replacing that which was previously against a recognized ‘common enemy’. There is an urgent need to continue to support the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and the TFG forces with requisite resources to enable them discharge their responsibilities effectively, especially to enable them consolidate and control the areas recently vacated by Al-shabaab. The NSSP is designed to meet this immediate goal.

1.4 Current Measures and Achievements

The TFG and the Somalia security institutions together with loyal militia groups such as ASWJ reinforced by AMISOM are determined to foster peace and stability in Somalia. In recent times, the combined forces have made serious military and security gains against the insurgent militias leading to their defeat and ultimate withdrawal from Mogadishu and some regions in the south central. It is now evident that Mogadishu is almost 100 percent under the control of the TFG forces and AMISOM. These gains could be attributed to continuous military training for the NSF with support from the international community particularly through AMISOM. The training offered to the security forces has enhanced discipline and morale of the security forces and boosted

4 Somalia dilemmas: Changing security dynamics, but limited policy choices 

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cordial relations with AMISOM. This has had a significant positive impact in national security.5 In essence, the technical, training and financial support of the international community including UN agencies, EU, United States SSR Team, the United Kingdom, AMISOM and other bilateral donors are proving critical and essential to the rebuilding of the Somali Security and justice sector institutions. President Sheik Ahmed Sharif, Prime Minister Dr. Abdiwali M Ali, TFG relevant Ministers, heads of the security and justice sector institutions, parliament and civil society indicated that more support (technical and financial) from donors through the work of the Joint Security Committee and its technical working groups is required and would enable the government to overcome major threats to the establishment of security, justice, peace and recovery in Somalia. They all call for consistent, sufficient and well-coordinated international assistance. On 6 May 2011, the TFG revived its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) after a lapse of 20 years. The EEZ extends 200 nautical miles from the Somali coast-line, following concerns about illegal and over-fishing and dumping of toxic waste. However, the SNA has no means with which to enforce the EEZ, thus depriving it of revenue and necessary protection of its natural resources. Public perception of TFG and AMISOM forces is positive. The Anti-TFG propaganda machinery is proving ineffective. There is need to continue proving additional support to TFG/AMISOM civic education and to raising public awareness of its role and mandate. However, despite these achievements, a number of generic threats and risks outlined in the preceding section persist that continue to undermine peace and stability in Somalia.

1.5 Threats and Risks Analysis The threats and risks facing war-torn Somalia are many and include: instability, protracted violence and human rights violations including gender-based violence perpetuated by extremists/insurgent armed groups such as Al-shabaab, proliferation of small arms and ammunition including landmines, clan-based armed militia groups with potential to cause de-stabilization, unprotected borders, weak public sector institutions, corruption, piracy, illegal fishing and destruction of other marine resources belonging to Somalia, illegal economic activities including logging, charcoal production and money laundering, absence of social services, poverty, and chronic unemployment. If these threats and risks are not immediately tackled, the national economy and interest, as well as the security of the Somali people will be profoundly affected. Beyond Mogadishu, the security situation remains difficult in South-Central Somalia. The number of Al Shabaab fighters can be estimated at several thousands mostly concentrated in Bay and Bakool (Mukhtar Robow’s militias) and around the port of Kismayo. TFG and allied forces are composed of the 2,000 Isiolo, Kenya trained soldiers to which must be added 600 men recently trained in Dhobley. The Raskamboni Movement of Sheikh Aden Madobe in Jubbaland comprises at least 3,000 men of which about 2,000 were trained by Kenya near Mombassa, the Rahanweyn Resistance Army, 5 See pp 7 of the Report of the Somalia SSA, published in June 2011

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ASWJ and smaller clan militias giving an estimated total of 9,000 men. It is urgent to strengthen and rebuild national security institutions to respond and eliminate the above mentioned threats and risks6.

1.6 Key Challenges

The current Transitional Federal Institutions (TFIs) have limited resources (human, financial and institutional) to tackle those threats and risks. They are faced with important structural challenges that continue to undermine the operational effectiveness of the security and justice sectors’ agencies and institutions in tackling the above threats. For example, the ability to develop and implement robust policies and strategies is critical to the success of TFG’s agenda for security and justice sector development based on the provisions of the Djibouti and Kampala peace processes. At the moment, however, although the political will and commitment exists, the TFG lacks adequate institutions and experienced human resources that can effectively and efficiently support strategic and policy development processes in the security and justice sectors. A focus on strengthening the legal and policy making structures, institutions and human resource capital for Security Sector Development (SSD) in Somalia is essential. This should be done in a wide effort that seeks both to improve training for civil and public servants in the security and justice line ministries and institutions, and to deliver a broader campaign on the importance of improved security and access to justice. For primary Somalia Security and Justice Agencies, such as the army and the police, on the other hand, the delivery of specialized training, equipment, payment of stipends, rehabilitation of office spaces and having in place Standard Operational Procedures (SOPs) and management systems are the main structural challenges ahead. In addition, the lack of adequate command leadership in the NSF, to develop, defence and military policies, serve as a serious limitation towards improving the effectiveness and professional standards of the NSF with adherence to the rule of law, respect for human rights and the protection of civilians. Right sizing, doctrinal development, integration of the various militias and professionalism remain a huge challenge for the TFG. The 2009 National Security and Stabilization Plan (NSSP) projects the security forces levels as: NSF - 25,000 (including the Navy and Coast Guards); National Police Force- 12,000; the National Security Agency (NSA) - 3,000, and the custodian corps- 5,000 personnel. These projections are yet to be met7 and need to be re-evaluated. A new assessment of the infrastructure and logistical needs of the security, justice and custodian corps in a rapidly changing environment, especially in areas under the control of TFG/AMISOM is urgently required. There is limited progress in building justice and corrections sector institutions in Somalia to serve as the main sources of jurisprudence of Islamic Law based on international principles and best practices. Twenty years of HR violations, and the absence of an

6 See Somalia SSA report of June 2011 for more details on Generic threats and risk analysis., pp 22 to 27 7 See pp 8, Somalia SSA report of June 2011

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effective courts system, has created a generation that has no experience of the Rule of Law: they are not socialised to the idea of criminals being prosecuted. This “lost generation” also means that there is a lack of experience within the judiciary. Access to justice is also limited as the judiciary, courts, custodian corps, etc are not equipped and functioning effectively. The perverse interpretation of Islam by Al Shabaab has resulted in multiple, flagrant abuses of human rights. “The civil population is subjected to targeted killings and assaults, repressive forms of social control, and brutal punishments under its draconian interpretation of shar’ia”8. With the withdrawal of Al Shabaab from Mogadishu, it is important that the administration of justice is conducted by the adherence to international norms. The absence of shar’ia law was an original Al-Shabaab claim. The introduction and upholding of true shar’ia law therefore undermines its cause, and thus it has both a political utility and is legally valuable.

On 27 April 2010, the UN passed UNSCR 1918 (2010) calling upon member states to criminalise piracy under domestic law. Since much piracy activity takes place within the EEZ, Somalia has a greater responsibility to comply with the UNSCR, but currently lacks sufficient resources to fulfil its obligations. It also lacks legislation. There are other opportunities in maritime law that the TFG and the International Community should consider in order to attack piracy more comprehensively. These include the 1988 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation; the 1979 Convention against the taking of Hostages and the 2000 UN Convention on Transnational Organised Crime. The Transitional Federal Parliament (TFP) is weak on defence and security matters and lacks the capacity to support the drafting of appropriate legislation related to the security and justice institutional development that is needed before the end of the political transition. Somali civil society and NGOs have limited capacity to engage in SSD interventions. Above all, they continue to be marginalized from the efforts of rebuilding the national security sector. Neither the Executive power nor the Parliament have historically encouraged civil society and NGOs to contribute to public debates about national security including the police, the army, correctional corps and intelligence. The NSSP contains a number of initiatives to strengthen the role and capacity of civil society in this respect, and also to raise awareness in the ranks of the security forces through civic education and training. A more open dialogue is desirable and this can be engendered by better and consistent strategic communications that inform the public and public opinion. The NSSP will help to overcome the threats, risks and important challenges identified above. The NSSP ultimately offers an opportunity to improve the quality of justice and the judiciary, and new legislation, ratification of treaties etc would help Somalia’s battle against criminality and terrorism. It is not a detailed long-term programmatic plan for Security Sector Reform. It is essentially a strategic policy document to compliment the on-going stabilization efforts as well as provide a vision for the security sector development in Somalia in coming years. 8 Harsh War, Harsh Peace, Human Rights Watch, April 2010, p2.

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A clear national security vision, a set of five strategic objectives, shaped by a series of guiding and operational principles for improving security and stabilization in Somalia are outlined in the succeeding sections.

2. NATIONAL SECURITY VISION The national security vision of the NSSP is as follows:

“A Secure and enabled federated Somalia that is in lasting peace with itself and with its neighbours; enjoying restored security, access to justice and the rule of law; upholding the human rights of its citizens; accountable, able to defend its constitution, people, territorial unity and integrity”.

3. STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE/S The realization of a shared national security vision as outlined above is shaped by a set of five strategic programmatic objectives. They are: Objective 1: To strengthen higher level security and justice policy and strategy

development and coordination mechanisms The purpose of policy development is to institutionalize a set of international norms, rules, principles, identities and organizational structures and processes to be adequately put in place to ensure democratic governance and accountability of the security sector in Somalia. Support should be provided at the political level for the development of strategic higher level security and justice policies and decision making processes. Such policies will enable relevant security and justice institutions and agencies to develop their own sectoral priorities, reform and implementation strategies. Important entry points for supporting policy and strategy development processes are the National Security Council (NSC), cabinet, relevant ministries and the JSC. Such interventions includes, capacity building on strategic planning, functional and management reviews, priority setting, decision making, resource management and budgeting; development of standard operational guidelines for security and justice sectors personnel about the value of a Whole-of-Government approach that defines the roles and responsibilities of each security and justice sector components in the delivery of these services. Objective 2: To rebuild affordable, accountable and professional defence/army,

security and justice agencies and institutions

AMISOM and TFG have increased their operational tempo and now control Mogadishu. As they expand their area of control, so the airport, sea-port and other critical infrastructure are no longer contested, but still remain attractive targets and the TFG lacks adequate resources to protect them adequately. Momentum need to be sustained. Relations between AMISOM and the TFG National Security Forces continue to strengthen, with TFG regularly fighting alongside AMISOM troops.

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The TFG will ensure the combat readiness and the operational effectiveness of Somalia’s National Security Force personnel by imparting them an improved and comprehensive capacity-building programme, including the provision of appropriate selection and recruitment mechanisms, training, equipment, and gender compliance. The TFG will take advantage of existing regional and international training supports for the NSF, the Somalia Police Force (SPF), NSA, custodian corps, etc, as a step towards standardizing its national security and defence doctrines; and improving the professional development of all elements of the security and justice agencies. To ensure the retention of the instruction of the troops, the TFG should consider conducting the NSF troops’ ‘basic military training inside Somalia. The training curricula in addition to the regular training cycle should also address those areas of serious challenges in today’s battle ground and provide soldiers the foundation of guerilla warfare, counterinsurgency, counterterrorism and urban and asymmetric warfare. The NSF training should also encompass a strong civic orientation program that teaches the troops citizenship, peace and religious education (i.e. citizens’ rights and responsibilities, human rights, the rule of law, common good and loyalty to the state, etc.). The curriculum and pedagogy of this civic orientation program must be prepared by the Ministry of Education and Ministry of Religious Affairs in coordination with the Ministry of Defense. And the instructional program should be incorporated in the regular military training and taught by competent teachers in civic and religious subjects. To ensure the combat readiness of the NSF, priority should be given the training of junior commanders (junior officers, such as, second lieutenant to captain) and the NCO’s. To that end, the TFG should put a particular emphasis on train-the-trainers program, whereby former officers and NCO’s are given a brief refreshment course so that they could properly train the troops.

Besides, the NSF should establish a standardized organizational military structure for small and medium level units (battalion, company, platoon and squad) that would determine unit formation and a clear ranking structure corresponding to its size. The Somali NSF, the Army, the Police Force (SPF), NSA, and the Custodian Corps, should standardize its national security and defense doctrines; and improve its professional development of all elements of the security and justice agencies.

To secure Somalia’s territorial water and enhance the capacity to protect coastal and maritime security, including piracy, toxic waste dumping, and illegal fishing, and armed robbery in the Somali coast, it is critical that in addition of strengthening the operational capability of NSF elements in land, to build a viable Somali Navy with efficient operational capacity, training; and armed and equipped with adequate weaponry, technology and supplies (Patrol Boats, adequate ships, radar and radios).

Developing the capacity-building of the Somali air force is an essential prerequisite of the Somali defense mechanism. Notwithstanding, its cost, building an adequate air force capable of conducting air, land and sea reconnaissance, and tactical operations is indispensable. Therefore, light patrol aircraft capable of conducting reconnaissance; helicopters & transport aircraft, Radar and Radio HF & VHF is required. It is paramount

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that the headquarters and training facilities, as well as, the troops’ barracks are immediately refurbished. This will guarantee that the command and control of NSF units is secure; the troops have adequate quarters; the routine trainings programmes are regularly and frequently carried out.

To rebuild the Somali NSF and equip them with the necessary weaponry and heavy equipment it is important the previous United Nations Resolutions embargo be lifted. The existence of these resolutions will hinder the NSF to carry out their defensive mandate. The TFG will ensure that the structure and command and control of NSF (army, police, navy and coastal defense, air force, and custodial corps) are in conformity with the Somali Transitional charter, chapter X Art.65.

The Command and Control structure will be based on these two principals: Operations (communications, artillery, reconnaissance, engineering and armor units) and Logistics (supply, personnel, administrations, health, transportation and armament). A code of conduct for the NSF officers will be created and published. Military Courts with their Attorney Generals will be established. A database of the existing codes and status will be created; Jurisdiction and the relationship between the Military Courts and Civilian Courts will be reconciled.

The process of selecting, vetting and recruiting Somalis into the ranks of NSF will be done in a transparent and accountable way to ensure regional and clan balance within the NSF. To ensure the size and strength of the security forces, a proper registration process will be established. All personnel should be issued a picture ID carried all the time and they must be verified and accounted for. TFG will contact all Pro-government leaders of all armed groups to broaden the reconciliation process and convince them to join the peace process and integrate their militias with TFG security forces. The development and strengthening of procurement policy and procedures for the purchase, supply and disposal of all defence, and security equipment will be clearly defined and applied based on standard operational procedures. Appropriate structural support is required, including organizational decision making and change management structures in relevant security and justice agencies to improve their level of professionalism, and in establishing a strong and neutral transitional chain of command and control mechanisms and structures. Capacity-building is an essential prerequisite to increase absorptive capacity. Objective 3: To ensure effective partnership and coordination between state and non-

state security and justice agencies/institutions Dealing with transnational organized crime and terrorism will require an increased level of collaboration, cooperation and information exchange between state and non-state security actors. Partnerships between the TFG ministries, security and justice institutions, AMISOM, friendly militia groups, private security and military companies, the international community, local, regional and district authorities, NGOs and civil society organizations, and the diaspora can enhance the complemetarity of interventions and support capacity in the face of scare financial and human resource in Somalia. Such partnerships will also help foster shared threats and risks analysis, data management systems, support trust and confidence building regulations on joint operational planning

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and investigations; support a framework for regular meetings between and across the various structures of the NSSP implementation process and oversight platforms, and fill capacity gaps in the security and justice sectors. If included through effective partnerships, non-state security and justice actors can feed information to the relevant state security and justice agencies and institutions such as information on the current security threats as a result of Al-Shabaab’s withdrawal, and on incidents involving abuses and human rights violation. CSOs may also provide a pool of expertise in research, administration and management which can support a successful implementation of the NSSP. Interaction and the level of collaboration and cooperation will be enhanced through the work of the NSC, JSC, NSSP Secretariat, line Ministries project implementation secretariats, regional and district security committees. Objective 4: To increase the inclusion and participation of parliament and Civil Society

Organizations in Somalia security and justice sector Development efforts The TFP is generally considered to be weak, both in terms of process and effect, and the same applies to the sub-committees which should be active in the field of defence and security, justices and human rights. Civil society is similarly lacking in capacity and voice in the security sector in Somalia. The NSSP will support the TFP in training of the parliamentary committees in matters of defence, security and justice; conducting an analysis of the gaps in the existing legal framework for security governance, and provide model laws to support the drafting of legal frameworks for the Somalia Police Force, Army, NSA, Coast guards etc. It will also support the development of reporting and analytical processes, especially security sector budgeting analysis. The engagement of CSOs and NGOs on Somalia’s security sector development issues will enable the perspective of the general public to be factored into security and justice policy development and governance processes. The capacity of specialized SSD sensitive CSOs will be built to advocate, monitor and report on SSD interventions with respect to human rights, gender equality and the rule of law. It is also important to establish a democratic institutional arrangement to ensure easy and transparent access for citizens to express their concerns in any of these respects. Their contribution in this respect can help with the high level strategic monitoring of the progress and effectiveness of the NSSP and can inform assessment and situational awareness in respect of trends that demonstrate whether stability is improving, and whether life for citizens is getting better, getting worse, or stable – but at least not subject to the daily horrors and frustrations of conflict. Objective 5: To enhance and sustain international support for the stabilization of

Somalia The recent withdrawal of Al-shabaab demands an urgent need of review of the African Union Mission to Somalia. AMISOM is currently conducting planning for the expansion of its mission outside of Mogadishu. This must be carefully harmonized with operations of the NSF and its allied friendly forces, to ensure that neither becomes over-stretched and vulnerable. Expanding AMISOM’s role will require additional troops, helicopters and other operational enablers, including management of explosives. It will also require different C2 structures and more robust communications and logistics. The TFG will request the AU to revise and re-formulate its mandate to include a second phase concept

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of operations (CONOPS) in support of international stabilization support in Somalia. The role of the TFG would be crucial to ensure national sovereignty is maintained. Somalia has endured decades of continuous armed violence, resulting in proliferation of small arms which are trafficked across the porous Somali borders. Combined with a warrior ethos, Somalis use weapons as an accepted form of conflict resolution, and this stimulates a lack of accountability which fosters a culture of impunity and disrespect for the Rule of Law. The problem is most acute in south-central Somalia; in Somaliland and Puntland, progress has been made in demilitarizing society. Assessments indicate that Al-Shabaab could change tactics and employ more IEDs and suicide bombers to stretch TFG and AMISOM manpower by conducting attacks in ostensibly secure areas, thus reducing their capacity to mount further offensive operations. A vigorous initiative is required to reach out to communities to encourage them to report suspicious activity and collaborate with the security sector. Whilst enjoying more success at the tactical level, the TFG currently does not possess the capability to generate Operational level gains that can be guaranteed to be sustainable. The establishment of District Security Committees will be useful. The NSSP will promote stabilization programmes for disengaging combatants, DDR, Armed Violence Reduction (AVR), small arms and light weapons reduction, Mine Action and broader explosive management to assist in de-militarization of Somalia. Such programmes will be carefully managed, to prevent the recruitment and training of radical youths that could defect to Al-Shabaab or international terrorist organizations. Meanwhile, reports of newly trained Al-Shabaab recruits being trained near Kismayo is a constant reminder that the threat has not disappeared. The NSSP must address the issues of de-radicalisation of such recruits, many of whom may have been coerced into membership. Conversely, opportunities to conduct second-generation DDR activities, based on community interests, are required to contribute to the overall goal of stabilisation.

