THE GOVERNANCEOF

MODERN BURMA

B , J. ร. FURNIVALL

S ec o n d e d i t io n e n l a r g e d , w i th an A p p r e c ia t i o n by F r a n k N. T r a g e r

and a S u p p le m e n t o n th e N e W in A d m i n i s t r a t i o n by J o h n S e a b u r y T h o m p s o n

THE GOVERNANCEOF

MODERN BURMA

ByJ. ร. FURNIVALL

S ec o n d e d i t io n e n l a r g e d , w i th an A p p r e c ia t i o n by F r a n k N. T r a g e r

and a S u p p le m e n t on th e Ne W in A d m i n i s t r a t i o n by J o h n S e a b u r y T h o m p s o n

International Secretariat INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

New York 1960

A ll Rights Reserved F irst Edition 1958 Second Revised Edition i960 Reprinted 1961

THE INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

The In stitu te of P acific Relations i s an u n o ffic ia l and non-partisan organization, founded in 1925 to fa c i l i ta te the s c ie n t if ic study of the peoples of the P acific area. I t i s composed of autonomous National Councils in the principal countries having important in terests in the P acific area, together with an International Secretariat. I t is governed by a P acific Council composed of members appointed by each of the National Councils.In addition to the independent a c t iv it ie s of i t s National Councils, the In stitu te organizes private international conferences every two or

three years. Such conferences have been held at Honolulu (1925 & 1927), Kyoto (1929), Shanghai (1931).» Banff, Canada (1933)^ Yosemite Park, C ali­fornia (1936), Virginia Beach, Virginia (1939); Mont Tremblant, Quebec (19^2), Hot Springs, Virginia (19^5).* Stratford, England (19V7), Lucknow, India (1950), Kyoto (195^) and Lahore (1958)* The In stitu te conducts an extensive program of research on the p o l it ic a l , economic and soc ia l problems of the P acific area and the Far East. I t a lso publishes the proceedings of i t s conferences, a quarterly journal, P acific A ffa irs, and a large number of scholarly books embodying the resu lts of i t s studies.Neither the International Secretariat nor the National Councils o f the In stitu te advocate p o lic ie s or express opinions on national or in ter ­national a ffa ir s . R esponsibility for statements of fa c t or opinion in In stitu te publications rests so le ly with the authors.

NATIONAL COUNCILSAmerican In stitu te of P acific R elations, Inc. Australian In stitu te of International Affairs Burma Council of World A ffairs Canadian In stitu te of International A ffairs Comite d'Etudes des Problemes du Pacifique Indian Council of World A ffairs Indonesian In stitu te of World Affairs Japan In stitu te of P acific Relations Netherlands Council for P acific A ffairs New Zealand In stitu te of International Affairs Pakistan In stitu te of International A ffairs Philippine In stitu te of World A ffairs Royal In stitu te of International A ffairs

IPR INTERNATIONAL SECRETARIAT 333 Sixth Avenue, New York 14, N.Y.

C O N T E N T SPage

J . ร. FURNIVALL: All APPRECIATION, by Frank IT. Trager AUTHOR'S PREFACE . ................. ....... ............CHAPTER I

CHAPTER I I -

THE BACKGROUND .............1 . Form and Function .2 . Geographical Background ................... .........:..3. The H is to r ic a l Background .... ............. . ..1.4 . A dm inistrative Background .... ... ........ ...;...

(a) T e r r i to r ia l adm in is tra tio n(๖) Departmental machinery . ....— .....(c) Local government ________ ___ __(a) The H il l Tribes ... . ........ ...... ......(e) The Ju d ic ia ry ..1 .( f ) The S e c re ta r ia t —(g) The L eg is la tu re ....__............5. The Japanese Interregnum ______6 . The B r i t i s h R esto ra tion ........ ..... .....

7. E ffe c ts of Foreign Rule ___________8 . Problems of Public A dm inistration9. The C o n stitu tio n ________________THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT ............_....... . . .......1 . The President (Sections 45 - 64) __2 . Parliamentะ(a) in the C onstitution___________________(b) in operation .......... ........... .........3 . The'Executive Government ................. ....(a) in the Constitution ...............(b) The Cabinet and M inistries

(c) Planning

CHAPTER I I I -

(d) P a r tie s and p ressu re groups ____4 . The A dm inistrative Machinery ....... ...... .... ...(a) The S e c re ta r ia t ..... ..................... ......(๖) The executive se rv ices ....................(c j Autonomous agencies _____ _____(d) The ju d ic ia ry (Section 133 " 153).

LOCAL GOVERNMENT .................................... ..... .....(a) Local Bodies .....................................(๖) The v il la g e cou rt . . ' 1........Z...... J.(c) Township and D is t r ic t Councils

1... 1

3 . 4 6 678

10 12 .141516192124283333364l48485°5455 62 62 65 70

.7๐

81818791

CHAPTER IV - REGIONAL GOVEREMBNT ...... .................. ..................... ...............931 . P relim inary N eg o tia tio n s .................. ................... ........ ...... 932 . The Panglong Agreement .. ... ___ _________________ _ 943. The H il l P eop les’ Council _________________________954 . The Rees-W illiams Committee __________ ____________ 955. F edera tion in the Assembly ...................... ........................ 97

C O N T E N T S (Continued)

CHAPTER IV - (continued)Page

6 . F ederation in the C onstitu tion : general7. T h e Shan S ta te s (Chapter D t,~ l6 i T ' 1 6 5 ) 1พ 8. The Kachin S ta te (Section 166-179) - ________ 10น9. The Karen s ta te (Section 180 - l8 l ) ................................... 1C&10. The Kayah s ta te (Section 182 - 195) ___ -..... ....".1.10611. The Chin Special D ivision (Section 196 - 1 98 )..... ...107

CHAPTER V - POST MDRTEM ......... ............. ..........1..... ........................ ........ ................109SUPPLEMENT. THE NE WIN ADMINISTRATION AND AFTER

by John Seabury Thompson .....:...... ;...................................133

JOHN SYDENHAM FURNIVALL, FEBRUARY lfc, 1878-July 7, i960. AN APPRECIATIONBy Frank N. Trager

P ro fesso r o f In te rn a tio n a l A ffa irs , New York U niversity

Near th e end of the Summer in 1958 my wife and I were having te a in the study of J . ร. F u rn iv a l l 's s u i te , lo ca ted in th a t remarkable V ic to rian - named in s t i tu t io n , The'Home o f the Waifs and S trays, the b e s t run so c ia l agency in Burma, with. Daw Tee Tee Luce, (w ife of Gordon Luce) as i t s p re s id in g genius. As u su al, we ta lk ed of Burma and s ta r te d by reviewing my notes, o f in terv iew s concerning the s p l i t in the A n ti-F a sc is t P eop le 's League. We were not a l i t t l e concerned over the in te n se ly personal and apparen tly i r r e v e rs ib le antagonisms which had caused the s p l i t and were m indful o f the d i f f i c u l t i e s in heren t in th e m il i ta ry take-over, rumors of which were a lready in th e a i r . (Our t r i p to Sandoway and Kyaukpyu had beer- cancelled because of m ili ta ry movements.) Our a p p ra isa ls of the s i tu a t io n shared a ccmmon understanding and p rognosis, though, as u sual, I was try in g to le a rn something from the g re a te s t scho lar on modern Burma. Each of us subsequently pub lished our fin d in g s , F u rn iv a l l 's in th i s , h is penultim ate monograph, The Governance of Modern Burma, completed and f i r s t pub lished in January, 1959*

The s e t t in g of The Home is re lev an t to an understanding of both J . ร. F p rn iv a ll and Gordon Luce, a breed of men who came to Burma (F u rn iv a ll in 1902) as members o f the Indian. C iv il S erv ice b u t who were in v ited to serve Burma a f t e r she regained her independence in 19^8 . T a ll, spare, ram-rod, tw inkling-eyed F u rn iv a ll , a dozen years or so sen io r to ruddy­faced, w hite-tha tched Gordon Luce, quipping a t the l a t t e r in h is t i g h t ­lip ped , d ry ly humorous way, planning th e weekly m usicale o r l i t e r a tu r e reading (carry in g forward a c u l tu ra l h a b it begun sh o rtly a f t e r World War 1)7 ever-m indful th a t Daw Tee Tee would r e a l ly have th e l a s t word whether to them, to her 125 "waifs and s tra y s" (deprived by death or delinquency of immediate fam ily ), o r to the Prime M in iste r. (Her "boys" were alm ost in v a riab ly graduated in to p roductive lab o r and s o c ia l u se fu l­n ess). Gordon Luce, poet and h is to r ia n , ra re ly stray ed beyond the E ighteenth Century and more happily remained engrossed in the riches of Burma's Pagan p erio d , whereas F u rn iv a ll, an a c t iv i s t as w ell as a sch o lar, was concerned w ith whatever happened to and in Burma a f t e r the a r r iv a l of the Europeans. Together th e i r work spanned Burma’s known h is to ry , c re a tiv e ly based on a profound b il in g u a l f a m il ia r i ty gained by liv in g fo r many aecades in the Burmese s e t t in g .

F u rn iv a ll was posted to Burma a f t e r he had completed the N atural Science Tripos a t T r in ity College, Cambridge, in 1899) and had passed the. ' I .e .S . exam inations. He r e t i r e d from the Service and re tu rn ed to England in 1931* He was enabled to study in Holland and Java during 1933- 35; and out of th is came h is N etherlands Ind ia (1939 )* I t was a t th is tim e, too, th a t he extended h is Southeast Asian research to include h is ( s t i l l unfin ished) work on the P h ilip p in es ; he resumed h is research on th is - during h is v i s i t to th e United States-, in 1955# hoping even tu ally to round out a study on the Is land s and compare โ'the colonialism s of England,Holland, France and the United S ta te s . (Though he had pub lished some a r t i c l e s in the Jou rna l o f th e Burma Research Society on the Portuguese

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period in Burma and Southeast A sia, he had n o t, to my knowledge, w ritte n much, i f anything, on Spanish co lo n ia l ru le ) .

F u rn iv a ll spent the next seven y ears, I935-I9U2, a t Cambridge Univer­s i ty as I .e .S . L ecturer in Burmese. Then th e (B r itish Government of Burma requested h is views on post-w ar so lu tio n s to the long-standing co lo n ia l problem of Burma. The outcome of h is work on th i s , subsequently published in 19^9* was the c la s s ic , C olonial P olicy and P ra c tic e . There i s no evidence th a t h is views were favorably rece ived . Acceptance would most probably have avoided the C hurchill Government's calam itous White Paper of 191*5 which, as F u rn iv a ll elsewhere remarked, c a lle d fo r a "reversion to executive ru le as i t had functioned ^Tn Burma/ before the p o l i t i c a l reform of 1923»••.Everything was to be as i t had been before the war, only more so ." On the eve of Burma's independence he was in v ite d to re tu rn to Burma as Adviser on N ational Planning to th e Union Government, serving in th a t capacity in the O ffice of the Prime M inister from 19^s to 1958*

Several tim es during th a t decade F u rn iv a ll expressed the thought th a t i t was time fo r him to r e t i r e perm anently. His views on n a tio n a l p lanning and the economy were reg u la rly and fran k ly given, i f not always accepted. However, h is re la tio n s w ith Prime M in iste r Nu were such th a t the l a t t e r always p rev a iled upon him to stay and to work 011 some p ro je c t which needed doing - - the l a s t being an in ten siv e study, The S ocial and Economic Develop­ment of Burma. I b e lieve th a t F u rn iv a ll was persuaded to remain, a lso because he had not yet e s th e t ic a l ly decided th e f in a l shape of h is l i f e : whether i t would be f i t t i n g and proper fo r him to d ie in harness in Burma or to r e t i r e to Cambridge fo r which he had sp e c ia l a ffe c tio n .

The advent of General Ne Win's "Caretaker" government in October, 1958# apparently decided him. This was a new phase in Burma's h is to ry w ith men (except fo r the General h im self) mostly unknown to him. He agreed to complete a d ra f t o f the f i r s t P a rt of the above-mentioned study co n sis tin g of two major Sections - - S t a t i s t i c a l d a ta , d ivided in to p erio ds, and an In te rp re ta tio n of each such subdiv ision . The second P a rt, (a syn th esis) was contemplated and d iscussed as a subsequent e f f o r t to be undertaken in b eh a lf of the Burma H is to r ic a l Commission. His work on th is p ro je c t f i l l e d 1959* Before the February, i960, e lec tio n s (which re tu rned h is f r ie n d บ Nu to power) he made plans to re jo in h is su rv iv ing daughter,Mrs. M arjorie Ady and h is grandchildren in Cambridge. He s a i le d back to England in A pril, i960, on th e steamer Martaban, which most c e r ta in ly must have reminded him of one of h is e a rly tasks,, the e d itin g of "Mr. Maingy's" (and o th e rs) Correspondence fo r the years 1825-26 to 18น2-น3«»«Office of the Commissioner Te'nasse'rim D ivision (R eprin t, 1929)» This l a t e r led to h is monograph, The Fashioning of Leviathan (1938), both based on m ate ria l follow ing the annexation of th a t province (and Arakan) a f t e r the f i r s t Anglo-Burmese War, I82U-I826.

He l e f t Burma amid an exhausting and a ffe c tio n a te outpouring of fa rew e lls . The Guardian (Rangoon,' A pril, i960) summed these up in a warm e d i to r ia l : "Farew ell Thado T h iri Thudhamma Dr. J . ร. F u rn iv a ll .(F u rn iv a ll had been invested with Burma's h igh est o rder, the Order of Thudhamma, fo r h is m erito rious se rv ice to the government), thus c a llin g a tte n tio n to the Governmental award (19^9) and the U n iv e rs ity 'ร Honorary Doctorate of L ite ra tu re (1957)> both sparing ly granted to fo re ig n e rs .To the Burmese, in the words o f 'th e e d i to r ia l , F u rn iv a ll was the "Grand Old Man of Burmese Scholarship" who had given "h is u n stin ted serv ices to

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th is country which owes a g re a t deal to him fo r the enlightenm ent he has ■brought about among the p re sen t generation o f . young Burma." The e d ito rs were r ig h t ly confiden t th a t he would "carry away w ith him fond memories of h is d e a r-d isc ip le s and our dear land which he loves so much. On our p a r t , memory's song w il l fo rev e r sing in our e a rs ." These were the not l ig h t ly chosen words— "enlightenm ent" and "d isc ip le s" - - given to a saya, a te ach e r, second in the Burmese value-system only to the pongyi who devotes h im self exc lu siv ely to th e E ig h tfo ld Path of the Buddha.

S hortly a f t e r F u rn iv a ll a rriv ed in Cambridge e a rly in May, we again exchanged correspondence and were planning to spend some time to g e th e r in England in the summer of i960. I had hoped to work w ith him on an annotated b ib liog raphy of h is published and unpublished w ritin g , a p ro je c t which we had s ta r te d in 1958* He had planned to s t a r t on th e second P a rt o f The S ocial and Economic Development of Burma and to review the lnimeo- graphed sec tio n s of the' f i r s t P a rt which he had e a r l i e r sen t to me and to William L. Holland of th e I n s t i tu te of P a c if ic R e la tio n s , ( in the l a s t two decades, the I .P .R . had become his major p u b lish e r and d is tr ib u to r in the United S ta te s .)

But our p lans were changed. As h is daughter subsequently .wrote to me, they had s ix weeks of f in e English weather and a ho liday . Then, :la te in June, he su ffe red a s trok e from which he d id .not recover, and he d ied on Ju ly 7.

I had not met Furnivall u n t il I went to Burma for the บ.ร. Economic Cooperation Administration in September, 1951» However, having had the prior b en efit of h is pioneer w ritings, esp ec ia lly Introduction to the P o lit ic a l Economy o f Burma (1931) and Colonial P olicy and Practice, ana knowing that the Union Government had in vited him to return to Burma as National Planning Adviser,.X. was determined before a l l e lse to weigh th e ir relevance to the tasks of the บ.ร. aid program, already somewhat snarled between what Washington had-proposed and what Rangoon was prepared to accept. (The d if f ic u lt ie s were not a l l one-sided ~ but tnat i s another s to r y .) We met for the f i r s t time on the s t i l l "tainted" grounds o f the Pegu Club, symbol of pre-independence B r itish exclusiveness.: Furnivall sensed my unspoken comment. As we sat down he quickly and q u ietly said;"You know, th e r e 's a housing shortage . They found space fo r me h ere ."Vie immediately became fr ie n d s and continued so from then u n t i l h is death. During my to u r of duty I had the advantage of h is immense knowledge and incisive'com m ent. We met again in the United S ta te s during 1955 and in Burma in 1956 and 1958* Always th e re was some "Burmese" work of mutual in te r e s t in p rogress and we shared an in te rm itte n t correspondence; in a l l th ese .n in e y ea rs, I cannot remember a time when th is was not so.

The S oc ia l and Economic Development of Burma was to be h is crowning e f fo r t devoted to an a n a ly s is of Burma during the B r i t is h connexion. I t is . a study from 1862 onwards, the year in which the th ree annexed d iv is io n s o f Burma, Tenasserim, Arakan (War of I82U-26) and Pegu (War of 1852) were incorporated as a s in g le Province w ith in B r i t is h Ind ia under a Chief Commissioner. F u rn iv a ll had completed an exhaustive re-exam ination of o f f i c i a l rep o rts (the annual and the re la te d B r i t is h documentary s e r ie s ) which began in th a t year. He had a lso p a in s tak in g ly c o lle c te d - - and knew more about than anyone e ls e — the i l l -p re s e rv e d Burmese records or s e t ta n s . He had mined th is m e te ria l fo r 'the a lready mimeographed d e sc rip tiv e and in te rp re ta t iv e sec tio n s o f the study. I t s even tual p u b lic a tio n , in e v ita b ly

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deprived of i t s completion, w il l none the le s s prove of substantial value to future students of Burma.I have ca lled Furnivall an a c t iv is t as v e i l as a scholar. This was no id le reference. For not only had he produced a sh e lf of scholarly works which no student of Burma can f a i l to consult with p ro fit , but he had a lso found time, beyond h is adm inistrative service in the B r itish and Burmese governments', to encourage and to help create a number of educa­tio n a l and other in stitu tio n s in Burma. He yas a founding member of the Burma Research Society and i t s Journal (1910). He organized (in the 1920'ร) Book Clubs and book stores to help in the d istr ib ution of English-language books when these were in short supply for Burmese students. Sim ilarly, he was a founding member of the Burma Education Extension Association and the Burma Council on World A ffairs (Since 1958 a National Council of the In stitu te o f P acific R elations), both these la t te r associations being designed to extend Burma's meager avenues for non-university adult education. He in it ia te d and taught courses in economics,at the U niversity

of Rangoon preparing the f i r s t Burma-centered textbook (h is Introduction) on the subject when the B ritish educational authorities did not deem i t necessary to do so. He put to use h is extensive knowledge of the v illa g e s , derived from h is I . e . s . Settlement O fficer assignments, to post-independence Commissions charged with the resp o n sib ility for devising democratic lo ca l and v illa g e administration — a system which would attempt to harmonize the values of p re-co lon ia l and co lon ia l experience. He translated into English Prime M inister Nu's. memoir on Burma Under the Japanese. His was a busy and fr u it fu l l i f e .I t i s obvious th a t these lin e s have been w ritte n in undisguised

adm iration fo r a no tab le human being who p a tie n t ly and b r i l l i a n t l y shaped h is l i f e so as to f u l f i l l f re e ly chosen personal and so c ia l o b lig a tion s in r ic h in te r - c u l tu r a l scho larsh ip and a c tio n . When F u rn iv a ll s ta r te d in Burma in 1902, he had the advantage o f good s c ie n t i f ic tra in in g . His so c ia l philosophy appears to have been a t the crossroads between N ineteenth Century B r it is h L iberalism and Fabian Socialism . His experience w ith colonialism in Burma g radually in c lin ed him even more to a v a r ia n t o f non- marxian so c ia l democracy. But he was never concerned w ith s o c io -p o li t ic a l la b e ls e i th e r fo r h im self or fo r o th e rs . S ocial science concepts of e ff ic ie n c y , p rogress, p lu ra l so c ie ty , w elfare, so c ia l ju s t ic e , c u ltu ra l in te g ra tio n (and re la te d o th e rs) continued to serve him as both to o ls of inqu iry and norms fo r judgment.

E ssen tia lly he had found that the colon ia l powers frequently brought "progress" to the colonies but at the expense of cultural d isintegration or a lien ta tio n . "The people," as he wrote in Colonial Policy and Practice, "no longer f e e l at home even in th eir home." Foreign rule and foreign ways give r ise f i r s t to the n a tio n a list movements which seek to oust co lon ia l power. This in turn i s followed by the d if f ic u lt search for both individual and c o lle c tiv e autonomy to re-in tegrate the formerly co lon ia l soc ie ty . At th is point F urn ivall's so c ia l philosophy becomes p rescrip tive. He argued that, though we cannot wholly escape the consequences of the past, we can and should encourage the conditions necessary to bring about freedom and cultural integration in former co lon ia l s o c ie t ie s . He presented h is theory in a variety of h is w ritings over the decades but nowhere more persuasively than in the concluding pages of Colonial Policy and Practice, penned during World War I I . The h is to r ic a l events since then in the Al'ro-Asian co lon ia l- viii -

and ex-colon ia l world document h is theory. As I w rite these l in e s , the experience in the former Belgian colony (now The Republic of the Congo) adds one more corroboration. Furnivall concluded that such international conduct as he advocated on the b asis of h is long experience with co lon ia l so c ie t ie s i s desirab le, not as an a ltr u is t ic boon to be granted (grudgingly or otherwise) to "nationalist ag ita tion ," but rather as a r e a lis t ic measure, required for the democratic attainment of world w elfare.Let th is right judgment be h is epitaph as i t was the ch ie f among h is manifold labors.

Ju ly , i960

PREFACE' Quid leges sine moribus vanae p ro fic iu n t?

Of what a v a il a re forms of law in d e fa u lt o f so c ia l order?Horace: Odes. I l l , 2b .

During the p a s t ten years a long succession of v i s i to r s , d isting u ished and und istingu ished , v a rio u sly expert o r fran k ly in ex pert hu t in q u is it iv e , have found th e i r way to Burma. Some have t r i e d to understand the working of the machinery of government and have come to me fo r inform ation. The forms of p o l i t i c a l in s t i tu t io n s in Burma a re la rg e ly modelled on English in s t i tu t io n s from which they a re derived . Many v is i to r s were Americans who seemed as ill-a c q u a in te d w ith English p o l i t i c a l in s t i tu t io n s as most Englishmen are w ith th e i r s , and they were s t i l l le s s able to understand the d is to r te d forms which E nglish in s t i tu t io n s have assumed in Burma. English v is i to r s were sometimes puzzled because in s t i tu t io n s w ith English names and forms d id no t function in the same way as in England. This was unreasonable. In s t i tu t io n s could not operate in th e same way as in England because they had d if fe re n t functions to perform .

This d iv e rs ity may conveniently be i l l u s t r a te d w ith reference to lo c a l government. Some Americans regard th e English system of lo c a l government as in e f f ic ie n t and undemocratic and some Englishmen have much the same opinion regarding lo c a l government in America. Tammany is a by-word of reproach. Yet in both coun tries lo c a l government seems on the whole to give people p re t ty much what they want. But i f the aim of lo c a l govern­ment in Burma were merely to give th e people what they want, the r e s u l t would not be very s a t is fa c to ry , e sp ec ia lly w ith regard to pub lic h ea lth and sa n ita tio n . One can see th is w ithout going out of Rangoon. The government of Rangoon Corporation is in the hands of the people. I f they wanted a c leaner and h e a lth ie r c i ty they would in s i s t on d ra s tic ac tio n by the C orporation. But the lo c a l C ouncillors know very w ell th a t d ra s tic ac tio n would cause an immediate outcry a g a in s t oppression and th a t they would be unseated a t the f i r s t opportunity . The same considerations apply w ith even g re a te r fo rce in ru ra l a rea s .

In s p ite of the new requirem ents of s o c ia l l i f e consequent on the absorp tion of Burma in the economic system of the modern world, the people in general would be q u ite content to go along, so f a r as p o ss ib le , as they have always done. They a re im patient o f the s o c ia l d is c ip lin e which modern circumstances n e c e s s ita te . The basic problem of lo c a l government in Burma is , not to give the people what they want, bu t to induce them to want what they need, and meanwhile to in troduce as much sa n ita ry d isc ip lin e as they w il l stand . The function of lo c a l government in Burma is d ire c t ly con trary to i t s function in the West; n e ith e r the American nor th e B ritish system of g iving the people what they want w il l y ie ld s a t is fa c to ry re s u lts in Burma, and the forms o f lo c a l government must be adapted to the functions which i t has to perform.

The same p r in c ip le app lies to the n a tio n a l government. In B rita in th ere i s a s ta b le n a tio n a l so c ie ty , deeply roo ted in th e p a s t and funda­m entally un ited in the in ten tio n to promote n a tio n a l w elfare . This f in d expression in i t s sp e c ia l type of p o l i t i c a l in s t i tu t io n s , though in the

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emergency o f war (and a lso in some economic c r ise s ) many tra d ition a l l ib e r t ie s had to "be curta iled . In Burma, on the contrary, the main function of government i s to create unity in a d isintegrated so c ia l order and f i t the people for so c ia l and economic l i f e in the modern world in which they have, quite recently , been absorbed. Yet the forms of govern­ment inherited from B ritish rule were as l i t t l e su ited to the new func­tion s of government in independent Burma as were the forms o r ig in a lly inherited from Burmese ru lel How these forms can be adapted to the p o l i t ic a l so c ia l and economic conditions of new Burma is a problem of in f in ite complexity. I f one seeks a p a r a lle l in America to modem Burrca, one must go back to the la s t quarter of the 18th century when the United States were hardly yet united sta tes and, for a l l the Declaration of Rights, the con stitu tion was s t i l l in the melting pot; there indeed one may find numerous in terestin g and in stru ctive (and encouraging) analogies with modern Burma. Burma i s s t i l l attempting by a process of t r ia l and error to devise, in s titu tio n s with a due correspondence between form and function. That i s one reason why i t i s d i f f ic u lt for foreigners (and even Burmans) to understand them.

I t was often suggested to me that I might นr ite an account of them and the task seemed worth attempting as a study in the adaptation of form to function; but for various reasons I was reluctant to undertake i t , and when I did so, I was not very w ell s a t is f ie d โ/ i t 'ท the resu lt.Apart from any shortcomings in the performance, there were two inevitab le d efects. I had given only a s ta t ic p icture of a dynamic process, a s t i l l photograph for a subject that needed a cinematograph. I t changed even while I was describing i t , and the study would be out of date before i t could be published. Again, I had described the machinery as carefu lly asI could, how i t had acquired i t s form and how i t was meant to function.But no one could t e l l how i t rea lly worked in p ractice . A ll I could present was a mere skeleton. To clothe i t with f le sh and blood, so far as th is was a t a l l p oss ib le , seemed to require the assistance of a Burman with access to the storehouse of pazat yazwin, liv in g oral h istory . And when, in May 1958, the AFPFL collapsed, my f i r s t reaction was to abandon the whole project.

But my friend Mr. William L. Holland, Secretary-General of the In stitu te of P acific R elations, in s is ted that the work might s t i l l be of some use to students engaged on research in applied p o l i t ic a l science.The new situ a tion had indeed m itigated the force of the arguments against early publication . There could be no further continual changes along the former l in e s , for the break-up of the AFPFL marked the d e fin ite c lose of one stage in the process of p o l i t ic a l evolution. I t i s s t i l l impossible to fathom how far the spate of rules and regulations took e ffe c t in actuc.l p ractice , but the recrim inations o f divided leaders have opened to the outside public a few pages in the chronicles of the pazat yazawin and thereby revealed some o f the stra in s to which the machinery had been subjected. They have brought to l ig h t some remediable d efects, but they have made i t c lear a lso that the catastrophe was due not merely to the f r a i l ty of human nature, but in great measure (perhaps in much greater measure) to the contradictions inherent in the problem which ten years ea r lier they had tackled so courageously with l i t t l e but optimism and enthusiasm to support them. The immediate prospect may seem dark and doubtful, but i t i s perm issible to hope that Burtons may be the richer for the lo ss o f some il lu s io n s .

J . S. FURNIVALLRangoon, September 1958- x i -

CHAPTER I . THE BACKGROUND1 . Form and Function.

I t i s an elem entary p r in c ip le of m echanical con struc tio n th a t a machine should be so designed as to work to the b ea t advantage., unless th ere is a c lose c o r re la tio n between form and function i t cannot a t ta in a high le v e l of e ff ic ie n c y . ■■ The sane p r in c ip le holds good in so c ia l engineering, b u t too o ften i s -disregarded. - In t e r r i t o r i e s su b jec t to the B r it is h Crown, i t i s only n a tu ra l th a t a u th o r i t ie s a ttem pting the problem of designing- machinery fo r self-governm ent should have taken English in s t i tu t io n s as th e i r model; they have t r i e d to reproduce, as c lo se ly as seemed expedient or p o ss ib le , the form of the machinery W1thou t s u f f ic ie n t regard fo r d iffe ren ces in the environment and in the Inunctions which i t i s intended to perform . That i s one reason why such experiments have o ften f a i le d to y ie ld s a t is fa c to ry re isu lts . In e a r l i e r days, when th e system of government'was p u re ly a u th o r ita r ia n and the a u th o r i t ie s attem pted l i t t l e beyond the maintenance of law and o rder, a c lo se r c o rre la tio n between form and function was p o ss ib le and,- w ith in i t s narrow er l im its , the government could be more e f f i c ie n t . But the so c ia l engineer never enjoys q u ite the same freedom as the mechanical engineer who can design machinery so le ly w ith refe rence to i t s fu n c tio n s . The s o c ia l engineer never s t a r t s w ith a blank sheet o f paper; th e re i s a lready a drawing on the b lue p r in t . He must take the e x is tin g machinery and a d ju s t i t to h is purpose; he may scrap much of i t , b u t even th e most v io le n t rev o lu tio n does no t wholly o b l i te r a te the p a s t .

A s im ila r d i f f i c u l ty hampers any attem pt to d ep ic t a system o f govern­ment which i s s t i l l in o p era tio n . The d e sc rip tio n of a mechanical con­s tru c tio n may รu ff ic e to exp lain i t s working, because i t s functions a re im p lic it in i t s form. A schedule of the mechanism of a government, however, may be very m islead ing , e sp e c ia lly i f i t has undergone g rea t changes; one must take in to account the way i t works. The form of govern-

•inent i s la rg e ly a p roduct of the p a s t; i t s functions express the a s p ira ­tio n s of the people, o r a t le a s t ,o f th e i r le a d e rs , fo r the fu tu re . ' The s tru c tu re o f the government Is tile r e s u lta n t o f th ese -two fa c to rs ; i t s s t a b i l i t y and e ff ic ie n c y depend on the success w ith which the form and functions have been harmonised. Thus, a d e sc r ip tio n b f a system of govern­ment req u ires more than a bare ' a n a ly s is of it 's s tru c tu re ; one.'must' exatoine the system as i t พ0ฟ£ร in p ra c tic e ..

There i s 'a fu r th e r d i f f ic u l ty in such an; e n te rp r is e . When Bagehot in 1872 s e t aho iit.b ring ing up’ to date..'the account of tn e ; B r i t is h C o nstitu ­t i o n 't h a t he 'had w ritte n only ..five years e a r l i e r , he found the ta sk impos­s ib le . - ' In sketching a. liv in g -C o n s titu tio n ) he sa id , ..the ch ie f d i f f ic u l ty i s "that, th e object, i s in constan t change . 1. . a contemporary, who t r i e s to

' p a in t what is . before him is .p u z z le d and perpiexed; what he*sees i s changing d a ily ." . But the fev e r-h aa t of c o n s t i tu tio n a l development in Burma during th e p a s t few years b lu rs the o u tlin e u n t i l p e rp le x ity • borders on b ew ild er­m ent Hardly anywhere i s th e re a c ie a r l in e between what was and what i s , or between what the Government, i s doing and what i t hopes" to do. . I t i s im portant moreover to 're c o g n iz e th a t the adjustm ent o f o ld forms to new functions i s a tw o-fold p ro cess , involving changes in law and.changes in p ra c tic e , and these ra re ly co incide .

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The b as ic ad m in is tra tiv e machinery of Burma was b u i l t up during the period of c lose on a hundred y ears, from 1826 to 1923J when i t s e s s e n t ia l fea tu res were the re s p o n s ib il i ty of the Government, 'through' the Government of Ind ia , to the-^Parliament in England; the concentra tion of au th o rity a t the cen tre o f government; and c o n tro l over le g is la t iv e functions by the Executive, i / This machinery had to be read ju sted fo r the performance of new functions in 1923, when Burma was granted p a r t i a l autonomy, and again in 1937 when, sim ultaneously w ith the g ran t o f w ider autonomy, Burma was separated from In d ia . Then, in 19^2, th e re was a much more d ra s tic read ­justm ent o f the machinery to adapt i t to the conditions of the Japanese occupation. With the re s to ra t io n of B r it is h r u l e . i n ,19 -5» th e machinery did no t, and could n o t, fun ction in the seme manner as before the war, nor could the o lde r forms be reco nstru c ted . The ex ten t of the readjustm ent then found necessary i s in d ica ted by the fa c t th a t w ith in a l i t t l e , over two y ears, the le g is la tu re passed n early two hundred new enactments. Subsequently, w ith the a ttainm ent of independence, the new Government passed more than f iv e hundred Acts between 1948 and 1956. Ilany of these new Acts were freq u en tly amended, and some were repealed to be replaced by s t i l l newer A cts. Almost a l l the major Acts, con tain p rov isions empowering the P res id en t to make ru le s which have the fo rce of law, and g enera lly the im plem entation of an Act depends on orders passed by execu­tiv e a u th o r i t ie s ; to understand the le g a l consequences of le g is la t io n one must study th ese ru le s and o rd ers . Also, most Acts empower the P residen t to f ix a date when the Act o r any .of i t s c lauses s h a l l come in to e f fe c t over th e whole country o r over any p a r t o f the country. Thus the law i s not uniform everywhere. For example, in some d i s t r i c t s lo c a l government is reg u la ted by the Act of 1953 fo r ad m in is tra tiv e reo rg an isa tio n while in o thers the D is t r ic t Councils Act o f 1921 and the Municipal Act of 1898 are s t i l l in fo rc e . In th ese circum stances any genera l statem ent regarding the form al 's tru c tu re of government must be read as su b jec t to exceptions.

Furtherm ore, one must take in to account the in e v ita b le divergence between lav; and p ra c t ic e . The machinery of government i s no t mechanical; i t i s v i t a l , c o n sis tin g o f human beings w ith human lim ita tio n s and with a human p re ju d ice a g a in s t new-fangled n o tio ns. A dm inistrative o f f ic ia l s a re com fortable in th e i r h a b itu a l ro u tin e ; they tend to re se n t changes and to go on as before even when they a re supposed to be doing something d i f fe re n t . Reforms o ften pass over th e i r heads. In the Report of the Indian S ta tu to ry Commission o f 1930 i t was noted th a t in Burma th e con­s t i tu t io n a l reforms o f 1923 had made l i t t l e d iffe ren ce in th e working of the Departments; even those Departments which had nominally been t r a n s ­fe rre d to popular c o n tro l " fo r the most p a r t c a rr ie d on as in pre-Reform days." 2/ Sometimes during recen t years Rules framed under new Acts have, fo r g re a te r f a c i l i t y in d ra f tin g , been modelled on Rules framed under pre-war A cts, so th a t , although purporting to give e f fe c t to the new Act, they are in c o n s is te n t w ith -its purpose; fo r in stance Boards intended to work on commercial l in e s have been c ripp led by r e s t r i c t iv e reg u la tio n s . Even where th e process works more smoothly, th e re must always be a tim e- lag between the enactment' o f a new measure and i t s im plem entation. The duration o f the tim e-lag depends la rg e ly on th e magnitude of the change1/ Indian s ta tu to ry Commission, Report. 1930, i , p* III*2/ I b id . , x i , p . 577.

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involved, and th is i s in d ica ted by the spate of new le g is la t io n . Formerly the d riv in g power :าวehind th e ad m in is tra tiv e machinery was f re e e n te rp r ise in the in te r e s t of economic progress; now, under a n a tio n a l government, economic e n te rp r is e must be kept under c o n tro l in the in te r e s t of inational w elfare . This involves p u ttin g the ad m in is tra tiv e machinery in to the rev erse gear, so as to go forward in the con trary d ire c tio n . I t Is no longer s u f f ic ie n t fo r c le rk s to p u t the usual f ig u re s in the usual columns and dispose o f papers in the usual f i l e s w ithout the tro u b le of. th ink in g .The c o rre la tio n of form and fun ction in the new environment req u ires th a t not only c le rk s bu t a lso o f f i c i a l s , high and low, and even th e genera l p u b lic , must come to accep t t h e i r new r e s p o n s ib i l i t ie s . This must be a gradual p rocess, and a t p re sen t one cannot a sc e r ta in w ith any p re c is io n how f a r reforms in p ra c tic e have kept pace w ith reforms on paper. Blit i t should be p o ss ib le to d escribe the form al s tru c tu re of the government as la id down in the C o n stitu tio n and .the law, to s t a t ^ the more im portant problems w ith which i t i s confronted , and to give a g en era l in d ic a tio n as to th e . way in which i t fu n c tio n s . In view o f the s ta tu s of Burma as a newly - independent country, form erly a province of the B r i t is h Empire, and of i t s s i tu a t io n as a b u ffe r s ta te between the two great-pow er b locks*of E ast and West, an attem pt to s e t th ese th ing s in o rder may be o f more than lo c a l in te r e s t . F i r s t , however, we must examine th e background ag a in s t which modern Burma must be .viewed.2 . Geographical Background.

The Union o f Burma i s a fed e ra tio n in which a l l the powers of govern- meht, l e g is la t iv e , executive and ju d ic ia l , a re exerc ised by organs of the Union except so f a r as they are s p e c i f ic a l ly delegated under t h e ' C onstitu ­t io n to fo u r c o n s titu e n t u n its ; the Shan s ta te , th e .k ach in s ta te , the K ayah 'state and th e Karen s t a t e . The c h a rac te r of the fed e ra tio n is d ic ta te d by the p h y sica l and p o l i t i c a l geography of Burma. The t o t a l area of the Union i s about 260,000 square milesT T h e .la s t census before the a ttainm ent o f independence gave th e population in 1941 as 16,823,798*For 1957 the United Nations estim ate was 20 m illio n s . Burma p ro p e r). the. a rea w ith in which the organs of the Union possess f u l l powers, c o n sis ts mainly o f two r iv e r in e systems; the v a lle y of the Irrawaddy, r is in g in the mountains of T ibet and tra v e rs in g the whole country down to th e sea below Rangoon; and the v a lle y o f the S itta n g , running p a r a l l e l to the lower Irrawaddy on th e e a s t . I t a lso comprises th e estu a ry of th e Salween River Which fo r p a r t o f i t s course forms the eas te rn boundary of Burma, and two c o a s ta l s t r ip s , Arakan bordering th e Bay of Bengal> and Tenasserim running down in to the Malay P en insu la . A ll round the Irrawaddy and’S itta n g "v a lle y s , franges .of h i l l s , o ff-sh o o ts of th e 'T ib e ta n mountain complex, cu t o ff Burma from i t s neighbours. W ithin these h i l l s l i e the t e r r i t o r i e s of the four c o n s titu e n t S ta te s . Another o ffshoo t from the same system p en e tra tin g Burma ..between Arakan and the Irrawaddy v a lle y c o n s t i tu te s the. Chin H il ls , a S pecial D ivision of. Burma proper which has more in common w ith the ' h i l l S ta te s !th an w ith ,th e lowlands-.

Burma, secluded from the o u te r world by mountains and the sea, appearsd estin ed fo r p o l i t i c a l u n ity by n a tu re . A nthropological re la tio n sh ip -and........economic.circumstances re in fo rc e the tren d to u n ity . ' For the indigenous, peoples a re a l l o f mongoloid stock and, a t l e a s t rem otely, a,kin; .and the land, w ith a wide range of s o i l and c l im a te ,■can provide a l l th a t by the standards of so u th -ea s t Asia i s r e q u is i te fo r modest comfort. Yet th e re

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a re many .po in ts of d iffe ren ce between the p eo p les‘of th6' lowlands.‘.and of t h e .h i l l s . The Burmans of the lowlands are predom inantly Burmese 3 / w ith com paratively :sm all m in o r it ie s .o f Mons, Karens and Shans; almost a i l of them are. .Buddhists; they c u lt iv a te land on permanent hold ings, they a l l , . even those who regard themselves as r a c ia l ly d is t in c t o r p ro fess 'a d i f - ' f e r e n t .r e l ig io n , have in common much th e same'Way o f l i f e ; nearly every one caii speak Burmese almost as n a tu ra lly a s 't h e i r mother-tongue, and most of/them have learned to read and w rite Burmese . In a l l these th ings which th e peoples o f Burma proper have in common, -they 'd if fe r from: the peoples of the h i l l s . ■ - ■■

The h i l l peoples f a l l in to a few main groups. In the extreme north o f Burma th e re a re the Kachins; on the no rth -east, the Shans and, e a s t of th ese , along the Chinese border, one fin d s most of th e Palaung-Wa t r ib e s ; fu r th e r south, bordering Thailand, a re th e Kayahs (form srly known as K arennis), and, reaching down in to T enasserim ,-the Karens. The o th e r main group, the Chins, occupy the h i l l s between the Irrawaddy valley-and Arakan. The h i l l t r a c t s , spread over 113,000 square mile3> form n early h a lf (k7 p e r cen t) o f th^ t o t a l a rea of Burma; b u t th e population in 19^1 was le s s than m illio n (about 16 p e r c e n t) . Nowhere.is th e h i l l population homogeneous. Of th e peoples in th e Chin H ills 95 p er cen t c a l l themselves Chins, bu t they c o n s is t o f fou r main c lans end innumerable minor groups d if fe r in g in language, custom and t r a d i t io n s . In the Kachin region le s s than h a lf the in h a b itan ts a re Kachins. Settlem ents of rep re se n ta tiv e s of a l l the groups except the Chins are w idely dlspersecTamong the Shans.The Shans a re , nominally, a t l e a s t , B uddhists, h u t the o ther peoples are mainly an im ist, though Buddhism i s spreading and many have recen tly adopted C h ris tia n ity . S h if tin g c u lt iv a tio n predominates and some of the sm aller groups have b a re ly emerged from the stage of food-gathering .There are w ell over a hundred d if fe re n t languages or m utally u n in te l l ig i ­b le d ia le c ts , sometimes w ith a range o f no m ore.than a few v il la g e s .Only th e Shans had any w ritte n language u n t i l m issionaries provided most o f the major groups w ith a lphabets; and everywhere i l l i t e r a c y s t i l l p re v a ils . D ifference of speech i s u su a lly asso c ia ted with d iffe ren ce of custom, and each group w ith a d is t in c t iv e language and customs tends to regard i t s e l f and to be regarded as r a c ia l ly d is t in c t .

- in these circum stances a fed e ra tio n embracing a l l these peoples and aiming to draw them in to c lo se r u n ity requ ired a very sp e c ia l ch a rac te r.3. The H is to r ic a l Background.

As f a r back as tn e 11th century, Burmese supremacy .extended over the whole country w ith in i t s n a tu ra l p h y sica l boundaries, and a l l th e h i l l peoples have a t some time recognised the suzera in ty of the Burmese crown. For them the Burmese cou rt was the cen tre of. c iv i l i s a t io n . The kings of Burma however were in general conten t to rece ive occasiona l p ro p itia to ry tr ib u te and normally absta ined frcan in te rfe ren ce in the in te rn a l a f f a i r s « f the innumerable p e tty s ta te s and t r i b a l c h ie f ta in s , who were l e f t to ru le th e i r people according to th e i r own customs.3/. I t ' i s ' convenient- to- d is tin g u ish ' ak Burmese those who speak the Burmese

language as th e i r mother tongue, whereas the in h ab itan ts o f Burma in . ■general may ap p ro p ria te ly be c a lle d Burmans. . ,

Even within-Bunne pr oper the a d m in is tra tiv e system was a product of gradual evo lu tion through the accumulation of custom over many c e n tu r ie s . The chain of a u th o r ity was inextricably confused, in p a r t t e r r i t o r i a l and in p a r t q u as i-feu d a l. There was no c le a r d is t in c t io n between the various fun c tion s o f government, and th e same o f f i c i a l who c o lle c te d revenue would a lso t r y c i v i l and c rim in a l cases. The system of law and the le g a l p ro ­cedure were wholly incom patible w ith the' c o n trac tu a l notions of th e West. Two c h a ra c te r is t ic fe a tu re s should be noted . One was the system of in d ire c t ' ru le by o f f i c i a l s o f the c e n tra l government through h e re d ita ry lo c a l c h ie f ta in s . The B r i t is h government fo r seme years adopted something very l ik e i t , and in a modernised form the same p r in c ip le colours lo c a l government in independent Burma. Another c h a ra c te r is t ic was the la rg e measure o f autonomy enjoyed by the Buddhist re l ig io u s o rder; th i s was lo s t under B r i t is h ru le b u t to some ex ten t i s now being re s to re d .

B r it is h ru le was extended over Burma piecem eal in th ree s tag es; in 1826, 1852 and 1886. The t e r r i t o r y taken over by the B r i t is h formed p a r t of the possessions o f the E ast Ind ia Company u n t i l these passed to the Crown in 1858. In 1826 th e Company acquired th e two m aritime p rovinces, Arakan and Tenasserim, and th ese were lin ked to g e th e r by the a c q u is it io n of Pegu in 1852. Each province ไ/as governed sep a ra te ly under the Govern­ment o f Ind ia u n t i l a l l th re e were amalgamated In 1862 as one p rovince, B r i t is h Burma. In 1886 th e annexation of Upper Burma completed the conquest of th e whole country , includ ing the v a s t expanse of t r i b a l h i l l s a l l round the f r o n t ie r . The whole of Burma w ith in i t s n a tu ra l boundaries then became a p rovince of th e Ind ian Empire.

The supreme authority in Burma was the head of the executive govern­ment, who adtainistered Burma-proper on a system of d irect ru le , and the tr ib a l h i l l s in d irec tly through th e ir own ch ie fta in s . In 1923 a certain measure o f autonomy was conceded to a p a r tia lly e lec tiv e le g is la tu r e , but the tr ib a l h i l l s were l e f t under the Governor as "backward areas." In 1937 Burma was separated from India fend the Governor became responsible to th e B ritish Government instead of to the Indian Government; at the same time the leg is la tu re was given wider powers, though the tr ib a l h i l l s were s t i l l ; l e f t under the Governor. Under.executive rule the B r itish Govern­ment fashioned a strongly cen tra lised form of administration which was su itab le for the maintenance o f law and order and such other functions as the Government was then.expected to perform. After the con stitu tio n a l reforms from 1923 onwards the former adm inistrative machinery remained e sse n tia lly unchanged, and continued to work in much the same manner as before,, though with more fr ic t io n , because of the discrepancy between form and functions.

พhen the Japanese occupied Burma in 19*4-2 they retained the same machinery, thougil adapting I t-to . su it th e ir own convenience. In 1945 the B ritish Government, on returning -from e x ile , purged the adm inistrative system of anything that seemed Japanese, but otherwise, made only such changes as the post-war situ a tio n was thought to require. When Burmans attained th e ir ., independence they naturally and in ev itab ly took over the ex istin g machinery of adm inistration. The senior o f f i c ia l s , the secre­ta r ie s , judges, m agistrates and adm inistrative o ff ic e r s in general had been trained under B r itish rule and. - - more important because le s s adapta­b le to changes ! so a lso had the c le r ic a l establishm ent. The B r itish adm inistrative system was the only system that Burmans knew and they could

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n o t scrap ’a l l th e old- M efcineryj they load .to make do w ith i t and very often make i t .do- many th in g s 'fo r ฯ;ilibti i t Jbad never been intended.. New machinery was needed and invented , b u t1 • i t 'had" to ' f i t in w ith th e o ld . Experiments along new -lines were.made and-are s t i l l being made. Gradually th e re seems to be evolving a c lo se r c o rre la tio n between the form of th e govern­ment and i t s new fu n c tio n s , b u t th i s must be c h ie f ly by th e slow and o f ta i f ru s tr a t in g p ro c e s s-Of t r i a l and e rro r; ' Meanwhile the s tru c tu re of govern­ment in Burma i s e s s e n t ia l ly a product of B r it is h ru le , and much th a t B r i t is h ru le con tribu ted w i l l almost c e r ta in ly be a permanent fe a tu re of any.government in Burma; ‘ An ap p rec ia tio n of the p resen t s tru c tu re of the government must begin th e re fo re w ith a b r i e f survey of the d is t in c t iv e ch a rac te ris tics-, o f B r i t is h adm in is tra tio n and then note any outstanding developments under the Japanese and ia fte r the re s to ra t io n of B r i t is h ru le . This should help to e lu c id a te the main s t ru c tu ra l l in e s , the form of the Government. But i t s fu n c tio n s , what i t does or a sp ire s to do, rep resen t i t s reac tio n s to i t s environment, and we- must th e re fo re b r ie f ly examine th e 'r e s u l t s o r consequences of fo re ign ru le w ith 'a view to dep ic ting the environment w ithin.w hich the ad m in is tra tiv e system works and by which i t i s conditioned .4 . A dm inistrative Background.'

The foundations o f the machinery o f government in inodern Burma were la id under B r i t is h ru le , and an exposition o f th e p re sen t s tru c tu re might be very m isleading i f read w ithout reference to the system from which i t i s derived . I t seems expedient th e re fo re to attem pt a b r i e f explanation of the arrangements under B r it is h ru le w ith regard to t e r r i t o r i a l adm inis­t r a t io n , departm ental machinery) lo c a l government'and lo c a l self-governm ent, the government of the h i l l , t r ib e s , the ju l ic ia r y , the s e c r e ta r ia t and the le g is la tu re .

(a) T e r r i to r ia l A dm in istration . As a lready mentioned, one, c h a rac te r­i s t i c fe a tu re of B r i t is h ru le was the h igh concentra tion of a u th o rity a t the cen tre . A c e n t r a l .government may exerc ise i t s a u th o rity through a t e r r i t o r i a l agency or th rough .a fu n c tio n a l agency. - During the n ine teen th cen tury , when B r it is h ru le was tak ing shape in Burma, i t was an accepted p r in c ip le o f E nglish p o l i t i c a l theory th a t , so f a r as p ra c tic a b le , th e functions of government should be confined to the maintenance of law and order. 1 Accordingly the adm in is tra tiv e system was organized on t e r r i t o r i a l l in e s , and lo c a l a u th o r i t ie s were resp o n sib le , through a chain of sup erio r a u th o r i t ie s , to .th e head o f the government, fo r the maintenance o f law and order and fo r such o ther functions as might be imposed on them. A fter the annexation o f upper Burma in 1886, Burma p roper, excluding the f r o n t ie r reg ion , comprised e ig h t (subsequently seven) la rg e D iv isions; in each D ivision th e re were th ree or fou r D is t r ic ts ; in each D is t r ic t , two or th ree Subdivisions, and in each Subdivision, two or fou r Townships. The township, w ith an area ty p ic a l ly of about 50 square m iles, was the sm allest u n it of general ad m in is tra tio n . A township u su a lly included th ree or four of the la rg e ly autonomous charges under h e re d ita ry c h ie f ta in s th a t had been a c h a ra c te r is t ic fe a tu re of Burmese ru le ; in the f i r s t in stance these charges were taken over as " c irc le s " and the fo rm e r.c h ie fta in s became " c irc le headmen"; but' towards the end of the n ine teen th century these c ir c le s were broken tip in to v il la g e t r a c t s , normally about 50 v il la g e t r a c ts to a township-. These a re d e a lt w ith below under the heading' o f lo c a l government.

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In each d iv is io n th e re was a Commissioner; in each d i s t r i c t a Deputy Commissioner; and, fo r the subord inate u n i ts , th e re were Subdiv isional and Township O ff ic e rs , The o ff ic e rs exe rc is in g ju r is d ic t io n over th ese various charges c o n s titu te d the a d m in is tra tiv e C iv il S ervice . The sup erio r o r Ind ian C iv il Service (Class I ) was predom inantly, and u n t i l 1923 exc lusiv e ly , European; the P ro v in c ia l C iv il Service (Class I I ) was predom inantly Burman, though i t included some E urasians; th e Subordinate C iv il S erv ice , (C lass I I I ) was almost ex c lusiv e ly Burman.

U n til th e end of the n ine teen th cen tury the B r i t is h ad m in is tra tiv e system .resem bled the Burmese system in tjaat the o f f i c ia l s in charge o f genera l a d m in is tra tio n ftใ ใ performed a l l the e s s e n t ia l functions of government; they t r i e d c i v i l cases as judges, and c rim in a l casea as m ag is tra tes ; they c o lle c te d the revenue and were g en era lly responsib le fo r the promotion o f w elfare throughout th e i r lo c a l charges. They a l l d id the same k in d .o f work w ith in the l im its o f th e i r re sp ec tiv e ju d ic ia l , magis­t e r i a l and revenue powers, which were graded according to th e i r rank and sen io rity ,- During th e p re sen t cen tury7 as explained below, they were m ostly re lie v e d of c i v i l ju d ic ia l work bu t otherw ise they were s t i l l , l ik e th e i r Burman p redecesso rs , omni-competent. But th e B r i t is h ad m in is tra tiv e system d if fe re d from th e Burmese system in one e s s e n t ia l fea tu re : Burman o f f i c ia ls had been su b jec t only to the in d e f in i te r e s t r a in t of custom; B r i t is h o f f i c ia l s in a l l th e i r a c t i v i t i e s , in s id e and ou ts id e th e i r Court, in the c o lle c t io n o f revenue and the promotion o f w elfare no le s s than in th e i r m a g is te ria l fu n c tio n s , were s t r i c t l y lim ite d by law. In any m atter, i f they went beyond the law, t h e i r orders were l i a b le to be appealed ag a in s t and. s e t a s id e . The whole system was based on law, and the primary re s p o n s ib il i ty of a l l o f f ic e rs in charge of g en era l adm in istra tio n was the maintenance o f law and o rd er. This graded t e r r i t o r i a l system, w ith each o f f i c i a l subord inate to h is immediate lo c a l su p e rio r, was the s t e e l frame of B r i t is h ru le .

(b) Departm ental Machinery. The system described above remained the standard p a t te rn of a d m in is tra tio n throughout the n ine teen th cen tury . Alongside th e Deputy Commissioner th e re were in most d i s t r i c t s a p o lice o f f ic e r , a m edical o f f ic e r and a pub lic works o f f ic e r . But these were in f e r io r in s ta tu s to th e Deputy Commissioner, who was o f f i c i a l ly respon­s ib le fo r a l l asp ec ts o f a d m in is tra tio n -in t h e d i s t r i c t . When the progress of development made th e ’burden too.heavy fo r one man, he was given the a ss is tan ce o f a d d itio n a l judges, m ag is tra tes o r revenue o f f ic e rs w ithout any d ev ia tion from the standard p a t te rn of c e n tra liz e d t e r r i t o r i a l ru le .In t im e ,:however, and e sp e c ia lly during the p re se n t cen tury , the p u rs u it of e ff ic ie n c y led to th e m u ltip lic a tio n o f sp e c ia l se rv ices of d ep art­ments, each w ith i t s own D irec to r a t the headquarters o f the Government.By th e tim e of th e Japanese invasion th e re were some f o r ty such d ep art­ments, la rg e o r sm all w ith th e i r own s p e c ia l fu n c tio n s , so th a t , super­f i c i a l l y regarded, the o rg an isa tio n appeared fu n c tio n a l ra th e r than t e r r i t o r i a l 7

But appearances were decep tive . A ll the more im portant d ep a rt­ments were o rd in a r ily rep resen ted in each d i s t r i c t , b u t the departm ental o f f i c ia ls had no a u th o r ity over th e people except through the Township O ffice r and lo c a l headmen, and these were subord inate only to the Deputy Commissioner, so th a t the s p e c ia l i s t o f f i c i a l s had to look to the Deputy Commissioner fo r support. Although the a d m in is tra tiv e system came to

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have the semblance of being fu n c tio n a l, in f a c t the Deputy Commissioner was more than ever th e hub on which the wheels of the adm in is tra tio n revolved, and the system was no le s s t e r r i t o r i a l than b efo re .In c e r ta in resp ec ts however the m u ltip lic a tio n of s p e c ia l i s t

se rv ices im plied fundamental changes in ad m in is tra tiv e procedure. Formerly the Deputy Commissioner, i f faced w ith any problem, could see i t as a whole. But a s p e c ia l i s t could look on i t only from the standpo in t o f h is d ep art­ment; he had no concern which o ther aspec ts of the problem, although very few s o c ia l problems have only one a sp ec t. S p e c ia lis ts were m u ltip lied fo r the purpose of g re a te r e ff ic ie n c y , b u t the consequent tendency to departm entalism was a b a r r ie r to e ff ic ie n c y . The remedy fo r departm ental­ism was coord ination , b u t i t was only a t the headquarters of the government th a t co -o rd in ation was p o ss ib le . Any new proposal would go up to the departm ental D irec to r fo r approval; he would pu t i t before the S ecre tary dealing w ith h is department who alone could g e t in touch w ith the Secre­ta r ie s concerned w ith o the r aspec ts o f the. problem. Each of these would probably w rite to the Deputy Commissioners concerned to a sc e r ta in th e i r views, and any f in a l o rders on the su b jec t would be addressed to the Deputy Commissioner by the S ecre tary dealing w ith genera l ad m in is tra tio n . This roundabout procedure aggravated another d efec t in heren t in any system of adm in is tra tio n where new measures a re in i t i a t e d from above in s tead of from below. The implementation o f such: measures needs c a re fu l and con­tinuous a tte n t io n . Not in freq u en tly , during the lengthy process of obtain ing approval fo r any innovation , the sponsor o f the p ro je c t would have l e f t h is former charge and been succeeded, q u ite p o ss ib ly , by a man w ith very d if fe re n t views7 No s a t is fa c to ry so lu tio n fo r these th ree problems of departm entalism , coord ination and lack of c o n tin u ity was ever found under B r i t is h ru le . In tak ing over the former adm in is tra tiv e system the new government of independent Burma took over the former problems end now, w ith i t s z ea l fo r promoting w elfare in every-aspect o f so c ia l l i f e and the consequent m u ltip lic a tio n of departments and se rv ices , the old problems have become even more form idable.

(c) Local Government. As mentioned above, the Burmese kings governed the country by in d ire c t ru le through lo c a l c h ie f ta in s ; . th e s e c h ie f ta in s were in g re a t measure autonomous and were the e ffe c tiv e lo c a l government. On th e t e r r i t o r i a l o rg an isa tio n s e t up under B r it is h ru le the lo c a l o f f ic e rs , the Deputy Commissioner, รน'b d iv is io n a l O ffice r, and Township O ffice r , w ith in th e i r resp ec tiv e charges, were a t the same time agents of the c e n tra l government and instrum ents of lo c a l government. In ea rly days, however, the few o f f i c ia ls knew nothing of the country, the people o r the language, and o f n e c e s s ity :they followed th e Burmese p lan of in d ire c t ru le through lo c a l c h ie f ta in s . The B r i t is h Government con­firmed in th e i r charges those lo c a l c h ie f ta in s who would recognise the new government and rep laced those who were r e c a lc i t r a n t by more com plaisant r iv a ls . The former lo c a l ju r is d ic t io n s came to be known as C irc les and the lo c a l c h ie f ta in s as C irc le Headmen. There were u su a lly th ree or fou r c ir c le s in a Township. The c i r c le headman continued to ru le h is charge on much the same lin e s as b efo re , d ispensing ju s t ic e as he had always done in accordance w ith lo c a l custom, and w ith l i t t l e , change in o ther m atters except th a t now he c o lle c ted revenue fo r the B r it is h government in s tead of fo r the Burmese government. W ithin the c i r c le th e re were numerous se ttlem en ts; sometimes th ese were la rg e enough to be c a lle d -a vil?.age and sometimes merely c lu s te rs of two or th ree households, b u t,

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la rg e o r sm all, they were so c ia l u n its and not ad m in is tra tiv e u n i ts . As under Burmese ru le , th e c i r c le headman enjoyed a : la rg e measure of autonomy, and th e u n i t o f e f fe c t iv e lo c a l government was n o t th e township b u t the c i r c le . :

A fte r the opening of th e Suez' Canal, c u lt iv a t io n expanded more rap id ly than th e c i r c le headman could a ssess i t , and the c u lt iv a to rs borrowed money from Indian money-lenders who enforced payment of th e i r dues through the township cou rt in s tea d o f through the headman. The former system was out of d a te7 A lso, during the re b e llio n in Lower Burma consequent on the B r i t is h invasion of Upper Burma, some of the c i r c le headmen showed, l i t t l e enthusiasm fo r the B r itish .c a u se . A new Chief Commissioner from Ind ia decided to in troduce a system o f d ir e c t ru le (on Indian l in e s ) through v il la g e headmen appointed by the Deputy Commissioner. .This forged a s in g le chain o f a u th o r ity from th e Chief Commissioner down to the v il la g e headman and p u t an end to lo c a l autonomy. Local government was merely an extension of the c e n tra l government. Subsequently, from 192k onwards, w ith th e in t r o ­duction of c o n s t i tu t io n a l reform s, the v il la g e s were given a voice in the appointment o f the v i l la g e headman and a sm all committee of e ld e rs was c rea ted to a s s i s t him in the t r i a l of p e t ty cases which form erly he had disposed o f by h im se lf. But i t was exp ressly l a id down th a t th is was not in tended to im pair h is a u th o rity as an executive o f f ic e r o f 'th e government. In towns th e re were ward headmen corresponding to th e v il la g e headman.

Local Self-governm ent. The con d ition s of u rban‘l i f e , however, in regard to s a n ita t io n and o th e r m a tte rs , n e c e ss ita te d sp e c ia l arrangements fo r th e towns. In 187k a few towns were le g a lly c o n s titu te d m un ic ipa li­t i e s and from 1883-8U the re s id e n ts were allowed to e le c t some of the members; in the sm aller towns Town Fund Committees were c o n s titu te d on s im ila r l in e s b u t w ith nominated members* In th ese various committees the ch ie f lo c a l o f f i c i a l , the Deputy Commissioner, S ubd iv isional o r Toimship O ffice r, was the P re s id en t and th e lo c a l o f f i c ia l s -of various departments were ex o f f ic io members. Most of the n o n -o f f ic ia l members had l i t t l e in te r e s t in th e fun c tion s th a t th e ccmmittees were expected to perform , b u t they had a l iv e ly in te r e s t in jo bs, c o n trac ts and appointm ents, o r they merely wanted to stand w ell w ith Government. By th i s means, however, the Government managed to ra is e lo c a l funds fo r such am enities as i t thought d e s ira b le in the in te r e s t o f u p l i f t . But the people tended to regard the am enities as burdens and d id not warlt to be l i f t e d up in th a t wayT To the s u p e r f ic ia l observer i t m ight seem th a t th e former lo c a l autonomy on Burmese lin e s had been rep laced , a t le a s t in the towns, by lo c a l self-governm ent on dem ocratic 'western l in e s . In f a c t however th e re were the forms b u t not the substance o f democracy. In 1915 th e re were k6 m u n ic ip a litie s b u t, fo r lack of candidate, only 13 included any e lec te d members.

With th e in tro d u c tio n of c o n s t i tu t io n a l reform s, the Government ' decided to s treng then the semblance o f democracy by withdrawing the o f f i c i a l members. This measure im plied th a t the committees o f th e i r own accord would do and pay fo r th in g s th a t th e members and the people d id n o t want.In p ra c tic e , however, the Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner were charged w ith superv ision over the a c t iv i t i e s of the committees, and various o ther devices were adopted to ensure th a t they d id no t e n t i r e ly d is reg a rd th e i r r e s p o n s ib i l i t ie s . The p recau tions .were no t very su ccessfu l and, in the o f f i c i a l Burma Handbook published by th e refugee Government of Buima in Simla in 19^3# th e m unicipal committees were condemned a s . in s u f f ic ie n t and co rru p t.

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Outside the towns certain lo ca l funds were raised and administered by the Deputy Commissioner, hut there wae no attempt to. introduce any form o f lo c a l self'government'on western lin e s u n t il 1921. E lective D is tr ic t Councils were then create.d to perform much the same functions as the municipal committees. They suffered from the same defects and in the Simla Handbook of 19^3 came under the same condemnation.

(d) The H il l T rib es . .Up to 1885 the only indigenous m in o irite s of any num erical importance were the Mons and the Karens. The Mons were f a s t lo s in g th e i r sense o f ' r a c ia l d iffe ren ce from th e Burmese and many, perhaps h a lf , o f those who c a lle d themselves Burmese, were p a r t ly o f Mon descent.In the p la in s, the Karens a lso were coming c loser to the Burmese; they had adopted a Burmese way of l i f e and most of them were Buddhists, though a Considerable minority accepted C hristian ity . The Government approved the trend towards greater unity and deprecated the tendency of Christian mis­sionaries to discourage i t . But the annexation of Upper Burma in 1886 was the occasion for a Burmese reb ellion in Lower Burma, and the Government, not without some reluctance, adopted the suggestion of the m issionaries that Karens should be recruited 'to suppress i t . The conquest o f Upper Burma extended B ritish rule over a vast area of tr ib a l h i l l s , and the Government decided to govern the h i l l peoples through th e ir own ch ie fta in s . This e ffe c t iv e ly cut them o ff from the Burmese and from one another.

The c o n s ti tu tio n a l reforms in troduced in 1923 drew a new l in e of d iv is io n between th e Burmese and the h i l l t r ib e s . The new form o f govern­ment was known as dyarchy because i t comprised two d is t in c t systems o f ru le . C ertain su b jec ts were reserved fo r the Governor-in-Couricil, i . e . , the Governor ac tin g w ith the two nominated members of h is Executive Council; in o the r su b jec ts he acted on th e advice of two Members responsib le to a p a r t i a l ly e le c tiv e le g is la tu re . The h i l l regions were declared to be

backward t r a c ts " and were excluded from the sphere of th e le g is la tu re in resp ec t o f ' le g is la t io n , the voting of expenditure and (except w ith the sanction of the Governor) in te rp e l la t io n and d iscu ssion . The G overnor-in- Council ru led the backward t r a c t s , except the Shan S ta te s where the Governor was the so le a u th o rity . The Governor a lso exercised p o l i t i c a l co n tro l over the th ree States of Karenni which were in subord inate a llia n c e w ith the B r i t is h Government. A sp e c ia l personnel fo r the adm in is tra tio n of the "backward t r a c ts " was provided by the Burma Frontier Service which was m ostly re c ru i te d from the Superior (or European) C iv il Service of Burma p roper. The Government o f Burma Act of 1935 l i s t e d these backward areas in a Schedule which inade a fu r th e r d is t in c t io n between Part I areas and Part II a rea s . Part I contained the le s s p o l i t i c a l ly advanced a reas; these were s t i l l l e f t fo r adm in istra tio n by the Governor in h is d is c re tio n . The adm in is tra tio n of the Part I I a re a s , p o l i t i c a l ly more advanced, was w ith in the sphere of M inisters responsib le to the L eg is la tu re , though they could be over-ru led by the Governor. The Part II areas were fu r th e r subdivided in to Constituency and Hon-constituency areas; the former re tu rned members to the L eg isla tu re and the l a t t e r did n o t. Hie Karenni States were omitted from th e Schedule as being tech n ica lly ou tside Burma.

The Shan S ta tes vary g re a tly in s iz e from 2b square m iles to about 12, 000. From Burmese tim es the c h ie f ta in s have always been graded. The most im portant had the t i t l e o f Sawbwa ( in Shan, Saohpa); c h ie f ta in s of the second grade had the t i t l e o f myo-sa' and those of the th i r d grade th e t i t l e o f ท, พeflun-hwu ( l i t e r a l l y "revenue o f f i c i a l " ) . Under the Burma Laws Act of

10

1898 the c iv i l , criininal and revenue adm inistration of every sta te was vested in the Chief of. th e 'S ta te , subject to any r estr ic tio n s imposed in h is order of appointment. .Almost a l l the States were grouped "under two Superintendents, for the northern and southern States resp ective ly , with such A ssistant Superintendents as were required. The .succession was hereditary but required confirmation in a formal order of appointment. Tenure o f the C hieftainship was conditional on good behaviour. The powers of the Governor extended to the appointment of o ff ic e r s to take part in the administration o f any s ta te , to the regulation of th e ir powers and procedure, to the m odification of customary law, and to the regulation of the assessment and c o lle c tio n of revenue. Criminal ju r isd ic tio n was reserved to the Superintendent or A ssistant Superintendent unless both complainant and accused were Shans, and in a l l matters the Superintendent had wide powers o f rev ision . Enactments in force in Upper Burma could be extended to the Shan S ta tes, and th is was a common p ra ctice . Thus the adm inistrative procedure tended to be assim ilated to that of Burma. In 1922 the main block of the Shan States was formed in to a Federation with an Advisory Council o f Chiefs, and in 1925 the whole area was placed under a Commissioner of the Federated Shan S ta tes, as Agent to the Governor. Outlying Shan States were supervised by the Deputy Commissioner o f the d is tr ic t to which they were attached.

At the time o f the Japanese invasion, the Northern Shan State comprised 11 sawbwas, 11 myo-sas, and 4 ngwegun-hwus; in the Southern Shan States there were 6 sawbwas. East of the Shan States are the wild Was, some of tile most prim itive people in Burma. Up to 1935 there had been no attempt to administer the Wa country, but, a fter the award of a Boundary Commission in that year d e lin it in g the common boundary with China, the Was on the Burma side of the border were formed in to a new group of Eastern Shan States and placed under the supervision of the Superintendent o f the Northern Shan S ta tes.The Kachins in -the extreme north of Buiira. in the h i l l s of Myitkyina,

Bhamo aiid Katha D is tr ic ts strenuously r e s is ted B ritish rule u n til 1895, when B ritish authority was e ffe c t iv e ly imposed under the Kachin H ills Regulation of that year.. The numerous clans are scattered throughout the h i l l s . Five clans stand out more prominently than the others, and the head of each of th ese- clans bears the t i t l e of Duwa. The ch iefta insh ip is hereditary, passing to the youngest surviving son. The Kachin tra c ts in each-D istrict were administered by the Deputy Commissioner concerned, who was ."the Sessions Judge, with the D iv ision al Commissioner as 'the High Court, but the adm inistration, apart from the t r ia l of serious offences, was l e f t to .th e Duwa to conduct in accordance with tr ib a l custom. Alongside the Duwa-and h is tr ib a l subordinates, however,' o f f i c ia ls known as taung-oks were appointed by Government to supervise the c o lle c tio n o f revenue, and to a s s is t the Duwas in the t r i a l o f'ca ses and in the performance of th e ir o th e r -d u tie s .'■ The taung-ok was the counterpart of the myo-ok in the r e s t of Burma,' and was subordinate to the Deputy Commissioner or to an A ssistant Resident.

The so c ia l organisation of the Chins, l ik e that of the Kachins, was t r ib a l’rather'than t e r r ito r ia l , but the s itu a tio n with.regard to the Chins had certain d is t in c t iv e features. One d ifference from the Kachins was' that the clans and sub-clans of the Chins f e l l in to groups with fa ir ly w ell defined lim its so that each group could be treated as a -te r r ito r ia l, u n it.- 11 -

More im portant was the f a c t th a t many of the. Chins had been w itilin the p o l i t i c a l boundaries of B r i t is h ru le since the occupation o f Arakan in 1826. In genera l, th e adm in is tra tiv e arrangements were the same as fo r the Kachins, w ith lo c a l c h ie f ta in s governing th e i r people under the superivsion of Superintendents or A ss is tan t Superintendents'. In the Arakan H il l T rac ts , form erly .known as the H il l D is t r ic t of Arakan, th ere was an A ss is tan t Superintendent w ith the.pow ers of a Superintendent, and the c i v i l powers o f a High Court were exercised by th e Commissioner of Arakan; c rim ina l ju r is d ic t io n had always been su b jec t to the h igh est ju d ic ia l a u th o rity in Burma. Elsewhere, the lo c a l Deputy Commissioner exercised the powers o f a Superintendent, and th e Commissioner of Magwe had the powers o f a High Court in both c iv i l and c rim in al cases. The law in fo rce in m atters between Chins was th a t la id down in the Chin H ills Rebulation of 1896, b u t fo r persons o th e r than 'C hins the law of Upper Burma was app lied .