4. OPERATIONAL PRINCIPLES As a founding principle, the NSSP, will be approved by the council of ministers of the Transitional Federal Government on the recommendation of the NSC, and subsequently by the Transitional Federal Parliament. A number of operational principles have been identified below along the lines of the five strategic programmatic objectives for a successful implementation of the NSSP. Key elements of the NSSP strategic programmatic interventions will be executed along the lines of the following operational principles: making sure appropriate legal and policy frameworks are set out; clearly defining roles and responsibilities of all security and justice institutions; ensuring that all supports are based on shared and Somali ownership, financial sustainability, accountability to the public, transparency, protection of civilians, women and children’s rights and minority groups; the process is as inclusive and participatory, subject to democratic oversight, respect for the culture, customs and religious belief.

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Legal environment: The Transitional Federal Charter authorizes the creation of an Army9 and Police (Article 65). The same article requires that the structure, function and system of cooperation between elements of the Somalia National Army should be regulated by law. Any changes to the structure advocated in the NSSP should therefore be approved by legislation. In addition, legal pluralism is a key feature of the rule of law in Somalia, with 3 principal sources: xeer- which is customary law; shar’ia, based in Islam and formal secular law, based on colonial and post-independent developments. The NSSP will be implemented bearing mind in improving security and access to justice, and respect for human rights requires the establishment of an integrated justice system that is accessible to all, and which uses the strengths of the various systems and mechanism under these 3 different codes. National ownership: The true hallmark of the NSSP is the collaborative effort of various Somali government agencies in partnership with the international donor community. Such a partnership is needed to give better focus and importance on mobilizing political, financial and human resources needed to do the job. At this juncture however, the idea of national ownership is crucial because it places responsibilities on the right shoulders and promotes the principle of accountability. A viable and functional NSSP Secretariat in Mogadishu is fundamental to support the execution and implementation of the NSSP implementation action plan (2011 to 2014). Somalia’s national ‘ownership’ of the NSSP would initially involve creating legal ownership by way of legislation as well as the centrality of regional, district and local grass-roots participation throughout the process of implantation of the NSSP. Lessons can be learned in this respect from the ways and means undertaken by both Somaliland and Puntland. In both places all sectors of society assembled themselves and forged together a peaceful way forward in their respective communities and neighborhoods. Evidently then, any meaningful stabilization effort for Somalia – to be truly locally owned and successful – must be conceived and understood within the context of public participation. Financial Sustainability: The UN/WB Joint Needs Assessment (JNA) of 2006 10 concluded that Somalia was one of the poorest countries in the world with an annual per capita income of $226, compared to an average of $515 in sub-Saharan Africa. Mis-management, inequitable and cumbersome tax systems and weak administration of tax resulted in government revenue being only 5-7% of GDP between 1984 and1990. The combination of natural disasters, local conflict and the absence of government has also negatively impacted the economy. 20 years of anarchy, broken infrastructure, a dysfunctional judicial system and a poor technological base have all ruined the economic base. Moreover, large numbers of unemployed male youths are vulnerable to being recruited by militias. The JNA estimates that 43% of the population lives below the extreme poverty line of $1 per day at purchasing power parity (PPP). The recent declaration of a famine, together with large-scale loss of live-stock makes the situation even more precarious. High levels of insecurity and very scarce resources promote the

9 The term “Army” is a collective noun for all elements of the SNA. 10 Somali Joint Needs Assessment Macro-Economic Policy Framework and Data Development Cluster Report dated August 2006.

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conditions where clan loyalty thrives, since clan solidarity then offers the only hope of survival. Foreign investment in Somalia is very low. The lack of security, political instability, weak financial management mechanisms, poor infrastructure and land rights issues collectively create a negative environment for investors. Moreover, there is a “lost generation” who has little formal education, reducing the pool of skilled labour for foreign investors. For the security and justice sector ministries, the priority to enhance security is clear. The TFG needs sustained economic support from the international community to successfully implement the provisions of the NSSP. Robust relationships with partners are required, and this must be underpinned by improved coordination processes and transparency. Potential donor fatigue must be mitigated by active engagement and demonstrable progress. Active engagement should also seek to ensure optimal communication in order to assist, or manage a process of harmonisation for Development Partners. This will help to avoid wasteful duplication, repetition or the danger of swamping the current weak and limited absorptive capacity of the TFG as stabilization of Mogadishu starts to permit a greater influx of development assistance and support. Over time, the international community will require the relevant security and justice ministries and agencies to assume full budgetary responsibility, so force generation and development (of the military, for example) must take into account the longer-term requirements for self-financing and sustainability by the Somali Government. Financial expectations at all times will be carefully managed. Accountability to the public: The NSSP will only be as meaningful if its implementation enhances the security of citizens. The NSSP implementation process must therefore benefit all citizens equally. From the start, in order to build confidence and ensure legitimacy, NSSP has to be based on the principles of accountability. Putting in place accountability mechanisms will safeguard concerns about the provision of financial and technical support by international partners and actors. Therefore, the NSSP implementation process will be subject to independent monitoring, oversight and evaluation procedures of all its operations and financing transactions. Transparency: the NSSP will be implemented based on clearly articulated legal and policy frameworks; established structures, standards and practices that will enhance the transparent management of public financial supports to the security and justice sector institutions and agencies, including parliament and civil society organizations in Somalia. The implementation process will also be subject to enhance cooperation and information-sharing between relevant line ministries, security and justice institutions and agencies, oversight bodies and the general public through regular the work of the Kampala Coordinating and Monitoring Mechanisms of the roadmap, the JSC, NSSP Secretariat, public debates, briefings and established monitoring and evaluation mechanisms. It is essential that citizens and the International Community gain confidence in the conduct of Government as an institution and as individuals. Probity and transparency of personal interests will be an important factor in building such confidence.

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Inclusive and participatory, democratic oversight: So far, the process of revising the NSSP has been highly inclusive and participatory, involving a wide range of TFG ministries, the TFP, international partners, regional authorities( specifically the Regional States of Puntland and Galmudug), pro-TFG non-state actors, such as ASWJ, CSOs, and NGOs to the extent possible. The NSSP therefore is the result of a continuous integrated strategic planning, consultative and dialogue processes. It is crucial that the process of implementation of the NSSP remains that way, as transparent and as consultative as possible to ensure appropriate service development, delivery and accountability. The TFG has committed to work jointly with regional administrations in the implementation of the NSSP, and to collectively seek support and assistance of international development partners. Article 33 of the TFG Charter makes provision for Parliament to investigate any “matter of public interest”. There are concerns about the professional knowledge of Parliamentarians to be effective overseers of the security sector, and capacity-building is required. Under the Djibouti process, the JSC is mandated to lead the process of creating security institutions and coordination and oversight of the security issues with the international community for assistance programmes. It also provides policy advice to the Technical Working Groups. Article 5 of the recent Kampala Accord also reiterate the importance of the JSC : ‘ The parties agreed that support for the current military operations and completion of the rebuilding the security forces are fundamental to the success of the transitional period and agreed that a reformed Joint Security Committee will seat permanently in Mogadishu”. The engagement of CSOs and NGOs to conduct research, advocate; monitor and provide oversight of the NSSP will add real value to the NSSP process. Protection of Civilians, women and children’s rights and minority groups: Somalia is a signatory to some International Humanitarian Law (IHL) treaties11, such as the Geneva Conventions; the Convention of the Rights of a Child, and the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in armed conflict and the Convention on cluster munitions. Protecting civilians, including women, children and minority groups’ rights from violations including from sexual exploitation and abuse and other forms of gender-based violence, requires the adherence to all internationally agreed conventions, resolutions, international human rights law, international humanitarian law and other bodies of the law; access to justice and equality before the law; establishing the ROLs; creating a safe environment and building social and economic stability. Lagging behind this explosion in humanitarian and human rights law, Somalia is at a significant disadvantage: it has no laws for combating people or human trafficking, financing terrorism, money laundering, drugs, dealing with piracy, or for combating illegal dumping of toxic waste. Furthermore, much criminal activity is trans-national, yet Somalia has no effective means of prosecuting criminals outside their borders for crimes committed within. The NSSP implementation will be sensitive to Somalia’s increased need for adherence to IHL or Human Rights Law, and established Rules of Engagement for the national security forces and institutions. 11 ICRC database of treaties signed by Somalia: http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/Pays?ReadForm&c=SO

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In addition, the TFIs and AMISOM are both obligated to ensure that civilians including vulnerable groups such as women and children are protected from violence and atrocities as a legal and moral endeavor. AMISOM’s civilian protection strategy include: support for the Transitional Federal Government, peace process, protection from physical violence and creating a safe and violent free environment. The national security apparatus will have the legal obligation to protect and serve the people including, women, children and minority, IDPs etc. Translating these obligations during the implementation of the NSSP will be a priority. Prioritizing the protection of civilians particularly women, children and minority is both a legal and moral endeavor. Respect for the culture, customs and religious beliefs: The majority of Somalis belong to a pastoral, nomadic culture, herding camels and live-stock. Today, some of these live in urban areas for part of the time. Dir, Isaq, Hawiye and Darod clans are primarily pastoralists, and descended from the common ancestor “Samale”; in the south, the agro-pastoralists are primarily Rahanweyn and Digil, descendents of “Sab”. The next largest group is primarily cultivators, whilst smaller proportions of the population derives its economic livelihood through commerce and fisheries, and live principally in the coastal communities. There are numerous examples in which elders have brought inter-clan violence to an end. This suggests that implementation of the NSSP should encourage “bottom-up” solutions and traditional mechanisms as well as de-centralisation of some functions. Ministry policies should reflect these traditional mechanisms where appropriate, especially in the establishment of regional and district security committees. . The NSSP must serve as a conduit for reaching out to these different groups and be sensitive to their needs. The informal method of resolving conflict through the use of clan elders is a key feature of Somalia’s customs. The active participation of district commissioners, clan elders, and religious and community leaders including women elders, leaders and preachers in the NSSP implementation process and the link to restorative justice are strengths. These local authorities, religious and community leaders can be powerful actors in conflict mediation and SSD for Somalia. The NSSP must ensure that gender-based violence and the protection of the vulnerable are addressed appropriately through main-streaming gender issues in the detailed implementation plans that will be cascaded for all components under the Strategic Objectives outlined in the broader results framework that is annexed to this document. The National Security vision is designed to adhere to Islamic legal principles as per the TFG Charter. The NSSP therefore will be implemented bearing in mind the importance of the human rights including women’s rights in Islam, the unity of the Somali people, embedding the progressive cultural values, traditions and customs for instance, the training doctrines or other rules and regulations for the security sector institutions. The NSSP must ensure that gender-based violence and the protection of the vulnerable are addressed appropriately through ensuring gender responsive mechanisms are in place to include engaging experts on gender and Sharia law, sensitizing and enforcing laws and policies that guard women and girls from harmful cultural practices.

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5. PRIORITIZATION AND SEQUENCING As envisioned in the NSSP, the office of the President, Prime Minister, government ministries, departments and agencies as well as non-state actors and relevant components of the wider public make up the security and justice sectors in Somalia. This particularly includes, the NSC, JSC and its technical working groups, line ministries of Interior, Defense, justice, the NSF, SPF, NSA, coast guards, as well as structures from other organs of government. The process or campaign of stabilizing Somalia would immediately require prompt interventions and joint operations of each of these security and justice apparatus. Although the stabilization of Somalia would be the product of their direct effort, each of these security and justice structures will need to develop their own areas of intervention in a prioritized manner. The NSSP serves as the conduit for harmonization, merging, coordinating and streamlining the priority actions and intervention of these security and justice bodies at the strategic national level. Security is more sustainable when linked institutionally and through policies and practices at all levels of government. Strong coordination, collaboration and participation of all stakeholders is required. The NSSP emergency phase requires capturing public attention and donor support.

Comprehensively improving the professionalism and operational effectiveness of the security forces and institutions are urgent priority interventions for the NSSP. This is reflective of what the Somalia government is going to do towards reclaiming the country back from outlaws and various criminal groupings. A consolidated list of priority actions and interventions are outlined in the annexes, to serve as a quick reference point to support negotiation for support by the international donor community and to act as the basis for the more detailed programmatic planning that both the TFG itself, and its international development partners will wish to undertake in a phased, sequenced and harmonized way. (see the Annex).

6. IMPLEMENTATION, MONITORING AND EVALUATION The limited institutional setting and human resource capacity available in Mogadishu, to support the realization of critical transitional security sector development tasks as outlined in the provisions of the Djibouti peace agreement has been a major source of concern to the international community through the work of the JSC. In many instances, the lack of adequate staffing and national institutional structures, has led to much lower absorptive capacity of resources provided by the international community for sector specific interventions. The implementation of the NSSP will not be an exception to this trend if effective and credible strategic advisory support, coordination, implementation, supervisory and monitoring systems are not put in place at all levels of the Somali society.

The NSSP implementation process will be nationally owned, therefore the primary responsibility will rest with all Somalis. The general institutions involvement for implementation will consist of the TFG, line ministries, the security and justice agencies/institutions, the TFP, regional and district security committees, and relevant

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civil society (including traditional male and female leaders and elders, religious leaders/ preachers, sultans, NGOs community based organizations and women’s groups), the private sector, the UN, AU/AMISOM, EU, IGAD and the international community at large. Effective collaboration and coordination among these entities will be crucial to successfully implement the NSSP. While ownership will lie with Somalis, success will be contingent upon building effective and strategic partnerships with the International Community.

6.1 NSSP Coordination Mechanism Four coordination and oversight bodies will be strengthened or set up to provide the necessary implementation, quality assurance, oversight and leverage required for timely, effective and efficient implementation of the NSSP, namely i) the Joint Security Committee linked to the overall Kampala Roadmap Coordination and Monitoring Mechanism, and (ii) the JSC Technical Working Groups (TWGs) (iii) the NSSP Secretariat, and iv) the regional and district Security Committees. a) Coordinating Development Assistance through the Joint Security Committee

(JSC) In collaboration with UNPOS and AMISOM, the TFG has already in place the JSC framework that supports security sector development policy and decision making processes between the TFG and the international community. The JSC will also continue to serve as a platform for coordinating all international assistance for the implementation of the NSSP. The NSC will be its national counterpart. The Committee will also be responsible for tracking, monitoring and evaluation of all sector specific projects related to the NSSP. The JSC will have a secretariat in Mogadishu, to work closely with the Somali-lead NSSP Secretariat. b) JSC Secretariat and its Technical Working Groups (TWG) The JSC Secretariat will comprise Liaison officers from the TFG, AMISOM and UNPOS the three co-chairs of the JSC. The Secretariat will be established to support the JSC policy guidance, monitoring and evaluation of the NSSP implementation process. The JSC Secretariat and its technical working groups will have responsibility for

i) organizing JSC Meetings, ii) reviewing sector specific progress and plans, consistent with the NSSP

benchmarks and indicators, and iii) reviewing the work of the JSC technical working groups, and d)

promoting civil society/NGO and parliamentary participation and inclusion in the implementation of the NSSP.

The JSC Secretariat will ensure international assistance is well coordinated for the implementation of the NSSP. The Secretariat will appraise the JSC on progress and problems in the implementation of the NSSP. A comprehensive set of Terms of References for the JSC Secretariat will be developed and adopted by the JSC, with emphasis on monitoring and evaluation functions.

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c) The NSSP Secretariat In the first year of implementation, the TFG will set up a NSSP Secretariat within the Office of the President or the Prime Minister to provide technical support to the Somalia National Security Council (NSC), line ministries and security and justice agencies and CSOs to fast track the operationalisation of the NSSP Implementation Action Plan. Other key functions of the Secretariat will include to:

i) set up and provide strategic advisory capacity support for the implementation of the NSSP to all relevant defense, security and justice line ministries, parliament, CSOs, and district security committees,

ii) support the development of sector specific project proposals based on a set of results framework and monitor the outcome from all sectors and districts security committees,

iii) coordinate with the JSC Secretariat in the preparation of the first annual report on NSSP implementation, and

iv) work collaboratively with the JSC structures established for coordination, monitoring and reporting on the implementation of the NSSP.

The institutional location of the Secretariat will be evaluated in the second year of implementation of the NSSP. The secretariat will provide all progress reports on the implementation of the NSSP to the JSC through its Secretariat. d) Regional Administrations and District Security Committees During the drafting process for the NSSP, a delegation of the TFG Ministers and officials visited the regions and held discussion with regional administrations and ASWJ to confirm to seek their agreement to and formal endorsement of the NSSP. The regional states expressed that the principal security sector priorities were: dealing with al-shabaab, many of whom have been arriving in the regions since being pushed out of Mogadishu; the need for AMISOM to expand its operations to the north, and the need to deal with piracy. They also expressed the serious need for humanitarian aid with a reported 400,000 IDPs in Puntland and no food aid ships coming into Bossasso. Hence, in line with TFG’s emerging security sector decentralization policy and programmes, security coordination structures will be set up in each region and districts to support tactical and operational planning, implementation and monitoring of the NSSP process. All regional and district security committees will be set up through the Ministry of Interior and National Security. The composition and size of the regional security committees will be determined by each state authority with the support of the Federal Government. On the other hand, the districts security committees will comprise of the District Commissioner, district representatives of line ministries, the district/regional police commander, district/regional brigadier commander, AMISOM, UN agencies, international multilateral and bilateral partners, NGOs and representatives of civil society, including women’s groups, under the chairmanship of the TFG. Among others, the district security committees will

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i) monitor and track the implementation of NSSP specific projects and activities at the district level,

ii) serve as early warning mechanisms for security threat and risks analysis, and

iii) prepare weekly progress reports for review by the NSSP Secretariat and the JSC secretariat.

6.2 Monitoring and Evaluation It is evidence that M&E provisions were missing in the 2006 and 2009 NSSP frameworks. Hence, it is desirable for the TFG and the international community to develop joint results based monitoring and evaluation system that will support the successful implementation of the NSSP. The proposed NSSP M&E framework must be based on robust monitoring and performance benchmarks. The framework will attempt to integrate and measure positive changes and impact of the NSSP on people’s lives in Somalia. It will involve greater coordination of efforts at all levels. The JSC Secretariat will take the overall lead in coordinating all higher level monitoring and evaluation and oversight of activities of the NSSP. The NSC and its committees will provide the national counterparts. In particular, the JSC will oversee and coordinate the activities of the its technical working groups; ensure effective collaboration in data collation to inform progress and adjustment of planned actions, analysis and reporting on established and agreed benchmarks consistent with the NSSP implementation Action Plan, the provisions of the Kampala Roadmap, and its monitoring and reporting mechanisms.

7. FUNDING AND RESOURCE MOBILIZATION OUTLOOK Sustained and timely advisory, human and financial supports the implementation of the NSSP priority actions need to be assured. Clearly, implementation of the 2006 and 2009 NSSPs suffered from funding gaps. Resource mobilisation is therefore crucial for successful implementation of the NSSP. Time and means should be provided to harness resources in a well coordinated manner. The NSSP implementation action plan will require significant financial resources, especially meeting the costs of training, office facilities/rehabilitation or reconstruction, stipends and salaries, and equipment to strengthen the operational capabilities of the primary security and justice institutions and agencies. Three main sources of funding have been identified: TFG own resources, bilateral and multilateral resources/support, including the UN SSI Trust Fund Mechanism. TFG Resources-National Budgetary Allocations: The overall responsibility for financing the NSSP implementation process lies with the TFG. The TFG will therefore coordinate with international partners, bilateral and multilateral agencies, through the work of the JSC and other stakeholders to ensure immediate and long-term financial sustainability for the NSSP activities is maintained.

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Bilateral Supports: Direct bilateral assistance to support the implementation of the NSSP is envisaged. This has been the case in the past and it is necessary to ensure that such assistance is, to the extent possible, well coordinated within the framework of the work of the JSC, its technical working groups and the NSSP Implementation Action Plan. It will be a duty of the JSC and the NSSP Secretariat to try – at the very least – to ensure that activities funded in this way are harmonized in terms of their phasing and sequencing, and their alignment with other activities and support – especially if both types of support are for one particular component, or with a view to contributing ‘outputs’ to the achievement of a common higher level ‘outcome’ or strategic objective of the NSSP.

UN Programmes, Agencies and Security Sector Institution (SSI) Building Trust Fund Mechanism: As a result of the current low level domestic revenue base, security sector development interventions in Somalia has been heavily donor dependent. Continuing lack or the availability of only limited donor support to some programmes, such as training, reconstruction and rehabilitation of barracks and office space, stipend payments, equipping the Somalia Police Force, army, coastal guards, and immigration officers, will seriously impact on consolidating recent military gains in Mogadishu and in Somalia as a whole.

The UN SSI Trust Fund mechanism established after the Istanbul conference in 2009 could be a perfect financial management and disbursement framework for SSD interventions in Somalia. New donor support is required. There is huge funding gap to continue to support Somalia’s security and justice sector development activities, including issues around disengaging or defecting fighters/DDR in Somalia. Donor contributions to the UN Somali Security Institution building Trust Fund need to increase, not only to support SSD interventions, but also those that relate to stabilization and recovery efforts in support of regional authorities and administrations. On 22 December, 2010, “The Security Council emphasizes the importance of strengthening the Somali Security forces including the development of effective command and control. While emphasizing the Somalis hold the primary responsibility for achieving political stability, security and the rule of law, the Council urges Member States and regional and international organizations to contribute generously and promptly to the United Nations Trust Fund for the Somali security institutions, and to provide assistance to the Somali security forces.” The NSSP is resource intensive and its success will require the fulfillment of pledges and contributions from bilateral and multilateral organizations.

8. RISKS AND ASSUMPTIONS Article 11 of the TFG charter requires Somalia to have a decentralized system of administration based on federalism, and provides a geographic definition of its boundaries. This defines the scope of the task, but masks some of the current realities in other regions such as Somaliland and Puntland. The NSSP should help to create the conditions for improved security and access to justice throughout Somalia. It will require

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increased political will from the TFG, Somaliland and Puntland authorities to collectively engage in translating the envisioned National Security Vision for Somalia.

8.1 CONSTRAINTS AND LIMITATIONS It is recognized that the mandate of TFG expires in August 2012, but that security and stabilisation planning require longer horizons. Accordingly, this plan has a 3-year horizon, and identifies some quick wins to create momentum. The NSSP will need to be reviewed in the post-TFG mandate era.

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ANNEX 1 : SOMALIA NATIONAL SECURITY AND STABILIZATION IMPLEMENTATION ACTION PLAN (NSSP) (to be implemented from 2011 to 2014)

Area/sector Key Issues Priority Action Benchmarks Responsibility Risks and Assumption12

Strategic Objective One : To strengthen higher level security and justice policy and strategy development and Coordination Mechanisms 1.1. National Security Policy and strategy development capacity strengthened

1.1.1. National Security Council (NSC) Decision making structure and processes.

Establish a Secretariat to support the work of the National Security Council (NSC) and the implementation of the NSSP.

4 – 6 weeks Develop Terms of Reference, Job Description and Action plan. 3 months: Recruit personnel and 6 months: provide training, such as confidentiality and procedures

Office of the President – lead Office of the Prime Minister (OPM) – executive body to carry out all the tasks in the benchmark column

No political support. No pre-planning process. Not followed through all tasks in the benchmarks column; Absence of funds renders NSSP implementation more difficult

1.1.2. Joint Security Committee Meetings

A JSC Secretariat established, equip and staff in Mogadishu

Baseline : UNPOS and Somalia Embassy in Kenya currently provide JSC Secretariat support since August, 2010 Target : 4 – 6 weeks TOR to be adopted, recruitment process completed. Suitable office identified with office equipment.

UNPOS – lead OPM – to oversee the process. AMISOM/AU and other partners to be consulted

A: UNPOS, TFG and AMISOM identify a conducive office space in Mogadishu. Donors support the JSC with technical advice through the SSI trust fund, R: Bureaucratic process could delay the establishment of the JSC Secretariat. Location of office not properly consulted to all concerned parties. R: Violence spreads in run-up

12 The 2 Main Assumptions made in this document are: 1. that fulfilment of the requirements of the Kampala Accord will enable this NSSP to be valid for 12 months and then indicatively for a further 24 months to consolidate the political transformation process; and 2. that IC funding support will be forthcoming to support Government’s own revenues for many of the proposed activities.

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to the end of the transition

1.1.3. Functional NSSP Secretariat

Establish the NSSP Secretariat to effectively provide strategic advisory support relevant line ministries and agencies

Baseline : 0 Target : 2 months NSSP Secretariat established, NNSP Implementation Coordinator appointed; staff and equipped with Somalia qualified strategic advisors to support the implementation of the priority actions in the NSSP by line ministries, security and justice agencies/institutions

Lead : Office of the President/Office of the Prime Minister Partners: Ministry fo National Security and Interior, MOD, Justice, SPF, NSF, Custodian corps, NSA, planning, Min of Gender & Family Affairs; TFP and CSOs

A: Political will and funding available to establish NSSP Secretariat. R: Misunderstanding of roles and responsibilities between the JSC Secretariat and NSSP Secretariat. Selection and Recruitment of strategic advisors compromised

Organized regular briefing sessions, seminars and exchange visits for National Security Council (NSC) members

Baseline : One Higher level Senior Leadership seminar on security decision making process conducted in January, 2011. Target : 3 to 12 months At least 5 to 10 briefing sessions and seminars attended by NSC members. Level of understanding of SSD in Somalia, and the roles and responsibilities of each line ministries clearly understood.

Lead : Office of the President Partners: OPM, NSC members, and international partners.

A: NSC willingness to continue with higher level briefings and seminars for Ministers and head of security and jsutcie institutions. R: Ad hoc arrangement, change of ministers and head of security institutions. Politcial wrangling.

1.1.4. Legal and policy framework

Undertake the reformation of out-dated and incompatible policies and requirements as well as draft new laws that are all inclusive.

Baseline : 0 Target for assessment and drafting: 6 to 9 months. Establish a policy development coordinating unit. All ministries

OPM – Lead Partners: All ministers are responsible to bring new or revised

A: Prioritization of funding due to competing priorities, if not prioritized with strict deadlines. No proper appraisal to ministers. R: Lack of competent legal

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existing policy and legislation conforms to international best practice and standards

to assess all policy documents and to identify and draft new laws. Ministers to present their draft to the COM for approval and adoption, then OPM to forward approved new laws to be tabled to the parliament for ratification before dissolution and elections.

documents to the COM. OPM to devise action plan with timelines, so each ministry can report progress on a weekly basis.

experts to assist ministers. Bureaucratic process within TFIs or No political support

1.2. Strategic planning 1.2.1 Decentralization of

Security Sector Asessment/ Development assistance.

Support the conduct of a comprehensive Security Sector Assessment (SSA) in all regions of Somalia, that include mapping of gaps, needs and priorities vulnerable sectors, such as IDPs, women and children

Baseline: SSA already completed for South Central. DPs to fund Regional Target : In one year SSA conducted in other regions of Somalia, and start implementation of actions plans consistent with international standards

Lead : Office of the President and Prime Minister Target: Regional administrations such as Puntland, Galmugud , Somaliland . Gedo etc; UN and IC Partners

A: it will be possible to align regional SSAs for Federal policy making. R: Lack of cooperation between Regional authorities; Political risk in relations to other emerging administrations in Somalia

1.2.2 National Security policy development following the adopting of a new constitution for Somalia

Establish a gender balanced sub-committee to develop a National Security Policy Baseline: SSA and NSSP

Implementation Action Plan developed Target: By 2013 A comprehensive National Security Policy formulated and published for Somalia

Lead: Office of the President/Prime Minister Partners: MIO, MOD, Ministry of Finance, TFP, CSOs, Justice, and international partners

A: Political decision and leadership, and commitment to complete a national security policy

R: disruption to NSSP implementation due to political wrangling among the TFIs about ending the transition

1.2.3 Develop a comprehensive financial

Use external and local resources and engage

Baseline: National budgetary allocation and SSI Trust Fund.

Office of the President;

A: TFG seek private sector support to ensure continuity

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resource mobilization strategy that will finance the implementation of the NSSP.

more with private sector and diaspora

Bi-lateral arrangements already exist. Target: 3 months Donor pledging conference will follow circulation of NSSP to IC.

OPM; Ministry of Finance for MDTF and bi-lateral arrangements.

of funding and manage expectations for the NSSP R: Pace of transformation slows/stops during run up to ending the political transition

1.3. Policy development on cross-cutting issues

1.3.1 Protect the Somali Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ)

Establish a Joint Maritime Authority (JMA)

Baseline : Coast guards exist within the National Security Force (NSF) and the Somalia Police Force (SPF) Target : 1 year Policy and Legislation drafted and enacted to establish a JMA, support the capacity building of the Coast Guard and enhance monitoring, control and surveillance (MCS) of Somali EEZ in accordance with United Nations Convention of on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Action Plan developed in year 2.

Lead: MOD Partners: Ministry of Marine Resources, Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Justice, and international partners

A: Political will, human and financial support available R: security risk to personnel and civilians, especially international partners

1.3.2. Maritime Security and Counter piracy policy, legislation and programs

Appoint a Counter Piracy Coordinator under a designated Minister

Baseline : 0 Target : by 20 January Effective maritime security and counter piracy policy and legislation in conjunction with regional entities including Puntland State of Somalia and Somaliland established:

Lead : Office of the Prime Minister Partners: Ministry of Marine Resources, MOD, Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Justice, and relevant international partners

A: The security environment continue to improve; political and technical commitment maintained R: Lack of cooperation and collaboration between the regional entities, including Somaliland and Puntland.

Develop an integrated Baseline : IOM and UNODC Lead : Ministry of A: Funding and technical

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maritime security management pilot initiatives

support Target: 6 months Develop programmes for anti-piracy community engagement and linked coastal economic projects by 20 December 2011 and begin implementation by 20 March 2012

Fisheries and Marine Resources Partners: MOD, MOI, Office of the President, Prime Minister,

capacity available R: Overcoming Political and institutional structural challenges in the creating or design of a Somalia Integrated Maritime Security Programme

1.3.3. Counter-Terrorism Policy and Strategy

: Undertake legal reviews of the various defence and security forces; prepare organic laws; organise stakeholder consultations; build consensus and enact organic laws/legal frameworks related to counter-terrorism in Somalia

Baseline: 0, a number of counter-terrorism training supports are currently being provided to the Somalia security institutions. No national CT strategy has been developed. Target : National counter-Terrorism Policy/Act and disaster management/prevention and preparedness schemes developed

Lead Agency: NSA Partners: MOI, NSF, SPF, Office of the President, Prime Minister, regional states, TFP, international partners

A: Eensure that Somali as Counter-Terrorism Strategy is guided by a legal framework; ensure that the defence and security forces operations on CT within legal codes; ensure civilian oversight of the CTS R:

1.3.4.Child Protection Prioritize action for the release and reintegration of children and youth associated with armed forces. Establishment of a process to prevent the recruitment of children (under age 18) by all Armed groups.

Baseline: Focal point appointed. General orders issued by SNA and AMISOM. Target: 3 months SoPs, policy and action plan developed. Legislation enacted ASAP. Continuous process thereafter to support pilot reintegration programmes for children associated with armed forces/groups and children at risk in Mogadishu and Dhusmareb

Lead: Ministry of Women and Family Affairs, Partners: Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Labour & Youth; UN Agencies, UNPOS, UNICEF, IOM, AMISOM, and donor partners

A: TFG ensure timely implementation of the recommendations of the UN Security Council Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict. R: Increased threats from insurgent groups such as Al-shaabab Lack of funding to support reintegration of children into local communities

1.3.5 Protection of women and girls from all forms of

Prioritize action for the prevention and response

Baseline: Focal point appointed. General orders issued by SNA

Lead: Ministry of Women and Family

A: TFG ensure timely implementation of the

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violence including sexual exploitation and abuse

to sexual violence in conflict in line with UNSCR 1325, 1820, 1960

and AMISOM. Target: 3 months Task Force, Policy and action plan developed.

Affairs, Partners: Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Labour & Youth; UN Agencies, UNPOS, UNICEF, IOM, OCHA, UNHCR, AMISOM, and donor partners

recommendations of related UN Security Council Resolutions on sexual violence in conflict Lack of funding to support survivors of violence

1.3.6 Disaster Management Establish a National Disaster Risk Management Department/structure to develop a coherent policy framework aligned with the NSSP implementation mechanism for Somalia

Baseline : NIL Target: 6 to 12 months Rehabiliate, equip, and staff a start up National Disaster Risk Management Department align with the overall NSSP framework.

Lead: Office of the President Partners: OPM, Ministry of Interior and National Security, MOD, Fire Services, SPF, NSF and the international community

A: Resources are provided and the political will maintained to support the establishment of a National Disaster Management Department under the office of the President. R: Potential resistance from some line ministries and state institutions. Legal instrument not enacted on time .

1.4.Functional Security Sector Ministries

1.4.1Ministry of Defence Develop a policy and strategy on defence transformation, military integration, wounded in action (WIA) and killing in action (KIA); collection and control of weapons, including heavy and small arms, ammunition and explosives, as well as other dual-use items from liberated areas;

Baseline : 0 Target : Within 6 months for policy; 6 months for FR and Strategic Plan – cascading to 1 year Op Plan and costing.