The p o s itio n w ith regard to the. Karen H ills was com plicated by the f a c t th a t the g re a t m ajo rity ..of the Karens, and almost a l l those who were p o l i t i c a l ly advanced, had come down in to the p la in s where they liv ed alongside th e Burmese. Under B r it is h ru le the Karens were adm itted to the army and the m ili ta ry p o lic e , b u t those who had learned only Karen in the m issionary schools were cu t o ff from o ther departments of government serv ice, where ๙ knowledge of Burmese was necessary . Most of the h i l l Karens liv ed in the Southern Shan S ta te s and were governed by th e i r own t r i b a l c h ie f ta in s . The Karens in the p la in s were granted communal rep re ­sen ta tio n under the C o n stitu tio n of 1923 and again under th a t o f 1937»

As mentioned above Kayah w ith th ree S ta te s , Kantarawadi c o n s titu tin g E astern Karenni, and Kye-bo-gyi and Baw-la-ke c o n s titu tin g Western Karenni, were tre a te d as ou tside Burma b u t were under the p o l i t i c a l co n tro l o f the Governor.

(e) The Ju d ic ia ry . For many years the adm in is tra tio n of c i v i l and c rim ina l ju s t ic e was regarded as one of. the m iscellaneous functions of the o f f i c ia l s o f the executive C iv il S ervice . Towards the end of the 19th

■century a J u d ic ia l Commissioner was appointed to re lie v e the Chief Com­m issioner o f ju d ic ia l work in B r it is h Burma and another J u d ic ia l Commis­s io n e r was subsequently appointed fo r Upper Burma; meanwhile b a r r is te r s had been appointed as Recorders fo r the seap o rts . In 1900 a Chief Court was c o n s titu te d fo r Lower Burma and in 1922 the Chief Court of Lower Burma and J u d ic ia l Commissioner of Upper Burma were rep laced by a High Court co n sis tin g of a Chief Ju s tic e arid te n puisne judges, of whom a t le a s t one-th ird , had to be b a r r i s te r s and a t le a s t o n e -th ird members of the C iv il Service . I t had ju r is d ic t io n as th e h ig h est cou rt o f c i v i l appeal, c rim ina l appeal and rev is io n over the whole of Burma except the Shan S ta te s and o ther f r o n t ie r a re a s , and even in these i t had ju r is d ic t io n over European B r i t is h su b jec t; in th e Arakan H il l T rac ts , however, i t had c rim inal b u t not c iv i l ju r is d ic t io n . I t was a lso the Court o f Session and the p r in c ip a l c i v i l court o f o r ig in a l ju r is d ic t io n fo r the City of Rangoon.

In 1905 a separa te J u d ic ia l Service was c o n s titu te d . The Deputy Com­m issioner and h is subordinate in th e i r m a g is te ria l capacity continued to t r y most of the c rim ina l cases, b u t some of these were taken over by the ju d ic ia l o f f ic e r , whose sp e c ia l fun c tion , however, was the adm in istra tio n o f c i v i l ju s t ic e . Under the Burma Courts Act o f 1922 the J u d ic ia l Service

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was reo rgan ized . This d id no t a f f e c t the powers and. functions of the m agistracy; the Deputy Commissioner was s t i l l the D is t r ic t M agistra te , the Subdivision*! O ffice r was the S ubdiv isional M agistrate, and th e Township O ffice r the Township M agistra te . But i t c rea ted a p a r a l le l d i s t r i c t ju d ic ia ry c o n sis tin g of th e D is tri-c t and Sessions Judge w ith A ss is tan t Judges and Subordinate Judges. The D is t r ic t Judge, in h is cap ac ity of Sessions Judge t r i e d a l l tne cases which under th e law had to be committed fo r t r i a l ; in some cases one D is t r ic t Judge had ju r is d ic t io n over two, or even th re e , d i s t r i c t s . The D is t r ic t Judge a lso had m a g is te ria l powers and so had h is subord inates and, although they were mainly concerned w ith c iv i l ju d ic ia l work, they a lso helped in th e d isp o sa l o f c rim in a l work. Most o f f i c ia l s in th e Superior J u d ic ia l Service were members of the ad m in is tra tiv e C iv il Service who h ad -p refe rred to sp e c ia liz e in ju d ic ia l work, b u t o th ers had been le g a l p ra c t i t io n e r s and u su a lly were b a r r i s te r s . The A ss is tan t and Subordinate Judges were m ostly re c ru i te d by open com­p e t i t io n , b u t candidates u su a lly had a degree in law from Rangoon Univer­s i ty ; some Judges, however, were re c ru i te d from th e le g a l p ro fess io n . The m ag is tra te s , as o f f i c i a l s of the C iv il S erv ice , were under the executive government b u t, in th e ex erc ise of th e i r m a g is te ria l fu n c tio n s , they were responsib le to the High Court; th e members cf the J u d ic ia l Service were p u re ly ju d ic ia l o f f i c i a l s and were d i r e c t ly subord inate to the High Court.

Crim inal law and procedure were based on E nglish p ra c tic e , except th a t t r i a l by ju ry was confined to o r ig in a l cases b efore the High Court; in such cases th e ju ry had n ine members and a m ajo rity v e rd ic t was d ec is iv e . Apart from th e p a r t i a l reco g n itio n of customary lav in f r o n t ie r a re a s , the same c rim in a l law and procedure app lied to a l l persons, reg ard ­le s s of race o r creed, w ith th e one exception th a t European B r i t is h su b jec ts could in c e r ta in circum stances claim to be t r i e d b efore a ju ry of th e i r own kindo The whole of the su b stan tiv e c rim in a l law was embodied in th e Ind ian PenRl Code o f i860 (o r ig in a lly d ra f te d by Macaulay), and the ru le s of procedure were c o d if ied in th e Crim inal Procedure Code of 1898, the law of evidence ไmร form ulated in th e Indian Evidence Act of 1872. A schedule a ttach ed to th e Procedure Code showed fo r each offence the cou rt competent to t r y i t . In th e most se riou s cases a m ag is tra te held a p re lim in ary enquiry and, i f the evidence was s u f f i c i e n t , ' committed the accused fo r t r i a l b y 'th e sessio ns cou rt; the sessions judge t r i e d the case w ith the a ss is ta n c e of two a sse sso rs , whose opinion he could d isreg ard , and he could pass any sentence p erm itted by the ap p ro p ria te law, though a sentence of death req u ired confirm ation by the High Court.- For offences t r ia b le by a m ag is tra te th e re were two a l te rn a t iv e methods of procedure.In minor a f f a i r s the accused was brought before th e co u rt by a ' suranons; the a lleg ed offence was explained to him and on h is admission he could be fo rth w ith convicted and sentenced, b u t, i f necessary , evidence was taken and recorded and th e accused was a c q u itte d or convicted . In more seriou s m atters the accused was brought before th e cou rt by a w arran t, though not n e c e ssa r ily under a r r e s t . Evidence fo r the p rosecu tion was taken and the accused examined: he could then be d ischarged , b u t th i s did not p reven t th e re-opening of th e enquiry subsequently^ I f a prima fa c ie case were e s ta b lish e d , he was then form erly charged and c a lle d on to p lead . A fter record ing the p lea of "g u ilty " or "not g u il ty " , the m ag is tra te then heard and recorded the evidence, fo r th e p ro secu tion and defence, and passed an order of a c q u i t ta l o r con v ic tio n . Experienced m ag istra tes could be empowered to t r y such "w arrant" cases by a more summary procedure.

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There were th ree c la sse s o f m ag is tra te s . Those of th'e~3rd ’ C lass' Could impose a sentence up to one month-and a f in e of 50 ru p ee s ;: 2nd class.-- m agistrates had powers up to s ix months and Rs. 200, and-1s t c la ss magis­t r a te s up to two years and Rs. 1, 000. -In most m unicipal to w n s 'th e re■■1*ere benches of Honorary M agistra tes; a bench had the m a g is te ria l powers' of; the sen io r m ag istra te s i t t i n g on i t . D is t r ic t M agistrates and o ther sen io r m ag istra tes were given sp e c ia l powers to try- any case n o t punishable w ith death; a m ag istra te w ith such powers could impose a sentence o f im prison­ment lip to seven y ears. . ' ■ะ'

One fea tu re of c rim in a l ju s t ic e in Burma was th e attem pt to! reduce the abnormal volume of crime by the vigorous: employment of: ■ preventive" reg u la tio n s fo r b inding persons o f i l l repute, to fu rn ish s e c u r i ty fo r good behaviour; in d e fa u lt o f fu rn ish in g se c u rity they could be:im prisoned fo r a p erio d not exceeding two years w ithout conviction of any sp e c if ic offence. In add itio n to p ro v ision s of th is kind in th e Procedure Code, the H abitual Offenders R e s tr ic tio n Act and Criminal Tribes Act were โ f re e ly used fo r the same purpose.

In c i v i l l i t i g a t io n w estern law was app lied except in m atters re la tin g to m arriage and in h e rita n c e . The procedure was cod ified in th e C iv il Procedure Code of 1882, subsequently rep laced by the Code of 1908. The p r in c ip le s of c o n trac t were mainly governed by the Indian C ontract Act, 1872; th e S pecific R e lie f Act, 1877; the Indian L im ita tion Act, 1877, and the T ransfer of P roperty Act, 1882. These, and ไ;’.any o th e r Acts of le ss genera l a p p lica tio n , were based on p rin c ip le s wholly fo re ig n to Burmese ideas o f ju s t ic e , which favoured compromise ra th e r tfoan the l e t t e r of the law. When domestic a f f a i r s were in d ispu te between Bursasins the courts u su a lly iloolced fo r guidance to c e r ta in t r e a t i s e s assumed to rep resen t Burmese Buddhist law; b u t these t r e a t i s e s , in te rp re te d by w estern or w esternised lawyers and app lied in accordance w ith w estern le g a l procedure, gave a very d is to r te d p ic tu re of Burmese custom.

( f ) The S e c re ta r ia t . One of the most imposing e d if ic e s in Rangoon i s the S e c re ta r ia t , a lo f ty b u ild in g around th ree sides of a la rg e court, s i l e n t ly proclaim ing and a p tly symbolizing the importance of the S ec re ta rie s in the ad m in is tra tiv e system. Yet the growth of the sec re ­t a r i a l establishm ent in numbers and powers i s a com paratively recen t development. U n til sh o r tly before the annexation of Upper Burma th e Chief Commissioner was the e ffe c t iv e ru le r and requ ired the a ss is tan ce o f only one S ecre ta ry . A separa te S ecre tary was appointed to deal w ith m atters r e la t in g to land records and a g r ic u ltu re in 1881, and by 1900 th e sec re ­t a r i a l s t a f f consisted of a Chief S ecre ta ry , and two S ec re ta rie s w ith th e i r U nder-S ecretaries. These were housed., toge ther w ith o ther high

.o f f ic ia ls , in the then newly b u i l t S e c re ta r ia t . The head o f the province had h is own sec re ta ry in Government House, a lso newly b u i l t . D espite the m u ltip lic a tio n of sp e c ia l departments and serv ices during th e e a rly years o f the p resen t cen tury , the same s t a f f su ffic ed up to the in trod uc tio n of c o n s t i tu t io n a l reforms in 1923.

The new reform s, however, led to a g re a t increase in th e number of s e c re ta r ie s , to a new conception o f s e c r e ta r ia l functions and to a fu r th e r complexity in s e c r e ta r ia t procedure. .B y 1930, in ad d itio n to the Chief S ecre ta ry , th e re were 7 S e c re ta r ie s , 7 U nder-S ecretaries, 2 A ss is tan t S ec re ta rie s and k R e g is tra rs . By I9U0, a f t e r the sep ara tio n of Burma from In d ia , th ere were 10 S e c re ta r ie s , 3 J o in t S e c re ta r ie s , 5 Deputy

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S e c re ta r ie s , 9 U nder-S ecretaries, 5 A ss is tan t S ec re ta rie s and 7 R e g is tra rs . There had a lso been a p ro p o rtio n a te , o r more than p ro p o rtio n a te , increase in the number of Superin tendents, Branch Superin tendents,' c le rk s , s teno ­graphers, ty p is ts and m enials. Formerly the s e c re ta r ie s had taken the orders of th e head of the government, who was h im self a p ro fe ss io n a l ad m in is tra to r and knew what could and could not be done. Under the reforms th e sec re ta ry was ad v ise r to a l l in is te r , who might have ideas as to 1/hat was d es ira b le b u t, fo r lack of ad m in is tra tiv e experience, could not know what was fe a s ib le or how th ings should be don e .. This gave h is sec re ta ry much g re a te r power. But, through the m u ltip lic a tio n of departments and o f f i c ia l s i t was much more d i f f i c u l t , even fo r th e se c re ta ry , to g e t anything done. The procedure was governed by the S e c re ta r ia t Code; i t was "a bulky volume, form idable in i t s e l f and made more form idable by p. h ost of co rrec tio n s l ip s " in the words of the F is c a l Committee in 1938*

The s e c re ta r ie s were re c ru i te d from the a d m in is tra tiv e c i v i l se rv ice and i t was a t r a d i t io n , though not very s t r i c t l y observed, th a t no one should spend more than th ree years a t a tim e in the s e c r e ta r ia t ; a f t e r th a t he rev e rted to d i s t r i c t work. Each se c re ta ry was in charge of perhaps two or th ree s p e c ia l i s t departm ents, th ese being headed by s p e c ia l i s t s who had spent th e i r l i f e dea ling w ith th e i r su b je c t. But they could not ge t

anything done except through the sec re ta ry in 'c h a rg e of th e departm ent, who had no s p e c ia l knowledge of the m atte r. This d e fe c t was aggravated by the frequen t t r a n s fe r o f a se c re ta ry from one m in is try to ano ther w ith in the s e c r e ta r ia t . And th e voluminous f i l e s u su a lly contained m a te ria l fo r ob jec ting to any proposed innovation as im prac ticab le , e i th e r because i t contravened some preceden t o r because i t was unprecedented. The system was freq u en tly c r i t i c i s e d as unduly cumbrous and o b s tru c tiv e and, since the a tta inm en t o f independence, i t has been a se rio u s o b stac le to the in tro d u c­t io n of reform s.

(g) The L e g is la tu re . I t was not u n t i l 1917* during the f i r s t world war, th a t the B r i t is h Parliam ent d e f in i te ly approved the p o lic y of equipping In d ia w ith th e forms of self-governm ent, "the g radual development of s e l f - governing in s t i tu t io n s w ith a view to th e p ro g ress iv e re a l iz a t io n of responsib le government in Ind ia as an in te g ra l p a r t o f th e B r i t is h Empire." In Burma th i s took e f f e c t in th e c o n s ti tu tio n of 1923* Buivia s t i l l remained a p a r t of In d ia , and supreme a u th o rity was vested in the ' c e n tra l Government o f Ind ia which re ta in e d c o n tro l over c e r ta in su b je c ts c la ssed as " c e n tra l su b je c ts ." In the Ind ian le g is la tu r e w ith 1^5 members, Burma was re p re ­sen ted by 5 members, b u t th ese could have l i t t l e in fluence on the conduct of a f f a i r s , o th e r fu n c tio n s , termed "p ro v in c ia l su b jec ts" were delegated to th e Government o f Burma. As a lready mentioned, t h i s was c o n s titu te d on the p r in c ip le o f dyarchy. The executive a u th o r ity in re sp ec t o f c e r ta in reserved su b jec ts was vested in th e G overnor-in-C ouncil, c o n sis tin g of the Governor and two Members appointed by th e Crown. In o th e r .su b je c ts executive a u th o rity was vested in the Governor and two M in iste rs nominated by the Governor from among th e e lec te d members o f a p a r t i a l l y e le c tiv e L e g is la tu re . The su b jec ts which were thus tr a n s fe r re d in some measure to popular c o n tro l were m ainly those concerned w ith the promotion of w elfare , such as education and p ub lic h e a lth . The reserved su b je c ts were those of v i t a l importance to th e s e c u rity of the government, such as P o lic e , General and J u d ic ia l a d m in is tra tio n , Finance and Revenue to g e th e r w ith a l l p ro ­v in c ia l su b jec ts th a t were not s p e c if ic a l ly t r a n s fe r re d . The L eg is la tu re co n sis ted o f one chamber w ith 103 members, o f whom 80 were e lec te d and th e

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r e s t nominated by the Governor. The e le c to ra te was divided on the communal p r in c ip le , w ith e ig h t Indian co n stitu en c ie s , f iv e Karen and two European and Anglo-Indian, and th e re were a lso seven sp e c ia l con stitu en c ie s fo r the various Chambers of Commerce and the U n iversity . There was a very wide fran ch ise linked up with the payment of taxes and w ith no d is t in c tio n of sex, b u t as boys, though not g i r l s , became l ia b le to a sm all p o l l ta x , and thereby e n t i t le d to vote , a t th e age of 18, th e e le c to ra te was predominantly male, including 2 m illio n men and 125,000 women. The annual estim ates of revenue and expenditure were la id before the Council, b u t i t had no powers in resp ec t of the reserved su b je c ts . The b u ild in g e rec ted fo r the L eg isla ­tiv e Council was a modest s tru c tu re of one sto rey) unpreten tious b u t not unpleasing, s e t in the inner cou rt yard of the flam boyant•S e c re ta r ia t by

•which i t was dwarfed and overshadowed,- the c o n tra s t between the two b u ild ­ings suggesting th e i r r e la t iv e importance in contemporary p o l i t i c s .

The C o n stitu tio n , d esp ite i t s l im ita tio n s , taught Burmans something about the forms of democratic in s t i tu t io n s and the banner of th e i r working. Their experience was enlarged in 1937 when the Government of Burma Act of 1935 came in to fo rc e . Burma then ceased to be a province of Ind ia and became a separa te t e r r i to r y under the Crown, rep resented in the Government of the United Kingdom by a S ecre tary of s ta te - f o r Burma (though th is made l i t t l e change except in the s ty le of the S ecretary o f s ta te fo r Ind ia who now became the S ecre tary of s ta te fo r Ind ia and Burma). The L eg isla tu re became bicam eral w ith a House of R epresen tatives and a Senate. The House of R epresentatives con sis ted of 132 members e lec ted fo r a period of fiv e years on a- fran ch ise which gave the vote to women a t the age of 21 i f able to pass an easy l i t e r a c y t e s t , thereby ra is in g the female e le c to ra te to about 750,000. The p r in c ip le of communal e le c to ra te s was re ta in ed ; 25 sea ts were reserved fo r m inority peoples and 16 were a l lo t te d to sp e c ia l c o n s titu ­encies, in d u stry , commerce, labour and the u n iv e rs ity . .The senate con­s is te d of 36 members, h a lf e lec ted by the House of R epresentatives and h a lf nominated by the Governor. The Government con sis ted of a Council of not more than ten M in isters se lec ted from among the members by th e Prime M inister, who depended fo r h is p o s itio n on a m ajo rity in the House of R epresen tatives. C ertain su b je c ts , such as defence, monetary p o licy and fo re ig n a f f a i r s were reserved to the Governor, o th e r m atters were made over to the M inisters and the Governor was normally bound to a c t on th e i r advice, though in .ex cep ­t io n a l circum stances the C o nstitu tio n e n t i t le d him to d isregard i t .

S u p e rf ic ia lly regarded, the C o nstitu tio n seemed very dem ocratic, but the device of communal e lec tio n s .prevented common ac tio n and fo s te red in tr ig u e , co rrup tion and r a c ia l d isco rd . What happened in p ra c tic e was th a t th e balance of power re s te d w ith the fo re ig n commercial in te r e s ts , who supported th e extreme a n t i -B r i t is h .f a c t io n ag a in st th e more numerous and more moderate n a t io n a l is ts . Burmans learned not only how the forms of democratic government could.be used bu t a lso how they could be misused. By th e time th a t the C o nstitu tio n was swept away by the Japanese invasion , many Burmans had lo s t th e i r b e l ie f in parliam entary in s t i tu t io n s and many Europeans were doubtfu l of the a b i l i ty of Bumans to work them.5. The Japanese Interregnum.

During the i n i t i a l confusion in c id e n ta l to the Japanese occupation in the ea rly months o f 19^2, the Burmese so ld ie ry drove out the o f f i c ia l s of the t e r r i t o r i a l c i v i l serv ice and took over charge of lo c a l adm in istra tion ,

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so th a t the ฟ๓!ทictratxvg machinery built up UftAcr British rule fteemed to have co llapsed . But the consequent' cU sorder’v & s .in tp le rab le , both to Burmans and. to .the Japanese m ili ta ry autiior i t le s jj’a h d th e ' l a t t e r , a f t e r due screen ing ,, r e in s ta te d - th e ‘former c i v i l o f f ic ia l s ’ On .i August* 19^2, they appointed a Burmese Executive Government W ith’D rr Be Maw as F i r s t M in ister and on August- -1, 1943/ Buma was form ally ..declelrfed an independent s t a t e .At t h a t time th e Shan, Karenni and Wa s ta te a were . s t i i l under the Japanese M ilita ry A dm inistration* b u t on December 2k they were handed over to Burma and. were adm inistered as the Kambawza s ta te by the Home M in iste r as High Commissioner' with a lo c a l A ss is ta n t High Commissioner and a subord inate and departm ental estab lishm ent.

In th e new Government of independent Burma th e re werte"again ten M in is te rs , and Dr. Ba Maw, as Prime M in is te r, assumed the t i t l e of A dipati (D irec to r o r Leader); th e re was a lso a sm all advisory P rivy Council w ith power to d iscuss the annual budget and to enact le g is la t io n in o ther m atte rs . The. Japanese exerc ised u ltim ate c o n tro l over th e new government b u t did no t in tervene in the a d m in is tra tio n fu r th e r than Japanese in te r e s ts req u ired .Dr. Ba Maw nominated the M in iste rs and P rivy C ouncillors and they were a l l so le ly resp on sib le to him. He rep ud ia ted th e "o ld dem ocratic p lan , based upon vo te -va lue"; when th in g s were s e t t le d , "people might go back to th e i r p o l i t i c a l p la y -a c tin g i f they should s t i l l want to be amused in th a t way; b j

But the te n M in iste rs corresponded in genera l to ;the ten M in is tr ie s of the previous government, and the procedure of the Privy. C o un c il 'in -en ac tin g le g is la t io n and in framing re so lu tio n s fo r co n sid e ra tio n by the various' M in is trie s was modelled on th a t of the former le g is la tu r e . The t e r r i t o r i a l c i v i l se rv ice was d is tr ib u te d over the country in the same manner: as b efo re , and th e previous departm ental se rv ices c a rr ie d on as b e s t they could w ith a dep leted s t a f f . Except th a t the new government d id no t recognize th e v a l id i ty of dem ocratic p r in c ip le s and was avowediy a u th o r ita r ia n , the ad m in is tra tiv e machinery remained very much the same- a s .b e fo re .

Yet in the working o f the machinery th e re were s ig n if ic a n t innovations, d estin ed to b ear f r u i t l a t e r . The f a c t th a t Burma was a t - le a s t nominally independent gave Burmans a new in s ig h t in to th e conduct o f •in te rn a t io n a l r e la t io n s , and in o th e r m atters a lso i t imbued them w ith a new,' i f sometimes uneasy, confidence in t h e i r a b i l i t y to manage th e i r own a f f a i r s . This con­fidence was streng thened by the f a c t th a t the new ad m in is tra tio n from top to bottom was BurmanT Senior Burman o f f i c i a l s now occupied houses form erly reserved fo r s e n io r ‘Europeans (SO 'far as th ese were not re q u is itio n e d by the Japanese); they s a t in th e sea ts, form erly held by Europeans, and they were in a p o s itio n to give orders in s tead of merely complying w ith the o rders of European su p e rio rs . The o f f i c ia l s of the a d m in is tra tiv e C iv il Service were, in theo ry , re lie v e d of th e i r m a g is te ria l fun c tion s which were made over to the J u d ic ia l S ervice; b u t 'th e y w ere 'g iven wider ad m in is tra tiv e powers and the exigencies o f th e war c a lle d on them fo r g re a te r p erson al i n i t i a t i v e and allowed le s s re lia n c e on ro u tin e . The departm ental se rv ic e s , ■ although dep leted by th e lo ss o f European and Indian o f f i c ia l s by whom some o f them had been so la rg e ly manned^ may have been le s s e f f i c ie n t , b u t they were now wholly Burman; h ere , as in o ther m ette rs , Burmans gained new experience. -A t the same tim e the range of departm ental ad m in is tra tio n was g re a tly extended byk j See "Burma's New Order P lan ," by.D r. Ba Maw (Forma, Sept. 19^4 , Vol. I ,

No. 1, p . 105).- .17 -

th e m u lt ip l ic i ty of new functions imposed on Government by th e p o l i t i c a l s i tu a tio n , and th i s in te n s if ie d the urgency of more e ffe c tiv e co-ord ination between departm ental a c t iv i t i e s . For th is purpose Dr. Ba Maw decided to group M inisters in to Boards fo r dealing w ith m atters concerning two o r more M in is trie s ; th u s, an Economic Board, comprising the M inisters fo r Commerce, F o res ts , A gricu ltu re , Cammunipatiq^s,. and. Public Works J. '.was c o n s titu te d to d ea l;'w i t t t 'q u e s t i '^ s ^ d l^ r c a\^t:i9n and. 'transport* The d i lu t io n .o f the a d m in is tra tiv e ะ e s tab iism eftt '~ ^ ith a la rg e number, of subord inates l i t t l e , i f

. a t - a l l , conversant ‘With1;English1'may have been'one f a c to r •in the decision to s u b s ti tu te -Burmese-for E nglish so f a r as p o ss ib le .1-1 ad m in is tra tiv e b usiness. ' -• --'''. These various innovations, however, were l i t t l e more 1 than patchwork

on the former ad m in is tra tiv e system to adopt i t to th e new s i tu a tio n , and they were m ostly the natural- and a lm o st‘in e v ita b le consequence o f the departure o f the form er European and Indian o f f i c i a l s . Yet they served as precedents when Burma once again achieved independence a f t e r the re s to ra t io n of B r it is h ru le . The Ba Maw Government a lso invented new machinery intended to function alongside and supplement- the former ad m in is tra tiv e system. This too fu rn ished u se fu l p receden ts. In the New Order P lan, published in October, 19^3/ Dr. Ba Maw envisaged the c re a tio n of a group o f n a tio n a l o rgan isa tions fo r con so lid ating the s o c ia l and ad m in is tra tiv e s tru c tu re .Among these the N ational P o l i t i c a l O rganisation was of ou tstand ing importance. The Japanese, w hile allow ing g re a t freedom 'of a c tio n to the Burma Government, m aintained a close, superv ision over the adm in is tra tio n by a network of p o l i ­t i c a l o f f ic e r s . The N ational P o l i t i c a l O rganisation was intended to perform the same function on b eh a lf of th e Burma Government. From 19^2 Dr. Ba Maw had in s is te d on the need fo r n a tio n a l u n ity i f Burmans were to hold th e i r own ag a in s t th e Japanese and, w ith th is aim, he had brought to g e th e r the various p o l i t i c a l fa c tio n s in to one p o l i t i c a l u n it , the Dobama-Sinyetha A ssociation . One o b jec t of th e N ational P o l i t i c a l O rganization was to complete the e lim ina tion o f a l l p a r ty la b e ls and d is t in c t io n s and achieve r e a l and e ffe c t iv e u n ity , and one of i t s main ta sk s was to promote co-opera­t io n between d i s t r i c t o f f i c ia l s and the lo c a l p u b lic . Another s im ila r body was th e N ational M ilita ry o r q u asi-M ilita ry O rganisation intended to function as a n a tio n a l m i l i t i a o r Reserve Force. Another was the Youths’ Organisa­t io n designed to s tim u la te p a t r io t ic a c t iv i t i e s among boys and g i r l s .

These o rg an iza tion s, o r th e i r successors, p layed an im portant p a r t in the re s is ta n c e movements, f i r s t ag a in s t the Japanese and then a g a in s t the B r it is h , and they have continued ac tiv e in independent Burma. In order to c o n c ilia te the m inority peoples in the cause of n a tio n a l u n ity , Dr. Ba Miaw c rea ted th e C entral Karen Bocrd and s im ila r Boards fo r th e Shans, Karennis and Kachins. A fu r th e r precedent fo r the subsequent Government of independent Surma was th e c re a tio n of a Sanghas1 O rganisation, a kind of s ta te Church, which he hoped to use as an instrum ent of propaganda linked up to Government through a M inister of R eligious A ffa irs , N ational W elfare and Propaganda.With a view to s tim u la tin g Burmese e n te rp r ise in tra n sp o rt and commerce he encouraged sh ip -b u ild in g and-opened a s ta te Bank. In the f i e ld of c u ltu ra l a c t iv i t i e s he inaugurated a s tre n g th and Sports Movement, appointed a L ite ra tu re and T ransla tio n Committee fo r the production o f a n a tio n a l d ic tio n ary and n a tio n a l encyclopaedia, and drew up p lans fo r a n a tio n a l museum. For th e successfu l opera tion of these various schemes he made arrangements fo r the appointment o f a C entral Planning Board. Many of the p ro je c ts never got beyond a b lue p r in t , and o thers d id n o t survive the

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co llapse o f the Ba Maw Government w ith th e d e fea t o f the Japanese, b u t some were re su rrec ted a f t e r Burma had- regained i t s independence, and even some ideas th a t never so t beyond paper under Dr. Ba Maw took ro o t and came to f r u i t io n subsequently.

'Far more im portant)- however, than th e changes in the form and machinery o f government were the changes in th e environment by which i t was condi­tio n ed . The Europeans'and Indians had gone away and such Chinese as remained were ly ing low; th is c rea ted a vacuum'in the sphere of in d u stry and commerce, and i t was f i l l e d even i f tenuously , by Burmans. For the f i r s t time Burmans found openings in in d u s try and commerce, and among them were o f f i ­c ia ls who had form erly looked down on business b u t p re fe rre d i t to serv ing a Government under Japanese c o n tro l. Also fo r the f i r s t time Burmans had arvarm'y which they could use a g a in s t fo re ig n ru le r s . The environment endowed them 'w ith the rudiments o f economic and m ili ta ry power w ithout which votes have no value and ta lk of self-governm ent, i s a mockery.6 . The B r i t is h R esto ra tio n .

Although many Burman's welcomed the Japanese as l ib e r a to r s , some of the s to u te s t opponents of B r i t is h ru le were even more s tro n g ly opposed to the Japanese and from t h e i r f i r s t a r r iv a l s e t about o rgan ising re s is ta n c e .Aung San, who had led a sm all Burman detachm ent.w ith the. invaders and was given command o f the Burman fo rc e s , soon lo s t h is i l lu s io n s and made con­t a c t w ith the re s is ta n c e movement. The N ational P o l i t i c a l O rganisation , the Karen C en tra l Board and o th e r l ik e o rg an isa tio n s f a c i l i t a t e d common a c tio n , and in August, 19^^, Aung San convened a s e c re t meeting of n a tio n ­a l i s t lead ers w ith a view to co -o rd in a tin g underground, a c t i v i t i e s . From 19^3 he had been try in g v a in ly to g e t in to touch w ith the B r it is h m ili ta ry a u th o r i t ie s , b u t towards the end of 1 9 ^ he succeeded in ob tain ing th e i r support* -.In th e e a r ly months of 19^5 the B r i t i s h troops fought th e i r way back in to Burma, and on March 16 Aung San astounded the Japanese by suc­c e s s fu lly tra n s fe r r in g a l l h is fo rces to the B r i t is h s id e . This was a f e a t of genera lsh ip th a t earned him th e w ell-deserved re sp ec t of bhe B r it is h ■military a u th o r i t ie s . In May, when the army occupied Rangoon and made i t the headquarters of the m il i ta ry a d m in is tra tio n , Aung San c a lle d the under­ground re s is ta n c e movement in to the open as the A n ti-F a sc is t P eop le 's Freedom League (AFPFL). 1 He a ls o had behind him th e Burmese., army and the reserve fo rce th a t had been c rea ted as p a r t of. the N ational M ilita ry O rganisation . With th i s s tre n g th to back him, he hoped to induce B rita in to confirm- th e independence th a t had. been gran ted to Burma by Japan. This w as-the s i tu a t io n in Burma in October 19 -5 when th e former Governor, who had taken refuge in Simla (In d ia ) during the war,- came back to re in troduce c iv i l ad m in is tra tio n .

- Plans fo r the; a d m in is tra tiv e and- economic r e h a b i l i ta t io n of Burma had a lready been'drawn up under the auspices o f the e x ile Government in Simla and th e S ecre ta ry of s t a t e . f o r Burma in London. The p o lic y of the B r i t is h Government was s e t fo r th i n 'a White Paper in May, 1945. B r i t is h o f f i c ia ls were no b e t te r p leased than Burman n a t io n a l is ts w ith th e working of. the C o nstitu tio n in t h e ’Government of .Burma Act of.,1935* The Act contained, however, a safeguard a g a in s t f a i lu r e in sec tio n 139.» which enabled the Governor in an emergency to assu re f u l l executive and le g is la tiv e -p o w e rs .A proclamation', to th is e f f e c t , issued in 19^2, was due to -expire, b u t - Parliam ent sanctioned the extension of th is system for., another p erio d of th ree y ea rs . ' One 'Of the f i r s t o rders of the Governor on h is re tu rn was to

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suspend the rep rese n ta tiv e "bodies which had been charged w ith the adm inis­t r a t io n of lo c a l a f f a i r s in urban and' ru ra l a reas, and to t ra n s fe r th e i r functions to the lo c a l o f f i c ia l s of th e t e r r i t o r i a l adm in is tra tiv e c i v i l se rv ice . Thus, a f t e r two yesrs of a t le a s t nominal independence, Burmans were deprived of any ac tiv e p a r t in the adm in istra tio n on both the n a tio n a l and lo c a l le v e ls . Apart from the a b o litio n of rep re se n ta tiv e in s t i tu t io n s , the Government aimed a t reco n stru c tin g th e -ad m in is tra tiv e system as' nearly as p ossib le along pre-w ar l in e s .

The suspension of the - le g is la tu re \ms defended o n 'th e ground th a t , in view of the grave damage, m a te ria l, economic and so c ia l , sustained- by Burma during the war, p o l i t i c a l development must be deferred pending "the re -estab lish m en t of s ta b le cond itions, th e re s to ra t io n of b u ild in gs) com­m unications and pub lic u t i l i t i e s , and the r e h a b i l i ta t io n of a g ric u ltu re and o ther e s s e n t ia l in d u s tr ie s ." These ta sks demanded a much more a c tiv e in te rv en tio n o f the Government in economic l i f e than before the war.Various p ro je c ts fo r economic r e h a b i l i ta t io n had been drawn lip by the o f f i c ia ls in Simla in c o n su lta tio n w ith th e lead ing rep re se n ta tiv e s in London of the commercial in te r e s ts concerned. On the m ili ta ry occupation of Burma, employees of the c h ie f European firm s in Burma were re c ru ite d or d ra fte d in to the C iv il A ffa irs S erv ice , Burma--- the (CAS(b) — and charged w ith the i n i t i a t io n of the p ro je c t , and, whan C iv il adm in is tra tio n was rein troduced in October, 19^ 5> P ro je c t Boards were c o n s titu te d to carry on th e work. The most im portant o f these was the A g ric u ltu ra l P ro je c t Board. ■ I t undertook the whole of the r ic e business; the g ran ting o f advances to the c u lt iv a to r , th e purchase of the crop and a lso m illin g and exporting . I t was a v as t s ta te e n te rp r is e . The o r ig in a l in te n tio n was th a t the Board, which included th e form er European lead ers of the in d u stry , should rec o n s tru c t i t along pre-w ar l in e s With a view to handing i t over to the former firm s as soon as they f e l t ab le to conduct i t p ro f ita b ly . S im ilar Boards were formed to rec o n s tru c t the tim ber b usiness, the in land w ater tra n sp o r t and o ther economic a c tiv itie s - . '

. 1 IAung San had o ffe red to co-operate ' w ith the Government w ith a view to

r e h a b i l i ta t io n of Burma as an independent country, b u t when the Government re je c te d h is o ffe r and s e t about reco n stru c tin g pre-w ar Burma, he r a l l i e d h is fo rces to oppose i t and soon proved th a t a Government which would not accept h is help could n o t govern e ffe c t iv e ly w ithout i t . His most ab le lie u te n a n t was a communistj Than Tun. Before the war economic l i f e in - Burma had been dominated by fo re ig n c a p i t a l i s t s . Burmans had learned to id e n tify fo re ig n ru le w ith cap ita lism and they were.opposed to both.- Some n a t io n a l is t lead ers had sided w ith Japan' as a means of obtain ing .inde­pendence, b u t out o f sympathy w ith Russia the Communists had declared fo r the A llie s and formed the spearhead of re s is ta n c e ag a in s t the Japanese.Aung San was the lead er o f the n a t io n a l is ts , b u t Than Tun was the most prominent lead er of the communists. For some time a f t e r the war they jo ined in th e common cause o f re s is ta n c e to the B r i t is h . Than Tun demonstrated the e ffe c tiv e n e ss of the ccacnunist weapon of d ir e c t ac tio n by organising a genera l s t r ik e which, in e f fe c t , brought about the co llapse of B r i t is h ru le . In October, 19^6, a new Governor in v ite d Aung San and h is colleagues to jo in the Executive Council. From th a t p o in t the paths of Aung San and Than Tun d iverged. Aung San be lieved th a t i t would be possib le to obta in the independence of Burma by p eacefu l n eg o tia tio n . Than Tun s t i l l b e lieved in the method of d ir e c t ac tio n p resc rib ed by orthodox communist d o c trin e . The r e a l p o in t a t issu e however was whether the lead

20

should re s t .w ith Aung San o r Than Tun. Than Tun had-only, a few -followers b u t t r i e d to secure c o n tro l over AFPFL by .ge tting h is awn men in to key - p o s it io n s . Aung San defeated th is a ttem p tj whereupon Than Tun, .with h is sm all group of communist fo llow ers, b ro k e .o ff from th e main body of n a t io n a l is t le ad e r. Formerly the AFFFL had served to r a l ly a l l sec tio ns b ro rgh t to g e th e r by th e i r common d es ire fo r independence. But when Than Tun t r i e d to cap ture the p a r ty and th e whole rev o lu tio n ary movement fo r . communism, o the r prom inent lead ers began to c a l l themselves s o c ia l i s t s and formed a s o c ia l i s t group or p a r ty w ith in AFFFL.

Aung San, having got r id o f Than Tun, continued h is 'n eg o tia tio n s and in January 1947 a rr iv e d a t an agreement w ith Mr. Clement A ttle e , then Prime M inister o f the Labour Government in B r ita in . The. essence o f th i s - . . agreement was th a t the people of Burma should be allowed to achieve, th e i r independence, e i th e r w ith in o r w ithout the Commonwealth, as soon .a s -p o ss i­b le . .For th is purpose the Executive Council of th e Governor was to c o n s t itu te the In terim Government of Burma and to arrange fo r th e e lec tio n of a C onstituen t Assembly to decide on th e fu tu re C o n stitu tio n of th e i r country. The e le c tio n s were held and a d ra f t p lan fo r a C o n stitu tio n , framed by AFPFL, was la id b efo re the C o nstituen t Assembly a t i t s f i r s t meeting in June. In Ju ly , Aung San and, some Ox h is lead ing colleagues were a ssa ss in a te d , b u t Thakin พน took h is p lac e . The C o n stitu tio n was adopted on September 24th . In a T reaty signed on October 17th between - Mr. A ttlee and Thakin Nu, the B r i t i s h Government undertook to in v ite the B r it is h Parliam ent to pass le g is la t io n fo r Burma to become an independent S ta te . This arrangement was approved in the Burma Independence. Act, 19^7J and on January 4th , 19^8, Burma regained i t s independence.7 . E ffec ts of Foreign R ule.

Nature and h is to ry impose two main ta sk s on th e ru le r s of Burma, whether na tiv e o r fo re ig n : the u n if ic a t io n o f the component peoples, and the adjustm ent of Burmans to l i f e in a la rg e r world. The Kings of Burma never f in a l ly achieved n a tio n a l u n ity and, so f a r as p o ss ib le 7 they shut out the world beyond th e i r b o rd e rs . Foreign ru le was the in ev ita b le p en a lty . - One e f f e c t o f fo re ig n ru le was to s h a tte r the customary Burmese so c ia l , economic and a d m in is tra tiv e system . In the p erio d of fo re ig n ru le th ere were th ree phases: pre-w ar B r i t is h ru le , Japanese ru le and the p o s t­war B r it is h re s to ra t io n . Each l e f t i t s mark on the country , bu t c e r ta in fe a tu re s c h a ra c te r is t ic ' of the Burmese s o c ia l and p o l i t i c a l s tru c tu re were never wholly o b li te ra te d and seem now to be re-em erging. Among th ese are the idea of an organie so c ie ty based on lo c a l autonomy7 the idea of- co-opera tion between the s ta te and a la rg e ly autonomous re l ig io u s e s ta b ­lishm ent, and th e idea of p erson al t i e s between lead ers and dependents.

The pre-w ar period, of B r i t is h ru le endowed Burma w ith the machinery o f a modern s ta te and tau g h t Burmans how to work i t . I t provided Burmans w ith an example of a c i v i l se rv ic e , organized on ra t io n a l u t i l i t a r i a n lin e s fo r th e purpose of g iv ing 'e f fe c t throughout the country to the p o lic y of the Government. The ad m in is tra tiv e c iv i l se rv ice had th ree c h a ra c te r is t ic fe a tu re s : I t was c lo se ly c e n tra lis e d , w ith each o f f i c i a l deriv ing h is a u th o rity from h is immediate sup erio r and so on through a chain of o f f i c ia l s up to -the head of th e Government;, i t was organised t e r r i t o r i a l l y w ith a c i v i l servan t as the agent and rep re se n ta tiv e of the c e n tra l government in each t e r r i t o r i a l subd iv ision ; and every o f f i c i a l was su b jec t to th e

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ord inary .law in a l l h is a c t iv i t ie s . : B r i t is h .ru le a lso introduced Burmans to the idea o f law as. a genera l jconmand, to the device of a' le g is la tu re a s an organ fo r . making laws, and to the conception of a Ju d ic ia ry , inde­pendent o f the Executive government, as an instrum ent fo r in te rp re tin g and adm inistering the lawT Before the war a lso , though more recen tly ^ B r i t is h ru le had in troduced the forms of rep re se n ta tiv e in s t i tu t io n s on the lin e s o f w estern democracy as understood in England. In these various ways B r it is h ru le l e f t an Im print on the s tru c tu re of government in Burma th a t can never he com pletely o b li te ra te d .

But B r i t is h ru le d id nothing to fo s te r n a tio n a l jn ity . On the con trary , both d ir e c t ly and in d ire c t ly , i t s tim ulated se c tio n a l p a r t ic u ­larism ; I t separa ted Burma proper from the f r o n t ie r peoples by p ra c tis in g d ire c t ru le in the former and in d ire c t ru le in th e l a t t e r ; and i t d ivided the f r o n t ie r peoples from one’ another by leav ing them under th e i r own lo c a l ch ie fta in s^ Also, by opening the armed fo rces to th e minor peoples and b arrin g them to the Burmese, i t fo s te re d r a c ia l antagonism and sub­verted the in te rn a l balance of power, rendering i t u nstab le . Even w ith in Burma proper Arakan was more sharp ly cu t o ff from th e r e s t of Burma than before and lo c a l p a r tic u la r ism was in te n s if ie d because in te rco u rse by sea w ith Chittagong and Rangoon rep laced th e former t r a f f i c by road across the h i l l s . N ational u n ity was never the goal o f B r i t is h p o lic y . The o b jec t of B r it is h p o licy was to develop the m a te ria l resources of Burma by throwing i t open fo r f re e e n te rp r is e to a l l the world on equal terms;This m u ltip lied s e c tio n a l d iv e rs i ty by a t t r a c t in g a host o f in assim ilab le a l ie n elem ents. As a r e s u l t o f f re e e n te rp r is e , in d u stry and commerce and the s c ie n t i f ic p ro fessio ns passed in to th e .hands of fo re ig n e rs , who a lso came to own much of the r ic h e s t r ic e land . Instead of b u ild in g up a n a tio n a l so c ie ty the e f f e c t o f B r i t is h ru le .was to c a l l in to ex istence a p lu ra l so c ie ty comprising numerous groups liv in g side by s id e , but sep ara te ly and meeting only in the market placeT Each r a c ia l group and sub-group depended on th e o thers fo r the performance of i t s own sp e c ia l economic fu n c tio n s , b u t th e i r economic in te r e s ts were o ften an tag o n is tic and they had no so c ia l l i f e in common. The re la t io n s between th e groups were governed so le ly by law, and i t was only by law supported by adequate m ili ta ry fo rce th a t they could be held to g e th e r. In such a s i tu a t io n of unstab le equ ilib rium , the lo g ic a l consequence of in a b i l i ty to enforce the law was anarchy.

In th is p lu ra l so c ie ty , dominated by economic fo rc e s , Burmans had no chance to adapt themselves to l i f e in a la rg e r world. Because in du stry , commerce and the s c ie n t i f ic p ro fessio ns o ffe red no opportunity fo r Burmans, the doors lead ing to the modem world were barred ag a in s t them. Economic fo rces held sway even in the schools, as students were d e te rred from taking courses which led nowhere, such as the study of economics and n a tu ra l science , two main p i l l a r s of a l l th a t i s d is t in c t iv e ly modern in the modern world. Thus, although fo re ig n ru le brought Burma in to economic con tac t w ith a la rg e r world, Burmans were h a lte d a t the th resho ld ,and they could not le a rn to l iv e in i t . In some d ire c tio n s th e i r horizon was not enlarged b u t narrowed, fo r cheap Indian labour and the import of fo re ign goods r e s t r ic te d the range of th e i r economic a c t iv i t i e s .

Formerly s o c ia l custom had re s tra in e d b u t had a lso p ro tec ted them in th e i r economic r e la t io n s . But under fo re ig n ru le , w estern law and western schools were the ch ie f agents o f economic fo rces in breaking down the hedge- 22 -

of custom. Even w ith in the v il la g e the s o c ia l t i e s of the community were unable to w ithstand the s t r a in of com petitive ind iv idualism . This process of s o c ia l d is in te g ra tio n was expedited by the extension of c e n tra l a u th o rity through the v il la g e system. The in s t in c t iv e human p ro te s t ag a in s t the domination o f s o c ia l l i f e by economic fo rces took shape during th e p resen t century as n ationalism , and n a t io n a l is ts , not unreasonably, tended to id e n tify fo re ig n ru le w ith c ap ita lism . Thus the growth of nationalism in a sso c ia tio n w ith an tip a th y to cap ita lism may be regarded as an e f f e c t of fo re ign ru le , and th is combination was c e r ta in ly a very p o ten t fa c to r in determ ining the s tru c tu re of the government on the a tta inm en t of indepen­dence.

The co n trib u tio n s of the Japanese to p o l i t i c a l a rc h ite c tu re in Burma were la rg e ly negative . The re lap se o f m illio n s of acres of c u ltiv a te d land in to jung le fo r lack of a m arket, the co n sc rip tio n o f men fo r the labour corps, and the bombing of towns and v il la g e s c a rr ie d s t i l l fu r th e r the d is in te g ra tio n of ordered so c ie ty . Yet a t the same time common m isery gave b i r th to a new u n ity , a n a tio n a l u n ity comprehending a l l r a c ia l and se c tio n a l groups. And n a tio n a l u n ity was no longer compromised by unas- s im ilab le fo re ig n groups, as these were la rg e ly e lim ina ted . Also, ex p e ri­ence under the Japanese confirmed and strengthened the aversion to fo re ig n ru le of any kind. I t gave Burmans a sp e c ia l aversion to d ic ta to rsh ip and to a rb i t r a ry ru le . By 19^1 most n a t io n a l is t lead ers were no le s s d isgusted than Dr. Ba Maw w ith the f u t i l i t y and co rrup tio n of the quasi-dem ocratic L eg is la tiv e Council; they d if fe re d from him only in p re fe rr in g "group- d ic ta to r s h ip ." 5/ By 19^5, however, opposition to d ic ta to rsh ip , " a n t i ­fascism ", was a ra l ly in g cry fo r a l l p a r t ie s , w ith democracy as the im plied a l te rn a t iv e . Also, w hile Burmans were s t i l l m is tru s tfu l o f le g a l su b tle ty , o f "the Big Book" (sa -o k -g y i) , Japanese ru le had taugh t them to value the p ro te c tio n of the law. On th e o th e r hand, the f a c t th a t under the Japanese the whole ad m in is tra tio n from top to bottom had been manned by Burmans gave them a new confidence in th e i r a b i l i ty to manage t h e i r own a f f a i r s w ithout fo re ig n o f f i c i a l s . And the Japanese device o f superv ising ad m in is tra tiv e a c t iv i t i e s a t a l l le v e ls through a p a r a l l e l p o l i t i c a l o rg an isa tio n , which Dr. Ba Maw had copied' in h is N ational P o l i t i c a l O rganisation , showed them how to m aintain a hold over o f f i c ia l s in th e in te r e s t o f a p a rty i f not always in th e in te r e s t cf the people. But i t was th e b u ild in g fo r the f i r s t time o f a n a tio n a l army, and the en try of Burmans in to the sphere of in d u stry and commerce th a t were the most s ig n if ic a n t e f fe c ts of Japanese r u l e . '

With the B r i t is h re s to ra t io n Burmans lo s t the p re s tig e of independence; B r it is h o f f i c ia l s rep laced th e Burmans who had been s i t t i n g in th e i r s e a ts ; and the p o lic y of the Government was to re b u ild a pre-w ar Burma, w ith fo re ig n domination over economic l i f e , includ ing the re tu rn to fo re ign land lords o f lands in which Burman c u lt iv a to rs had resumed possession . The immediate e f fe c t was to r a is e the fev e r of n a tiona lism to new h e ig h ts . The in te rv en tio n of the s ta te in economic development served as an argument fo r the n ec ess ity of soc ia lism , and was an o b jec t lesson in the methods by which s o c ia l i s t th e o rie s could be ap p lied . And the success of the s t r ik e s , in which th e rea c tio n a g a in s t th e p o lic y o f Government found ven t, demon­s tra te d the potency o f d i r e c t ac tio n on Marxian p r in c ip le s .5 / See Burma under th e Japanese, by Thakin Nu, (Macmillan, New York, 1954)

p . 60.- 23 -

These, in b r ie f , were the most obvious p o l i t i c a l re s u l ts of fo re ig n ru le , and they foreshadowed the problems fo r which a new government in independent Burma would have to fin d so lu tio n s . But i t had a fu r th e r consequence, le s s re a d ily apparent on s u p e r f ic ia l observation . Burmens, not w ithout -reasoni a ttr ib u te d , th e i r backwardness , to ^ B ritish ru le b u t they b elieved th a t, a l l t h e i r d i f f i c u l t i e s would d isappear when they were- r id of i t . They f a i le d to re a l iz e th a t independence-IS a-co nd itio n of : . w elfare b u t not a cause o r juar&ntee of w elfare , and they 'looked forward t o 'a shower of gold and s i lv e r w ithout re a liz in g the n e e d Lfo'r organized, - and in d iv id u a l e f f o r t to a t ta in w elfare. And th e new Government^ -even i f the members had re a l iz e d the need, was not strong enougL to impose :the necessary d is c ip l in e . •• . . . . . 1 ■-■-■ - vv8 .; Problems of Public A dm inistration .

The f i r s t problem of the new government was to choose between . d ic ta to rsh ip : and democracy. .The d ic ta to rsh ip of the p r o le ta r ia t was an orthodox Marxian so lu tio n , b u t Japanese ru le had given Burmans more than enough of d ic ta to r s , and the choice o f democracy was a foregone conclUi- sion7; So a lso was the choice between p re s id e n tia l and parliam entary - democracy, fo r parliam entary democracy was the only type w ith which 3urmans were acquainted . Another problem c a ll in g fo r immediate decision 17a ร the choice between a u n ita ry and a fed e ra ted s ta te . . The slogan of Dr. Ba Maw's New,Order had been "One'blood, one voice, one le a d e r ," and under Dr. Ba Maw the Home M in iste r had been Chief Commissioner o f the Shan S ta te s . The u n ita ry s ta te was ta in te d w ith memories of "fascism "; and, e v e n 'i f Burmans had p re fe rre d i t , they could not have obtained the support o f the f r o n t ie r peoples. A f e d e ra l .union in some shape. Was in e v ita b le ; b u t the d iffe ren ce between Burma proper and the f r o n t ie r s ta te s in numbers, wealth and p o l i t i c a l experience req u ired th a t Burma should have' a sp e c ia l p o s itio n in the fed e ra tio n . Burmans had to decide a lso how- f a r a u th o rity should be c e n tra liz e d and how f a r i t could be delegated on the p rin c ip le of lo c a l autonomy. From B r it is h ru le they in h e r ite d a s tro n g ly c e n tra liz e d system; th is-w as the type of adm in is tra tio n to which they were accustomed and which the o f f i c ia l s knew how to work. Even so f a r as Burmans^preferred lo c a l autonomy, the immediate s i tu a t io n demanded ท strong c en tra l..au th o rity fo r the re s to ra t io n of o rder. C e n tra liz a tio n was n ecessa ry 'a lso both fo r the promotion, d ire c tio n and co n tro l o f economic p rogress, and-fo r the enhancement o f w elfa re . The enhancement of W elfare, though n o t.th e most urgen t, was the most d i f f i c u l t and, in the long run, probably the most im portant problem th a t the new Government had to so lve . -In th is m atter the Burmese Government was faced .w ith the same obstac le as- the former B r i t is h Government. In w estern lands people want - more than they need, but in cou n tries l ik e Burma they need more than they want> e sp e c ia lly in . resp ec t of pub lic h ea lth and the-p reven tion of d isease among men, crops and c a t t l e . Without the cooperation of th e people l i t t l e can be accomplished, and they must be induced .to cooperate in measures which they do not recognise as necessary and o f which they do not app rec ia te the benefit*The promotion o f w elfare req u ires the m u ltip lic a tio n of departm ents; and public apathy n e c e s s ita te s c e n tra l is a t io n and the invention of devices to f a c i l i t a t e coord ination and prevent departm entalism . For a l l these various reasons i t was e s s e n t ia l th a t , in th e s tru c tu re o f the-new government, a u th o rity should be c e n tra lise d and the system of adm in is tra tio n bureau­c ra t ic . This ra ised the fu r th e r problem as to how b u reau cra tic procedure could be d isen tangled from red tape and brought under popular c o n tro l.

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The choice between bureaucracy and popular c o n tro l was th e dilemma w ith which Burmans were confronted . Socialism i s o ften deprecated as synonymous w ith bureaucracy, and Burmans had f a i t h in socia lism , .'but, as one o f :th e lead ing p o l i t ic ia n s in s is te d , they wanted "socia lism w ithout bureaucracy!1, fo r they a sso c ia ted bureaucracy.w ith B r i t is h ru le .They believed in socia lism as opposed to c ap ita lism , b u t no t many Burmans c le a r ly app rec ia ted the im plica tions of these terms under the conditions p re v a ilin g in Burma. During Burmese ru le a l l economic re la t io n s had been governed'by custom. B r i t is h ru le had rep laced t h i s •customary system by a c a p i t a l i s t system in which economic a c t iv i t i e s were governed, not by custom, b u t ra t io n a l ly .

O rd in arily the a p p lica tio n o f labour and c a p i ta l to n a tu ra l resources •yields a surp lus over-the economic energy consumed in p roduction . This surp lus may be wasted, as o ften happened form erly in Burma when the h arvest was in excess of domestic requirem ents and p a r t of the crop was l e f t unreaped. Or the surp lus may be so ld and s to red unproductively as jew elle ry or in spec ie , and th is i s s t i l l a common p ra c tic e among Burmans. But in a c a p i t a l i s t economy most of the surp lus w ealth re s u lt in g from prooiuction i s u t i l iz e d as c a p i ta l fo r th e production of more w ealth . I t is c h a ra c te r is t ic o f a c a p i t a l i s t economy th a t production i s r a t io n a l ly d ire c te d towards ob ta in ing th e maximum re tu rn to the labour and c a p ita l expended. The in crease of w ealth and i t s use to the b e s t advantage as c a p i ta l i s no le s s d e s ira b le in a s o c ia l i s t s ta te than in any o ther form of p o l i t i c a l o rg an iza tio n , fo r the w ealth may be used to the b e s t advantage of the community. O rd in arily , however, in a c a p i t a l i s t economy production i s l e f t to p r iv a te e n te rp r is e and economic a c t iv i t i e s a re not d ire c te d to th e b e s t advantage of the community b u t a re d ire c te d , and freq u en tly r e s t r i c te d , w ith a view to the maximum p r o f i t o f the p r iv a te in d iv id u a ls who d ir e c t them. C ap ita l, i f l e f t unregu lated , tends to flow in the d ire c tio n of the g re a te s t re tu rn w ithout any regard fo r non-economic con­s id e ra tio n s , and th i s i s o ften a n t i - s o c ia l . Thus a c a p i t a l i s t economy tends to transform the s o c ia l o rder w ith in which i t o pera tes in to a c a p i t a l i s t so c ie ty , which i s in f a c t not a so c ie ty bu t a business concern.

In the w estern world, even in such co u n trie s as England and America which a re regarded as ty p ic a l ly c a p i t a l i s t , economic e n te rp r is e i s r e s t r i c te d by the common so c ia l sense to a f a r g re a te r degree than is genera lly recognised , and th i s common s o c ia l sense is co n tin u a lly being re in fo rced by law when i t i s in danger o f proving in s u f f ic ie n t . But in Burma, as in o th e r p lu r a l s o c ie tie s under fo re ig n ru le , there, was. no common so c ia l sense ,to r e s t r i c t the a n t i - s o c ia l tendencies o f .p r iv a te economic e n te rp r is e , w hile w estern law favoured such e n te rp r is e and, fo r lack of th i s common s o c ia l sense, even.laws and reg u la tio n s in tended to. keep p riv a te economic e n te rp r is e w ith in whoiesome lim its were la rg e ly in e f fe c tiv e .

Students o f comparative p o l i t i c a l economy a re now coming in c reas in g ly to. recognise th a t such "under-developed cou n tries" a re f a r more ty p ic a l of cap ita lism than the " c a p i ta l i s t" West, So f a r as they a re permeated by w estern economic a c t iv i t i e s they become mere business concerns, and in Burma th ese a c t iv i t i e s p en e tra ted more deeply than elsewhere because they extended r ig h t down to th e p easan try , converting the peasan ts over the g re a te r p a r t o f th e r ic h d e lta lands in to a la n d less and impoverished p r o le ta r ia t . The rea c tio n to th i s process was the more acu te , and extended over th e whole n a tio n , because th e economic p rocess was under

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fo re ig n d ire c tio n and th e re were no-Burman c a p i t a l i s t s .N aturally , Burmans on obtain ing th e i r independence fa i le d to d is tin g u ish between a c a p i t a l i s t economy and a c a p i t a l i s t , so c ie ty . In rep ud ia tin g the

c a p i t a l i s t so c ie ty in to which th e s o c ia l order had.been, transform ed, they were im pelled a lso to repud ia te th e c a p i t a l i s t economy w ith which i t was a sso c ia ted ; they m is tru s ted not only fo re ig n c a p i ta l b u t c a p i ta l in genera l, and even the accumulation of w ealth th a t might be used as c a p i ta l . They aad n o t, i t was sa id , 'got r id o f p lu to c ra ts in European tro u se rs o r Indian dho tis merely to rep lace them by p lu to c ra ts .in a Burman head-dress. . They would have no tru ck w ith c a p i ta l and were susp icious .even of rich es .: .This a t t i tu d e may have derived 'in p a r t from the e q u a lita r ia n ch a rac te r o f th e s o c ia l s tru c tu re under Burmese ru le ; a l l a l ik e were' equally sub jec ts of the Grown, or ( in the Burmese idiom) ro y a l s la v e s .’ With-few exceptions; every one, reg ard less o f h is b i r th , could a sp ire to the h ig h est o ff ic e under the Crown; and the c i r c le headmen, the. h e re d ita ry squ irearchy , had been abolished under B r i t is h ru le through the in tro d u c tio n of the v il la g e system.

In th e rea c tio n ag a inst c ap ita lism , socia lism appeared to ; be the obvious a l te rn a t iv e . Socialism was taken to imply s ta te ownership, manage­ment or c o n tro l o f economic a c t iv i t i e s , and th e re was serious 'concern and l iv e ly d iscussion as to how f a r p r iv a te e n te rp r is e , even on the sm allest sca le , was c o n sis ten t w ith s o c ia l i s t p r in c ip le s . But th e lim its rfith in which p riv a te e n te rp r is e should be allowed was only a s u p e r f ic ia l problem.The fundamental problem in the a p p lica tio n o f s o c ia l i s t p rin c ip le s to Burma a t t r a c te d l i t t l e a t te n t io n . In s o c ia l i s t theory th e s ta te is regarded as th e agent of so c ie ty ; b u t i t i s a lso the c re a tio n jo f so c ie ty and'grows or i s fashioned in response to s o c ia l needs. The conception o f ' the s ta te as the agent of so c ie ty r e s t s on th e assumption th a t th e re " is a lready -a s o c ia l o rder in being which can be rep resen ted by th e s t a t e . ' "B u t-th is Was not the case in Burma7 and the b as ic assumption of s o c ia l is t , theory was in v a lid . Through the impact of economic fo rces under fo re ig n ru le the customary s o c ia l o rder had co llapsed and been rep laced by a business concerr w ith fo re ig n e rs and Burmans c o llab o ra tin g in an unstab le sym biosis, which had been sh a tte red by the war and th e 'Jap an ese occupation. The fo re ig n e rs , the major p a rtn e rs in the concern, were no longer a v a ila b le , and the Burmans a id not want them to re tu rn , and c e r ta in ly d id .n o t want them to 'r e tu r n on the same t£rms as b efo re .

■ Society was d is in te g ra te d and the fu lf ilm en t of s o c ia l i s t a sp ira tio n s requ ired the re - in te g ra tio n of so c ie ty on a n a tio n a l b a s is before s o c ia l i s t p r in c ip le s as understood in w estern lands could be app lied . Normally the s o c ia l order i s th e p a ren t o f the s ta te ; in Burma these conditions were reversed , and the ad m in is tra tiv e appara tus, designed under B r it is h ru le fo r a very d if fe re n t purpose; o r so much of i t as s t i l l remained, had to be used as an instrum ent fo r c rea tin g a new n a tio n a l soc ie ty which in due course would fash ion a new s ta te responsibe to i t s needs. Socialism in Surma im plied, not the transform ation of the s ta te bu t the c re a tio n of a new so c ie ty .

The new so c ie ty wnich Burmans asp ired to b u ild was to be dedicated to promoting the w elfare o f the!common man. In various ways however the zea l fo r w elfare was an element of weakness. Welfare measures are c o s tly , and Burma'ร productive capac ity had been devasta ted by th e war. The d es ire fo r g re a te r w elfare had to be balanced ag a in s t the need to increase produc­

e s -

t io n . Also, w elfare measures do not y ie ld speedy re tu rn s , and those on whose behalf, th ey .a re devised must pay th e co s t b efore they f e e l the b e n e f i ts .- A.government cannot e a s ily promote w elfare w ithout tread in g on people*.ร.'to e s j and i t must be strong enough to rap over th e knuckles those who are. r e c a lc i t r a n t . The main o b jec tiv es of w elfare p o lic y were to rep lace by Burmans th e fo re ig n elements in in d u stry and commerce; to r e s to r e -to . c u l t iv a t in g peasan ts the land which they had lo s t to absentee and o th e r n o n -c u ltiv a tin g landowners; and to ra is e th e genera l standard of l iv i r g by improved education and s a n ita tio n .

. 'ะ:The exp ro p ria tio n and n a tio n a lis a tio n of fo re ig n in te r e s ts in in du stry . and-commerce c a rr ie d g en era l approval and sympathy among Burmans, who were m o re .lik e ly to c r i t i c i s e such ac tio n as too le n ie n t o r d i la to ry than as

.op p ressive , and few o f them apprehended any d i f f ic u l ty beyond the p o s s i­b i l i t y o f r e p r is a ls by fo re ig n powers. Not many app rec ia ted th e d iffe ren ce in th is m atter between Burma and the West. In the West p r iv a te e n te rp rise s a re a lready n a tio n a l in th e sense th a t they a re owned and operated by n a tio n a ls ; n a tio n a lis a t io n im plies m erely the t r a n s f e r of ownership from p riv a te e n te rp r is e to th e s ta te as rep resen tin g th e n a tio n . But in Burma n a tio n a lis a tio n im plied a double p rocess; i t im plied not m erely the tr a n s fe r of ownership b u t th e transfo rm ation o f the e n te rp r is e in to a n a tio n a l concern through rep lac in g fo re ig n e rs by Burmans. Burmans, w ith no previous experience of in d u stry o r commerce, tended to underestim ate the p ra c t ic a l d i f f i c u l t i e s of tak in g over fo re ig n e n te rp r is e s w ith no Burmans competent by tra in in g and experience to manage and conduct them and w ith an inade­quate supply of labour h ab itu a ted to the d is c ip lin e of in d u s tr ia l ro u tin e .

Agrarian reforms lik ew ise commanded gen era l sympathy and were i n s i s ­te n t ly demanded by th e land-hungry p easan try organized in th e Peasants Union from which the government derived most o f i t s popular support. Delay in meeting th e i r demands would encourage w holesale d e fec tio n to th e com­munist opp osition . Here again fo re ig n e rs could expect no help from th e i r own governments and w ealthy Burman landowners were too few and too widely sc a tte re d to p u t up e ffe c t iv e opposition . But in most towns and in many v illa g e s th e re were Burmans who had bought a few acres of land as p ro v ision fo r i l ln e s s or o ld age and th ese could not be d ispossessed w ithout in cu rring resentm ent. However c a re fu lly land may be d is tr ib u te d th ere must always be seme who a re d i s s a t i s f ie d w ith the holding a l lo t te d to them, and in any case th e re was not enough land to go round among a l l those who wanted land . S im ilarly measures fo r the spread of education fo r the improvement o f pub lic h ea lth , even so f a r as they were ap p licab le to cond itions in Burma,-could not be .en forced w ithout s u f f ic ie n t s tre n g th to impose the necessary d is c ip l in e .

For .the a tta inm en t of a l l these o b jec tiv e s a s trong government was e s s e n t ia l , s t i l l more was strong government needed to r e s t r a in the tu rb u len t g en era tio n which had grown up during the war years, lea rn in g to handle a gun in s tea d o f a plough, and fin d in g i t e a s ie r and more congenial to make a liv in g .b y p lunder ra ih e r than by p roductive in d u s try . Yet in resp ec t o f m il i ta ry fo rce no government could w ell have been weaker. The only men w ith experience of m ili ta ry d is c ip lin e were th e sm all con tingents re c ru i te d from the f r o n t ie r t r ib e s fo r the B r i t is h g arriso n ; these con­s t i tu te d n ea rly h a lf of the m il i ta ry fo rces a t th e d isp o sa l of the govern­ment and t h e i r lo y a lty to. a Burmese government was d ou b tfu l. The' r e s t of the fo rce co n sis ted o f g u e r i l la s , .who had fought a g a in s t th e B r i t is h and the

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Japanese but’ were unpromising m a te ria l fo r m ilita ry se rv ice 'in th e rou tin e of c iv i l l ife * . Ihe few. b a tta l io n s ,at. 'the ‘ command of government Were in s u f f ic ie n t .’even to allow of strong and, e ffe c tiv e measures fo r the. m aintenance.of o rder. . The s tre n g th of the goyefnmeht was n o t m ilita ry b u t moral; i t was derived from optimism and enthusiasm a n d 'r e s te d :on the general b e l ie f in i t s good w i l l . But in the p re v a ilin g circum stances th is genera l b e l ie f was l ia b le to be corroded by f ru s tr a t io n and th e b as ic problem was how to su rv ive .

These problems would have been form idable even i f the environment had been p ro p itio u s and the ad m in is tra tiv e machinery in good running o rder.But in these resp ec ts the s i tu a tio n could hard ly have been more depressing. With th e a tta inm en t o f independence the ad m in is tra tiv e personnel had been dep leted . A comparison between the Q uarterly C iv il L is ts of October, 19V7, ana A p ril , 19^8, i s illu m in a tin g , in the October l i s t th e re were" 99 members o f the Superior C iv il Service , the m ainspring o f the adm in istra tive . machinery; by A pril, 71 of these had r e t i r e d o r were on leave p rep a ra to ry to re tirem en t. Out of the top 50 in th e l i s t 33, tw o -th ird s , had gone; and of the top 25 only 4 remained. In the Police Service, so e s s e n t ia l fo r the maintenance of o rd er, out o f 37 o ff ic e rs w ith the rank of D is t r ic t รuperin tendent o r h ig h er, 31 had gone.. In th e October l i s t th e re were 23 permanent o ff ic e rs w ith th e rank of Executive, Engineer and upwards, b u t in A pril th e re remained only f iv e , of whom two were non-Burmans. The s i tu a tio n in th e C iv il Medical Service was not q u ite so deplorable; o f 36 doctors w ith th e rank o f C iv il Surgeon upwards 18 s t i l l remained, though only 6 o f these were Burmans. In the F ro n tie r Service, responsib le fo r adm in is tra tio n in the t r i b a l h i l l s , th e re was almost a clean sweep; out of 62 o f f i c ia l s only 9 vere l e f t .

Merely to carry on as b efo re , a l l th ese p osts had to be f i l l e d , : Promotion from the subordinate se rv ices l e f t vacancies to be rep laced by raw re c r u i ts . And the Government wanted to do, and by reason of the wide­spread damage and d e s tru c tio n , had to do, so much more than had ever p rev iously been attempted'. In ad d itio n to the innumerable domestic problems, i t had to en te r the f i e ld of in te rn a t io n a l r e la t io n s , of which, th e l i t t l e , th a t was known had been learned under the Japanese; y e t w ith th is scanty equipment, i t had to f e e l i t s way along the p e rilo u s f r o n t ie r between E ast and West.9. The C o n s titu tio n .

The C o nstitu tio n framed by the C onstituent Assembly was intended to meet these problems so f a r as tiiey were a lready fo reseen . As a lready mentioned, i t was based on a p re lim inary d ra f t approved by the AFPFL. The General Convention of the AFPFL which adopted the d ra f t a lso passed a R esolution comprising fou rteen p o in ts th a t were regarded as of fundamental im portance. These main p o in ts may be b r ie f ly summarized.

The Independent Sovereign Republic of Burma was to be a Union com- p r i s ^ g d ivers t e r r i t o r i e s which, i f they possessed c e r ta in sp ec ified q u a lif ic a tio n s , should be guaranteed such a measure of autonomy as might, be deemed expedient. L e g is la tiv e power was to be vested in a P resid en t, and a Union Assembly w ith two Chambers; the Chamber of N a tio n a litie s , rep resen ting th e c o n s titu en t t e r r i t o r i e s , and the Chamber o f D eputies, e lec ted by u n iv ersa l a d u lt su ffrag e . Hie h ig h est executive a u th o rity , the

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Unioa Govezyoetit, was to be responsib le to the Chamber of D eputies. Ju s tic e was to be-adm inisw rea in p u b lic courts* e s ta b lish e d by th e -C o n stitu tio n o r by law; th e Judges yere to be independent and su b jec t only tO 'th j5 law and th e C o n s titu tio n . The c h a rac te r of th e government then contemplated w as..indicated by-one a r t i c i e of the R esolution which ran as fo llo w s::; " ju s t ic e , so c ia l , economic a n d -p o lit ic a l; .e q u a li ty o f s ta tu s , of oppor­tu n ity and befo re the law; freedom o f thought, expression, b e l ie f , f a i th , w orship, vocation , a sso c ia tio n and a c tio n , au b jec t -to law and public , m ora lity , s h a l l be guaranteed and. secured to a l l c i t iz e n s ." .

A fu r th e r re so lu tio n a s se r tin g th e " r ig h t to r e c a l l any e lec ted - rep resen ta tiv e" i s o f i n te r e s t fo r the l ig h t i t throws upon the p o l i t i c a l ideology of those who d ra f te d the R esolu tion . This document in an abbrev iated form com prising seven p o in ts , was la id b efore the C onstituen t Assembly a t i t s f i r s t Session as a d ire c tiv e in accordance, w ith.w hich 'th e C o n stitu tio n should be framed. . .

The C o n s titu tio n , as f in a l ly adopted, incorporated th e .a r t i c l e c i te d above in a form al Preamble which ran as fo llow s:

"WE THE PEOPLE OF BURMA including the F ro n tie r A reas.and the:.Karenni S ta te s , Determined to e s ta b lis h in s tre n g th and .unity-.a,-SOVEREIGN INDE­PENDENT- STATE. To m ain tain s o c ia l o rder on the b a s is of the e te rn a l p rin c ip le s of. JUSTICE s o c ia l , economic and. p o l i t i c a l ; LIBERTY- of thought, expression, b e l ie f , f a i th , worship, vocation , a sso c ia tio n and ac tio n ; EQUAUTY o f s ta tu s , of opportun ity and befo re the law, HI OUR CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY th is Tenth day o f Thadingyut waning, 1309 B.E. (Twenty-fourth day of September, 19^7 A .D .), DC HEREBY ADOPT, ENACT.AMD GIVE TO OURSELVES THIS CONSTITUTION."

This d e c la ra tio n , w ith i t s emphasis on freedom of every conceivable sp ec ies , b rea thes the s p i r i t o f w estern lib e ra lism in i t s most comprehen­siv e form. Yet i t suggests a question as to how f a r so much in d iv id u a l freedom could be reco n c iled w ith " J u s tic e , so c ia l , economic and p o l i t i c a l . " For an answer to th a t question one must study the p ro v ision s of the C o nstitu tio n to which the d e c la ra tio n is a preamble.

The C o n stitu tio n con tains fou rteen chap ters and fou r schedules. The f i r s t chap ter, dealing w ith th e form of the s ta te , defines i t as a Republic c o n s is tin g .o f a Union com prising sp e c if ied t e r r i t o r i e s . I t lays down th a t th e sovereignty of the Union re s id e s in the people, and i t reserves a l l powers,, le g is la t iv e , execu tive and ju d ic ia l , to th e organs of. the Union except; so f a r ,a s they a re s p e c if ic a l ly d e lega ted to th e c o n s titu en t t e r r i ­to r ia l - u n i t s . , The second, chap ter defines the n atu re of c i t iz e n s h ip land t r e a ts , in d e ta i l o f ; the various in d iv id u a l r ig h ts s e t .fo r th -in. the;Preamble. .-.Among these r ig h ts c e rta in -item s deserve sp e c ia l n o tic e .. I t i s l a id down (sec tio n 16) th a t "no c i t iz e n s h a l l be deprived of his. p erson al

. l ib e r ty , n o r 'h is dw elling en te red , nor h is p ro p erty c o n f is c a te d ,. save in accordance w ith law."-.- 1. . - - '

Again, in re sp ec t o f economic r ig h ts , i t i s provided (Section 2 3 ) .th a t "the S ta te guarantees the r ig h t o f p riv a te p ro p e rty and of p riv a te i n i t i a ­t iv e in th e economic sphere. P ro tec tio n by th e law is fu r th e r guaranteed in the in ju n c tio n (Section 2*0 th a t "no person s h a l l be convicted of crime except fo r v io la tio n of a law in fo rce a t th e tim e of the commission o f the

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a c t charged as an offence)" and (Section- 2'7 ) th a t- "ex .eap tdn time.?, of invasion , reb e llio n ,, in su rrec tio n o r grave emergency, n o .c itiz e n : s h a ll be denied red ress by due process of law fo r an ac tio nab le wrong done;to or su ffe red by hiflu P rovision is made a lso fo r-p rp te c tio n no t only by the law b u t by the Courts, in th e ir -a p p lic a tio n o f the law; thus sec tio n 25 affirm s "the. r i j h t to move the Supreme .Court by app rop ria te proceedings

. f o r the enforcement of any of the r ig h ts conferred by th is Chapter, and i t s p e c if ic a l ly endows the Supreme Court w ith "power to issu e ..directions in the natu re of Habeas Corpus* Mandamus1 p ro h ib it io n , quo w arranto.and c e r t io ra r i" app rop ria te to such r ig h ts , to g e th e r w ith an undertaking th a t the r ig h t to enforce these remedies s h a l l not be suspended u n less , in the circum stances sp e c if ied in sec tio n 27", the pub lic sa fe ty may so re q u ire ."

The C o n stitu tio n , then, embodies, even in minute d e ta i l , th e d is l ik e and d i s t r u s t o f the executive government which Bagehot regarded as "a p e c u lia r i ty o f the 'English people ." This, however, i s n o t merely an exo tic product, an im ita tio n of English le g a l phraseology; i t expresses,

• as in England, a s p i r i t o f " re s is ta n c e , more or le s s le g a l, o r more or le s s i l l e g a l , more or le s s audacious o r more or le s s tim id , to the execu­t iv e government," the s p i r i t -which Burmans d isplayed under the B r it is h and the Japanese. Even i f th is s p i r i t o f re s is ta n c e was not wholly of B r it is h o rig in , i t gathered s tren g th under B r it is h ru le rs who themselves venerated and valued th e s p i r i t of re s is ta n c e . Yet, in ad d itio n to r e s t r ic t io n s on l ib e r ty in the in te r e s t o f pub lic sa fe ty , reco gn itio n is accorded in th is chapter to r e s t r ic t io n s in the in te r e s t o f pub lic w elfare . The general guarantee in sec tio n 23 of the r ig h t of p r iv a te p roperty and p riv a te e n te rp r ise i s .qualified, in subsequent c lauses p ro h ib itin g th e use o f the r ig h t o f p riv a te p roperty to the detrim ent of the general p u b lic , and the form ation of p riv a te monopolist o rgan izations ’'c a lcu la ted to in ju re the in te r e s ts of the n a tio n a l economy," and in c lauses sanction ing the l im ita ­t io n or exp rop ria tion o f p riv a te p roperty , i f so requ ired by the pub lic in te r e s t (though "only in accordance w ith lav" and on payment, o f compensa­tio n as p resc rib ed by law ), and sanction ing a lso th e n a tio n a liz a tio n or a c q u is itio n by the s ta te of economic e n te rp rise s" by law, i f the public in te r e s t so re q u ire s ."

In chapters I I I and IV, however, the C o nstitu tio n appears to be coloured by ideas of pub lic w elfare ra th e r than of p riv a te 'r ig h t; they am plify the vague a sp ira tio n s a f t e r s o c ia l ju s t ic e which found expression in the o r ig in a l d ra f t and in the Preamble. Chapter I I I deals w ith the re la tio n s of the s ta te to peasants and workers. I t begins w ith th e p ro ­nouncement (section . 30) th a t "the s ta te i s the u ltim ate .owner of. a l l l a r i s . " ( in th i s , however, th ere was nothing revo lu tionary ; i t merely re s ta te d the b as ic p r in c ip le of the land p o licy of the Indian Government, which a lready found expression in the law of Lower, Burra th a t; the occupa-

- t io n o f land d id not confer the r ig h t o f ownership b u t only a '.landholder's r i g h t1. ) The a s se r tio n of s ta te ownership, however, acquired a new s ig n i­ficance in the p ro h ib itio n of la rg e holding© and. in the express rese rv a ­t io n of the r ig h t to d is t r ib u te land fo r "c o lle c tiv e or co-opera tive farming o r to a g r ic u l tu ra l tenan ts" (Sub-sections 2 and 3 ). As regards workers, the s ta te acknowledged re s p o n s ib il i ty fo r th e i r p ro te c tio n by so c ia l le g is la t io n and proclaim ed i t s r ig h t "by economic and o ther measures" to help workers to help themselves " fo r p ro te c tio n -a g a in s t economic e x p lo ita tio n (sec tio n 31).

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rThe p r in c ip le o f s ta te in te rv en tio n in s o c ia l and economic l i f e i s

c a rr ie d fu r th e r in Chapter IV, which se ts fo r th " d ire c tiv e p r in c ip le s of S ta te p o licy" to he observed in le g is la t io n , though "not enforceable in any cou rt o f law ." (sec tio n 32). These p r in c ip le s a re s ta te d in l ib e r a l phraseology: every c i t iz e n s h a l l be secured in " the r ig h t to work, the r ig h t to maintenance i f in ca p a c ita te d , th e r ig h t to r e s t and le is u re and the r ig h t to education" (sec tio n 33)» Obviously these r ig h ts could not be secured w ithout very a c tiv e in te rv en tio n in most asp ec ts of s o c ia l and economic l i f e ; fo r in s tan ce , prim ary education i s to be not only fre e b u t compulsory (se c tio n 33)* I t IS la id down a lso th a t "the economic l i f e of the Union s h a l l be p lan n ed ," and th a t p o lic y s h a l l be d ire c te d towards g iv ing p re f e r e n t ia l treatm ent " to economic o rg an iza tion s no t working fo r p riv a te p ro f i t" and e sp e c ia lly to "co -opera tive and s im ila r economic o rg an iza tion s (sec tio n 4l , 42). And the f in a l sec tio n in th is chapter p re sc rib e s th a t p o lic y s h a l l be d ire c te d towards th e opera tion of a l l p ub lic u t i l i t y o rg an iza tio n s , and towards the e x p lo ita tio n o f a l l n a tu ra l resources by the s ta te or by lo c a l bodies o r by people 'co -o p era tiv e o rg an iz a tio n s’ (sec tio n 44 ). This sec tio n is fu r th e r explained and am plified in sec tio n s 218 and 220 in Chapter X III dea ling w ith general p ro v is io n s . The follow ing chap ters V and V III d ea l successiv e ly w ith the P re s id en t as Head of the s t a t e , th e L e g is la tu re , th e Executive Government and the Ju d ic ia ry . P rov isions regard ing the c o n s t itu e n t u n its are con­ta in ed in Chapters IX and X. The l a s t fo u r chap ters con tain various p rov isions regard ing the amendment of the C o n stitu tio n , in te rn a t io n a l r e la t io n s , m iscellaneous d e ta i ls and t r a n s i t io n a l arrangem ents.

From th i s b r i e f summary c e r ta in p o in ts w ith regard to the ch a rac te r o f the C o n stitu tio n s tan d out c le a r ly . I t i s apparent th a t th e C o nstitu ­t io n as f in a l ly adopted agreed very c lo se ly w ith the o r ig in a l conception of a n a tio n a l government u n itin g a l l the peoples of Burma fo r th e i r common w elfare which Aung San envisaged when the achievement o f independence through p eace fu l measures and by le g a l forms f i r s t became a r e a lis a b le id e a l . Both th e o r ig in a l conception and th e f i n a l p roduct embody two con­f l i c t i n g p r in c ip le s ; the p r in c ip le of in d iv id u a l freedom under the ru le of law, c h a ra c te r is t ic of B r i t is h ru le ; and the p r in c ip le of s o c ia l o b lig a tio n as a rea c tio n a g a in s t th e s o c ia l d is in te g ra tio n and economic d i s a b i l i t i e s re s u lt in g under B r i t is h ru le through f re e e n te rp r is e under the ru le of law. The C o n stitu tio n voices s o c ia l i s t p ro p e n s itie s ; y e t through the whole document th e emphasis i s on in d iv id u a l r ig h ts ; o b lig a tio n s a re imposed upon the s ta te , b u t not one c lause imposes any duty on the people or suggests th a t in d iv id u a l r ig h ts a re in any way c o n d itio n a l on the performances of s o c ia l d u tie s . Perhaps i t may b e s t be summarized as a l i b e r a l C o nstitu tio n w ith s o c ia l i s t a sp ira t io n s . How these w i l l b lend in p ra c tic e i s as ye t u n certa in .

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CHAPTER I I . THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT. 1 /1 . - The P resid en t (S ections k-5-6k ).

The Head of th e s ta te in Burma i s the P res id en t of. the Union. To those who a re in s u f f ic ie n t ly acquainted w ith E nglish c o n s t i tu t io n a l theory and p ra c tic e and w ith th e i r a p p lica tio n under B r i t is h ru le in Burma, th is bare statem ent may suggest th a t he e x e rc ise s , o r was in tended to ex e rc ise , powers, corresponding to h is august p o s itio n . In England, the sovereign can a c t an h is d is c re tio n w ith in th e vague l im its o f the ro y a l p re rog a tive b u t, e sp e c ia lly under the in fluence of l i b e r a l ideaG, the p re ro g a tiv e has’ been so r e s t r i c te d th a t in p ra c tic e he ex e rc ise s h is powers and performs h is-.func tions only on the advice of the e lec te d Government, though the Crown s t i l l serves to form a l in k between th e Dominions. In Burma under , B r i t is h ru le , even a f t e r 1937* the Governor, as rep re se n ta tiv e of the Crown, s t i l l re ta in e d the r ig h t to a c t on h is own d is c re tio n in c e r ta in circum stances; b u t th is was repugnant to n atio na lism re in fo rced by l i b e r a l ­ism, and in p ra c tic e he accep ted , a s . in normal circum stances he was bound by law to accep t, the advice of the e lec te d M in istry . But, l ik e th e Crown w ith in the Empire, th e Governor formed a l in k , th e only l in k , between Burma proper and the scheduled a re a s . The n a t io n a l i s t le ad ers had no experience of any o ther form of government and, in t h e i r d e lib e ra tio n s on the s ta tu s and powers of the .P residen t, they c a rr ie d th e l i b e r a l theory o f B r i t is h ru le to what seemed i t s lo g ic a l conclusion , w ith the head of th e S ta te , form ally a t l e a s t , as l i t t l e more than a figurehead .

This conclusion was im p lic i t in the f i r s t o u tlin e sketch of a Con- . s t i tu t io n approved by .the General Convention o f AFPFL in May, 19^7• ■ The . appointment of a P re s id en t as Head of th e s t a t e was one of th e fou rteen ' p o in ts in th i s document.-.The s t a t e was to .b e fe d e ra l Union in which c e r ta in c la sse s o f su b jec ts were "assigned exc lusively" to subordinate le g is la tu r e s , and the P res id en t was xhe only organ of government' re p re ­sen ting the Union as a whole and lin k in g up the subord inate le g is la tu re s w ith the Union L e g is la tu re . T he/h ighest executive organ o f the Union was to be, not the P re s id en t, b u t the Union Government, resp on sib le to re p re ­sen ta tiv e s of the people in the .L eg is la tu re , and d eriv ing a l l th e i r powers and a u th o rity from -the.people . In th ese circum stances a P res id en t w ould- be in much, th e same p o s it io n as the. fojTTier Governor, b u t w ithout the. d isc re tio n a ry powers th a t the Governor had enjoyed as re p re se n ta tiv e of th e B r i t is h Crown. - The d ra f t approved b y ,th e General Convention พ£4ร "the skele ton which, a f t e r i t had been invested w ith .f le s h and blood by the C onstituen t Assembly, became th e accepted C o n stitu tio n of the Union of Burma, -.2/ and in the C o n stitu tio n ^ th e -p o s itio n of -the P residen t;rem ains e s s e n t ia l ly the same: as th a t o r ig in a l ly contem plated.

The P resid en t must be a c i t iz e n of the Union, who was, o r both of whose paren ts were, born ,w ith in th e Union; he must be .q u a lif ied fo r e le c tio n to Parliam en t, b u t may not be a member of e i th e r Chamber.- He is1 / (In the follow ing sec tio n s dealing re sp e c tiv e ly w ith P arliam ent, the

Government and th e Ju d ic ia ry , a r t i c l e s of the C o n stitu tio n which f a l l w ith in th e corresponding chapter o f the C o n stitu tio n a re not o rd in a r ily c ite d by number;, a r t i c l e s .a r e c i te d only i f they must be looked fo r in some o ther c h a p te r .)

2/ See Burma1 ร F ig h t For Freedom. Government P ress, Rangoon, 19^8 > p* ^9*- 33

e n t i t le d to an o f f i c i a l residence , and .h is emoluments .and allowances are f ix ed by law. At p resen t he occupies the residence of the former Governor, a flamboyant e d if ic e designed to symbolise, u n fo rtun ate ly in. the a rc h i- . t e c tu r a l s ty le of the e ighteen n in e tie s , the m ajesty of B r it is h power.His modest s a la r y .i s only 5,000 Kyats (approximately บ.ร. $1,050) a month, h a lf th a t form erly drawn by B r it is h Governors. As Head o f .th e s ta te he rece ives s ta te guests and incurs o ther expenditure on o f f i c i a l e n te r ta in ­ments, and he must proceed a t.t im e s on ceremonial to u rs ; fo r th ese and. o the r m iscellaneous necessary expenses he draws a fix ed allowance in add i­t io n to h is sa la ry , b u t h is p o s itio n i s one of duty and d ig n ity ra th e r than o f p r o f i t .

The P resid en t is e lec te d by se c re t b a l lo t o f both Chambers of P a r l ia ­ment in jo in t session ; he holds o ff ic e fo r f iv e years and may be re -e le c te d , b u t no one may serve as P resid en t fo r more than two terms in a l l . His powers and functions a re c lo se ly lim ited fo r , except so f a r as otherwise provided in the C o n stitu tio n , they are "exerc isab le and perform able only on the advice of the Union Government." He appoints a Prime M in ister, bu t only on the nomination of the Chamber of Deputies; and he a lso appoints th e o ther members o f the Union Government, b u t only on the nomination of the Prime M in iste r. I t i s the P resid en t who summons, prorogues or d isso lv es the Chamber of Deputies (and thereby both Chambers) b u t he must do so in accordance w ith the advice of the Prime M in is te r. To th is ru le th e re i s one apparent exception . I f the Prime M in iste r ceases to re ta in the support of a m ajo rity in the Chamber, he must res ig n unless (sec tio n 119) the P resid en t on h is advice d isso lves the Parliam ent. In such circum stances the P res id en t may d isreg ard the advice o f th e Prime M in iste r, who can no longer a c t e f fe c t iv e ly as head of the Government, and he may c a l l on the Chamber to nominate a new Prime M in is te r. The former Prime M in ister continues to carry on th e d u tie s of h i s o ff ic e u n t i l a successor i s appointed (120) b u t, i f the Chamber f a i l s to nominate a new Prime M in ister w ith in f i f t e e n days, th e P resid en t must d isso lve i t .

Normally every B i l l passed by both Chambers req u ires the sig na tu re of the P resid en t for, i t s enactment, b u t, i f he f a i l s to sign i t w ith in seven days, the B i l l becomes an Act w ithout h is s ig n a tu re . The r ig h t to pardon convicted offenders i s vested in the P res id en t. The C o nstitu tio n expressly provides a lso th a t the P resid en t may communicate w ith the Parliam ent by message or address on any m atter of n a tio n a l o r p u b lic importance; and he may address a message to th e nation a t any time on any m atte r. I f the o ff ic e o f Speaker:or Deputy Speaker in e i th e r Chamber be vacant, the P resid en t may appoint a member of the Chamber to perform the d u tie s of a Speaker (67). The P res id en t i s empowered a lso to r e f e r to the Supreme Court any question of such natu re and of such importance th a t i t i s expedient to obtain th e opinion of th a t Court (151)*

In c e r ta in circum stances the P resid en t has sp e c ia l powers. He may issu e a Proclam ation of Emergency which has th e e f fe c t o f extending the a u th o rity o f the Parliam ent over the subordinate le g is la tu re o f the component S ta te s (9*0 ; such a Proclam ation however ceases to operate a f te r s ix months unless extended by a re so lu tio n of both Chambers. F u rth er, a t any time when both Chambers a re not in sessio n , The P res id en t, i f s a t is f ie d th a t the circum stances req u ire him to take immediate a c tio n , may promulgate Ordinances which have the e f fe c t o f law (110); any such Ordinance however must be la id before th e next ensuing session of Parliam ent, i f not e a r l i e r

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withdrawn-, w ithin forty.”f iv e days from the date of promulgation;, so. far as. any ordinance i s beyond; the competence of-Parliament, i t . i s vo id ..T h u p , ' even in an. emergency, the authority-of Parliament over the/President . i s ' . ensured. And in respect of. a ll- th e powers and functions; specified'.above he must act "only on the advice of the Union Government."

T h is'lim itation applies .to a ll-m atters except where the Constitution . provides -that he s h a ll act on h is d iscretion- or. on the advice or nomina- . tion of,' Or on a communication from, some source other; -than the Union Government. * "Recently some'-Buddhist d ig n ita r ie s sought an in terv iew -w ith th e

P re s id e n t, ' -in connection apparen tly w ith a d isp u te as to th e ad m in is tra - ... tioiV of one of the -national pagodas, b u t they were inform ed,.that he could •hot rece ive a deputa tion except w ith th e consent -of J the C abinet.. 3 / - T he,. P resid en t may "in h is d isc re tio n " remove c e r ta in d is q u a li f ic a tio n s fo'r the fran ch ise or fo r membership of the Parliam ent ( l 4 ). I f the Chamber of N a tio n a li tie s req uests him”to r e f e r to a Committee o f-P riv ile g e s .the question whether a b i l l i s or i s not a "Money B i l l , ’1 the P res id en t "may " in -his ‘d isc re tio n " accede to th e req u e s t; and the eventual d ec ision of th e P resid en t " in h is d isc re tio n " is f i n a l (107)» ’ I f the Shan s ta te Council submits a B i l l - f o r h is s ig n a tu re ,‘.heTmay. " in -h is . d isc re tio n " : r e fe r to the Supreme Court the question '"of i t s -c o n s titu tio n a l v a l id i ty , and in

••'such case-he must abide by th e advice o f- th e Supreme • Court - (157)* The. same p ro v is ion ap p lie s a lso to 'o th e r S tates; - The v a l id i ty o f anything purporting to have be6n done by th e president under the C onstitu tion -may n o t-b e -c a lled in q uestion on th e ‘ground th a t i t was done otherw ise than in accordance w ith h is c o n s titu tio n a l 'p o w e rs , and be i s not answerable to e i th e r Chamber o r 't o -any.Court fo r h is a c ts and behaviour; b u t e i th e r Chamber may by a -tw o -th ird s m ajo rity impeach him fo r h igh treaso n , v io la ­t io n of the C o n stitu tio n or gross m isconduct. Any -such charge must be in v e s tig a te d by the o ther. Chamber, and a re so lu tio n by a tw o-th ird s m ajo rity of th e in v e s tig a tin g Chamber th a t t h e ' charge has been susta ined operates to remove th e .P re s id en t from h i s -officeV.

• The foregoing exposition o f the powers and functions of the President may suggest that he i s merely an ornamental figurehead. But he can be much more than th is . Bagehot regarded as inherent-in the English co n stitu ­tio n a l monarchy "the righ t to be consulted, the right, to- encourage and the right to warn. In the Constitution these r igh ts are fully-•safeguarded*The Prime M in iste r must "keep the P resid en t g en era lly informed on a l l m atters of-dom estic and in te rn a t io n a l po licy" (124) , and th e r ig h t to be consulted im plies the r ig h t: to ' encourage and to warn. The Head,of. the S ta te in Burma is-w eaker than-sin England both because, th e re i s -not the same long t r a d i t io n o f lo y a lty to an h e re d ita ry l in e , and because the lim ita tio n on th e term o f o f f ic e of a P re s id en t p rec lu d es/th e a tta inm en t of au th o rity -b ased on-’ ripe! ' experience th a t in England th e -sovereign may accu­mulate by-the-passage--'of y ea rs . -Yet the r ig h ts to . be 'Consulted, to encourage and to warn a re not' e n t i r e ly nugatory.-,. In any case they were the m o s t 'th a t , ; a t the tim e o f'fram in g the C o n stitu tio n , Burmans would to le r a te ; perhaps too re a d ily they confounded executive d is c re tio n and .d ic ta to rsh ip . And the'weakness- Ox - the President- may have one advan tage.;- A Parliam ent . norm ally i iv e s four y ears-and -a : P resid en t holds - o ff ic e fo r f iv e years. -The3 / See Mvaam?. M ia ' ■ November 2, 1956. ■- - 7.

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time must soon -come when a P resid en t v i l l be e lec ted in th e l a s t year of :a Parliam ent and in the next Parliam ent the p a r ty w hich .a lected him may no longer have a m ajo rity . In those circum stances a President, who was more than a figurehead would he a p ub lic danger.

The th i rd e le c tio n of a P residen t in March, 1957* has brought to no tice a fu r th e r advantage of the p o s itio n held by th e .P re s id en t under the C o nstitu tio n . The f i r s t P residen t was a Shan,.m ainly on the fo r tu ito u s ground th a t , as Vice-Chairman of the Constituent.A ssem bly, he succeeded to the Chairmanship when บ บน was c a lle d on to head the Government a f te r the a ssa ss in a tio n of Aung San. The second P resid en t was a Burman. The th ird P resid en t i s a Karen, and i t now seems to be e stab lish ed as a con­vention th a t , so f a r as p o ss ib le , the P resid en t s h a l l be appointed from each o f the c o n s titu e n t S ta te s in ro ta t io n . This u se fu l convention could hard ly have been e s tab lish e d i f the functions of the P resid en t had not been mainly ceremonial and adv isory .2 . Parliam ent; (a) In the C o n s titu tio n .

( i ) General P rovisions (Section 65 to 8 2 .) O f f ic ia l ly , though not in common usage, the Union L eg is la tu re i s s ty led the Parliam ent ( in the Burmese version Pa-li-m an)T I t c o n sis ts of the P re s id en t, the Chamber of Deputies and the Chamber of N a tio n a li tie s ; the former rep resen ts the . c it iz e n s as in d iv id u a ls and the L a tte r rep resen ts th e t e r r i t o r i a l and r a c ia l components o f the Union. The Parliam ent must meet a t le a s t once a year and the in te rv a l between two successive sessions must be le s s than twelve months. Each chamber e le c ts from among i t s members a Speaker to p resid e over i t s meetings and to perform such o ther functions as may be p rescrib ed in the ru le s of procedure, unless the Speaker re s ig n s , or i s removed by a m ajority vote , he remains in o ff ic e fo r the d u ra tion of the Parliam ent and u n t i l immediately b efore the f i r s t meeting of the Chamber in a new P a r l ia ­ment. Each Chamber a lso e le c ts a member as Deputy Speaker to a c t fo r the Speaker as occasion may a r i s e . The s a la r ie s of the Speskers and Deputy Speakers a re determined by an Act of the Parliam ent. The C onstitu tion guarantees to a l l members freedom of speech w ith in the l im its allowed by the C o nstitu tio n and the ru le s of procedure, and i t a lso p ro te c ts them ag a in s t le g a l proceedings in resp ec t o f th e i r speeches and vo tes; a l l the o f f i c i a l rep o rts and p ub lica tio n s of the Parliam ent or of e i th e r Chamber a re abso lu te ly p riv ile g e d . Members a re e n t i t le d to such sa la ry and allow ­ances as may be fix ed by law.

Unless le g a lly d isq u a lif ie d , every c i t iz e n who has a tta in e d the age of eighteen has the r ig h t to vote in any e le c tio n to the Parliam ent, and every c i t iz e n who has a tta in e d the age of twenty-one i s e l ig ib le fo r mem­b ersh ip ; th e re is no p roperty q u a lif ic a tio n fo r .v o tin g o r fo r membership, and no law may be enacted d isq u a lify in g any c i t iz e n fo r voting o r member­ship on the ground of sex, race or r e l ig io n . The C o nstitu tio n provides, however, th a t members of a re lig io u s o rder nay by law be debarred e ith e r from voting or being a member o f e i th e r Chamber. Under sec tio ns I I and 27 o f the Parliam entary E lec tion Act of 19^7 members of the Buddhist c lergy and m in iste rs o f re l ig io n in general a re debarred both from membership and voting; provisos to these sec tio ns exp lain , however, th a t Buddhist members of Parliam ent are allowed to take the yellow robe while Parliam ent i s not in sessio n , and th a t Buddhist c lergy and temporary m in iste rs of re lig io n a re only debarred from voting so long as they are p ra c tis in g as suchT

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The main grounds of d is q u a li f ic a t io n fo r membership a re s e t fo r th in the C o n stitu tio n . One o f these grounds, i s o f p r a c t ic a l importance in con­n ection w ith the d e f in i t io n of c i t iz e n sh ip . Every person born in Burma, if .e v e n one of his' grandparents was a Burman, i s a c i t iz e n of Burma. This' would include most Anglo-Burmans, Indo-Burmans and Sino-Burmans, who may a lso be su b jec ts of a fo re ig n power; b u t any one who i s a su b je c t, or i s e n t i t le d to the p r iv ile g e s of a su b je c t, o f a fo re ig n power, i s d is q u a li- . f ie d from membership o f e i th e r Chamber. The o th e r grounds are undischarged bankruptcy, c e r t i f i e d in sa n ity , e lec to ra l- co rrup tio n or m alpractice and co n v ic tio n .o f a se riou s o ffence; the l a s t th re e d is q u a li f ic a t io n s may be purged by lapse of time or removed by the P re s id en t in h is d is c re tio n . The p rov isions, in the C o n s titu tio n r e la t in g to d is q u a li f ic a t io n fo r membership a re e lab o ra ted in Chapter V of th e Parliam entary E lec tio n Act, w h ic h 'is , however, to.much th e same e f f e c t . The d is q u a li f ic a t io n s fo r vo ting are a lso reg u la ted by th e E lec tio n Act; no person may be included in the e le c ­to r a l r o l l i f c e r t i f i e d insane, o r i f d is q u a lif ie d under Chapter V fo r e le c to ra l co rrup tio n or m alp rac tice , and no one may vote i f in p riso n . The C o n stitu tio n makes p ro v is io n fo r laws r e la t in g to the r e c a l l o f members, b u t no such law has been enacted.

The C o n stitu tio n req u ire s a lso th a t th e d e lim ita tio n of c o n stitu en c ie s , the conduct of e le c tio n s and th e d ec is ion o f d ispu ted e lec tio n s s h a l l be reg u la ted by law, and these a re d e a lt w ith in th e E lec tio n Act. A ll members of the Union Government and th e A ttorney General have the r ig h t to speak in e i th e r Chamber and in any jo in t s i t t i n g of th e Chambers, b u t no one is e n t i t le d to vote except in the Chamber of which he i s a member. Each Chamber makes i t s own ru le s of procedure, and the P resid en t in co n su lta tio n w ith both Speakers makes ru le s regard ing jo in t s i t t i n g s of the Chari)ers.The Parliam ent may not d iscuss the conduct of any judge of the Supreme.Court o r the High Court except on a 'r e s o lu t io n fo r h is removal. 'On the o ther hand the v a l id i ty o f any proceedings in th e Parliam ent may not be questioned in any Court on th e ground of i r r e g u la r i ty in procedure.

( i i ) The .Chamber' of Deputies,. (Sections .83 to .86). The C o nstitu tio n req u ires th a t th e re s h a l l be not le s s than one member of the Chamber of Deputies f o r each 100,000 o f the popu la tion . The population i s about 20 m illio n and the minimum number of deputies i s th e re fo re 200. The number must a lso be as n ea rly as p ra c tic a b le tw ice the number o f members o f 'th e Chamber of N a t io n a li t ie s , which i s fix ed by th e 'C o n s titu tio n a t 125* Under the E lec tion Act o f 19^8, as most rec e n tly amended, the. number of members i s fix ed a t 250 and the sev e ra l co n stitu en c ie s were a lso determined in the same Act. Under th is Act the co n stitu en c ie s a re d is tr ib u te d among the c o n s titu e n t t e r r i t o r i a l and r a c ia l u n its as shown below:

The c o n stitu en c ie s must be rev ised not le s s than once in ten years and in every re v is io n the. p ro po rtio n between th e number of members and the popu­la t io n as a sc e rta in ed a t the l a s t proceding census should be as n ea rly as p ra c tic a b le the same fo r a l l c o n s titu en c ie s , except t h a t in the sp a rse ly

The Shan s ta terpVv piThe- Chin S pecial D ivision The Kayah s ta te The rem aining area T o ta l 250 members.203 members;

25 members; 7 members; 6 members, 2 members;

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populated Kayah s ta te and Chin Special- D ivision the p roportion may he h igher. The l a t e s t rev is io n was approved by Parliam ent ea rly in 1956 in time fo r the genera l e le c tio n in the follow ing A p ril. A general e le c tio n must take p lace not l a t e r than 60 days a f t e r the d isso lu tio n of the Chamber, and p o llin g must as f a r as p o ss ib le take p lace on the same day throughout the Union; the' Chamber must meet w ith in s ix ty days from the p o llin g day.In view of the d is tu rb ed conditions in some p a r ts o f the country d u rin g - the genera l e lec tio n o f -1956, the P resid en t had to take ac tio n under h is emergency powers, as defined in sec tio ns 80 A and 91 of the E lec tion Rules, to allow the e lec tio n s in c e r ta in co n stitu en c ies to be postponed, and, when th e Chamber of Deputies met in June, only 240 sea ts had been f i l l e d and ten e lec tio n s were s t i l l pending. The normal l i f e of the Chamber is fou r years b u t, in the event of a grave emergency declared by proclam ation under sec tio n 9k of the C o n stitu tio n , the two Chambers by a tw o-th irds m ajority in a jo in t s i t t i n g may prolong the l i f e of the Chamber from year to year so long as the s ta te of emergency con tinues.

The d is t in c t iv e fun ction of th e Chamber of Deputies is to approve the annual estim ates of the re c e ip ts and expenditure of the Union, and i t must take those in to considera tion as soon as p o ss ib le a f t e r they have been p resen ted . The le g is la t io n requ ired to give e f fe c t to the f in a n c ia l re so ­lu tio n s of the year must be enacted w ith in th a t year, except so f a r as may be provided by sp e c if ic enactment in each case . The in i t i a t iv e in resp ec t o f the app rop ria tion of pub lic funds r e s t s w ith th e Government, and the Chamber may not pass any vote or re so lu tio n on' such m atters unless the purpose of the app rop ria tion has been recommended to the Chamber by the Government.

Under the Payment of Members Act V of 1952 members of the Chamber of Deputies were allowed a sa la ry of K.300 a month w ith a d a ily allowance of K.20 while a ttend ing a meeting o f the Parliam ent or of a Committee, to g e th e r w ith t ra v e ll in g allowance fo r journeys on parliam entary duty.

( i i i ) . The Chamber of N a tio n a li tie s (Sections 87 to 8 9)» The number o f members of the Chamber of N a tio n a li tie s i s fix ed by the C o nstitu tio n a t 125. The a llo c a tio n of these i s s e t fo r th in a schedule appended to the C o n s ti tu tio n .. As amended a f t e r the c re a tio n of the Karen s ta te by Act XIV of 1952, which came in to fo rce on June 1, 1954, the d is tr ib u tio n of the members among the t e r r i t o r i a l and r a c ia l u n its i s shown below:

The Kayah s ta te i s rep resen ted by i t s th ree c h ie f ta in s , and the rep re ­sen ta tiv e s of the Shan s ta te a re chosen by the Sawbwas from among them­se lves . The revocation of th is concession was proposed in a d ra f t b i l l published in the o f f i c i a l G azette in December, 1956/ fo r considera tion in the next sessio n . The co n stitu en c ies fo r the remaining areas were fix ed a t the l a t e s t rev is io n under the Parliam entary E lection Act. Of the 12 Kachin C onstituencies 6 a re Kachin co n stitu en c ie s and 6 a re general con­s ti tu e n c ie s .

The Kachin s ta teThe Karen s ta teThe Chin Special D ivisionThe Shan s ta teThe Kayah s ta teThe remaining areaT otal

12 members; 15 members; 8 members; 25 members;3 members, 62 members;

125 members.

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The general e le c tio n fo r the Chamber o f R a tio n a li t ie s should be com­p le te d not l a t e r than the f i f te e n th day from th e f i r s t meeting of the Chamber o f'D epu ties a f t e r a d is so lu tio n , b u t in th e genera l e je c tio n of 1956 th is was found im practicab le and,- as fo r the Chamber of D eputies, some e le c tio n s had to -be postponed; a t the f i r s t meeting of the'.Chamber o f • N a tio n a li tie s 25 sea ts were s t i l l vacan t. A d is so lu tio n .of ..the Chamber o f Deputies opera tes as a d is so lu tio n o f the Chamber o f Nationalities. .The Chamber o f N a tio n a li tie s has no c o n tro l over fin an ce , and i t s proced­ure w ith re sp ec t to Money B il l s i s explained under th e head o f L eg is la ­t io n . In o the r re sp ec ts the p ro v is ion s re la t in g to the-Chamber of Deputies apply a lso to the Chamber of N a t io n a li t ie s .

( iv ) Powers (Sections 90 to 9 7 ). . In genera l th e .s o le and exclusive - power of making laws i s vested in th e P arliam ent. But any a u th o rity duly empowered under an Act o f Parliam ent may make ru le s and reg u la tio n s having th e fo rce of law; such ru le s must be consonant w ith th e Act under which they a re framed, and they must be la id before each Chamber a t i t s nex t ensuing sessio n and a re then l ia b le to annulment w ith in th ree months by a motion c a rr ie d in both Chambers. The C o n stitu tio n also, recognizes the p rin c ip le of reg io n a l autonomy and exp ressly perm its the delegation of sp e c if ied powers to le g a l ly c o n s titu te d lo c a l a u th o r i t ie s . The law­making power o f the P arliam ent i s lim ite d in re sp ec t o f the component S ta te s . For each s ta te th e re i s a ’s ta te 'C o u n c il.w h ich has the exclusive power o f making laws fo r the s ta te in re sp ec ts of n a t t e r s ■enumerated in the S ta te L e g is la tiv e L is t g iven in the Third Schedule appended to the C o n s titu tio n ! This l i s t inc ludes " a l l m atters which in th e opinion of the P resid en t a re of a merely lo c a l or p r iv a te ' n a tu re in the s t a t e ." "For g re a te r c e r ta in ty ," th e re fo re , th e same Schedule comprises a Union L egis­la t iv e L is t , and any m atte r covered by th is l i s t may not be deemed to be a m atter of a lo c a l or p r iv a te n atu re under the s ta te L e g is la tiv e L is t ( fo r the Union and s ta te L e g is la tiv e L is ts , see Appendix A below).

There i s s t i l l a fu r th e r l im ita tio n on the powers ex e rc isab le by the Parliam ent. No concession regard ing n a tu ra l resources w ith in one o f the Component S ta te s may be issued except a f t e r c o n su lta tio n w ith the Union M inister fo r th e s ta te concerned, and th e Parliam ent may .therefo re not sanction such a concession un les3 the M in iste r concerned has been con­su lte d . Recently a p ro je c t fo r a jo in t venture w ith a p r iv a te company fo r the working of m ineral d ep o sits in th e Kayah S ta te was nearing com­p le tio n b u t had to be postponed because th is cond ition had been overlooked. On the o th e r hand the powers of the Union Parliam ent may be enlarged through the su rrender by a S ta te Council of any of i t s t e r r i t o r i e s or any of i t s c o n s t i tu t io n a l 'r ig h ts and powers^. I f the P resid en t dec lares by a Proclam ation of Emergency th a t a grave'emergency e x is ts whereby the se c u rity of the Union is th rea ten ed , whether by war or in te rn a l d istu rbance , or th a t a grave economic emergency a ffe c tin g th e Union has a rise n in any p a r t of th e Union, th e Parliam ent ob ta ins power to make iaws w ith re sp ec t to any of the m atters enumerated in the s ta te L e g is la tiv e L is t . This does not r e s t r i c t the law-making power of the s ta te Councils, b u t any p ro v is io n of a s ta te law which c o n f l ic ts w ith a law passed by the Union Parliam ent under i t s emergency powers becomes in o p era tiv e . As a lready explained, a Proclam ation of Emergency, unless renewed, ceases to be v a lid a f t e r s ix months, b u t may be renewed from time to time fo r a fu r th e r period of twelve months by re so lu tio n s of both chambers. ; A law made under a Proclam ation of Emergency Ceases to have e f fe c t s ix months a f t e r the Proclam ation has

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ceased to operate.. The Parliam ent may a iso "be empowered to le g is la te on m atters' in th e s t a t e L e g is la tiv e L is t concerning tvro o r more s ta te C ouncil’ i f they consider le g is la t io n by Parliam ent to be d es ira b le and pass re so ­lu tions. to th a t e f f e c t . .. But any such Act may, as regards any s ta te to which i t a p p lie s , be. amended or repealed by an Act of the s ta te Council.

The Parliam ent has no power over the revenues assigned to ,1 the compon­en t s ta te s in the s ta te Revenue L is t appended to the C o nstitu tio n as Schedule IV (see Appendix B b e l o w A l l such revenues form p a r t o f the revenues of the s ta te in or by which they a re r e c e iy ^ . 0^ แ revenues o ther than those enumerated in th a t l i s t form p a r t of th ' ' f f the Union,b u t the C o nstitu tio n expressly sanctions g ran ts an .■ 093. {ร out ofUnion revenues to th e component u n its , and. a s ta te rd has 'beenc o n s titu te d to make recommendations w ith regard to .ร'ich g ran ts .

F in a lly , tbe r ig h t to r a is e and m aintain m ili ta ry , naval and a i r fo rces i s vested exc lu siv ely in th e Parliam ent, and a l l o the r m ilita ry or sem i-m ilita ry o rgan izations (ap a rt from c iv i l p o l ic e ) ’a re s t r i c t l y p ro ­h ib ite d »

(v) L egislation (Sections 98 to 113)» Proposals for le g is la t io n may be introduced either by a representative of the Government or by a private member. Any B i l l , other than a Money B i l l , maybe in it ia te d in either Chamber and, i f passed in that Chamber, i t i s sent to the other Chamber.I f i t be approved, w ith amendments i f necessary , by both' Chambers, i t is p resen ted to the P res id en t fo r s ig n a tu re and prom ulgation as an: Act. In d e fa u lt of agreement between the two Chambers th e 'P re s id e n t must convene a jo in t .s i t t in g of both Chambers. In such a jo in t s i t t i n g no amendments a re allowed except w ith re fe ren ce to th e p o in ts on which the two Chambers a re not agreed. I f ' t h e B i l l , w ith or w ithout the amendments proposed by the o ther Chamber, i s then passed by a m ajo rity of the members p resen t and voting , i t i s deemed to have been passed by both Chambers, and i s subm itted to the P resid en t in accordance w ith 'th e usual procedure. I f the P resid en t omits to sign any B i l l w ith in seven days from the day on which i t was presen ted to him, i t becomes an Act iiTithout h is s ig n a tu re .

A Money B i l l can o rig in a te only w ith the Chamber of D eputies. A com­prehensive ' d e f in it io n of a Money B i l l s ta te s in i t s genera l e f fe c t th a t th is term covers any B i l l r e la t in g to tax a tio n or to th e f in a n c ia l a c t iv i ­t i e s of the Government. A c e r t i f i c a t e by the Speaker of the House of Deputies th a t a B i l l i s a Money B i l l i s o rd in a r ily f in a l and conclusive.The Chamber of N a tio n a li tie s may, however, request the P res id en t to r e fe r to a Committee of P riv ile g es the question whether the B i l l i s , or i s no t, a Money B i l l . The P resid en t need not d efe r to the request b u t, i f in h is d isc re tio n he decides to do so, he re fe rs the question to a Committee o f P riv ile g es c o n sis tin g of an equal number of members of both Chambers, w ith a judge o f th e Supreme Court as Chairman. The P resid en t need not accept the opinion expressed in the re p o r t of the Committee; th is i s l e f t to h is d is c re tio n , bu t h is decision on th e question is f in a l . No B i l l imposing ta x a tio n , or ap p ro p ria ting funds fo r th e o rd inary serv ices of the Govern­ment, may include any o th e r m atte r. Although a Money B i l l may be in i t ia te d only in the Chamber of D eputies, i t must, when approved by th e Chamber, be sen t to the Chamber of N a tio n a li tie s fo r comment. With or w ithout com­ments, the B ill-m ust be re tu rned to the Chamber of Deputies w ith in twenty- one days; i f i t i s not re tu rned w ith in th a t period , o r i s returned, w ith

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recommendations which the Chamber of Deputies does not accept, i t i s deemed to have been passed by both Chambers a t the expiration of twenty-one days.The President, as already explained, has power, in matters o f urgency when both Chambers are not in session , to promulgate Ordinances which have the same force and e ffe c t as an Act of ■ Parliament. Every Act must be promulgated by publication in the o f f i c ia l Gazette and comes into force

on tihe date o f promulgation or at such time as may be prescribed in the body of the Act. • '( v i ) r ~ '' น . . , ' ' ' f,;in g s . Hie procedure in connection with Joint S ittin g s

of the t*' not d ealt with in the Constitution but is se t forthin sepal!-.oe โ ® เ ^ , . ; 1.,ne date of a proposed jo in t s i t t in g must be pub licly n o tif ie d . One i.. luK 'ed members must be present to con stitu te a quorum.The Speaker-of the Chamber of N atio n a litie s must take, the Chair or, i f he cannot attend, the Speaker of the Chamber of Deputies. The Secretary to the Chamber of N atio n a litie s acta as Secretary for the jo in t s i t t in g . No business may be taken in to consideration except that for which the jo in t s it t in g is ca lled . For example, when the President summons a jo in t s it t in g to d eliver a message to the Parliament, any d iscussion of h is address must be reserved for a la te r day. And no amendments to a B i l l may be proposed except with regard to the points of d ifference between the two Chambers which the jo in t meeting has been ca lled to s e t t le .2B. The Parliament; (b) In Operation.

The law rela tin g to e lection s is contained in the Parliamentary E lec­tion Act of 19^8 , as subsequently amended, and in the Rules under that Act. The procedure is based sub stan tia lly on that of the L egisla tive Council under B ritish ru le, which followed-an Indian model, deriving o rig in a lly from England. English e lec to ra l procedure represents the accumulation over a long period of devices to prevent malpractice; Indian ingenuity discovered new loopholes and invented new precautions; in Burma there have been further accretions during the th ir ty years of e lection eering since the f i r s t in tro ­duction of dyarchy. Hence the procedure o ffers numerous traps for the unwary and opportunities for the sop h isticated . However, the Act allows the employment of agents, and most of these seem -to know the law w ell enough to take advantages of mistakes by th e ir opponents. Out of about three hundred contests in the e lec tio n s of 1956 there were th ir ty p etitio n s against the r e su lt .The d istr ib u tion of seats in the Chamber of N ation a lities i s fixed in the Constitution, but the E lection Act a llo c a te s among the various communi­t ie s the number of seats in the Chamber of Deputies, and Rules .under the Act delim it the con stitu encies for both Chambers. A voter may be entered on the e lec to ra l r o l l and may stand fo r -e lec tio n in any constituency in

which he i s "ordinarily resident." But the mere "maintenance of a dwelling ready for occupation in which he occasionally resides" i s held to con stitu te ordinary residence, so that the obstacles to "carpet-baggers", are not formidable. For the general e lection s of 1956 the compilation of the e lec tora l r o lls began in April 1955> and they were n o tified as f in a lly con­firmed in January, 1956. T he'total number on the r o lls was 8,570,308, including 110,628 in the armed forces and 571 residents abroad. According to the returns the e lectorate had increased by about a m illion since the election s of 1952, but the apparent increase was probably due in part to

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more accura te r e g is t r a t io n . As already mentioned, c e r ta in r e s t r ic t io n s a re imposed:-on members o f a re lig io u s order and on m in iste rs o f re l ig io n .For g re a te r f a c i l i t y in voting the Returning O fficer prepares a s e t of boxes marked by some d is t in c t iv e symbol chosen by th e candidates, and a t the time of voting the P resid ing O ffice r gives to each v o te r a token th a t he can pu t in to the app rop ria te box behind a screen . The e lec tio n s fo r the Chamber of- Deputies precede th e e lec tio n s fo r the Chamber of N a tio n a li­t i e s , b u t the l a t t e r should be completed not l a t e r than th e f i f te e n th day from the f i r s t meeting of the Chamber of D eputies. ' '

The E lec tion Act however perm its th e postponement .o f an e le c tio n i f circum stances prevent i t from being held on the date f ix ed . Defeated- candidates are allowed to p e t i t io n a g a in s t the r e s u l t of an e le c tio n , and the numerous grounds on which an e le c tio n may be con tested a re sp ec ified in the Rules. E lec tion p e t i t io n s a re t r i e d before a Commission of th ree members se lec ted -by the P resid en t from a panel of judges subm itted annually to him by the Chief J u s tic e of the Union; one of the th ree i s o rd in a rily a Judge of the High Court. An e lec ted member ag a in s t whcra a p e t i t io n is f i l e d takes h is s e a t in the Chamber pending the r e s u l t of the enquiry, bu t vacates i t i f the d ec ision i s ag a in s t him, and a new e le c tio n must then be held .

The Parliament s t i l l occupies the building o r ig in a lly put up for the L egisla tive Council of 1923# when one storey provided ample accommodation for a sin g le Chamber. I t i s a modest though not unattractive structure se t in the inner courtyard of the Secretariat, a pretentious ed ific e of three to four storeys, embellished with turrets and porticos in the Byzantine trad ition of Indian Imperial architecture as standardized by the Public Works Department in the c losing years of the nineteenth century.The s itu a tio n of th e Council House, overshadowed on a l l s ides by the S e c re ta r ia t , and the c o n tra s t between the accommodation provided fo r the rep re se n ta tiv e s of the people and th a t req u ired fo r housing the adm in istra ­t iv e machinery, symbolise n o t unaptly th e i r former r e la t iv e importance in the conduct of a f f a i r s . The main assembly h a l l ju s t allows s u f f ic ie n t room fo r a jo in t s i t t i n g of both Chambers; o rd in a r ily i t i s reserved fo r meetings of the Chamber of D eputies, and th e Chamber of N a tio n a li tie s has to hold i t s s i t t in g s in the law Courts. Plans fo r a new parliam ent b u ild in t a t a co st of about Rs. 30 m illio n ($6.3 m illio n ) have been approved; construc tion has been delayed by f in a n c ia l s tringency .

The main council chamber is designed on the model of the House of Commons a t W estminster; the sea ts are arranged in s t r a ig h t rows and not round the. arc of a c i r c le . I t i s a long h a l l w ith a dais and a ta b le fo r the speaker a t one end.and w ith a gangway down the middle sep ara tin g the Government from the O pposition. The lead ers on each side face one another across a ta b le fo r o f f i c ia ls and rep o rte rs and the o ther members on e ith e r side of the gangway face the Speaker, As S ir Winston C hurchill has remarked, the tone of a le g is la t iv e body arranged l ik e th is tends to d i f f e r from th a t o f one arranged on a c irc u la r p a tte rn ; a' member i s e i th e r fo r the Government o r ag a in s t i t ; he must choose h is s ide and cross -the gangway to go from one sid e to the o th e r.

S im ilarly , in a l l m atters of procedure the English p ra c tic e was adopted w ithout question as n a tu ra l; the forms of English parliam entary government

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were n a t iv e to th e E n g lis h members o f the mixed le g is la tu r e under B r i t is h r u le and th e y soon became fa m i l ia r to th e o th e r members. D esp ite the un p re te n tio u s e x te r io r aspect o f the .. 'b u ild in g , care was taken to g ive an a i r o f solemn d ig n i t y to th e bus iness tra n s a c te d w i th in i t . The speaker wore a cerem on ia l robe and, as in the House o f Commons, had a mace w ith a macebeerer to c a r ry i t . T h is t r a d i t io n s t i l l s u rv iv e s . ■ D u ring the Japanese regime D r. Ba Maw r id ic u le d " p o l i t i c a l p la y -a c t in g , " b u t the p la y e rs le a rn a t le a s t to a c t t h e i r p a r ts . New members g e t t h e i r f i r s t le sson a t th e opening m eeting o f each se ss ion . When the members assemble in ccm pliance w ith a summons from the P re s id e n t, the S e c re ta ry to the Chamber announces th e name o f th e member app o in ted by th e P re s id e n t to take th e C ha ir pend ing the e le c t io n o f a Speaker. The member so des igna ted , who has been w a it in g in an ante-room , then en te rs th e Chamber, b u t in h is o rd in a ry costume and w ith o u t any m ace-bearer to precede him , and takes h is sea t in th e Speaker's c h a ir . He c a l ls on th e members in due succession to make the p re s c r ib e d d e c la ra t io n o f lo y a l t y in th e term s la id down in a schedule to the C o n s t itu t io n . On the c o n c lu s io n o f t h is ceremony the mace, which had been ly in g on the d a is , is p laced on th e Speaker's ta b le as a symbol th a t the Chamber is in sess ion .

The o rd inances , i f any, p rom ulgated by th e P re s id e n t under s e c tio n 110 o f the. C o n s t itu t io n w h ile th e P a rlia m e n t was n o t in sess ion , are then la id b e fo re the Chamber by th e M in is te rs concerned and th e Chamber proceeds to bus iness . The a c t in g Speaker c a l ls f o r nominations f o r th e o f f ic e s o f Speaker and Deputy Speaker; f o r th e e le c t io n o f a Prime M in is te r , i f th a t o f f ic e is va ca n t; and f o r the e le c t io n o f a P u b lic Accounts Committee, and the House Committee and f o r members to re p re s e n t the P a rlia m e n t on c e r ta in p u b lic bo d ie s , such as th e U n iv e rs ity C o unc il and the N a tio n a l Mausoleum.A t the same tim e he f ix e s th e dates .on w h ich these e le c t io n s a re to be h e ld . Any b i l l s o f w h ich n o t ic e has been g iven a re then in tro d u c e d and d e a lt w ith in accordance w ith th e p rocedure e xp la in e d be low . In the new P a rliam en t o f 1956 th e fo rm er .Speaker, who had a ls o been app o in ted p r o v is io n a l ly as A c tin g Speaker, was re -e le c te d .w ith o u t o p p o s it io n . He thereupon ad journed th e Chamber f o r a b r ie f in te r v a l b e fo re re tu rn in g , dressed in th e Speaker's o f f i c i a l gown and preceded by h is m ace-bearer. ' T h is ceremony completes th e r i t u a l o f h is appo in tm ent, and shou ld im press on members th e d ig n i ty o f th e o f f ic e ra th e r than o f th e man. In accordance w ith E n g lis h p a r lia m e n ta ry t r a d i t io n s the le a d e rs o f a l l se c tio n s o f a l l p a r t ie s thereupon co n g ra tu ­la te d him and assured him o f t h e i r con fidence in re c e iv in g f a i r tre a tm e n t, to w hich he r e p lie d w ith an assurance th a t t h e i r con fidence was no t m is ­p la ce d , th a t he would-do e v e ry th in g p o s s ib le to secure ju s t ic e and f a i r p la y f o r a l l p a r t ie s , th a t he looked f o r t h e i r supp o rt in m a in ta in in g the d ig n i ty o f the House and e n fo rc in g s t r i c t com pliance w ith the ru le s , and he exho rted them to keep t h e i r temper even i f opponents in th e h ea t o f debate shou ld th row unp leasan t words a t them. A Deputy Speaker vas then e le c te d on p a r ty l in e s .

C e rta in bod ies must be appo in ted by th e Speaker a t the b e g in n in g o f each sess ion : th e Panel o f Chairmen, two B i l l Committees and th e Committee o f P r iv i le g e s . The Panel o f Chairmen c o n s is ts o f e ig h t members whose fu n c t io n i t is to p re s id e over the v a r io u s com m ittees. Each B i l l Committee c o n s is ts o f the member s u b m itt in g th e B i l l , the M in is te r concerned, the A tto rn e y -G e n e ra l, a member o f th e P anel o f Chairmen, and n o t more- than f i f t e e n members nom inated by .the Speaker, w ith the S e c re ta ry to th£ Chamber as E xecu tive O f f ic e r . The fu n c t io n o f a B i l l Committee is to s c ru t in iz e

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d r a f t B i l l s and see th a t they are in o rd e r and s u ita b ly d ra fte d , and to . re p o r t on them b e fo re th e y come b e fo re th e Chamber f o r c o n s id e ra tio n .The Committee o f P r iv i le g e s c o n s is ts o f the Deputy Speaker, th e A tto rn e y G eneral, a member o f the Panel o f Chairmen and seven members nominated 1, by the Speaker. I t s fu n c t io n is to re p o r t on any q u e s tio n o f p r iv i le g e re fe r re d to i t by th e Speaker. The Rules do n o t f i t t e r the d is c re t io n o f th e Speaker in nom ina ting members to these b o d ie s , b u t in p ra c t ic e he arranges th a t a l l im p o rta n t se c tio n s are represen ted by t h e i r le a d e rs .Thus th e Panel o f Chairmen appo in ted f o r the f i r s t sess ion o f th e new P a rlia m e n t in 1956 in c lu d e d a Chin, Kachin and Karen and th e le a d e r o f the Arakanes s e c t io n o f the A l l ie d O p p o s itio n ; th e Committee o f P r iv i le g e s in c lu d e d two members o f the A l l ie d O p p o s itio n and one member o f the l e f t - w ing U n ited F ro n t. ' One o f the: B i l l Committees in c lu d e d th re e members o f the U n ite d F ro n t, and th e o th e r in c lu d e d two members o f th e U n ite d F ro n t and one Independent Member.

The S tand ing Committee on P u b lic Accounts is . appo in ted in th e f i r s t sess ion o f a new P a rliam en t to h o ld o f f ic e n o t m ere ly , l i k e th e o th e r com m ittees, f o r th e sess ion , b u t u n t i l th e P a rliam en t is d is s o lv e d . I t c o n s is ts o f a member o f the Panel o f Chairmen a lre a d y appo in ted by the Speaker, th e M in is te r f o r F inance and Revenue, and te n o th e r members e le c te d by a m a jo r ity vo te from among the members o f th e Chamber; thus the committee rep resen ts th e m a jo r i ty o r Government p a r ty and i t s recommenda­t io n s are l i k e l y to p rove acce p ta b le . I t s p r im a ry fu n c t io n is to s c ru t in iz e th e annual s ta tem en t o f Accounts and th e A u d ito r -G e n e ra l'ร re p o r t thereon and to be s a t is f ie d th a t expe nd itu re has been in c u rre d o n ly in accordance w ith the g ra n ts sanctioned by P a rlia m e n t; i t must b r in g to th e n o t ic e o f P a rliam en t any case in w h ich funds sanc tioned by P a rliam en t under one head o f the budget have been re -a p p ro p r ia te d to ano the r head, and any case in w hich re -a p p ro p r ia t io n w ith in the same budget head has been e ffe c te d o th e r­wise than in accordance w ith th e c o n d it io n s p re s c r ib e d by th e F inance Departm ent. I t must a ls o b r in g to th e n o t ic e o f P a rliam en t a l l requests f o r expend itu re w h ich th e F inance Department has recommended f o r th e . app rova l o f P a rlia m e n t. T h ird ly , the Committee must examine whether i t is s a t is f ie d w ith th e accounts m a in ta ined hy Government com mercial e n te rp r is e s in accordance w ith th e o rde rs o f the P re s id e n t and w ith the re p o r ts thereon by th e A u d ito r-G e n e ra l. The f i n a l re p o r t o f the Committee is subm itted to P a rliam en t by i t s Chairman; n o th in g th a t t ra n s p ire s in the Cojcaittee may be d is c lo s e d , b u t m inutes o f i t s m eetings must be m a in ta ined and subm itted to g e th e r w ith th e re p o r t . O ther e le c tio n s made on p a r ty l in e s a t th e b e g inn ing o f a sess ion a re those f o r th e House Committee and f o r the o u ts id e bod ies to w h ich th e P a rliam en t appo in ts re p re s e n ta tiv e s .

The d a i ly ro u t in e o f th e Chamber c o n s is ts in d isp o s in g o f th e qu e s tio n s , m o tions, re s o lu t io n s and enactments s e t down in th e L is t o f Business f o r the day. No bus iness re q u ir in g p re v io u s n o t ic e may be entered in the l i s t o f business un less the p e r io d o f n o t ic e has e x p ire d , and no business o u ts id e the l i s t may be taken up w ith o u t the leave o f the Speaker. One day a week is s e t a p a rt by the Speaker f o r th e B i l l s and o th e r business o f p r iv a te members. To the gen e ra l r u le th a t no business o u ts id e the l i s t may be con­s id e re d th e re are c e r ta in e xcep tions . A t any tim e the Speaker may a llo w , i f he th in k s f i t , 'a m otion o f condolence o r c o n g ra tu la t io n to be in te rp o se d , and th e re a f te r may accep t a vo te th a t th e P a rliam en t do a d jo u rn . He may a ls o accep t a m otion f o r adjournm ent f o r th e d is c u s s io n o f a m a tte r o f u rg e n t p u b lic im portance p ro v id e d th a t i t com plies w ith c e r ta in c o n d it io n s

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l a id down in th e Rules to p re v e n t an abuse o f t h is p r iv i le g e . F o r example, a t th e f i r s t m eeting o f the c u r re n t P a rlia m e n t, a f te r the'members had made t h e i r d e c la ra t io n o f lo y a l t y , a member o f th e o p p o s it io n asked pe rm iss ion to move the adjournm ent o f the Chamber to co n s id e r the abuses p ra c t is e d in the re c e n t e le c t io n s ; b u t the Speaker ru le d th a t , as th e e le c tio n s were o ve r, the m a tte r cou ld n o t be regarded as o f immediate p u b lic concern and co u ld be d e a lt w ith more a p p ro p r ia te ly by q u e s tio n s , m otions o r re s o lu ­t io n s . One o th e r e xce p tio n re la te s to p o in ts o f o rd e r . Any member may a t any tim e re q u e s t the Speaker to decide a p o in t of. o rd e r . A member who is then speaking must im m ed ia te ly resume h is sea t u n t i l the Specker has g iven h is d e c is io n upon the p o in t in q u e s tio n .

The f i r s t hou r o f every s i t t i n g is made a v a ila b le f o r th e ask ing and answ ering o f q u e s tio n s . The q u e s tio n must r e la te s o le ly to p u b lic a f f a i r s w ith w h ich the Government is o f f i c i a l l y concerned o r to some m a tte r o f a d m in is tra t io n f o r w h ich th e Government is re s p o n s ib le , o r i t may be addressed to a p r iv a te member in connection w ith some business b e fo re the Chamber f o r w h ich he is . re s p o n s ib le . The q u e s tio n must be asked in s u ita b le term s and may be d is -a llo w e d by th e speaker i f he regards i t as ou t o f o rd e r . N o tic e , o r d in a r i ly te n days, must be g iven to a llo w f o r p re p a ra t io n o f an answer, w hich may be g iven in w r i t in g un less the que s tion is s ta rre d as an in d ic a t io n th a t an o r a l answer is d e s ire d . F a c i l i t i e s f o r e lu c id a t in g o r fo rm in g p u b lic o p in io n by means o f such ques tions are perhaps th e b e s t safeguard o f democracy in modern p a r lia m e n ta ry p rocedure , w h ich in o th e r m a tte rs tends to c o n fin e express ions o f o p in io n w ith in s t r i c t l y p a r ty l im i t s .

Any member may a t any tim e subm it a m otion in v i t in g d is c u s s io n by the Chamber o f any m a tte r o f p u b lic in te r e s t w ith w h ich i t is concerned, o r he may frame a re s o lu t io n making a recoqjaendation as to a c t io n th a t s h a l l be taken by th e Government. In b o th cases no t le s s than f i f t e e n days n o t ic e must o r d in a r i ly be g ive n .to th e S e c re ta ry to th e Chamber. A m otion serves m ere ly to e l i c i t o p in io n , b u t a re s o lu t io n demands a c t io n by the Government and, i f the R e s o lu tio n is passed by th e Chamber, a copy must be sen t to th e Government f o r such a c t io n as may be deemed a p p ro p r ia te . The r e la t iv e precedence o f re s o lu t io n s is determ ined b y b a l lo t , and n o t more than f i v e re s o lu t io n s may, w ith o u t s p e c ia l leave from th e Speaker, be en te red on th e l i s t o f bus iness f o r any day a l lo t t e d to th e bus iness o f p r iv a te members. Under the C o n s t itu t io n a s p e c ia l p rocedure is re q u ire d f o r re s o lu t io n s p r e fe r r in g charges a g a in s t th e Speaker o r Deputy Speaker o r a g a in s t th e P re s id e n t, and s im i la r ly , re s o lu t io n s exp ress ing want o f con fidence in the Government o r d isa p p ro v in g i t s p o l ic y cannot be in t r o ­duced w ith o u t the express app ro va l o f a t le a s t f i f t y members shown by r is in g in t h e i r p la c e s .

L e g is la t io n . Fo r the in tro d u c t io n o f le g is la t io n th e p e rm iss io n o f the Cheimber must be o b ta in e d . A member who w ishes to o b ta in p e rm iss ion must g iv e f i f t e e n days n o t ic e o f h is in te n t io n , accompanying th e n o t ic e w ith th re e cop ies o f the d r a f t A c t, u s u a lly term ed, in accordance w ith E n g lis h p ra c t ic e , a B i l l , to g e th e r w ith a Statem ent o f O b jec ts and Reasons. The o f f i c i a l language o f the- Chamber is Burmese b u t , w ith th e p e rm iss io n o f th e Speaker, E n g lis h may be used f o r amendments o f A cts o r ig in a l ly passed in E n g lis h , and th is procedure was adopted, d e s p ite p ro te s ts by the O p p o s itio n , f o r an amendment o f the F o re s t A c t in th e new P a rlia m e n t o f 1956. The r e la t iv e precedence o f p r iv a te B i l l s n o t y e t in tro d u c e d is

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decided by b a l lo t . On th e day thus determ ined th e member asks leave to in tro d u c e the B i l l and, in the even t o f o p p o s it io n , th e speaker, a f te r h ea ring such e x p la n a tio n as he! th in k s f i t from the proponent and opponent, o b ta in s th e d e c is io n o f the Chamber w ith o u t f u r th e r debate. I f the Chamber approves, th e in tro d u c t io n o f the B i l l i t must then be p u b lish e d in the o f f i c i a l G azette i f t h is has n o t a lre a d y been done.

Not ie s s 1 th a n . f iv e days a f t e r p u b lic a t io n , the.member in charge o f th e B i l l may move e i th e r : {a ) th a t i t be taken in to c o n s id e ra tio n ; o r (b ) th a t i t be re fe r re d to a S e le c t Committee, o r (c ) th a t i t be c ir c u la te d by th e Government to e l i c i t p u b lic o p in io n i On t h is a c t io n the p r in c ip le o f the B i l l may be d iscussed and a ls o i t s g e n e ra l p ro v is io n s , b u t o n ly so f a r as may be necessary to e x p la in i t s p r in c ip le .

(a ) I f the mover asks the Chamber to take the B i l l in to c o n s id e ra tio n the Speaker may d i r e c t th a t i t be sen t to one o f the B i l l Committees f o r s c ru t in y and re p o r t , o r he may a llo w th e Chamber.to d iscuss the B i l l as i f the B i l l Committee had a lre a d y re p o rte d on i t . The B i l l , when f i r s t in tro d u ce d , o r a f t e r ap p ro va l i f necessary by th e B i l l Committee, i s then taken in to c o n s id e ra tio n c lause by c la u se . A f te r i t has been d e a lt w ith in t h is manner th e member in charge o f i t may ask th a t i t be passed. I f passed, the Speaker fo rw ards .a' copy to th e Chamber o f N a t io n a l i t ie s .

(b ) I f the mover asks th a t th e B i l l may be re fe r re d to a S e le c t Com­m itte e and t h is m o tio n , is accepted th e Chamber appo in ts a S e le c t Committee to examine the B i l l - in d e t a i l .

(c ) I f the mover asks th a t the B i l l be c ir c u la te d by the Government to e l i c i t p u b lic o p in io n , th e Chamber may e i th e r accept o r . r e je c t the. m o tion .I f the mover s t i l l w ishes to proceed a f t e r o p in io n has been a sce rta in e d ,he must move th a t the B i l l be re fe r re d to a S e le c t Committee un less the Speaker a llo w s a m otion th a t i t be taken in to c o n s id e ra tio n .

When the mover on th e f i r s t in t ro d u c t io n o f a B i l l asks th a t i t be taken in to c o n s id e ra tio n , any member may move an amendment th a t i t be re fe r re d to a S e le c t Committee o r be c ir c u la te d to o b ta in p u b lic o p in io n ; and an amendment in the la t t e r sense may bemoved i f the member in charge has asked f o r a S e le c t Committee.

A S e le c t Committee must in c lu d e th e member re s p o n s ib le f o r th e B i l l , the M in is te r concerned, the A tto rn e y -G e n e ra l and a member o f the Panel o f Chairmen to g e th e r w ith n o t more than tw e lve o r le s s than te n members o f the Chamber appo in ted by i t a t the tim e th a t the committee is form ed. The S e le c t Committee may c a l l in expe rts o r re s p re s e n ta tiv e s o f s p e c ia l in te re s ts to a tte n d o r to produce documents l i k e l y to b e 'h e lp fu l. I t has the power to make such amendments as are re le v a n t to the s u b je c t-m a tte r o f th e B i l l and, a f t e r such e n q u iry and d is c u s s io n as may seem necessary, i t subm its to the Speaker a copy o f the B i l l as amended in com m ittee, to g e th e r w ith i t s re p o r t . N oth ing th a t i s s a id o r done by any member o f a committee may be d iv u lg e d , b u t any member, when s ig n in g the re p o r t , may add m inutes o f re s e rv a tio n o r d is s e n t. The re p o r t i s c ir c u la te d to a l l members o f the Chamber and, i f the Committee so d e s ire , i t i s p r in te d in th e o f f i c i a l G azette .

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Not le s s than, f iv e days- la te r th e member in charge, of. the B i l l may move th a t i t he taken in to c o n s id e ra tio n as amended by the. Se-lect Com-

.m itte e . 1 I t is open tp him however o r to any o th e r member to.moif.e. th a t i t be sent back to the S e le c t Ccnm ittee f o r f u r th e r co ns ide ra tion ;’ o r sen t

" to a f re s h S e le c t Committee. The Speaker then subm its th e B i l l c lause by c lause f o r d is c u s s io n and app rova l o r amendment; o r , i f he th in k s f i t , he. may subm it th e B i l l f o r c o n s id e ra tio n as a whole w ith o u t, d e ta i le d exam­in a t io n of. each c la u se . Amendments re q u ire th re e days, n o t ic e except w ith th e pe rm iss ion o f th e Speaker, and, w ith o u t h is pe rm iss io n , a B i l l cannot be passed a t the same s i t t i n g as an amendment. When, a l l tne suggested amendments have been disposed o f , th e Speaker c a l ls .on the .Chamber to pass o r r e je c t th e B i l l . I f i t is passed, he sends a copy to th e Chamber o f

. N a t io n a l i t ie s ’.

The. B i l l is then cons ide red by the Chamber o f N a t io n a l i t ie s which re tu rn s i t w ith such amendments as i t may co n s id e r necessary. I f the Chamber o f D eputies cannot accep t the amendments, a J o in t Committee o f te n members from each Chamber is appo in ted w ith a v iew to reach ing agreement.

. When b o th Chambers a re f i n a l l y agreed the . Speaker o f the Chamber subm its th e measure to the P re s id e n t f o r s ig n a tu re . I f agreement cannot be ach ieved, the Speaker subm its th e B i l l to th e P re s id e n t w ith a re p o r t to th a t e f fe c t and a reques t f o r th e h o ld in g o f a j o i n t sess ion as' p ro v id e d in the C o n s t itu t io n .

Except on days s e t a p a rt f o r p r iv a te bus iness , government measures have the precedence and u s u a lly taice up a l l th e t im e ./ • Precedence among p r iv a te b i l l s n o t y e t in tro d u c e d is decided by b a l lo t . -Among b i l l s - th a t have been in tro d u c e d precedence in th e l i s t o f bus iness f o r the day is g iven in the fo llo w in g o rd e r:

(a ) B i l l s in w h ich th e n e x t stage is th e .p ro d u c tio n of- a re p o r t from a J o in t Committee o f bo th houses o r from a B ill-C o m m itte e o r .f ro m .a S e le c t Committee;.

(b ) B i l l s th a t have, been re tu rn e d a f te r b e ing passed in the Chamber o f N a t io n a l i t ie s ; 1-.

(c ) B i l l s o r ig in a t in g in and passed in th e Chamber o f N a t io n a l i t ie s ;

(d ) B i l l s in re sp e c t o f which a m otion has been c a r r ie d th a t th e B i l l be taken in to c o n s id e ra t io n ;

(e ) B i l l s on w h ich a re p o r t has been re ce ive d f ro m -a .J o in t Committee o r a B i l l Committee o r a S e le c t Committee;

( f ) B i l l s w h ich have been c ir c u la te d f o r the purpose o f e l i c i t i n g p u b lic o p in io n ;

(g ) O ther B i l l s . ......................