Lead MOD/NSF; Partners: Cabinet, MOI, NSF, Parliament Consultants and international partners;

A: Provided there is political will and commitment. R: Lack of commitment, changes in the actors; deterioration of the security situation; Lack of consultancy funds;

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Establish a SNF transformation Secretariat

Baseline: 0 Target: 6 months Support the establishment of a defence and military transformation Secretariats in Mogadishu, South central Somalia

Lead : MOD Partners: office of the President, prime Minister, Ministry of Interior, Finance, Justice, planning, and international bilateral and multilateral partners

A: Defence and military policy development and making, including the integration of friendly forces and, administration enhanced. R: lack of fundingto supports the transformation process.

Refurbish and equip the Ministry of Defence

Baseline : The US and the UK are currently supporting the rehabilitation of the Army/NSF HQs, including Villa Baidoa Target : one year Additional donors come in to support the Unted States and UK in the refurbishment and rehabilitation of the Defence HQs in Mogadishu

Lead: MOD Partners: Office of the President, Prime Minister, Ministry of Finance

A: High-level commitment and leadership exists within relevant TFG ministries, Parliament and agencies –

Non-traditional donors support this initiate to enhance a number defence and military related policies and legal instruments e.g Protection of Civilians, Military integration etc; Use of Child Soliders etc

R: TFG political commitment falters (key programme assumptions prove wrong)

Somalia Defence Transformation and the national security vision

Baseline : o Target: 6 months Functional & Management Review of Ministry. Strategic and Operational Plans

Lead : MOD Partners: office of the President, OPM, Ministry of planning, Finance and National Security, international partners, including the UN, CSOs/NGOs

A: Minister of Defence and Director General provide the leadership and funding for a functional and management review R: SNF military posturing along the frontline with

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AGEs OR increased hostile rhetoric towards Mogaishu

Draft legislations that will tackle military integration of friendly forces, killing in action and wounded , child soldiers, GBV, corruption, piracy, Develop a policy framework for child soldiers, protection of civilians;

Draft legislation ASAP. Enactment and action planning: 6-12 months

Lead: Min Justice; Partners: MOD, Min Gender & Family Affairs, Min of Interior, Cabinet, Parliament and Consultant

A: Provided there is political will and commitment. R: Lack of commitment, changes in the actors; deterioration of the security situation; Lack of funding;

1.4.2 Ministry of Interior and National Security

Functional & Management Review; Results-oriented Strategic and Operational Plans

Baseline : O Target: 18 months To train ministry personnel, conduct FR, facilitate Strategic Plan and Op Plan; provide office equipment and adequate operational cost. Attain an effective professional and accountable Ministry;

MOI- Partners : lead Police, NSA, office of the Presdient and Prime Minister; Ministries of planning and Finance, Local Government authorities, Mayors office and international partners

A: Ministry needs met. Establish internal guidelines for the smooth functioning of the Justice Ministry is acceptable – continuously check developments against guidelines

R. Lack of political will, security, lack of continuity, lack of timely resource,

Policy and strategy development capacity of the Ministry of Interior and national Security enhanced

Baseline: Government of Japan has already provided a start up support for the creation of a function Ministry of National Security and Interior through the SSI Trust Fund for 2011 to 2012 Target: 6 months Policy development Unit established, and qualify strategic advisory staff selected and recruited to support the unit under

Lead : MOI Partners: Office of the Prime Minister, SPF, NSF, NSA, Ministry of Finance,

A: An environment which enables the Ministry of Nattional security and interior to focus on the start up of basic functions and government services in a responsbible and accountable manner; R: Increased participation of Ministery staff, and the

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the Minister/Director General adherence of cabinet to a reform and organization =al change management structure of the MOI

A coordinated intelligence collection and analysis established

12 months Built all necessary machinery, provide equipment and train personnel

Lead: MOI Partners: NSA, SPF, and Coast guards, adminstrationa staff of the Ministry and relevant international partners

A. Ministry achieves integration of departments R. competing and rivalry environment

Rehabilitation and equipment of the ministry

Baseline: some minimum rehabilitation work has commenced already, but very minimal. Target 24 months Rehabilitate the three HQs in the first 6-12months. By 18 months refurbish all 16 police stations in Mogadishu. By 24 months rebuild or rehabilitate the rest district police stations, NSA district offices and MOI infrastructure.

Lead : MOI Partners: Ministry of Finance, planning, works, private sector, and international partners

A. Complete some of the work R. buildings and equipment overtaken by other regimes.

R: Political and security environment

Establish a Discipline Internal Investigation Unit to combat corruption and corrupt practices within SPF, NSA and other departments in the MOI

Baseline: 0 Target: 2 years ( 2014) MOI capacitated to combat corruption and corrupt practises

Lead : MOI Partners : Ministry of Finance, office of the Prime Minister, audito general and international partners

A: Participtaion of all relevant ministries in charge of security in setting up transparency and accountability structures in there ministries R: lack of standard operational procedures and procurement systems

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undermines government administration and management

Ensure efficient use of SPF and NSA financial resources

Baseline : Obsolete financial management and administrative procedures Target: one year Accountability of SPF and NSA resources enhanced and comprehensive financial reporting

Lead: MOI Partners : Ministry of Finance and relevant international partners

A: Imporved financial transparency and accountability measures through the SSI trust Fund mechanism; build financial management capacities R: Lack of adequate human resources capacity to enhance financial and administrative capacities

1.4.3. Executive Oversight Functions

Legal and policy frameworks of the NSA, SPF, and other relevant security agencies under the MOI reviewed with a view of broadening the civilian democratic governance

Baseline : Minister and Director General appointed, but with limited human and institutional resources to provide executive oversight functions Target : Develop and strengthen corporate governance of the SPF , NSA, and introduce the change Management Strategy for the service

Lead : Ministry of Interior Partners: Office of the President, Prime Ministerr, Ministry of Planning, NSA, SPF and coast gaurds

A: An environment which enables the Minister of Interior and National Security to exercise executive oversight functions of the police and the other security services under its pruview. R: Political and executive willingness to restructure line of reporting between the Minister and heads of security agencies.

To build the capacity of immigration department in order to prevent illegal movements (terrorist) in collaboration with other agencies.

12 months Establish immigration points on newly liberated borders. Recruit, train and equip immigration officers, due to expanded territory

NSA – lead Immigration, police in partnership with customs and military

A. Government reaches all its borders

R. Lack of coordination with other agencies and regional authorities, lack of cooperation with neighboring countries.

Establish a Coordinating 3 months MOI – partners Lack of legal framework,

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Secretariat to support disengaging fighters

To establish the secretariat, recruitment process, Job description, training,

Defense political support.

Establishment and strengthening of regional administrations and district security committees; Functional Reviews and Plans.

Baseline: 0, however, the Government of Japan has provided initiatal funding for the establishment of at least six District Security Committees in Mogadishu. Targets: 12 months At least 15 District Security Committees Established, including regional administrations To consult with community, launch public awareness campaign, identify suitable individuals, form committee with roles and responsibilities

Lead :MOI – Partners: Office of the President, Office of the Prime Minister, local government authorities. Traditional leaders, District commissioners, SPF, NSF, MOD, CSOs, AMSOM, UN, and relevant international partners.

A: The Ministry provides leadership and direction in the establishment of District Security Committee; cooperation and partnerships enhanced amongst state and non-state security stakeholders in each identified districts. R: Lack of security and stability, cooperation and partnership between the Ministry and local authorities, including traditional leaders, and warlords

Establish a clear national legal and regulatory framework for Defectors, Small Arms and Light weapons (SALWs), including Safe storage and management of ammunition and stockpiles, Mine Action, and IED.

Baselien : 0 \ Target: 6 – 9 months To review current policies and procedure, prepare legislation with consultation of legal experts, prepare an action plan with timeframe.

Lead : MOI, MOD and office of the Prime Minister Partners: Office of the President, AMISOM, Ministries of defence, planning, Gender, NGOs/CSOs, UNMAS, UNDP and other agencies, and international donors and partners

A: continued leadership and political commitment to policy development sustained. R: Political support, delays of legal frame work ratification. Lack of legal experts,

Develop policies and SOPs between TFG and AMISOM targeting

Baseline: Provisional measures already initiated with TFG

Lead: MOI, Partners: AMISOM,

A: Funding for meeting the profiling, rehabilitation and reintegration of

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registration, screening, vetting, care and follow-up for disengaging fighters/defectors and their dependants. Ensure the policies and SOPs are in conformity with international standards, including International Human Rights and Humanitarian Laws, other international legal instruments related to child soldiers, protection of civilians etc).

6 – 9 months To appoint focal point to ensure all agencies are consulted, informed. Prepare terms of reference and procedures. Draft policy agreed and implemented. Consult with legal experts to ensure conformity with international human rights standards, 6 – 9 months

MOD, Office of the Prime Minister, NSA, SPF, NSF, Ministry of Women Affairs and Family Care, UN, agencies, IOM, and international partners

defectors/disengaging ro surrendeees made available R: Lack of coordination among partners, lack of political support, lack of expertise.

1.4.4. Ministry of Justice and Religious Affairs

Inaugurate the functioning JSC Justice and Corrections Technical Working Group and hold the meetings regularly.

Baseline : 0 Target : 3 month Provision of operation costs for organizing coordination and strategic planning meetings and workshops on Justice and Corrections

Lead: JSC framework Partners: Ministry of Justice, Office of the Prime Minister, planning, defence, and international partners

A: The government in proactively creating a legal framework for the establishment of a strong independent judiciary; Conduct Functional & Management Review; Facilitate mid term Strategic ad annual operational plans Office space and demonstration of no political will nd commitment from the relevant actors. R. The justice will not progress, efficient etc; R- if security of judges is not secured the judges will not

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take up post etc

Rehabilitation and refurbishment of the Ministry of Justice building to include a technical coordinating secretariat for Justice and Corrections

Baseline : 0 Target : one year A temporary building identified and refurbished to support the work of the Ministry of Justice

Lead : Ministry of Justice, Religious and Affairs Partners : Through the JSC framework, UN agencies, Ministry of Finance, and office of the Prime Minister

A: Build political will on the part to reactivate the Higher Judicial Council; in the interim the Chief Justice should be empowered to issue a transitional order to provide judicial oversight; R: Funding and donor willingness to provide assistance for reconstruction and rehabilitation

Conduct a functional and management review of the Ministry of Justice, religious affairs with view of enhancing efficiency and effectiveness of the justice system and administration a well as the independence of the judiciary.

Baseline : O 18 months To train ministry personnel, conduct FR, facilitate Strategic Plan and Op Plan; provide office equipment and adequate operational cost. Attain an effective professional and accountable Ministry;

Lead : Minstry of Justice, Religious Affaris Partners: Partners : lead Police, NSA, office of the Presdient and Prime Minister; Ministries of planning and Finance, Local Government authorities, Mayors office and international partners

A: Development of the Somali Justice and Corrections Institutions towards a normal framework of accountability and oversight and the capacity to combat threats to the peace process. R: Political and security stability

Justice and Corrections Capacity Technical Secretariat aligned with the JSC mechanisms

Procurement of equipment, infrastructure development and hiring of staff for the Justice and Corrections Technical Secretariat in Mogadishu under the Ministry of Justice, Religious Affairs and

Lead: JSC Technical Wokring on Justice and correction co-chairs Partners : Ministry fo

A: Development of the Somali Justice and Corrections Institutions towards a normal framework of accountability and oversight and the

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Endowment.

Justice, Judiciary, Attorney general’s office, Custodiap corps, SPF, NSF, UN, and international partners

capacity to combat threats to the peace process. R: partnership and cooperation with international actors within the framework fo the jSC working group on Justice and Corecctions

Evidenced-based Policy and research support

Conduct mapping, research or review on Islamic legal pluralism in Somalia: exploring an understanding of the interplay between customary law (xeer), sharia, and State Law as they relate to Somali’s Islamic legal systems and principles, while examining their compliance with national laws and international human rights standards

LEAD: Ministry of Justice , Religious Affairs and Endownment Partners : Office of the President, OPM, ministries of finance, planning, foreign affairs, defence, and national security , Ministry of Women Affairs and Family Care; CSOs, Universities, TFP, and international partners

A: Funding urgently made available to support the management and functioning of the Ministry of Justice, Endowment and Religious Affairs. In terms legal review and policy formulation; R: Political will and leadership not sufficiently developed around this issues with all Somalis.

1.4.5. Running and operational cost of the Ministry of Justice, Religious Affairs and Endownment

Provision of operation costs for organizing `coordination and strategic planning meetings and workshops on Justice and Corrections

Baseline : TFG national budgetary allocations for 2011 Target: 24 months Provide extra-budgetary support to the Ministry for meeting the running cost for Justice policy development and coordination

Lead : Ministry of Justyice Partners: Ministry of Finance, Office of the Prime Minister, UN ahencies and international partners

A: Government’s continued willingness to provide running cost to the Ministry R: Lack of adequate funding and risk of corruption

1.4.6. Support formal court structures and institutions

Provision of adequate resourcing, stipends and rehabilitation of the infrastructure

Baseline : 0 Target : Within 12 months at least one court in every district in

Lead : MOJ Partners : MOF, UN, donors and

A. Security will improve R. if security doesn’t improve then buildings

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Mogadishu functioning. In 24 months one court in each of regional headquarters

international partners

could be taken over by others and equipment looted.

Renovate and equip the supreme court, central prisons in Mogadishu

Baseline : 0 Target : In 12-24 - Months Renovation of the Supreme Court, Mogadishu central prison and Ministry of Justice compound and all office equipment must be in place.

Lead : MOJ Partners: MOF, Judiciary, Mayor of Benadir, and Ministyr fo Interior

A. Security will improve R. if security doesn’t improve then buildings could be taken over by others and equipment looted.

Case management support Baseline : 0 Target : Within 6 to 12 months courts must have case management system

Lead : Judiciary Partners; MOJ, SPF, Formal courts, NGOs, UN and international partners

A. Security will improve R. if security doesn’t improve then buildings could be taken over by others and equipment looted.

Sustainability of stipend payments

Baseline : with 12 months judges, corrections corps and prosecutors should be paid in full salary, AG office functional in 6 months

Lead : MOJ Partners; Ministry of Finance, UN and other international partners

A: Domestic revenue increases to meet salaries and stipends, and international partners continue to provide support. R: financial crisis persist, and funding to sustain stipend scarce.

Training and capacity building for judges, prosecutors and other personnel

Various capacity building activities and training for judges, prosecutors and other personnel including correctional officers in the areas such as development of codes of conduct, disciplinary

Baseline : Some professional training have been delivered through UNDP. Target : 12 months Continue and sustain current professional training programmes, including human rights and gender, for the judges and

Lead : MOJ Partners: Ministry of Finance, Office of the Prime Minister, UN, AMISOM, and relevant international

A. human resources, in place R. availability of many actors claiming judiciary accreditation

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mechanisms and selection and appointment procedures, the publication of judicial decisions, the adoption of anti-corruption measures, and the promotion of public awareness campaigns to improve the image and credibility of the justice system.

prosecutors including tailor made training for Sharia scholars and traditional elders. In 6 months -3 years - Provide Correctional Corps recruit and training, including instruction in the development of registers, standing and operational order to approximately 8000 -10000 guards and officers.

partners

Legal training centres for magistrates etc

Baseline : 0 Target : 36 months Establish magistrates schools, legal training centres and continuing education courses for judges, prosecutors and lawyers, utilizing the capacity of national trainers and training institutions

Lead : MOJ Partners : Ministry of Finance, Office of the Prime Minister, UN, AMISOM, IGAD, and relevant international partners

A: Funds are available to support the establihsmnet of training centres for magistrates R: Insecuirty and lack of funding to support the establishment of higher institution of training for maogistrates etc

Improve gender justice though the development of women's professional associations; review of laws to ensure adequate gender issues that have particular importance to women such as gender-based violence

Baseline 0 Target : 12 to 24 months Organised several consultative meetings on SSD, CEDAW , Resolution 13 25, 1820 to mainstream gender sensitive approach to security sector development in Somalia

Lead : Ministry of Gender and Children Partners: MOD, MOI, SPF, NSF, Ministry of Finance, planning , NSSP Secretariat and international partners, including NGOs etc

A: Funds are available to support the establihsmnet of training centres for magistrates R: Insecuirty and lack of funding to support the establishment of higher institution of training for maogistrates etc

Creation of Junile courts Baseline : limited Target : 24 months

Lead : MOJ Partners : Magistrate courts, supreme,

A: Finances are available to support the establihsmnet of training centres for magistrates

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Enhance justice for children through alternatives to detention for children; the creation of juvenile courts/panels, and the development of child-sensitive procedures and protective measures for child victims and witnesses

Ministry of Finance, Partliament, CSOs and international partners

R: Insecuirty and lack of funding to support the establishment of higher institution of training for maogistrates etc

Create coordination body of MOJ, Courts, Police and Correctional

In 6 months coordination of justice law and order institutions is created with terms of reference elaborated.

MOJ is lead MOI

A; Judiciary delivery will be effective R: Could result in duplication, conflict of interest

Creation of abridging mechanisms such as temporary mobile courts to facilitate justice delivery in lieu of the establishment of district and regional courts..

Establish free legal aid system in 12 months that includes the recruitment and training of women paralegals to support survivors of gender related violence. Within 6 to 12 months Several mobile courts should be setup Re-open regional /district courts as security improves under TFG control

Lead : Court is lead Partners : MOJ, Parliament to endorse and international partners to fund as deem necessary

A: No courts outside the capital A. Security R: Duplication of work of other justice providers like traditional elders.

Create and establish Referral Networks

Baseline : 0 Target : 36 months Support a referral network for victims’ services such as legal assistance, strengthening of the alternative dispute resolution mechanisms, and the setting up of

Lead : MOJ Partners : CSOs, Ministry of Finance, education NSSP Secretariat, OPM, and international partners.

A: No courts outside the capital A. Security R: Duplication of work of other justice providers like traditional elders

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court service centres and help desks.