O ther p r iv a te B i l l 's , w h ich have ’been 'in tro d u c e d b u t 'w h ic h have n o t y e t reached any o f the above s tages, have p r i o r i t y acco rd ing to th e -d a te and o rd e r o f . t h e ir in t r o d u c t io n .

There are s p e c ia l p ro v is io n s r e la t in g to . fin a n c e b i l l s . The budget o f es tim a tes f o r re c e ip ts ana expend itu re f o r the fo llo w in g yea r must be p resen ted to th e Chamber on th e date f ix e d by th e P re s id e n t. No d is c u s ­s io n is a llow ed on th e day th a t i t is p resen ted . The subsequent procedure comprises two staged: (a ) a g e n e ra l.d is c u s s io n , and (b ) th e v o t in g o f demands f o r g ra n ts . The น,e n e ra i d isc u s s io n is h e ld on th e d a te , n o t le s s than fo u r d a y s 'la te r , f ix e d by the speaker in c o n s u lta t io n w ith the F inance M in is te r ; ' I t must be co n fin ed s o le ly to th e g e n e ra l f in a n c ia l p o l ic y o f th e budget, and no d is cu ss io n is a llow ed on a d m in is tra t iv e p o l ic y w h ich has no d i r e c t beairing on bhe f in a n c ia l p o l ic y so d is c lo s e d o r on any m a tte r e x c lu s iv e ly concern ing any p a r t ic u la r l o c a l i t y o r community.The Finance M in is te r opens the d is c u s s io n when p re s e n tin g the budget and has a r ig h t o f re p ly a t th e end o f the d is c u s s io n b u t in t h is stage no m otion may. be moved. The a p p ro p r ia t io n accounts are then s c ru t in iz e d by the s tand ing Committee on P u b lic A c c o u n ts .;. In the second stage th e re is a d e ta ile d ' d is c u s s io n o f the demands f o r th e g ra n t o f funds , and f o r t h is d is cu ss io n n o t le s s than tw e lve days must be a l lo t te d . -

Any member may move th e re d u c tio n o f any proposed g ra n t, b u t must g ive th re e days n o t ic e o f h is in te n t io n to g e th e r w ith a b r ie f j u s t i f i c a ­t io n . T h is procedure is commonly adopted by a member who wishes to c r i t i c i z e seme aspect o f th e a d m in is tra t io n . He moves a c u t in th e a p p ro p ria te g ra n t w h ich th e M in is te r then has to j u s t i f y . The re d u c tio n may be m ere ly a token ou t o f no more than K 1, and is u s u a lly w ithdraw n a f te r the M in is te r has g iven h is e x p la n a tio n ; the member is s a t is f ie d w ith having drawn th e ‘a t te n t io n o f the Government to the a lle g e d g rieva nce .The m otion f o r a re d u c tio n may however be in tended s e r io u s ly and pressed to a d iv is io n , which n a tu r a l ly fo llo w s p a r ty l in e s . No demand f o r a 'g ra n t may be made except a recommendation by the Government, and no m otion may be made to in c rease any g ra n t o r to a l t e r i t s d e s t in a t io n . The Speaker may f i x the tim e a l lo t t e d f o r the d is c u s s io n o f each item and d a i ly a t k p.m . must d ispose ' o f a l l o u ts ta n d in g m a tte rs in connection w ith the demands a llo c a te d to th a t day. I f supplem entary expend itu re is found necessary d u r in g th e ye a r, the P re s id e n t f ix e s a date f o r c o n s id e ra tio n o f the supplem entary demand, w hich is d e a lt w ith in the same manner as a demand f o r a g ra n t in the budget, and th is procedure a ls o a p p lie s to any expend itu re in c u rre d in excess o f th e g ra n t made "by P a rlia m e n t.

The Budget, as f i n a l l y passed by the Chamber, is subm itted to the P re s id e n t in the fo rm o f a b i l l f o r h is s ig n a tu re . As exp la ined a lre a d y , the Chamber o f N a t io n a l i t ie s has no connection w ith f in a n c e ; th e Speaker has th e power to decide th a t a measure is a money b i l l and p ro v is io n is made in the C o n s t itu t io n f o r the s e ttle m e n t o f any c o n tro ve rsy "between the two Chambers as to whether a b i l l has r ig h t l y been c lassed as a money b i l l . Except w ith regard to th e c o n t ro l o f funds the procedure in the Chamber o f N a t io n a l i t ie s is th e same as in the Chamber o f D eputies .

3. The E xecu tive Gov* me i t

(a ) In the C o n s t itu t io n (S ec tions 114 to 125) . The Union Government c o n s is ts o f a P:’ime M in is te r and o th e r members. They are appo in ted by the P re s id e n tะ th e Prime M in is te r on th e nom ina tion o f the Chamber o f D eputies and the o th e r members on the nom ina tion o f the Prime M in is te r . The Govern­ment is c o l le c t iv e ly re s p o n s ib le to the Chamber o f D e pu ties . A member o f the Government, o th e r than the Prime M in is te r , need n o t be a member o f the

P a rlia m e n t a t the t im e -o f h±g appo i ir t iuepili' 'b u t h ie gppourteem ;.- i^ G e s i f a t any tim e be holds' o f f ic e f o r lo n g e r ’th a n s ix conse cu tive months w ith o u t

j b e in g a member o f P a rliam en t* .Any,.member o f the Government may re s ig n . a t any tim ie, and must re s ig n i f th e Prime M in is te r so r e q u ir e s . . - The Prime M in is te r i s o b lig e d to re s ig n i f he. ceases, to ccasmand a m a jo r i ty in th e .Chamber o f D eputies .un less th e P re s id e n t, on h is a d v ic e , d isso lve 's , the P a rlia m e n t and the Prime M in is te r secures a m a jo r i ty in the new Chamber a f t e r a genera l -e le c t io n . The re s ig n a t io n o f the Prime M in is te r , in v o lv e s th e re s ig n a t io n o f a l l th e o th e r members o f th e ' Government, วนt th e y a l l ,

.. in c lu d in g th e Prim e M in is te r , c a r ry on t h e i r d u t ie s , even a f te r a d is s o ­lu t io n Of P a rlia m e n t, u n t i l t h e i r successors a re app o in ted . The a u th o r i ty o f th e e x e c u tiv e Government extends ove r the same sphere as th a t o f the P a rlia m e n t. A l l e xe cu tive a c t io n by th e Union Government is taken in the rieme o f . th e -P re s id e n t b u t , ■as exp la ined above, th e P re s id e n t n o rm a lly

■I a c ts .o n ly on th e a d v ic e 'o f the Prime M in is te r . However the P re s id e n t shou ld a lvays have a v o ic e in the conduct o f a f f a i r s , as th e Prime M in is te r is e n jo in e d to keep him g e n e ra lly in fo rm ed on a l l m a tte rs ...o f dom estic and in te r n a t io n a l p o l ic y . ' 1. . ........

The. o n ly d u ty - p o s i t iv e ly imposed on the. Government under th e C o n s ti­t u t io n is th a t ' o f p re p a rin g es tim a tes o f re c e ip ts - and expe nd itu re f o r

. each f in a n c ia l .y a a r and s u b m itt in g them to the -Chamber o f D e p u t ie s .fo r c o n s id e ra t io n , b u t the final a p p ro p r ia t io n o f the -revenues and a l l ' m a tte rs in connection th e re w ith ! re s ts w ith the Chamber o f D e p u t ie s 'fo r re g u la t io n in accordance w ith la w . The Government may n o t -d e c la re 'o r -p a r t ic ip a te in any war w ith o u t th e assen t o f th e P a r lia m e n t 'b u t, : in th e case o f a c tu a l o r im m inent in v a s io n , th e Government may take w hatever steps th e y may th in k necessary f o r th e p ro te c t io n o f- th e U n ion , tho iigh th e ap p ro va l o f P a rlia m e n t must be sought a t the e a r l ie s t p o s s ib le da te and, i f n o t then s i t t i n g , i t must be summoned.

In c o n s t i tu t io n a l p ra c t ic e th e re is one n o ta b le fe a tu re to w h ich th e re i s no re fe re n c e in th e C o n s t itu t io n . From the f i r s t a tta in m e n t o f independence i t has been the p ra c t ic e to recogn ize one o f the members o f th e Government as Deputy Prime M in is te r . Presumably t h is was in tended to meet such an emergency as arose on the a s s a s s in a tio n o f Aung San, b u t i t has been found u s e fu l as a device f o r c a r ry in g on th e business o f th e government d u r in g the n o t in fre q u e n t v i s i t s o f the -P rim e M in is te r to , fo re ig n c o u n tr ie s . In the new Government fo rm e d -a fte r the gen e ra l e le c t io n o f 1956 th e re was a fu r th e r development o f t h is p ra c t ic e . Three Deputy Prime M in is te rs were app o in ted , and th e Prime M in is te r exp la ined th a t a l l th re e were in v e s te d พi t h the f u l l powers .o f : the Prime M in is te r . .The ir fu n c t io n s are e xp la in e d be low . ; ; 5 ,

■ . .--xTbe iA tto rn a y -G e n e ra l (S ec tion s 126, 127) . The C o n s t itu t io n .p rov ides for-,•■•the 1 appoin tm ent o f an'- A tto rn e y -G e n e ra l. He. i s n o t n e c e s s a rily , a. member b£ tfte Government, 'a n d need n o t be a member o f e i th e r chamber o f the ' L e g is ­la tu r e , b u t.h e is appo in ted by th e P re s id e n t on the a d v ice o f th e Prime M in is te r , and must re s ig n i f BO re q u ire d by th e Prime M in is te r , .a n d goes o u t o f th e o f f ic e w ith th e Government, though, l i k e members o f the Govern­ment, c a r ry in g on h is d u t ie s u n t i l th e appoin tm ent o f a new Prime M in is te r . He must be an advocate o f the H igh C ourt, and h is fu n c t io n is to g ive le g a l adv ice to th e Government and to pe rfo rm such o th e r d u t ie s o f a le g a l c h a ra c te r as. may be- re q u ire d o f him .

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The A u d ito r-G e n e ra l (S ec tions 128, to 132 ). P ro v is io n is a ls o made in the C o n s titu t io n f o r the appointm ent o f an A u d ito r-G e n e ra l. He is appo in ted by th e P re s id e n t emd th e re fo re in e f fe c t by th e Prime M in is te r .But he is n o t a member o f the Government and h is p o s it io n is v e ry d i f f e r e n t . The Prime M in is te r can nominate a member o f th e Government w ith o u t con­s u l t in g P a rlia m e n t, b u t the appointm ent o f th e A u d ito r-G e n e ra l re q u ire s the app ro va l o f b o th Chambers, and he ho lds o f f ic e u n t i l he r e t i r e s , un less removed from h is o f f ic e in l i k e manner and on l i k e grounds as a Judge o f the High C ourt; no r can h is r ig h ts o r s a la ry be ab ridged un less he vo lu n ­t a r i l y agrees to a re d u c tio n o f s a la ry in th e event o f gen e ra l economy and

r re trenchm ent. H is fu n c t io n is to c o n t ro l on b e h a lf o f th e Union a l l d is ­bursements, and to a u d it a l l accounts ad m in is te re d under the a u th o r i ty o f the P a rlia m e n t and S ta te C ounc ils ; thus h is sphere is more ex tens ive than th a t o f the L e g is la tu re o r th e Government. He i s a ls o re q u ire d to subm it to the Chamber o f D eputies such re p o r ts r e la t in g to the accounts o f th e Union and the S ta tes as th e law may p re s c r ib e .

(b ) The Cabinet and M in is t r ie s . The members o f th e Union Government when m entioned in E n g lis h are o r d in a r i ly c a l le d M in is te rs and, c o l le c t iv e ly , in accordance w ith E n g lis h usage, th e C ab ine t, a lthough n e ith e r o f these terms appears in connection w ith the Union Government in th e E n g lis h v e rs io n o f th e C o n s t itu t io n . In th e s ta te Governments, th e E n g lis h v e rs io n o f th e C o n s t itu t io n re fe rs — in (s e c t io n 162 (3 ) — to a "C ab ine t o f S ta te M in is te r s . " Each M in is te r has charge o f one o r more of- the M in is t r ie s among w h ich the o rd in a ry fu n c t io n s o f government a re d is t r ib u te d . Fo r each M in is te r th e re is a P a rlia m e n ta ry S e c re ta ry and a P r iv a te S e c re ta ry . The P a rlia m e n ta ry S e c re ta ry , as th e name im p lie s , is a member o f P a rlia m e n t; he is u s u a lly a young and p rom is ing p o l i t i c ia n who a s p ire s to become a M in is te r h im s e lf in course o f t im e . The appoin tm ent o f bo th P a rlia m e n ta ry and P r iv a te S e c re ta ry re s ts w ith th e M in is te r , and t h e i r fu n c t io n s are a m a tte r o f m utua l arrangem ent. The s a la ry o f the Prime M in is te r is K .2 ,300 (about $483) a month, and o f the o th e r M in is te rs K .1, 700; th e y have a f ix e d t r a v e l l in g a llow ance , v a ry in g from one M in is t r y to ano the r acco rd ing to the amount o f to u r in g l i k e l y to be re q u ire d . The emoluments are c e r ta in ly n o t ex travagan t and, in r e la t io n to the s ta tu s o f the o f f ic e and th e in c id e n ta l expend itu re in v o lv e d , th e y a re b a re ly adequate.

O rd in a r i ly th e re is a c a b in e t m eeting once a week where a l l m a tte rs o f to p ic a l in te r e s t come up f o r d is c u s s io n and the c o l le c t iv e p o l ic y o f the Government takes shape. S u b je c t, however, to th e o f f i c i a l p o l ic y o f the Government, each M in is te r c o n tro ls the a f f a i r s o f h is OWE M in is t r y . For each M in is t r y th e re is a S e cre ta ry to Government in charge o f one o r more e xe cu tive departm ents, w ith such J o in t S e c re ta r ie s . A d d it io n a l S e c re ta r ie s , Deputy S e c re ta rie s and A s s is ta n t S e c re ta r ie s as are though t necessary, to g e th e r w ith a subo rd ina te e s ta b lish m e n t. A M in is te r who ho lds two o r more p o r t fo l io s o r d in a r i ly has a S e cre ta ry to Government w ith th e a p p ro p ria te s t a f f f o r each p o r t f o l io . Some fu n c t io n s have been de lega ted to ร eparate C o rpo ra tions , Boards and Commissions w h ich are in tended to be independent o f departm enta l ro u t in e b u t re sp o n s ib le to P a rliam en t th rough the M in is te r concerned.

Be fore the war th e re were te n M in is t r ie s , th e l i m i t imposed in the then C o n s t itu t io n . N orm ally these d e a lt re s p e c t iv e ly w ith Home A f f a i r s , J u d ic ia l A f f a i r s , F inance , Revenue, Commerce, F o re s ts , E duca tion , Labour, A g r ic u ltu re , and H e a lth and P u b lic Works. These fu n c t io n s , to g e th e r w ith

- 50 -

those fo rm e r ly rese rved f o r the . o f f i c i a l Governor, and w ith new fu n c t io n s a r is in g o u t o f th e p o s t-w a r s itu a S io fi; a re now d is t r ib u te d among a . la rg e r number o f M in is t r ie s . These have v a r ie d from tim e to tim e b o th in number and in th e method o f d is t r ib u t io n . In g e n e ra i th e y f a l l in to two groups; fu n c t io n a l and t e r r i t o r i a l . The fu n c t io n a l. M in is t r ie s a re those d e a lin g w ith the m a tte rs rese rved under th e C o n s t itu t io n to th e Union Government, and th e t e r r i t o r i a l M in is te rs d e a l w ith th e a f f a i r s o f the fo u r S ta tes and th e Chin s p e c ia l D iv is io n .

Some o f th e fu n c t io n a l M in is t r ie s have had ra th e r an ad hoc c h a ra c te r, changing t h e i r name and scope in response to a tem porary need to f in d a man f o r a jo b o r a jo b f o r a man. Of the fo rm e r te n M in is t r ie s o n ly th re e s u rv iv e as separa te M in is t r ie s under the same name; these are th e Home,' J u d ic ia l and la b o u r M in is t r ie s , .a n d o f- th e s e th e M in is t r y o f Labour has a t tim es lo s t i t s separa te id e n t i t y . The M in is t r y o f F inance and Revenue now combines two departm ents fo rm e r ly sepa ra te , and so a ls o does the M in is t r y o f A g r ic u ltu re and F o re s ts . The fu n c t io n a l M in is t r ie s a re g iven in the fo llo w in g l i s t to g e th e r w ith t h e i r re s p e c tiv e e xe cu tive departm ents o r s e rv ic e s and w ith th e independent agencies Which th e y su p e rv ise ; b u t , as the a l lo c a t io n o f these fo l lo w changes in th e t i t l e and scope o f th e M in is t r ie s , th e arrangement cannot be regarded as permanent and th e l i s t ‘is n o t in te n d e d to be com plete .

F u n c tio n a l M in is t r ie s , w i th t h e i r Departments and Agencies.

M in is t r y A g r ic u ltu re

and F o res ts

C o -op e ra tives andCommodity D is t r ib u t io n

D e m o c ra t is a tio n 'o f L o ca l A d m in is tra t io n , ' and Loca l Bodies

Departm ents, e tc . Department o f A g r ic u l­

tu re and F is h e r ie s , F o re s t Departm ent, I r r ig a t io n Department V e te r in a ry Departm ent.

C o -op e ra tive Department Department o f C i v i l

S upp lies

Agencies A g r ic u ltu re and R u ra l Development C o rp o ra tio n , s ta te Tim ber Board.

C i v i l S upp lies Board

E ducation and C u ltu re

F inance Revenue

F o re ig n A f fa ir s

H e a lth .

Department o f E duca tion , Department o f Union

C u ltu re

Customs Departm ent, E xc ise Department Income Tax Departm ent, stamps

Ir ra ig ra t jo n S e rv ice

H e a lth S e rv ice ,M ed ica l S e rv ice

Union Youth C o u n c il, C o u n c il o f C u ltu ra l

A f fa i r s

Union Bank o f - Burma

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M in is t r y Home A f fa ir s

In d u s tr ie s

In fo rm a tio n

J u d ic ia l A f fa ir s

Labour

Land N a t io n a liz a t io n

Mines

Marine (P o r t, M arine, C i v i l A v ia t io n & C oasta l S h ipp ing )

N a tio n a l Economy

Prime M in is te r , N a tio n a l Defence, Nfc»cional P lann ing .

P u b lic Works & Housing

Railways & In la n d Communications (W ater T ra n sp o rt, Posts 8s T e le g ra p h s .)

Departm ents, e tc .C i v i l A d m in is tra tio n , P o lic e Department

Department o f in d u s tr ie s In d u s t r ia l Research, B o ile r In s p e c tio n

In fo rm a tio n Department, B roadcasting S e rv ice , Stage and F ilm s , P r in t in g & S ta t io n e ry .

P riso n Department, T ra n s la tio n Department

Labour Department F a c to r ie s Department

Land N a t io n a liz a t io n , S e ttlem en t & Land

R ecords,- .Surveys,S ta te C o lon ies , R e g is tra t io n .

G e o lo g ic a l Department, Mines & E xp lo s ive s .

M arine S e rv ice C i v i l A v ia t io n D epart­

ment.

P u b lic Works- D epart­ment

P o s ta l S e rv ice , Telecommunications

Agencies

In d u s t r ia l Develop- - ment C o rp o ra tio n ,

S p inn ing 8s Weaving Factory.

E le c t r i c i t y Supply Board

Dock Labour Board, Union Insurance Board, T i le F a c to ry Board.

M in e ra l Development C o rp o ra tio n ,

Burma C o rpo ra tion(1951) L td .Burma O i l Co. (1954)

L td .

Sh ipp ing Board, A irways Board.

Economic and S o c ia l Board

Bureau o f S p e c ia l In v e s t ig a t io n ,

P u b lic Serv ices Commission.

Housing. 8s Country Development Board.

R ailw ay Board,In la n d Water T rans­

p o r t Board

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M in is t r y Departm ents, e tc . Agencies.R e h a b i l i ta t io n R e h a b i l i ta t io n Board

R e lie f & R e - s e t t l e m e n t '.••ะ. - •.ไ!;.;. -.’ j'. • '

R e lig io n s . A f f a i r s , S o c ia l'. - • B uddh is t C o unc il,"A ffa irs ,- Mass E d uca tion , • • ■ ■' J •• B u d d h is tic I n s t i t u t e ,

. ~ ไ 1 ' : B uddh is t E duca tion ,, • . . ^ . - Mass E duca tion C o u n c il

S o c ia l S e rv ices S o c ia l S e rv ices. : ‘ '..ไ.-.. :.CccramisSion.

Trade Development and •- 'ไ *• - ' ' :; Supply. '7 . ; ไ-''. V ' •

M ention has a lre a d y been made o f an in te r e s t in g and' im p o rta n t in nova ­t io n — th e extended use o f Deputy Prime M in is te rs and the g roup ing o f M in is t r ie s . The th re e Deputy p r im e -M in is te rร: are-"the M in is te r f o r F o re ign

. .A f fa ir s , the M in is te r f o r National:-Econom y• a id -the" M in is te r f o r S o c ia l 'S e rv ic e s . They are. charged -w ith s u p e rv is in g groups* o f ■ M in is t r ie s and c o -o rd in a tin g t h e i r a c t iv i t ie s , . - a n d th e y -fo rm , in e f fe c t , : an In n e r C abinet The Prime M in is te r announced th a t they .'w ou ld -'e xe rc ise t h e - f u l l powers o f a Prime M in is te r , /presumably w i th in t h e i r o w ii-s p e c ia l spheres, h j

T h is .experim ent may w e l l p rove i to ;be -_a s a t is fa c to r y s o lu t io n f o r . the d i f f i c u l t problem o f -d e v o lu tio n ะ . a n d "C O -o rd in a tio n .- The M in is te r f o r N a tio n a l Economy w i l l be re s p o n s ib le (s u b je c t o f course to th e C ab ine t) f o r th.e h ig h e r .d ir e c t io n o f .-a g r ic u ltu re ; and F o re s ts J C o -ope ra tives and Commodity D is t r ib u t io n , F inance ไa n d . Revenue-,- in d u s try , M ines, Metrine,Railways and In te r n a l Communications,- and Trade, "Development arid Supply.The M in is te r f o r S o c ia l S e rv ices occupies a s im i la r p o s i t io n w ith regard to D e m o c ra tiza tio n and L o c a l A d m in is tra t io n , E duca tion and C u ltu re , H e a lth , In fo rm a tio n , Labour,.- Land -N a t io n a liz a t io n , ■ P u b lic ' Works and Housing,

■ R e h a b i l i ta t io n , . and R e l ie f and R ese ttlem en t. The Prim e M in is te r is in p e rso n a l charge o f N a tio n a l Defence and N a tio n a l P la n n in g / and presum ably takes a s p e c ia l in te r e s t in th e M in is t r ie s no t a l lo t t e d to these two deputy Prime' M in is te rs . The th ir d - Deputy Prime- M in is te r i n charge o f F o re ig n A f fa ir s doe s ,no t seen to have-been p l o t t e d any s u p e rv is o ry re s ­p o n s ib i l i t i e s , b u t would n a tu r a l ly take over the s p e c ia l fu n c t io n s o f the •prime M in is te r in the event o f h is absence abroad. -

There is an in te re s t in g . in n o v a t io n a ls o in conn ec tion w ith the t e r r i ­t o r i a l M in is t r ie s . Under th e C o n s t itu t io n th e re are M in is te rs f o r each o f th e fo u r S ta tes and f o r Chin A f f a i r s , and these are appo in ted on th e nom ina tion o f th e Prime M in is te r a c t in g in .c o n s u lta t io n w ith th e re s p e c tiv e C o u n c ils . There h&'re always been re p re s e n ta tiv e s o f th e m in o r i t ie s among th e fu n c t io n a l M in is t r ie s anCL th § t t r a d i t io n is s t i l l o b s e rv e d 'in the p re se n t Government w h ich in c lu d e s a B uddh is t Arakanese,- a Muslim Arakanese, a' Shan, a Karen and a Kayah. I t sterns however th a t fo rm e r ly the t e r r i t o r i a l M in is te rs had l i t t l e , say, . i f any, in m a tte rs o th e r than those concern ing

. ^ / On the resum ption .of o f f i c e o f the fo rm e r Prime M in is te r , บ Nu, th e : e x fP rim e ;M in is te r U.Ba Gwe, becameไ-th e fo u r th Deputy Prime

.M in is te r ! , , ; • . : : - 1 -.- ะ-.; •• ■

ะ:.’r น : " 5 3 - ■ ■ T. - ' . ;

t h e i r own s p e c ia l t e r r i t o r ie s . Now however th e y a re to have a f u l l vo ice in th e C ab ine t. The C o n s titu t io n l im i t s the powers o f the Cabinet over the subo rd ina te c o n s t itu e n t u n its , b u t now the re p re s e n ta tiv e s o f these subo rd ina te u n its w i l l have a share in the Government o f Burma p ro p e r.The im portance o f t h is new p ra c t ic e is th a t , as th e Prime M in is te r exp la ined when 'questioned on the s u b je c t a t a Press Conference, the in c lu s io n o f these re p re s e n ta tiv e s w il l~ S H la rg e 'th e ir v is io n beyond t h e i r p a ro c h ia l l im i t s and shou ld he lp to promote n a t io n a l u n i ty and s o l id a r i t y .

(c ) P la n n in g . When th e e le c tio n s o f 1947 bad g iv e il a c le a r ’m a jo r ity to . the AFPFL, one o f th e most u rg e n t problems f o r s o lu t io n was the re p a ir o f the damages sus ta in ed by Burma th rough th e war and th e re c o n s tru c tio n o f the. n a t io n a l economy. The s i tu a t io n as i t appeared to Burmans a t th a t tim e is described in th e in tro d u c t io n to th e Two Year P lan f o r th e Develop­ment o f Burma.

"D u rin g the JSeriod in which Burma formed a p a r t o f the overseas dominions o f B r i t a in she has been th e scene o f in te n se economic a c t i v i t y in c e r ta in s p h e re s .. . But t h is p e r io d was dominated by th e r u l in g d o c tr in e o f la is s e z f a i r e and th e n a tu re and e x te n t o f the economic development was determ ined a lm ost e x c lu s iv e ly by th e s e l f - in t e r e s t o f fo re ig n c a p i ta l is t s and en trep reneu rs . . . W hile p u b lic w e a lth in c re a s e d j the m a te r ia l c o n d it io n s o f the people Saw l i t t l e im provem ent." But now, i t con tin ued , th e re was " th e o p p o r tu n ity o f deve lop ing an economy s u ite d to th e needs o f the c o u n try and the gen ius o f ou r p e o p le ."

The p o l ic y o f la is s e z f a i r e was d e f in i t e ly re je c te d : th e re w a s .to be a p la n . And the scope o f th is p la n was n o t to be l im i te d to economic development b u t to serve as an in s tru m e n t f o r the c re a t io n o f a n a t io n a l economy. T h is comprehensive o b je c t iv e found express ion even b e fo re the f i r s t sess ion o f the C o n s titu e n t Assembly and, so e a r ly as May 1947, a N a tio n a l P lann ing Board was c o n s t itu te d under th e chairm anship o f a member o f the G overnor's C o unc il who became the Member f o r P lann ing . I t was n o t m ere ly economic p la n n in g , b u t n a t io n a l p la n n in g . There seems, however, to have been some u n c e r ta in ty as to the scope o f i t s fu n c t io n s ; and in Februa ry 1948 i t was re-named the Economic P lann ing Board. In f a c t , i t s sphere a lre a d y extended beyond p u re ly economic m a tte rs , and in the fo llo w in g A p r i l the o r ig in a l name was re s to re d . Since then i t has always been s ty le d the N a tio n a l P lann ing Board.

The com bina tion o f economic p la n n in g w ith s o c ia l re c o n s tru c tio n has from the f i r s t been a c h a ra c te r is t ic and d is t in c t iv e fe a tu re o f p la n n in g in Burma. I t was fo rm a lly announced in s e c tio n 4l o f th e C o n s titu t io n :"The economic l i f e o f the Union s h a l l be p lanned w ith th e aim o f in c re a s in g th e p u b lic w e a lth , o f im prov ing th e m a te r ia l c o n d it io n s o f the people and ra is in g t h e i r c u l tu r a l le v e l, o f c o n s o lid a t in g th e independence o f the Union and s tre n g th e n in g i t s de fens ive c a p a c ity ." P lann ing was to comprise a l l aspects o f n a t io n a l l i f e , as is im p l ic i t in th e D ire c t iv e P r in c ip le s o f S ta te P o lic y which a re se t f o r t h in Chapter IV o f the C o n s t itu t io n . One fu n c t io n o f th e P lann ing Board was to draw up the two year p la n o f economic development mentioned above. Th is p la n was devised f o r prom oting economic development and a ls o "e q u a lly im p o rta n t — fo r la y in g th e fo unda tions o f a p lanned economy and f o r tra n s fo rm in g Burma in to a coun try where the w e lfa re o f the common man c o n s t itu te s th e main m otive o f s ta te a c t i v i t y . "I t was in tended .to " tra n s fo rm th e v i l la g e in Burma in to a s o c ia l u n i t where every in d iv id u a l l iv e s a f u l l and h e a lth y l i f e and en joys a f a i r share o f

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the am en ities ; o f-n o d e m c iv i l i z a t i o n . " On th e a tta in m e n t o f independence i t was under, th e M in is te r f o r N a tio n a l P lann ing th a t the P lann ing .Board con tinued to fu n c t io n ,. . , 1

One o f the e a r l ie s t measures o f the P lann ing Board was to arrange f o r th e es ta b lish m e n t o f a committee to fo rm u la te p ropo sa ls f o r th e recon - . s t r u c t io n o f lo c a l, government from the v i l la g e upwards on dem ocratic l in e s as an in s tru m e n t of- s o c ia l and economic u n i ty . One team o f expe rts was c a l le d ' in to a d v ise .o n m a te r ia l development and ano the r to adv ise on the p rom otion o f s o c ia l w e lfa re , and a t a g re a t n a t io n a l W elfa re (Pyldaw tha) Conference in 1952 a l l th e p lans f o r economic and s o c ia l development were b roug h t to g e th e r and la id b e fo re th e peop le .

A l l these m ahy-sides p lans were - in th e n a tu re o f th in g s . in t im a te ly • connected. They a l l made demands on Burma' s •l im i te d f in a n c ia l resources and s t i l l more l im i te d resources o f manpower; h o s p ita ls competed w ith fa c to r ie s f o r men and money;- P lann ing is f u t i l e un less th e p lans a re . implemented, and some c e n t ra l .a u th o r ity was needed to c o -o rd in a te the p lans and to supe rv ise t h e i r exe cu tio n . T h is has ra is e d numerous d i f f i c u l t a d m in is tra t iv e problem s f o r w h ich v a rio u s s o lu t io n s have "been sought. The M in is tr y o f P lann ing was o n ly one among many o th e r M in is t r ie s , and the in te rv e n t io n o f the M in is t r y o f P lann ing in th e a c t i v i t i e s o f o th e r M in is t r ie s was n o t u n n a tu ra lly resentedT One obvious s o lu t io n was to p la ce

•the M in is t r y o f P la n n in g d i r e c t ly under th e Prime M in is te r , b u t he was a lre a d y overburdened w ith many o th e r d u t ie s . The n e x t exped ien t was to c re a te two Commissions, one concerned w ith economic development and the o th e r w ith s o c ia l w e lfa re . These Commissions were in tended to c o -o rd in a te th e p ro je c ts w i th in t h e i r re s p e c tiv e spheres and p u t them b e fo re a more comprehensive Economic and S o c ia l Board on w h ich most o f th e im p o rta n t m in is t r ie s w e re 're p re se n te d . The c re a t io n o f-a n Econcoic and S o c ia l Board was an e x p l ic i t re c o g n it io n o f the p r in c ip le th a t s o c ia l re c o n s tru c t io n and economic development a re in s e p a ra b le . The Chairman o f th e Board was th e Prime M in is te r ; and th e Board cou ld th e re fo re use h is a u th o r i ty to keep a check on th e im p lem en ta tion o f p la n s . Th is -a rrangem ent, however, was too cumbrous, and the two Commissions are d e fu n c t, though th e Board is s t i l l a c t iv e . The most re c e n t s o lu t io n is to a p p o in t le a d in g members o f the C abinet as Deputy Prime M in is te rs w ith r e s p o n s ib i l i t y f o r the two main branches o f p la n n in g , and th e event may prove th a t t h is i s ' t h e most s a t is fa c to ry s o lu t io n o f th e p u re ly a d m in is tra t iv e problem s o f p la n n in g . A lso a s tro n g committee c o n s is t in g o f th e S e c re ta r ie s o f th e M in is t r ie s mo^t in t im a te ly connected w ith p l annin g has b e e n 'ap po in ted to supe rv ise tlae p rogress ach ieved by th e agencies charged--w ith th e ' im p lem en ta tion o f th e v a r io u s p ro je c ts .

(d ) P a r t ie s and Pressure Groups. The p re se n t Government rep resen ts th e A n t i-F a s c is t P e o p le 's Freedom League (AFFFL). As a lre a d y e xp la ined , t h is was c re a te d by th e p o l i t i c a l genius o f Aung San in May 19^5 as a n a t io n a l o rg a n iz a t io n com pris ing a loose' c o a l i t io n o f numerous groups u n ite d o n ly in t h e i r common o p p o s it io n to fo re ig n r u le . T h is was bo th i t s s tre n g th and i t s weakness. To understand i t s c h a ra c te r and c o n s t itu t io n s , however, one must g o - fu r th e r back and t r a c e 'b r ie f ly the e v o lu t io n o f p o l i t i c a l p a r t ie s in Burma.

The b i r t h o f m o d e rn 'n a tio n a lism in Burma may be dated from th e founda­t io n in 1906 o f a Young Men's B uddh is t A s s o c ia tio n (YMBA), in s p ire d , as the

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name im p lie s , by th e example o f the Young Men's C h r is t ia n A s s o c ia tio n and, l i k e th a t , p ro fe s s e d ly r e l ig io u s ra th e r than p o l i t i c a l . B u t, as Buddhism was th e n a t io n a l r e l ig io n , i t was as much n a t io n a l is t as r e l ig io u s , and from the f i r s t i t had p o l i t i c a l im p lic a t io n s , i t s e a r l ie r a c t iv i t i e s were in the f i e l d o f e du ca tion . I t found p o in ts o f a t ta c k on the e d u c a tio n a l system in th e predominance o f C h r is t ia n m is s io n a r ie s and in th e s u p e rio r advantages enjoyed by E uras ians; a ls o i t demanded e d u c a tio n a l re fo rm s th a t would open up a w ider, f i e l d o f employment f o r Burmans. A few Buddhist

"monks were among i t s e a r l ie s t le ade rs and the B uddh is t R e lig io u s O rder, rep resen ted in every v i l la g e , was a p o te n t ia l f i e l d f o r propaganda over th e whole c o u n try . The r ic e - c o n t r o l p o l ic y o f 1917-18» f i x in g a maximum b u t no t a minimum p r ic e f o r paddy, s t im u la te d w idespread d is c o n te n t .among the pea san try and ensured a fa vo u ra b le re c e p tio n f o r any movement in o p p o s it io n to th e government. Then a D ire c to r o f P u b lic In s t r u c t io n (new ly appo in ted from Madras) t r i e d to improve e d u c a tio n a l e f f ic ie n c y by w ith d ra w in g government su p p o rt from m onastic and o th e r v i l la g e schools th a t d id n o t a t ta in h is s tanda rd . In 1919 the ve rn a c u la r schoo ls re c e iv in g g ran ts com prised 3228 m onastic and 5269 la y schoo ls ; by 1921 th e re remained o n ly 1,434 m onastic and 2 ,599 la y schoo ls . T h is gave a new s tim u lu s to d is a f fe c t io n in the m onastic o rd e r and in th e v i l la g e s . The same o f f i c i a l was a ls o la rg e ly re s p o n s ib le f o r the p ro je c t o f a u n iv e r s it y th a t Burmans regarded as meant to r e s t r i c t ra th e r than extend t h e i r o p p o r tu n it ie s . The outcome was a w idespread schoo l s t r ik e and the fo u n d a tio n o f n a t io n a l schools in o p p o s it io n to the o f f i c i a l e d u c a tio n a l system. These deve lop­ments inc reased the in f lu e n c e o f th e YMBA, and when the YMBA leade rs re je c te d as inadequate p o l i t i c a l re fo rm s propounded by th e Government, they had the suppo rt o f a movement ex tend ing th roughou t the whole c o u n try . In 1921 they founded th e G eneral C o u n c il o f Burmese A s s o c ia tio n s , n o t B uddh is t b u t Burmese, n o t r e l ig io u s b u t p o l i t i c a l . T h is remained an im p o rta n t

—fa c to r in p o l i t i c a l e v o lu t io n up to the tim e o f the Japanese in v a s io n .

Under the c o n s t i tu t io n a l re fo rm s o f 1923, and aga in a f t e r th e separa­t io n o f Burma from In d ia in 1937* communal re p re s e n ta tio n h inde red the a tta in m e n t o f e f fe c t iv e power by any n a t io n a l is t group. Consequently p o l i t i c a l r i v a l r y was a s tru g g le f o r p o s it io n ra th e r than f o r power, and the s o -c a lle d p a r t ie s were m ere ly groups o f much the same persons w ith k a le id o s c o p ic changes o f p a r ty names and le a d e rs . C o nd itions however were changing. D is a f fe c t io n among the c u l t iv a to r s , o r ig in a t in g in th e r ic e - c o n tro l p o l ic y o f 1917» became more acute th rough th e t r a n s fe r o f some m il l io n s o f acres o f r ic e - la n d s to In d ia n m oney-lenders as a r e s u l t o f the depress ion o f 1930. D r. Ba Maw t r ie d tp take advantage o f t h is and s tru c k a new- note w ith h is s in y e -th a (poo r man) p a r ty , b u t h is fo l lo w in g con­s is te d o f p o l i t ic ia n s ra th e r than o f peasants and even among p o l i t ic ia n s he had o n ly a sm a ll m in o r i ty

A group o f younger men form ed a new p a r ty w ith the s ty le o f th a k in (m as te r), a term p re v io u s ly rese rved in commori usage on ly , f o r Europeans.They c a r r ie d the s in y e -th a p o l ic y from th 'e 'p la t fo rm to th e peop le . In 1938 Thakin Mya founded th e A ll-B u rm a Peasants’ O rg a n iza tio n (ABPO) and in 1940 บ Ba Swe, th e la te Prime M in is te r , f ig u re d p ro m in e n tly in the A ll-Burm a Trade Union Congress (ABTUC). A lthough the Thakins never h e ld more than th re e seats in the le g is la tu r e , th e y had a s tro n g fo llo w in g in the co u n try th rough these two o rg a n iz a tio n s . To the same group belonged Aung San who, as a lre a d y m entioned, ob ta ined m i l i t a r y t r a in in g from th e Japanese and rose to th e command o f th e Burmese m i l i t a r y fo rc e s . Another th a k in composed a

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a p a t r io t ic song, Do-Bama (We Burmans), and t h is was adopted as th e s ty le o f a p a r ty o rg a n iz a t io n which was le d oy the th a k in s h u t a ls o in c lu d in g o th e rs . The amalgamation o f th e Do-3-ma p a r ty w ith D r. Ba Maw's S in ye -th a group p ro v id e d the fram ework o f Dr. Ba Maw's N a tio n a l P o l i t i c a l O rgan iza­t io n . T h is was rep resen ted in every d i s t r i c t , and the s e c re ta ry o f the d i s t r i c t o rg a n iz a t io n was u s u a lly a th a k in , 2 / 80 th a t th e o rg a n iz a t io n became in e f fe c t an in s tru m e n t o£ the th a k in le a d e rs .

Most o f the n a t io n a l is t groups had o r ig in a l ly welcomed th e Japanese as l ib e r a to r s , b u t th e s e c t io n th a t was in c l in e d to communism to o k the s id e o f the a l l i e s in sympathy w ith R ussia , and opposed the.Japanese from t h e i r f i r s t a r r i v a l . T h is s e c t io n , w i th Than Tun as one o f i t s c h ie f le a d e rs , o rgan ised the re s is ta n c e a g a in s t the Japanese, and, as o p p o s it io n to the Japanese grew s tro n g e r, th e y r a p id ly inc reased in number and came to be known as th e N a tio n a l R e v o lu tio n a ry P a rty (NRP). T h is p a r ty was fo rem ost in o b ta in in g r e c r u i t s f o r th e g u e r r i l la s and the Burmese army, and a ls o he lped in conn ec tion w ith the c re a t io n by Aung San o f the c o a l i t io n formed in August 1944, known o r ig in a l ly as the A n t i - f a s c is t O rg a n iz a tio n (AFO) and from May 19k 5 as th e AFPFL. '

C e rta in fe a tu re s o f th e c o n s t i tu t io n and c h a ra c te r o f the AFPFL deserve c lo se a t te n t io n . F i r s t and most im p o rta n t i t was a n a tio n -w id e o rg a n iz a t io n w ith m achinery ex tend ing ove r th e whole c o u n try . Three o th e r p o l i t i c a l o rg a n iz a tio n s a ls o covered th e whole c o u n try ; th e A ll-B urm a Peasents' O rg a n iz a tio n (ABPO), the A l l Burma Youth League (ABYL) and the A ll-B u rm a Trade U n io n .Congress (ABTUC) though the la s t o f these com prised o n ly the w orkers in th e few and s c a tte re d in d u s t r ia l concerns. These th re e o rg a n iz a tio n s were a f f i l i a t e d to th e AFPFL, and the lo c a l le a d e rs were o r d in a r i ly members o f th e AFPFL and a t th e same tim e were a ls o the lo c a l. le a d e rs o f the ' AFPFL. Thus th e AFPFL had a lm ost s o le command over the whole p o l i t i c a l o rg a n iz a t io n o f th e c o u n try . The c h ie f excep tion o f p o l i t i c a l s ig n if ic a n c e was th e P e op le 's V o lu n te e r O rg a n iz a tio n (pvo), which co n s is te d la r g e ly o f s o ld ie rs o f the w a r-tim e fo rc e s who were excluded when th e army was reo rgan ised a f t e r th e B r i t is h re -o c c u p a tio n .T h is rep resen ted the n a t io n a l movement in i t s m i l i t a r y aspect as the AFPFL d id in i t s c i v i l aspe c t, and Along San was a t th e head o f b o th . O ther na tion -w ide , o rg a n iz a tio n s were the B uddh is t r e l ig io u s o rd e r and the Burma Muslim P a rty . The fo rm e r had no le g a l c o n s t i tu t io n under B r i t is h ru le b u t was in g e n e ra l sympathy w ith th e AFPFL, and the la t t e r , n u m e ric a lly in s ig n i f ic a n t , b u t im p o rta n t com m erc ia lly , was a f f i l i a t e d to the AFPFL. Among the m in o r i ty peop les , the Shans, K ach ins, Karens, Kayahs and Chins, th e re were p o l i t i c a l o rg a n iz a tio n s a f f i l i a t e d to th e AFPFL and no o th e r p o l i t i c a l o rg a n iz a t io n except f o r a s e c t io n o f d is s id e n t Karens’. In e f fe c t , th e AFPFL was the o n ly p o l i t i c a l o rg a n iz a t io n , a p a rt from th e PVO, co ve rin g th e whole o f Burma.

The o th e r n o ta b le fe a tu re o f the AFPFL was th a t i t d id n o t p ro fe ss any p a r t ic u la r p o l i t i c a l id e o lo g y o th e r than n a tio n a lis m . P r io r to the secession o f the communists under Than Tun, p o l i t i c a l d iv e r s i t y , in i t s usua l sense, was d is re g a rd e d . Then, however, a s o c ia l i s t p a r ty was founded by o th e r members who t ru s te d Aung San as t h e i r le a d e r, accepted h is p o l ic y o f o b ta in in g independence by n e g o t ia t io n ra th e r than by fo rc e , and p re fe r re d w este rn dem ocra tic s o c ia lis m to communism. O the rs, who m is -

5 / Thakin Nu, Burma under th e Japanese, (M acm illan , New York, 195*0,p . 43.

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t ru s te d s o c ia lis m , o r bad more to lo s e under a 's o c ia l is t reg im e, began to draw a p a rt in separa te groups, b u t they were so few th a t th e y c a r r ie d l i t t l e w e ig h t.- C a p ita l is t in te re s ts h a rd ly 'e x is te d o u ts id e Arakan where some w e a lthy la n d lo rd s had s e t up a bank. On the a tta in m e n t o f indepen­dence e f fe c t iv e p o l i t i c a l power was in th e hands o f the AFPFL 'leaders ( s t i l l com pris ing a communist m in o r i ty ) and th e FVO, w h ich (as the r e s u lt o f i t s o r ig in in a com m un is t-insp ired re s is ta n c e movement and the sub­sequent a s s a s s in a tio n o f ' t h e i r r e a l le a d e r, Aung San) tended to fa v o u r th e communists ra th e r than th e s o c ia l is t s . When the communists went under­ground, fo llo w e d by a la rg e s e c t io n o f th e PVO, th e AFPFL became more than ever a o n e -p a rty government.

A s in g le p a r ty system is o f te n regarded as in c o n s is te n t ' w ith democracy. B u t a p a r ty c o n s t itu te d on the l in e s o f the AFPFL would seem to re p resen t th e people more e f fe c t iv e ly in some ways than e i th e r o f the two main p a r t ie s in England. In England th e p a r ty machine recommends cand ida tes who may p re v io u s ly have been q u ite unknown to the lo c a l e le c to ra te and have no lo c a l t ie s w ith th e c o n s titu e n c y w h ich they are supposed to re p re se n t; when e le c te d th e y a re re q u ire d to vo te in accordance w ith in s t r u c t io n s from the p a r ty . They re p re s e n t th e p a r ty in th e c o n s titu e n c y ra th e r than th e c o n s titu e n c y in p a r lia m e n t; th e re is a p a r ty government ra th e r than po p u la r government. But the C e n tra l E xe cu tive C o u n c il o f th e AFPFL is f i r m ly ro o te d in lo c a l and fu n c t io n a l r e a l i t i e s . There is a s o c ia l is t p a r ty to which most members o f the C e n tra l C ounc il be longs, y e t th e y are in th e C o u n c il, n o t as re p re s e n ta tiv e s o f th e s o c ia l is t p a r ty , b u t as re p re se n ta ­t iv e s o f the s e v e ra l component groups, th e Peasants ' and Trade Union o rg a n iz a tio n s , and o th e r s im ila r o rg a n iz a t io n s , such as th e C o -opera tive O rg a n iz a tio n , which have come in to ex is ten ce o f la te ye a rs . The Deputy Prune M in is te r , บ Ba Swe, was u n t i l q u ite re c e n t ly the Chairman o f the lo c a l tra d e un ion o rg a n iz a t io n ; ano the r o f the Deputy Prime M in is te rs was Chairman o f the P easan t's o rg a n iz a t io n ; ano the r Deputy Prime M in is te r was the head o f the C o -ope ra tive Movement, and ano the r p rom inen t member o f the C ounc il was th e head o f th e Rangoon AFPFL. A t D i s t r i c t and Township Head­q u a rte rs th e re a re lo c a l AFPFL C o u n c ils , s im i la r ly re p re s e n ta t iv e o f the lo c a l peasant, tra d e un ion and c o -o p e ra tiv e o rg a n iz a t io n s . And the D is ­t r i c t and Township C ounc ils a re based on urban and r u r a l ward and v i l la g e c o u n c ils , chosen from among th e lo c a l in h a b ita n ts . The D is t r i c t AFPFL IS n o t a mere e le c to ra l c o lle g e , b u t each member can make a fu n c t io n a l con­t r ib u t io n to a g e n e ra l connexus o f lo c a l in te r e s ts . These lo c a l c o u n c ils can re p re se n t t h e i r views to s u p e rio r c o u n c ils and, a t each stage up to the C e n tra l C o u n c il, th e re is an o p p o r tu n ity f o r a f re e express ion o f o p in io n w ith o u t the o b l ig a t io n to speak and vo te in accordance w ith p a r ty p o l ic y th a t is necessary in P a rlia m e n ta ry debates, where a candid expres­s io n o f o p in io n o r an adverse vo te may e n ta i l the f a l l o f the government.I f th e C o -ope ra tive o r Land D is t r ib u t io n o r W elfa re o rg a n iz a t io n in any D is t r i c t is d is s a t is f ie d w ith the conduct o f a f f a i r s by the D is t r i c t AFPFL, i t can b r in g th e m a tte r to th e n o t ic e o f the C e n tra l C o unc il th rough th e member o f the C e n tra l C o unc il who rep resen ts t h e i r own p a r t ic u la r i n s t i t u ­t io n . Thus the AFPFL is in a v e ry r e a l sense a dem ocratic o rg a n iz a t io n .

A t the same tim e i t is a ve ry p o w e rfu l o rg a n iz a t io n . The fundam ental b a s is o f a u th o r i ty in the AFPFL is th e n a t io n a l conven tion , h u t s ince the f i r s t A l l Burma AFPFL Convention h e ld in 19^7 th e re has n o t been ano the r, and e f fe c t iv e p o l i t i c a l power has re s te d w ith the E xecu tive Committee o f th e C e n tra l AFPFL. The p a r ty now c la im s a m i l l io n re g is te re d members.

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Through: th e re g is te re d members i t is rep resen ted n o t o n ly on the s p e c ia lis e d lo c a l organs b u t a ls o in lo c a l government, th e V illa g e ,. Urban, Township and D is t r i c t C o u n c ils , where i t s re p re s e n ta t iv e can e x p la in th e AFPFL-po licy to o th e r members who .do n o t be long to th e AFFFL* A lso , th ro ugh the lo c a l -branches o f i t s .CQEQDonent u n its , i t can watch over th e conduct o f a d m in is ­t r a t iv e o f f i c i a l s . One main fu n c t io n o f th e lo c a l u n its is to r e c r u i t suppo rt f o r the AFPFL. That th e y do n o t always succeed in t h is was apparent in th e -recent e le c t io n s when th e AFFFL lo s t seats th a t ought to have been s a f e . • -In some in s ta n c e s , where the f a i l u r e seemed due to the m isconduct o r bad re p u te o f lo c a l members o f th e AFPFL, an e n q u iry was h e ld and th e lo c a l c o u n c ils were re -c o n s t i tu te d . And a t any tim e a member o f a lo c a l AFPFL who cannot g iv e a s a t is fa c to r y e x p la n a tio n o f a com p la in t a g a in s t him is l i a b le to be' d is c ip l in e d o r even e x p e lle d from the p a r ty .

The a c tu a l fu n c t io n in g o f th e o rg a n iz a t io n depends o f n e c e s s ity in th e la s t r e s o r t upon th e human' e lem ent. The members o f th e D i s t r i c 0 and Township AFPFL C ounc ils have g re a t power w h ich th e y can e a s i ly abuse and w ith g re a t te m p ta tio n to abuse i t ; the Prime M in is te r , บ Nu, ju s t i f i e d h is re s ig n a t io n on th e ground th a t he w ished to devote h is p u b lic a c t iv i t i e s e n t i r e ly to th e ta s k o f p u rg in g th e AFPFL o f c o r ru p t o r o the rw ise u n d e s ira b le e lem ents. Another danger is th a t a member o f th e C e n tra l C o u n c il, who is a t ’th e same tim e Chairman o f one o f th e fu n c t io n a l o rg a n iz a tio n s such as th e ABPO, may tend to fa v o u r h is p a r t ic u la r o rg a n iz a t io n to the d e tr im e n t o f the p u b lic in te r e s t , and th e AFPFL re c e n t ly decided th a t no member o f the C e n tra l C o unc il may be the chairm an o f any o f th e component u n i ts ; a c c o rd in g ly บ Ba Swe re s ig n e d h is o f f ic e as Chairman o f th e Trade Union

.Congress^ Burma, and o th e r members o f th e C o u n c il have fo llo w e d h is example. On ra th e r s im ila r grounds th e C o unc il has dec ided th a t i t c a n ’no lo n g e r recogn ize as an a f f i l i a t e d group the Burma M uslim A s s o c ia tio n which was one -of the o r ig in a l component u n i ts . I t i s in th e C e n tra l C o unc il o f the AFPFL th a t p o l i t i c a l power is co nce n tra ted ; a l l im p o rta n t que s tions o f p o l ic y a re s e t t le d in i t b e fo re the Government decides on th e l in e which i t w i l l ta k e , and th e Prime M in is te r re c e n t ly e xp la in e d a t a Press Con­fe rence th a t he c o u ld n o t re -o rg a n iz e h is C ab ine t w ith o u t re fe re n ce to the AFPFL. In c o n s t i tu t io n a l- th e o ry th e Government is re s p o n s ib le to the Chamber o f D e pu ties , b u t ove r .the members o f th e Chamber i t can e xe rc ise th e s t r i c t c o n t ro l o f p a r ty d is c ip l in e ; in p ra c t ic e i t is re s p o n s ib le to the AFPFL.

T he .C h ie f s t re n g th o f th e AFPFL d e r iv e s from th e f a c t th a t i t in h e r i ­te d and has c o n s o lid a te d th e p o l i t i c a l o rg a n iz a t io n o f th e re s is ta n c e movement. Some w ould-be n a t io n a l le a d e rs , ร1นch as D r. Ba Maw, were re lu c ta n t, to . jo in th e AFPFL o r any o th e r o rg a n iz a t io n in any p o s it io n except the h ig h e s t. Some h e ld a lo o f because o f a p r iv a te grudge a g a in s t th e AFPFL o r some o f i t s more prom inen t members, o th e rs fe a re d th a t the AFPFL would no t g ra n t them th e re c o g n it io n w h ich th e y regarded as due to t h e i r a b i l i t i e s . A few la n d lo rd s and o th e rs fe a re d th e e f fe c t o f s o c ia l i s t le g is la t io n on th e i. r p o cke ts . Such men have broken away from the main n a t io n a l is t body to fo rm s p l in t e r groups, w h ich th e y d ig n i f y w ith th e name o f p a r t ie s . S im i la r ly d is s e n t ie n t would-be le a d e rs in the m ino r s ta te s can- o ffe r, l i t t l e more than in d iv id u a l o p p o s it io n to the p a r ty which is a l l i e d w ith th e AFPFL.', O nly Than Tun was a b le t q c o l le c t a fo l lo w in g o f any co n s id e ra b le number, and a lm ost th e o n ly e f f e c t iv e ly o rgan ized o p p o s i­t io n is c o n t ro lle d b y the communists and t h e i r fe l lo w t r a v e l le r s who d id n o t jo in Than Tun in open r e b e l l io n . The s tre n g th o f th e AFPFL's con­

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t in u in g h o ld o ve r the . c o u n try l i e s v e ry la rg e ly in , Ithe f a c t th a t i t s p o l ic y meets w ith gen e ra l a p p ro va l, "bu t.ve ry la rg e ly , a is o in the absence o f o rgan ized o p p o s it io n . F o r the genera l e le c t io n s ' o f 1956 a l l these -' sm a ll groups came to g e th e r in . a n 'A l l P a rty O p pos ition A ll ia n c e ' com pris ing f iv e groups opposed to any fo rm o f s o c ia lis m and f iv e groups w ith com- - m un is t sym pathies; th e fo rm er were, lo o s e ly o rgan ized in the Burma N a tio n a l B loc (BNB) under th e nom inal d i r e c t io n ,o f Dr* Ba Maw, and the la t t e r , ra th e r more, c o h e s iv e ly i n th e N a tio n a l U n ite d F ro n t (N U f), . I t was, however; o n ly the pro-com m unist s e c t io n o f the NUF w h ich made any se rio u s a tte m p t to o rgan ize th e o p p o s it io n fo rc e s in the c o n s t itu e n c ie s ." The o r ig in a l compact to d is t r ib u te the c o n s titu e n c ie s e q u a lly among the a l l i e d se c tio n s d id n o t even la s t u n t i l th e h o ld in g o f th e e le c t io n s , and in th e ■ r e s u l t th e o p p o s it io n won 53 seats o f w h ich 46 went to th e NUF. Both ' : b locks u n ite in P a rliam en t in o p p o s it io n to th e Government, b u t , even i f th e y were s tro n g enough to d e fe a t i t , th e y cou ld n o t fo rm an a lte rn a t iv e government because th e two b lo cks would im m e d ia te ly 'fa l l a p a r t . A f te r ' the e le c tio n s th e NUF con tin ued th e a tte m p t to extend i t s in f lu e n c e in th e c o n s titu e n c ie s and in August i t h e ld an A l l Burma NUF Conference a t which i t c la im ed an a ttendance o f uuo de lega tes from 30 d i s t r i c t s .

The absence o f an o rg a n iz a t io n capable o f ta k in g over th e government is no t w ith o u t c o u n te rv a il in g advantages. The t e s t o f the p re se n t Con­s t i t u t i o n on the E n g lis h p a r lia m e n ta ry model w i l l come when th e re is an o p p o s it io n s tro n g enough to d e fe a t th e p a r ty in power b u t n o t s u f f i c ie n t l y u n ite d to p ro v id e an e f fe c t iv e s u b s t itu te . . T h is would tend to re v iv e the c o r ru p tio n , in t r ig u e and impotence c h a ra c te r is t ic o f p re -w a r le g is la tu re s . I t would seem than , th a t under p re se n t c o n d it io n s in Burma, the s in g le p a r ty government o f the AFPFL n o t o n ly p ro v id e s a mar e re p re s e n ta t iv e and dem ocratic type o f government than two r i v a l p o l i t i c a l machines, b u t is a ls o as s tro n g a government as in th e p re se n t c ircum stances th e co u n try is ab le to produce.

A p a rt from th e d is t in c t i v e ly p o l i t i c a l p a r t ie s and groups th e re are o th e r groups w h ich can and do e xe rc ise p ressu re on th e Government; a lthough n o n - p o l i t ic a l th e y c a r ry w e igh t in p o l i t i c s . Some o f these , such as th e A l l Burma Peasants' O rg a n iz a tio n , th e Trade Union Congress, Burma, and the C o -ope ra tive Union a re c lo s e ly a l l i e d w ith th e Government and can exe rc ise pressure from w ith in ; o th e rs have no p o l i t i c a l a f f i l i a t i o n , b u t t h e i r p o l i t i c a l in f lu e n c e , exe rc ise d from o u ts id e th e government, must be taken in to accoun t. The A ll-B u rm a Peasants' O rg a n iza tio n was th e source from w hich the th a k in s o r ig in a l ly d e r iv e d t h e i r s tre n g th , and i t is s t i l l p ro b a b ly the c h ie f m a instay o f the AFPFL. The c o n d it io n s o f r u r a l l i f e make i t d i f f i c u l t to c re a te .a n y e f fe c t iv e r i v a l o rg a n iz a tio n among th e p e a san try . The o rg a n iz a t io n o f in d u s t r ia l la b o u r f o r p o l i t i c a l o r economic ends• is much e a s ie r . I t was indeed as a p o l i t i c a l in s tru m e n t th a t the A l l Burma Trade Union Congress (ABTUC) was o r ig in a l ly founded in 19^ 0 . ■ I t was re c o n s tru c te d in May 1945 under a communist le a d e r, and p layed a u s e fu l p a r t " in o rg a n iz in g re s is ta n c e a g a in s t B r i t is h r u le . The s o c ia l is t group however soon became su sp ic io us o f i t s p o l i t i c a l o b je c t iv e s and, a p p a re n tly about November o f th e same yea r, c rea ted a separa te o rg a n i­z a t io n , the Trade Union Congress, Burma (TUCB), and the A l l Burma TUC became m ere ly the B u n a Trade Union Congress (BTUC). U n t i l t i le AFPFL p a r ty ob ta ined adm ission to th e G overnor's C o unc il in O ctober, 19^6, the two o rg a n iz a tio n s worked to g e th e r in a loose a l l ia n c e , b u t when the BTUC embarrassed Aung San's Government w ith th e th re a t o f a g e n e ra l s t r ik e , he

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broke th e s t r ik e and th e in f lu e n c e o f th e BTUC. In March, 19^8 , the BTUC went underground w ith the Communists, le a v in g th e d ir e c t io n o f the le g a l la b o u r movement to TUCB. The l a t t e r however in c lu d e d members w ith- p ro ­communist le an ings ', and among these were the P re s id e n t and V ic e -P re s id e n t.

Gr .wing te n s io n le d to th e tem porary suppress ion o f the TUCB, and, soon a f te r i t had been purged and re c o n s t itu te d under new .leaders , th e fo rm er le a d e rs w ith .'communist' sym pathies re s ig n e d from the S o c ia l is t P a rty ana formed th e Burma Workers and Peasants Party-(BWPP) w h ich ท9พ form s the backbone o f th e KUF, though i t has l i t t l e nu m e rica l supp o rt from in d u s t r ia l la b o u r and v e ry much le s s from among the pea sa n try . Yet in d u s t r ia l la b o u r, w ith l i t t l e , rega rd f o r p a r ty a f f i l i a t i o n s , can and does continue, to e xe rc ise p ressu re on th e Government. I t does n o t seem s tro n g enough to o rgan ize a. w idespread s t r ik e , b u t i t can a t t r a c t fo llo w e rs f o r a p rocess ion ropnd th e S e c re ta r ia t sh o u tin g f o r more pay and le s s w ork, a s logan th a t would meet w ith more sympathy from th e In te rn a t io n a l Labour O ff ic e . than from a Communist GoveiTiment. Bu t i t fo s te rs d is c o n te n t and p ro v id e s copy fo r. the P ress. In g e n e ra l, however, th e Government, th ro ugh the a f f i l i a t e d TUCB, seems to have handled th e la b o u r problem t a c t f u l l y and w ith o u t pan ic concessions to p re ssu re .

, A nother le gacy from th e Ba Maw.Government was th e Youth Movement, and t h is a ls o has made i t s e l f f e l t in p o l i t i c s under r i v a l le a d e rs , though b o th le ade rs were adherents o f AFPFL. R e cen tly however th e re has. been a com­m un is t i n f i l t r a t i o n in to th e f i e l d o f edu ca tio n . As. in the Labour movement, th e Government has t r ie d to d e fe a t communist in f lu e n c e in d i r e c t ly ; i t has fo rm e d . its own group among th e s tuden ts under a p a r ty name th a t aoes no t e f fe c t iv e ly d is g u is e i t s r e la t io n s w ith th e Government. W ith the s tu d e n ts , how ever,. the Government has been le s s s u c c e s s fu l than w ith la b o u r, and in the re ce n t U n iv e rs ity e le c t io n s the communist group, demanding lo r ig e r h o lid a y s and le s s r i g i d exam ina tions, won an easy v ic to r y ; t h is does n o t im p ly th a t a l l th e s tu d e n ts who want lo n g e r h o lid a y s and e a s ie r te s ts .are communists, and a lm ost a l l o f them would c e r ta in ly r e -a c t much more v io le n t ly a g a in s t communist d is c ip l in e . - B u t, here a g a in , th e s tuden ts who fo l lo w ’ th e ' communist le a d g e t t h e i r cause- (and t h e i r names) a d v e rt is e d in the newspapers, and t h is exposes the weakness o f the Government, w h ile making i t s t i l l weaker.

The'Government is a ls o exposed-to p ressu re from ano the r ang le by the Chambers o f Commerce. Each community has i t s - own Chamber o f Commerce, and a l l the Chambers a re in g e n e ra l opposed to s o c ia lis m . The Burmese Chamber o f Commerce is th e one w ith the w id e s t p o p u la r appea l. T h is is a lm ost a c re a t io n o f th e new Government, as i t b a re ly e x is te d b e fo re the w ar. A l l th e Chambers p u t p ressu re on th e Government in conn ec tion w ith the re g u la ­t io n o f im p o rts , and the Burmese Chamber stands 'a p a rt from th e o th e r o n ly in c la im in g th a t , so f a r as im p o rt lic e n s e s -a re g ra n te d , th e y shou ld be g iven to Burma n a t io n a ls ra th e r than to fo re ig n e rs , and to ind igenous Burman c it iz e n s ra th e r than to c it iz e n s o f In d ia n ,C h in e s e o r o th e r fo re ig n o r ig in . As the Burmese Chamber re p resen ts tra d e .- ra th e r l than in d u s try , i t tends to oppose r e s t r ic t io n s o n -tra d e fe'ven i f th e y a re in te n d e d ;to enhance p ro d u c tio n in Burma. In numbers the m e rc a n tile .a n d in d u s t r ia l c lasses a re in s ig n i f ic a n t , ’’ and th e G overnm ent-de rives. i t s main supp o rt from the p e a s a n t r y . .B u t p o l i t i c a l l y , th e m e rc a n tile and in d u s tr ia l-c o m m u n it ie s a re im p o rta n t' because i t i s o n ly w ith t h e i r c o -o p e ra tio n th a t the Govern­ment can g ive e f fe c t to i t s economic p o l ic y . Thus th e y are in a p o s it io n

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to exe rc ise p ressu re on the Government and the Government has to c o n c i l ia te them. ' ' ■' • - J -1.

; I t . is th e s tre n g th o f th e Muslim community in commerce th a t .g ives them p o l i t i c a l ' im p o rta n c e .- The Burma M uslim ,Coiigress, as a lre a d y m entioned, a s s is te d in the c re a t io n o f AFPFL. The AFPFL le a d e rs , however, regarded a group based on r e l ig io n as a dangerous element i n p o l i t i c s . They ru le d a c c o rd in g ly th a t the Burm» Muslim Congress cou ld no lo n g e r be accepted as one "of the a f f i l i a t e d u n i ts , and gave the Congress th e cho ice between re c o n s t itu t io n on a n o n -re lig io u s b a s is o r re s ig n a t io n from th e AFPFL. The Corigress has keen ly opposed th is d e c is io n b u t w ith o u t e f fe c t .

P o te n t ia l ly , however, the group most ab le to p u t p ressure on th e Government is the B uddh is t c le rg y . So f i r m is t h e i r h o ld over th e people th a t even th e s tro n g e s t Government cou ld no t .a ffo rd to a lie n a te the B uddh is t m onastic o rd e r w ith im p u n ity . Under the C o n s titu t io n th e y are debarred from p o l i t i c a l a c t iv i t i e s , even from the exe rc ise o f th e fra n c h is e , b u t, i f they were to take s ides in an e le c t io n , t h e ir in flu e n c e would c a r ry much w e igh t in d e te rm in ing the r e s u l t . The t r a d i t io n o f the o rd e r is a g a in s t p a r t ic ip a t io n in p o l i t i c a l a c t iv i t i e s , and the man who en te rs i t p ro fe s s e d ly cu ts h im s e lf o f f from the w o rld in o rd e r to g a in h is own s a lv a t io n ; y e t, under B r i t is h r u le , some members o f the o rde r were prom inent as leade rs o f th e n a t io n a l is t s . The C o n s t itu t io n "recogn izes th e s p e c ia l p o s it io n o f Buddhism as the f a i t h p ro fessed by the g re a t m a jo r ity o f the c it iz e n s o f the Union" (s e c t io n 31)7 and th e Government has passed a s e r ie s o f enactments w hich shou ld c o n c i l ia te the o rde r and re in fo rc e c le r i c a l d is c ip l in e . The E c c le s ia s t ic a l Courts A c t p rov id es f o r the e s tab lishm en t o f e c c le s ia s t ic a l c o u rts f o r the d e c is io n o f d ispu tes in r e l ig io u s m atte rs and f o r the e xp u ls ion o f immoral o r h e r e t ic a l monks. The P a ll U n iv e rs ity A c t e s ta b lis h e s a P a li C o llege which is be ing used as an in s t i t u t e f o r the p rom otion o f B u d d h is tic s tu d ie s . And the Sasana (R e lig io u s ) C o unc il A ct c rea ted an o rg a n iz a t io n w ith power to a c t on b e h a lf o f the Government in a l l r e l ig io u s m a tte rs . These measures, and frtn e r tokens o f re sp e c t f o r the Buddh is t r e l ig io n and c le rg y , shou ld a t t r a c t th e sympathy and m ora l support o f th e r e l ig io u s o rderT - Yet the Government - s t i l l has to proceed w a r i ly in re g a rd to any measure which may p o s s ib ly o ffe n d c le r ic a l suscep­t i b i l i t i e s . I t appears th a t th e re is a c lo s e , though u n o f f ic ia l , a l l ia n c e betveen some government leade rs and a s tro n g group among th e younger members o f the o rd e r. On th e o th e r hand one reads n o t in fre q u e n t ly o f the presence o f B uddh is t c le rg y a t dem onstra tions o rgan ized by.communists o r by groups w ith communist sym pathies.

4 . The A d m in is tra tiv e M achinery.

The m achinery f o r g iv in g e f fe c t to th e p o l ic y o f the Government con­s is ts o f - th e S e c re ta r ia t , the S e rv ices , and v a r io u s more o r le s s autonomous agencies known as C o rpo ra tions , Boards o r C o unc ils .

(a ) The S e c re ta r ia t . In each M in is t r y , as in the la t e r days o f B r i t is h r u le , th e re is a h ig h o f f i c i a l who has the t i t l e o f S e cre ta ry to the Union Government in th e M in is t r y to which he is assigned and w ho,. in a l l th a t concerns h is M in is t r y , i s a u th o r iz e d to s ig n o rde rs and o th e r documents on b e h a lf o f the Government. I f a M in is te r ho lds two o r more p o r t fo l io s th e re is a S e c re ta ry to Government f o r each; f o r in s ta n c e , in th e recen t Govern­ment one member o f the Government h e ld charge o f the M in is t r ie s o f N a tio n a l

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P lann ing , R e lig io u s A f fa ir s , and Union Culture.,, and f o r each of- .these. ;th ree d is t in c t : fu n c t io n s he had. a. separa te ' Secretary,- t o .Government w ith - a;.■1 „ 1-.., subo rd ina te s t a f f . F ro m .B r it is h tim es the S e c re ta r ie s have been- known , c o l le c t iv e ly as the S e c re ta r ia t . T h is name is a ls o g ive n t o the b u i ld in g in w h ich most o f them have t h e i r o f f ic e s . Under B r i t is h r u le . . i t provided- ample accommodation f o r a l l th e S e c re ta r ie s ; b u t the F o re ig n O ff ic e , new ly c o n s t itu te d on th e a tta in m e n t of- independence, has always teen; housed s e p a ra te ly , and grow ing p ressu re on th e space has made i t necessary to f in d -ro o m ,e lse w h e re fo r . o th e r m in is t r ie s . The S ecre ta ry forf.Home:-.- A f f a i r s ho lds a p rim acy as C h ie f S e c re ta ry , and th e .S e c re ta rie s fo r : F o re ig n A f fa ir s and f o r Defence a re d is t in g u is h e d as Permanent. S e c re ta r ie s , ’■ presum ably because th e y a re in ten ded to s p e c ia lis e perm anently in t h e i r own s u b je c ts ;•* in 1 the .-pa s t, o th e r s e c re ta r ie s were f re q u e n t ly . tra n s fe rre d : a t s h o rt in te r v a ls from one M in is t r y to ano the r b u t now th e s e . fre q u e n t : t ra n s fe rs -a re unusua l- F o rm e rly , under e x e cu tive r u le when the re "w e re as y e t-n o m in is t r ie s , the work -at the headquarte rs o f th e Government, was '■ d is t r ib u te d among v a r io u s departm ents, a n d 'th is te rm is s t i l l sometimes a p p lie d - to th e whole s t a f f o f a m in is t r y . But th e term "departm ent" is v e ry co n fu s in g , .a s . : i t i s a ls o a p p lie d , to in te g ra l, s e c tio n s o f a m in is t r y , and to - th e -e x e c u tiv e se rv ices , w h ich g iv e e f f e c t . t o th e o rde rs emanating . from the m in is t r y . I t i s ; conve n ie n t to d is t in g u is h these v a r io u s grades in th e o f f i c i a l h ie ra rc h y by r e fe r r in g to an in te g r a l s e c t io n w ith in a

• m in is tr y .a s a "departm en t") and to an e x e c u tiv e agency o u ts id e , th e .m in is t r y as a " s e rv ic e . " - Thus , ; i n th e M in is t r y o f A g r ic u ltu r e and F o res ts the re a re separa te departm en ts•d e a lin g re s p e c t iv e ly w ith A g r ic u ltu re , V e te r in a ry A f fa i r s , • F o r e s t r y } ‘ I r r ig a t io n , and S a lt , and f o r each o f these departm ents a t headquarte rs th e re a re one o r more agencies o rgan ized t e r r i t o r i a l l y - o u ts id e :th e m in is t r y , such as the A g r ic u l tu r a l S e rv ice , th e F o re s t Serv ice and-so on...

The- S e c re ta ry to Government in any M in is t r y is th e o f f i c i a l to whom th e -M in is te r c h ie f ly looks f o r adv ice on a l l m a tte rs th a t com e .w ith in h is p ro v in c e , f o r a s s is ta n ce in fra m in g h is p o l ic y in c o r re c t o f f i c i a l form s, and f o r the e f f i c ie n t a d m in is tra t io n o f h is M in is t r y . The S e c re ta ry is u s u a lly c a l le d in to th e C abinet when m a tte rs conce rn ing h is M in is t r y are under d is c u s s io n . In many M in is t r ie s th e re are A d d it io n a l S e c re ta r ie s to whom s p e c if ic r e s p o n s ib i l i t ie s and departm ents are ass igned ; they draw the same s a la ry as a S e c re ta ry and, w ith in th e l im i t s o f t h e i r assignm ent, th e y p e rfo rm th e same fu n c t io n s . Next be low these come the Deputy Secre­ta r ie s , who may .be a l lo t t e d s p e c ia l fu n c t io n s o r may occupy th e p o s it io n o f a s t a f f o f f i c e r o r p e rs o n a l.a s s is ta n t to th e S e c re ta ry o r to an A d d i­t io n a l S e c re ta ry .: Below th e Deputy S e c re ta ry ccmes th e ' A s s is ta n t S e c re ta ry , ..who is - u s u a l ly re s p o n s ib le f o r th e d e t a i ls o f ■ a d m in is tra tiv e , ro u t in e a n d - fo r see ing, t h a t cases p u t up :to h is s u p e rio rs a re -co m p le te1 ะ.' w i th a l l th e re fe re n ce s necessary--fo r convenience in p e ru s a l; he-.may be, expected, to make.'-.an a b s tra c t .o f-r th e p roceed ings w ith .a u c h o b s e rv a tio n s vas ■ he may. . th in k , h e lp fu l . • r.'.

A l l th e se o f f ic e r s a re drawn from th e g e n e ra l a d m in is tra t iv e C i v i l S e rv ice in the: d i s t r i c t s , to which a t any -tim e- th e y may re v e r t . F o rm erly i t was. a . t r a d i t io n th a t .n o o n e ,. excep t p o s s ib ly th e S e c re ta ry , shou ld remain more than th re e .years in th e S e c re ta r ia t,- so th a t he 'S hou ld n o t lo se touch w ith a f f a i r s in th e in t e r io r ; ’ b u t an o f f i c e r who d isp la ye d a s p e c ia l g i f t f o r o f f i c e work was a p t t o spend most o f h is s e rv ic e in - th e S e c re ta r ia t u n t i l by s e n io r i t y he became e l ig ib le f o r one o f the h ig h e s t pos ts in the

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a d m in is tra t iv e s e rv ic e .- Now, owing to th e s c a rc ity o f o f f i c ia l s w ith the e d u c a tio n a l and o th e r q u a l i f ic a t io n s needed f o r work i l l the S e c re ta r ia t , the fo rm er t r a d i t io n o f re v e r t in g t o d i s t r i c t work seems obso lescen t. ••A lso , as m entioned above, th e re is a grow ing tendency, f o r o f f ic e r s to remain in th e same M in is t r y .

Bslow th e A s s is ta n t S e c re ta ry th e re is th e m in is te r ia l or. c le r i c a l se rv ie e * The work o f the o f f ic e is d is t r ib u te d among Branches, each ' - i branch d e a lin g w ith i t s own p a r t ic u la r s e c t io n s . Fo r each Branch th e re is a Branch S uperin tenden t w ith as many c le rk s o f the upper and low er grades as may be though t, necessary. The number o f branches in a m in is t r y ranges from about f iv e to f i f t e e n , and the number o f c le rk s from about 50 to , perhaps,. 150. . I f th e re are numerous branches in a M in is t r y th e re w i l l be a C h ie f S uperin tenden t who ranks between the A s s is ta n t S e c re ta ry and the Branch S u pe rin tend en ts . The S uperin tendents a re promoted from th e c le r i c a l s t a f f , b u t the C h ie f S upe rin tenden t, and o th e r S uperin tendents o f s u f f ic ie n t s ta n d in g , have th e s ta tu s o f a "g a z e tte d o f f i c e r , s ig n ify in g th a t th e y have an honorary p o s i t io n among th e s u p e r io r o f f ic e r s whose appointm ents a re n o t i f ie d in th e o f f i c ia l . G aze tte . Under the c le r i c a l s t a f f th e re are the messengers (who in Burma do much o f the work th a t, in o th e r lands is done by m a il o r te lephone ) and v a r io u s o th e r m en ia ls .

The com pos ition and procedure o f the S e c re ta r ia t- have lo ng been c r i t i ­c is e d and were o b je c ts p f v e ry un favou rab le comment by. the s tro n g F is c a l Committee appo in ted to re -o rg a n is e th e fin a n ce s o f Burma on i t s se p a ra tio n from In d ia in 1937* I t s re p o r t , dated 1938, remarks th a t " th e S e c re ta r ie s are in no sense s p e c ia l is ts in the work o f the Departments which th e y are p u t in charge . T h is system may p ro v id e the F o re s t, E duca tion , J u d ic ia l and Home Departments w ith s u ita b le S e c re ta r ie s , b u t i s n o t c a lc u la te d to supp ly the F inance , Revenue and Commerce Departments w ith o f f ic e r s possess­ing th e knowledge and experience re q u ire d by the S e c re ta rie s in these D epartm ents." The procedure was "com p lica ted and u n re a l, " and e n ta ile d "volum inous and o f te n unnecessary n o tin g on the f i l e s , " com pe lling h ig h a d m in is tra t iv e o f f ic e r s to spend much o f t h e i r tim e on un im portan t m a tte rs o f ro u t in e .

In independent Burma the z e a l o f the. Government f o r d ir e c t in g economic e n te rp r is e in . th e in te r e s t o f the n a tio n and f o r p rom oting s o c ia l and in d iv id u a l w e lfa re demanded o f S e c re ta r ia t o f f i c ia l s a change o f o u tlo o k

-and a more p o s i t iv e concep tion o f t h e i r fu n c t io n s ; the m u lt ip l ic a t io n o f new se rv ic e s in te n s i f ie d th e need f o r in te r -d e p a rtm e n ta l c o -o rd in a tio n y and in v o lv e d -th e re c ru itm e n t o f a g re a t ly en la rged S e c re ta r ia t s t a f f to cope w ith th e m u lt ip l ic a t io n o f a c t i v i t i e s . Yet a t th e same t im e :th e s t a f f was dep le ted by th e dep a rtu re o f. a lm ost a l l the form er- h ig h o f f i c ia l s , and those who remained o r to o k t h e i r .p lace had to pay more a t te n t io n than b e fo re to a d m in is tra t iv e ro u t in e because the new r e c r u its in , th e low er ranks had n o t y e t acqu ired th e necessary experience to d ispose o f everyday bus iness . Meanwhile the Manual o f S e c re ta r ia t Procedure had been re v is e d in conse­quence o f the s t r ic tu r e s o f the F is c a l Committee, b u t ,tbe Pay Commission re p o rte d in 19^7. th a t m a tte rs were v e ry much the-same, w ith much unnecessary work and "le n g th y , n o t in g a t each s ta te from th e tim e i t reaches th e o f f ic e u n t i l o rders are a c tu a l ly passed ." The A d m in is tra tio n R e -o rg a n iza tio n Jommittee in i t s Report o f 1951 drew a t te n t io n to ..these d e fe c ts and suggested th a t a Committee o f S e c re ta r ia t O f f ic ia ls shou ld be. c o n s t itu te d w ith a ฬ .eพ to d e v is in g fu r th e r s im p l i f ic a t io n .

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Since then the Government has had the assistance o f th re e successive exp e rts o n "p u b lic a d m in is t ra t io n ^ ' The: - f i r s t of: these,- who a r r iv e d in 1952, was charged w ith making an ‘a d m in is tra t iv e -s u rv e y o f the Departments o f Government, t h e i r problem s o f re o rg a n iz a tio n ,- -c o -o rd in a tio n and - p e rson ne l, and w ith recommending m e a s u re d fo r the b e t te r d e f in i t io n o f r e s p o n s ib i l i t y ^ th e e l im in a t io n o f wasted e f f o r t and th e improvement o f a d m in is tra t iv e e f f ic ie n c y . One o f the p o in ts to w h ich he drew a t te n t io n was th e undue r i g i d i t y o f f in a n c ia l c o n t ro l, o f w hich he g ive s se le c te d i l lu s t r a t i o n s , and w h ich he c h a ra c te r is e d as " i n p a r t r e l iq s o f a c o lo n ia l system and n o t in accordance w ith modern p r a c t ic e . " He noted a ls o th a t , in d e a lin g w i th correspondence, each document u s u a lly had to pass th rough t h i r t y - n in e steps from th e tim e i t reached th e o f f ic e . u n t i l a subo rd ina te c le r k f i n a l l y "p u ts i t aw ay.or p laces i t in th e .p e n d in g f i l e o r the p i le o f pending f i l e s . ’1 He made.numerous suggestions f o r .im proving the c u r re n t S e c re ta r ia t p rocedure and i n : some cases ...supervised: t h e i r im p le ­m en ta tio n , ■ b u t he a d v ised . th a t ' th re e ' more experts; were re q u ire d to 'd e a l w ith s p e c ia l prob lem s,; .-A second e x p e rt was app o in ted in 1954' w ith the p a r t ic u la r 'O b je c t o f e x p lo r in g how' b e s t • th e 'U n ite d -Nations could- h e lp ' th e Government W ith ) .te c h n ic a l as6is td n c e -:i ท 'p u b lic , a d m in is ira -p io n . • He . ' : remarked th a t-p o li t ic a lj in d fc p e ^ d e n c e h a d - 'i f t te n s if ie d th e need f o r changes in ' a d m in is tra t io n t o keep p a c e 7 w ith '' rfecen t'deve lopm ents, b u t 're c o g n iz e d - th a t in n o v a tio n s must-.be. g radua l; and in - 'h a r m o n y - t i \ th e e x is tin g - 'g o o d t r a d i t io n s o f p u b lic s e rv ic e and ■ p o l i t ic a l im p a r t ia l i t y * 3๙ emphasized th e need fo r - a "changed .o u tlo o k 1' am ong -S ecre ta ria t o f f i c i a l s and f o r a "m anage ria l" ra th e r than a " s e c re ta r ia l" : approach to p ro b le m s ;-th e a d m in is tra to rs shou ld be. educated as " s o c ia l-e n g in e e rs ," and s u ita b le p ro v is io n shou ld be made f o r t r a in in g them as such. He aga in recommended the appoin tm ent o f th re e more e x p e rts ■from .the U n ite d N a tio n s , and in o th e r respec ts a ls o h is recommendations were much a long the l in e s o f h is p redecessor. In 1955 a t h i r d e x p e rt was ap p o in te d , m a in ly to g iv e adv ice on re o rg a n is a t io n and t r a in in g . These v a r io u s re p o r ts have re c e iv e d c lo se a t te n t io n , one n o ta b le d e p a rtu re b e in g the e s ta b lish m e n t o f in -s e rv ic e c lasses in the p r in c ip le s and techn ique o f p u b lic a d m in is t ra t io n . But " in n o v a tio n must be g ra d u a l," and th e re has n o t y e t been tim e to judge how f a r th e v a r io u s M in is t r ie s have been a b le to p r o f i t from the adv ice g iven by the e x p e rts . ;

(b ) The E xe cu tive S e rv ice s . The p o l ic y o f government, as fo rm u la te d in the le g is la tu r e and.worked o u t in th e S e c re ta r ia t , takes e f fe c t in gen e ra l th ro ugh a cha in o f e xe cu tive s e rv ic e s d is t r ib u te d th ro ugho u t the c o u n try . The a d m in is t ra t iv e m achinery th a t evo lved g ra d u a lly under B r i t is h r u le has a lre a d y been d e sc rib e d . There was a graded t e r r i t o r i a l o rg a n iz a t io n com pris ing Commissioners, Deputy Commissioners, S u b d iv is io n a l O ff ic e rs and Township O ff ic e rs in charge- re s p e c t iv e ly o f D iv is io n , D is t r ic t s , S u b d iv is io n s and Townships; each o f these o f f i c ia l s was re s p o n s ib le f o r g e n e ra l ia d m in is tra t io n w i th in th e area o f h is ju r is d ic t io n and was the lo c a l re p re s e n ta t iv e o f th e c e n t ra l government. A long these were numerous‘dep a rtm en ta l o f f i c i a l s p e rfo rm in g s p e c ia l fu n c t io n s , whose sphere o f work m igh t o r-m ig h t ..not c o in c id e -w ith the u n its o f g e n e ra l a d m in is tra ­t io n . ' O rd in a r i ly th e re was a re p re s e n ta t iv e a t d i s t r i c t headquarte rs o f each s p e c ia l is t s e rv ic e w h ich came a t a l l in to c o n ta c t T-rith th e lo c a l peop le . The Deputy. Commissioner, as 'th e lo c a l re p re s e n ta t iv e o f the Government,- was.assumed t o e x e rc is e a g e n e ra l s u p e rv is io n ove r the work

'.o f th e - 's p e c ia lis t o f f ic e r s , .and th e y were- expected to keep in touch w ith him, b u t- th e y w e re .re s p o n s ib le 'd ire c t ly t o . t h e i r own d ep a rtm en ta l s u p e r io r

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and n o t to th e Deputy Commissioner. Thus any fo rm a l c o o rd in a tio n between th e a c t iv i t i e s o f v a r io u s se rv ice s was p o s s ib le o n ly a t th e headquarters o f th e Government. The s p e c ia l is t o f f ic e r s knew t h e i r own s p e c ia l jo b b u t , in most s e rv ic e s , th e y knew l i t t l e o f th e peop le , and th e y had no o f f i c i a l concern w ith th e a f f a i r s o f o th e r s p e c ia l is t se rv ice s in the samt a rea . Hence th e re was a s tro n g tendency to departm enta lism . Both t h f la c k o f c o -o rd in a tio n and departm enta lism were aggravated by the fre q u e n t t r a n s fe r o f a l l these o f f i c ia l s , and t h is was a g re a t o b s ta c le to. e f f ic ie n c y .

The p r im a ry fu n c t io n o f the Deputy Commissioner and o f a l l h is subo rd ina tes in th e a d m in is tra t iv e s e rv ic e was th e maintenance o f law and o rd e r; a lth o u g h he was n o m in a lly re s p o n s ib le f o r p rom oting th e w e lfa re o f th e d i s t r i c t he had l i t t l e tim e to pay much a t te n t io n to t h is branch o f b is d u t ie s . Much o f h is tim e was occupied w ith correspondence. When th e Government o f In d ia , o r the S e c re ta ry o f s ta te , o r a member o f the B r i t is h P a rlia m e n t o r someone in the League o f N a tions o r in any o f i t s o rg a n iz a tio n s wanted in fo rm a tio n about a n y th in g which m igh t im p lic a te Burma, a re fe re n ce came to the Government o f Burma; in such cases, and. a ls o i f th e Burma Government wanted in fo rm a tio n , i t was a m a tte r o f ro u t in e f o r th e S e c re ta r ia t to issue c i r c u la r le t t e r s to a l l Deputy Com­m iss io ne rs to fu rn is h th e in fo rm a tio n , a ltho ugh in most cases th e y knew n o th in g about th e m a tte r and had no means o f o b ta in in g th e in fo rm a tio n w h ich, i f a v a ila b le a t a l l , was p ro b a b ly on re co rd in the a p p ro p ria te departm ent o f the S e c re ta r ia t . And even so f a r as th e Deputy Commissioner had s u f f i c ie n t in te r e s t and tim e f o r th e p rom otion o f w e lfa re in h is d i s t r i c t , he r a r e ly stayed in one d i s t r i c t lo ng enough to f in d o u t what was needed and s t i l l le s s how to do i t .

Most p ro je c ts a f fe c t in g w e lfa re depend in la rg e measure on th e in te r e s t o f th e people whose w e lfa re th e y w i l l a f f e c t . Under B r i t is h ru le i t seemed a t one tim e th a t the c o -o p e ra tiv e movement m igh t p ro v id e m achinery f o r the autonomous p rom otion o f lo c a l w e lfa re , b u t t h is id e a was p ro m p tly squashed in an announcement by th e L ieu tenan t-G overno r a t an e a r ly C o -op e ra tive Conference th a t v i l la g e c o -o p e ra tiv e s o c ie t ie s must n o t be a llow ed to encroach on the a u th o r i ty which th e v i l la g e headman exe rc ised as th e agent o f the government. Soon a fte rw a rd s , however, the new s p i r i t found exp ress ion in th e fo rm a tio n o f V i l la g e A s so c ia tio n s in o p p o s it io n to th e v i l la g e headman and th e government. S im i la r ly , i t was in o rd e r to p rese rve th e execu tive a u th o r i ty o f the v i l la g e headman th a t in 1923 th e v i l la g e was re je c te d as th e p r im a ry u n i t o f re p re s e n ta tiv e government, w ith th e r e s u l t th a t p a r lia m e n ta ry re p re s e n ta tio n undermined the in f lu e n c e o f th e v i l la g e headman w ith o u t c re a t in g any lo c a l a u th o r i ty to re p la ce i t .

These were th e main fe a tu re s o f th e a d m in is tra t iv e m achinery when i t was taken ove r by the new Government, which was im m ed ia te ly faced w ith th e problem s o f fo s te r in g c o -o rd in a tio n , a b o lis h in g departm enta lism and p rom oting c o n t in u ity by reduc ing th e frequency o f t ra n s fe rs . These obs tac les to the p rom otion o f w e lfa re were th e more fo rm id a b le because the new government a s p ire d to much g re a te r a c t i v i t y in th e prom otion o f w e lfa re . One r e s u l t was to m u lt ip ly th e demands on lo c a l o f f i c ia l s f o r im poss ib le and su p e rflu o u s re p o r ts and leave them w ith even le s s tim e f o r a n y th in g b u t correspondence. T h e ir s i tu a t io n was a f fe c te d a ls o by o th e r changes in c id e n ta l on th e t ra n s fe r o f power. Under a C o n s titu t io n which

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a llow ed fre q u e n t changes in th e government from one p o l i t i c a l -pa rty to a no the r, th e re .was a danger o f th e grow th o f a " s p o i ls system, w ith •• changes in the pe rson ne l o f the c i v i l s e rv ic e s fo llo w in g th e cnangeG in the government. -An a tte m p t had "been made to guard a g a in s t t h is danger in th e C o n s t itu t io n o f .1937 by the appoin tm ent o f a P u b lic S e rv ice Commission b u t th is -h a d proved in e f fe c t iv e . The new C o n s t itu t io n o f Independent •: Burma a c c o rd in g ly p ro v id e d (s e c t io n 221) th a t th e P a rlia m e n t shou ld '."by 1. ' law , ร e t : up a P u b lic Service.Com m ission to a s s is t th e Union Government' in m a tte rs r e la t in g to re c ru itm e n t to th e c i v i l s e rv ic e s o f the Union, and to adv ise :in d is c ip l in a r y measures a f fe c t in g th e s e rv ic e s ," A P u b lic S e rv ice Commission*has been Qreated in accordance w ith t h is p ro v is io n ;a n d seems to be fu n c t io n in g s a t is f a c t o r i ly , a lth o u g h th e U n ite d N ations e xp e rt who.made a survey o f p u b lic a d m in is tra t io n in Burma- in 1952-53 ' recommended t h a t i t s sphere shou ld be extended to in c lu d e v a r io u s m is ­ce llaneous s p e c ia l is t and c le r i c a l e s ta b lish m e n ts .

I t is however in th e d a i ly ro u t in e o f d i s t r i c t o f f ic e r s th a t th e •c o n ­sequence o f pa rty -gove rnm en t a re most c le a r ly appa ren t. Under the fo rm er government th e y had to keep one eye on the lo c a l member o f the L e g is la t iv e C o u n c il, b u t he was o f te n m ere ly a su bo rd ina te agen t, as - i t were a non­commissioned o f f i c e r , in the c o n f l ic t , o f r i v a l groups fo r .p o w e r , ; a n d 'm igh t have l i t t l e ,o r no in te r e s t i l l lo c a l a f f a i r s . Under the new regime in every d i s t r i c t and township" th e re -was- a .re p re s e n ta tiv e o f the AFPFL, who m igh t o r m igh t n o t be a member o f the P a rlia m e n t b u t who was a lo c a l man o f g re a t lo c a l in f lu e n c e and in c lose c o n ta c t w ith th e heads cf th e p a r ty . Loca l o f f i c ia l s had to keep bo th eyes on th e lo c a l agents o f the AFPFL. There had always been .an u n d e rcu rre n t o f m u tua l s u s p ic io n between th e o f f i c ia l s -who were se rvan ts o f the Government and th e p o l i t ic ia n s who cla im ed to be se rvan ts o f the peop le . The change o f re la t io n s between them b ro u g h t t h is to . th e s u rfa c e . F o rm erly the p o l i t ic ia n s , n o t w ith o u t reason, charged su b o rd in a te o f f i c ia l s w ith ta k in g i l l i c i t p e rq u is ite s ;One. fe a tu re o f th e new system was a genuine d r iv e among o f f i c i a l s f o r c le a n s in g the a d m in is tra t io n o f c o r ru p tio n ; th e c le rk s in lo c a l o f f ic e s jo in e d th e M in is te r ia l.S e rv a n ts ' Union and to o k a c t io n a g a in s t ’p ic k in g s ; b u t . th e y :r e to r te d th e charge o f ta k in g i l l i c i t p e rq u is ite s on p a r ty members who;.- w ith .g re a te r in f lu e n c e , were in a b e t te r p o s i t io n to ex to rt-'-- them. Thus, in v a r io u s respec ts th e new s i tu a t io n o f government o f f i c ia l s was-unhappy.. .

But w ith few ^exceptions th e y Were s tro n g su pp o rte rs o f th e new regim e. In some,ways i t s treng thened t h e i r p o s i t io n , fo r , , w ith th e d e p le t io n o f the s p e c ia lis t - s e r v ic e s , . d is t r i c t - o f f i c e r s had to ta ke on fu n c t io n s w hich fo rm e r ly had been assigned to s p e c ia l is ts . A lso , th e B ritish -G o ve rn m e n t, on i t s re tu rn from.- e x i le , h®d suspended th e m achinery f o r lo c a l Government and t ra n s fe r re d to lo c a l o f f i c ia l s a l l the fu n c t io n s fo rm e r ly imposed on D is t r i c t C ouncils ” 'and M u n ic ip a l Committees, so th a t , as in the: e a r l ie r days o f B r i t is h r u le , the lo c a l o f f i c ia l s became the so le a u th o r i ty in lo c a l m a tte rs . They had m oreover.one fu r th e r advantage ove r th e lo c a l p a r ty agents; th e y were th e o n ly people w ith a d m in is t ra t iv e experience and th e y a lone knew how to g e t . th in g s done, how to s e t about o b ta in in g funds from th e Government f o r lo c a l needg,. and-how to comply w ith Accounts Department re g u la t io n s in spending them. - Then, w ith th e ra p id emergence o f in s u r ­re c t io n and th e concom itan t m u l t ip l ic a t io n o f v io le n t c rim e , i t was on d i s t r i c t o f f ic e r s th a t th e Government depended f o r the re s to ra t io n o f law and o rd e r, andj in i the g e n e ra l co n fu s io n , th e y were l e f t la r g e ly to t h e i r 01m resources w ith new o p p o r tu n it ie s f o r d is p la y in g in d iv id u a l i n i t i a t i v e .

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The s te e l frame o f c e n tra lis e d t e r r i t o r i a l a d m in is tra t io n " b u i l t up under B r i t is h ru le was found u s e fu l "by th e Japanese as an in s tru m e n t f o r the re s to ra t io n and maintenance o f o rd e r. S ince the a tta in m e n t o f indepen­dence i t has p layed a m ajor p a r t in h o ld in g the co u n try to g e th e r a g a in s t the fo rc e s o f -d is ru p t io n , and the new Government w h ich , on the a t ta in ­ment o f power, open ly p ro fessed m is t ru s t o f the t e r r i t o r i a l o f f i c i a l s : : in h e r i t in g the t r a d i t io n s o f B r i t is h r u le , has lea rned by experience to a p p re c ia te t h e i r im portance and the va lue o f t h e i r lo y a l, s e r v ic e s . ...

• Such was th e g e n e ra l e n v iro n m e n t.in which th e Government drew up i t s p lans fo r . s o lv in g i t s a d m in is tra t iv e problem s. A t f i r s t i t s a t te n t io n - was m a in ly d ire c te d towards p rom oting th e c o -o p e ra tiv e movement. D ire c ­t iv e s in th e C o n s t itu t io n s tre sse d th e im portance■o f "peop les ', co -opera­t iv e o rg a n iz a tio n s " in economic development, in the e x p lo ita t io n o f - . n a tu ra l resources and in unde rtak ings o f p u b lic u t i l i t y . T h is found e a r ly express ion in the tra n s fo rm a tio n o f the c o -o p e ra tiv e s e rv ic e . Form erly th e c o -o p e ra tiv e s e rv ic e had been a lm ost e x c lu s iv e ly concerned w ith the p ro v is io n o f a g r ic u l t u r a l c r e d i t . In 19*4-8 a com m ittee, formed to d ea l w ith t h is problem , recommended th e c re a t io n o f a s ta te A g r ic u l­t u r a l Bank. In i t s re p o r t the Committee p o in te d ou t th a t a c o -o p e ra tiv e s o c ie ty was a v o lu n ta ry o rg a n iz a t io n o f w hich th e members p ledged t h e i r u n ite d c r e d it and th e re fo re would n o t adm it members whose c r e d it was d o u b tfu l, whereas in Burma a l l c u l t iv a to r s were in need o f funds and e s p e c ia lly those whose c r e d i t was m ost d o u b tfu l, so th a t th e problem o f indebtedness cou ld n o t be so lved on c o -o p e ra tiv e l in e s ; i t recommended th a t the funds a v a ila b le f o r loans to c u l t iv a to r s th rough the Bank shou ld be open to a l l c u l t iv a to r s w ith s p e c ia l m achinery f o r the recovery o f deb ts . T h is p ro p o sa l seemed to th re a te n the o rg a n iz a tio n f o r c o -o p e ra tiv e c r e d it w ith e x t in c t io n and a t f i r s t encountered some re s is ta n c e , b u t a t th e same tim e th e c o -o p e ra tiv e o rg a n iz a t io n was ex tend ing the scope o f i t s a c t iv i t i e s to consum ers', p ro d u ce rs ' and m arke ting s o c ie t ie s , and these new p la y an im p o rta n t p a r t in th e m achinery f o r p rom oting w e lfa re .

Another in n o v a tio n devised by th e Prime M in is te r in May, 19^ 8, was a p ro je c t f o r a R e h a b il i ta t io n B rigade which shou ld re lie v e unemploy­ment and h e lp to meet th e s e rio u s shortage o f s k i l le d la b o u r, and w h ich would be employed m a in ly on th e p ro v is io n o f lo c a l a m e n itie s . P lans were a ls o drawn up f o r th e more e f fe c t iv e p rom otion o f w e lfa re th rough autono­mous lo c a l bo d ie s . A l l these v a r io u s in n o va tio n s were d ire c te d towards tra n s fo rm in g th e re la t io n s o f th e e xe cu tive se rv ice s w ith the c e n tra l government on th e one hand and w ith the gen e ra l p u b lic on the o th e r . The in s u rre c t io n s checked th e im p lem enta tion o f these p la n s , b u t in 1951 t r a n q u i l i t y was s u f f i c ie n t l y re s to re d to p e rm it th e h o ld in g o f a gen e ra l e le c t io n , and s h o r t ly a fte rw a rd s the Prime M in is te r s e t to work on p lans f o r a N a tio n a l W e lfa re Conference ( th e Pyidawtha Conference) w h ich should inaugu ra te c lo s e r r e la t io n s between the p u b lic se rv ice s and the peop le .

T h is Conference (h e ld in August, 1952) approved p lans f o r th e devo lu ­t io n o f powers, f o r th e d e m o c ra tiza tio n o f lo c a l a d m in is tra t io n , f o r a g r i ­c u l tu r a l and r u r a l development, f o r economic development, f o r th e n a t io n a l­iz a t io n o f the la n d , f o r under-developed ( i . e . th e f r o n t ie r ) a reas, f o r housing , t ra n s p o r t and communications, f o r educa tion , and f o r m ed ica l a id and p u b lic h e a lth . A l l these p la n s , and e s p e c ia lly those r e la t in g to the d e v o lu tio n o f powers and d e m o c ra tiza tio n o f lo c a l a d m in is tra t io n , had a d i r e c t be a rin g on the o rg a n iz a tio n and fu n c t io n s o f the execu tive s e rv ic e s .

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The p la n f o r lo c a l a d m in is tra t io n w i l l "be desc rib e d i n th e a p p ro p ria te p la c e ; here i t must s u f f ic e to n o t ic e the Phydawtha p la n f o r •toe d e v o lu t io n o f powers. In each tow neoip th e re was to be s e t up a Township W elfa re Committee w ith th e Township O f f ic e r as Chairman and ฬ .th members com pris ing re p re s e n ta tiv e s o f th e s p e c ia l is t s e rv ic e s • p o l ic e , p u b lic w orks, c o -o p e ra t iv e , a g r ic u ltu r e , v e te r in a ry , la n d re co rd s , edu ca tio n , m e d ica l and f i r e s e rv ic e to g e th e r w ith fo u r members nom inated by th e C e n tra l AFPFL to re p re se n t th e p u b l ic , so f a r , a t le a s t as th e AFPFL c o u ld be id e n t i f ie d w ith th e g e n e ra l p u b l ic . Above these Township W elfa re Committees was a D i s t r i c t W e lfa re Committee w ith th e Deputy Commissioner as Chairman and re p re s e n ta t iv e s o f th e fo re g o in g and o th e r s e rv ic e s a t th e d i s t r i c t le v e l , to g e th e r w ith a re p re s e n ta t iv e f o r each Township nom inated by th e C e n tra l C o u n c il o f the AFPFL. Above th e D is t r i c t C o u n c il th e re was a D iv is io n a l W e lfa re Committee s im i la r ly c o n s t itu te d , b u t w ith th e D iv is io n a l Commissioner as Chairman and w ith one re p re s e n ta ­t iv e o f each D i s t r i c t nom inated by th e C e n tra l AFPFL. Each C o u n c il was to draw up i t s own p la n s w ith es tim a tes o f th e e xp e n d itu re in v o lv e d . The Township p la n s would be in c o rp o ra te d in th e D i s t r i c t p lans and th e D is t r i c t p lans in th e D iv is io n a l P lan , w h ich would, come b e fo re the C ab ine t f o r c o n s id e ra tio n and in c lu s io n in th e n a t io n a l budget to be la id b e fo re P a r l ia ­ment. Funds would then be a l lo t t e d to th e D iv is io n a l Committees in th e fo rm o f d is c re t io n a ry g ra n ts w h ich th e y c o u ld expend w ith o u t f u r th e r re fe re n ce to th e Government o r f u r th e r s a n c tio n by th e F inance M in is t r y .In th e im p lem en ta tion o f th e p lans lo c a l c o u n c ils were re q u ire d to con­t r ib u t e e i th e r in cash, k in d o r la b o u r ; th e im p lem en ta tion o f th e works and the accou n ting f o r e xp e n d itu re were to be supe rv ised by th e D iv is io n a l Committee, b u t re p re s e n ta t iv e s o f th e heads o f departm ents in th e C e n tra l Government would have the r ig h t to in s p e c t and adW se on works in p ro g re ss . In th e f i r s t in s ta n c e K .50,000 was a l lo t t e d as a d is c re t io n a ry g ra n t to each Township W e lfa re Committee and a d d it io n a l e xpe nd itu re was a u th o ris e d on s p e c if ic approved p ro je c ts .

On t h is Pyidaw tha p la n a l l the dep a rtm en ta l o f f ic e r s a t each le v e l were b ro u g h t to g e th e r w ith a v iew to f a c i l i t a t i n g c o -o rd in a tio n and a v o id in g depa rtm en ta lism , w h ile th e re p re s e n ta t io n o f the p u b lic th rough the nom inated lo c a l re p re s e n ta t iv e s was a guarantee o f c o n t in u ity in the execu tion o f th e p lans in th e d r a f t in g o f w h ich th e y had p a r t ic ip a te d . The arrangement was open to the c r i t ic is m th a t i t Was th e AFPFL and n o t the gen e ra l p u b lic w h ich was rep resen ted on th e com m ittee, b u t membership o f th e p a r ty was open to a l l and th e re p re s e n ta t iv e s o f th e p a r ty were p ro b a b ly in most cases th e b e s t and most in f l u e n t ia l members o f the lo c a l p u b lic . The in te n t io n was however th a t these W e lfa re Committees shou ld in due course be rep la ced by lo c a l bod ies c re a te d under the new arrangements f o r lo c a l a d m in is tra t io n . Except in so f a r as th e e xe cu tive s e rv ic e s by reason o f th e n a tu re o f t h e i r fu n c t io n s came in to in t im a te c o n ta c t w ith th e peop le , the s p e c ia l is t s e rv ic e s con tin ued on much the same l in e s as under B r i t is h r u le excep t f o r the d e p le t io n th ro ugh th e lo s s o f fo re ig n o f f i c ia l s . These, th e new government had to re p la c e as b e s t i t couldT To seme e x te n t i t was com pelled to have recourse to the engagement o f fo re ig n e rs on tem pora ry c o n tra c ts and 200 m edical, men were b ro u g h t in from In^.iaT But g re a t a t te n t io n was p a id to th e t r a in in g o f o f f ic e r s who would e v e n tu a lly re n d e r Bur~a independent o f fo re ig n h e lp in a l l i t s re g u la r s e rv ic e s . Arrangements were a ls o made f o r t r a in in g o f f i c i a l s in t h e i r new fU i-c tions by th e in s t i t u t io n o f courses and c lasses in p u b lic a d m in is tra ­t io n .

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( c ) Autonomous Agencies. In Burma th e government p a r t ic ip a te s in many a c t iv i t i e s th a t in c o u n tr ie s w ith a d i f f e r e n t economic background are l e f t to p r iv a te in d iv id u a ls . - T h is is due p a r t ly to th e p o s t-w a r economic s i tu a t io n , and p a r t ly to th e p re -w a r s o c ia l and economic background. A government can ope ra te in e i th e r o f two ways; i t caii take a c t io n d e p a rt­m e n ta lly th rough i t s own o f f i c ia l s , o r i t can e n tru s t the m a tte r - to an autonomous agency, th a t i s , to an agency w h ich has autonomous powers w i th in the l im i t s sanctioned by the a u th o r i ty o f w h ich i t is an agent.. Before the war, th e fo re s ts were worked to some e x te n t, and a t _tim es to a ve ry co ns ide rab le e x te n t, by. government o f f i c ia l s , b u t the s ta te R a ilw ay was managed by an autonomous agency, the s ta te R a ilw ay Board. Except f o r those fu n c t io n s w h ich are a lm ost o b l ig a to ry f o r any government, the p re se n t government has p re fe r re d on th e whole to a c t th ro ugh autonomous agencies ra th e r than d e p a r tm e n ta lly . .

Before the war modern commerce and in d u s try in Burma were w h o lly fo re ig n and p r a c t ic a l ly a l l the c a p i ta l assets o f th e c o u n try except the la n d , and a lso much o f th e la n d , belonged to fo re ig n e rs . As a r e s u l t o f th e war a lm os t a l l th e c a p i ta l asse ts were destroyed , and even much of. th e la nd needed heavy c a p i ta l expe nd itu re f o r re c la m a tio n . O n,the re tu rn o f the B r i t is h Government one o f the most u rgen t problems was economic re c o n s tru c t io n . But th e c a p i ta l asse ts des troyed by th e war had been b u i l t up o u t o f annual p r o f i t s ; th e new c a p i ta l now re q u ire d f o r recon­s t r u c t io n would have to be ra is e d in th e open m arke t. The f i r s t wh ich had fo rm e r ly c o n tro lle d the r ic e and t im b e r in d u s tr ie s and in la n d w a te r t ra n s p o r t would no t re tu rn .unless th e Government would p ro v id e most o f th e r e q u is ite c a p i ta l and bea r th e r i s k o f lo s in g i t . But th e Government cou ld n o t p u t up th e c a p i ta l w ith o u t re s e rv in g some measure o f c o n t ro l.Thus the B r i t is h Government, w ith no s o c ia l i s t b ia s , was com pelled to e n te r on v a r io u s economic a c t i v i t i e s . I t devised p ro je c ts in which the s ta te was asso c ia te d w ith p re -w a r c a p i t a l i s t f irm s in o rd e r . to nurse them u n t i l th e y cou ld see th e way to making a s a t is fa c to ry p r o f i t w ith o u t government h e lp o r in te r fe re n c e , s ta te in te rv e n t io n was regarded as a tem porary measure w ith th e o b je c t o f re p a ir in g the p re -w a r economic s t ru c tu re , b u t in th e p o s t-w a r s i tu a t io n i t was recogn ized as in d isp e n sa b le .

But Burmans had no d e s ire to re s to re the p re -w a r economic f a b r ic .Under th e p re -w a r system o f f re e economic e n te rp r is e th e y had been unPble to o b ta in a fo o t in g in in d u s try o r commerce and had lo s t t h e i r r ic h e s t la n d to fo re ig n m oney-lenders. By way o f re a c t io n a g a in s t p re -w a r co n d i­t io n s they favoured s ta te ownership and c o n t ro l, and c a l le d themselves s o c ia l is t s . T h is was n o t m ere ly an id e o lo g ic a l concep tion ; i t bad a f i r m b a s is in economic r e a l i t i e s . There were no Burman c a p i ta l is t s ; o n ly by com bination cou ld th e y hope to h o ld t h e i r own a g a in s t fo re ig n c a p i ta l is t s , and i t was o n ly th ro ugh the s ta te th a t th e y cou ld combine e f fe c t iv e ly * S o c ia l is t th e o ry may have in c l in e d them to push c o n t ro l f u r th e r than the circum stances n e c e s s ita te d , b u t the economic a c t iv i t i e s o f th e B r i t is h Government seemed to j u s t i f y t h e i r b e l ie f in s o c ia lis m ; a ls o , what is more im p o rta n t, i t p ro v id e d them w ith a model f o r autonomous agencies on s o c ia l i s t l in e s . On a t ta in in g independence they transfo rm ed th e a g r ic u l­t u r a l p ro je c t in to a s ta te A g r ic u ltu re M arke ting Board and s h o r t ly a f t e r ­wards c rea ted s im ila r Boards f o r the tim b e r in d u s try and th e in la n d w a te r t ra n s p o r t .

A t the same tim e the Government was ex tend ing i t s a c t iv i t i e s in to new f ie ld s th rough th e n a t io n a l P lann ing Board and, as each new e n te rp r is e was

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taken lip , a new Board was formed to manage i t . When the number o f Boards became in c o n v e n ie n tly numerous th e Government decided to group a l l i e d p ro je c ts to g e th e r in to comprehensive C o rp o ra tio n s . I t seemed a ls o th a t f o r c e r ta in aspects o f th e p rom otion o f s o c ia l welfare_ s im ila r autonomous agencies were p re fe ra b le to depa rtm en ta l management: . i n o th e r m a tte rs p a r t ic ip a t io n w ith p re -w a r companies in " jo in g ve n tu re s " was found expe d ie n t, and the id ea o f a j o i n t ven tu re was subsequently extended to com m ercial e n te rp r is e s in w h ich th e s ta te was asso c ia te d w i th B’irma n a t io n a ls . These v a r io u s a c t iv i t i e s re q u ire d an a p p ro p ria te f in a n c ia l apparatus and the Government a c c o rd in g ly founded S ta te banks to p ro v id e the necessary fu n d s . Thus, in the course of- the few years s in ce the a tta in m e n t o f independence th e re has r a p id ly evo lved an e la b o ra te complex o f c o rp o ra tio n s , boards, c o u n c ils , j o i n t ven tu res and bank ing in s t i t u t io n s in w h ich the Government is d i r e c t ly in te re s te d . ' The more im p o rte n t o f these are c la s s i f ie d under t h e i r re s p e c t iv e ’ heads in th e fo l lo w in g l i s t :

C o rp o ra tio n s .A g r ic u l tu r a l and R u ra l Development C o rp o ra tio n Commerce Development C o rp o ra tio n •I n d u s t r ia l Development C o rp o ra tio n M in e ra l Resources C o rp o ra tio n

Economic E n te rp r is e s .a . Communications .

In la n d Water T ra n sp o rt Board Union o f Burma A irw ays Board Union o f Burma R a ilw ay Board Union o f Burma S h ipp ing Board ""i •Board o f Management : fo r the P o rt o f Rangoon Burma s te v e d o rin g Board

■ b . ■ Coxmnerc e find In d u s try : ■C i v i l Supplies-Management Board Government S p inn ing and Weaving F a c to ry Board Government T i le F a c to ry Board Paper F a c to ry and Chemical In d u s tr ie s Board

■ S p e c ia l P ro je c t Im p lem enta tion Board S ta te A g r ic u l tu r a l M a rke ting Board S ta te Timber Board Union Of Burma Purchase'Board

c. M isce llaneousBurma Research Board E le c t r i c i t y Supply BoardN a tio n a l Housing fie Towr. and C ountry Development Board S ta te Pawnshop Management Board- Union o f "Burma Insurance Board -:

(Fo r each o f these economic e n te rp r is e s except th e s ta te A g r ic u l tu r a l- M arke ting Board, separa te es tim a tes o f re c e ip ts and expend itu re were

appended a& Annexure 2 to th e Union Budget f o r 1955-56 .)

S o c ia l W e lfa re I n s t i t u t io n s .Burma T ra n s la tio n S o c ie tyC u ltu ra l C o unc ilMass E ducation C o u n c il

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N a tio n a l C o -ope ra tive C ounc ilN a tio n a l F itn e s s Board '• • " -r,s?S a n ita t io n Board. - .S o c ia l S e rv ices Board ■' ............... .... ■S o c ia l S e rv ices C o u n c il T o u r is t T r a f f ic A d v iso ry Beard

J o in t Ventu res: Fo r P ro d u c tio n *Burma C o rpo ra tion ( 1 9 5 1 ) L td i Burma O i l Company (1954) L td .Anglo-Burma T in Co.Burma P harm aceutica l F a c to ry

J o in t V entu res: N a tio n a l.Raw M a te r ia ls and M achineryT e x t ile sHardwareP ro v is io n sTyres and Tubes

Banks.Union o f Burma Bank S ta te A g r ic u l tu r a l Bank Union o f Burma Commercial Bank S ta te C o -opera tive Bank

Th is l i s t serves to i l l u s t r a t e • the wide and vax*ied range o f Govern­ment a c t iv i t i e s in rega rd to economic e n te rp r is e and s o c ia l w e lfa re . I t cou ld be expanded by the in c lu s io n o f s im ila r Boards subo rd ina te to the la rg e C o rp o ra tio n s , and in o th e r respec ts i t is n o t exhaustive .

A l l these in s t i t u t io n s , a p a rt from th e J o in t Ventures and the Banks, have c e r ta in common fe a tu re s . The P a rliam en t a n n u a lly , so f a r as neces­sa ry , vo tes them funds f o r c a p i ta l and w ork ing expenses and in gen e ra l each in s t i t u t io n has i t s own account in a bank nominated by the Government. The main reason f o r w ork ing th rough an autonomous agency ra th e r than d e p a rtm e n ta lly is to exempt the in s t i t u t io n s from unnecessary r e s t r ic t io n s o f departm enta l ro u t in e and to a llo w them to conduct t h e i r a f f a i r s e f f i ­c ie n t ly on the same lin e s as p r iv a te e n te rp r is e . But t h e i r accounts must be m a in ta ined in a form approved by the A ccountant-G enera l who a lso a u d its the annual sta tem ent o f accounts, and t h is statem ent to g e th e r w ith an annual p rogress re p o r t must be subm itted to P a rliam en t b e fo re the nex t y e a r ’ s a llo tm e n t is sanc tioned . A lthough the s ta tues and o rde rs e s ta b lis h in g the in s t i t u t io n s p u rp o r t to g ive them a f re e hand, the ru le s , re g u la t io n s and by-law s govern ing t h e i r procedure are la rg e ly m odelled on departm enta l re g u la t io n s and are l i t t l e le s s r e s t r ic t iv e . And members o f the Government and o f f i c ia l s f ig u r -3 p ro m in e n tly on most o f th e Boards.So f a r as regards economic e n te rp r is e s , th e p r o f i t s , i f any, are a t the d is p o s a l o f th e Government, and th e r e s p o n s ib i l i t y f o r t h e i r success o r f a i lu r e re s ts u l t im a te ly w ith the Government, w h ich1' w i l l take the c r e d it f o r t h e i r success and w i l l be exposed to c r i t ic is m i f .they are unsuccess­f u l . Thus the complex o f autonomous agencies is a v e ry im p o rta n t fe a tu re in the s t ru c tu re o f government.

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The la rg e C o rpo ra tions are much more than mere aggregates o f subor­d in a te Boards; th e y .manage some p ro je c ts d i r e c t ly , and they engage in research and make advances to p r iv a te e n te rp r is e . The la rg e s t is the A g r ic u l t u r a l and R u ra l Development C o rp o ra tio n o f w hich th e budget f o r 1955-56 in c lu d e d 30 separa te p ro je c ts r e la t in g to d a iry fa rm in g , f i e l d c rops , f o r e s t r y and f is h e r ie s . The Board o f D ire c to rs c o n s is ts o f the Deputy Prime M in is te r f o r Economic A f f a i r s as Chairman, w ith - th e Deputy Prime M in is te r f o r S o c ia l A f fa i r s and th e M in is te r f o r A g r ic u ltu re and F o re s ts as th e two V ice-C ha irm en and, as o rd in a ry members, th re e o th e r M in is te rs f o r Land N a t io n a l iz a t io n , Trade Development, and C o -opera tives; fo u r S e c re ta r ie s to Government, f o r A g r ic u ltu re and Forests^ Land .N a t io n a liz a t io n , C o -o p e ra tive s and In d u s try ; fo u r h ig h dep artm en ta l o f f i c i a l s , th e 'F in a n c ia l Commissioner f o r A g r ic u ltu re , the C h ie f Con­s e rv a to r o f F o re s ts , th e C h ie f E ng ineer f o r I r r ig a t io n , and th e D ire c to r o f V e te r in a ry A f f a i r s , w h ile ano the r o f f i c i a l serves bo th as member o f th e Board and as i t s C h ie f E xe cu tive O f f ic e r .

The M in e ra l Resources Development C o rp o ra tio n manages c o a l, copper, i r o n and z in c m ines, w ith o th e r s m a lle r p ro je c ts . The A c t under which i t is ' c o n s t itu te d p re s c r ib e s th a t fo u r members o f the Board s h a l l have a s p e c ia l knowledge o f in d u s t ry , th e m arke ting o f m in e ra ls , f in a n c e , economics o r o f in d u s t r ia l d i r e c t io n o r management. In p ra c t ic e i t has been found necessary to r e c r u i t government o f f i c i a l s ra th e r than men w ith p r a c t ic a l experience o f m in in g . The Board c o n s is ts o f the M in is te r f o r Mines as Chairman, w ith th re e M in is te rs , f o r F inance , In d u s try and Labour, th re e S e c re ta r ie s to Government, th e F in a n c ia l Commissioner f o r Commerce, th e two Chairmen o f the Union Bank and o f th e S ta te Commercial Bank and ano the r o f f i c i a l as C h ie f E xe cu tive O f f ic e r .

The I n d u s t r ia l Development C o rp o ra tio n is s im i la r ly c o n s t itu te d . S ubord ina te Boards in c lu d e th e Cement F a c to ry Board, th e S ta te Brewery and D i s t i l l e r y Management Board, th e Tea P ro je c t Board, the E ng inee ring In d u s try P ro je c t Board, th e S e r ic u ltu re P ro je c t Im p lem enta tion Board, and the Sugar F a c to ry Board, and i t has a ls o s e t up a S te e l R o ll in g M i l l , a Ju te Bag and Twine M i l l , and o th e r p ro je c ts , w h ile i t su p e rv ise s , o r is c lo s e ly a sso c ia te d w ith , an Atom ic Energy Centre and v a r io u s research in s t i t u t e s .

The Commerce Development C o rp o ra tio n , the youngest o f the fo u r is managed by a Board c o n s is t in g o f the M in is te r f o r Trade Development as Chairman; two M in is te rs f o r F inance and Revenue, and f o r In d u s tr ie s ; the S e c re ta ry to th e M in is t r y f o r Trade Development, th e two Chairmen of" the Union Bank and o f th e s ta te Commercial Bank, and. th re e o f f i c i a l s , the R e g is tra r o f C o -o p e ra tive S o c ie t ie s , the Commissioner o f C i v i l S u pp lies , and. the D ire c to r o f In d u s t r ie s , w ith ano the r o f f i c i a l as Deputy D ire c to r G eneral and S e c re ta ry to the B oard .. The main body has s e t up a s u b s id ia ry , th e Rubber E xp o rt and Development C o rp o ra tio n , in c lu d in g some members o f the p a re n t Board, t i le P a rlia m e n ta ry S e c re ta ry to th e M in is t r y o f Trade Development and W o n o n - o f f ic ia ls w ith experience in th e rubber in d u s try .

O bv ious ly a l l these C o rpo ra tions a re under v e ry c lo se Government c o n t ro l and are in e f fe c t government concerns. In many o f t h e i r a c t iv i t i e s th e D ire c to rs a re a s s is te d by fo re ig n exp e rts as a d v is e rs , b u t the p ro v is io n o f th e necessary pe rson ne l f o r management, a d m in is tra t io n and o p e ra tio n p u ts a severe s t r a in on th e v e ry meagre manpower resources

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o f the c o u n try and, as th e m in is te rs , s e c re ta r ie s and o f f i c ia l s must a ls o c a rry on t h e i r usua l departm enta l a c t iv i t i e s , they cannot 'e a s ily f in d tim e to d ischa ige t h e i r r e s p o n s ib i l i t ie s in connection w ith the Corpora­t io n s , though in many cases th e re is s ta tu to ry p r o v is io n \ fo r the de lega­t io n o f these to re p re s e n ta tiv e s .

The s m a lle r Boards a re c o n s t itu te d on the same lin e s and d i f f e r c h ie f ly in be ing concerned o n ly w ith a s in g le e n te rp r is e .' Thus th e T i le F a c to ry Board, c o n s t itu te d in 1953 under the M in is tr y ' o f Housing and Labour, b u t t ra n s fe r re d in August 1956 to th e M in is t r y o f P u b lic Works and Housing in c lu d e s th e a p p ro p ria te M in is te r as Chairman, th re e S e c re ta r ie s , f o r P u b lic Works, In d u s try , and F inance and Revenue, th e C h ie f Engineer o f the N a tio n a l Town and Country Development Board and the D ire c to r o f In d u s try ; i t a ls o in c lu d e s two n o n - o f f ic ia ls , one a r e t i r e d C iv i l Servant and a re p re s e n ta tiv e o f the Trade Union Congress, Burma. A t one tim e i t was a p ra c t ic e to in c lu d e re p re s e n ta tiv e s o f the employees; thus the In la n d Water T ra n sp o rt Board as e s ta b lis h e d in 19^9 in c lu d e d , to g e th e r w ith th e o f f i c i a l members, fo u r members to re p re se n t the gen e ra l p u b lic and fo u r to re p re s e n t.th e In la n d Water T ra n sp o rt Employees Union.S im ila r ly the R a ilw ay Board in c lu d e d members o f th e R a ilw ay W orkers1 Union. There seems however to have been a re a c t io n a g a in s t the re p re ­s e n ta tio n o f employees on the Boards, and they do n o t appear among tne members o f the In la n d Water T ranspo rt Board as now c o n s t itu te d . The Chairman is th e M in is te r f o r Posts and Te legraphs, and th e members c o n s is t o f a re p re s e n ta t iv e from th e same M in is t r y and one from the M in is t r y o f Finance and Revenue to g e th e r w ith re p re s e n ta tiv e s o f o th e r co rp o ra tio n s and boards, a member o f P a rliam en t and a n o n - o f f ic ia l nominated by the P re s id e n t. A conspicuous in s tan ce o f the degree to which the Government th rough these autonomous agencies permeates the d a i ly l i f e o f the people is p ro v id e d by the o p e ra tio n s o f the C iv i l Supp lies Management Board. T h is Board a ls o i l lu s t r a t e d the fa c t th a t these agencies a re n o t m ere ly the. c re a t io n o f s o c ia l is t id e o lo g y b u t have t h e i r ro o t in the f a c t s . o f the po s t-w a r economic s itu a t io n , f o r i t de rive s from th e Department o f Commerce and S upp lies under the in te r im B r i t is h Government. I t was c o n s t itu te d by execu tive Order in 1951 and the Board in c lud es the Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner o f C i v i l S u pp lies , the re p re s e n ta tiv e s o f th re e M in is t r ie s , a re p re s e n ta tiv e o f th e C o -opera tive S o c ie tie s Department and th re e n o n - o f f ic ia ls , o f whom two however must be members o f a C o -ope ra tive S o c ie ty . For th e d is t r ib u t io n o f su p p lie s i t fu n c t io n s m a in ly th rough c o -o p e ra tiv e s o c ie t ie s , w ith a. branch a t D is t r i c t Headquarters under th e Deputy Commissioner, ana subo rd ina te branches on much th e same lin e s a t Township Headquarters. Thus i t s ope ra tions extend down to the lo w es t le v e l o f a d m in is tra t iv e o rg a n isa ­t io n . Under th e o r ig in a l Order i t was charged w ith the "procurem ent o f supp lies o r th in g s th a t may be deemed necessary f o r the c i v i l p o p u la tio n o f Burma" and was e x c lu s iv e ly re s p o n s ib le f o r th e d is t r ib u t io n o f sugar, t in n e d m ilk , te a , c o tto n yarn and*o ther m ajor com m odities. S ince then the scope o f i t s a c t iv i t i e s has been w id e ly extended.

The Boards and C ouncils concerned w ith s o c ia l w e lfa re p re se n t a ve ry s im ila r p a t te rn , b u t u s u a lly have a la rg e r p ro p o r t io n o f n o n - o f f ic ia ls on the Board.

The e xp e rt deputed by th e U n ited N ations to survey a d m in is tra t io n in Burma suggested th a t th e re was n o t in fre q u e n t ly a d u p lic a t io n o f fu n c t io n s

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between th e C o rp o ra tio n s , Boards7 ~ M If lIs tr ie s and Departments and a tendency to m u lt ip ly Boards in o rd e r to re lie v e M in is t r ie s o r Departments o f fu n c t io n s w h ich they shou ld be ab le to p e rfo rm . He suggested a ls o th a t th e -co n d itio n s under w h ich these agencies opera te a re undu ly r e s t r ic t iv e and th e re b y d e fe a t th e main o b je c t o f c re a t in g them. 'He commented'too on th e n e e d -fo r th e members o f th e Boards to have ' a - p r a c t i - .­c a l approach to such d u t ie s . B u t, as a lre a d y e xp la in e d , on th e a t ta in - - . . ment o f independence th e re ' were no Burmans w ith the necessary' expe rience , and i t is o n ly now th a t , w i th f in a n c ia l a s s is ta n ce and guidance from these in s t i t u t io n s , some p r iv a te in d iv id u a ls a re p a in f u l ly a c q u ir in g i t . ’ .

The J o in t Venture's a re on q u ite a d i f f e r e n t fo o t in g . These had t h e i r o r ig in in p re -w a r c a p i t a l i s t f irm s w ith w h ich th e Government has- gone in to p a r tn e rs h ip , p a r t o f th e c a p i ta l b e in g p ro v id e d by the p re v io u s company and p a r t be in g subscrib ed by th e Government to fo rm a new Corapany, w ith a"Board o f D ire c to rs on w h ich each p a r ty shou ld be rep resen ted .The D ire c to rs re p re s e n tin g th e fo rm er company p rp v id e d e xp e rt knowledge, and those re p re s e n tin g the Government can e x p la in th e views and wishes o f the Government-at th e same tim e th a t th e y a re a c q u ir in g p r a c t ic a l e x p e r i­ence in managing th e b u s in e ss . The o r ig in a l in te n t io n was th a t the whole - bus iness shou ld be taken ove r by the Government as' sOon as the o u ts ta n d in g share o f the c a p i ta l cou ld c o n v e n ie n tly be made a v a ila b le , b u t from a . " re c e n t s ta tem en t by Prime M in is te r บ Nu i t seems th a t th e Government has le a rn ed to va lue th e help- and guidance o f th e n o n - o f f ic ia l D ire c to rs and to a p p re c ia te the need f o r f u r th e r experience b e fo re u n d e rta k in g so le management. The P harm aceutica l F a c to ry is n o t, s t r i c t l y speaking , a • j o in t ve n tu re , as the f i r m w h ich is a s s is t in g the Government has n o t p u t up any p a r t o f the c a p i t a l , . b u t in e f f e c t - i t is ope ra ted .on v e ry s im ila r l in e s though a p p a re n tly i t has n o t so f re e a hand as th e j o i n t ven tu res in th e re c ru itm e n t o f s t a f f . . .

The com m ercial J o in t Ventures have n o t y e t been f i n a l l y c o n s t itu te d . The p re se n t in te n t io n is th a t each C o rp o ra tio n s h a l l have a c a p i ta l o f K . 5 m i l l io n ($1.05 m i l l io n ) o f 'w h ic h th e Government w i l l ร'ฒว s-cribe K .2.6 m il l io n ' and th e rem a in ing c a p i ta l in K .100 shares w i l l be open to Burma c it iz e n s up to a l i m i t o f K .10,000 f o r each s u b s c r ib e r , t h is be ing the minimum q u a l i f ic a t io n f o r membership o f the Board o f D ire c to rs . The c h ie f o b je c t o f these is to remove the d i f f i c u l t i e s w h ich th e new business men o f Burma, encounter th ro ugh t h e i r la c k o f c a p i ta l and 'exp e rie n ce , o n ly by com bination on a c o n s id e ra b le sca le , w ith la rg e c a p i ta l , and by p o o lin g -■ th e exp e rt knowledge w h ich the Government can o b ta in are Burmans l i k e ly , to h o ld t h e i r own a g a in s t fo re ig n c o m p e tit io n . As the m ajor ow ner-o f c a p i ta l , the Government w i l l be ab le to e xe rc is e e f fe c t iv e c o n tro l and, by p ro v id in g f a c i l i t i e s in rega rd to im port, lic e n s e s and o th e r concessions, i t w i l l do m u c h 't o - fa c i l i ta te p r o f i t a b le opex-ations. : To th e e x te n t th a t these e n te rp r is e s succeed th e y w i l l - e x te n d th e sphere o f government in economic a c t i v i t i e s , b u t in th e lo ng run th e y shou ld fo s te r th e grow th o f an independent c la ss o f bus iness men who w i l l re s e n t in s te a d o f welcome Government in te rv e n t io n in the conduct of- economic e n te rp r is e .

Over th e fo u r s ta te Banks th e Government e xe rc ise s no d i r e c t c o n t ro l and i t i s n o t rep resen ted on th e Boards o f D ire c to rs , b u t i t p ro v id e s the i n i t i a l c a p i ta l and app o in ts the D ire c to rs and in .v a r io u s Ways can e xe r­c is e cons id e ra b le in f lu e n c e on p o l ic y ; beyond th a t however i t has l i t t l e o r no say in the conduct o f t h e i r a f f a i r s and th e y a re in p ra c t ic e -a s w e l l

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as in name.1 autonomous agencies in ', p ro v id in g the f in a n c ia l apparatus needed f o r the development o f Burma a long l in e s approved by the Government

Perhaps one can b e s t understand the s i t u a t io n ' in Burma a t ' t h e p re se n t day by a comparison w ith Java in 1830. Under French ru le th e Dutch had fo rg o tte n t h e i r t r a d i t io n o f com mercial e n te rp r is e ; they had no c a p ita l , no m anu factu res,.and d id n o t a s p ire beyond c u l t iv a t io n and p e t ty tra d e .In Java, under th e l i b e r a l system o f f re e e n te rp r is e in h e r ite d from R a ff le s , .the. p r o f i t s o f economic a c t iv i t i e s went to E n g lis h m anufacturers and merchants and th e land to Chinese middlemen; the T reasury was empty and the people were in d e b t. Van den Bosch in tro d u ce d the C u ltu re System o f S ta te c o n t ro l over e n te rp r is e , and w ith in a few years Java was p ro ­duc ing a la rg e annual s u rp lu s , which enabled the Dutch to b u i ld up a m e rc a n tile m arine , b rough t them in to bus iness in Java and, u n t i l i t was overworked, p u t money in to th e pockets o f the Javanese. B y .1870 the men whom Van den Bosch cou ld h a rd ly drag from beh ind t h e i r coun te rs , were clam ouring f o r l ib e r a t io n from the trammels o f s ta te c o n t ro l. Van den Bosch was more h a p p ily s itu a te d than th e p re se n t ru le rs o f Burma, because s h o r t ly b e fo re h is a r r i v a l a s ta te Bank had been e s ta b lis h e d , and the suppress ion o f a w idespread ’ in s u r re c t io n had l e f t him in command o f a s tro n g army. B u t, i f Burma can produce a Van den Bosch, one may no t unreasonably expect th a t in th e course o f one o r two gen e ra tions th e in te rv e n t io n by the s ta te w h ich the p re se n t s o c ia l and economic s i tu a t io n demands w i l l fade away because i t s success w i l l have rendered i t no lo n g e r necessary.

(d ) The J u d ic ia ry (S e c tio n 133 to 153) Throughout the Union ju s t ic e is ad m in is te re d in Courts e s ta b lis h e d by the C o n s titu t io n o r by law . The Courts e s ta b lis h e d by th e C o n s t itu t io n are th e Supreme C ourt and th e High C ourt. The Supreme C ourt and High C ourt rep laced th e fo rm er H igh C ourt o f Ju d ic a tu re w ith such changes as the new s itu a t io n re q u ire d ; a l l the o r ig in a l members o f th e Supreme C ourt had fo rm e r ly been Judges o f the High C ourt under B r i t is h r u le , and had a l l been c a lle d to the b a r in England, as had some o f th e o th e r s e n io r ju d ic ia l o f f ic e r s o f the new regim e.Thus E n g lis h le g a l t r a d i t io n s were s t ro n g ly rep resen ted a t the ce n tre o f th e new ju d ic ia l o rg a n iz a t io n . The number o f judges in th e Supreme C ourt and the H igh C ourt IS f ix e d by law , as a re t h e i r s a la r ie s and c o n d it io n s o f s e rv ic e ^ and no change to t h e i r p re ju d ic e may be made in these except by t h e i r v o lu n ta ry agreement on an occasion o f genera l re trenchm ent f o r a l l s e rv ic e s . The C o n s t itu t io n p ro v id e s th a t , a l l Judges s h a l l be in d e ­pendent in the exe rc ise o f t h e i r ju d ic ia l fu n c t io n s and s u b je c t o n ly to the C o n s titu t io n and the law .

The Supreme C ourt has ju r is d ic t io n th roughou t the whole o f the Union, and th e law as dec la red by i t is b in d in g on a l l C ourts . The head o f the Supreme C ourt is s ty le d the C h ie f J u s t ic e o f the Union. He is appo in ted by the P re s id e n t w ith the app ro va l o f bo th Chambers o f P a rliam en t in jo in t sess ion . No d iscu ss io n o f the s u i t a b i l i t y o f the P re s id e n t 's nominee is p e rm itte d . The same procedure is adopted in th e appointm ent o f a l l the o th e r Judges, bo th o f the Supreme C ourt and o f the H igh C ourt. The J u d ic ia ry A c t p ro v id e s f o r the appoin tm ent o f f iv e judges o f the Supreme C ourt; o r ig in a l ly th e re were o n ly th re e members, b u t s ince 1955 th e re have been fo u r . In th e d e fa u lt o f a quorum the C ourt may c a l l in a Judge o f the H igh C ourt to s i t w ith th e re g u la r members, and t h is was o fte n found necessary b e fo re a fo u r th judge was appo in ted . No judge o f the Supreme Court may be removed except f o r proved m isbehaviour o r in c a p a c ity .

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No charge may be p re fe r re d a g a in s t any judge o f the Supreme C ourt except a t the in s ta n c e o f one o f the Chambers on a r e s o lu t io n supported by a m a jo r i ty o f th e m em bers'present, and i t must then b e . in v e s t ig a te d by a S p e c ia l T r ib u n a l c o n s is t in g o f the Speakers o f th e two Chambers and the P re s id e n t o r a depu ty app o in ted by the P re s id e n t. The a lle g e d d e lin q u e n t has the r ig h t to . appear and to be "rep rese n te d in the p roceed ings. I f th e T r ib u n a l unanim ously d ec la res th a t the charge has n o t been, proved, i t s d e c is io n is f i n a l . In o th e r cases i t s re p o r t is cons idered by bouh Chambers. in j o i n t s i t t i n g and; i f the m a jo r i ty so dec ides , the P re s id e n t must o rd e r th e rem oval o f the c u lp r i t from h is o f f ic e .

The Supreme C ourt is the C ourt o f f i n a l appeal f r o m ,a l l judgm ents, o rde rs and decrees o f a l l c o u rts w i th in th e Union; b u t leave to appeal must f i r s t be ob ta ined from th e High C ou rt, o r s p e c ia l leave from the Supreme C ourt. Any person has th e r ig h t to move the Supreme.C ourt (s e c t io n 25) to issu e d ire c t io n s in the n a tu re o f Habeas Corpus, mandamus, p r o h ib it io n quo w a rra n to and c e r t io r a r i a p p ro p ria te to the fundam enta l r ig h ts guaranteed under Chapter I I o f th e C o n s t itu t io n . T h is r ig h t has been f r e e ly e x e rc is e d . ' In 195^ th e re were o n ly 6 .c r im in a l appeals and 20 c i v i l appeals b u t th e re \rere no le s s than 183 c r im in a l, and 152 . c i v i l m isce llaneous a p p lic a t io n s . The Supreme C ourt may b e -c a lle d on by the P re s id e n t/to d e l iv e r an o p in io n on any q u e s tio n o f law , and th is p rocedure has been found u s e fu l in conn ec tion w ith proposed le g is la t io n re g a rd in g the e x p lo i ta t io n o f n a tu ra l resources on w h ich th e C o n s t itu t io n p laced c e r ta in r e s t r ic t io n s . S im i la r ly in th e case o f le g is la t io n by the con­s t i t u e n t S ta te s , the P re s id e n t may r e fe r a B i l l to the Supreme C ourt w ith a v iew to a s c e r ta in w hether i t s p ro v is io n s a re in any way repugnant to th e C o n s t itu t io n .

S ince th e Supreme C ourt was f i r s t e s ta b lis h e d an unforseen burden has been p laced on i t . One fe a tu re o f the in s u r re c t io n s has been th e lo o t in g o f r ic e and r ic e p ro d u c ts in th e possess ion o f the S ta te A g r ic u l­t u r a l Board f o r w hich payment wa.s o u ts ta n d in g . To meet these c la im s a w ho le -tim e c i v i l c o u r t was e s ta b lis h e d under the S p e c ia l C i v i l C ourt Act (L X X X IIl) o f 1951> w ith a member o f th e Supreme C ourt as p re s id e n t o f th e t r ib u n a l. T h is is th e c h ie f reason why i t was -o ften so d i f f i c u l t to p ro v id e a quorum o f th re e judges f o r the o rd in a ry work o f th e Supreme C ourt u n t i l th e s i tu a t io n was re lie v e d by the a d d it io n o f a fo u r th Judge.

■The Supreme C ourt s i t s in Rangoon b u t may a ls o s i t a t such o th e r p laces as the P re s id e n t in c o n s u lta t io n w ith th e .C h ie f J u s t ic e o f th e Union may d i r e c t .

The in v io l a b i l i t y o f the Supreme C ourt as in te r p r e te r o f the Con­s t i t u t i o n is safeguarded by th e p ro v is io n th a t 110 law may be passed exempting from i t s a p p e lla te ju r is d ic t io n any q u e s tio n as to th e c o n s t i­t u t io n a l v a l i d i t y o f law s, and in a l l cases i t s d e c is io n is f i n a l .

The H igh C ourt has o r ig in a l ju r is d ic t io n f o r th e C ity o f Rangoon and in a l l m a tte rs r e la t in g to the in te r p r e ta t io n o f th e C o n s t itu t io n 7 and in a l l d isp u te s between the Union and one o f i t s component unitSj o r between one u n i t and a n o th e r; i t . i s requ ire d , to t r a n s fe r t o - i t s e l f any case pending in an in f e r io r C ourt i f i t is s a t is f ie d th a t a c o n s t i tu t io n a l issue is in v o lv e d . I t is a ls o th e p r in c ip a l C ourt o f Appeal f o r th e whole Union in b o th c r im in a l and c i v i l m a tte rs , and a l l c a p i ta l sentences by an in f e r io r c o u r t re q u ire c o n firm a tio n by th e H igh C o u rt. I t must s i t in the

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c a p i ta l c i t y b u t , l i k e the Supreme C ourt, i t may s i t a t such o th e r p laces as th e P re s id e n t in c o n s u lta t io n w ith th e C h ie f J u s t ic e o f the Union may d i r e c t ; in O ctober 1956 arrangements were made f o r a Judge o f the High C ourt to s i t perm anently in Mandalay. The C o n s t itu t io n a ls o d ire c ts th a t one o r more judges s h a l l s i t a t such p lace in th e Shan S ta te as the P re s id e n t may a p p o in t a f t e r c o n s u lta t io n w ith the C h ie f J u s t ic e o f th e Union. As a lre a d y m entioned, th e procedure f o r th e appoin tm ent o f the C h ie f Judge a n d 'o th e r Judges o f the High C ourt is - th e same as f o r the a pp o in tm en t-o f th e Chieif J u s t ic e o f the Union. The procedure f o r the removal o f a H igh C ourt Judge is the same as f o r the rem oval o f a Judge o f th e Supreme C ourt, except th a t the C h ie f J u s t ic e o f th e U n ion 're p lace s th e P re s id e n t on th e t r ib u n a l.

One in n o v a tio n in j u d ic ia l procedure was in tro d u ce d by th e B r i t is h Government on i t s re tu rn from In d ia in 1945 in o rd e r to . cope e x p e d it io u s ly w ith the enormous volume o f c rim e . The S p e c ia l Judges A c t (ix) o f 1946 empowered the Government to a p p o in t S p e c ia l Judges who cou ld t r y sessions cases by the le ss cumbrous procedure a p p lic a b le to w a rra n t cases. These powers have been c o n fe rre d on Sessions Judges and on some A s s is ta n t Judges. Subsequently a Bureau' o f S p e c ia l In v e s t ig a t io n was c rea ted i l l 1-947 to -d e a l w ith cases under th e P u b lic O rder P re s e rv a tio n A c t (xvi), th e F o re ig n Exchange R e g u la tio n -A c t (XLIV),. th e E s s e n tia l S upp lies and S erv ices A c t (X L V Il) , and C o n tro l o f Im po rts and E xports A c t (L V l) ; in 1948 the new Government in i t s ze a l f o r the suppress ion o f c o r ru p tio n , passed th e R e s tr ic t io n o f B r ib e ry and C o rru p tio n A ct ( i x v i l ) and extended th e fu n c t io n o f the S p e c ia l In v e s t ig a t io n s Bureau to d e a l w ith such m a tte rs . A l l the o ffences in v e s tig a te d by the Bureau under these Acts a re t r ia b le by th e S p e c ia l Judges.

A p a rt from these S p e c ia l Judges th e fo rm er m achinery f o r ju d ic ia l a d m in is tra t io n in the D is t r ic t s has been re ta in e d . In each d i s t r i c t th e re is a D is t r i c t M a g is tra te p r im a r i ly re sp o n s ib le f o r th e maintenance o f law and o rd e r th ro ugho u t the d i s t r i c t and w ith execu tive a u th o r i ty over a l l the subo rd ina te m a g is tra te s in the D is t r i c t . A l l these m a g is tra te s , d is t r ib u te d over the tow nsh ips, have f i r s t , second o r t h i r d c la ss powers, and th e s e n io r m a g is tra te s have s p e c ia l powers to t r y a l l o ffences no t pun ishab le w ith death and to impose a sentence o f im prisonm ent up to seven ye a rs . The D is t r i c t M a g is tra te may h im s e lf t r y some o r ig in a l cases and is th e a p p e lla te a u th o r i ty f o r a l l the m a g is tra te s w ith second o r t h i r d c la ss powers. A l l these m a g is tra te s are o f f i c ia l s o f the execu tive a d m in is tra t iv e s e rv ic e b u t , in the d ischarge o f t h e i r ju d ic ia l fu n c t io n s , th e y are a l l s u b je c t to th e c o n t ro l o f the High C ourt.