Transitional Justice and Reconciliation issues Dual track justice and reconciliation mechanism to deal with ex insurgents and other militias providing criminal proceedings for war crimes and gross human rights abuses

Create government inter departmental body that will recommend ways and modalities to deal with those insurgents to be prosecuted and not amnestied and perpetrators of sexual violence ASAP Government should act on recommendations within 6 months Government must have an overall transitional justice policy in 3 years

Prime Minister A: the Government will agree to set up this body. A: Al Shabaab fighters will ask for amnesty/surrender/re-integration. R: Rivalry, conflict of interest, duplication, lack of political will, could raise security issue Gross justice violations may happen. R: Lack of clarity in the scope and modalities of jurisdiction

Establishing laws ensuring respect for private properties and communally owned lands and national land and ensure the prevention of land grabbing by any actor.

Within 24 months Develop legislation and regulation of construction and land usage; property rating system for taxations etc.

Municipal authorities. A. government will agree to address land issues. R. increased conflict

Strategic Objective two: To rebuild affordable, accountable and professional defence/army, security, justice and Custodian Corps Agencies and Institutions 2. 1. National Security Force

2.1.1. Build functional and efficient military forces

Recruit, train, equip and sustain the Somali National Forces that is capable of fulfilling their

Baseline : 3 years projection is 26,000. Currently there is 7000 well

Lead : MOD; Partners: Min of Finance, Min of

A: Provided there is continuous funding from the IC, Political will and adequate training

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mandates, by imparting them an improved and comprehensive capacity-builoding programme, including the provision of appropriate selection and recruitment mechanism, training , equipment, and gender complaince

trained but not well equipped and 9000 not well trained. - 6000 to be trained in 12 months. - 12 000 to be trained in 24 months. - 18 000 to be trained in 3 years.

Health, Min of Interior and AMISOM.

support. R: Lack of financial support, lack of training facilities, inadequate trainers.

Establish standardized organizational military structure for small units (company, platoon and squad) that would determine unit formation and a clear ranking structure corresponding to its size.

Baseline : Baseline: Some units are already organized. Target: 12 months The process of selecting , vetting and recruiting Somlis into the ranks of NSF will be done in a transparent and accountable way to ensure regional and clan balance within the NSF. To ensure the size and strength of the security forces , aproper registration process will be established. All personnel should be issued a picture ID carried all the time and they must be verified and accounted for.

Lead : NSF Partners : MOD, Office of the President, Prime Minsiter, Ministry of Interior and Ntaional Security, Ministry of planning and finance

.A: Political decision to reorganize the military structure for small units etc R: Lack of financial support to manage organisationa change management processes relted to the NSF.

Conduct a gender mapping of NSF to promote the integration of gender perspectives in the reforms (from recruitment, training, promotion, logistics)

Baseline : 0 Target : 12 months Encourage recruitment and training of female trainees

Lead : MOD/NSF Partners: EUTM, US, AMISOM, and international partners

A: Funding available to conduct gener and SSR mapping and research R: Cultural beliefs and concerns.

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2.1.2. Military Integration and transformation

Facilitate a unified Command and Control structure for the NSF, including the integration of all armed groups into a unified national force

Baseline: Between now and 2 years time. The agreement between Al-Sunnah W.J is already in place. Target: 12 months The Somali NSF in collaboration with the IGAD Coordinating Mechanism, AMISOM and other international partners are reorganized

The Executive Branch; Partners: MOD, IC, AMISOM and IGAD

A: Provided all state armed groups allied to TFG are willing to integrate. More Junior Commanders trained R: Lack of Political will and commitment; lack of funding; security situation allowing. Split and fragmentation of the NSF, friendly militias and the emergency and increased warlordism once more

2.1.3.Terms and Conditions of Services (TACOS)

Harmonization and sustainability of stipend payments

Baseline: The IGAD Coordinating Mechanism established for payment of stipends. US and Italian Governments have agreed to continue to pay stipends to the NSF up to mid 2012. Target : 2 years Additional non-traditional donors required to sustain and complement stipend payments to the Somali NSF for to meet the cost of at least 18,00 personnel

Lead: Office of the President, MOD/NSF Partners: Office of the Prime Minister, Ministry of Finance and international partners, e.g. US, Italy, UK,

A: Biometric electronic database completed. Efficient payment mechanisms ensure; morale, loyalty, cohesion prevent defections to Anti-government Elements (AGEs) R: Lack of sustained donor funding to improve Terms and Conditions of Services for the NSF

2.1.4. Force size and composition

Streamline selection, recruitment and training process for new NSF personnel; establish a harmonized NSF biometric database system; ensuring vetting process and criteria in accordance with international norms and

Baseline : 3,500 NSF personnel have been registered through a harmonized biometric database Target: 12 months Entire NSF personnel registered in the biometric database by 2012

Lead: MOD/NSF Partners: Ministry of Finance, Office of the President and Prime Minister; UN, AMISOM and international bilateral partners

A: Political will to complete project before the expiration of funding R: Funding, continued lack of transparency and accountability for every NSF personnel; existing JSC/donor coordination mechanisms not adhered to

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standards.

2.1.5. Equipment of the NSF

Sustaining the equipment of the Somalia national Security Forces

Baseline: A number of bilateral donors are currently providing funding vehicles, food, fuel, boots and uniform; Target : 12 months Provide additional vehicles to include tactical vehicles and comms for deployment of NSF l

Lead : MOD/NSF Partners: Ministry of Finance; and international partners e.g US, UK, Italy AMISOM, and UN

A: Government and international community’s willingness to support additional NSF transportation and communication equipments; R: Operational Sustainability , maintenance and repair costs

2.1.6 Capacity building of the coast guards/Navy

To secure Somalia’s territorial waters and enhance the capacity to protect coastal and maritime security, including piracy, toxic waste dumping, and illegal fishing and armed robbery in the Somalia coast., it is critical that in addition of strengthening the operational capabiloity of NSF elements in land, to build a viable Somali Navy.

Baseline : Limited capacity Target 24 months Build efficient operational capacity , training , arm and equip with adequate weaponry, technology an dsupplies ( patrol Boats, adequate ships , rada and radios)

Lead : NSF/MOD Partners : SPF, NSA, and international partners.

A: Government and international community’s willingness to support additional NSF transportation and communication equipments; R: Operational Sustainability , maintenance and repair services when government revenue is currently weak. Political instability etc

2.1.6. NSF Medical Support Reconstruction and equipment of the Di Martini Hospital.

Baseline: Italian Government is currently funding the partial reconstruction of the Di Martini hospital. Target: Additional donor funding required to complete the reconstruction of the hospital. More Somalia Diaspora doctors attracted/

Lead ; MOD Partners: AMISOM NSF; SPF and civilians; Italian and other international partners

A: TFG appointed medical Director and nurses is maintained; AMISOM to continue to provide medical care and personnel R: Relocation support and salaries to staff of the Military Hospital; Medical supplies sustained through government funding

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Encourage dialogue and consultations, meetings and conferences that lead to national reconciliation

Baseline : 0 Target: 6 months Continuous process of participation of the NSF in district security committee meetings, public debate with local communities

Lead: Min of Constitution & Nat. Reconciliation - Partners: MOD, NSF, Executive and Parliament, IC.

A: Provided aggrieved parties are ready to dialogue. R: Lack of Political will and commitment, lack of funding, security situation allowing.

Find a lead nation willing to coordinate, train and equip the National Security Forces (NSF)

Baseline : Target : Within 1 year

Lead” Executive; and Lead : MOD : Partner: Min of Foreign Affair, Finance and planning Relevant bilateral and multilateral partners e.g UN , US, and EU

A: Provided there is interested member state to take the lead. R: Unavailability of a willing nation and/organization, Lack of political will.

2.1.7. Future Training Needs and Policy

Additional technical and specialized trainings received, including Command and Staff training for NSF The NSF training should also encompass a strong civic orientation programme that teaches the troops citizenship, peace and religious education (i.e. citizens rights and responsibilities, human rights, the rule of law, common good and loyalty.

Baseline: 16 000 NSF (7,000 well trained and 9000 not well trained). Training Needs Analysis Conducted Target : 12 month 6000 to be trained in specialized skills e.g. C2; and a total of 18000 trained by 2014

Lead : MOD/NSF Partners: US, AMISOM, EUTM, UN, and other relevant international partners

A: Findings and Recommendations of the JSC MTWG TNAs are utilized to review the NSF Training Curriculum based on the current and merging military scenarios R: Provisions of parallel and competitions for the delivery of training services without reference to the work of the MTWG

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2.1.8. Delivery of NSF trainings inside Somalia

Rehabilitation of Al Jazeera Camp in Mogadishu

Baseline : Rehabilitation of Al Jazeera Training camp have started Target : 6 months Rehabilitation and expansion of training camp using EU funding to provide the camp with 2000 beds. NCOs recruits trained in Somalia

Lead : MOD/NSF Partners: NSF, NSA, etc AMISOM/ EASFCOM, US, EU and other bilateral and international partners

A: The training camp will ensure NSF forces are trained inside Somalia, including T# (Trainer-the-Trainers. Courses). Donor Funding sustained R: Protective security and access control to the training camp site are relaxed;

The TFG takes advantage of existing regional and international training support for the NSF, the Somalia Police Force (SPF), NSA, custodian corps, etc as a step towards standardizing its national security and defence doctrines and improving the professionalism development of all elements of the security and justice agencies.

Sustain training and capacity building support for other regional forces outside Mogadishu and beyond

Baseline: Uganda, Djibouti, Kenya and Ethiopia providing training for NSF and associated friendly forces. Target: 6 months More training assistance, equipment and logistics support required for the regional forces outside Mogadishu, e.g. Puntland, Galmugud, Gedo, Lower Shabelle, Somaliland etc, including ASWJ

Lead : MOD/NSF Partners: Office of the President, Prime Minister; National Security Council, Bilateral donors, and regional member states

A: All training assistance, equipment and logistics support required or provided for the regional forces outside Mogadishu are endorsed and approved by the JSC through respective technical working groups. R; Non-compliance with the JSC provisions by bilateral donors

2.1.9. Stockpile management

Establishment of Government armories

Baseline : 0 Target : 2 year Partners are willing to provide support for the establishment at least one to two international standard armory

Lead: MOD; - Partners: Min of Interior, international partners

A: Provided there is a political will, commitment and adequate funding. R: Lack of funding, lack of capacity.

Monitor and report the effects of the nuclear and chemical waste dumping and the illegal fishing in the National waters

Baseline : 0 Target : 1 year

Lead: Min of Fishery, Marine Resources and Environment; Partners: Executives

A: Provided there is support and cooperation from the IC. R: Lack of funding, lack of capacity, lack of cooperation of International agencies.

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Policies and strategies to deal with chemical waste dumping and illegal fishing developed and implemented.

& International Agencies.

2.1.10. Prevention and Recruitment Children in the Somalia Conflict

Ensure timely implementation of the recommendations of the Security Council working group on Children and Armed Conflict

Baseline: TFG focal point and human rights for child soldiers appointed. General Orders on the use of child soldiers have been prepared and circulated. Target: 3 months Task force on Child Protection issues urgently required

Lead : Office of the Prime Minister Partners; MOD, Ministry of Gender, Women and children Affairs; MOI; CSOs/NGOs, TFP, UN, AMISOM, and relevant international partners

A: Continue political will and commitment maintained; R: Lack of cooperation from the NSF and its associated friendly forces.

2.1.11. Prevention and Protection of women and girls from sexual violence in conflict

Ensure timely implementation of the recommendations of the Security Council resolutions on women, peace and security

Baseline: TFG focal point on sexual violence in conflict appointed. General Orders on the armed forces code of conduct revised/prepared and circulated. Target: 3 months Task force on women, peace and security urgently required

Lead : Office of the Prime Minister Partners; MOD, Ministry of Women Affairs and Family Care; MOI; CSOs/NGOs, TFP, UN, AMISOM, and relevant international partners

A: Continue political will and commitment maintained; R: Lack of cooperation from the NSF and its associated friendly forces.

2.2. Somalia Police Force 2.2.1. SPF size and composition, including the conduct of a census of the SPF;

Recruit and train additional SPF personnel (ensure gender balance); Development of a transparent accountability mechanism for the SPF

Baseline : 5,000 SPF personnel Target: 10,000 by year 3 Capacity of SPF to provide peace and security and public order enhanced. Biometric System for the SPF established.

Lead : SPF Partners: MOI, NSA, AMISOM Police Component, and relevant international partners

A: Strong political will and commitment currently exist among the TFIs to engage on SSD activities in Somalia. The IC indeed working hard to sustain this momentum;

2.2.2. SPF transformation Organizational structure and Operating procedures, including the Integration of serving SPF personnel

Better understanding of the concept of SPF corporate service enhanced and policy for corporate governance formulated

Lead: SPF Partners: MOI, NSA, Un agencies,

A: Strong political will and commitment currently exist among the TFIs to engage on SSD activities in Somalia. The

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and comprehensive human resource records of SPF maintained

AMISOM Police Component, and relevant international partners

IC indeed working hard to sustain this momentum; R: Resistance from the rank and file of the SPF leadership structure

2.2.3. Transportation and Logistics Restructuring of the SPF

Provide adequate transport and logistics to enhance the operational effectively of the SPF

Baseline: SPF currently have 6 pick ups Target : 6 months Provide 5 APCs, 25 Police 4*4 pick up trucks procured and provided to the Somali Police Force; 3 trucks (7 tons capacity) procured and provided to the Somali Police Force; ; 2 Ambulances procured and provided to the SPF

Lead : SPF Partners: MOI, NSA, NSF, and other security/justice agencies

A: Government of Japan funding through the SSI trust Fund is available and procurement process is concluded as soon as possible. R: Procurement delays obstructs the performance of the SPF. Insecurity as a result of renewed fighting.

2.2.4. Special Crowd Control, Riot and Patrol Units

Establish rapid response frontline units to enhance community policing together with AMISOM Police enforcement capabilities.

Baseline: Already established consistent with the Mogaidhsu security plan following Al-shaabab’s withdrawal. Target: SPF special patrol, riot, crowd control and community police units established to work with AMISOM Formed Police Units (FPU).

Lead : SPF Partners: NSF, Coast guards, Custodian corps, NSA. Office of the President and the NSC. Relevant international partners

A: Adequate riot and crowd control equipments are provided such as handcuffs, helmets and batons. R: Al-shaabab snipers and increased asymmetric warfare

Logistic and equipment support

Baseline : 0 Target: 6 months Through the SSI trust Fund, Procure relevant office equipment, weapons and

Lead : SPF Partners: MOI, Ministry of Finance and UN through the SSI Trust Fund

A: Government of Japan funding already available to start provision of logistics and equipment for the SPF R: Delays in procurement and disbursement of funds. Lack

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communications, Vehicles, systems., uniform and transport

of Maintenance and repair costs may have impact on sustainability of equipment; Insecurity and accident/IEDs

2.2.5. SPF Communication Network

Review existing SPF communication strategy to further enhance the effectiveness of the SPF

Baseline : Reliance of NSF and AMISOM communication network Target : 3 months Communication capability of SPF enhanced by procuring installing equipments including 20 VHF bases and 1800 VHF handsets for the SPF

Lead: SPF Communication department Partners: NSF, NSA, coast guards, AMISOM and UN police, UN agencies and relevant international partners

A; 1068 communication VHF hadn radios, 20 VHF based and 8 communication mats are now in Mogadishu to be handed over to the SPF. R: frequency assessment mission have been undertaken, but expectations of the SPF need to be managed and training is urgently required.

2.2.6. Training support Middle management skills: Provide local and overseas training /exchange programmes for staff of the Anti-Teerorism Unit, CID, Drugs of the SPF

Baseline : UNDP and other bilateral countries such as Sudan, Egypt, etc have been providing middle level management trainings to the SPF Target : 12 months Target: At least 200 SPF senior officers trained in middle level management skills. SPF capability to manage personnel records/files improved. Capacity of SPF CID, and other specialized units/Departments to gather intelligence enhanced. Quality training for SPF provided.

Lead : SPF/JSC PTWG Partners: Ministry of National Security and Interior, NSF, NSA, Ministry of Finance, and relevant international partners such as UN agencies, AMISOM, EU, and other bilateral and multilateral partners

A: All specialized management courses provided consistent with the JSC/PWTG training curricula for the SPF. R: Selection, recruitment and training of the SPF personnel conducted without reference to international accredited and harmonized training processs Not linking training provisions to stipend payments

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2.2.7. Refurbishment and rehabilitation of SPF police stations

Refurbish or rehabilitate the SPF stations in Mogadishu and other regions of Somalia

Baseline: 6 to 7 Police Stations in Mogadishu/under the control of TFG/AMISOM are partially functional. Target : 12 months Rehabilitate 20 SPF police stations with the south central region, and the HQ in Mogadishu.

Lead : SPF Partners; JSC PTWG sub-committee on Rehabilitation of SPF police stations; relevant donors

A: Funding for phase 1 ( 6 SPF Police Stations) of the rehabilitation is already available from Government of Japan. Phase 2 will required substantive donor support. R: Rehabilitation delays due to procurement procedures involving local tenders and bidding process. Inusfficient funding to undertake phase 2: rehabilitation and reconstruction of more SPF stations.

2.2.8. Sustainability of stipend payments to the SPF

Sustained Somali Police Force stipend payments

Baseline: A total of 3065 SPF personnel have received stipend payments up to May 2010. Target: 36 months ( June 2010 to 2014) Stipends payment lists for the entire SPF registered and verified personnel through the JSC PTWG harmonized and sustained by the international community till end of 2014., with the Somalia Government gradually taking over the cost of stipends.

Lead: JSC PTWG/SPF Partners: MOI, Ministry of Finance, Stipend payment and monitoring committee, Office of the Prime Minister, UN agencies, AMISOM, and donors

A: Government of Japan and the European Union support to stipend payments for the SPF sustained. Other non-traidtional donors provide additional funding to close the funding gaps.

R: Insecurity due to payment delays/absence of payment for

Establish a biometric system for the SPF

Baseline : Electronic database exists through UNDP

Lead : SPF Partners: MOI,

A: PTWG decision to harmonise biometric database to register all SPF personnel

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Target : 12 months Streamline selection, recruitment and training process for new SPF personnel; establish a harmonized NSF biometric database system; ensuring vetting process and criteria in accordance with international norms and standards.

MOD, SPF, ministy of Finance, and international partners.

R: Not conducting proper vetting and screening process.

2.2.9. Terms and Conditions of Services (TACOS) for the SPF

Review Terms and Conditions (TACOS) of the SPF

Baseline : SPF quarters, barracks and training centres deplorable in and outside Mogadishu, e.g in Puntland Standard of living of SPF personnel improved, including construction

Lead : MOI Partners : SPF, Ministry of works, Finance, and potential international partners

A: Funding to support reconstruction of barracks/accommodation for the SPF through south central Somalia made available. R: Access to SPF buildings and land constrained due to insecurity and escalation for conflict.

2.2.10. Basic operational and administrative needs of the SPF met

Define SoPs for the SPF Command , Control and organizational structures

Baseline : Target : 24 months Benchmark: outreach ongoing

Lead : SPF Partners: MOI, Ministry of Finance, JSC PTWG, UNDP, UNPOS,

A: need a strong will and commitment from SPF Command. R: frequent change of command in SPF

2.2.11Logistics and running cost s SPF Police Stations

Maintenance and operation cost for of the SPF Police Stations, including running cost for police operations (Main HQ) and District police stations, wards , maintenance and fuel for vehicles

Baseline : National budgetary allocation (30%), limited running costs available to cover up to 5 to 8 police stations Target : 24 months Support the running costs of

Lead: SPF Partners: MOI, UN agencies, ministry fo Finance, JSC PTWG, UNDP, UNPOS, and international partners

A: Funding for running and maintenance costs are sustained; TFG meets at least 30% of this cost. R: Limited domestic revenue impacts of national budgetary allocation, including less budget to the SPF. TFG

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police vehicles, generators for 20 Police Stations by 2013, including HQ and the airport police station

limited capacity to take over running costs, particularly maintenance and repair services to vehicles and office generators.

2.2.12. Accommodations for SPF

Construct/rehabilitate barracks for SPF personnel nationwide that are sensitive to needs of female personnel

Baseline : 0 Improved working and living environment lead to better performance of the SPF respectful of men and women SPF needs

Lead: SPF Partners; MOI, Ministry of Finance, Office of the Prime Minister and international partners

A: Funding availability and political will R: National domestic revenue doest not increase due to insecurity from Al-shabaab and other anti-governmental elements.

2.2.13. SPF Airport/Civil Aviation Security Capability

Provide adequate support for response capability against armed attack, plane crash and hostage taking at the Airport

Baseline: IOM currently providing support to the SPF and NSA for immigration support. Target : 12 months At least 30 SPF Airport security officers trained and equipped with relevant devices and communication sets. Capability on civil aviation security enhanced, Provide adequate support for response

Lead : Somalia Airport Management Partners; SPF, NSF, Fire brigade/Force, MOI, Ministry of Transport and Communication, and relevant international partners

A: Mapping and assessment of the threats and risks to aviation security in Somalia carried out based on ICAO standards. Funding is available to support the SPF and other relevant security sector agencies. R: Selection and recruitment process into the aviation security wing of the SPF. Terrorism and organized crime infiltration

2.2.14. Maritime Police /Coast Guards

Select, recruit, train and equip the Maritime Police/Coast Guards unit within the SPF on Maritime and border security

Baseline: Target: Capacity of SPF coast guards to handle maritime and border security improved

Lead : MOI Partners: MOD, SPF, NSF, Ministries of planning and Finance.

A: Given the strageic importance of Somalia natural resource base for its peace building efforts, the strengthening of coast guards will ensure an integrated maritime security capability is sustained to effectively promote monitoring surveillance and control (MSC) mechanisms for the

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EEZ. R: lack of funding and insecurity, worst lack of political commitment and instability.

2.2.15. SPF medical support

Refurbish SPF hospital to meet the medical needs of all personnel (men and women)

Baseline: minimum SPF medical facilities/allowances are being provided to the SPF by TFG. Target: 12 months SPF health care delivery capability enhanced

Lead : MOI Partners: MOD, SPF, NSF, Finance, AMISOM, Ministry of Health and international partners

A: Funding for medical facilities for SPF is available R: Low domestic revenue impact on budgetary allocation.

2.2.16. SPF anti-Terrorist Unit

Train and equip the Anti-Terrorist Unit of the SPF to effectively perform duties assigned to them

Baseline: Limited training delivered to the SPF on Counter-Terrorism Target: 12 months Establish a transnational crime and terrorism unit within the SPF. Provide adequate security intelligence and police records on terrorism in Somalia

Lead : SPF Partners: MOI, NSA, NSF, JSC PTWG, and international donors/bilateral partners

A: IGAD regional counter-terrorism programme initiative is sustained. International partners are willing to provide funding to draft and legsilatte a Somalia Counter-terrorism act. R: Lack of funding or political will and prioritization of legal reforms, including transitional justice instruments

2.2.17. Criminal Intelligence gathering and Analysis

Develop credible and sustainable intelligence system that will assist SPF in combating crime in the communities

Baseline: CID exist, but have limited capacity to gather and analyze credible criminal intelligence. Target: 6 months At least 50 SPF officers trained in Intelligence gathering, and sharing capabilities of SPF enhanced

Lead: SPF Partners: NSA, NSF, and the MOI, with IGAD regional security forces, and international partners

A: Funding support for training in intelligence gathering and analysis is prioritized. R: Not sustain the funding needs will undermine the recent military gains or support from the local communities.

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2.2.18. Forensic analysis Speed up the establishment of a Forensic Science unit for SPF

Baseline : relationship between Interpol and the East Africa Police Chief Association on forensic expertise is evolving Target: 36 months Forensic capability enhanced in Somalia

Lead: SPF Partners: Interpol, MOI, Ministry of Health, MOD and international partners

A: Funding, level of collaboration and partnership with IGAD member states R: Lack of funding to establish and support forensic laboratory analysis

2.2.19. SPF Explosive Ordnance Disposal/Counter-IED capacity

Increase the capability of the SPF EOD teams to address and mitigate explosive contamination from mines/ERW/IED and stockpiles.

Baseline: Initial training completed for 62 staff: Level I training for 16 EOD operators, and Phase I training for 7 forensic IED investigators, 2 medics, 28 security/cordon officers, and 2 explosive detection dog handlers. Target: 24 months: Participation by TFG SPF in planning, administration and budgeting for EOD capacity 100% operators to EOD Level 2 2 members per team identified for advanced training to EOD Level 3 IED response functional Forensic exploitation of blast sites is conducted thoroughly and systematically

Lead: SPF Partners: MOI, NSA, NSF, JSC PTWG, UNMAS and international donors/bilateral partners

A: Funding for EOD support is prioritized, with engagement by relevant supporting ministries. R: Lack of commitment by relevant TFG ministries or international community members (financial, human resources, equipment support) could limit delivery of outputs.

2.2.20. Gender-based violence and child protection

Establish a rape, gender violence, child exploitation unit in SPF Select, recruit, train and equip a rape/gender violence, child

Baseline : Nil Target : 12 months Establish a Gender-based Violence or Family support Unit within the SPF

Lead: SPF Partners: Partners: MOI, MoGFA, UN agencies, and international partners

A: Funding is made available to include gender issues in the change management structures of the SPF.

R:

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exploitation unit in SPF 2.3. National Security Agency

2.3.1. Coordinate the Assessment of National Security Threats and Risks Analyze national

security threats to Somalia, its neighbours and the international community with respect to IHL and human rights;

Baseline : Threat assessments is being carried out disjointly among security agencies; Target: 12 months A holistic national security threat assessment established

Lead: NSA Partners: Office of the President, Prime Minister, Ministries of Defence, National Security, NSF, SPF Foreign Affairs, and international partners

A: Establish and/or link into early warning mechanisms – e.g. intelligence on arms shipments. Strengthen mechanisms of feeding back information to the NSC structures

2.3.2. Legal and Policy framework for the NSA in existence

Develop, rationalize, clarify all legal and policy issues;

Baseline: Draft legislation is already in place. Target : 3 months To hire expert/consultant to ensure that the draft can be presented to the COM. Parliament to ratify.

Lead: MOI – Partners: Office of the President, Prime Minister, NSA, Parliament and international partners

A. No more delay in the process of the ratification and legislation of the draft bill on establishment of the NSA. R: Lack of political support Security – lack of continuity Lack of timely resources

2.3.3. Organizational change management and leadership development of the NSA

Conduct Functional & Management Review; Facilitate Mid term (3 year) and annual operational planning

12 months To review strategic plan and complete the process. Find relevant male and female experts and programs. Implement training programs.

Lead : NSA Partners; MOI, SPF, office of the President, Prime Minister, regional administrations, District Commissioners, and international partners

A: Neutral, impartial and credible NSA established and functional with sustained funding. R: maintaining or upholding political neutrality principles, or how to ensure politicians do not resort to politicisation of the NSA interventions

2.3.4. Training and Capacity building (knowledge enhancement)

Training and Capacity building (such as, build open source capability and signal intelligence capability).

Baseline: Limited training in higher threat and risks analysis Target: 6 to 12 months Over 100 NSA male and female personnel trained and capacity

Lead ; NSA Partners: MOI, SPF, NSF, Immigration, Coast guards, Ministry of Finance, office of the

A: Funding is made available for continue training and capacity building of NS personnel R: The security situation though improved in the south

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developed to carry out assigned national security tasks in a transparent and accountable manner.

President and Prime Minister, and international partners

central, Mogadishu, the situation still remain fragile and precarious with high influx of IDPs, unemployed youth, many of whom where former combatants alongside al-shabaab..

Establishing checks and balances on the use of information gained by state surveillance

Baseline : 0 Target: 24 months Standard Operational Procedures (SOPs) and Guidelines developed to support information gathering by state surveillance institutions

Lead : NSA Partners: MOI, MOD, SPR, NSF, and international partners

A: Information collection and analysis is coordinated without violation of human rights, and contrary to the principles of the Rule of Law. R; The risk of political manipulation of state intelligence services.

Office equipments and Communication systems

Procure relevant office equipment, logistics, weapons and communications systems

Lead : NSA Partners: MOI, Ministry of Finance, and international partners

A: Funding made available R: sustaining maintenance and repair costs office equipment and communication systems

2.3.5. Renovation and rehabilitation support

Reconstruction and Rehabilitation of offices/centres

Assess the rehabilitation needs and costs. Prepare project proposals and financial requirement.

Lead ; NSA/MOI Partners: Ministries of Finance, works, and international partners

A: Funding and reconstruction or rehabilitation costs R: Renewed fighting, and political instability

2.3.6. Logistics for personnel

Logistics, , ensure the supply of uniforms specific for both men and women personnel, and transport

Basleine : Limited Vehicles assigned to support the day to day operations of the NSA Target: 12 months Additional logistics toinclude pickup vans and vehicles secured to improve the operational effectiveness of the NSA.

Lead ; NSA Partners: MOI, ministry of finance,

A: Financial and procurement support R; Cost of sustaining maintenance and repairs services

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2.3.7. Sustainability of

salaries and stipends Regular stipends

Baseline : Stipend payments are relatively satisfactory compared to other Somalia National Security Institutions Target: 36 months To establish realistic salary scaling system. Find key partners to support while the same time improving local revenue generation system

Lead : MOI Partners: Office of the President, Prime Minister, Ministries of defence, planning, and Finance, international partners

A: Bilateral support are sustained till 2014 R: political disruption and nepotism

2.3.8. Patrol weapons management

Weapons supplies and management

Baseline: Limited and unregulated NSA weapons available to support its operations. Target : 12 months NSA receive additional weapons, registration and stockpile management trainings

Lead : MOI Partners: NSA, SPF, NSF, MOD, and international partners

A: Adherence to rules and regulations for arms procurement, control and management R: misuse of weapons supplied for crime perpetuation in local communities.

2.4. Custodian Corps 2.4.1. Selection, recruitment

and re-training Recruitment and Training of Custodian corps

Baseline : 300 staff strength with working conditions military in nature Target: 12 months At least 500 staff strength trained and capacity built to efficiently, professionally and effectively service delivery achieved and managerial capacity improved

Lead; MOJ Partners: Custodian Corps, NSF, Ministry of Finance and international partners. E.g UN agencies

A: Funding available R: Peace process disintegrates; sporadic fighting re-emerges through out South central or Somalia

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2.4.2. Organizational management structure of the Custodian Corps:

Restructuring the Custodian Corps to reflect current Somalia Government security policy, particularly with respect for human rights IHL and gender principles

Baseline : 0 Target : 12 months Size , composition of the Custodian corps determined through mapping; Better oversight mechanism of the Custodian Corps enhanced and threats posed by inefficiencies in prison system mitigated

Lead : Ministry of Justice Partners: Office of the Prime Minister, Ministry of Finance, and relevant international partners

A: Funding available R: Peace process disintegrates; sporadic fighting re-emerges through out South central or Somalia

2.4.3. Terms and Conditions of Sevices (TACOS)

Review salaries and conditions of service for male and female prison staff to reflect current economic trend

Baseline: minimum salaries and remuneration to the custodian corps are being paid by the TFG. Target : 36 months Sustain stipend payments to the custodian corps. Better performance and service delivery of Custodian Corps achieved

Lead : Custodian Corps Partners: OPM, Ministry of Justice, Religious Affairs and Endowment, and Ministry of Finance

A: Clear political messages on TACOS communicated to the Security services, explicitly rendering NSSP implementation and continuation successfully.

R: Indiscipline and low morale, leading to

2.4.4. Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of barracks and Correction facilities, ensuring gender sensitive management of infrastructure

Construct new and rehabilitate existing living quarters for male and female Custodian corps personnel and inmates with adhering international minimum standards for prisons

Baseline: Limited accommodation for custodian corps exist. Target: 36 months Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of Correction facilities and barracks for male and female Custodian Corps personnel in Mogadishu, Puntland and Galmudug

Lead : Custodian Corps Partners: OPM, Ministry of Justice, Religious Affairs and Endowment, Ministry of Finance and Ministry of Works, Somalia NGOs, and international partners, including NGOs

A: Funding is available R: Renewed fighting and insecurity in the south central region of Somalia

2.4.5. Network and Communication facilities for the male and female Custodian Corps

Strengthen, expand and equip the Prisons Communication Unit

Physical security of male and female inmates, Custodian Corps and citizens achieved

Lead: Custodian Corps Partners: MOJ, Ministry of

A: The custodian corps security sector communication arrangements are linked to the NSF and SPF. Funding to

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Information and communication, MOD, Finance and international partners

establish the custodian corps communication network provided R: the absence or of lack of trained custodian corps to support the communication unit. Political stability, safety and security issues.

2.4.6 Prisons biometric database ( Transparency and Accountability System)

Establish a comprehensive database of male and female inmates of prisoners nationwide with ensuring confidentiality and access provisions to database

A comprehensive database of male and female inmates generated and maintained

Lead: Custodian Corps Partners: MOJ, Ministry of Information and communication, MOD, Finance and international partners

A: Funds are available to establish, link and harmonize the database for all national security institutions in Somalia. R: Technical capacity to maintain and operate an electronic biometric database for the Custodian corps.

Through the establish database on inmates, extend educational facilities to male and female inmates in prisons nationwide, ensuring access to equal opportunities

Baseline: Minimum training supports have been provided to support the inmates at the Mogadishu central prisons in the last few years. Target : 12 months At least 300 inmates are provided with basic educational support/rehabilitation or reformatory education.

Lead: Custodian Corps Partners: MOJ, Ministry of Information and communication, MOD, Finance and international partners

A: Funds are available to establish, link and harmonize the database for all national security institutions in Somalia. R: Technical capacity to maintain and operate an electronic biometric database for the Custodian corps.

2.4.7. Prisons Oversight Functions

Establish a prisons council to oversee the affairs of the prisons

Baseline: MOJ capacity to provide executive oversight of the correction services limited. Same for CSOs and Parliament. Target: 24 months Effective oversight control of the

Lead: Ministry of Justice, Religious Affairs and Endowment Partners: Office of the President, OPM, Ministry of Finance and international

A: Funds are available to establish, link and harmonize the database for all national security institutions in Somalia. R: Technical capacity to maintain and operate an electronic biometric database

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prisons department enhanced partners. for the Custodian corps.

Strengthen investigation and discipline capacity of the Custodian corps

Baseline : 0 Target : 24 months Establish an internal investigations and discipline unit to investigate and act upon alleged assault, corruption and abuses against prison inmates.