In each d i s t r i c t , a longs ide th e D is t r i c t M a g is tra te , th e re is a Sessions and D is t r i c t JudgeT As Sessions Judge he t r ie s a l l those se rio u s cases w h ich th e law re q u ire s to be committed f o r t r i a l b e fo re a Sessions C ourt; he hears appeals from f i r s t c la ss m a g is tra te s and a lso from s p e c ia l power m a g is tra te s un less th e sentence exceeds fo u r yea rs , when the appeal l i e s to th e High C o u rt. The D is t r i c t C ourt is the c o u n te rp a rt o f th e Sessions C ourt on th e c i v i l s id e . The D is t r i c t Judge exe rc ises o r ig in a l ju r is d ic t io n in th e more im p o rta n t c i v i l cases; he a lso hears appeals from th e A s s is ta n t and S ubord ina te Judges w ith in the d i s t r i c t , though in c e r ta in cases th e re is a second appeal to the High C o u rt. The A s s is ta n t Judges and Subord inate Judges t r y the c i v i l cases a r is in g w ith in t h e i r ju r is d ic t io n acco rd ing to tn e l im i t s p re s c r ib e d f o r

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t h e i r re s p e c tiv e C ou rts . Many o f the A s s is ta n t and S ubord inate Judges a ls o t r y c r im in a l cases as m a g is tra te s , and some may be w h o le -tim e m agis­t ra te s . : Thus, excep t th a t, the m ag is tracy does n o t d e a l w ith c i v i l work, th e re is . no ha rd and f a s t l i n e between the ju d ic i a l fu n c t io n s o f o f f i c ia l s o f th e e x e cu tive and ju d ic i a l s e rv ic e s . T h is ra th e r com p lica ted system

•may be i l l u s t r a t e d by ta k in g a d i s t r i c t a t random from th e C iv i l L is t .

A t th e headquarte rs o f a t y p ic a l d i s t r i c t th e re a re seven o f f i c ia l s o f th e e x e c u tiv e s e rv ic e who e xe rc ise m a g is te r ia l powers. The D is t r i c t

■M agistrate and h is Headquarters A s s is ta n t a re f i r s t c la s s m a g is tra te s w ith •s p c c ia l powers; the Head Revenue A s s is ta n t (akunwun) , T reasury O f f ic e r , Headquarters รนb d iv is io n a l O f f ic e r and Headquarters Township O ff ic e rs are a l l f i r s t c la ss m a g is tra te s , and an A s s is ta n t Township O f f ic e r has o n ly t h i r d c la ss powersT A longs ide these are f i v e o f f ic e r s o f the J u d ic ia l :S e rv ice . The D i s t r i c t .and Sessions Judge and an A s s is ta n t Judge bo th have s p e c ia l m a g is te r ia l powers; the l a t t e r , though in the J u d ic ia l S e rv ice , i s a w h o le -tim e m a g is tra te and a S p e c ia l Judge f o r the t r i a l o f S p e c ia l In v e s t ig a t io n casesT The R e g is tra r o f the D i s t r i c t Court and the Headquarters A s s is ta n t Judge b o th have f i r s t c la s s m a g is te r ia l powers, and th e Headquarters S ubord ina te Judge (w ith the powers o f a Sm all Cause C ourt up to Rs. 100) has second c la s s m a g is te r ia l powers. The D is t r i c t M a g is tra te m igh t take o n ly a p p e a lla te and re v is io n a ry work, and th e D is t r i c t and Sessions Judge w ould have no c r im in a l work a p a rt from sessions cases; th e o rd in a ry c r im in a l cases f o r t r i a l a t the d i s t r i c t -headquarters would be d is t r ib u te d by th e D i s t r i c t M a g is tra te among the o th e r m a g is tra te s , hav ing rega rd f o r t h e i r o th e r e x e cu tive fu n c t io n s , and in re s p e c t o f o f f ic e r s o f th e J u d ic ia l S e rv ice , in c o n s u lta t io n w ith the D is t r i c t and Sessions Judge. F o r th e o u t ly in g tow nsh ips th e re would be a s im ila r though s m a lle r group o f m a g is tra te s and judges s h a rin g th e w ork. In a remote tow nsh ip th e re m igh t be no more than two o f f ic e r s , a Township M a g is tra te a c t in g a ls o as A d d it io n a l Judge o f the Township C ourt and. a Sub-Judge o f th e Township C ourt a c t in g a ls o as A d d it io n a l M a g is tra te .

In g e n e ra l i t may be s a id th a t th e o f f ic e r s o f the a d m in is tra t iv e C i v i l S e rv ice a re se rvan ts o f th e e xe cu tive government who, among t h e i r m isce llaneous d u t ie s , e xe rc ise m a g is te r ia l powers in v i r t u e o f t h e i r r e s p o n s ib i l i t y f o r th e maintenance o f law and o rd e r, whereas the o f f ic e r s o f the ju d ic ia l s e rv ic e are se rvan ts o f th e law , re s p o n s ib le f o r a p p ly in g th e law to such issues as are p u t b e fo re them f o r d e c is io n . But m agis­t ra te s and judges a l ik e a re re s p o n s ib le in t h e i r j u d ic ia l proceedings to th e High C ourt w h ich , under th e Supreme C o u rt, is th e u lt im a te gua rd ian o f the ru le o f law . As the fo re g o in g account shows, th e Government o f independent Burma has taken o ve r the concepts and procedure o f E n g lis h law in mass and d e t a i l . In Burma, as elsewhere and. perhaps more than elsewhere, th e law has n o t in f r e q u e n t ly been an in s tru m e n t o f in ju s t ic e , and th e re is a s tro n g u n d e rcu rre n t o f resentm ent a g a in s t the s u b t le t ie s o f th e "B ig Book" ( s a -o k -g y i) , the LAW, and in a s o c ia l i s t s ta te one m igh t expect a c lo s e r re g a rd f o r s o c ia l w e lfa re than f o r in d iv id u a l r ig h ts . Yet the E n g lis h concep tion o f the r u le o f law is f i r m ly entrenched in the C o n s t itu t io n .

The e x p la n a tio n o f t h is is o f some in te r e s t . Under B r i t is h r u le the le g a l p ro fe s s io n o f fe re d Burmans the spee d ie s t and most c e r ta in method o f a t ta in in g w e a lth and d is t in c t io n and i t th e re fo re a t t r a c te d men w ith the b e s t b ra in s and the keenest a m b itio n s , who n a tu r a l ly to o k a le a d in g p a r t

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in framing the Constitution. Most of the leading Burrnan lawyers had been trained in England, and they imbued the Constitution'with the individual­ist principles which are so strong in English legal tradition.' Also the High Court under British rule was jealous of its prerogatives and inherited the critical attitude towards the executive authorities that .has been characteristic of Indian Courts from the time of Warren Hastings. In this way it came to be regarded as in some measure an ally of those who, like the nationalist leaders, were in opposition to the Government, and this disposed Burman Ministries to accept the principle of the rule of law even after they had attained power and found their authority .questioned in the .Courts. But the appointment of the Judges rests with Parliament, and therefore with the party which has a majority in the Parliament; it is not improbable that in course of time the Judges will be of the same political complexion as the Government, the Coiirts will follow the elections and tend to be less critical of ;socialist activities.

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CHAPTER III. LOCAL GOVERNMENT

1 . Loca l B od ies .

The m achinery o f lo c a l government in Burma p ro p e r under B r i t is h r u le has a lre a d y been d e s c r ib e d . Burma was d iv id e d in to D iv is io n s , D is t r ic t s , S u bd iv is io ns , and Townships, under the charge re s p e c t iv e ly o f Commissioners, Deputy Commissioners, S u b d iv is io n a l and Township O f f ic e r s . A longside these o f f i c ia l s in charge o f g e n e ra l a d m in is tra t io n the re .w as a p a r a l le l o rg a n is a t io n o f j u d ic i a l and o th e r dep a rtm en ta l o f f i c e r s . The a d m in is tra ­t iv e and d e p a r tm e n ta l 'o f f ic ia ls posted to these v a r io u s 1 charges were n o t •instrum ents o f lo c a l government b u t m ere ly agents o f the c e n t ra l gove rn - m e n t O r i th e - t r a n s fe r o f power the whole o f t h is m achinery was taken ove r by th e new government. ' ‘ .

In common usage- in Burma th e term lo c a l government is r e s t r ic te d to organs c o n s is t in g w h o lly o r p a r t l y 'o f lo c a l n o n - o f f ic ia ls and concerned w ith - th e prom otion ' o f lo c a l a m e n itie s . These organs com prised m u n ic ip a l and town .com m ittees’' and d i s t r i c t ’ c o u n c ils . ': R e p re se n ta tive M u n ic ip a l Committees were f i r s t c o n s t itu te d by law in 1874, and becaine p a r t ly e le c t iv e in 1884; th e y were re -o rg a n iz e d under th e M u n ic ip a l A c t o f 1898. Town, committees w i th ' le s s ex tens ive -pow ers were c o n s t itu te d f o r the s m a lle r -tow ns . . I n 1922' the -M u n ic ip a l Committee o f Rangoon’'was' endowed w i t h ' a -h ig h e r s ta tu s as th e Rangoon C orpora tion^ ' T h e 'D is t r ic t C ounc ils were c o n s t itu te d under the- R u ra l Se lf-governm ent' A c t o f 192i » ' : These Acts remained in fo rc e up to th e Japanese‘ in v a s io n . On the r e s to r a t io h o f B r i t is h r u le a l l .the fo rm e r lo c a l bod ies w ere 'suspended and t h e i r powers and r e s p o n s ib i l i t ie s were ves ted in th e Deputy Commissioners. S ince the t r a n s fe r o f power th e fo rm er committees and c o u n c ils have been re s to re d , except where th e y were re p la ce d by lo c a l bod ies on th e new p la n d esc rib ed be low .

A f te r the annexa tion o f Upper Burma in 1886 a l l th e d i s t r i c t s in Burma were d iv id e d in to v i l la g e t r a c t s , u s u a lly about 50 to a tow nsh ip , and a v i l la g e headman was app o in ted to each v i l la g e t r a c t , w ith power to t r y p e t ty c r im in a l and c i v i l cases. T h is v i l la g e system as re v is e d in the V i l la g e A c t o f 1907; remained in fo rc e up to th e end o f B r i t is h r u le ,

'b u t an amendment-in 1924 re q u ire d the Deputy Commissioner, b e fo re a p p o in tin g a headman, to a s c e r ta in the w ishes o f the v i l la g e r s by means o f an e le c t io n , and gave th e headman th e a s s is ta n c e o f an e le c t iv e v i l la g e com mittee f o r th e t r i a l o f cases. Th is V i l la g e A c t s t i l l a p p lie s in p laces where the new p la n has no t been in tro d u c e d .

D uring the la t e r days o f B r i t is h r u le the m a tte rs o f w h ich the a d m in is tra t io n was ves ted in m u n ic ip a l and town com mittees com prised "v e rn a c u la r edu ca tio n , conservancy, w a te r su p p ly , m aintenance o f b u i ld in g s , roads, b r id g e s , e t c . , s t r e e t l i g h t in g , v a c c in a t io n , m arkets and s la u g h te r -

■ houses, and7 in g e n e ra l, m a tte rs a f fe c t in g th e s a fe ty , h e a lth and con­venience o f the p u b lic . 1 / C o n tro l over th e Rangoon C o rp o ra tio n was vested in th e L o c a l Government, b u t,a s regards o th e r urban a u th o r i t ie s , D iv is io n a l and Deputy Commissioners were empowered to e xe rc is e g e n e ra l s u p e rv is io n over the com mittees and were g iven powers to o v e rru le the committees in c ircum stances o f s p e c ia l emergency. The g e n e ra l p r in c ip le , a p a rt from th is

1 / Indian s ta tu to r y Commission, xi, p .457*

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indirect control*, was to leave the administration of local affairs to com­mittees periodically elected. But the members usually had little interest in the adequate performance of many of the functions with which they were entrusted. The tendency was "to increase the number and'pay"of the staff rather them to demand an adequate standard, of work." Various devices wer§ adopted to counteract this tendency but, as. already noted, the com­mittee were regarded in general as inefficient and corrupt.

The D is t r i c t C ouncils c o n s is te d o f a m a jo r ity o f e le c t iv e members chosen by C irc le Boards e le c te d by th e lo c a l ta x -p a ye rs to g e th e r w ith a m in o r ity o f o f f ic ia l . a n d appo in ted members. These were s im i la r ly s u b je c t to the c o n t ro l o f th e Commissioner; they were charged w ith th e adm in is ­t r a t io n th ro ugho u t th e d i s t r i c t o f m inor roads and waterways, s a n ita t io n , h o s p ita ls , m arke ts, s la u g h te r houses, v e te r in a ry m a tte rs , and o th e r m a tte rs a f fe c t in g th e w e ll-b e in g o f the lo c a l p u b lic . The o r ig in a l in te n ­t io n was t h a t th e y shou ld de lega te t h e i r powers to C irc le Boards and V i l la g e Committees, b u t in p ra c t ic e the C irc le Boards became m ere ly an e le c to ra l c o lle g e and no V i l la g e Committees were c o n s t itu te d under the A c t. L ike the m u n ic ip a l com m ittees, th e d i s t r i c t c o u n c ils were regarded as in e f f i c ie n t and c o r ru p t.

The, suspension o f th e powers o f lo c a l bod ies by the B r i t is h Government a f t e r th e war c le a re d th e way f o r a re c o n s tru c tio n o f lo c a l government on new l in e s , , and the Burmese Government dev ised a p la n f o r making i t bo th more dem ocratic and more e f f i c ie n t . One fundam enta l d e fe c t o f th e fo rm er system was th a t members o f the v a r io u s c o u n c ils and committees were expected o f t h e i r own accord to. do and pay f o r many th in g s th a t th e y d id n o t want to do and d id no t recogn ise as necessary, w h ile th e re was no adequate s u p e rv is io n o r c o n t ro l over t h e i r conduct o f a f f a i r s , o r over the expend itu re o f t h e i r funds . A lso th e re was no o rgan ic l i n k between th e c e n t ra l government and th e lo c a l c o u n c ils , o r between urban and r u r a l a d m in is tra t io n , o r between the d i s t r i c t c o u n c il and th e v i l la g e s . The new p la n aimed to l i n k a l l the lo c a l c o u n c ils w ith in a d i s t r i c t w i th in one o rgan ic whole, to p ro v id e adequate s u p e rv is io n , to encourage the prom otion o f w e lfa re , and to c re a te m achinery f o r the e f fe c t iv e p rom otion o f w e lfa re and to supp ly th e . re q u is i te funds .

Under s e c tio n 91 o f the C o n s t itu t io n p ro v is io n may be made by law on p r in c ip le s o f re g io n a l autonomy f o r d e le g a tin g to re p re s e n ta t iv e lo c a l bod ies s p e c if ie d powers in a d m in is tra t iv e , c u l t u r a l and-economic m a tte rs .I t was in accordance w ith th is s e c tio n th a t the Dem ocratic Loca l Govern­ment A c t was passed in 1953* Under t h is A c t each v i l la g e e le c ts a V il la g e C o u n c il, n o rm a lly o f f iv e members. Each ward in a town e le c ts a Ward Committee o f th re e to f iv e members, and each Ward Committee sends re p re ­s e n ta tiv e s to an Urban C o u n c il. The V i l la g e and Urban C ouncils are b rough t to g e th e r in a Township C o unc il com pris ing one re p re s e n ta tiv e o f each Urban C o u n c il. Each Township C o unc il is represen ted by fo u r to e ig h t members on th e D is t r i c t C o u n c il. The s m a ll V i l la g e and Urban C ounc ils a re re q u ire d to meet once a month; th e la rg e r Township and D is t r i c t C ouncils are convened in f u l l sess ion o n ly tw ic e a yea r, one o f these m eetings be in g to frame the annua l budget, b u t the members choose from among themselves a sm a ll E xecu tive Committee to conduct the o rd in a ry bus iness .

The various councils are graded in regard to their authority; the Village and Urban Councils are subordinate to the Township Council, and the Township Councils are subordinate to the District Council which is directly

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subordinate to the Ministry of Local Government. Each Council must comply with all lawful orders from superior authority but otherwise has full liberty to promote local welfare in any way that IS not contrary to the policy of government, and to the full extent to which it can provide the requiisite funds. The general idea is that in all aspects of social life the central government shall prescribe a national minimum of welfare; each District Council must attain this standard but may prescribe a higher district minimum. •'Each" Township Council must attain the district minimum ' but may. prescribe a higher-township minimum. Each Urban or Village Council must attain the Township minimum but may adopt a higher local.standard. Provision is made also for two or more Villages to join forces for any ■ common end. On this plan all the local.communities, within a district are linked together in one organic whole for the promoti on of' the common welfare/ while a spirit of emulation between the. Councils, should encourage them 'to undertake more than the prescribed minimum required.

One defect of the former system was that the local councils were supposed to manage their ovm affairs but they were not equipped vrith the’ administrative machinery for managing them efficiently. Each council had its own secretary who was in effect the executive officer. . But; the' secretary to the district council was usually the clerk who had formerly been concerned with such matters in the district office, and who had neither the qualifications nor the experience requisite for his new func­tions. The councils were left to appoint their ovm officers, subject to certain regulations; with the funds•available they could not engage honest and capable employees, yet these men were left solely responsible to the council although the members of the council had no special qualifi­cation for supervising them. A dishonest or incompetent engineer and a dishonest- or: incompetent contractor could easily hoodwink the members of the council, even if none of these had a rake-off, on the transaction.For this the new plan attempts to provide a remedy. The former Deputy Commissioner, relieved of magisterial and revenue functions, becomes the Chief Executive Officer of the District Council and should exercise supervision over all branches of the administration, just as he did, or was supposed to do, when Deputy Commissioner. He is responsible to the Council for giving effect to its policy with due efficiency, but at the same time he is responsible to the Council and, if necessary, to the Ministry for the prevention of irregularities.

Arrangements along similar lines are intended to promote efficiency and prevent malpractice in the various departments of the District Council's activities. For example, there is, as there always has been, in each district a Public Works official of the central government and an official in charge of local-public works. Formerly there was no connection between the two. On the new plan the local public works official of the central government is also District Engineer and head of the public works service of the District Council and of all subordinate local councils.The District Council frames its policy, decides how much it can afford to spend on roads and buildings, what roads and buildings it requires and gives out the contracts. The District Engineer is responsible to the District Council for giving effect to its policy, but, in his professional capacity, for seeing that the works are carried out with due economy and efficiency, he is responsible not to the District Council but to his superior officer in the Public Works Service of the central government. Similarly the-Township Council may appoint a Township Engineer who will be

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responsible to the Township Council for giving effect to its policy, but in respect of economy and efficiency in the conduct of the work he IS responsible to the District Engineer. The same principle is applied in all departments of the local government service. Each official is res­ponsible to the Council which employs him for doing what the Council wants, but in the practical execution of the work he is responsible to a professional superior with better qualifications or greater experience.

On this plan each local council is, "Within the iimits of its juris­diction, both an instrument of local government and an agent of superior authority. If, for example, the central government decides that there shall be a primary school in every village, it can appoint a village school master in every village and supervise his work by departmental agency. Or it can employ the Village Council as its agent, delegating to it the responsibility for maintaining the school in accordance with departmental instructions; in that cast it must provide the Village Council with the necessary funds and with such other assistance as may be expedient; the Village Council would also have the power to provide a school better than the prescribed minimum standard by paying for an additional teacher or for greater amenities. Similarly,. if the Public Health Ministry decides that there should be a tube-well in every village, it can have the work done departmentally or by the Village Council as its agent, and the Village Council, if it deems fit, can put down more tube-wells than the Ministry prescribed. The intention is that, so far as possible, all work in connection with the public' welfare should be conducted by local councils, either as agents of superior authority or on their own initiative, and it is laid down that any authority prescribing work must provide the requisite funds.

This plan should minimise, though it does not remove, the main obstacle to efficiency in local self-government in a country like Buraia, where the people do not want things that in the modern world they need and ought to want. It is only by personal influence continually exercised that they can be taught to want such things and appreciate their benefits. The former system of local government allowed no scope for personal influence because officials were transferred at short intervals from one district or one function to another merely for administrative convenience. The usual justi­fication for this practice was the assumption that foreign officials needed to recuperate at frequent intervals in Europe. But it was also defended on the ground that an officer in a new charge soon exhausted his utility and should he replaced by some one with a different outlook on affairs. And, especially as regards Burman officials, it was held that, if they stayed too long in one place, they would become too intimate with the local people and take sides in local politics. So long as little mattered except the maintenance of law and order, frequent transfers were comparatively innocuous and perhaps beneficial; a partisan magistrate is a public danger. But frequent transfers are incompatible with the exercise of personal influence in the interest of public welfare, and an official with no magis­terial functions need not adopt the cold aloofness of the law. The inten­tion of the plan is accordingly that the former Deputy Commissioner in his new capacity as Chief Executive Officer of the District Council shall remain more or less permanently in one charge unless there is sufficient reason for a change. Another feature of the new plan is the intention that the administrative head of each department of the District Council shall regard the education of the public in respect of their activities as one of his

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p rim a ry fu n c t io n s . I f the a d m in is tra t iv e o f f i c ia l s can g a in the suppo rt and a ss is ta n ce o f th e members o f the lo c a l c o u n c ils and make f u l l use o f the new a u d io -v is u a l f a c i l i t i e s f o r en ligh tenm ent one may reasonab ly a n t ic ip a te a change in p u b lic o p in io n on such m a tte rs .

The p re se n t p o s it io n w ith regard to lo c a l government, however, is obscure . N tfn ir .a lly the p la n has been in trodu ced ; in to te n d i s t r i c t s b u t o n ly in - tw § jias i t been in o p e ra tio n f o r mere then a 'fe w months, ■ C e rta in

. - . d i f f i c u l t ie g ye re fo re seen and have been experienced .- C h ie f among these is the c o n flic t.b e tw e e n , lo c a l se lf-gove rnm en t and c e n tra liz e d departm ent­a lis m ; As., soon as Burma became independent the Government began to under­ta ke numerous unprecedented a c t iv i t i e s and, as each new m in is t r y o r departm en t.cam e-in to e x is te n ce , i t en te red w ith enthusiasm on i t s ta s k to the f u l l l im i t s o f th e funds and s t a f f a v a ila b le , o rg a n iz in g lo c a l committees in each d i s t r i c t , township and v i l la g e . Thus in some v i l la g e s one;may f i n d , . a t ■le a s t in nom ina l e x is te n c e , a v i l la g e educa tion committee

..... fo r - th e v i l l a g e : sch o o l, a v i l la g e p u b lic h e a lth com mittee f o r th e lo c a l w a te r supp ly , a v i l la g e f i r e - f ig h t i n g committee f o r p ro te c t io n a g a in s t

. . f i r e , .a v i l la g e c o -o p e ra t iv e com m ittee, a v i l la g e defence committee and so on. The most comprehensive o f these o rg a n iz a tio n s is th e v i l la g e pyidaw tha (n a t io n a l-w e lfa re ) com m ittee w ith much the same fu n c t io n s as th e v i l la g e c o u n c il. And :thie m o s t-p o w e rfu l o rg a n iz a t io n is th e io c a l la n d

- d is t r ib u t io n com mittee under the la n d n a t io n a l iz a t io n programme. '

- These v a r io u s v i l la g e committees a l l fu n c t io n , . ' i f a t a l i , under departm en ta l o f f i c i a l s Of th e Township O f f ic e r ; th e y a l l have t h e i r own funds a d m in is te re d under depa rtm en ta l s u p e rv is io n , and th e su p p o rt o f the

- M in is t r y in m a in ta in in g t h e i r 'independence. The in te n t io n is . th a t a l l •these a c t iv i t i e s a t th e a p p ro p ria te le v e ls shou ld be b roug h t w ith in th e sphere o f the D is t r i c t , Township, Urban and V i l la g e C o u n c ils . How f a r t h is in te n t io n has been re a liz e d is u n c e r ta in . I t appears, however, th a t , where these new C ounc ils have been in tro d u c e d , the p re v io u s pyidaw tha committee has been d is s o lv e d and i t s fu n c t io n s handed .over to the c o rre s ­ponding C o u n c il. ■■ I t is s ig n i f ic a n t moreover th a t the ]v lin i.s te r in charge o f la n d n a t io n a l is a t io n was a ls o appo in ted M in is te r f o r lo c a l government to supe rv ise the in t r o d u c t io n o f the new p la n . A f u r th e r s tep in the SKme d ir e c t io n was taken w ith the re c o n s tru c t io n o f the Government under the new Prime M in is te r in June 1956# when th e same M in is te r was appo in ted a Deputy Prime M in is te r w ith a g e p e ra l charge over a l l s o c ia l se rv ic e s and the v a r io u s m in is t r ie s d e a lin g w ith v a r io u s aspects o f p u b lic w e lfa re . T h is is perhaps the b e s t guarantee th a t a s o lu t io n f o r the problem o f r e c o n c il in g dep artm en ta l a c t iv i t i e s w ith lo c a l se lf-gove rnm en t may u l t im a te ly be found.

Two o th e r o b s ta c le s to th e w o rk ing o f th e new p la n a re the d i f f i c u l t y o f f in d in g s u ita b le incumbents fo r th e p o s t o f C h ie f E xecu tive ' O f f ic e r to the D i s t r i c t C o u n c il, and th e d i f f i c u l t y o f p ro v id in g th e v a r io u s c o u n c ils w ith s u f f i c ie n t funds f o r the d ischarge o f t h e i r r e s p o n s ib i l i t ie s .F o rm erly th e Deputy Commissioner en joyed the p re s t ig e a t ta c h in g to members

. o f the In d ia n c i v i l S e rv ice and, as D i s t r i c t M a g is tra te and C o lle c to r o f Revenue, seemed th e most p o w e rfu l o f f i c i a l in th e d i s t r i c t , though the l im i ta t io n s o f h is p o s i t io n p rec lu ded the e f fe c t iv e e xe rc is e o f power o r in f lu e n c e f o r th e p rom otion o f w e lfa re . In th e new p la n , the Deputy Com­m iss io n e r as C h ie f E xe cu tive O f f ic e r w i l l have no m a g is te r ia l powers o r any d i r e c t r e s p o n s ib i l i t y in revenue a f f a i r s and in course o f tim e he

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shou ld , in v ir t u e o f h is acqu ired experience , a t t a in much g re a te r ipower and in f lu e n c e than he ever exe rc ise d as D is t r i c t M a g is tra te . But some o f f i c ia l s seem to rega rd th e new p o s it io n as a'stepTdown, and a re r e lu c ­ta n t to exchange th e power o f sending people to j a i l ' . f o r the p r iv i le g e o f s e rv in g then* And i t is no t im probable tha t.som e members o f the D is t r i c t C o u n c il, f u l l o f t h e i r new im portance , a re more in c lin e d to a s s e r t i t a t - th e expense o f" th e o f f i c e r deputed to a s s is t.th e m than to welcome h is a ss is ta n c e .

The la c k o f adequate funds has always been one o f the weak p o in ts o f lo c a l bod ies in the p a s t. A .s tro n g F is c a l Committee o f 19^0 remarked th a t "a lo c a l a u th o r i ty w h ich depends (as do most D i s t r i c t C o u n c ils ) f o r the b u lk o f i t s revenue on f ix e d g ra n ts cannot be a re s p o n s ib le body, and i t s fin a n ce s tend to have an a i r o f u n r e a l i t y . " 2] One fe a tu re o f the new p la n is the p r in c ip le th a t every a u th o r i ty e n jo in in g any fu n c t io n on a lo c a l body must p ro v id e th e necessary fu n d s . Bu t i t is e a s ie r to s ta te t h is as a p r in c ip le than to a p p ly i t in p ra c t ic e . A s tep in t h is d ir e c ­t io n has been taken in the d e c is io n th a t la nd revenue s h a l l be a llo c a te d to lo c a l bo d ie s ; i f th e assessment and c o l le c t io n o f revenue were as e f f i c ie n t as in the p a s t, t h is would go f a r to meet th e co s t o f lo c a l government, b u t , owing to th e d is tu rb e d c o n d it io n s o f th e c o u n try , the revenue from th is source is com pa ra tive ly in s ig n i f ic a n t , and the problem o f p ro v id in g lo c a l a u th o r i t ie s w ith s u f f i c ie n t funds, s t i l l a w a its s o lu ­t io n .

Among o th e r fe a tu re s o f th e p la n w h ich deserve s p e c ia l n o t ic e are c e r ta in devices in tended to ensure th a t the m achinery works on dem ocratic l in e s ad an in s tru m e n t o f p o p u la r government and n o t m ere ly o f p a r ty government, and to p ro v id e safeguards a g a in s t the subve rs ion o f th e C o n s titu t io n and the s e iz u re o f power by a would-be D ic ta to r , whether f a s c is t o r communist. The fra n c h is e is th e same as f o r e le c t io n s to P a rlia m e n t; th e re is a d u lt s u ffra g e a t the age o f 18 s u b je c t to c e r ta in s p e c if ie d d is q u a l i f ic a t io n s . But 7 whereas f o r p a r lia m e n ta ry e le c t io n s the r e s id e n t ia l q u a l i f ic a t io n may be f i c t i t i o u s , i t is la id down in Rule 8 o f the Rules under the A c t th a t , f o r in c lu s io n in th e e le c to ra l r o l l f o r any p la c e , res idence f o r no t le s s than s ix months d u r in g th e p re v io u s year is e s s e n t ia l. Thus a v o te r must be an a c tu a l permanent re s id e n t o f the v i l la g e o r town in which he is e n t i t le d to v o te ; a p a r ty member cannot be sen t down from p a r ty headquarters to become the nom ina l re p re s e n ta t iv e o f th e v i l la g e . A lso , i t has been recogn ized th a t , in a democracy, v o t in g is a d u ty and n o t a p r iv i le g e , and a c c o rd in g ly appearance a t th e p o l l in g s ta t io n has been made com pulsory. T h is arrangem ent, i f implemented, should p ro v id e an adequate safeguard a g a in s t power f a l l i n g in to the hands o f a c liq u e th rough the n e g le c t o f the m a jo r i ty to take the t ro u b le o f v o t in g . Again , experience shows th a t a would-be d ic ta to r u s u a lly se izes power by o b ta in in g c o n t ro l o f the m i l i t a r y o r th e p o l ic e . The A c t a c c o rd in g ly p rov id es f o r the c re a t io n o f a v i l la g e p o lic e fo rc e and a v i l la g e defence fo rc e w h ich s h a l l be under th e c o n tro l o f the lo c a l c i v i l a u th o r i t ie s in s te a d o f under the re g u la r army o r p o l ic e , so th a t th e re shou ld be means f o r re s is ta n c e to a coup d 'e ta t th a t has n o t g e n e ra l support among the p u b lic .

2/ F is c a l Committee, In te r im R eport (19^0 ), p . 6.

A nother in n o v a tio n o f some in te r e s t is the p ro v is io n f o r th e a p p o in t­ment! of- a People, s Counsel. In th e p a s t . i t has happened in f re q u e n t ly th a t men-o f w e a lth o r lo c a l in f lu e n c e have been ab le by b r ib e r y o r b u l ly ­in g , . to 'd e p riv e o the rs , o f house, o r la n d , o r i n -, v a r io u s ways d e s p o il them. The v ic t im ? a re e i th e r to o weak o r -ignorant to a s s e r t t h e i r r ig h ts in the C ourts o r ; ‘ i f " t h e y go to law , th e y lo se t h e i r case because th e y cannot a f fo rd to hirfe* a s k i l l f u l advocate o r to buy the ju d g e .' O ften in such cases th e p u b lic in te r e s t i s in v o lv e d and goes by d e fa u lt f o r la c k o f any m achinery to p r o t e c t - i t . The A c t p ro v id e s a c c o rd in g ly f o r th e a p p o in t­ment to each D i s t r i c t C o u n c il o f a P eop le1ร Counsel who " s h a l l be respon­s ib le f o r a d v is in g any L o ca l Body in m a tte rs o f law ; f o r h e lp in g the peop le to secure ju s t ic e , to ta ke e f fe c t iv e measures a g a in s t c o r ru p tio n • in a l l b ranches’ o f th e a d m in is tra t io n and t o secure to th e people th e 1 r ig h ts guaranteed t<p them .under- th e C o n s t itu t io n . I t seems however- th a t t h is in n o v a tio n is regarded, w ith s u s p ic io n by the le g a l p ro fe s s io n , w h ich - has done v e ry w e l l w ith o u t- i t i n th e p a s t, and a p p a re n tly no such a p p o in t­ment has been made in D is t r ic t s where the new C o u n c ils ' have been in t r o - - duced.

(b ) The V i l la g e C o u rt.- - -One fe a tu re o f th e p la n f o r the gen e ra l re o rg a n iz a t io n ' o f lo c a l' government is the c re a t io n o f a new type .o f v i l la g e c o u r t . F o rm erly i t was th e u s u a l p ra c t ic e f o r people, to s e t t le t h e i r d is p u te s , c i v i l o r c r im in a l, th ro ugh in fo rm a l a r b i t r a t io n by lo c a l e ld e rs ; in d i f f i c u l t ; cases th e y co u ld in v i t e th e : ass is ta n ce - o f the. C irc le Headman though he had no le g a l s ta tu s in such m a tte rs ;-b u t o r d in a r i ly " th e y w o iiid h a rd ly ever d^eain o f d is p u t in g the d e c is io n o f th e lo c a l e ld e rs ; f o r them i t was as b in d in g as any C i v i l C ourt would make i t . " 3 /

When the .Government b roke up, the c ir c le s and in s t i t u t e d v i i la g e headmen, i t a ttem pted to s tren g th en .the . a u th o r i ty o f th e v i l la g e headman by empowering him to decide c i v i l d isp u te s u p - to the va lue o f Rs.5 and to t r y p e t ty case's o f a s s a u lt , t h e f t , m is c h ie f, c r im in a l tre sp a ss and such o th e r o ffe nces as m ig h t be s p e c ia l ly n o t i f ie d . - O rd in a r i ly h is powers were l im i te d to 'im p o s in g a f in e o f Rs.5 o r confinem ent f o r 2k hours b u t , i f s p e c ia l ly empowered, he cou ld impose a f in e o f Rs.50 o r confinem ent f o r n o t more th a n '15 days. Under th e A ct as amended in 1924, v i l la g e com­m itte e s , p e r io d ic a l ly e le c te d , w ith th e v i l la g e headman as chairm an, were c o n s t itu te d f o r the perform ance o f these fu n c t io n s , and a s im p le procedure was drawn up f o r t h e i r d is p o s a l o f c i v i l s u i t s . R esort to the v i l la g e c o u r t thus c o n s t itu te d was o p t io n a lf The o rde rs o f th e t r ib u n a l in c r im in a l m a tte rs were s u b je c t to re v is io n by th e Deputy Commissioner o r S u b d iv is io n a l O f f ic e r in t h e i r a d m in is tra t iv e c a p a c ity and n o t as m agis­t r a te s , so th a t the cases la y o u ts id e th e p ro v in c e o f th e High C ourt and o th e r ju d ic ia l a u th o r i t ie s ; in c i v i l n a t te rs th e re was no appea l, b u t in c e r ta in c ircum stances th e re m igh t be an a p p lic a t io n to th e lo c a l Township Judge f o r r e v is io n .

Under th e new p la n , as s e t f o r t h in th e D em ocratic L o ca l Government A c t o f 1953? th e p lace , o f the v i l la g e headman was taken by an e le c t iv e v i l la g e c o u n c il, n o rm a lly o f f iv e members, w i th a chairm an chosen by the members from among them selves. A l l the p re v io u s fu n c t io n s o f th e v i l la g e headman as a judge , m a g is tra te , p o l ic e o f f i c e r and revenue o f f i c e r devo lved upon the C o u n c ilJ to g e th e r w ith h is g e n e ra l r e s p o n s ib i l i t y f o r th e promo­t io n o f w e lfa re . F o r each v i l la g e t r a c t th e re was c o n s t itu te d a V i l la g e

3 / Report on the A d m in is tra t io n o f Burma, 1868-69, p . 60.

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C ourt c o n s is t in g o f a l l the members o f the V i l la g e C o u n c il. T h is V i l la g e C ourt to o k th e 'p la c e o f the fo rm er V i l la g e Committee. A l l the members o f the C o u n c il are e n t i t le d to s i t in the V i l la g e C ourt f o r t r y in g cases, and

- ,nc case may be t r ie d o r decided by le s s than th re e members o f whom eft le a s t • tw o must have con tin ued unchanged th roughou t th e case. The Chairman o f

the ' V i l la g e C o u n c il, i f p re s e n t, i s the Chairman o f th e V i l la g e C ou rt; in h is absence th e members p re se n t choose a member from among them selves. Wo member o f a V i l la g e C o u n c il may s i t as a member o f th e V i l la g e C ourt f o r h e a rin g any case in w h ich he is a p a r ty o r is p e rs o n a lly in te re s te d , o r w h ich he has caused to be in s t i t u t e d .

The new p la n aimed to re s to re th e v i t a l i t y o f th e V i l la g e community which had d is in te g ra te d under fo re ig n r u le , and f o r t h is purpose i t proposed to a llo w g re a te r autonomy in th e d is p o s a l o f v i l la g e a f f a i r s to the C ounc il re p re s e n tin g th e v i l la g e community, and to endow the C o u n c il w ith g re a te r a u th o r i ty in connection w ith c r im in a l and c i v i l cases than the fo rm er v i l la g e committee possessed. The in te n t io n was th a t th e V i l la g e C ourt shou ld d ispose o f m a tte rs so f a r as p o s s ib le in an in fo rm a l manner by m u ta l arrangement so as to s a t is f y th e sense o f ju s t ic e w ith in th e v i l la g e , which is n o t in fre q u e n t ly ou traged by a s t r i c t a p p lic a t io n o f the .law .

In c r im in a l cases th e range o f the V i l la g e C o u rt 's ju r is d ic t io n was meant, in ge n e ra l, to be much the sume as th a t o f th e fo rm er v i l la g e com­

- m it te e , b u t the p e cu n ia ry va lue o f the damage o f which th e C ourt c o u ld take cognizance was ra is e d from Rs.5 to K .200. One im p o rta n t in n o v a tio n was to co n fe r on the V illa g e ,C o u r t m uch-grea te r freedom than o th e r Courts in a llo w in g the "compounding" o f o ffe nces by the v o lu n ta ry payment o f compensa­t io n by o ffe n d e rs to any person agg rieved . T h is shou ld f a c i l i t a t e the am icab le se ttle m e n t o f d is p u te s . Another, new fe a tu re , o f s t i l l g re a te r p r a c t ic a l im portance, Ims to in v e s t the V i l la g e Court w ith power to demand s e c u r ity f o r keep ing th e peace, o r f o r b e ing on good beh av io u r, s im i la r to the power c o n fe rre d on c e r ta in m a g is tra te s under the p re v e n tiv e se c tio n s o f th e C r im in a l Procedure Code. Many c r im in a ls s t a r t t h e i r ca ree r as p e t ty b u l l ie s o r p e t ty sneak th ie v e s in t h e i r own v i l la g e , b u t fo rm e r ly th e v i l la g e community had no power to d ea l w ith them, and no one o u ts id e the v i l la g e had s u f f i c ie n t in te r e s t in the m a tte r u n t i l th e v i l la g e nuisance jo in e d the ranks o f m a jor c r im in a ls . The conferm ent on th e V i l la g e C ourt o f power to d e a l w ith such lads shou ld promote harmony in th e v i l la g e and shou ld he lp to reduce the excessive c r im in a l i t y o f Burma by d e a lin g w ith th e problem a t i t s source. The most fundam enta l change however was th a t th e re was no lo n g e r to be any o p tio n as to th e p lace o f t r i a l . F o rm erly most p e t ty cases and a l l those th a t reached the p o lic e were sen t up f o r t r i a l b e fo re a s t ip e n d ia ry m a g is tra te , u s u a lly th e lo c a l Township M a g is tra te . In th e new A c t i t was la id down th a t "cases t r ia b le by th e V i l la g e C ourt s h a l l be t r ie d o n ly by th a t C o u rt ," and th e p o l ic e were d ire c te d to r e fe r such cases to th e V il la g e C ourt in s te a d o f in v e s t ig a t in g them w ith a v iew to t r i a l by a s t ip e n d ia ry m a g is tra te .

The powers o f th e V i l la g e C ourt were f a r g re a te r than those o f the fo rm er v i l la g e com m ittee. They were empowered to impose a f in e o f K .30; o r to sentence an o ffe n d e r to u s e fu l la b o u r up to one month; o r to sim ple o r r ig o ro u s im prisonm ent up to one month in such manner and in such p lace as m igh t be p re s c r ib e d by ru le s under the A c t. In e i th e r o f th e two la t t e r cases a f in e cou ld be imposed in a d d it io n to o th e r pun ishm ent. A V i l la g e Court cou ld be s p e c ia l ly empowered to impose a f in e up to K .200, a id o f

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im prisonm ent up to s ix months. The M in is te r charged w ith th e in tro d u c t io n o f th e new p la n has e x p la in e d ? th a t sentences -o f im prisonm ent were in tended to- be e x c e p tio n a l, '"as a la s t : - r e p o r t .11.. %J '.There have ■‘been suggestions th a t f o r many such cases d feW iho^rs.r in 1 th e s tocks ’would he th e 'm o s t '■ s u ita b le fo rm o f irn p r is o n m e n tjjb u t-a p p a re n tly th is , is ' regarded'"vas o u t - io f - ' da te , sym bolic o f ’.'backwardness^;', and* no such . 'p ro v is io n seems' ds y e t '• to have b e e n -in c lu d e d in t h f R u les , •.1 . ...

There is no appea l aga ins t, an o rd e r o f a V i l la g e 1 C ourt im posing a f in e o f n o t more than K .50; - in 'o th e r .cases an appea l l ie s to th e 1 d i s t r i c t M a g is tra te ; b u t a t any stage o f the p roceed ings b e fo re a V i l la g e C o u rt, th e D i s t r i c t M a g is tra te may c a l l f o r the re c o rd , e i th e r o f h is own m otion o r a t the in s ta n c e o f th e P e op le 's Counsel o r o f any p a r ty concerned, and, i f he th in k s f i t , he may w ith d ra w i t from th e V i l la g e C o u rt, take cognizance o f any o ffe n ce d is c lo s e d and e i th e r t r y i t o r r e fe r i t f o r t r i a l to a s t ip e n d ia ry m a g is tra te . And a f t e r th e case has been decided the D is t r i c t M a g is tra te may c a l l f o r the re c o rd to a s c e r ta in "w hether o r n o t the judgment is in accordance w ith ju s t ic e ^ " and he must c a l l f o r the re co rd on an a p p lic a t io n by th e P e o p le 's Counsel, the D i s t r i c t S upe rin tenden t o f P o lic e o r any o th e r p u b lic se rva n t concerned. I f he f in d s th a t th e case was beyond th e ju r i s d ic t io n o f th e V i l la g e ■C o u rt, o r " t h a t the judgment is c o n tra ry to ju s t ic e , " he can pass-such o rd e rs f o r quashing th e c o n v ic t io n o r f o r r e - t r i a l by a s t ip e n d ia ry m a g is tra te o r may take such o th e r a c t io n as may seem p ro p e r. As soon as any m a tte r reaches th e C ourt o f the D is t r i c t M a g is tra te i t comes w i th in th e cognizance o f th e H igh C ourt.These p ro v is io n s ensure th a t every .one.who comes b e fo re a V i l la g e C ourt shou ld have the f u l l p ro te c t io n o f th e law a g a in s t in ju s t ic e a r is in g th rough igno rance , incompetence o r b ia s .

There is however one d i f f i c u l t y f o r w h ich no s a t is fa c to r y s o lu t io n seems to have been found . The fo rm er V i l la g e Committee was empowered to t r y the .o ffence s o f a s s a u lt , t h e f t , m is c h ie f and c r im in a l tre s p a s s . The in te n t io n was th a t the V i l la g e C ourt shou ld have much the same range o f ju r is d ic t io n . But in th e P enal Code, th e re are no such comprehensive o ffe n c e s . F o r example, th e re a re numerous o ffe nces under th e head o f m is c h ie f; some o f them a re s u ita b le f o r t r i a l by a V i l la g e C ourt, b u t o th e rs are u n s u ita b le . M is c h ie f is one o ffe n ce when the damage sus ta in ed is n o t more than K .50; a d i f f e r e n t o ffe n ce i f th e damage is no t more than K .200; a d i f f e r e n t o ffe n ce i f the damage n o t exceeding K .10 is sus ta in ed in re sp e c t o f an an im a l; a d i f f e r e n t o ffe n ce i f the an im a l is va lued a t more than K .50; a d i f f e r e n t o ffe n ce i f th e damage, however s m a ll, a r is e s in connection w ith a p u b lic road ; a d i f f e r e n t o ffe n ce i f damage, however sm a ll, is occasioned to a p u b lic road by f lo o d in g ; and m is c h ie f by d e s tro y in g a p u b lic su rvey mark is a d i f f e r e n t o ffe n c e . A l l these k inds o f m is c h ie f were regarded as s u ita b le f o r t r i a l by a V i l la g e C o u rt. The fo rm er V i l la g e Committee cou ld t r y any k in d o f m is c h ie f so lo ng as the damage d id n o t exceed th e l im i t s o f i t s ju r i s d ic t io n . The ju d ic ia l a u th o r i t ie s h e ld however th a t to empower th e V i l la g e C ourt to t r y cases o f m is c h ie f w ith o u t re fe re n c e to th e a p p ro p ria te s e c t io n o f th e Penal Code would be u n c o n s t i tu t io n a l by c re a t in g a d i f f e r e n t law f o r urban and r u r a l areas and th e re b y co n tra ve n in g th e c o n s t i tu t io n a l p ro v is io n f o r the u n ifo rm ity o f la w . The V i l la g e C ourt i s th e re fo re re q u ire d to s p e c ify the p a r t ic u la r s e c t io n under w h ich i t is a c t in g and to r e je c t f o r t r i a l by ano the r c o u r t any k in d o f m is c h ie f, however s m a ll the damage, f a l l i n g underany s e c tio n o th e r than those w h ich i t has been empowered to t r y . Th is

(•"57 Burma, V o l. V, No. i i i , p . 16.

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Im p lie s th a t th e members o f V i l la g e Courts must have a n , in t e l l i g e n t acquain tance w ith th e whole Penal Code and, as many o f the ' members o f such Courts can o n ly by co u rte sy be regarded as l i t e r a t e , any such e x p e c ta tio n is e n t i r e ly u n r e a l is t ic and l i k e l y to cause in ju s t ic e . . I f .the V i l la g e

' Courts had been g iven powers in th e same g e n e ra l terms as th e fo rm er V i l la g e com m ittees, th e powers o f the D is t r i c t M a g is tra te to in te rv e n e d u rin g o r a f t e r the d is p o s a l o f a case would have p ro v id e d adequate p re ­c a u tio n a g a in s t abuses; b u t le s s work f o r la w ye rs . P o s s ib ly , however, in o rd in a ry p ra c t ic e , common sense w i l l p r e v a i l , and in c o u rs e .o f tim e the law w i l l be changed so as to g iv e e f fe c t to in s te a d o f d e fe a tin g the p u r­pose o f the A c t as an in s tru m e n t f o r th e b e t te r a d m in is tra t io n o f ju s t ic e , the re s to ra t io n o f the v i l la g e community and th e re d u c tio n o f crim e.

As regards th e c i v i l ju r is d ic t io n o f th e V i l la g e C ourt l ik e w is e the in te n t io n o f th e A c t was to c o n fe r g re a te r power on i t than had been enjoyed by v i l la g e com m ittees. F o rm erly the Commissioner cou ld in v e s t a v i l la g e committee w ith th e powers o f a C i v i l C ourt f o r the t r i a l o f s u its between persons o f whom b o th o r a l l , as the case may be, re s id e w ith in the v i l la g e t r a c t , and co u ld s p e c ify th e c la sses , and the v a lu e , no t exceeding Rs.50, o f the s u i t wh ich such v i l la g e committees cou ld t r y .There was no r ig h t o f appea l, b u t the d e c is io n s were s u b je c t to re v is io n by th e Township Judge. But no one was bound to in s t i t u t e a s u i t in the Court o f a V i l la g e Committee.

Under the new A ct s u its n o t exceeding IC.500 in va lue have to be t r ie d in th e a p p ro p ria te V i l la g e C ourt i f th e y f a l l w i th in any o f the fo llo w in g c la sse s ; th e re is no o p tio n o f r e s o r t in g to any o th e r C ou rt.

(1 ) (a ) S u its f o r damages fo r a s s a u lt o r in ju r y ;(b ) S u its f o r damages f o r de fam ation ;(c ) S u its f o r damages f o r m is c h ie f caused by c a t t le tresp ass ;(d ) S u its r e la t in g to money f o r moveable p ro p e rty ;(e ) S u its on c o n tra c t;( f ) S u its r e la t in g to sa le o r purchase o f goods;(g ) S u its r e la t in g to a r ig h t o f way, and,(h ) S u its r e la t in g to the use o f w a te r from w e lls , ta n ks ,

w e irs , channels, bund, dams, o r w a te r-cou rses .

(2 ) A lso , ir r e s p e c t iv e o f t h e i r va lu e ,(a ) S u its f o r d iv o rc e ;(b ) S u its f o r th e r e s t i t u t io n o f co n ju g a l r ig h ts .

(P rov ided however th a t th e ju r is d ic t io n in s u its f o r d iv o rc e and p a r t i t io n o f p ro p e rty the va lue o f the p ro p e r ty to be p a r t i t io n e d cou ld n o t exceed K .1 ,0 0 0 ).

Where a l l the defendants re s id e w ith in th e same v i l la g e t r a c t , and the cause o f a c t io n a r is e s w ith in th e l im i t s o f th e same v i l la g e t r a c t , the V i l la g e Court o f th a t t r a c t is the C ourt hav ing ju r is d ic t io n ; where a l l th e defendants re s id e w ith in th e same v i l la g e t r a c t , b u t the cause o f a c t io n a r is e s in ano the r v i l la g e t r a c t , th e V i l la g e C ourt in e i th e r v i l la g e t r a c t has ju r is d ic t io n . In o th e r cases th e s u i t must be in s t i t u t e d in any C iv i l C ourt having ju r is d ic t io n under the o rd in a ry c i v i l law . On the a p p lic a t io n , however, o f a p a r ty concerned, o r o f th e P e op le 's Counsel th e D is t r i c t Judge may, on s u f f ic ie n t grounds" w ithd raw a case pending in a V il la g e

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..Court and t r a n s fe r i t - t o such C ourt a? may seem a p p ro p r ia te . There is no appeal, a g a in s t-a n y judgm ent, decree o r o rd e r o f a V i l la g e C ourt in c i v i l รนi t s no t; exceeding IC.200 in va lue h u t, on the a p p lic a t io n o f.'a p a r ty Con­

c e rn e d o r o f the P e o p le 's Counsel,, the D i s t r i c t Judge may, " i f ' h e cons ide rs th a t i t is c o n t ra ry j t p ju s t i c e , " re v is e the d e c is io n ; i f , however, the va lue o f - th e s u i t exceeds,k .200 an appea l l ie s to th e D i s t r i c t Judge whose

■ dec is ion is f i n a l .

. : i t . w i l l be no ted tn a t in re s p e c t of. c i v i l cases as in c r im in a l cases the ground f o r in te r f e r in g w ith th e o rd e r o f a c i v i l c o u r t is n o t th a t i t is "c o n tra ry to law " b u t th a t i t i s " c o n tra ry to ju s t i c e ; " m inor i r r e g u la r i ­t ie s which have n o t in f a c t re s u lte d in a m is c a rr ia g e o f ju s t ic e are d is re g a rd e d . But th e procedure f o r the new V i l la g e C ourt appears much more com plicated, than th a t p re s c r ib e d f o r the. fo rm e r V i l la g e C om m ittee ,'and in v ie w .o f the p re c a u tio n s a g a in s t in ju s t ic e g iv e n by th e recou rse , where necessary, to . a C i v i l Judge, th e fo rm er s im p le procedure would have seemed adequa te .. However, in a c tu a l p ra c t ic e in the v i l la g e i t is n o t im probable th a t the procedure w i l l be s im p le r than is . contem plated in th e ru le s .

(c ) Township and D is t r i c t C o u n c ils . As a lre a d y m entioned, each Town­sh ip and D i s t r i c t C o u n c il is re q u ire d to e le c t from among i t s members an E xe cu tive Committee f o r th e perform ance o f some o f i t s fu n c t io n s , b u t th e re are c e r ta in m a tte rs th a t must be d e a lt w ith by the C o u n c il as a whole. M a tte rs conce rn ing th e whole C o u n c il a re the fo rm u la t io n o f p o l ic y , the es ta b lish m e n t o f departm ents, th e ap p ro va l o f th e annua l budget and t ra n s fe r o f funds from the budget head to a n o th e r, th e making o f bye -la w s , the app ro va l o f the annua l re p o r t on i t s w o rk ing and th e annual s ta tem ent o f accounts to accompany th e annual re p o r t , th e le v y in g o f ta xe s , the a p p o in t­ment and c o n t ro l o f i t s o f f i c i a l s , th e s a n c tio n in g o f new works, the te k in g o f a c t io n a g a in s t members o f th e C o u n c il, th e o b ta in in g o f sa n c tio n from th e P re s id e n t o f the Union f o r m a tte rs in w h ich such s a n c tio n is re q u ire d , and, in a d d it io n , any o th e r m a tte r w h ich in th e o p in io n o f th e Chairman shou ld be la id b e fo re th e C o u n c il. I t is expected th a t w i th in any one f i s c a l year two sessions o f the \•]h o le C o u n c il shou ld o r d in a r i ly s u f f ic e ; one f o r pass ing th e budget and one f o r o th e r m isce llaneous bus iness .

The C o u n c il d is t r ib u te s i t s work among s e v e ra l departm ents o f w h ich the G eneral Department is under th e charge o f the Chairman o f the C o u n c il, w h ile o th e r departm ents are a llo c a te d to in d iv id u a l members o f the E xecu tive Committee. The member a l lo t t e d to each departm ent is re s p o n s ib le to th e C o unc il f o r s u p e rv is in g the work o f h is departm ent and f o r p rom oting c o r d ia l r e la t io n s between d e p a rtm e n ta l o f f i c i a l s and the g e n e ra l p u b lic . F o r each D is t r i c t o r Township C o u n c il, the Government a p p o in ts an E xe cu tive O f f ic e r who is head o f the G enera l Department and re s p o n s ib le f o r the s u p e rv is io n and c o -o rd in a tio n o f th e work o f a l l th e o th e r departm ents. The in te n t io n is th a t t h is E xe cu tive O f f ic e r shou ld e n jo y much the same p o s it io n and pe rfo rm much th e same fu n c t io n s as the fo rm e r Deputy Commissioner, though w ith o u t th e m a g is te r ia l fu n c t io n s and revenue w h ich fo rm e r ly occup ied most o f the tim e and a t te n t io n o f th e Deputy Commissioner. Fo r each D is t r i c t C o u n c il the Government a p p o in ts a P eop le1ร Counsel who is head o f the J u d ic ia l Departm ent. S im i la r ly f o r each o f th e o th e r Departm ents, the Government a p p o in ts a dep a rtm en ta l head. Thus f o r eve ry branch o f the work o f a D i s t r i c t o r Township C o u n c il th e re is a n o n - o f f ic ia l member o f the committee w o rk ing a lo n g s id e an o f f i c i a l e x p e rt app o in ted by th e Government. The n o n - o f f ic ia l member is re s p o n s ib le to th e C o u n c il f o r see ing th a t e f fe c t

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i s g iv e n - to the p o l ic y o f 'th e C o u n c il, and the departm en ta l head i£i respon­s ib le f o r g iv in g e f fe c t to i t s p o l ic y in accordance w ith the in s tru c t io n s o f the n o n - o f f ic ia l member. In e f fe c t th e s t a f f a t th e headquarters o f a D is t r i c t o r Township C o unc il w i l l be much the same as the d i s t r i c t - o f f i c i a l s under the fo rm er system, and the E xecu tive O f f ic e r w i l l be in much the same r e la t io n to them as th e -fo rm e r Deputy Commissioner was to th e head-- q u a rte rs s t a f f . But every o f f i c e r o f th e C o u n c il, w h ile re sp o n s ib le to the C o unc il f o r g iv in g e f fe c t to i t s p o l ic y in c o n ju n c tio n w ith th e n o n - o f f ic ia l member to whom h is departm ent i s a l lo t te d , i s re s p o n s ib le to h is d e p a rt­m enta l s u p e r io r f o r th e s a t is fa c to ry perform ance o f work undertaken on b e h a lf o f the C o unc il and f o r the c a re fu l use o f funds.

T h is procedure shou ld ensure a s t r i c t c o n t ro l over the perform ance o f t h e i r fu n c t io n s b y 'th e s e c o u n c ils . A t the same tim e the A c t p rov id es th a t every lo c a l body may take such a c t io n as i t may th in k f i t f o r the p rom otion o f lo c a l w e lfa re , and the v a r io u s departm enta l o f f i c ia l s a re in tended to s t im u la te lo c a l in te r e s t and a c t i v i t y in re sp e c t o f w e lfa re w i th in t h e i r p a r t ic u la r spheres.

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CHAPTER IV . REGIONAL GOVERNMENT.

1 . P re lim in a ry - N e g o tia tio n s -

The s t ru c tu re o f th e government in the f r o n t ie r re g io n s a t the t ik e o f the Japanese in v a s io n has a lre a d y been d e s c rib e d . On th e occupa tion o f Burma the . ea s te rn states-, remained d i r e c t ly u n d e r-the J a p a n e s e 'm ilita ry a u th o r i t ie s , b u t) s h o r t ly a f t e r Burma was g ran ted independence oh 1 August, 4-9^ 3;- /they were made over. to . th e Ba Maw Government. ' They were then p laced under the M in is te r f o r Home A f fa i r s as H igh Commissioner f o r the Shan S ta te s , and an A s s is ta n t H igh Commissioner was appo in ted to take th e p lace o f b o th the fo rm er S upe rin tend en ts . The a d m in is t ra t io n / , so ..fa r,a s .‘~ i t was' e f fe c t iv e , con tin u e d on much th e same l in e s as b e fo re . A C e n tra l Karen

. Board, d i r e c t ly under the A d ip a ti, . w a s -c o n s titu te d under a K a re n 'P re s id e n t to d e a i..w ith Karen a f f a i r s and. to promote a m ity between the Karens and ■ Burmese. The Chin and Kachin reg io ns la y a lo n g the b a t t le f r o n t and were ; n o t under th e e f fe c t iv e c o n t ro l o f the B r i t is h ; Burmans o r Japanese.

On th e r e s to ra t io n o f B r i t is h r u le th e p o l ic y w ith rega rd to the f r o n t ie r , re g io n s was s ta te d in th s VJhite Paper o f May, 19^ 5• "The a d m in is - t r a t jp n ไo f th e Scheduled A rea, t h a t is th e Shan S ta tes and-the t r i b a l areas in t h e 'm ountainous f r in g e s o f th e c o u n try , in h a b ite d by peoples d i f f e r in g in language, s o c ia l customs and degree o f p o l i t i c a l development from the Burmans in h a b it in g the c e n t r a l.a r e a j would f o r the t im e b e ing be s u b je c t to a s p e c ia l regim e under the Governor u n t i l such "time as t h e i r in h a b ita n ts s ig n i f y t h e i r d e s ire f o r some s u ita b le form o f amalgamation o f t h e i r t e r r i t o r ie s w ith Burma p ro p e r." l / A D ire c to r , F r o n t ie r Areas A d m in is tra t io n , w ith headquarte rs in Rangoon, was appo in ted to have gen e ra l charge over th e F r o n t ie r re g io n s , w ith two- Deputy D ire c to rs , who were a ls o S e c re ta r ie s to Government, an A s s is ta n t D ire c to r and th e u su a l S e c re ta r ia l S ta f f . The Federa ted Shan S ta tes were p laced under th e charge o f two R esiden ts , as in 1925 b e fo re th e re was a separa te Commissioner f o r th e Shan S ta te s . T h is d id away w ith the c e n t ra l e xe cu tive o f th e Federated Shan S ta tes and w ith lo c a l c o n t ro l over fe d e ra l departm ents. The Sawbwas th e re ­fo re formed t h e i r own E xe cu tive C o unc il w h ich in c lu d e d re p re s e n ta tiv e s o f th e peo p le . The o th e r h i l l t r a c ts were p la ce d , as b e fo re , under th e lo c a l Deputy Commissioners. Below the R esidents th e re were about 40 A s s is ta n t R esidents who were a lm ost e x c lu s iv e ly young European O ff ic e rs re c ru ite d a f t e r th e war.

The re v e rs io n to th e fo rm e r system o f d iv id in g th e f r o n t ie r areas from Burma was one o f the p o in ts to w h ich Burmans to o k e x c e p tio n . T h is came under d is c u s s io n in th e Conference o f 19 -6-47 between th e B r i t is h Govern­ment and th e d e le g a tio n o f the Burma E xe cu tive C o u n c il le d by Aung San. As the outcome o f t h is d is c u s s io n th e Aung San - A t t le e Agreement o f January 27, 19^-7* s ta te d th a t th e agreed o b je c t iv e o f b o th p a r t ie s was " to achieve the e a r ly u n i f ic a t io n o f th e F ro n t ie r Areas and M in is te r ia l Burma w ith the f re e consent o f th e in h a b ita n ts " , and th a t in the meantime, " th e people o f th e F ro n t ie r Areas shou ld in re s p e c t o f su b je c ts o f common in te r e s t be c lo s e ly a sso c ia te d w ith the Government o f Burma in a manner accep tab le to b o th p a r t ie s . " A c c o rd in g ly th e le a d e rs and re p re s e n ta t iv e s o f the F r o n t ie r Areas were to be in v i te d to express t h e i r v iews as to th e most accep tab le fo rm o f a s s o c ia t io n d u r in g the t r a n s i t io n p e r io d ; a Conference would then be h e ld to d iscuss th e b e s t method o f a t ta in in g e a r ly u n i f ic a t io n in

1 / Burma, s ta tem en t o f P o lic y by H.M.G. Cmd,6635, p* 11•

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accordance w ith th e views so expressed. A .Committee o f E n qu iry was to "be s e t up to examine the best''m ethod o f a s s o c ia tin g th e f r o n t ie r peoples w ith the w ork ing o u t o f a new C o n s t itu t io n f o r Burma, t h is Committee.was t o : subm it a re p o r t to the Governments o f Burma'and' Of the '"U nited 'K ingdom b e fo re the summoning o f the C o n s titu e n t Assembly,.,

•• * In th e fo llo w in g month, in pursuance of, t h is arrangem ent, re p resen ta ­t iv e s o f the Shans, Kach ins, and Chins met members o f the-Burma E xecu tive C o u n c il a t Panglong,' and agreed on a form of. a s s o c ia t io n f o r th e t r a n s i t io n p e r io d . ' . - ■

2 .- The Panglong Agreement.

In the Panglong Agreement o f 1947 the term s o f .the a s s o c ia t io n were s e t f o r t h ' i n ' t h e fo llo w in g s ta tem en t. A conference hay ing been, h e ld a t Panglong, a ttended by c e r ta in Members o f the E xecu tive C o u n c il o f th e '.. . Governor o f Burma, a l l Saophas and re p re s e n ta tiv e s o f th e Shan s ta te , the Kachin H i l l s and Idle Chin H i l l s :

The Members o f th e Conference, b e l ie v in g th a t freedom w i l l be more s p e e d ily achieved by th e Shans, th e Kachins and the Chins by t h e i r immediate co -o p e ra tio n w ith th e In te r im Burmese Government:

The Members o f . th e Conference have a c c o rd in g ly ,- and w ith o u t d is e n t ie n ts , agreed as fo llo w s :

(1 ) A re p re s e n ta tiv e ' o f th e H i l l Peoples, se le c te d by the Governor on the recommendation o f re p re s e n ta tiv e s o f th e Supreme C o unc il o f th e U n ited H i l l Peoples (SCHOUEP), s h a l l be appo in ted a C o unse llo r to th e Governor to d e a l w ith the F ro n t ie r Areas.

(2 ) The s a id C o unse llo r s h a l l a ls o be appo in ted a Member o f the G overnor's E xecu tive C o u n c il, w ith o u t p o r t f o l io , and the s u b je c t o f F ro n t ie r Areas b rough t w ith in the pu rv iew o f the E xecu tive C o unc il by C o n s t itu t io n a l Convention as in th e case o f Defence and E x te rn a l A f f a i r s . The C ounse llo r f o r F r o n t ie r Areas s h a l l be g ive n execu tive a u th o r i ty by s im ila r means.

(3 ) The s a id C o unse llo r s h a l l be a s s is te d by two Deputy C ounse llo rs re p re s e n tin g races o f which he is n o t a member. โ-Jhile th e two Deputy C ounse llo rs shou ld d e a l in the f i r s t in s ta n ce w ith the a f f a i r s o f t h e i r re s p e c tiv e areas and th e C ounse llo r w ith a l l the rem a in ing p a r ts o f the F ro n t ie r Areas, th e y shou ld by C o n s t itu t io n a l Convention s e t on the p r in c ip le o f j o in t r e s p o n s ib i l i t y .

(4 ) W hile th e C o u n se llo r, in h is c a p a c ity o f Member o f the E xecu tive C o u n c il, w i l l be th e o n ly re p re s e n ta t iv e o f the F ro n t ie r Areas on the C o u n c il, th e Deputy C ounse llo rs s h a l l be e n t i t le d to a tte n d m eetings o f the C o unc il when su b je c ts p e r ta in in g to the F ro n t ie r Areas are d iscussed.

(5 ) Though the G overnor*ร E xecu tive C o unc il w i l l be augmented as agreed above, i t w i l l n o t opera te in re sp e c t o f the F r o n t ie r Areas in any manner which would d e p rive any p o r t io n o f these Areas o f th e autonomy which i t now enjoys in in te r n a l a d m in is tra t io n . F u l l autonomy in in te r n a l a d m in is tra t io n f o r the F ro n t ie r Areas is accepted in p r in c ip le .

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( 6 ) Though th e q u e s tio n o f dem arcating a n d -e s ta b lis h in g a 'S epa ra te Kachin S ta te w ith in a U n if ie d Burma is one w h ich must he re le g a te d f o r d e c is io n 'by th e C o n s titu e n t Assembly, i t is agreed th a t such a s ta te is d e s ira b le .As a f i r s t s tep towards th is end, th e C o unse llo r f o r F r o n t ie r Areas and th e Deputy C ounse llo rs s h a l l be co n su lte d in the a d m in is tra t io n o f such areas in the M y itk y in a and the Bhamo D is t r ic t s as a re P a rt I I Scheduled Areas under th e Government o f Burma A c t o f 1935- ■ .

(7 ) C it iz e n s o f th e F r o n t ie r Areas s h a l l e n joy r ig h ts a n d -p r iv ile g e s w h ich are regarded as fundam enta l in dem ocra tic c o u n tr ie s . •

( 8 ) The arrangements.-.accepted in t h is Agreement a re w ith o u t p re ju d ic e to the . financia l-..autonom y: now ves ted in th e Federa ted Shan S ta te s .

(9 ) The-arrangem ents ;accepted in th is Agreement are w ith o u t p re ju d ic e to .;th e f in a n c ia l a s s is ta n c e which the Kachin H i l l s and th e C h in -H i l ls are e n t i t le d - to . r e c e iv e from th e revenue o f Burma, and th e E xe cu tive C ounc il w ill.-;exam ine w ith the F r o n t ie r Areas C o u n se llo r and. Deputy.. C ounse llo rs the f e a s ib i l i t y o f a d o p tin g f o r th e Kachin H i l l s and the Chin H i l l s f in a n c ia l arrangements s im i la r to those between Burma and the Federa ted Shan S ta te s ."

3.; , T h e -H il l P eop les1 C o u n c il. . ' ' •.■โ .'.

Perhaps th e most im p o rta n t f a c t about the--Panglong; Conference is th a t i t ^provided an .occas ion f o r b r in g in g the h i l l peop les to g e th e r.- ' Under Burmese ru le they had a l l recogn ised .s e v e ra lly th e ^ s u z e ta in ty - 'O f ' th e Burmese Crown; under B r it is h '. . r u le th e y ;h a d a l l.b e e n ru le d i t t d i i ’6c t l y th ro u g h '! t h e i r own c h ie f ta in s by th e B r i t i s h Government o f Bura&. ’ B u t-th e y -h a d never had any common l i n k beyond t h e i r common s u b je c t io n to th e s a in e 'a u th o r ity : -The Supreme C o u n c il o f the U n ite d H i l l Peoples was formed in o rd e r to enable The Panglong C on fe rence-'to 'be h e ld and-was a no tew orthy s te p 'fo rw a rd in the es ta b lish m e n t o f re p re s e n ta t iv e in s t i t u t io n s among the f r o n t ie r peop les .The immediate purpose o f the Panglong Agreement was to d e v is e :a ’form o f a s s o c ia t io n d u r in g the t r a n s i t io n p e r io d u n t i l :- some• more permanent a rra nge ­ment cou ld be ach ieved . But i t d id much more than t h a t . ' I t la id down c e r ta in p r in c ip le s ; th a t th e f ro n t ie r -p e o p le s s h o u ld 'b e •e n t i t le d to funda­m enta l dem ocratic r ig h ts ; t h a t th e y shou ld e n joy f u l l autonomy in dom estic a f f a i r s ; 'and th a t 'th e y shou ld be e n t i t le d t o a s s is ta n c e from th e revenues o f M in is te r ia l Burma. " • '

"‘ ‘ •But a lth o u g h th e Panglong Conference w e n t- fa r 'to w a rd s e s ta b lis h in g the p r in c ip le o f n a t io n a l u n i oy f o r a l l th e p e o p le s -o f Burma w i th in i t s 1 n a tu ra l •geographica l l im i t s , t h is was s t i l l in com p le te . The Karens o f the Salween D is t r i c t and th e Kayahs were n o t rep resen ted by de lega tes a t Panglong and were n o t p a r t ie s to th e agreement, o th e r absentees were the Chins o f th e Arakan H i l l T ra c ts and th e Nagas and"the Was. Tha t was th e s i tu a t io n when the Committee o f E n q u iry , p o s tu la te d by th e Aung San - A t t le e Agreement, m et, w ith Mr. D. R. R ees-W illiam s (now Lord Ogmore), as i t s Chairman.

น. The R ees-W illiam s Committee.

The Committee o f E n q u iry in c lu d e d fo u r Burma members and Four F ro n t ie r Area Members. The fo u r Burma members were, a member o f th e E xecu tive C o unc il (บ T in T u t, fo rm e r ly o f the In d ia n C i v i l S e rv ic e ), two members o f the AFPFL and a member o f th e Karen Youth O rg a n iz a tio n ; the f r o n t ie r area

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members.were the C ounse llo r, f o r th e F ro n t ie r Areas (a le a d in g Shan Sawbwa), and th e two. Deputy C ounse llo rs (a Kachin and, a C h in ), and a re p re s e n ta tiv e o f the Karen N a tio n a l Union. I t met in Rangoon on March 18, and, a f t e r a coup rehens iv e e n q u iry , .. in c lu d in g th e hea ring o f re p re s e n ta tiv e s o f a l l p laces o r groups c la im in g o r though t l i k e l y to have separa te in te r e s ts , the members s igned .a unanimous re p o r t on 2b A p r i l . The . l i s t o f w itnesses IS in s t r u c t iv e from the l i g h t i t throws on modern a d m in is tra t iv e problems in th e f r o n t ie r re g io n . The Shan w itnesses in c lu d e d n o t o n ly re p re s e n ta tiv e s o f d i f f e r e n t p a r ts o f the-Shan c o u n try b u t a ls o re p re s e n ta tiv e s o f the Shan Sawbwas, the Shan S ta tes P eoples ' Freedom Congress and th e "Burmanised Shans" o f H orra lin ; th e Kachin w itnesses in c lu d e d th e Army Kachins, the F r o n t ie r C onstabu la ry Kach ins, the Kachin Youth League and th e oungpaw,( i . e . K ach in) "N a tio n a l Modern C iv i l iz a t io n Development A s s o c ia tio n , the Chin w itnesses in c lu d e d th e Chin P ens ioners ' A s s o c ia tio n , and th e Karen w itnesses th e Karen N a tio n a l Union, th e U n ite d Karen O rg a n iz a tio n , and the Karen Youth O rg a n iz a tio n . These numerous groups suggest th a t a d m in is tra t iv e problems in th e f r o n t ie r re g io n are com p lica ted n o t o n ly by t e r r i t o r i a l d is p e rs io n b u t by a d iv e r s i t y o f p o l i t i c a l o u tlo o k th roughou t the whole re g io n .