Lead: MOJ Partners: Custodian corps, office of the Prime Minister, Ministry of Finance, and international partners

A: Political will and commitment; funds available to support the establishment R: Establish investigative system in the absence of a clear legal and policy framework on how to address impunity , Gender-based violence, assault etc

2.4.8. Transportation Provide adequate transportation facilities for prisons personnel and inmates

Baseline: Very limited vehicles to support the day-to-day work of the custodian corps. Target: 12 months Procure at least 10 pick up vehicles to support the work of the custodian corps. Maintenance of transport of prisons enhanced

Lead : Custodian Corps Partners: MOJ and Ministry of Finance; potential international partners and NGOs

A: Funds are available R: No revenue allocated or donors unwilling to provide support to the custodian corps

2.4.9. Reformation of inmates

Provide reformatory and recreational facilities for gender responsive prison inmates

Baseline : 0 Target: 24 months Mental and physical conditions of inmates and prisons personnel improved

Lead : Custodian Corps Partners: MOJ, Ministry of Gender, NGOs and international partners

A: Funds are available to support reformatory and recreational facilities R: No revenue allocated or donors unwilling to provide support to the custodian corps

2.4.10. Medical facilities Upgrade the prisons hospital to meet the health care needs of both officers and inmates

Baseline : Limited access to a common security medical hospital utilized by army and the SPF Target: 12 months

Lead: MOJ/Custodian Corps Partners: Ministry of health; Ministry of defence/National

A: Money is available to support the rehabilitation and upgrading the prisons medical facilities R: No budgetary allocation, or lack of donor support

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Improved medical facilities extended to prison personnel and inmates.

security and international partners

2.4.11. Provision of Water and Sanitation Facilities

Reconstruct or refurbish the central prisons water and sanitation facilities.

Baseline : 0 Target : 6 months Adequate water and sanitation facilities provided at the central prisons in Mogadishu

Lead: MOJ/Custodian Corps Partners: Ministry of health; Ministry of defence/National security and international partners

A: Water and sanitation facilities exist are needs refurbishment. R: No budgetary allocation, or lack of donor support

2.5. Disengaging Combatants/Defectors and DDR Commission

2.5.1. Inter-Ministerial Coordination Committee on dealing with Disengaging Combatants/ Defectors

Establish an Interim Inter-ministerial Coordination Committee on Disengaging Combatants/

Baseline: formation on-going Target: Establish by November, 2011 an inter-ministerial coordination mechanism for dealing with defectors/former combatants

Lead: Prime Minister’s Office Partners : Ministry of National Security and Interior, MoDef,, MoFin, MoJust, MoInf, MoYouth, MoEd and Ministry of Women & Family Care, UN agencies

A: various line ministries are willing to continue to cooperate and participate in coordination mechanism. Funds made available to support the establishment of a coordination secretariat for defector issues. R: Capacity of the member ministries (No ToR for each ministry) R: Political – Changes of the Government overtime affects retention of trained staffs and government officials to lead the process.

2.5.2. JSC Task Force on Disengaging Combatants/Defectors Technical Capacity Assessment

Institutional capacity needs assessment

Baseline: UNPOS’s scooping mission reports, Lessons Learned Workshop Target : 6 months

Lead : Interim Inter-ministerial Former Combatant /defectors Coordination Committee;

A: Political and technical commitment sustained as already demonstrated. R: Donors and partners not willing to support defector

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Submission of Report and project prosal to the Ministry fo Interior and the Prime Minister’s Office by November, 2011

Partners: UN . IOM and Int’l stakeholders

progarmmes. No political support; Security situation No funding availability No partner inside

Capacity building initiatives to various TFIs

Baseline: lessons Learnt Workshop on Disengaging Fighters Benchmark: Ongoing process

Lead: IIMCC Partners: UNPOS, UNDP, UNICEF, IOM

Changes in government, Lack of technical staff in ministries, Lack of funding

2.5.3. Coordination Roles and Responsibilities

Strategic Planning and Programming (SPP) coordination workshop for roles and responsibilities

Baseline: ToR for the SSP have been developed Target : Conduct workshop in Mogadishu before end of November, 2011

Lead : IIMCC Partners: AMISOM and International Stakeholders

A: Willingness, level of collaboration and cooperation between TFG line ministries, particularly defence and national security, justice, AMISOM and the UN on defection issues sustained. R: No political support Security situation No funding availability

2.5.4. Framework (Disengaging fighters from anti-government insurgents and other armed groups and militia)

Development of legal and policy framework for Disengaging fighters/non-conventional DDR approaches to address immediate needs of the disengaging fighters and other armed militias in conformity with international human rights standards and other norms

Baseline: TFG’s Provisional measures already developed to respond to the immediate caseload of disengaged fighters, Reviewed NSSP Target: 12 months Submission of draft legal and policy framework which could work as “agreement” with international community by 31 December 2011 Submission of proposals for funding programmes by 31 December 2011

Lead: Interim Inter-ministerial Coordination Committee on Disengaging fighters/former combatants Partners: IIMCC-DDR, UNPOS, UNDP, UNICEF, IOM, Int’l stakeholders

A: Funding and staffing is available to support the TFG and the international community in developing a coherent policy and legal framework on disengaging fighters. R: No political support Security situation No funding availability

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2.5.5. Standard Operational Procedures (SOP)

Creation of the SOP targeting reception, screening, registration, vetting, care and follow-up of disengaged fighters and their dependants, adhering international norms and standards

Baseline: Provisional measures already exist Target : Creation by November, 31 2011 of a revised SOPs

Lead ; Ministry of Interior Partners: AMISOM, MoJ, NSA, UNPOS, IOM, ILO, UNICEF, UNDP)

A: The importance of addressing issues related to disengaging fighters considered as a priority for both the TFG and the international community. R: No political support Security situation No funding availability

2.5.6. Outreach Information collection and Management

Outreach to armed groups (e.g. warlords, armed militia, clan militia, freelance) to negotiate.

Baseline: Nil Target : 12 months Complete baseline assessment by 31 December 2011, and outreach activities ongoing

Lead : Ministry of Interior and national security Partners: UN, AMISOM, Ministry of Constitution and Reconciliation)

A: Political will to engage in outreach to armed groups to negotiate evolved. R: No political support Security situation No funding availability

2.5.7.Demobilization Assessment and development of capacity for intake, disposal and/or destruction of weapons from demobilized fighters.

Baseline: No system in place, or capacity for safe and effective storage or disposal of out-of-commission or damaged weapons. Target : 12 months Safe disposal of weapons.

Focal point: IIMCC-Disengaging fighters/ DDR with Police Commissioner and Chief of Army? Partners: Police, Army, AMISOM, UNPOS, UNDP, UNMAS, Bilateral partners

A: Desire for disposal of out-of-commission weapons, and political engagement to encourage demobilization. R: Resource limitations, limited number of demobilized fighters

2.5.8. Reinsertion

Gender sensitive assessment and mapping of the armed groups and armed militia, sex and age disaggregated data collection, analysis and management

Baseline: Existence of data base system Target : Establish secretariat for the IIMCC-DDR, Start assessment and collection of data by January 2012,

Lead IIMCC-Disengaging fighters and DDR Partners: UNPOS, IOM, UNICEF, UNDP, ILO,

A: Funding and technical assistance is provided to engage in a continued gender sensitive assessment and mapping exercise. R: Resource limitation

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Bilateral Partners (financial resource, human resource, etc.) No partner inside

Community Re-insertion support that will be provided to communities where the ex-fighters will be registered and are currently residing

Baseline: Nil Target : 24 months Start reinsertion support by 1 April 2012

Lead : IIMCC-Disengaging fighters/DDR Partners: Regional/District/Community authorities, Community leaders, Ex-combatant, UNDP, UNPOS, IOM, ILO, and int’l stakeholders

A: Security conditions continue to improve; trends in disengaging fighters increases. R: No political support Security situation No funding availability No partner inside

2.5.8. Reintegration

Prioritization of action for the released and reintegration of children and youth associated with armed forces

Baseline: project on going (Youth at Risk) Immediate and ongoing

Prime Minister’s Officer Partners: Min of Women Affairs and FC, UNICEF, IOM, ILO, UNDP, ICRC, INGOs)

No political support Security situation No funding availability No partner inside

Assessment for socio-economic reintegration, including business/job market research, profiling, and referral system to seek support from business community

Baseline: Nil Complete assessments by 30 April 2012 Start Reintegration Opportunity Support on incremental approach by 31 May 2012

IIMCC-DDR (Partners: IOM, UNDP, ILO), INGOs, CBOs,

No political support Security situation No funding availability No partner inside

Assessment for host community support

Baseline: Nil Complete assessments by 30 April 2012 Start Community Support by 31

IIMCC-DDR (Partners: UNPOS, IOM, UNDP, ILO), INGOs, CBOs,

No political support Security situation No funding availability No partner inside

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May 2012 2.5.9. Media Strategy Conduct a one day

consultation meeting to draft a gender responsive media strategy

Baseline: Existence of a Public Information Structures with the UN and the TFG Benchmark: By 15 November 2011

Lead: Ministry of Information and IIMCC Partners: UN, CSOs INGOs,

Lack of funding and international partners on the ground

2.5.10. DDR Commission Provide support for the re-establishment and functioning of the National DDR Commission

Baseline: DDR Commission already exists within the Ministry of Interior and National Security. Target : 24 months Source funding for institutional capacity building and staffing for re-establishing the DDR National Commission

Lead : Ministry of Interior and national security Partners: Office of the President, Prime Minister, Ministry of defence( MOD),

A: Funding made available to start the process of re-establishing the DDR Commission. Formal ceasefire or peace agreements signed between conflict parties with DDR provisions.

Strategic Objective three : To ensure effective partnership and coordination between state and non-state security and justice agencies/institutions 3.1. Support technical, operational and coordination structures at all levels to integrate SSD within public administrations reforms

3.1.1 Establish a holistic National Security Architecture

Establish Regional, District Security Committees

Baseline: A few exists , but less inclusive and functioning Target : 24 months At least 10 regional and district security committees established. In 3 months -

Lead: Ministry of Interior and National Security Partners: Office of the President/NSC Secretariat, Office of the Prime Minister, Ministry of Justice & Religious Affairs

A: Work through NSC Security Committee and other forums to ensure coordinated messages and influence on national security threats and to manage risks

3.1.2. Defining roles and Responsibilities of security and justice agencies/institutions

Clearly delineated roles and responsibilities for addressing security challenges established

Baseline : 0 Target : 3 months Standard Operational Procedures

Lead: Office of the President/National Security Council Partners: Office of

A: Work through NSC Security Committee and other forums to ensure coordinated messages and influence on national security threats and to

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( SOPs) or Guidelines developed to support effective coordination among the Somalia security forces and other international security forces.

the Prime Minister, all relevant ministries of security and defence, and justice. International partners.

manage risks. R: Unwillingness to cooperate and collaborate among the security institutions, including the friendly militias to the Government.

3.1.3. Organized Crime Analysis Cell

Establish a crime analysis system, which will facilitate purposeful deployment of resources to quantify various crimes committed

Baseline: A criminal Investigation Department (CID) exists. Target : 24 months Proper records of crime generated and effective/reliable information networks enhanced

Lead : National Security Agency Partners: SPF, NSF, Ministries of Interior, defence, office of the President, Prime Minister and international partners.

A: Funds available to establish crime analysis cells R: Confusion among security sector agencies about lead institutions, possible.

3.1.4. Joint Operational Centres

Create scope for joint national security exercises to enhance coordination.

Baseline : Limited Target : 6 months Support the establishment of a JOC in Mogadishu

Lead : Office of the President/NSC Partners : Ministries of Defence, MOI, planning , finance, SPF, NSA, and the NSF

A: TFG security forces team formalise appropriate partnerships and management arrangements/agreements with national and international partners. R: Al-shabaab’s regular asymmetric warfare because of a failure of not promoting the importance of a =n integrated and holistic operational planning structure.

3.1.5. Protective Security Measures for VIP ., Ministries and dignitaries

Provide personnel for state ceremonial/public duties including presidential Guard Duties

Baseline: Limited trained capacity exists, already working alongside AMISOM. Target : 24 months Ministries receive hands-on

Lead ; Minstry of Interior and national Security Partners: SPF, NSF, NSA, office of the President, Prime

A: Funding to train and enhance additional protective security personnel available. R: Not properly vetting and screening selected and newly trained personnel into the

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training in protective security measures, SPF and NSF jointly organized to provide VIP protective measures under a unified command a structure

Minister, Mod, and relevant international partners.

Protective security cadre of the siomali security forces.

Serious and transnational organized crimes

All security institutions in the south central, Punltand, Galmugud and other regions in Somalia work to prevent and combat international terrorism, money-laundering and other Transnational organised crimes such as human and child trafficking

Baseline : Limited support to tackle serious and organized crime Target : 12 months Programmes to tackle threats of Transnational organised crime enhanced and incidence reduced.

Lead : NSA Partners: SPF, NSF, MOI, UN agencies , IOM, regional and international organisations

A: Legal and policy frameworks to address serious and transnational organized crime drafted and legislated. R: lack of political will and commitment; limited capacity of the Somali security forces.

Institutionalize peace culture for all security Forces/institution in Somalia

Provide joint civic education training to promote the Peace and Political Transformation processes in Somalia for NSA,, SPF, Custodian Corps, NSF, and the entire Somalia National Security Sector personnel

Baseline : Somalia National Security (NSF) forces existing training curricula cover some elements of national reconciliation Target : 12 months All training curriculum and courses for the Somali security institutions are developed to include culture of peace courses/modules and lessons

Lead : Ministry of Education Partners: MOD, MOI, SPF, NSF, NSA, custodian corps, MOJ, and international partners, particularly the UN mission and agencies

A: Training needs assessment are conducted and required to be included in curricula. R: Insecurity and continued violence; Al-shabaab not willing to engage; continued indiscipline and intolerance

3.1.6. Security information flow between agencies and the public

Improve information flow between the SPF, NSF, NSA, Custodian Corps and the public

Baseline : level of collaboration and cooperation between security institutions need to be strengthened Target: 36 months

Lead: NSC Partners : Office of the President, Prime Minister, MOD, MOI,

A; All security sector institutions in Somalia are willing to cooperate and collaborate; SOPs developed to support increased level trust and confidence between and among the security sector

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Partnership between and amongst Somalia’s primary security forces improved; and local public awareness of tasks and responsibilities of each of the security institutions improved

institutions

3.1.7. Strengthen Neighbourhood watch/Community safety and security

see 5.3 See 5.3 See 5.3 See. 5.3

3.1.8. Sustain existing peace structures

Strengthen Regional, Distirct and community security committees

Baseline : Community safety and security committees established in few district Target : 12 months Address drivers of violence through socio-economic development

Lead : Ministry of Interior and National Security Partners: Office of the President, OPM, MOD, regional and district security committees and international partners

A: Improved security is maintained. Relationship and level of collaboration and cooperation R: Political and security conditions deriorates further.

3.1.9. Unified Command and Control structure of the Somalia Coast Guards

Strengthen the Coast Guards of both the SPF and the NSF

Baseline : Limited capacity of the coast guards Target : 12 months Somalia maritime capability enhanced through regular training and capcity building for over 200 coast guards by 2014.

Lead : MOI/MOD Partners: NSF and SPF, Finance, ministry of Fisheries and Marine Resources, international partners.

A: Political will to ensure reoragnisation of the coastal guards under a unfied command and control structure. R: Political and security conditions does not deteriorates

3.1.10. HL, Human rights, Rule of Law and gender advance trainings

Provide advanced training on Human Rights, Rule of Law, gender and due process of law for middle level and senior NSF, SPF, Custodian Corps and NSA Personnel, including

Baseline : UPR report with recommendations developed and adopted. Target: 12 to 24 months HR record of all the Somalia

Lead : Relevant ministries Partners: UN and human rights organizations, AMISOM

A: Continued political will to engage in the implementation of human rights recommendations based on the UPR report.. R: Political and security

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civilians as well. Security Forces improved conditions does not deteriorates

3.1.11. Regulation of private security companies in Somalia

Strengthen the capacity of government to effectively regulate Private Security/Military Companies

Baseline : 0 Target : 24 months legal and policy frameworks established for PSCs/PMCs activities in Somalia

Lead : Ministry of Interior Partners: office of the Prime Minister, MOD , finance with international assistance

A: Political willingness and action required R: Not taking action to regulate the activities of private security companies operating in Somalia may continue to undermine the peace process.

3.1.12 Organisational institutional arrangements

. Consideration and decision of optional institutional arrangements on the issues related to landmines, explosive remnants of war

Baseline : 0 Target : 12 months Institutional arrangements to collectively address issues around landmines and IEDs resvolved and legal or policy framework established.

Focal point: MA Inter-ministerial Committee Partners: MoI, MoD

A: Availability of dedicated personnel, expertise, capital and facilities

3.1.13. Establishment of District Security Committee Structures

Equip District Security Committee structures that include women to support the security sector/agencies in maintaining the security in their localities

Baseline : 0 Target: 10 between in 2011 to 2013: Performance of District security committees improved

Lead : MOI Partners : MOD, Office of the Preisident, SPF, Local government ,AMISOM, UN, and international partners

A: Funding aready exists and provided without delays R: Insecurity and lack of cooperation between state and non-state security institutions at the district level

Strategic Objective four: To increase the inclusion and participation of parliament and Civil Society Organizations in Somalia security and justice sector development efforts 4.1.1 Support to TFP

sub/committee on defence, security and justices (Effective parliamentary oversight of the Security and Justice Sectors requires

Hold seminars in Mogadishu to create awareness and strengthen the capacities of Parliamentary Committees (defense,

Baseline: Relationship between TFP and Somalia Security Institutions (SSI)SI is weak: Target : In 2 months, - establish

Lead : Actors: Parliament must identify the type of trainings required and the participants; Partners: Minister of

Risk and Assumption A: funding made available and parliamentarians

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expertise and adequate resources)

security, justice in oversight functions

an accountable relationship between TFP and SSI;

Finance, justice, MOD, Interior, Office of the President, Prime Minister, and the international community, including UN, NGOs and bilateral to support SSIs.

R: Become too close and compromise accountability. Lack of political will / commitment to improve relationship between TFP and SSI (business as usual); Insecurity. No action (business as usual)

Facilitate awareness raising and advocacy support on the importance of SSD in promiting peace and security in Somalia.

Baseline : 0 Target 6 to 12 months Suppport to deliver at least 6 workshops on the concept of SSD in Somalia; the role of CSOs, media etc in SSI. how to how to draft legislations, conduct hearings, research capacities, related to security sector development

Lead : Parlaimentary Sub-committee on defence, security and justice in Somalia. Partners: The TFP, TFG, CSO (media), Min. of Interior, Justice, the NPF, and other security sector institutions, international community e.g UN

A: Political space is created and funding available to support capcity building efforts of parliament. - Insecurity, lack of political support, no behaviour and structural changes – business as usual Insecurity, no changes (business as usual) – behaviour, structural and policy changes. Insecurity, lack of political support,

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Strengthen relations between Parliament and SSI.

Baseline : Non-existent Timeframe: 24 months A working relationship between TFP and CS strengthened with SSI. Public debates and meetings jointly organized .

Lead : CSOs Netowrk on SSD in Somalia Partners: African Security Sector Network (ASSN), NGOs, and international partners.

A: Political will and commitment to support CSOs, local communities, and women’s organization to engage with parliament on SSD in Somalia. R: TFG may not create a conducive environment for CS to participate in public debates on security issues;

Establish Parliamentary website and resource centre with equipment, furniture to support the work of the sub-committee on defense and security issues;

Baseline : 0 Target : 12 months Non-existent. In 12 months, a Parliamentary web-site and resource center that is fully equipped (secure access to documentation);

Lead: TFP to seek out the support of other Parliaments; Partners: TFG ministry of Finance; IC can provide financial and technical support to the establishment of centre;

A: Funding made available to the sub-committee for defence and security R: Funding is not provided for parliamentary sub-committee to participate in public debates on security issues;

Capacity to legislate enhanced

Baseline: Parliament’s access to external resources is very limited. Target : In 12 to 24 months, increase Parliament’s access to external funding for the

Lead: TFP to seek out the support of other Parliaments; Partners: TFG ministry of Finance; IC can provide financial and

A: Funding made available to the sub-committee for defence and security R: Funding is not

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ractification and legislation of at least four (4) laws related to security and justice sector development in Somalia;

technical support to the establishment of centre;

provided for parliamentary sub-committee to participate in public debates on security issues;

Engage CS in discussions of drafting and reviewing security policies;

Baseline : Non-Existent Target : Timeframe: 24 months – more CS participation in reviewing security policies, by engaging in evidence-based research on SSD in Somalia

Lead : TFP sub-committees on Defence,security and Justice Partners: Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Interior, NSSP Secretariat, African Security Sector Networks (ASSN) , UN, and international partners.

A: Political willingness and space continue to be maintained. R: Lack of encouragement, government policies and behaviours towards CS remain unchanged.

Organize informed public debates / hearings on justice, security policy issues;

Baseline : Non-existent. Target :Timeframe: 6 to 12 months – secure more public debates / hearings on security policy issues ( at least 6 public debates organized)

Lead: Parliamentary defense and security Committees and SSI to hold monthly consultative meetings on security issues Partners: Ministry of Interior, MOD, SPF, NSF, Universities in Somalia, international CSOs, NGOs and relevant international partners.

A: Political willingness and space continue to be maintained. R: Lack of encouragement, government policies and behaviours towards CS remain unchanged.

Encourage (through passing motions) the participation of CS in public debates around justice, national security, the armed forces,

Baseline : Non-existent. Target : Timeframe: 12 to 24 months – increased participation of CS in public debates on justice and security issues;

Lead : TFP Partners : CSOs, women’s groups, Office of the President, Prime Minister etc.and

A: Financial resources and expertise made available to support public debates etc.

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policing, violation of human rights and gender based violence (GBV) and so on;

international partners

R: Cultural intolerance to openly discussed gender-based violence issues

4.1.2 Support to Civil

Society Organisations (CSO). (CS have understanding of citizen’s security and can be a link between government and the public.

Raise awareness of the importance roles which CS can play in security and justice issues, including Civilian and child protection, responsibility to protect and gender

Baseline : There is some space where CS can exercise their oversight - however, most of them lack the capacities to articulate on governance and security/justice issues; Timeframe: 12 months More recognition and awareness of CS’s roles in security and justice issues; at least six workshops/seminars involving CSOs organized. A space for CS to voice their concerns, educate the public, facilitate alternative debates in the public domain

Lead : CSOs The Parliament to legislate a law that will regulate the work, mandate of CS in relation to the role of CSOs in security sector development in Somalia ; Partners : Office of the President, POM, Min. of Interior (registration), TFP, other security sector institutions and Ministries such as Justice, Min. of Gender and Family Affairs; United Nations and international partners

A: Provide the space for civil society to exercise their oversight and engage in legislation processes; B: Lack of understanding of the role of CS in security issues, TFG may restrict CS’s activities; TFG, TFP and TFIs including SSI may not create opportunities / space for CS to participate in security issues; Some CS may not take advantage of the space given to them and exercise their oversight and some of them may abuse the privileges given to them and this may closed up the space. If all the challenges are mitigated, perhaps, there will be more CS influence in decisions and policies with regard to the security issues;

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A working relationship between CS and TFP.

Deliver workshops to build the capacities of CS to advocate, monitor and report on SSD interventions with respect for HR, GBV especially Sexual Violence in conflict, and ROLs within all national security institutions;

Baseline : Non-existent Timeframe: 12 to 36 months – more organized CS in thematic areas (human rights, justice); Some trainings were offered to some members of CS particularly those involved HR – there is a need to build on existing work that was previously carried out (expand to other areas).

Lead : Somalia CSOs and NGOs Partner : ASSN, NGOs, UN agencies and programmes and the international community

A: Political and funding requirement made available. R: CS may fail to participate in public debates around security and justice due to lack of expertise, experience and trust;

Organize an annual gathering for all for CS to share and exchange information on their contributions to establishing and maintaining security and access to justice;

Baseline : Non-existent. An annual CS symposium on security issues; Target : Timeframe: once in a year. Annual conference of the Somalia SSD Civil Society Network

Lead : NSSP Secretariat Partners: Office of the President, POM, Min. of Interior (registration), TFP, other security sector institutions and Ministries such as Justice, Min. of Gender and Family Affairs; United Nations and international partners

A : Human and financial capacity, and resources, are available to conduct research. R: No organizational changes in the ways in which CS does its work (business as usual).

Gender and SSD related issues, access to justice, accountability,

Baseline : Some workshops delivered –

Lead : Ministry of Gender and children affairs

Insecurity. CS may not streamline their work in thematic areas and their

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transparency to strengthen the role of CS in security sector development; Preferably after the gender assessment/ mapping of the security sector components

Target : 24 months Deliver at least 4 workshops on gender issues are needed. Have CS that can articulate and advocate for the inclusion of gender issues in SSR Timeframe: 24 to 36 months;

Partners: NSSP Secretariat, SPF, NSF, relevant security and justice ministries, UN and other international partners. Including NGOs and CSOs

current structure and organization may remain. No structural changes / reform (business as usual)

Establish Somali SSR network to generate public debates and discussions on security issues;

Baseline : Non-existent. Universities and research centers in Somalia are yet to produce experts in the field of security sector development (academics and researchers). Target : Timeframe: 24 to 36 months, Identify credible international consortium such as ASSN to work and support Somalia universities and research centers that can produce independent research, analysis (as well as monitoring SS) and information on security and justice issues to both Parliament and the public

Lead : NSSP Secretariat/ Ministry of Interior and National Security Partners: Affiliate CSOs/NGOs, regional, district and communitye security committees

A: Funding and expertise deployed to support the process of establishing Somalia SSD Network R: Insecurity, lack of resources, lack of commitment and expertise to organize such a conference; R: Insecurity, lack of commitment and efforts to enable CS to participate in security issues; lack of structural and behavior changes; lack of interest (CS) and due to fear, CS not willing to exercise its oversight;

Establish consultative relations with members of CS and the constitutional making process, to increase public input and oversight of the SS

Baseline :0 Target : 12 months At least four consultative meetings organized on SSD provisions in the constitution

Lead : NSSP Secretariat Partners: CSOs, Ministry of Constitution, Justice, MOD, and international partners

A: Funding and political space created R: Lack of security, commitment and facilitation, capacity-building;

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making and electoral processes.

Increased CSOs understanding of the SSD provisions in the Djibouti Peace Agreement and the Kampala Accord

Baseline : There is some existing capacities but need to build on these existing capacities – Target : Timeframe: 6 to 12 months .Organize four public education forums on SSD and political peace processes according to the Djibouti and Kampala peace processes;

Lead : NSSP Secretariat Partners: Somalia CSOs and NGOs, Universities and research centres, local communities; district and regional security communities, and international partners.

A: Polictical will, commitment and tolerance for CSOs to relate to the the Security Sector in Somalia R: Insecurity. Failing to hold the conference due lack of resources.

Mapping Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) working in the Security Sector in Somalia

CS need to re-organize - streamline and work in thematic areas and form shadow bodies i.e human rights CS and so on;

Baseline : Non-existent and it is worth noting that CS are not united actors; Target : Timeframe: 12 to 24 months: cohesive CS with a united civic agenda towards security issues; In 12 months, establish their own rules and regulations – Standard Operational Procedures

Lead : NSSP Secretariat Partners: Ministry of Interior, Local Governance structures, Office of the Prime Minister, CSOs and NGOs, international partners.

A: Funding available to engage with CSOs capacity building. R: Lack of security, commitment and facilitation, capacity-building

Commission universities and research centres to conduct research on improving security and eliminating insecurity;

Baseline : Limited capacity to conduct Security and Justice Sector Development research Target : 24 months Research training and capacity building efforts strengthened

Lead : University of Somalia Partners: NSSP Secretariat, line ministries, CSOs, and international partners

A: Funding available to engage with CSOs capacity building. R: Lack of security, commitment and facilitation, capacity-building

Encourage CS to Baseline : Limited capacity Lead : Ministry of A: Funding available to

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participate in monitoring activities of crime related to armed violence, sexual violence, mine actions, community safety

currently exists. Target : Timeframe: 4 times in a year, CS that have the ability to carry out advocacy, monitoring and reporting on SSD; more involvement of CS in monitoring of armed violence and mine action;

Interior and National Security Partners: CSOs, SPF, NSF and UN, international NGOs and partners.

engage with CSOs capacity building. R: Lack of security, commitment and facilitation, capacity-building

Support mapping and research activities related to the link between Terrorism, security sector development as disaster prevention and preparedness tool and humanitarian space

Baseline : 0 Target : in mapping of Conduct at least 4 awareness raising involving civil society groups, humanitarian organisations, donor agencies on disaster prevention and preparedness schemes around Terrorism

Lead : NSSP Secretariat Partners: Universities, research centres, line ministries and international partners.

A: Research funds are sourced to engage with research related to counter-terrorism, SSD and humanitarian assistance R: Lack of security, commitment and facilitation, and capacity to engage in research.

Strategic Objective five : To enhance and sustain international support for the stabilization of Somalia 5. 1. AMISOM 5.1.1. International

Stabilization force agreement

Renewal of Agreement between the AU and TFG

Baseline : SOMA of March 2007 exists between AU and the Somalia TFG Target : 6 months Review the Status of the Mission Agreement (SOMA) of March 2007 between TFG and AU according to troop increase mandated by UN resolution (from 8,000 , 12,000 to 20,000).

Lead: Executive, Partners : AU, UN and relevant national and international partners

A: Provided there is Political will. R: Lack of Political will and commitment

5.1.2.Protective Security Measures

Protection of VIPs, TFIs, and installations

Baseline : Already being provided

Lead: AMISOM Partners : UN and

A: AMISOM mandate expanded, additional funding and resources provided to meet

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Target : Additional support required to complement AMISOM’s expanded mandate

TFG protective security tasks R: Expiry of the mandate & inadequate resources provided AMISOM continues to remain in Somalia.

5.1.3.Support training and capacity building of the National Security Force and the Somalia Police Force(SPF)

Reinforcing the Somalia Security Forces and institutions to stabilize and consolidate military gains

Within the period of AMISOM mandate

Lead: AMISOM, Partners : MOD, Ministry of Interior, UN, IC

Expiry of AMISOM mandate, Inadequate resources & lack of good will, provided AMISOM continues to remain in Somalia.

5.1.4. Enhancing partnership between AMISOM and TFG SPF to mitigate IED threats.

Reinforce reduction of mine/ERW/stockpile and IED threat in Mogadishu, and other areas of TFG control

Baseline : Ongiong efforts Target 3 months: - Joint operations coordinated

by the EODCC at the International Airport

6 months: Strengthen existing cooperation through SOP for joint operations

Lead : Lead: AMISOM, Ministry of Interior Partners: MOD, UNMAS, NGOs, Ministry of Health and other relevant international partners

i A: Continued ed engagement of TFG Police in EOD. Non-renewal of AMISOM mandate R: Severe deterioration in the security situation causing refocus of AMISOM operational efforts

5.1.4. Size of the AMISOM Police Component which should include both female and male forces

Force size and composition

Baseline : 9, 200 Target : 6 months 12,000 and more subject to renewed agreement and UN SC mandate of AMISOM

Lead : TFG/UN Partner: AU, TFG, IGAD, and relevant international partners

A: UN Security mandate renewed R: Not receiving adequate funding to support TCCs.

5.2. Mine Actions 5.2.1. Legal and policy

framework Developing legal and policy frameworks for effectively managing threat of landmines, and explosive remnants of war.

Baseline : MOU exist between UNMAS and former TFG governments. Target : 4 months Ensure MOU between UNMAS

Lead : Focal point: MoD? Partners: MOI, Ministry of Planning and International

A: Availability of dedicated personnel R: Limited cooperation to support the development of a coherent legal or policy

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and the Somalia government authority revisited and agreed unpon.

Cooperation, UN, IC

framework for landmines management etc.

5.2.2. Organisational and institution management support for landmines

Management of activities to mitigate the threat of landmines, explosive remnants of war

A: Baseline : MOU exist between UNMAS and former TFG governments. Target : 12 months Ensure MOU between UNMAS and the Somalia government authority revisited and agreed unpon.

Focal point: MA Inter-ministerial Committee Partners: MoI, MoD

A: Availability of dedicated personnel, expertise, capital and facilities R: Political instability and security environment suddenly deriorates.

5.2.3. Reduction of threat of landmines, explosive remnants of war for freedom of movement of TFG, IDPs and other vulnerable groups, humanitarian actors.

Support international implementation capacity, develop concept for national capacity for mine action.

3 months: Establish Mine Action Working Group

Focal point: MA Inter-Ministerial Committee Partners: MOD, SPF, UN, International partners, IC

A: Availability of dedicated personnel, expertise, capital and facilities Security and socio-political conditions permissive for Mine Action

5.3. Community Safety and Security/Armed Violence Reduction

5.3.1. Establish district mechanism for peace and District or regional /community security committees

1) Establish committee including representative from youth, elder, women, business, religious leaders, Police, and local authorities 2) Establish Community Peace Centre 3) Establish coordination structure between the District, Region and Ministerial level

Baseline : 0 1) Every district in Mogadishu has a functioning District safety Committee, 2) Four Peace centre constructed and operational, 3) Coordination structure in Place. Target : 12 months Addditional Dsitrict and safety committees established and functioning.

Lead: Min of Interior; Partner: SPF, MOD, NSA, JSC & other agencies and international partners

A: The community is willing to partner with authorities, R: Lack of cooperationa among key security agencies and local communities. Political instability and security environment suddenly deriorates

5.3.2.Demobilization of Pre-mediation and Baseline : 15 March 2010 Lead: Min of A: Security level is reached to

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armed groups negotiations arrangements to support ceasefie and peace making processes with willing armed groups

agreement between TFG and ASWJ Target 12 to 24 months 1) Community mediation and reconciliation for the demobilization of armed groups 2) Registration and community probation mechanism in place 3) demilitarization training and socio-economic integration

Interior; Partner: SPF, MOD, NSA, MoYS, MoH, MoJ, MoGA, JSC & other agencies and international partners .

gain the confidence of the armed groups R: Lack of cooperation and willingness to engage

5.3.3. Establishment of the Civic Protection Unit

1) Establish the community policing unit, 2) Identify and train women peace agent from the community, 3) public order, services and information activities implemented

1,600 Peace Agent Unit supports public order, services to the victims, referral and information

Lead: Min of Interior; Partner: SPF, JSC PTWG & other agencies and international partners.

A: The police and the community accepts to work together. R: Insecurity and lack of cooperation with local authorities

5.4. Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALWs)

5.4.1. Community weapons collection and destruction

Establish procedures and conditions for weapon and ammunition collection and disposal

Baseline: No systematic method for management of weapons, stockpiles, ammunition. Benchmarks: Establish DDR/ SALW working group to focus on physical transportation, secure storage, and disposal of weapons. Establish policy and procedures for weapon collection including handover process, accounting, transport, storage, and disposal Establish secure weapon storage facility, and mobile or static

Lead: Min of Interior; Partners: MOD, SPF, UN, international partners, IC

A: Provided armed groups and individuals are willing to drop their arms R: Lack of funding, lack of capacity, unwillingness to surrender weapons, Lack/inadequate sensitization.

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weapon transportation/disposal capacity

5.4.2. Firearms registration and controlled

1) Develop the registration database for firearms 2) development of the legal framework 3) sensitization ,

Baseline : 0 Target : 12 to 24 months Legal review of existing firearms laws; develop a comprehensive registration database for firearms

Lead: Min of Interior; -Partner: MOD & other agencies, UN , IGAD and international partners

A: Funding available for consultants to conduct a legal review of existing firearms laws; The level of security and confidence in the state security sector