The p rim a ry fu n c t io n o f the Committee was to enqu ire in to and re p o r t upon the b e s t method o f a s s o c ia t in g the f r o n t ie r peoples w ith th.e .w ork ing ' o u t o f th e new C o n s t itu t io n . The Committee found th a t (w ith two i n s i g n i f i ­can t e xce p tio n s ) a l l th e w itnesses "expressed w ith o u t h e s ita t io n th e d e s ire th a t re p re s e n ta tiv e s shou ld take p a r t in th e work o f th e C o n s titu e n t Assembly a longs ide th e re p re s e n ta tiv e s o f Burma p ro p e r," who, by the tim e th a t the Committee s igned i t s re p o r t , had a lre a d y been e le c te d . The Committee recommended a c c o rd in g ly th a t th e fo llo w in g areas shou ld be rep resen ted in th e C o n s titu e n t Assembly: 1 /

The Federated S han.S ta tes, in c lu d in g Kokang and MongpaiThe Kachin H i l l sThe Chin H i l l s w ith th e Arakan H i l l T ra c tsThe Karenni (now Kayah) S ta tesThe Somra T ra c tThe Salween D is t r i c t , and the .Homalin S u b d iv is io n

The Committee however found i t im poss ib le to c o n fin e th e exam ination o f the w itnesses s t r i c t l y to i t s p r im a ry o b je c t iv e . To many o f th e w itnesses " th e q ue s tion o f p a r t ic ip a t io n in th e work o f the C o n s titu e n t Assembly was in e x t r ic a b ly in te r tw in e d w ith th e q ue s tion o f the fu tu re o f the f r o n t ie r peoples under th e new c o n s t itu t i< 5n , and th e y appeared to v iew th e two ques tions as d i f f e r e n t fa c e ts o f a s in g le g re a t p rob lem ." The Committee o f E n qu iry th e re fo re f e l t i t incumbent on them to % ffe r some recommendations on th is s u b je c t. In t h is p a r t o f t h e i r re p o r t the Committee envisage a p ic tu re o f a F ed e ra l Union o f Burma w ith the Shan and Kachin reg io ns and p o s s ib ly Karenn i as component S ta te s ; th e Karen H i l l re g io n p ro b a b ly , and the Chin H i l l re g io n p o s s ib ly m igh t be in c o rp o ra te d in Burma p ro p e r. The Committee noted a ls o the d e s ire o f the H i l l S ta tes f o r the f u l l e s t p o s s ib le autonomy w ith a r ig h t to secede from th e Union a t any t im e . One item o f p a r t ic u la r in te r e s t is the assurance g iven by the Kachin w itnesses th a t , i f th e p a r t o f the Kachin re g io n , fo rm e r ly under th e L e g is la t iv e C o u n c il and la rg e ly Burmanized, and even In d ia n iz e d , shou ld be u n ite d w ith th e P a rt I

1 / Burma F r o n t ie r Areas Committee o f E n q u iry , R eport. 19^ 7» Ctorci- 7138, p . 18.

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Areas to fo rm th e new s ta te , th e y would w i l l i n g l y guarantee the r ig h ts and p r iv i le g e s o f the non-Kachin peoples and freedom to r e ta in t h e i r own customs. T h is appears to have been th e o r ig in o f the arrangem ent in th e C o n s titu t io n th a t among the component S ta tes the Kachin s ta te a lone was excluded from t i l ’s p r iv i le g e o f secess ion . The. Committee a ls o suggested amalgamations o f v a r io u s u n its th a t would "reduce the c ra z in e ss o f th e pa tch -w o rk q u i l t " p resen ted by th e fo rm e r m achinery of. a d m in is tra t io n .

The Committee a ls o subm itted recommendations re g a rd in g th e a l lo c a t io n o f . .s e a ts in th e C o n s titu e n t Assem bly.to the v a r io u s t e r r i t o r i a l u n its o f the

F ro n t ie r A reas. Under th e arrangement f o r th e g e n e ra l e le c t io n s Burma p ro p e r was to have 210 sea ts in th e Assembly. On a p o p u la tio n b a s is r i g i d l y a p p lie d , the F ro n t ie r Areas would p n ly be. e n t i t le d to about 35 se a ts . B u t, ta k in g in to account th e la rg e e x te n t o f th e F r o n t ie r Areas and th e d iv e r s i t y

•-o f i t s peo p le s , the Committee suggested th a t 42 seats shou ld be a l lo t t e d to th e P a rt I Areas in Schedule I I , one sea t to Homalin S u b d iv is io n , a P a rt I I n o n -c o n s titu e n c y area in th e same schedule ; and 2 sea ts to K a renn i, p re v io u s ly t re a te d as o u ts id e Burma. A c c o rd in g ly the Committee recommended th e fo llo w in g d is t r ib u t io n :

Federa ted Shan S ta tes ( in c lu d in g Kokang and Moiigpat 26 seatsKachin H i l l s 7Chin H i l l s ( in c lu d in g th e Arakan H i l l T ra c ts ) 6 Salween D is t r i c t . 2Somra T ra c t 1Homalin S u b d iv is io n - 1Karenni 2

T o ta l 45

5. F e d e ra tio n in th e Assembly.

As soon- as th e g e n e ra l e le c t io n s were over th e le ade rs o f the AFFFL, secure o f t h e i r v ic t o r y , s e t to work on draw ing up f o r c o n s id e ra tio n by the C o n s titu e n t Assembly an o u t l in e p la n o f the new C o n s t itu t io n . Th is was approved by a G eneral C onvention o f th e AFPFL, on May 27* In c lud ed in i t were p roposa ls r e la t in g to the t e r r i t o r i a l component u n its o f the new S ta te . 2/

Paragraph 2 d e fin e d the t e r r i t o r ie s o f th e Union as fo llo w s :

"A. Such t e r r i t o r ie s as were h e re to fo re w i th in B r i t is h Burma and knownas -

( i ) M in is te r ia l Burma( i i ) The Homalin S u b d iv is io n( i i i ) S in g k a lin g Hkamti( i v ) Thaungdut(v ) The Somra T ra c t

• , ( v i ) The Naga H i l i s( v i i ) .The-. Salween D is t r i c t( v i i i ) The K a n p e tle t S u b d iv is io n , and( i x ) The Arakan H i l l T ra c ts

2/ Burma's F ig h t f o r Freedom, Rangoon, 1948, p . 49.

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B. The-.'Federated Shan S ta tes ( in c lu d in g Kohang and Mongpai)c. , 1: The Ka-renni S ta tesD. The Kachin H i l l s , andE. The Chin H i l ls . D i s t r i c t (e x c lu d in g -th e K a n p e tle t S ubd iv is ion )'.'

Paragraph-3 s e t f o r t h th e . re q u is i te s f o r autonomy, as fo l lo w s : - .

" ( l ) Such o f th e t e r r i t o r ie s m entioned in B.C.D. and E possessing a l l o r some o f. th e fo llo w in g c h a ra c te r is t ic s , namely - . .

( i ) a d e fin e d -g e o g ra p h ic a l a re a .w ith a ch a ra c te r o f i t s own,. ( i i ) . U n ity o f language d i f f e r e n t from the. Burmese,

( i i i ) U n ity o f c u ltu re ,( iv ) Community o f h is t o r ic a l t r a d i t io n s ,(v ) Community o f economic in te re s ts and a measure o f economic

s e l f - s u f f ic ie n c y ,( v i ) a f a i r l y la rg e p o p u la tio n , and( v i i ) th e d e s ire to m a in ta in . i t s d is t in c t id e n t i t y as a separa te U n it ,

s h a l l possess th e s ta tu s o f the "Union s ta te , " "Autonomous s ta te " o r "N a tio n a l Area" as may be de te rm ined .by th e C o n s titu e n t Assembly and th e re ­a f te r acco rd ing to the law o f the C o n s t itu t io n , and s h a l l e xe rc ise a l l such powers and fu n c t io n s as-may be vested in o r assigned to them.

" (2 ) Such powers and fu n c t io n s s h a l l be determ ined by m utua l agree­ment a f t e r n e g o tia t io n to be made by a CoEmittee appo in ted by t h is Conven­t io n ; the agreement a r r iv e d a t on th e p a r t o f the s a id Committee s h a l l be s u b je c t to r a t i f i c a t io n by th e E xecu tive Government o f th e AFPFL."

Paragraph 7, r e c i t in g the r ig h ts o f n a t io n a l m in o r i t ie s , w ith a s p e c ia l re fe re n ce to th e Karens, con ta ined two c lauses .'

" (1 ) Such r ig h ts o f N a tio n a l M in o r i t ie s " as

( i ) humar. r ig h ts ,( i i ) n a t io n a l and c u l tu r a l r ig h ts ,( i i i ) freedom o f a s s o c ia t io n w ith c u l tu r a l autonomy, and( iv ) due re p re s e n ta tio n in th e le g is la tu re ,

s h a l l be guaranteed to a group o f c it iz e n s who d i f f e r from th e m a jo r ity in race , language, c u ltu re and h is to r ic t r a d i t io n s , and fo rm a t le a s t one- te n th o f the p o p u la tio n o f the U n it concerned.

" (2 ) A Karen A f f a i r s C ounc il s h a l l be c o n s t itu te d in o rde r to a id and adv ise th e Union Government on m a tte rs r e la t in g to th e Karens; the composi­t io n o f and the method o f s e le c t io n to the s a id C o u n c il s h a l l be p re s c r ib e d by la w ."

Paragraph 8 la id down th a t " a l l powers, o th e r than those powers th a t may be s p e c i f ic a l ly assigned to the 'U n ion s t a te ' , "Autonomous s ta te " o r "N a tio n a l A re a ," s h a l l be vested in the "Union of. Burma," and s h a l l be e x e rc is a b le by o r on b e h a lf o f the organs o f th e Union o f Burma e s ta b lis h e d by the C o n s t itu t io n .

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The f i r s t sess ion o f th e C o n s titu e n t Assembly was held, on June 19*In a d d it io n to 210 members from Burma p ro p e r ( o f whom 2k rep resen ted the Karen community and 4 th e Anglo-Burme community) th e re were 43 members re p re s e n tin g th e F ro n t ie r A reas, as recommended by th e R ees-W illiam s Com­m it te e ; th e two sea ts a l .o tte d by t h a t Committee to re p re s e n ta tiv e s o f K a renn i had n o t y e t beer f i l l e d / b u t 'th e K arenn i members a r r iv e d in .time f o r . t h e - th i r d a n d 'f in a l session and agreed th a t Karenn i shou ld enter, the Union- On th e same term s is the Shan s ta te T On 16 June Aung San mov/=d ai " d i r e c t iv e R e s o lu tio n c< ndensing in to seven p o in ts th e fo u r te e n p o in ts ... approved a t the AFPFL-C< a t r a l Convention o f May. The C o n s t itu t io n , based on a d r a f t fram ed by a : p e c ia l d r a f t in g com m ittee, was f i n a l l y passed, unanim ously i n the t h i r . sess ion o f ' t h e Assembly on 2k ‘ Septem ber..

6* 'Federation in the c< nstitution; General Provisions.'The C o n s t itu t io n , ร f i n a l l y approved, recogn ized (C h a p te r. 1 ) , th e : Shan

S ta te , th e K achin s ta te and K arenn i (subseq uen tly Kayah) s ta te as c o n s t i tu ­e n t .u n its o f th e -Union. P ro v is io n was a ls o made (s e c tio n s 180, 181) . fo r the fo rm a tio n o f a Kare . s ta te w ith th e same s ta tu s as the Shan s ta te .T h is was to c o n s is t o f ' .he K arenn i s ta te , th e Salween D is t r i c t .and o th e r a d ja ce n t, areas - occup ied by Karens,' b u t i t was o n ly to come in to e x is te n ce , " i f th e m a jo r i t y 'o f th e peop le l i v in g in th e s e .th re e areas and of" the Karens in Burma- o u ts id e these a reas" shou ld so d e s ire ; meanwhile the Salween D is t r ic t " a n d ad ia ce n t a rea occup ied by Karens were to c o n s t itu te a S p e c ia l Region to be mown as K a w -th u -la y . S im i la r ly a S p e c ia l D iv is io n was c re a te d f o r th e Chj is , com pris ing c e r ta in areas in th e Chin H i l l s D i s t r i c t and the A raker H i l l T ra c ts (s e c tio n s 196-198)* In a l l these a r e a s .a l l th e in h a b ita r fcs le g a l ly q u a l i f ie d f o r c it iz e n s h ip a re c it iz e n s o f th e .Union o f Burma;- th e re i s no c it iz e n s h ip o f any o f th e c o n s t itu e n t u n its as d is t in c t from th e c it iz e n s h ip o f th e Union (s e c tio n 9 )*

. C e rta in a t t r ib u te a re common to ใ th e S ta te s . Most o f these are repea ted s e p a ra te ly f c • each o f the above m a jo r u n its in Chapter IX (1 5 ^ -2 0 0 ). Fo r each ร ;a te th e re is a s ta te C o u n c il c o n s is t in g o f a l l the re p re s e n ta t iv e s o f the s ta te in th e P a rlia m e n t. F o r each s ta te th e re is a Member o f th e Union Government, known as th e M in is te r f o r th e s ta te concerned, who is appc in te d by the P re s id e n t on th e nom ina tion o f the Prime M in is te r a c t in g in c o n s u lta t io n w ith th e s ta te C o u n c il and from among i t s members. T le M in is te r so app o in ted is a ls o the Head o f the S ta te . The Head o f t le s ta te is th e e x e cu tive a u th o r i ty o f the s ta te and has charge o f the adi in is t r a t io n , in c lu d in g a l l m a tte rs r e la t in g to th e re c ru itm e n t and d is c : p l in e o f th e s ta te c i v i l s e rv ic e s . The s ta te C o u n c il e le c ts , from among i ‘ .s members o r o th e rw ise , a s ta te M in is te r o r M in is te rs ( th e S ta te C a b in e t) ;c a id and adv ise th e Head o f the s ta te . The C ounc il a ls o has c e r ta in leg L s la t iv e powers. A lthough th e P a rlia m e n t has gen e ra l power to make laws 5 o r th e whole -or. any p a r t o f th e -Union c e r ta in m a tte rs are rese rved f o r t h s ta te C ounc ils in th e T h ird Schedule to th e C o n s titu ­t io n (See Appendix .ร ) . T h is Schedule c o n s is ts o f two l i s t s . L is t I enumerates s u b je c ts t h a t s h a l l n o t be deemed w i th in the competence o f the S ta te C o unc ils , b u t t h is i s f o r th e sake o f c l a r i t y w ith o u t p re ju d ic e to the g e n e ra li ty o f t le powers o f th e P a rlia m e n t; L is t I I enumerates the m a tte rs w h ich are € -cc lu s iv e ly rese rved f o r le g is la t io n by th e s ta te C ouncils (s e c t io n 9 2 ). Leg} s la t io n by th e s ta te C o u n c il w i th in th e l im i t s o f i t s competence is b in d i ng on th e Head o f the s ta te . In a l l o th e r m a tte rs the Head o f th e s ta te i 3 re q u ire d to c o n s u lt th e s ta te C o unc il b u t i s n o t , . ;

. .. 'ไ - . - . - 99 -

bound by i t s a d v ice . He is p a r t ic u la r ly d ire c te d to frame and p re se n t f o r ap p ro va l by th e s ta te C o u n c il an annual budget of, p robab le revenue and exp e n d itu re . S ub jec t to the p ro v is io n s o f th e C o n s t itu t io n , a l l m a tte rs r e la t in g to the.pow ers and d u tie s o f th e Head of. the S ta te o r the s ta te C o unc il and o f th e s ta te M in is te rs and o f t h e i r r e la t io n s to one ano the r ■' and to th e Union Government must be determ ined by law .

In rega rd to fin a n c e each s ta te is expected to depend v e ry la rg e ly on i t s own resou rces . Schedule IV o f the C o n s t itu t io n g ives a l i s t o f the revenues w h ich be long to th e s ta te in w h ich o r by w h ich they are ra is e d ; a l l revenues n o t so assigned are c re d ite d to the Union (see Appendix B-). F o rm erly the Shan S ta tes were p r a c t ic a l ly s e lf-s u p p o r t in g b u t the o th e r F r o n t ie r Areas have always c o s t more than they b rough t in . Now, w ith a g re a t in c rease in Government a c t iv i t i e s and consequently a correspond ing inc rease in a d m in is tra t iv e charges, th e S ta tes c o u ld 'n o t pay t h e i r way w ith o u t a s s is ta n c e . The charges f o r th e M in is te rs re p re s e n tin g the v a rio u s S ta tes in th e Union Government, t h e i r P a rlia m e n ta ry S e c re ta r ie s and es tab ­lis h m e n t a re d e b ite d to th e c e n tra l revenues, so a ls o are the charges f o r the S e c re ta r ia t departm ent f o r each o f the s ta te M in is t r ie s , b u t these may p ro p e r ly be considered c e n t ra l charges. Fo r th e r e l i e f o f charges c o n s t i t u t io n a l ly d e b ita b le to th e S ta te s , the P a rliam en t a n n u a lly a l lo t s a lump sum, which is d is t r ib u te d among th e S ta tes by a s ta te A id C o unc il th a t in c lu d e s re p re s e n ta tiv e s o f a l l th e S ta te s , though i t seems th a t th e adv ice o f the F inance and Revenue M in is t r y , w h ich has a s tro n g vo ice in f ix in g th e amount a v a ila b le f o r d is t r ib u t io n , is u s u a lly re ce ive d w ith re s p e c t fu l a t te n t io n . In th e budget f o r 1955-56 the t o t a l sum a llo c a te d f o r c o n tr ib u t io n s t o s ta te Governments was K s .26, 200, 000, o f w hich 13*7 m il l io n went to th e Shan s ta te , 7 .5 m i l l io n to the Kachin s ta te , 3»๐ m i l l io n to th e Karen s ta te and 2.0 m i l l io n to th e Kayah s ta te .

One n o ta b le fe a tu re o f the C o n s t itu t io n is the r ig h t o f the S ta tes to secede a t any tim e a f te r te n years from th e date on w hich th e C o n s t itu t io n came in to o p e ra tio n . T h is is d e a lt w ith in Chapter X, w h ich does n o t however a p p ly to the Kachin s ta te (s e c tio n 173). Another f a c i l i t y g ran ted to a l l th e S ta tes is a p ro v is io n which a llo w s a s ta te C o unc il to recommend to th e P a rliam en t th e pass ing o f a law r e la t in g to any m a tte r beyond the competence o f th e C o unc il (s e c tio n s 155* 158* 184) . P ro v is io n is made a ls o f o r any two o r more s ta te C ounc ils to jo in to g e th e r in in v i t in g the P a r l ia ­ment to pass an A c t f o r re g u la t in g a m a tte r w ith w h ich , i f c o -o p e ra tio n were n o t d e s ira b le , each C o unc il would be competent to d e a l (s e c t io n 95)*

7. The Shan s ta te , (ch a p te r IX , 16k to 165)

The U n ite d H i l l P eoples ' C o u n c il, which came in to ex is ten ce in 19^ 8, in c lu d e d 66 members o f whom h a l f were sawbwas and h a l f were chosen, though w ith o u t any fo rm a l e le c t io n , as re p re s e n ta tiv e s o f the peop le . The H i l l C ounc il deputed 23 members to th e C o n s titu e n t Assembly; these in c lu d e d 10 sawbwas' re p re s e n ta t iv e s , 2 Shan s ta te Kachins, and 1 re p re s e n ta tiv e from Kokang s ta te .

The Shan s ta te was c re a te d by the C o n s t itu t io n to comprise a l l the t e r r i t o r ie s p re v io u s ly known as the Federated Shan S ta tes and the Wa S ta te s . Pending th e suppress ion o f th e C o n s titu e n t Assembly by a d u ly e le c te d P a rlia m e n t, a l l th e members o f the C o n s titu e n t Assembly s a t to g e th e r in a P ro v is io n a l Shan S ta tes ’ C o u n c il. In the Chamber o f N a t io n a l i t ie s th e Shan

- 1 0 0 -

s ta te was a l lo t te d 25 s e a ts , and i t a lso .h ad 2 5 ;sea ts in the Chamber of D eputies. The members .of the Chamber of N a tio n a li tie s , were e le c te d 'b y the Sawbwas (Saobpas) from among them selves; the members of the Chamber of Deputies a re e lec te d .b y the people to rep resen t c o n s t itu e n c ie s■formed under the Parliam entary E lec tio n Act. The Sawbwas a re n o t .e l ig ib le 'f o r member­ship of the Chamber ..of- D eputies. 3 / .

A ll th e members o f both Chambers form the s t a t e Council, which is the le g is la tu r e fo r the Shan s t a t e . I t may enact fo r th e Shan s ta te any measure w ith in the scope of th e s ta te L eg is la tiv e L is t (Appendix A).. A B i l l 1passed by the s ta te Council is subm itted to the P res id en t who must sign i t w ith in one month u n le ss , in h is d is c re tio n , he r e fe r s i t to the Supreme Court fo r dec ision a s to whether i t con ta in s any m atte r repugnant to the C o n stitu tio n ; i f by a m ajo rity th e .Supreme Court f in d s . th a t any p ro v is io n is repugnant to th e C o n stitu tio n , th e P re s id en t must re tu rn th e B i l l to the s ta te Council and may not sign i t u n t i l the necessary amendments have been made. The S ta te Council may recommend to the Parliam ent the passing- of any law re la t in g to any m atter on which th e Council i s not competent to l e g is la te . The meetings 'O f th e s ta te . Council have always been heid in Taunggyi, the c a p i ta l o f th e Shan s t a t e , where a su ita b le Council H all -has now been erec ted .

The Government o f the Shan. S ta te s i s vested in th e Head of the s ta te ac tin g w ith th e s ta te Council. The Prime M in is te r o f th e Union, in con­s u l ta t io n w ith th e Shan s ta te Council nominates a member of the Shan s ta te Council as the M in ister fo r th e Shan s ta te in tbs Union Government. The M inister i s a lso th e Head of the s ta te . The s ta te Council a t i t s f i r s t m eeting a f t e r a genera l e le c tio n e le c ts a Cabinet of s ta te M in isters who o rd in a r ily a re , b u t need not be, members of the s t a t e Council; on the form ation o f a new Government a f t e r the g en era l e le c tio n s of 1956 the Cabinet con sis ted o f a Chairman, Vice-Chairman and f iv e M in is te rs ; the Chairman was a Sawbwa and the Vice-Chairman a commoner. The Head of the S tate is bound to con su lt th e S ta te Council on a l l m atters r e la t in g to the S ta te ; thus he i s in e f fe c t the l in k between th e Union Government and the S ta te . In a l l m atters w ith re sp ec t to which the s ta te Council has power to make laws he must a c t in accordance w ith the d ec isions of the Council.The Head of the s ta te is in genera l charge of the a d m in is tra tio n and in p a r t ic u la r h is a u th o r ity covers a l l m atters r e la t in g to recru itm en t and d is c ip lin e in connection w ith th e s ta te se rv ic e s .

The Head o f th e s t a t e i s resp on sib le fo r th e p re p a ra tio n of estim ates fo r re c e ip ts and expenditure fo r each f in a n c ia l y ea r. He must submit them fo r co n sidera tion by the s ta te Council, which has the power to approve the "budget, su b jec t to any cond itions imposed by th e Union Parliam ent w ith . regard to i t s co n trib u tio n s to the s t a t e . Control over the observance of such conditions i s e ffe c te d by the p ro v ision th a t th e s ta te Budget be incorporated in the Union Budget. The Head of the s ta te i s a lso req u ired to la y before the s ta te Council in each o rd inary sess io n , an account of h is3 / As .mentioned above, a d ra f t B i l l has been pub lished in the o f f i c i a l

G azette fo r an amendment of the C o n stitu tio n by th e c an c e lla tio n of sec tio n 15^ (2 ). The e f fe c t w il l be to cancel the p r iv ile g e of the Sawbwas o f e le c tin g the Shan s ta te re p re se n ta tiv e s in the Chamber of N a t io n a li t ie s , and to make them e l ig ib le fo r membership of the Chamber of D eputies.

- 1Q1 -

work, and a re p o r t on a l l m atters re la t in g to the s t a t e , to g e th e r with reeanaaenct&tions as .to measures th a t he considers d e s ira b le .

The b u s in e ss .o f the s ta te i s tra n sa c te d by departments which a re ' d is tr ib u te d among the M in is tr ie s ; - In the s ta te Government formed a f te r the genera l e le c tio n s of 1956 the Vice-Chairman was in charge of Home A ffa irs , and the o ther M in is trie s d e a lt re sp ec tiv e ly w ith N ational S o lid a r ity and Inform ation; Education and H ealth; Finance and Revenue;Land u t i l iz a t io n ; and Public Works and I r r ig a t io n . .'Of these M inisters th ree were sawbwas.'

The Union- M in ister fo r the s ta te has an o ff ic e in the S e c re ta r ia t in Rangoon, w ith a Secretary, to th e Government fo r th e Shan s ta te M inistry and such Deputy and A ss is tan t S ec re ta rie s as may be req u ired . There i s a lso a S ta te S e c re ta r ia t a t Taunggyi, w ith Deputy and A ss is tan t Secre­t a r i e s , one of the Deputy S ec re ta rie s to the Shan s ta te Government being a lso ex o f f ic io S ecre ta ry to the s ta te Council.

The p a rty grouping in the Shan s ta te is obscure. To some ex ten t i t follow s ethn ic l in e s . The follow ing ta b le shows the r a c ia l c la s s i f ic a t io n assumed by the Rees-Williams Committee o f Enquiry.

(Figui-es in thousands. )R acial Group Northern Southern

Shan S ta te s - Shan' S ta tes T o talShan and Lolo Moso 334 515 849Palaung-wa 220 51 271Burma Group 53 153 206Karen Group 192 192Kachin 71 - 71Indian, Chinese, e tc . 94 18 112As the above ta b le shows, th ere i s a d iffe ren ce in r a c ia l c o n s titu tio n between the Northern and Southern S ta te s ; even members of the same group in d if fe re n t p a r ts o f each t r a c t have p a r t i c u l a r i s t tendencies. In almost every group there- i s a fu r th e r cleavage on id eo lo g ica l l in e s between old and \young, mediaeval or feuda l and modern o r dem ocratic. The Committee of Enquiry heard w itnesses of the United H il l Peoples' Council, and o f the Sawbwas" and of the P eop le 's Freedom Congress. The primary in te r e s t o f the AFPFL lead ers i s in s treng thening the t i e s between Shan and Burman and th is n e c e s s ita te s co-operation w ith th e Sawbwas, b u t th e i r democratic sympathies l in k them to the m odernists. In the C onstituen t Assembly the in fluence of the Sawbwas was' the s tro n g er. But in the Parliam ent the sea t of power l i e s in the Chamber of Deputies in which the Sawbwas are not rep resen ted , though the modern group a lleg e th a t , in v ir tu e of th e i r in fluence , they a re in d ire c t ly rep resen ted among the D eputies. In the g enera l e le c tio n s of 1956 th ere was 60 candidates fo r the 25 s e a ts . . Of these 60 candidates 25 stood on b eh alf o f the H il l Peoples' Union, the o rgan i­za tion p a tro n ised by the Sawbwas and supported by the AFPFL; 10 stood fo r the Shan' S ta te s P easan ts ' O rganization opposed to the Sawbwas but a sso c ia ted w ith th e AFPFL; 8 fo r the United Pa-0 O rganization in opposition to the AFPFL, 7 fo r th e Northern Shans A ssociation and 10 were Independents. Of the e lec ted members i t seems th a t only two members from the .Shan S ta tes

- 102

took th e i r sea ts on th e opposition s id e . There i s considerab le p ressu re for.-the^Sawbwas^tq s p re a d e r -?their.; former-; .priv ileges. “£nd .they have.-agreed , to -doi-spt-on- payment o f;;co n c ilia tio n /; .hu t^gQ ti£ t;L ons ,on ..th is -p o in t a re•ท qt; y e t -completed.-■.•■..•”1-; f v.l. .7:0 !'_-v

;Un^er th e /C o p s tit^ tip n the .Shan s ta te .hasl th e” r i^ h t. o f , secession a t 'an y time a f t e r ten years from the date on which .th e 'C p jistitu tip n . was .,.. formed. There seems to be very l i t t l e fe e lin g in favour of sep ara tio n and, q u ite a p a rt from sentim ent, ;fir.ancial, con sidera tion s w i l l c a rry w eight.The Shan s ta te F ed era l Fund/ - c re a te d • i i r i s & i i I f a s ••inaintained-’fay-cdhtrihu-

;.,tions; from the.: S ta te s and from the. funds pf. Burma, and by. r e c e ip ts from , m ineral^ and fo r e s ts . ' A fte r the sep ara tio n of Burma from In d ia 'in 1937 .and the 'conferment o f g re a te r autonomy on M in is te r ia l Burma1, th e .c o n tr ib u ­tio n frpm Burma,was c a lc u la te d on th e b a s is .o f what was' due ' to th,e S ta te s ;on acco\jnt o f revenue...accruing to Burma from w ith in the States^., '.On th is b a s is th e Shari’. S ta te s were f in a n c ia l ly s e lf -s u p p o r t in g .' B lit.the Fund .has b ee^ /in abeyance since 19*4-1 and,, from the date ot independence, .'the รnaท S tate 'H as.been in re c e ip t o f c o n trib u tio n s frpm 'a common fund voted annually by the.' Parliam ent a f t e r n eg o tia tio n s 'between th e s ta te s and the Finance and Revenue M in is try . On th e o ther hand, the much g re a te r a c t iv i ty on the p a rt, of the s ta te Government fo r econom ic 'development and the .pro­motion of W elfare has g re a tly increased th e co s t o f ad m in is tra tio n . I t ■is d o u b tfu l how f a r th e Shan s ta te could provide the p re sen t am enities i f

.. l e f t to, ,it£ own /resources . ■'The machinery of government in the Shan s t a t e , as in Burma proper

c o n sis ts o f a t e r r i t o r i a l a d m in is tra tiv e se rv ice a longside which th ere a re departm ental o f f ic e rs under t h e i r own departm ental head at. th e headquarters o f-th e S ta te . A Third D is t r ic t , th e E astern Shan s t a t e , under a separa te R esident was c rea ted in 1951; i t c o n s is ts of fou r s u b -s ta te s ; the Northern Wa S ta te , the Southern Wa and Manglun s t a t e , Kokang s ta te and Kengtung s t a t e , . each under an A ss is ta n t R esident. . A p lan fo r a genera l rev is io n o f the a d m in is tra tiv e machinery was drawn up in 195^ and subm itted to the Union Government fo r c r i t ic is m emd adv ice .. The t e r r i t o r i a l d is tr ib u tio n o f o f f i c i a l s (and monthly s a la r ie s ) a s . f in a l ly approved in 1956.i s shown below. , 1.-1,ไเ. *

S ecre tary to th e Shan S ta te s Government Ks. 1,600.5 R esidents N orth -easte rn Shan S ta te s (Lashio)N ortheast S pec ia l D is t r ic t (.Hopang) .1' ' 'E astern Shan-State, (Loimwe)Loilem D is t r ic t (Loimwe) 1. / ’'Taunggyi D is t r i c t (Taunggyi)’ 1 Ks. 1,000 to 1,^0020 A ss is ta n t R esidents, Senior Branch, * ' .

p lus 3 fo r Leave Reserve Ks. 350 to 70020 A ss is ta n t R esidents, Jun io r Branch Ks. 200 to 300The Senior Branch o f f i c i a l s correspond to th o se -o f th e Burma C iv il Service and .the Jun io r Branch correspond to those of the รน๖o rd in a te Service

in Burma p roper, and hold the appointments of Township O ffice r , Headquarters M agistra te , Treasury O ffice r or A dditional M ag istra te . Thus the adm in istra ­t iv e machinery of the Shan s ta te i s now c lo se ly p a r a l l e l to th a t o f Burma p roper. There a re th re e M u n ic ip a litie s a t Taunggyi, Kalaw and lo ilem . Elsewhere experiments a re being conducted in the in tro d u c tio n o f v illa g e co u n c ils . - 103 -

Alongside these o f f ic e rs in charge o f geneTal adm in istra tio n th e re a re , as in -: Burma proper,. departm ental”o f f i c i a l s . . Among these, departments the most com pletely organized i s the Education Department; th e re is a' P rin c ip a l Education O fficer (who i s a lso in charge of education in Kayah); under him th e re a re two A ss is tan t Inspec to rs w ith headquarters a t Lashio and Taunggyi, and 8 Deputy In sp ec to rs ,8. The Kachin S ta te . (Section 166 to 179)»

The c re a tio n o f a Kachin s ta te was complicated- hy the f a c t th a t under the 1937 c o n s titu tio n some areas f e l l under p a r t I o f the Second Schedule and some under' P a rt I I ; and of th e areas, f a l l in g under P a rt I I some were "constituency areas" rep resen ted in the L eg is la tiv e Council, and some \vere "non-constituency a re a s . The people in the constituency a rea s , la rg e ly Burmese or Shan-Burmese, w ith Ind ian and Chinese tra d e rs , were re lu c ta n t to f o r f e i t th e i r p r iv ile g e of rep re se n ta tio n in Rangoon. I t was im possible however to c rea te a v iab le s ta te w ithout including them. The dilemma was solved by assign ing them to th e Kachin s ta te w ith a guarantee th a t, h a lf the sea ts of the Kachin s ta te in the Chamber of N a tio n a li tie s should be a l lo t te d to Non-Kachins and the o ther h a lf reserved fo r Kachins; as a fu r th e r p ro te c tio n the Kachin s ta te was denied the option o f secession from the Union, and no B i l l p re ju d ic ia l ly a ffe c tin g any acknowledged r ig h t or p r iv ile g e of the Kachins or the non-Kachins of the Kachin s ta te may be deemed to have been passed by th e Council un less the m ajo rity of the ; members of the community so a ffe c te d vote in favour o f i t .

In the Chamber of N a tio n a li tie s 12 sea ts were a l lo t te d to the Kachin S ta te and, on the b as is of p opula tion , 7 sea ts were a l lo t te d to i t in the Chamber of D eputies, These 19 members c o n s titu te the Kachin s ta te Council. The p ro v ision s w ith regard to th e appointment of a M in ister and Head of the S ta te , h is powers and re sp o n s ib il i t ie s -a n d h is re la t io n to the s ta te Council a re the same in th e i r genera l e f fe c t as tnose re la t in g to the Shan S ta te . The ch ie f d iffe ren c e in regard to the Government i s th a t th e re are fewer M inisters and the sphere of ac tio n o f each M in ister i s correspondingly increased . At p resen t th ree s ta te M inisters deal re sp ec tiv e ly w ith Educa­tio n ; w ith Public H ealth and S ocial Services; and w ith Public Works, A gricu ltu re and F o re s ts .

The main c o n f l ic t o f in te r e s t w ith in the s ta te i s between the in hab i­ta n ts of the more advanced lowlands to those of the t r i b a l h i l l s , bu t p o l i t i c a l c o n f l ic t ran c h ie f ly on the p erson al ambitions o f r iv a l c h ie f ­ta in s . The AFPFL seems to be more stron g ly rep resen ted in the Kachin s ta te than in th e Shan s ta te , b u t i t s re la tio n s w ith the follow ers of the r iv a l c h ie f ta in s a re ambiguous. There has not y e t been any d ra s tic reo rgan iza­t io n of the adm in is tra tiv e m achinery,. which c a rr ie s on along much the same lin e s as before ; the lo c a l c h ie f ta in s conduct the adm in is tra tio n w ith the help of c iv i l serv ice o f f i c ia l s as A ss is tan t R esidents..9-, The Karen s ta te . (Section 180, 181).

The c re a tio n of a s ta te fo r the Karens p resen ted d i f f i c u l t i e s th a t did not e x is t in the case of o ther e thn ic m in o ritie s . Among these m in o ritie s the Karen group was the la rg e s t . But i t was by no means homogeneous and i t was widely sc a tte re d over la rg e areas both in the h i l l s and in the p la in s , and only in one com paratively sm all lo c a l i ty did the Karens form the

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la rg e s t group "among thV lo c a l p op u la tio n ." Before deciding to e s ta b lis h a sep ara te Karen s t a t e fo r th e-a ree ' where Karens were in a m ajo rity , i t was necessary to take in to account the views- of Karens ou ts id e th a t a rea . Also various circum stances''had given r i s e to s tro n g an tip a th y towards the Burmese among a sec tio n of the’ Karen population and had im paired f r ie n d ly re la tio n s between the Karens and the Burmese. Under B r i t is h ru le Karen p a r tic u la r ism had been encouraged by the g ran t of sep ara te communal (rep­re se n ta tio n to th e Karens.”-' Some Karens had no -desire fo r a sep ara te .Karen S ta te ; probabiy most Karens wanted a sep ara te s ta te w ith in th e Union;'.but some wanted a Separate s t a t e ou tside the Union. "' In the C onstituen t - Assembly 2h s e a ts were a llo c a te d to K arens,; e lec ted -on a communal b a s is . ‘

At th a t time th e re was no very sharp d is t in c t io n in the minds of most people between th e ’K arens-and 'the K arennis, o r Red Karen. The Con- . s t i tu t io n p rovided ; a. sep ara te s ta te for-K arenni on th e assumption th a t th is would u ltim a te ly be enlarged by the in c lu s io n of ad jacen t Karen areas in .a Karen s ta te which -should have the same s ta tu s as the Shan s ta te . Pending the C o n stitu tio n of th e Karen s ta te , the Saiween D is t r ic t to g e th e r w ith the ad jacen t Karen a reas was to be made a S pecia l Region to be known as Ka\rthulay; P rov ision was made a lso fo r the c re a tio n of a Karen A ffa irs Council to c o n s is t of a l l the members of the Chamber of D eputies rep resen ­tin g Karens, to g e th e r w ith no t more than f iv e members co-opted by them from among th e Karen re p re se n ta tiv e s in the Chamber of N a tio n a li t ie s . The Prime M in is te r, a c tin g in 'c o n s u lta t io n w ith th e Karen A ffa irs Council, was to nominate from among th e i r members a M in iste r fo r Karen a f f a i r s . The fun ction and re s p o n s ib i l i t ie s of th e M in iste r fo r Karen A ffa irs were b roadly s im ila r to those of the Head of the s ta te in o th e r cases, but the Karen A ffa irs Council had not' th e le g is la t iv e powers o f a s ta te Council.

In October, 19^8 , th e Government appointed a Regional Autonomy Enquiry Commission under the C h ief Ju s tic e ' บ Ba บ (subsequently P resid en t) to submit recommendations on the Karen problem and in February, 19^9, the. Commission recommended th e c o n s t i tu tio n of a. sep ara te Karen s ta te , to be demarcated subsequently in accordance- w ith the m ajo rity wishes o f the people re s id in g w ith in the a rea concerned;, whether th e Karenni should merge w ith the Karen s ta te was a m atte r .that the. people re s id in g w ith in Karenni should decide. - By th is tim e, however, th e extreme sec tio n of the Karens had decided to- venture on re b e llio n .and they, were -joined by a considerable- p ro po rtio n of th e Karen community, includ ing some of those - le a d e rs ' who-had advised a g a in s t i t . The re b e llio n hindered fu r th e r ; p ro g ress, and m atters -concerning the Karens in -g e n e ra l were l e f t to - th e - M in is te r fo r Karen A ffa irs , who was in charge of a D irec to ra te of Karen A ffa irs and a Karen Education Departments - The D irec to ra te of Karen A ffa irs had a s t a f f of about 50 Karen A ffa irs O ffice rs d is tr ib u te d over fou rteen d i s t r i c t s in Lo^Te r Burma in o rder to promote b e t te r r e la t io n s between- the Government and the Karens, and between th e Karens and th e i r neighbours.The d e lta reg ion had always been the stronghold of Karen education, b u t the immediate e f fe c t of the re b e llio n was the alm ost t o t a l e lim ina tio n of the Karen v il la g e schoo ls. With a view to .rep a ir in g th is d is a s te r the Government appointed a Karen Chief Education O ffice r and a s t a f f to a s s i s t in reb u ild in g the numerous schools th a t had been burned down, and to b ring ing back th e teach e rs whom th e re b e llio n had d ispersed .

A f i r s t - s tep towards the c re a tio n o f a Karen s t a t e was taken in October, 1951,” w ith th e amendment of sec tio n s 180, 181, o f the C o n stitu tio n

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by Act LXH of 1951 which transform ed the Salween D is t r ic t in to the nucleus of a Karen s ta te . The f i r s t meeting of the Karen s ta te Council was held in March, 1952. In September, 1952, an Amendment Act (XIV of 1952) extended the Karen s ta te by the in c lu s io n of f iv e townships ad jacen t to the Salween D is t r ic t . With the passage of th i s Act the Karen S ta te Government, came in to being w ith i t s own S e c re ta r ia t and s ta te Council. As a co ro lla ry , however, the education of the Karens in Burma proper outside the new Karen S ta te devolved upon the M inistry o f Education. In the Karen s ta te Govern­ment thus formed th e re were s ix s ta te M in is tr ie s . But the Act d id not empower th e Karen s ta te Council t o ' adm inister the area .composing the Karen S ta te ; th i s was to be d efe rred u n t i l law and order were s u f f ic ie n tly re s to re d . Meanwhile i t was the fun ction o f the s ta te Government to a s s i s t in the re s to ra t io n of law and o rder, and to make p repara tion s fo r taking over f u l l re s p o n s ib il i ty as soon as p o ss ib le . Two of the Karen M in iste rs , however, s e t up headquarters in Moulmein, c lose to th e ch ie f cen tre of d istu rbance , and a S pecia l Commissioner was posted to Moulmein to help them. Under the Pyidawtha (N ational W elfare) p lan of 1952 a d isc re tio n a ry g ran t of K.50,000 was a l lo t te d to each•township in the Karen reg ion , as to townships elsew here, and although the s ta te Government, not y e t being vested w ith ad m in is tra tiv e powers, could no t take an a c tiv e p a r t in the implementation o f the scheme, i t provided the re q u is i te funds and gave in d ire c t encouragement. A fu r th e r s tep was taken in 195^ when the P re s i­dent issued a n o t i f ic a t io n th a t , w ith e f fe c t freon June 1 , f u l l powers of adm in is tra tio n in th ree of the townships were tra n s fe r re d to the Karen S ta te Government. This date accord ingly marks the b i r th of the Karen s ta te as a fu l ly autonomous c o n s titu e n t u n i t - in .the Union of Burma.

Although the Karens a re the most numerous of th e m inority peoples, only about o n e -th ird of them l iv e w ith in the a rea forming the Karen s ta te . Under the C o nstitu tio n as amended the Karen s ta te has been a l lo t te d 15 se a ts in the Chamber of N a tio n a li t ie s . In the d is tr ib u tio n of sea ts on the b as is of population fo r th e genera l e le c tio n s of 1956 i t received seven sea ts in the Chamber of D eputies. The AFPFL was the only p o l i t i c a l o rgan iza tion th a t took p a r t in the e le c tio n s , and although fo r most of the sea ts th e re were independent cand idates, few of these were successfu l and even these few a sso c ia ted themselves w ith the AFPFL in the Parliam ent. The member o f th e Union Government fo r the Karen s ta te is a lso the Head of the S ta te , and h is re la tio n s w ith the s ta te Council are the same as in the Shan S ta te . The a d m in is tra tiv e machine has not y e t been re-o rgan ised and continues on the same lin e s as b efo re , w ith such lo c a l readjustm ents as the prolonged d isturbance and confusion have n e c e ss ita te d .10. The Kayah s ta te . (Section 182 to 195)

The t o t a l a rea of Kayah is le s s than 5,000 square m iles and the popu­la t io n , though never ex ac tly enumerated, i s only about 70*000» R acia lly i t i s very mixed, w ith a preponderance of Taungthus who though known to. the Burmans as Red Karens, have no connection w ith the Karen e i th e r in r a c ia l o rig in o r in language. Apart from p o l i t i c a l superv ision by the Superintendent of the Southern Shan S ta te s , i t was form erly l e f t to go i t s own way under the lo c a l c h ie f ta in s and i t i s one of the most backward regions in th e Ifriion.

The C o nstitu tio n provided fo r the merging o f Karenni in the Karen S ta te . But during the in su rre c tio n the m il i ta n t Karen reb e ls invaded Karenni and

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fo r a tim e occup ied -part o f i t . This aroused so much i l l - f e e l in g towards the Karens among th e lo c a l in h a b itan ts th a t they demanded a separa te s ta te and th a t th e ir , name should he changed from .Karenni to-. Kayah. E ffec t to t h e i r wishes was given in the C o n stitu tio n Amendment Act (IX II) o f 1951*The.new.Kayah s ta te was. o f f ic ia lly . inaugurated in Jan uary .1952 w ith i t s . cap ita l- a t Loikaw. At the; same tim e th e re was another, change. The’ Con­s t i tu t io n p ro v id ed -fo r th e accession of Mongpai s ta te , form erly one of the F ederated Shan S ta te s ,, to Karenni i f the people should .so d e s ire .A s-p a rt:o f the genera l re -se ttle m e n t of the reg ion a f t e r the" expulsion o f ; the Karen -rebel fo rc e s> th e ad m in is tra tio n of the Mongpai state*w as taken over; by. the Kayah -Government, although the amalgamation was not le g a lly ra t if ie d ;b y ; a p le b is c i te '. I t was np t however u n t i l November 1953 th a t the reb e ls i’.w ere ..f in a lly .c lea red -1out of th e im portant’ Maychi Mines a re a . " •

Under the C o n stitu tio n th e Kayah s ta te was a l lo t te d ' th ree s e a ts ’ in the Chamber of- Deputies to be. f i l l e d by. the three, c h ie f ta in s o f the lo c a l sub­s ta te s . - 'in the d is tr ib u tio n , o f 's e a ts on th e ’b a s is of popula tion fo r the general e lec tions, o f . 1956-.the Kayah s ta te w a s 'a l lo t te d two sea ts i n ‘the Chamber of D eputies. These .f iv e members of. the two' Chambers c o n s t i tu te th e Kayah S ta te Council. The M in ister fo r the Kayah s ta te in ’ the Union " 1 Government i s a lso Head o f the s ta te and th e re a re only th ree s ta te M in is te rs . The a d m in is tra tio n i s c a rr ie d on by a R esident w ith the help o f th ree A ss is ta n t R esidents to g e th e r w ith th e lo c a l sawbwas, and subor­d in a te o f f i c i a l s , known as ne-oks, to a s s i s t the sawbwas.11 . The Chin S pecia l D iv is io n . (Section 196 to 198).

The re p re se n ta tiv e of the Chins l e f t the Rees-W illiams Committee in some doubt as to whether they would p re fe r a Federated s ta te or amalgama­tio n w ith M in is te r ia l Burma, though they s t ip u la te d th a t in the l a t t e r event the c h ie f ta in s would s t i l l be allowed to adm inister th e i r t r a c t s in accordance w ith t r i b a l customs and t r a d i t io n s . In pursuance of the Panglong Agreement the Chins sen t seven re p re se n ta tiv e s to th e C onstituen t Assembly.

The outcome of the d iscussions in the C onstituen t Assembly ไ-ms th e p ro v is io n in the C o n stitu tio n fo r a Chin S pecia l D iv ision which, although included in Burma p roper, should have c e r ta in of the a t t r ib u te s of a sep ara te s t a t e . The C o n stitu tio n provided th a t e ig h t se a ts in the Chamber o f N a tio n a li tie s should be f i l l e d by re p re se n ta tiv e s from the S pecia l D ivision of th e Chins. In the d is t r ib u t io n o f se a ts fo r the Chamber of Deputies in 1956 the Chins were a l lo t te d s ix s e a ts . The members re p re ­sen ting the Chins in th e two Chambers compose the Chin A ffa irs Council.The Prime M in is te r, a c tin g in c o n su lta tio n w ith the Chin A ffa irs Council, nominates one member of th e Council to be the M in ister f o r Chin A ffa irs in the Union Government. The functions o f the M in is te r fo r Chin A ffa irs a re much th e same as those of the Head of the s ta te in o ther reg io ns, bu t he i s no t the Head of the s ta te as th e re i s no Chin s t a t e . In th is con­nec tion , however, one p o in t should be noted. In the s ta te s , education i s one of the su b jec ts included in th e s ta te L e g is la tiv e l i s t . In the Chin Special D ivision the M in iste r fo r Chin A ffa irs i s e sp e c ia lly charged with the superintendence, d ire c tio n and c o n tro l of a l l m atters r e la t in g to schools and c u l tu ra l in s t i tu t io n s . This has the p r a c t ic a l e f fe c t of con ferring autonomy on the Chins in educa tiona l and c u l tu r a l a f f a i r s , so th a t they are in much the same p o s itio n in th is m atter as the S ta te s .

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No p o s itiv e re s p o n s ib i l i t ie s a re p laced on the Chin..Affair© .Council in the C o nstitu tio n except th a t i t i s requ ired to- a id and advise the M in ister in the d ischarge-o f h is d u tie s ." The AFPFL i s the only p o l i t i c a l o rgan i­sation: ex tensiv ely rep resen ted in the Chin S pecia l D ivision , b u t lo c a l p o l i t i c s , both in s id e and ou tside -the AFPFL o rg an iza tion , a re la rg e ly a m atter o f p erson a l r iv a lry between the c h ie f ta in s .

In; the Chin S pecia l D ivision th e re has been, a more determined attem pt to modernise the adm in is tra tiv e system than in most of the o th e r h i l l reg ions. By the Chin Special D ivision Act (XLIX) of 19^8 the former system of in d ire c t a d n in is tra tio n through h e re d ita ry c h ie f ta in s and headmen was- abo lished . There a re now two D is tr ic ts w ith fiv e ..sub d iv is io ns. These a re divided- in to C irc les and V illages under e lec ted headmen and cou nc ils . The system appears to be working s a t i s f a c to r i ly , and, on the expiry of the term of o ff ic e of the councils e lec ted in 19^8, new councils were e lec te d in 1952* Alongside th is t e r r i t o r i a l adm in is tra tio n th e re a re departm ental estab lishm ents under th e M in iste r fo r Chin A ffa irs . For each D is t r ic t th ere i s an In sp ec to r of Schools w ith a Deputy Inspec to r fo r each Sub­d iv is io n . In the Public Works Department th ere i s an Executive Engineer in charge of the whole D ivision w ith an A ss is tan t Engineer fo r each D is t r ic t . The Co-operative C redit Department i s s tron g ly rep resen ted , b u t lack of funds has delayed the c re a tio n of an A g ric u ltu ra l Department. Thus in the Chin H il ls , even more than elsew here, the new adm in is tra tiv e machinery is modelled on th a t s e t up in Burma during the e a rly days of B r i t is h ru le .

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CHAPTER V. POSTMORTEM

Davy I beseech you, s i r , to countenance William v is o r o f Woncot ' a g a in s t Clement Pcrkes 0J th e h i l l .- . 1 . . .

Shallow There, i s many com plaints,' Davy, a g a in s t th a t V isor; th a t v is o r”rr: r i s an a r ra n t knave^ on my knowledge.

' Davy_ I g ran t your w o rsh ip .th a t-h e i s a knave, s i r ; b u t y e t, Godfo rb id , s i r , b u t a knave should have some countenance a t h is fr ie n d * ร req u e s t. An honest man, s i r , i s ab le to speak fo r h im se lf, when a knave i s n o t. I have served your worship t r u ly , s i r , , th i s e ig h t .y e a r s ;• and i f 1 cannot once or tw ice in a q u a rte r bea r out a knave a g a in s t an honest man, I have b u t very, l i t t l e c r e d i t w ith your w orship. The knave, i s my honest f r ie n d , s i r ; - ■therefore, I beseech your1 worship, l e t hiffl be countenanced.

Shallow Go to ; I say he s h a l l have no wrong.I I Henry IV. Act V, S c .i .

Cassius That you have wronp/d me doth appear in th is ;You have condemn'd, and noted Lucius P e lla For tak in g bribe." here o f the Sardians; Wherein my l e t t e r , p ray ing bn h is s id e . Because I.knew the man, were s lig h te d o f f .

Brutus You wrong'd y o u rse lf to w rite in such a case .Cassius In such a time as th is i t i s not meet

That every n ice offence should have h is commentJ u liu s Caesar. Act TV, S c . i i i .

The above quo ta tion s may be recognized as a n p t in ap p ro p ria te pendant to the foregoing account o f how the machinery of government in Burma functioned , o r was in tended to fu n c tio n , in 1956. And we can perhaps understand the s i tu a t io n in 1956 b e t te r i f ve r e c a l l th e s i tu a tio n in 19V6. For th is purpose i t may be p e rm iss ib le to rep e a t an a n a ly sis of th e s i tu a tio n w ritte n ten years ago, ^when B r i ta in had ju s t granted Burma independence. - - -

"On both p a r ts t h i s may seem bold even to the p o in t o f rashness.Some contend th a t we have been too ready to throw o ff th e re s p o n s ib i l i t ie s of government and Burmans over-ready to assume them. I t i s a tumbled house th a t they in h e r i t , and th e re IS urgen t need to r e p a ir the damage, moral and m a te r ia l, in f l i c t e d on Burma in a war during which i t was tw ice invaded .. .D espite th e gen era l in ex perien ce-of Burmans in modern in du stry and commerce, th e i r new lead ers must enable Burma, so f a r as n a tio n a l in te r e s t a llow s, to make a due co n trib u tio n to world w elfare by the

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development o f i t s resources. Moreover, in a country where th e t r a d i t io n o f m ilita ry serv ice has long been su ffe red to decay, they must t r a in the people to defend th e i r freedom. Now a lso i t w i l l f a l l on them to deal with' problems long- standing and h ith e r to in so lu b le ; to adapt w estern in s t i tu t io n s to an e a s te rn peoplej provide remedies" f o r a g r ic u l tu ra l debt and land a lie n a tio n , reduce l i t i g a t io n and crime to healthy p ro po rtio ns, re s to re order among the Buddhist c lerg y , and p u rify the adm in istra tion , of co rrup tion . In a tro ub led world, though le s s acquainted w ith a f f a i r s ’ than th e i r old ru le r s , they face a s i tu a t io n far'm ore d i f f i c u l t . ' In these circum stances i t i s im possible to contemplate the fu tu re w ithout m isgivings, and we may w ell re g re t th a t in the p a s t more was: not'done to equip the" people and th e i r lead ers fo r th e r e s p o n s ib i l i t i e s ' o f independence.

’ I t 'w a s th e AFPFL which achieved' independence', and ever "since then i t has’ governed Burma. "Now, to a l l appearance, i t has d ied q u ite suddenly.•Was i t murder, o r s u ic id e ; ' o r death from' n a tu ra l causes? A p o s t mortem may be in s tru c t iv e . This demands some reco n sid era tio n of the c o n s titu tio n of the AFPFL’ and o f the "conditions "under which i f had to work b u t, even i f i t involves some re p e t i t io n o f what has a lready been sa id , i t may be worth attem pting.

The b asic p r in c ip le of B r it is h p o licy was economic freedom sub jec t only to th e ru le of law. Economic freedom b u i l t up an unstab le economic system in which in d u stry and fo re ig n tra d e were d ire c te d , managed and operated by Europeans, Ind ians and Chinese, w ith much of the in te rn a l trad e in imported goods a iso in Indian hands,' w hile Burman' economic a c t iv i t i e s were r e s t r ic te d alm ost ex c lusiv e ly to a g r ic u ltu re . The war and Japanese occupation devasta ted the m a te ria l resources of Burma and sh a tte red the unstab le economic fa b r ic , leav ing Burma not only impoverished and d e s t i tu te of c a p i ta l equipment b u t "also w ithout the human resources to re p a ir the damage. A bsorption in the economic apparatus of the modern world had transform ed the environment of s o c ia l l i f e and demanded a new so c ia l d is c ip lin e to re in fo rc e or rep lace the custom which had p rev iously been a s u f f ic ie n t guarantee of s o c ia l w elfare; b u t the care fo r s o c ia l w elfare had been d isregarded . Even the w ea lth ie r Burmars educated in w estern schools had never geen brought in to e ffe c tiv e con tac t w ith the c u ltu ra l aspects o f w estern c iv i l i s a t io n and, ju s t as th e re were no Burman m anufacturers or merchants, th e re were p ra c t ic a l ly no Burman engineers or doc to rs , because the economic demand fo r these had been met by Europeans, Indians and Chinese; fo r the same reason th ere were few who had been tra in e d in modern science or could teach i t . The ru le of law p rev a iled o r, ra th e r , the ru le o f law yers. Every one was fre e to pursue h is in d iv id u a l m a te ria l in te r e s t su b jec t to the r i s k of le g a l p en a lty . But "of what a v a il a re forms of law in d e fa u lt of s o c ia l o rder?". The n a tu ra l consequence was s o c ia l d is in te g ra tio n o f which the most obvious symptom was the growth of crime th a t the law was unable to rep ress . The war and the Japanese occupation c a rr ie d s o c ia l d is in te g ra tio n a stage fu r th e r , and the new Government of independent Burma, w ith no tra in e d army to suppress law lessness, was b a re ly able to hold i t s own a g a in s t the fo rces making fo r anarchy.

Yet in t h i s p recarious s i tu a tio n the new lead ers had to face the ta sk of c re a tin g a n a tio n a l so c ie ty , held to ge ther by the t i e s of so c ia l o rder in stead of merely by the machinery o f law and inco rpo rating an economic s tru c tu re on a b a s is more s ta b le than economic freedom. Burmans

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in. genera l be lieved th a t th e magic o f independence would b rin g down showers of io ld 'a n d ;s i lv e r , .a n d they, looked fo r t h i s ; a t . once. The le ad e rs , l ik e the people, lacked p erson a l experience in in d u stry and b u sin ess, and had l i t t l e . or.; no acquaintance-w ith-'the modem world out Side "Burma. Few,

.. . i f anyi app rec ia ted the magnitude of t h e t a s k th a t they had undertaken and t h e y ‘looked fo r im m ed ia te-resu lts . In some m atters the ' s i tu a t io n n e c e ss ita te d speed y .ac tion , o r a-show o f-a c tio n , to p reven t d efec tio n to C om m unist.critics. Foreign powers, who fo r various reasons wanted to r e s to re and in c rease the p roductive capacity o f Burma, encouraged tbem to expand th e i r a c t iv i t i e s in every p o ss ib le (and sometimes im possible) d ire c ­t io n . Yet alm ost th e i r so le a s s e ts were optimism and enthusiasm and the g enera l b e l ie f in . th e ir good w i l l and a b i l i ty to promote th e n a tio n a l w elfa re . • •

. The. machinery a t th e i r d isp o sa l co n sis ted of what 'remained' of the former a d m in is tra tiv e s t a f f a f t e r th e exodus of alm ost; a l l the sen io r and experienced o f f i c i a l s . The s t a f f , the t r a d i t io n s of the se rv ic e , and the o f f i c i a l ro u tin e and customary procedure had taken shape a t a 'tim e when the maintenance of law and o rd e r was regarded as th e main, i f not th e so le , fun c tion of government; ..through subsequent a cc re tio n s i t had become more cumbrous and le s s e f f i c ie n t , b u t had s t i l l served w ell enough fo r Burma

. as a business concern, in: which business w a s 'le f t to b usiness men. Now'it had to b e 'u sed fo r a -v ery d i f f e r e n t purpose, as th e m ainspring o f a dynamic p rocess, -the c re a tio n of a new -social o rd er. The obvious and perhaps the only way. of adapting the.m achinery to i t s innumerable new’ functions was to expand i t y i th new departm ents and se rv ic e s , toge ther w ith .s e m i-o ff ic ia i o rg an isa tio n s fo r such fun c tion s as were u nsu itab le fo r departm ental o p e ra tio n . For the ad m in is tra tio n of th ese new se rv ices and o rg an isa tio n s they had to r e c r u i t what men they could-as b e s t they could. From a recen t o f f i c i a l communique i t appears th a t by the end of 1957* only ten years a f t e r the a tta inm en t of independence, th e re were 32 m inistries^ J 83 departm ents, and d ire c to ra te s , 53 boards and co rpo ra tion s,16 councils and commissions, and 3 committees. There were 4,059 g azetted o f f ic e rs and 169*384 non-gazetted employees in th e m in is tr ie s and d ep a rt­ments, to g e th e r w ith over 100,000 employees in the various semi-govern­m ental o rg a n isa tio n s . There was.one government employee fo r every 58 head of the popula tion as a g a in s t one to every. 45,000 in Bengal and one to 58,000 in Hyderabad. 1 / (How f a r th ese f ig u re s a re s t r i c t l y comparable i s u n c e r ta in .) There were a lso some hundreds of s ta te scho lars of whom many had been unable to f in d s u i ta b le employment on th e i r re tu rn from study abroad. In a d d itio n to th e army o f government employees th e numerous committees in every d i s t r i c t and township and in many v il la g e s comprised some men who expected ta n g ib le rem uneration fo r t h e i r g ra tu ito u s pub lic se rv ic e . Every new job allowed of scope fo r jobbery - - i f not robbery.I t i s easy to condemn th e system, b u t not so easy to say , given the circum stances, what e lse could-, have been done where so l i t t l e had been attem pted to equip th e people and th e i r lead ers fo r th e r e a l i t i e s of independence.

One could reasonably expect th a t in due time many of th ese ventures would be f r u i t f u l , b u t no one who understood th e s i tu a t io n could reasonably expect th a t f a c to r ie s managed by inexperienced d ire c to rs and operated by tech n ic ians fre sh from school, w ith labour accustomed only to th e seasonal1/ The Guardian~~(daily), Rangoon, April 5 and 23, 1958.

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d is c ip lin e o f a g r ic u ltu re and not ye t broken in to a d a ily in d u s tr ia l ro u tin e , could function e ff ic ie n tly , w ithout a period of. t r ib u la t io n , or could look fo r the smooth working, of h a s t i ly improvised -organisations to -• impose on the people an unaccustomed s o c ia l d is c ip lin e fo r the sake o f w elfare th a t many o f them did no t want. Where so many people expected so much so soon, disappointm ent and f r u s t r a t io n were in ev ita b le ,- and n a tu ra lly weakened the confidence of the people in the government♦

Take a simple i l l u s t r a t io n : few Burmans understood th a t - u n t i l produc­t io n could be ra is e d , consumption must be c u t. The fe a tu re of th e economic system which c h ie f ly concerned most people was the exchange of Burma r ic e fo r fo re ig n p iece-goods. Formerly every one had been f re e to buy 'as. much c lo th in g as he could a ffo rd . Now th ere were le s s piece-goods fo r a la rg e r popu la tion , b u t not many Burmans re a liz e d th a t they must s t i n t on c lo th in g u n t i l they could export more r ic e , s t i l l le s s .did they re a l iz e th a t , w ith a r e s t r i c te d supply, the p r ic e o f piece-goods in Burma was governed by th e lo c a l demand and had no re la t io n to the cost in th e country of o rig in , leav ing an abnormal p r o f i t to the im porters. The genera l w elfare demanded r e s t r i c t io n s on im ports, p ric e s and p r o f i t s , ra is in g numerous d i f f i c u l t problems which were aggravated by the d es ire (and, in th e in te r e s t of s o c ia l and economic s t a b i l i t y , the n e c ess ity ) to t r a n s fe r the c o n tro l and conduct of fo re ig n tra d e from fo re ig n e rs to n a tio n a ls and from n a tio n a ls of fo re ig n o rig in to those o f lo c a l descen t. R e s tr ic tio n s , however wise and necessary , could not b u t ex c ite resentm ent which n a tu ra lly a l l those-’ who stood to gain by the removal o f r e s t r ic t io n s tended to f o s te r by emphasizing and exaggerating th e inconvenience which they occasioned. At the same time many who clamoured ag a in s t r e s t r ic t io n s on th e i r own a c t i v i ­t i e s were p re ss in g fo r more and c lo se r r e s t r i c t io n s upon o th e rs . S im ilarly , i t was u rg en tly necessary to re d is tr ib u te , th e la rg e areas of land th a t under the' ru le of law had passed to absentee and fo re ig n owners, and to transform the ru ra l p r o le ta r ia t in to a s ta b le p easan try . And i t was necessary to reorganize the machinery o f lo c a l government along lin e s app ro p ria te to circum stances and the n a tio n a l teap eracen t. The d i f f i c u l t i e s in these and in many o ther problems were aggravated by the genera l demand, and the n ec ess ity , fo r some kind of m akeshift so lu tio n .

In these circum stances the ro sea te hues o f the e a r ly dawn of inde­pendence faded, and no government, however wise i t s counsels and scrupulous i t s conduct of a f f a i r s , could have re ta in e d i t s i n i t i a l p o p u la rity . I t was n a tu ra l and ju s t i f i a b le th a t th e Government should e n tru s t the conduct of i t s p lans to those who would support i t and a t l e a s t p ro fess b e l ie f in i t s p lan s, o r, in o ther words, to p a r tis a n s o f the AFPFL. But in Burma, as remarked by บ Ba Swe, in h is Guide to Socialism , p o l i t i c s had long come to be regarded as "a c a ree r of grabbing o ff ic e in D is t r ic t Councils, Muni­c ip a l i t i e s and the Houses of L e g is la tu re ." Many of i t s p a r t is a n s looked fo r jobs w ithout any very firm b e l ie f in th e Government o r i t s p lan s, and w ith l i t t l e thought of p ub lic se rv ic e . Throughout the whole process of reco n stru c tio n th e re were innumerable o p p o rtu n ities fo r p ick ings and p e r­q u is i te s . Many, probably the g re a t m ajo rity , among the employees of government and the s e m i-o ff ic ia l o rg an isa tio ns and among the u n o ff ic ia l members o f the various lo c a l bod ies, h onestly d esired to render pub lic se rv ice , bu t w hite an ts would creep in , and th e i r a c t iv i t i e s and the consequent damage were exaggerated by those who su ffe red from th e i r depre­d a tio n s, and s t i l l more v oc ifero usly by those who wanted th e i r jo b s. • The wonder I S , not th a t the AFPFL f in a l ly co llapsed , b u t th a t fo r ten years i t

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guided the country through so many and so g re a t dangers w ithout a ca tastrop he . The exp lanation of i t s success and f a i lu r e must l i e p a r t ly in i t s personnel and com position.

Many o f th e lead ers of the AFPFL f i r s t made th e i r appearance in pub lic l i f e , to g e th e r w ith some of th e i r lead ing opponents, in a. striH ^ in the U niversity in 1936 which became an in c id en t o f n a tio n a l importance.. . I t , o rig in a ted in th e expulsion o f 'Aung San follow ed by th e expulsion ' of.. บ Nu, then P res id en t of the S tud en ts ' "Union and subsequently P resid en t"o f the . S tr ik e Committee. บ พน, who had tak£ท h is degree .some. years e a r l i e r had; '. re tu rned to the U niversity to study law, and was about s ix years o lder than most o f th e s tu d en ts , by,whoin he Was a lready regarded w ith a ffe c t io n and re sp ec t on account of h is c h a rac te r , eloquence and s e n io r i ty . Then f o l ­lowed the c re a tio n by Thakin Mya of th e 'A ll. Burma! Peasants'1 O rganisation (ABPO) in re a c tio n a g a in s t fo re ig n c o n tro l over the a g r ic u l tu ra l economy. S hortly afterw ards บ Ba Swe played a lead ing p a r t in a s t r ik e on -the o i l . f ie ld s Which.gave b i r th to th e Burma Trade" Union Congress (BTUC). From the f i r s t days o f the war. บ Kyaw.Nyein took th e le a d in o rgan ising .a r e s i s ­tance movement, f i r s t ■a g a in s t the Japanese arid subsequently ag a in s t the B r i t is h re-occupation .' ' Aung San was in command of th e Burma fo rces under, th e Japanese, and บ Nu became, even i f r e lu c ta n tly , a member of บ Ba Maw's Japanese-sponsored government b u t used h is p o s i t io n a n d in fluence t o .a s s i s t and s h e l te r th e re v o lu tio n a r ie s . Most of the o th e r lead ers formed the hard core of the People*ร R evolutionary P arty which grew out o f th 6 re s is ta n c e movement;

When Aung San decided th a t th e time was approaching fo r an organised r is in g ag a in s t th e Japanese, he obtained the cooperation o f th e lead ers of the R evolutionary P arty and the mass o rg an isa tio n s under th e i r c o n tro l, which, to g e th e r w ith o th e r n a t io n a l is t elem ents, he welded to g e th e r in the A n ti- fa s c is t O rganisation (AFO) subsequently re-named the A n ti- fa s c is t People * ร Freedom League (AFPFL). When th e Communists formed a d is t in c t p a r ty and then broke w ith Aung San, most of th e remaining lead ers of the re s is ta n c e movements began to c a i l them selves S o c ia l is ts and s e t about forming a S o c ia l is t P a rty , choosing as th e i r P resid en t Thakin l^ya, the fo u n d er'o f the ABPO which by th i s time he had handed over to Thakin Tin.'For Aung San the AFPFL rep resen ted a s in g le n a tio n a l f ro n t , and he was re lu c ta n t to id e n tify i t w ith any one p o l i t i c a l formula and averse from recognizing d i s t in c t p o l i t i c a l p a r t ie s w ith in th e League,' so th a t the S o c ia l is t P arty remained more o r le s s submerged. The a ssa ss in a tio n of Aung San l e f t บ Nu as the acknowledged and resp ec ted head of the AFPFL, b u t he shared and in h e r ite d the unw illingness of Aung San to recognize the S o c ia lis ts as a sep ara te p a r ty w ith in the common n a t io n a l i s t1 movement' which the AFPFL was intended to re p re se n t. He never became a member of the inner group of S o c ia l is t lead ers who co n tro lled the mass o rg an isa tio ns on which the AFPFL so la rg e ly depended fo r popular support throughout th e ' country . On the o th e r hand, among the S o c ia l is ts , d esp ite th e i r venera­t io n fo r บ Nu from co llege days and th e i r g ra titu d e fo r h is p ro te c tio n a g a in s t the Japanese, th e re was a la te n t fe e lin g th a t he was not re a l ly one of them because he had not f u l ly shared the p e r i l s and hardships of the re s is ta n c e movement nor con trib u ted in sweat and blood to the c re a tio n o f the AFPFL which they tended to regard as p e c u lia r ly th e i r own c h ild .

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Aung San had come to the f ro n t as a m ilita ry , .leader.. On‘.the re tu rn o f the B r i t is h the -Burmese fo rces were disbanded. A.mg San recognized th e .p o l i t i c a l udngers of tu rn in g e x -g u e rilla s loose upon the:C ountry and proposed to organize them f o r s o c ia l and economic r e - h a b i l i t a t io n . He a lso needed a reserve to streng then his. hands in the n eg o tia tio n s w ith the B r i t is h . Accordingly, out of the remnants o f the; Burmese army to ge ther w ith a preponderance of new re c ru i ts he c rea ted -for th is dual purpose.the sem i-m ilita ry force which subsequently became known as the peop le1ร V olunteer O rganisation (pvo). P rim arily i t was tra in e d fo r f ig h tin g , i f th is should become necessary . The a ssassin a tio n , of Aung San removed i t s leader> and the achievement o f independence:by p eacefu l means l e f t i t .with id le hands'and ample opportunity fo r m isch ief. .'Disbandment ■■ was. resen ted , even when m itig ated by b e la ted .p ro jec ts fo r tra n s fo rm in g 'it ', in to a r e h a b i l i ta t io n corps. 'The men had been tra in e d fo r 'underground ' f ig h tin g and,-when the communists went underground, :a la rg e p roportion ' (probably about th r e e - f i f th s ) of the PVO w ith some o f th e i r top le ad e rs -; followed them. In th is emergency the Government, w ith .the b are 'n uc leu s of an army, u n tra ined and’ of doubtfu l lo y a lty , h a s t i ly re c ru i te d a m i l i t i a - (Sit-w un-dan)' to su p p re ss 'th e re b e ls . This soon d e te r io ra te d and was abo lished. In p lace of i t a new V illage Defence Force, the Pyu-saw -hti, was en ro lled in October 1955 and d id u se fu l work in holding the f i e ld open fo r the fre e conduct of th e .g e n e ra l e le c tio n s to th e le g is la tu re in 1956. A fter the e le c tio n s , i f not e a r l ie r , i t was. increasing ly ' permeated by the p a r tisa n s of p o l i t i c a l leaiaers and members of th e AFPFL. Many v illa g e defenders revealed themselves as v illa g e b u l l ie s and the- new fo rce became no le s s unpopular than i t s p redecesso rs. I t s a b o litio n was se rio u sly contemplated b u t the f in a l dec ision was to purge i t of crim inal and o ther undesirab le elements and to re c o n s ti tu te the x-emainder ■ as a S pecial Police Reserve organized by d i s t r i c t s under the command of the lo c a l Police Superin tendents. These successive v o lun teer fo rc e s , h a s t i ly re c ru ite d to meet immediate emergencies, served a u se fu l purpose in the suppression of dangerous subversive movements, bu t the government which was so feeb le as to need th e i r help was too feeb le to co n tro l them, and the consequent abuses ta rn ish ed the rep u ta tio n o f the AFPFL and weakened i t s authority.-

The composition o f the AFPFL re f le c te d i t s d iverse o rig in . The one t i e common to a l l the groups and members was opposition to fo re ig n ru le .On the attainm ent of independence th is t i e was re laxed and some minor groups, o f no s ig n ific an ce In resp ec t of numbers, broke away. P ra c t ic a l ly a l l those remaining p ro fessed some form o f s o c ia l i s t ideology, from Demo­c ra t ic Socialism to Marxism. The Burma Trades Union Congress (BTUC) favoured Marxism and l e f t the League in sympathy w ith the communist in su rre c tio n , bu t the P resid en t, บ Ba Swe, though a lso p ro fessin g a Buddhist In te rp re ta tio n of Marxism, organized the Trades Union Congress Burma (TUCB) of the unions which remained lo y a l to the League. The con­tro v e rsy which arose in connection w ith United S ta te s ' Korean p o licy led to a fu r th e r s p l i t and to the form ation o f th e Burma Workers and P easan ts ' P arty (BWPP) w ith strong communist sym pathies. Apart from these seces­sions however th e main body held to g e th e r and a t th e end of 1957 the t o t a l membership of the AFPFL was given as 1,287,290 comprising the mass o rgan isa tions and in d iv id u a l p a rty members as shown in the follow ing ta b le . 2/

2/ The Guardian (daily), January 8, 1958.- I l k -

Affiliated GroupsA ll Burma P easan ts’ O rganisation (ABPO) 550;050F edera tion of Trades O rganisations (FTO) 100,243Trades บทion Congress, Burma (TUCB) 6 0 ,58VUnited Karen O rganisation (UKL) 31*669 -

■ Burmese Women1 ร Freedom League (BWFL) 57>น5V '- ' T o ta l : '800,000.

In d iv id u a l P arty Members- Upper Burma 128,181..

C en tra l Burma . 199/309 lower "Burma ' 130,126 ,. C onstituen t S ta te s 29,67V

. 487,290 '•Total 1,287,290

In th e League as thus composed c e r ta in p o in ts deserve c a re fu l a t t e n ­t io n . บ Nu was g en era lly respec ted in s id e and o u ts id e th e League, and h is p re s tig e and p o p u la r ity co n trib u ted g re a tly to i t s s tre n g th and stand ing .But n e ith e r in s id e nor o u ts id e the League’had he any mass o rg an isa tio n or organized body of fo llow ers to support him. A part from บ Nu the leaders of the League were the surv iv ing members of the R evolutionary P arty who now c a lle d them selves and th e i r fo llow ers the S o c ia l is t P arty ; re fe ren ces to "the S o c ia lis ts " in the Government or the League u su a lly s ig n ify th is p a r t ic u la r group of ex -rev o lu tion ary le a d e rs . W ithin th is group however c e r ta in members c a r r ie d a d d itio n a l weight in v ir tu e of th e i r co n tro l over th e mass o rg an isa tio n s ; th u s , Thakin Tin was P res id en t of the ABPO and บ Ba Swe was P re s id en t o f th e TUCB. บ Kyaw Nyein had taken the i n i t i a t i v e in founding the re s is ta n c e movement, and possessed g re a t in fluence ou tside the League through h is connection w ith the co -op era tiv e movement and in d u s tr ia l development, b u t in s id e the League.h e ‘had no mass o rg an isa tio n to back him and was dependent fo r num erical support on h is own personal fo llo w in g .' Again, the peasan ts and workers o rg an isa tio n s had,been founded long before the S o c ia l is t P arty came in to ex is tence an d ,.ex cep t s o - fa r as th e i r votes were c o n tro lle d by the mass o rg an isa tio n s, to which they .belonged, the members could no t be regarded as p o l i t i c a l supporte rs ' of the S o c ia lis t group. And although some in d iv id u a l p a r ty members belonged to the con­s t i tu e n t ■ S ta te s , the S ta te s as such were no t members o f- th e League. These m atters a re s ig n if ic a n t in connection w ith i t s p o l i t i c a l c o n s t itu tio n .

Perhaps the c o n s t i tu tio n may b e s t be explained by an account of the A ll Burma N ational Convention held e a rly in 1958. The f i r s t Convention a f t e r the o r ig in a l foundation of th e League was held in December, l ybj , jus-t before ' th e a tta inm en t of independence.' Since then none had been, held ; although conventions had been contem plated, th e d is tu rb ed s ta g e of th e country and o th e r o b stac le s had caused repeated, postponement. The AFPFL and a f f i l i a t e d o rg an isa tio n s were b u i l t up on d i s t r i c t branches, coincid ing w ith th e d i s t r i c t s o f c i v i l a d m in is tra tio n . _ i t ‘ seems th a t , in theo ry , each d is t r ic t 'b r a n c h e lec te d i t s own o f f i c ia l s an d .in some cases

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e lec tio n s were held . In p ra c tic e , however, d i s t r i c t o f f i c ia ls might be appointed and removed by the c e n tra l a u th o r i t ie s , thougtrmore- o r ie s s in co n su lta tio n w ith lo c a l opinion. In 1953 th e d i s t r i c t branches of the AFPFL and of a f f i l i a t e d o rg an isa tio ns were rep resen ted by 2,178 d e lega tes. The minor S ta te s , although not.members of the League, -were in v ited to send rep re se n ta tiv e s and, where th e re were r i v a l groups w ith in a s ta te , arrangements were made fo r . th e rep resen ta tio n of both groups. In the se ttlem e n t-o f- is su e s b efore the Convention the dec ision followed the m ajo rity of v o tes . Voting power, however, was a llo c a te d in such a way as to favour the mass o rg an isa tio n s . Each in d iv id u a l member of th e AFPFL had a vote . But a member o f one of the a f f i l i a t e d o rg an isa tio ns became.auto­m atica lly a member of the AFPFL; he had one v o te "a s 'a meffiber~of th e ' a f f i l i a t e d o rg an isa tio n and another vote in h is in d iv id u a l cap ac ity as a member of the AFPFL. o th e r ra th e r com plicated d e ta i ls gave a fu r th e r advantage to th e members of a f f i l i a t e d o rg an isa tio n s . As shown above, the members of a f f i l i a t e d o rg an isa tio ns had a num erical m ajority, of n early two to one. over the o ther members, and by th i s system of p lu ra l vo ting they had a voting m ajo rity of n ea rly fou r to one, while the ABPO taken alone very nearly commanded a m ajo rity of the v o tes.

A huge temporary Assembly H all provided sea tin g accommodation fo r some 50,000 people and, as i t was open a l l round, o u ts id e rs could watch the proceedings; the audience on the f i r s t day was e stim a ted -a t over 100, 000. The various branches sen t numerous delegates, along w ith th e i r o f f ic ia ls re p re se n ta tiv e s ' and each d e lega tio n was a l lo t te d i t s p lace in the h a l l . The a c tu a l business of the convention was conducted by the 260 members of the Supreme Council, who were en tru s ted w ith vo ting on b eh a lf of the o rg an isa tio ns and branches which they rep resen ted . The Executive Committee of 15 members s a t on a d a is fac ing the audience and- th e remaining 245 members of th e Supreme Council occupied the f ro n t rows in the h a l l .At the opening session the Council e lec ted a sup er-cab in e t o f f i f te e n members, whose fun c tion i t was to arrange fo r the e le c tio n of th e P resid en t fo r the coming year. Fourteen nominations were received , a l l in favour of บ Nu, who was thereupon e lec ted โท.thou t c o n te s t. บ Nu then , as P resid en t, nominated f i f t e e n members to th e Executive Council. His nomina­tio n s were accepted w ithout controversy and f iv e a d d itio n a l members were co-opted. A fter the completion of o th e r form al business the proceedings c losed w ith an address by บ Nu. Rumours had long been cu rren t o f d iscord a t high le v e ls and many people were apprehensive o f tro u b le during the convention. Yet i t seemed th a t a s p i r i t o f compromise and good w il l had p rev a iled , and not im possible th a t , as the lead ers of the League had o ften p re d ic te d , i t would ru le Burma fo r another fo r ty y ea rs. Yet w ith in th ree months i t was dead.

Nowadays i t i s g en era lly recognised th a t economic a c t iv i t i e s must be reg u la ted in the in te r e s t of so c ia l w elfa re , b u t a lso th a t reg u la tio n s fo r th is purpose m u ltip ly offences which cannot e a s ily be d etec ted and proved. I t was to deal w ith such m atters and w ith co rrup tion in general th a t a Bureau of S pecia l In v es tig a tio n (BSl) was c rea ted in December, 1951*When th e fo llow ers o f p o l i t i c a l lead ers were prosecuted by the BSI, they looked to th e i r patrons fo r p ro te c tio n and one l in e of defence was th a t the Bureau was being used fo r p a rty purposes. Even w ith in the S o c ia l is t group th e re was a lready im perfect sympathy between some of the leaders and such charges engendered f r ic t io n . The general e le c tio n of 1956 brought m atters to a head. The AFPFL gained an imposing v ic to ry as regards the

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number o f s e a ts , b u t th e combined opposition obtained n early h a lf (about h6 p e r c e n t)”of the to ta l-v o te s c a s t . F ru s tra tio n , and-, disappointm ent were la rg e ly responsib le , fo r the reaction* b u t u Nu a t t r ib u te d th e u n a s t is r -. fa c to ry r e s u l t t o ; the. abuse .o f th e i r power, by the subord inates and depen-1 dents of .the AFPFL and to r iv a lry between lo c a l fa c tio n s . A ll th e lead ers were h onestly concerned to p reserve the Union.of Burira and b e lie v e d -th a t fo r. th i s purpose th e su rv iv a l o f the AFPFL was the fundamental co n d ition .But they d if fe re d as..to how i t s . su rv iv a l could be ensured. . บ Nu held th a t w ithout d ra s t ic ac tio n to purge th e p a rty i t w ould.die a stiam eful.i f [I lin g e r in g death.from th e can ce r,o f co rrup tio n , o th e rs .h e ld th a t th e" remedy was more dangerous than the d isease ; i t would e n ta i l a major opera­t io n and the p a t ie n t would d ie under the surgeon’ร k n ife . The purge would d is c re d i t the patrons of those found g u il ty and would d estro y th e i r in fluence through th e i r in a b i l i ty to p ro te c t th e i r c l i e n t s . Even i f the A FPFL ,still survived in name, ■ i t would no longer ibe the AFPFL which the S o c ia l i s t le ad e rs had founded and in which they held a m ajo rity in ,th e ; in ner c i r c l e .

. u Kyaw Nyein was the most vehement exponent of th i s view, p a r t ly perhaps because he diagnosed the s i tu a t io n more c le a r ly .th a n h is co lleag u es, b u t a lso because he f e l t th a t he h im self was the le ad e r o f whom บ Nu c h ie f ly wanted to be r id . บ Nu proposed to re s ig n tem porarily from th e Prem iership in order to conduct t h e ;purge. บ Kyaw Nyein .in te rp re ted h i s .a c tio n as a- device to o b ta in so le .an d supreme power. In th e heated exchanges in .th e Executive .Council during the las.t few m eetings in which บ Nu explained h is views, บ Kyaw Nyein "b lu rted out th a t he kn£W•บ Nu-s .o b jec t was to f in d f a u l t w ith th e S o c ia l i s t le a d e rs ." บ Nu held to h is purpose and a t th e end of-June 1956 obtained the re lu c ta n t approval o f the Council to h is re s ig n a ­tio n fo r one year. This marks the occasion on.which th e in te rn a l s t r a in on the machinery of th e League f i r s t caused an open r i f t . ’ .

บ Nu’ร re s ig n a tio n was immediately follow ed by an exchange of l e t t e r s w ith บ Kyaw Nyein vhich have recen tly .b een .published. '3 / In A pril, 19^9* the S o c ia l is ts group had resigned, from th e Government in .o rd e r to . . f a c i l i ta te a re c o n c il ia t io n between บ Nu and h is c r i t i c s . บ Kyaw Nyein d id not r e f e r to th is in c id en t in h is l e t t e r b u t it.m ay have sown seeds o f.su sp ic io n th a t germ inated in th e p arliam en tary e le c tio n s o f 1951-52, when tie claim s to ..have rio ticed in d ic a tio n s th a t บ Nu. wished to break th e power o f the S o c ia lis ts .. This fe e lin g had been re in fo rced by the .ru ling of ,u Nu th a t members of the government Should be debarred from o ff ic e in the mass o rg an isa tio n s from which they derived th e i r s tren g th ; w ithout th is support they would .no longer be ab le .to p u t up e ffe c t iv e opposition a g a in s t him and tie would have.m atters a l l h is own way. F u rth e r , 'บ Nu had aimed to d iv ide the S o c ia lis t.g ro u p by tak ing advantage o f the fac tio ns, to s e t one S o c ia lis t, le ad e r a g a in s t ano ther. Again^ he had t r i e d ;to p ac ify the r iv a ls by appoin ting to the key p o s itio n of General S ecre ta ry in th e AFPFL a man who belonged to n e ith e r group and was no t even a member of th e ‘S o c ia l is t p a r ty — a device t h a t would ensure a balance of power.'between them by making them a l l pow erless, u Nu's rec k less d isreg ard o f the in te r e s t of the AFPFL, or even h is d e lib e ra te -in ten tio n to destro y i t , ' could be seen from h is a r b i t r a r y se ttlem en t of a d ispu te in a lo c a l branch when, in s te a d of a ttem pting to smooth out p riv a te d i f f e r e n c e s ,1he had summarily dism issed' a l l the fa c tio n s ;, and a g en era l - purge along these l in e s would le av e .th e AFPFL in r u i n s . - บ. Kyaw Nyein s ta te d

'

3/ The Guardian (daily), May 6rl0, 1958*

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th a t บ Nu had e sp ec ia lly charged-the B5I to in v e s tig a te the conduct o f h is subord inates and had accused him person ally of using h is in fluence in con­nection w ith sa le s of r ic e to ra ise ' funds fo r the S o c ia l is t Party ; he th e re fo re be lieved th a t the a tta c k on corrup tion was a cover fo r an attem pt "to expose him as a -man who employed co rrup t people and th e re fo re a corrup t man h im se lf," and by th is means d rive him out of p o l i t i c s . บ Nu proposed to res ig n o ff ic e te m p o ra r ily / b u t whiat would happen on h is re tu rn? Would, he f in d h is former colleagues g u ilty ? Under the wide d e f in it io n of m is­conduct in the Prevention of Corrupt P rac tice s Act, they might not improbably be caught by i t fo r anything they had done or not done, even although ac tin g in q u ite good f a i th . A ll the lead ers of th e AFPFL must go in fe a r of บ Nu, and he could see only one in te rp re ta t io n of h is ta c tic sT

"You a re working-•(บ Kyaw Nyein w rote) to g e t out o f the AFPFL/' Executive- and th e d i s t r i c t lead ersh ip of the League, a l l S o c ia l i s t leaders and to f i l l th e i r p laces w ith people who w il l acknowledge a lleg ian ce to you only. You are moving to make the AFPFL your own o rg an isa tio n , and then you w il l s e t up a Government of your own, th a t i s to say, minus S o c ia l is ts , in which you a re supreme."

- บ Nu re p lie d th a t , fo r th e most p a r t , บ Kyaw Nyein'ร charges were vain imaginings and unworthy s u s p ic io n s ; ' the high o f f i c ia l s to 'w hose p rosecution บ Kyaw Nyein had re fe r re d were บ Nu's men ra th e r than บ Kyaw N yein 's . As regard the improper sa le of r ic e , he had heard บ Kyaw N yein 's explanation and although not s a t i s f ie d w ith i t , had thought b e s t to l e t the m atter drop.

I t was not u n t i l the p u b lic a tio n of th is correspondence th a t the f i r s t crack in the framework of th e AFPFL was c le a r ly e:<posed to the o u te r world.บ Nu had resigned , bu t harmony s t i l l seemed to p re v a il in the inner counsels. บ Ba Swe became Prime M in ister w ith บ Kyaw Nyein and Thakin Tin a s s is t in g him as D eputies, each w ith f u l l powers w ith in h is own sphere. บ Ba Swe announced th e achievement of in te rn a l peace as h is main o b jec tiv e , and th is was a m atter on which a l l were agreed. His tenure of o ff ic e , i t was sa id , "gave the country a sense of p la c id i ty ." But s t i l l w aters run deep, and beneath the surface th e re were v io le n t opposing c u rren ts . บ Nu had taken leave fo r one year, b u t he came to b e liev e th a t th e re was a p lo t to p re ­vent h is re tu rn . Formerly some d isg ru n tled Members of Parliam ent had sug­gested th a t he would be le s s dangerous as P resid en t than as Prime M in ister, bu t then บ Kyaw Nyein came to h is a ss is ta n c e by a llay in g d isco n ten t; now, he b elieved , บ Kyaw Nyein was h is c h ie f adversary . Before h is re s ig n a tio n บ Kyaw Nyein had warned him th a t h is co lleagues, even w ith the c le a re s t conscience, would be apprehensive as to th e consequences of h is re tu rn .Now he was given to understand th a t th e re was a p lo t ag a in s t him. "When I wished to resign" he sa id , "they did not want me to go; b u t when I proposed to re tu rn , they d id not want me to come b a c k . . . I f I d id not come back, a l l th a t I had done fo r the government during the p a s t ten years would have gone to w aste." hj Not u n n a tu ra lly , in view of the บ Kyaw N yein 'ร warning, he was prone to b e liev e in the ex istence of a conspiracy and to regard บ Kyaw Nyein as head co n sp ira to r. He ‘came to b e liev e th a t the p lo t had been defeated by Thakin Tin and Thakin Kyaw Tun, the M in ister fo r A gricu lture who was a lso General S ecre tary o f th e Executive Council. Although he had taken leave fo r a year he decided a t end o f e ig h t months, to re tu rn in time fo r the February session of Parliam ent. The conspiracy has been denied,~kj The Guardian (daily), May 10 a'nd June 10, 1958*

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b u t/ a p a rt from บ. Ku*ร b e l ie f in i t , no exp lanation of h i s (premature re tu rn has ever been made p u b lic . On the o ther hand no o bstac le seems to have b e e n .se t .up to h inder h is re tu rn . บ Ba ร}-re, i t .was, sa id , had 1.' "admirably f i l l e d the gap u n t i l บ Ku f e l t f re e to re tu rn " and when he stepped down, Burma .could f e e l sure th a t he did so in-accordance w ith h is cwn wish-and th a t o f the m ajo rity w ith in the AFPFL. 5/ บ Nu's re tu rn seem ed.at the t in e to have passed o ff as smoothly as h is 'r e s ig n a t io n , ' y e t now i t stands out c le a r ly as the second.m ilestone on the downward path .

At th e February sess io n , on the re s ig n a tio n of บ Ba SWe: th e re were twelve nominations fo r the vacant o ff ic e o f Prime M in is te r ,. a l l in favour of U.Nu,- and he was e lec te d w ithout c o n te s t. บ Kyaw M ein 'and Thakin Tin were jo ined by บ Ba Swe as a th i r d Deputy Prime M in is te r.' Under the'new government, the su rface s t i l l appeared u n ru ffled . Yet the in c id en ts in connection w ith บ Nu-' ร re tu rn added fu e l to th e b a re ly la te n t an tip a thy between บ KyaW:Nyein and Thakin Tin,; w ith บ Kyaw Tun as a p a r t is a n of Thakin Tin and .a sp e c ia l o b je c t o f su sp ic ion to บ Kyaw Nyein; below the su rface both s id es were re c ru i t in g th e i r fo rces fo r a t r i a l ' of s tre n g th in th e overdue A ll Burma N ational Congress. This met on January 29, 1958 in th e la rg e open space round the. Peace Pagoda re c e n tly e rec ted by the AFPFL Government-in the o u ts k ir ts o f Rangoon to c e le b ra te the 2 ,500th year of th e Buddhist e ra . The b usiness procedure has a lready been summarized b u t, f o r an understanding of the course of events a t the convention and subse­quent, i t i s necessary to f i l l in some of .the d e ta i l s .

บ Ba Swe was charged w ith superv ising the genera l .arrangements but th e M aster of Ceremonies พas บ Tha Khin, M in is te r fo r Home A ffa irs and the candidate of th e ICyaw Nyein group fo r the p o st o f General S ecre tary to the new Executive Committee in p lace of the incumbent, บ Kyaw Tun.' As each d e lega tio n a rr iv e d w ith song and dance and i t s banner f ly in g , ..it was .shown in to i t s a l lo t t e d p lace w ith in the H all. P rov ision had been made fo r food and lodging; Burmans l ik e to take th e i r business g a ily and th ere were th e a t r ic a l .performances and o ther side-shows; th e re was a p o lic e co u rt, in case the fun or p o l i t i c a l fe rv ou r should lead to a d istu rbance of the peace; and th e re .was the pagoda fo r s p i r i tu a l refreshm ent and as a reminder th a t th e AFPFL Government devoutly supported the n a tio n a l r e l ig io n . The com­b in a tio n o f.g rav e and gay was very Burmese and a trium phant i l l u s t r a t io n of th e ' o rganizing a b i l i t y of Burmans in m atters which they understood and in which they were se r io u s ly in te re s te d .

The proceedings opened w ith a sh o rt speech by u Ba Swe, who adm itted with r e g re t . th e sounds and signs o f d isco rd w ith in the League/ c a llin g on a l l the members to r e s i s t dev isive in fluences and p reserve i t s un ity ; he h im self would devote a l l h is energy to working fo r harmony b u t, i f necessary , he.would l iv e up to h is sob riq ue t o f "Tiger" a g a in s t any one responsib le fo r fo s te r in g d issen sio n . บ Nu follow ed w ith a long speech which had a lready been .approved, a f t e r c a re fu l study, by the Executive Committee. I t seems to have been addressed not merely to the d elega tes and th e huge audience w ith in hearing , bu t to the country in genera l and e sp ec ia lly to comrades underground' and th e i r .aboveground a s so c ia te s . The p o l i t i c a l atmosphere was tinged w ith Marxism and some of th e lead e rs on the dais s t i l l c a lle d themselves M arxist even i f no longer unquestioning fo llow ers of Marx. บ Nu aiped to show th a t Marx was not an in f a l l i b l e guide, th a t h is doc trine5/ The Guardian (daily), March 3, 1957*

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needed adap ta tio n to time and circum stances and could not be r ig id ly app lied in Burma. Both Marxism and s ta te Socialism im plied a u to c ra tic d ic ta to rsh ip which was .uncongenial to the Burman temperament. The goal of the AFPFL was n a tio n a l u n ity w ith in a S o c ia l is t s ta te , b u i l t up on .the p rin c ip le of p o l i t i c a l democracy by the fre e consent of a un ited people.The proceedings were .formal, bu t th e i r in te n tio n was to f o s te r among the delegates the s p i r i t of compromise which had a lready been accepted by the le ad e rs , and to c re a te a favourable clim ate fo r the c r i t i c a l decision o f the follow ing day.

Everything tu rned on the e le c tio n of the Supreme Council. I f the- ABPO under Thakin Tin and the FTO under ซ, Pan Myaing (M in ister fo r Local Government and a p a r tis a n of Thakin Tin) should exerc ise th e i r f u l l voting s tre n g th , they could o b ta in co n tro l over th e Supreme Council and th is would in e v ita b ly mean the d is ru p tio n of the League, as i t would enjoy f u l l l e g i s ­la t iv e , executive and a d m in is tra tiv e a u th o rity u n t i l the next n a tio n a l convention. The votes were taken a t the morning session and, when the r e s u l t was announced in th e a fternoon , th e re was a fe e lin g of general r e l i e f th a t the AFPFL had survived the c r i s i s . The new inner cab ine t of f i f te e n members was f a i r ly rep re se n ta tiv e of the r iv a l fa c tio n s and included one or two members who had not p rev iously been id e n t i f ie d w ith e i th e r fa c tio n or even w ith p o l i t i c a l a c t iv i t i e s . I t showed th a t among

- the members and mass o rg an isa tio ns the s p i r i t of compromise ac tu a tin g the lead ers had p rev a iled . In re tro s p e c t i t may be s ig n if ic a n t th a t the f i f te e n names d id no t include บ Kyaw Tun, the S ecretary-G eneral of the exp iring Executive Council bu t did. include the r iv a l candidate fo r th is p o s t, บ Tha Khin; a t the tim e, however, th is does not seem to have a t t r a c te d much a t te n t io n .

The next is su e , the e le c tio n of a new P re s id en t, was a foregone con­c lu s io n . As a lready mentioned, the fou rteen nominations were a l l in favour of บ Nu who was e lec te d w ithout a c o n te s t. In th e next s tage , th e appo in t­ment of a new Executive Council o f twenty members, the in i t i a t i v e re s te d with บ Nu, who nominated f i f te e n members, th e o ther f iv e p laces being f i l l e d by co-op tion . Among the nominated members seven u ltim a te ly jo ined the รพe-Nyein group b u t the balance was made even among the co-opted members w ith ten members on e i th e r s id e . I t should be noted, however, th a t as y e t th e re were ท๐ s id e s , and th a t i t was s t i l l uncerta in which way some of the members, including u Ba Swe h im self, would go i f i t should become necessary to choose s id e s . บ Nu nominated as Vice P resid en ts บ Ba Swe, บ Kyaw Nyein and Thakin Tin, and as T reasurer บ Tin (the M inister fo r Trade Development and form erly Finance M in ister and g en era lly respected fo r h is age and in te g r i ty .)

So f a r a l l was p la in s a i l in g . The only c o n tro v e rs ia l appointment was th a t of General S ecre tary ; w ith the balance o f power between the r iv a l groups u n certa in , th is p o s t was of excep tional im portance. บ Nu b e liev in g th a t the former incumbent, (บ Kyaw Tun) had supported him a g a in s t the o ther S o c ia l is t le ad e rs , wished to r e ta in h is se rv ic e s . The Kyaw Nyein group, vho b elieved th a t บ Kyaw Tun had m isrepresented them to บ Nu, stron g ly re s is te d th is appointment and urged the claim s of บ Tha Khin, th e Home M inister and a s to u t p a r tis a n of Y Kyaw Nyein. Rumors were w idely cu rren t th a t บ Kyaw Nyein and some of h is fo llow ers th rea ten ed , i f บ Kyaw Tun were appointed, to form a new S ocial Democratic P arty though w ithout breaking away from th e League, and apparen tly i t was only through the

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in fluence of บ Ba Swe w ith the 'm alcon ten ts t h a t th i s design was abandoned. F inally 'a 'com prom ise was arranged, •บ Kyaw Tun being appointed1 as S ecretary and บ Tha' Khin 'as J o in t S ecre ta ry . I t was a lso ' a sse r te d th a t th i s ' a rrange­ment was accepted oniy on the understanding th a t บ Kyaw Tun would'Vacate the' o ff ic e w ith in a couple of months. 6/ '■

A ll the seriou s business was then over. In h is c lo sin g speech บ Nu p aid t r ib u te s to the th ree V ice-P residen ts , บ Ba Swe, บ Kyaw Nyein and Thakin Tin fo r th e i r good work, and urged them to co-operate in promoting the w elfare of the country and to discourage r iv a lry among th e i r follow ers in lo c a l p o l i t i c s . The AFPFL had survived the convention^ bu t never before had the in te rn a l s tre s s e s been so c le a r ly v is ib le .

That the AFPFL was s t i l l alm ost beyond challenge so long as even form al u n ity was p reserved was soon demonstrated in the e le c tio n s fo r the Rangoon Corporation when the AFFFL candidates gained a l l b u t one of the th i r ty - th r e e S ea ts. But th is was sh o rtly follow ed by new signs of tro u b le . D espite the a lleg ed understanding th a t บ Kyaw Tun would r e t i r e ; he s t i l l remained in o ff ic e , and on March 29 th e Executive Council decided to summon' a meeting of the Supreme Council to d ea l, among o ther m atte rs , w ith p roposals fo r changcs in the Executive Council appointed a t the convention. Another ominous symptom a t th e same meeting was a d ec ision to c rea te a new mass o rg an isa tio n under the c o n tro l of บ Kyaw Nyein. These mass o rgan isa­tio n s (country-wide and in o rig in n o n -p o li t ic a l , or a t le a s t non -p artisan ) were the main p i l l a r s of the AFPFL, but th e i r use fo r p a rty p o l i t i c s was as Aung San and บ Nu had contended, a danger th a t would drag i t down, because, r iv a l p o l i t ic ia n s could use them fo r th e i r ovm in te r e s t ag a in s t one ano ther. The re s ig n a tio n of o ff ic e in th ese o rg an isa tio n s by members o f the government had been p u b lic ly announced, b u t i t i s now c le a r th a t the re s ig n a tio n s were unw illing and, presumably, not accepted by the o rg an isa tio ns concerned. The new mass o rg an isa tio n would increase the danger. Formerly the Union Youth O rganisation , d e b i l i ta te d by s t r i f e between two r iv a l lead ers (both members of th e AFPFL), had succumbed to . • Communist in fluence and had been d isso lved in October 1957- There s t i l l survived a S o c ia l is t Youth O rganisation , b u t th is was not recognized by . th e AFPFL. The defunct Union Youth O rganisation was now to be rep laced . by an AFPFL Youth movement, open to a l l youths between th e ages of 16 and 36; members of th e former Union Youth and S o c ia l is t Youth would be adm itted as in d iv id u a l members. The Chairman of the C en tra l Committee fo r organising the new movement was Y Kyaw Nyein; the two Vice-Chairmen were among h is c lo s e s t a l l i e s in th e Cabinet and the two s e c re ta r ie s were Parliam entary S ec re ta rie s in h is own group. The obvious exp lanation was th a t บ Kyaw Nyein aimed to streng then h is p o s itio n 'th ro u g h th e support of a body which would counterbalance the o the r mass o rg an isa tio ns in th e AFPFL.

But บ Nu had a lready taken ac tio n in d ic a tin g th a t he meant to purge the AFPFL of p a ra s i te s , even i f i t should wreck the League and b ring about h is dow nfall. On March 14 he au thorized the f i r s t o f a s e r ie s of mass a r r e s ts , which were soon extended from Rangoon Town .to two adjacent d i s t r i c t s . In a p re ss conference in A pril he revealed th a t 51 people had been a rre s te d in the Rangoon area and 179 and 226 re sp e c tiv e ly in the o ther d i s t r i c t s . He repud ia ted th e suggestion th a t th e a r r e s ts had been d ic ta te d by p a rty b ia s and claim ed th a t booh fa c tio n s in th e AFPFL had been tre a te d6/ The Guardian (daily), February 3> 1958»

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im p a rtia lly ; many of บ Kyaw N yein 's fo llow ers had been a rre s te d in one d i s t r i c t , b u t man,y o f-บ.Kyaw Tun's fo llow ers-in .,the o ther d i s t r i c t .Those a rre s te d included leading members in Thakin .T in 's ABPO, e lec ted o f f i c ia ls o f high standing in the new democratic lo c a l councils formed under th e guidance of Thakin Tin, and many outwardly re sp e c ta b le . indepen­dent members of the AFPFL.

A second l in e of a tta c k on co rrup tion , made pub lic a t the same tiipe, was a d ire c tiv e fo r retrenchm ent in the pub lic se rv ice , contain ing the f ig u re s c ite d above regard ing the number of employees. The retrenchm ent programme embodied e ig h t p o in ts . The number of m in is tr ie s was to be reduced; departments were, so f a r as p o ss ib le , to be in teg ra ted w ith the m in is tr ie s ; the tendency to s e t up independent departments was to be • elim inated; the number o f boardsj co rpo ra tion s, commissions, e t c . , was to be reduced; th e number of-.employees o f such, o rg an isa tio ns was to be cu t down; departments perform ing s im ila r functions were to be amalgamated; the number of m otor-cars a ttached to semi-government in s t i tu t io n s ' was to be reduced; and the number o f branch o ff ic e s in d i s t r i c t headquarters was' to be dim inished. In a l l th e re was to be a reduction o f 25/3 in the number of employees in the pub lic se rv ic e s . Most o f the d efec ts in the adm inis­tra tio n ,.to which the o rd ers drew a tte n tio n had been recognized fo r some years by the o f f i c ia ls them selves and had been emphasized by experts c a lle d in , to help in th e re v is io n of ad m in is tra tiv e procedure, and th ere had been various su g g estio n s .fo r rem edies. But new a c t iv i t i e s were con tinu a lly being undertaken; i t was' much e a s ie r to invent new m achinery' and to employ more men than to re a d ju s t the old machinery and to cu t down superfluous personnel. The proposed retrenchm ent was very d es ira b le and, in design, im p a rtia l. But i t s b e n e f ic ia l e f fe c ts would depend la rg e ly on the manner in which i t was conducted ,' and th e mere p ro je c t of retrenchm ent was enough to cause a panic among a l l p o l i t ic ia n s who looked to a re tin u e of follow ers fo r support.

The th i r d s tep marked the p a rtin g o f the ways. บ Tha Khin, as Home M inister and Chairman of the Defence Committee, was o f f i c i a l ly responsib le for the mass a r r e s t s . บ พน rep eated ly exonerated him from blane in con-' nection w ith them: he "had not been wanting in any way, or committed any m istake." But บ Nu doubted whether the m il i ta ry and c i v i l p o lice Would hold firm under p ressu re and, in view of the r is in g ten s io n , he decided to take personal charge of the Home M in istry . He has s ta te d th a t on A pril 22 he had come to the conclusion th a t he could no longer hold the two fa c tio n s to g e th er; he f e l t compelled to choose h is -s id e and chose th a t of Thakin Tin and บ Kyaw Tun on the ground th a t they had supported him in the p lo t which, he be lieved to have been in s tig a te d by บ Kyaw Nyein. He acquainted Thakin Tin w ith h is d ec ision and on the follow ing day he informed บ Ba Swe, whose p leas fo r re -co n s id e ra tio n he re s is te d .

At th a t time บ Tha Khin had l e f t fo r C alcu tta as head of G trad e m ission; he was re c a lle d , b u t did not le a rn o f the in te n tio n to remove him from the Home O ffice u n t i l h is a r r iv a l on A pril 25. u Nu o ffered him another im portant m in istry b u t, not u n n a tu ra lly , he refused the o ffe r and resigned from the Government. A pparently บ Nu had intended to explain h is d ec is ion a t th e โ/eekly meeting of the Executive Council but the news had leaked prem aturely and the meeting, from which a l l th ree Deputy Prime M inisters and. บ Tha Khin were absen t, passed o ff q u ie tly .I t s proceedings, however, were not w ithout p o l i t i c a l s ig n ific an ce ; i t

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accepted a p roposal to f a c i l i t a t e arrangements fo r the re sp ree n ta tio n of u Kyaw N yein 'ร AFPFL Youth a t th e forthcoming convention o f the Supreme Council, and i t debarred from enrollm ent in the AFPFL persons expelled from th e c o n s titu e n t o rg an isa tio n s , and v ice versa , thereby excluding p a r tis a n s expelled during the rec e n t'p u rg e s . บ Kyaw Nyein was a t 't h e time In Arakan and out of co n tac t w ith recen t developments u n t i l h is - re tu rn on the 27th. The Prime M in ister d iscussed the s i tu a t io n w ith ;him on A p ril 28, and they-agreed th a t th e r iv a l fa c tio n s should .con tinue as sep ara te o rg an isa tio ns w ith in the AFPFL u n t i l th e issu e could be.decided in Parliam ent; meanwhile th e re should be no more changes in the Govern­ment and no fu r th e r mass a r r e s t s . Another in c id en t of p o l i t i c a l s ig n i f i ­cance on the same day was the postponement of retrenchm ent fo r :six months.On A pril 29 th e s p l i t was o f f i c i a l ly announced in a b roadcast-by บ.Nu.

There were s t i l l suggestions from one o f the M in is te rs , th a t he and some of h is co lleag u es, includ ing บ Ba รire, had not y e t committed them­selves f in a l ly to บ Kyaw Nyein and so f a r m ight be regarded as n e u tra l.But in th e Executive C ouncil,- a t i t s next weekly meeting--on May 3i the: two groups f in a l ly decidcd on sep ara tio n and .appointed a Leaders' Couanitr te e c o n sis tin g of บ Nu, บ Ba Swe, u Kyaw Nyein and Thakin Tin to arrange th e term s, meanwhile the M in isters in both groups vould remain in o ff ic e .The lead ing o f f ic e rs of th e Executive Committee,, t h e “P res id en t บ Nu, the; T reasurer บ Tin; and the General S ecre tary บ Kyaw Tun. a l l belonged to th e - Nu-Tin s id e , w hich‘accord ing ly remained in possession o f the o ff ic e a n d - ; a s s e ts , whereas the Swe-Nyein group had to s e t up a sep ara te o ff ic e in the ; q u a rte rs of บ Ba Swe's TUCB, and i t ob ta ined ,an in ju n c tio n a g a in s t the . Nu-Tin group p ro h ib it in g use by them of AFPFL Funds.

On May 5. the P re s id en t summoned an., ex trao rd inary m eeting of the Chamber of Deputies fo r June 8 , and both s id es devoted th e i r energies to re c ru i t in g support fo r the impending co n tes t in P arliam ent. I t was soon ev iden t th a t a m ajo rity of the AFPFL members of Parliam ent would follow บ Ba Swe, and, th a t i f they were to decide the m atte r, บ Nu would be defeated . .But the NUF block announced th e i r sympathy w ith บ Nu and on May 11 published th e i r d ec ision to support him. On May 25 a m ajo rity of the M.p.s rep resen tin g the c o n s titu e n t S ta te s decided in favour of บ Nu.The r e s u l t seemed to depend on the dec ision of th e opposition group from Arakan. In a meeting (May 31-June 2 ) of the Leaders' Committee appointed on May 3 nothing was decided except to summon a t an e a rly date the meeting o f the Supreme Council fo r which arrangements had been made in March.On June 4 f i f t e e n M in iste rs o f th e Swe-Nyein group resigned and บ Nu appointed a new Cabinet of only 20 members. On th e eve o f the Parliam entary session the Arakan group jo ined บ Nu who withdrew h is previous opposition to a separa te s ta te fo r Arakan. The Chamber of D eputies met on June 9 and บ Ba Swe moved a vote of non-confidence. As a l l the opposition leaders had been members of the Government u n t i l w ith in the l a s t few days, almost the only charge which บ Nu had to meet was th a t he had been responsib le fo r the sp litT He re p lie d th a t the s p l i t a lready ex is te d ; a l i th a t he had done was to give up the attem pt to hold the d isco rdan t elements to ge ther any longer. With the support of the .NUF group, the /urakan group and a m ajo rity of the members from th e c o n s titu e n t S ta te s , บ Nu ju s t managed to hold h is own. The a c tu a l vo ting f ig u re s a re ta b u la ted below:

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Groups Mu-Tin Swe-NyeinATP PET.NUF block Arakan group Shans Kachins

51kk6163322

97

9k3Chins

KayahsKarens 5T otal 127 119

บ Nu's v ic to ry by a narrow and composite m ajo rity s e t t le d the immediate issu e between th e r iv a l groups, b u t dark clouds obscured the fu tu re . Since then th e re have been fu r th e r notable developments. As regards th e two in c id en ts which formed the immediate occasion fo r the break, บ Nu had a lready on A pril 29 promised บ Kyaw Nyein th a t th e re should be no more mass a r r e s t s , and th e problem of retrenchm ent had been shelved fo r s ix months. In both groups heated s p i r i t s found r e l i e f in th e excom­m unication of opponents. On June 13 the Swe-Nyein group, w ith 136 members of the f u l l Supreme Council o f the AFPFL, e lec ted a p ro v is io n a l Executive Committee which summoned the Council fo r June 22, when บ Nu was deposed and บ Ba Swe e lec ted in h is p lace as P resid en t o f th e AFPFL; บ Nu and h is a sso c ia te s were expelled and the Swe-Nyein fa c tio n assumed the s ty le of the "S table" (subsequently the "R eal") AFPFL. On Ju ly 2 , the Nu-Tin sec tio n , c a ll in g i t s e l f the "Clean" AFPFL, expelled the Swe-Nyein group and arranged tc c a l l i t s own f u l l Congress to confirm the expulsion. On the same day บ Ba Swe expelled Thakin Tin, บ Kyaw Tun and บ Pan Myaing, (P residen t of the FTO) from the Burma S o c ia l is t P arty . บ Nu had a lready shown th a t h is im agination extended beyond the exchange of anathemas.On June 2k, a t h is f i r s t P ress Conference a f t e r the form ation of h is new Government, he had announced the proposed enactment of an Indemnity Act to ensure a t o t a l amnesty to a l l insinrgents, and a p ro je c t of a N ational Convention, where rep re se n ta tiv e s of a l l p a r t ie s (includ ing the opposition ) could d ra f t , sign and adopt a N ational C harter of Democracy.

On Ju ly 20, in p rep a ra tio n fo r the N ational Convention he inaugurated a Seminar comprising rep re se n ta tiv e s of in du stry and commerce, the pub lic se rv ices , economic and c u l tu ra l o rg an isa tio ns and th e p re ss . Some 2,000 people a ttended on the opening day to hear บ Nu expound h is views, and fo r the follow ing ten days th e re were reg u la r morning and afternoon sessions of the se c tio n a l in te r e s ts concerned. Each sec tio n in tu rn had the opportunity to rep resen t and d iscuss the d i f f i c u l t i e s which they had experienced and to le a rn something of the d i f f i c u l t i e s which the Govern­ment had encountered. บ Nu explained th a t so f a r planning had been imposed mainly from above; now he wanted to make a fre sh s t a r t by planning from below. As each session ended, the p a r tic ip a n ts were in v ite d to go home and p u t th e i r considered views in w ritin g so as to provide m a te ria l fo r th e new C harter. The Seminar la s te d u n t i l Ju ly 29* On th e 30th the second promise in the Press Conference of June 2k was f u l f i l l e d by the p u b lica tio n of a decree by the P resid en t under Section 60 o f the C onstitu ­t io n g ran ting a complete amnesty to in surgen ts (on th e surrender of th e i r arms) fo r a l l crimes committed up to th a t d ate , and covering a lso the members of p o l i t i c a l o rg an isa tio ns which had been declared unlawful; i t

124

a lso promised an indemnity fo r members of the Defence S erv ices, o ther p ub lic servan ts and a l l a c tin g under, th e ir , orderg w ho,''in-the 'perform ance o f th e i r d u tie s , had tran sg ressed the law, and had committed a c ts th a t in normal circum stances would have been c rim inal o ffen ces . The exact ... scope;and consequences o f • th is proclam ation, and i t s v a l id i ty -unless con­firm ed by the le g is la tu r e , s t i l l need c la r i f i c a t io n .

The.next im portant move was the re c o n s ti tu tio n of th e-P ub lic Services Commission as a token th a t th e Clean AFPFL in tended to l iv e up-to ' i t s t i t l e . Th3 term o f o ff ic e of the o r ig in a l Commission had re c e n tly '■ " expired; th e former Chairman was re-appo in ted bu t of the th re e o rd inary members two were rep laced by new men. P rev iously the Commission, ais a lready explained, subm itted recommendations fo r the appointment and-pro­motion o f g aze tted o f f ic e rs in government se rv ice ; now i t s scope was extended to the appointm ent, confirm ation and promotion of g azetted o ff ic e rs in the various Boards, C orporations and o th e r ; l ik e o rg an isa tio n s . Such appointments had in the p a s t 'given o p p o rtu n itie s ' fo r p o l i t i c a l jobbery, and t h i s ■extension of the scope of the Public -Services Commission had been recommended by expert ad v ise rs on a d m in is tra tiv e re -o rg a n isa tio n b u t, , so f a r as such bodies are in tended to work on business l in e s , c lo se r co n tro l over appointments and promotions by an o ffic ia l-com m ission , w ith more concern fo r compliance w ith reg u la tio n s than w ith -business e ff ic ie n c y , may tend to hamper th e i r a c t iv i t ie s T A fu r th e r s tep towards the p u r i f ic a ­t io n of p ub lic l i f e was th e reo rg a n isa tio n of th e Pyu-saw -hti v il la g e defence u n i ts . On th e same day th a t th e Chamber of D eputies met fo r the . motion, of non-confidence in บ Nu, th e proposed a b o li t io n of th is fo rce had been announced'. I t had become n o to rio u sly co rru p t, and too many of the-men were p a r ty b u l l i e s , or b u l l i e s w ithout the excuse of p a rty a f f i l i a ­t io n . Yet th e re were elements o f g re a t p o te n t ia l value in the p ro je c t ,as o r ig in a l ly conceived; a v illa g e p o lic e could p lay a u se fu l -part in the r e - h a b i l i t a t io n of v il la g e autonomy, and i t s d e fe c ts were la rg e ly due to the fa c t th a t i t had been en ro lled uoo h a s t i ly and t r i e d too h igh, and perhaps c h ie f ly to i t s entanglement in p a rty p o l i t i c s . A conference of a d m in is tra tiv e , p o lic e and m il i ta ry o f f ic e rs showed a g re a t d iv is io n of opinion, b u t f in a l ly the Government decided to s i f t out the harmful elements and to transform the remnant in to a S pecia l P o lice Reserve under the lo c a l P o lice S uperin tendents.

In August one problem, perhaps th e most momentous, s t i l l awaited a so lu tio n . Under the C o n s titu tio n ' (sec tio n 125) "The Government s h a l l p repare estim ates o f re c e ip ts and estim ates of expenditure o f the Union fo r each f in a n c ia l year, and s h a ll p re sen t them to ' the Chamber of Deputies fo r co n sid e ra tio n ." I t was very u n certa in whether บ Nu would be ab le to hold h is fo llow ers to g e th e r in th e c o n tro v e rs ia l debates in c id e n ta l to the passing of a budget. The annual budget sessio n is o rd in a r ily held in August and September. There was b a re ly time fo r a genera l e le c tio n ; th e re was grave doubt whether the fev e r h ea t o f f a c t io n a l s t r i f e would allow a p eacefu l e le c tio n ; and i f the opposition came in to power they would have no time to frame a budget and would presumably have to make the b e s t of th e departm ental d ra f t which had a lready been prepared under the former government. The e a s ie s t course was to postpone a d ec is ion and w ait on events. Accordingly the P re s id en t convened a sessio n w ith August 28 as the date fo r the meeting of the Chamber of D eputies and. September 15 fo r th e Chamber o f N a t io n a li t ie s . In mid-August the s i tu a tio n was d iscussed in conference o f a d m in is tra tiv e , p o lic e and m il i ta ry o f f i c i a l s . In every

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d i s t r i c t the lo c a l o f f ic ia ls ' were prepared to guarantee se c u rity fo r the holding of an e le c tio n h u t asked fo r time to "bring the e le c to ra l r o l l s up to d a te . In a p ress conference on August 19 the Prime M in ister announced th a t the autumn session would be cancelled-and th is was confirmed on the same day in a n o t i f ic a t io n by th e P res id en t. On the 22nd บ Nu c a lle d a meeting of the Leaders' Committee o f which nothing had been heard since June 2, and informed the opposition lead ers th a t the budget would be promulgated by P re s id e n tia l Ordinance under Section 110 o f the C onstitu ­t io n . " ■ I

An Ordinance can only be promulgated "a t a time when b o th •Chambers a re not in S ession ." Parliam ent must th e re fo re f i r s t be d isso lv ed . . Under sec tio n 84 a genera l e le c tio n fo r members of the Chamber of Deputies " sh a ll take p lace not l a t e r than s ix ty days a f te r the d isso lu tio n of the Chamber." An Ordinance must be la id before both Chambers "w ith in fo r ty - f iv e days from the date of prom ulgation th e re o f ." Section 84 provides th a t the Chamber of Deputies " s h a ll meet w ith in s ix ty days from the p o llin g day." How f a r i t w i l l be p o ss ib le to convene a sess io n ,w ith in 45 days of the prom ulgation of the Ordinance i s u n certa in , and so a lso i s the le g a l v a l id i ty of an Ordinance a f t e r 45 days when th e re i s no Parliam ent before which i t can be la id . 2 /

By the time th a t the c o n f l ic t between the two groups had reached th is stage the whole country from the P resid en t down to the coo lie on the wharves and in the f a c to r ie s and the c u lt iv a to r in the v illa g e s were embroiled in i t . The P re s id e n t 'ร ru lin g was sought w ith refe rence to the v a l id i ty of the re s ig n a tio n of h is se a t by a member of Parliam ent and fo r the decision of a p o in t in issue between th e Prime M in ister and the s ta te Councils. Legal question s, such as th ese , he could, and d id , r e fe r to the Supreme Court under sec tio n 151 of the C o n stitu tio n . But he could not so e a s ily escape the semblance of r e s p o n s ib il i ty in o ther m atters and was c a lle d on to deal w ith the use of p a r ty badges in an e lec tio n fo r the Rangoon Corporation and w ith the removal of the Corporation S ecre ta ry . In such m atters he d id not in f a c t exercise ' personal r e s p o n s ib il i ty because he was bound by the advice of the Prim e"M inister, and the orders th a t issued in h is name were in f a c t the orders of the M inister concerned. D iv in ity may hedge a King b u t does not s h e lte r a P resid en t, and he was f re e ly charged w ith p a r tis a n a c t iv i ty when in f a c t he was complying with the C o n stitu tio n . The Swe-Nyein group a lso c r i t i c i s e d him fo r canvassing on b eh alf of th e i r opponents. In response to th is charge he explained through h is P riv a te S ecre tary th e grounds fo r h is d is s a t is f a c t io n w ith some of the Swe-Nyein lead e rs , adm itted a p re fe ren ce -fo r the Nu-Tin Group, which he considered b e t te r f i t to lead the nat-ion, - and, w hile d isclaim ing a c tiv e support o f the Nu-Tin p a rty , he acknowledged h is personal in te r e s t in the Union Karen League which was linked up w ith the AFPFL.

The Supreme Court held a lo o f, so f a r as p o ss ib le , from p a rty s t r i f e .In the f i r s t days of the break between the two groups th e re had been a suggestion by บ Nu, accepted w ith some q u a lif ic a tio n by 'h is, opponents,27 On September 22 i t was announced th a t th e P re s id en t on the advice of

Prime Minister Nu, would d isso lv e the Parliam ent on September 29 and announce the Ordinance on th e 30th. (New York Times, September 23, 1958). — Editor.

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th a t the Chief Ju s tic e of the Union- should p re s id e over a' committee to enquire in to the in te g r i ty Of the" lead ers on both s id e s , h u t the Chief J u s tic e had p ru d en tly declined on the ground th a t h is f นทcti'on was' to decide le g a l issu e s and n o t p a rty d isp u tes . • The Supreme Court, however, could not evade:g iv ing a dec ision on th e two cases mentioned’ above.as. . re fe rre d to i t by th e -P re s id e n t, although these were in 'f a c t 'p a r ty . , is su e s . T heir in te rp re ta t io n o f th e law seems to have been accep ted 'w ithou t c r i t ic is m , b u t - i t i s c le a r th a t frequen t re fe ren ces of p a r ty 'd isp u te s would be l ia b le to im pair confidence in the p o l i t i c a l im p a r tia l i ty of the Judges.

As ■ reg a rd s- the c o n s titu e n t S ta te s , th e .an a ly s is of .’the voting on the non-confidence motion-shows th a t th e members rep resen tin g them were sharp ly -d iv ided in - th e i r a lle g ia n c e . When บ I-Iu form ed 'h is new C abinet- on June 4 , ' he chose h is own M in isters fo r th e S ta te s . ' Under th e .C o n s ti­tu tio n '.the M inister so appointed to rep resen t the s ta te wasi a lso the Head of the S tate.. The former M in isters f o r the Kachin and Karen S tates..had jo ined the Swe-Nyein group and บ Nu -replaced' them by M in isters who would . support- him*-: On' the s ta te C ouncils, however, th e opposition had a narrow m ajo rity . Oh th e Karen s t a t e Council, w ith 22 members, 12 jo ined .the' opposition and only 10 remained w ith •บ’ Nu; bn the Kachin s ta te Council, the o p p o sitio n .m a jo rity seems to have1 been no more than one. The ex-M inisters p ro te s te d th a t. UNu ' s s e le c tio n of a M in ister from the m inority was u n c o n s titu tio n a l a s , under th e C o n stitu tio n , he was req u ired to make h is nomination" ac tin g in c o n su lta tio n w ith the s ta te C ouncil." บ Nu po in ted out th a t under sec tio n 115 of th e C o n stitu tio n t h e ;Cabinet Was c o lle c t iv e ly re s p o n s ib le ; ' and th a t th is debarred the in c lu sio n ' of re p re se n ta tiv e s in opposition to th e Government. The M inisters took the m atter to the P resid en t and then to the Supreme Court which decided th a t the clause regarding c o n su lta tio n w ith th e s ta te Council was d ire c tiv e and not mandatory.

In th e S ta te Councils the members o f "the Cabinet of s ta te M in isters" refused to re s ig n ; had they done so , they would presumably have been re -e le c te d by th e opposition m ajo rity . This c rea ted p ra c t ic a l d i f ­f i c u l t i e s in th e conduct of the a d m in is tra tio n . In the Shan s ta te , the Head of the s ta te was req u ired " to recommend such measures as he might th in k f i t fo r promoting the' gen era l w elfare" (sec tio n 163), and to prepare th e annual budget (sec tio n 164); b u t the s ta te Council had power to approve the budget, and in a l l m atters w ith in the sphere of the s ta te Council i t s d ec is ion was b inding on th e Head of the s ta te (sec tio n 162).On th e o the r hand the executive a u th o r ity of the s ta te was vested in the Head of the s ta te , includ ing a l l m atters r e la t in g to th e recru itm en t, p ostin g and tr a n s fe r of o f f i c ia l s (sec tio n 161). Corresponding p rov isions app lied to the o th e r S ta te s . The C o n stitu tio n assumed th a t th e Head of th e S ta te would have a m ajo rity in th e s ta te Council, and a lso th a t he would be accep tab le -to th e Prime M in iste r as a member of the Union Cabinet. Where these two assumptions d id n o t hold good the consequence was a dead­lock which i t would seem th a t only' a re v is io n of the C o n stitu tio n could fo rce open. W ithin the various S ta te s , moreover, th e re were sharp lin e s o f cleavage and o ld co n tro v ers ie s th a t th e new c r i s i s re su s c ita te d . In th e Shan S ta te s th e re was a p o te n t ia l ly se riou s c o n f l ic t between the Sawbwas and th e i r su b je c ts . When the s p l i t occurred , the Shan C h iefta in s had a lready agreed w ith th e Union Government as to th e compensation to be paid fo r the relinquishm ent of th e i r t r a d i t io n a l p r iv i le g e s , b u t the

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settlement of this question, long overdue, was once again postponed, and fresh objections were' raised in some quarters to the surrender of their powers.- Again, in the States, and especially among the Kachins and Chins, the relation of chieftain and follower, patron and client (by no means obsolescent in Burma even if reinterpreted in the terms of democratic politics) was still a living force; the embers of clan feuds were smouldering, with the further possibility, even more disastrous, that clans -might forget fraternal differences, in common action against external authority.

The public services, whatever might be the personal sympathy of individual members, held by the sound tradition of loyalty to the estab­lished government, a useful heritage from the days when they supported British rule against nationalist opposition. The army, too, under wise and patriotic leadership, proved immune against political temptations;■but, as already mentioned, บ •บน was not too confident about the military and civil police. Moreover some officers of the administrative service held appointments in the Bop.rds and Corporation, where the path between loyalty to the Government and loyalty to a quasi-autonomous institution was not so clearly marked. The Directors and employees of these institu­tions also included non-officials, who in some cases held their'appoint­ment during the pleasure of the Government. The institutions were intended to give effect to the general policy of government. How far was it safe to leave them under the control of men in opposition to the Government? And how could such men be replaced by others congenial to Government without"creating a dangerous precedent for a "spoils" system and giving ground for charges of political corruption? Inevitably one consequence of the breach between the party groups was the entanglement of all these institutions in party politics.

Similar, but perhaps even more serious, was the reaction on local self-government. We have noticed that, only just before the final breach, the AFPFL gained all but one seat on the Rangoon Corporation. After the breach a majority declared in favour of the Swe-Nyein group. Two instances in which the President was called in to overrule the Swe-Nyein majority have already been mentioned. In the election in which the party badge was in dispute the Swe-Nyein group withdrew their candidate when the ruling went against them, ana then hindered the newly elected member from taking his seat. Factional rivalry in local politics in rural areas, with each side looking to its patron for protection, had been very largely responsi­ble for the rift between the leaders; now, with the leaders openly at odds, there was nothing to mitigate local quarrels. The whole machinery of local government throughout the country was endangered.

The mass organisations were split from top to bottom. One Minister, a high Executive in บ Ba Swe's TUCB went over to the Nu-Tin group and organized a new Union Labour Organiaation (ULO), which was given the repre­sentation of labour in the various official and semi-official bodies, with the natural consequence of factional fights between the members of Nu-Tin Unions and รพe-Nyein Unions. On the other hand a Minister closely asso­ciated with Thakin Tin in the land nationalisation movement joined the Swe-Nyein group. The distribution of land by local committees was certain to cause disappointment and to provide material for charges of corruption even with a united committee; with a committee divided along party lines or re-constituted along party lines, mutual recrimination, embitterment and

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violence were more l ik e ly than an agreed d is tr ib u t io n by common consent.Even the newly formed p a r t ie s were u n stab le . The. Nu-Tin government

was p a te n tly a c o a li t io n of two uneuqally yoked extremes... The sm all- Arakan group ,'-in a d d itio n to i t s common demand fo r an autonomous s t a t e / had a conservative t in g e . The NUF .included elements, th a t p ro fessed ..- communism’to th e f a r th e s t Verge o f le g a l reco g n itio n , of which some sm all groups th rea ten ed to break away because they regarded the lead ers as too m oderate. But some elem ents, no tab ly the J u s t ic e P arty w ith about ...one- th i r d of the t o t a l members, were le s s in c lin e d to p o l i t i c a l experiments, than th e lead ers of e i th e r of the two main fa c t io n s . The Swe-Nyein group was u n ited in o pposition , b u t no one could say how f a r and how long the members would hold to g e th e r i f p u t to the t e s t o f carry ing on the govern­m ent.*

To the statem ent th a t the whole Country, has been to rn by p a r ty .s t r i f e th e re would seem to be one''exception: .the Buddhist c le rg y . A.meeting, ■ apparen tly w ell-a tten ded p ro te s te d a g a in s t the reg u la tio n s in tended to streng then monastic d isc ip lin e ,- b u t t h i s had no apparent connection w ith p a r ty p o l i t i c s i ' -Some Arakanese c le rg y supported the demand fo r a sep ara te s ta te , b u t i t ' i s q u estio n ab le how f a r the m eeting was re p re se n ta tiv e of the Buddhist o rder in Arakan. In another c l e r i c a l assemblage one re so lu ­tio n exported-both p a r t ie s to a b s ta in ' from v io lence . But th e n ea res t approach to o rg an ise d .ac tiv e in te r e s t in p o l i t i c a l events was the encouragement given by a group o f lead ih g members of the Buddhist Order in Rangoon to th e In te rn a l Peace'Committee headed by Thakin- Kodaw Hmaing who, fo r two genera tions has been the forem ost le ad er o f the l i t e r a r y world in Burma and ( a t over 80) has devoted the energy o f a youth to the cause o f rec o n c ilin g th e Government and the in su rg en ts . Recently h is e f fo r ts have been rewarded by the re tu rn of the Mon reb e ls to "the demo­c ra t ic fo ld ," follow ed sh o rtly afterw ards by the PVO under th e new s ty le o f the P eop le 's Comrade P arty (pep). When the r i f t occurred, n eg o tia tio n s were in p rogress w ith Than Htun, the lead er of the Communist re b e llio n in 19^8 . Apparently h is f i r s t re a c tio n was to s t i f f e n h is terms fo r surrender o r, as he p re fe rs to pu t i t , reco g n itio n . Now he is s t i l l haggling over the terms of the amnesty. Many of h is fo llow ers have a lready "exchanged - arms fo r democracy;" not improbably some w il l s t i l l p re fe r daeo ity to democracy, even i f he comes in .

# •* * *

A p o st mortem is an enquiry in to what has happened in th e p a s t end n o t an occasion fo r sp ecu la tin g as to what may happen in the fu tu re . Yet from what has happened in the p a s t we may, i f we can ap p rec ia te i t s s ig n if ic a n c e , f in d guidance fo r th e fu tu re . This enquiry has d e a lt w ith the q u ite -re c e n t p a s t; how the machinery of government in Burma was put to g e th e r and how i t now seems to be f a l l in g a p a r t . I t has a lready sug-* The p o l i t i c a l c r i s i s en tered a new phase on September 26 when Prime

M in iste r บ Nu announced th a t he had arranged fo r General Ne Win, the Commander-in-chief of the Army, to become Prime M in iste r on October 28 and th a t . th e e le c tio n s (p rev iously planned fo r November) would be postponed u n t i l about A pril 1959* For a :f u l l e r account see th e a r t i c l e by Frank N. T rager, "The P o l i t i c a l S p l i t in Burma," Far E astern Survey, October, 1958 - - E d ito r .

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I

gested th a t, in order to appreciate the sig n ifica n ce of recent events, we must look further backwards but, in conclusion, a f in a l b r ie f retrospect may be perm issib le.

พhen. Burma gained independence, Burmans were brought for the f i r s t time in to d ir ec t contact with the v i t a l r e a l i t ie s o f the'modern world in a l l i t s a sp ects . The modern world has a long h is to ry . I t s d is t in c t iv e features originated in Europe in the 15th century when the rule o f custom under the aeg is of r e lig io n was f i r s t e f fe c t iv e ly challenged by the re-b irth o f human reason. One o f the e a r l ie s t reactions was a new impetus to the natural desire for in d iv id u al gain without, regard to so c ia l in te r e s ts . But th is a n t i- s o c ia l fo rce , a r is in g w ithin the so c ia l order was only one aspect o f a process o f s o c ia l evolu tion generating, a t the same time and as part o f the same p rocess, the moral strength not only to p rotect the so c ia l fab ric aga in st a n t i- s o c ia l elements but to incorporate them in a stronger fab ric on more secure foundations. The issu e was long in doubt through su ccessive ages o f c o n f l ic t and upheaval; the r e lig io u s wars of the 16th and 17th cen tu ries; the in d u str ia l revolu tion o f the l 8th- and 19th centuries; the French revolution ,, a sser tin g the claim s o f in d iv id u al r igh ts against so c ie ty , and the re-a sser tio n o f s o c ia l d u ties in the Russian r e v o lu t io n .. I t was the combined impact o f long years o f s t r i f e with which Burma was q u ite suddenly confronted when i t f i r s t took i t s p lace among the nations that had survived these p erilou s ord ea ls. Yet Burmans thought to gain admission to th is new world merely by pronouncing, l ik e some "Open sesame," the magic word o f independence. The productive apparatus of the world, f e r t i l i z e d by the bloodsned of four hundred years yielded a harvest o f unprecedented r ich n ess. Burmans were dazzled by the wealth and thought to share in i t , but they were strangers to the dynamic process which produced the w ealth.

Under i t s own kinds, so c ia l l i f e in Burma, as in mediaeval Europe, had been governed by custom reinforced by r e lig io n and consequently was unable to r e s i s t the western powers when they came knocking a t i t s doors in the pursu it o f gain . Under foreign ru le , the impact o f economic forces from outside released the d esire o f gain from the constra in t of custom but did not generate w ithin the so c ia l order any creative impulse able to replace the p ro tective sh ie ld o f custom u n til i t bred a reaction in the guise o f modern nationalism . When Burma became independent, the s o c ia l habits and mental outlook of the great mass o f the people were s t i l l those of the middle ages, except th at bows and arrows had given p lace to bombs and tommy-guns. Meanwhile the so c ia l fab ric had been transformed in to a factory for m aterial production in which the free play o f economic forees had debarred Burmans frcta learning how to handle the machinery, though they had learned to wreck i t by' s tr ik e s . Burmans had been taught the forms of B r itish p o l i t i c a l in s t itu t io n s , but th ese had no r ea lity even in pre-war Burma, and they had s t i l l le s s correspondence with the functions o f government in independent Burma. The task o f the new govern­ment was to weld the component peoples in to a united nation; to re-in teg ra te so c ia l l i f e from the v i l la g e upwards in an organic nation al so c ie ty ; to i n s t i l in to Burmans the d isc ip lin e of so c ia l and economic l i f e in the modern'world; and to equip Burma with the p o l i t i c a l and economic in s t i t u ­tio n s of a modern s ta te . The process was certa in to impose irksome r e s tr ic t io n s , arouse resentment and engender res ista n ce , y e t, i f only because to s ta r t w ith the Government had p r a c tic a lly no trained army, i t could not enforce the r e s tr ic t io n s without the consent of the people, even

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The magic o f independence could not bridge the gap, o f.fo u r centuries separating Burma from the .modern world. But the lead ers, p artly fe a r fu l o f disappointing the. people,, and s t i l l more perhaps concerned to demon­str a te th at Burma was a f u l l member o f the modern world, looked for short cuts to Utopia. With each new demand on th e ir energy and invention , the machinery o f government took shape under the pressure of events, and. rapid ly grew beyond control* with the fee b le means a t th e ir d isp o sa l. This rapid expansion o f the machinery was f a c i l i ta t e d , i f not stim ulated , by o ffer s o f help from .in tern ation al organisations and foreign powers, often with no very c lea r perception o f the lim ita tio n s on th e ir a b i l i t y to help , o f Burma's need for help , and on the capacity o f Burma "to accept the help .

Tnis study, however inadequate, o f the complex machinery of. govern­ment in modern Burma may perhaps suggest some u se fu l le sso n s . One conclu­sion seems unquestionable. A Communist government would attempt to impose fa r more r e s tr ic t io n s ; i t would have to employ much the same m ateria l and much the same means,, w hile the force at. i t s d isp o sa l, apart from foreign in terven tion , would be no greater.than and probably le s s than, th at which has proved in s u f f ic ie n t for the AFPFL; i t would appear then th a t Communist rule in Banna i s im practicable. .Yet. Communism i s dangerous because o f the methods which i t employs to gain con tro l and, in every aspect o f s o c ia l , economic and p o l i t i c a l reconstruction , 'there i s a need to counteract them with .sp ec ia l precautions which are apt to be disregarded because they were not needed by the lib era lism o f the n ineteenth century on which the p o l i t ic a l , in s t itu t io n s o f Burma were o r ig in a lly modelled and from which the p o l i t i c a l conceptions o f modern Burmans in great part d erive. The study may serve a lso to .show th at n ation al regeneration cannot be accom­p lish ed a r t i f i c i a l l y by the mass production o f ru les and regu la tion s, but only by fo ste r in g in the community a crea tiv e power can fin d a stronger in sp ira tion in nationalism and Buddhism.than in Communist ideology which, so far a s . i t has gained a fo llow in g , i s one aspect o f the reaction aga inst the s o c ia l d is in teg ra tio n that i t would carry a stage fu rth er.

The hydra-headed insurrectionary movement, o f which Communism i s merely one head, i s sometimes regarded as a s u f f ic ie n t explanation or excuse fo r the shortcomings o f the government. But th is is an i l lu s io n . Doubtless the in surrection s aggravated the d i f f i c u l t i e s of the government but they did not cause them. The ready resort to armed opposition was a natural, perhaps in e v ita b le , consequence o f the general dem oralisation resu ltin g from the impact o f the war on a so c ie ty in which the common t i e s o f so c ia l l i f e had been d isso lved by economic forces under the rule o f law.

Another i l lu s io n , more in s id io u s ,, i s th at the present s itu a tio n i s due in any great measure to the personal d efects o f the leaders and th e ir p etty quarrels; th at "other men would have done b etter ." They had human f r a i l t i e s , but they were faced with a super-human task; and the optimism and enthusiasm, which were almost th e ir so le a s se ts , tempted them to go* These methods are no longer d is t in c t iv e property o f the Communist Party

but are common to a l l party organizations which have learned the tr ick o f u t i l i s in g public apathy in order to gain power fo r a m inority.

when these did .not appreciate the need for. restrictions.

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ahead too f a s t and too fa r . What they achieved l i e s outside the scope of th is study which deals so le ly with th e ir attempt, with no guidance from precedent, to construct the machinery of a government that could perform the functions required o f any government in newly independent Burma. Now i t seems to have collapsed and the p e r i l o f anarchy which threatened Burma ten years ago once again looms ominously. Yet they held the-country together for ten years, and i t i s d i f f ic u l t to b e liev e th a t any group o f men, in the same circumstances and with the same lim ita tio n s , would have done b e tte r . This i l lu s io n i s in sid iou s because i t i s stim ulated by the recrim inations o f the r iv a l groups, each try in g to blame the other; and the charges and countercharges พ:!.!! reverberate with growing vehemence in the general e le c t io n with which Burma i s now faced.

The readiness to emphasize personal shortcomings and to resort to ev il-sp eak in g , ly in g and slandering breeds m alice, hatred and uncharita­b len ess , and i s e sp e c ia lly dangerous because i t tends to encourage fa ls e optimism in the a b i l i t y o f any government that may assume o f f ic e in the near future to re tr iev e the s itu a tio n . This w i l l have a t i t s d isp osa l the army b u ilt up under the la te government but, in other resp ects , i t w il l be faced with the same problem of constructing in Burma forms of government that are appropriate to i t s functions and w i l l encounter much the same d i f f i c u l t i e s , even in an aggravated form. For one o f i t s f i r s t tasks w i l l be to implement the p roject o f retrenchment, "shelved for s ix months," and to reduce the apparatus o f government and the para-govern­mental organisations w ithin the lim its o f the human resources a v a ila b le . P o lit ic ia n s have a p ro fess io n a l capacity for-tak in g the objurgations o f . th e ir opponents in a Pickwickian sense, and i t may not be beyond the bounds o f .p o s s ib i l i t y th at r iv a l lead ers, brought more c lo se ly face to face with the p erilou s consequences o f discord, may invent a formula for r ec o n c ilia tio n and th a t, in a common e ffo r t to repair the damage, a rejuvenated AFPFL may r is e l ik e a phoenix, from i t s ashes. "Judge m ildly the tasked world" was the theme f i f t y years ago of a memorable sonnet th at has a much more urgent message for the world today, and not le a s t for Burma; but i t c a l l s , in sid e and outside Burma, for an increase o f fa ith , hope and charity .September 1938

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S U P P L E M E N T A SECOND CHANCE FOR BURMA: THE INTERIM GOVERNMENT AND THE i960 ELECTIONS-

By John Seabury Thompson

the. derates. of* th e’ A n ti-F asc ist People1 ร Freedom League', saddened by the d isin tegra tion o f th e p o l i t i c a l leadership which, "with l i t t l e but optimism and enthusiasm to support th e m ,h a d guided Burma through the f i r s t chaotic decade of independence. 1 / ''The immediate prospect may seem dark and- ~ d o u b tfu l," h e wrote in September 1958, "but i t i s perm issib le to hope th at the Burmans may be richer for the lo ss of-some il lu s io n s ." As he closed ' h is account, Burma, under an.unstable c o a lit io n government, was s lid in g headlong towards anarchy and c i v i l warfare, and there seemed’ to .be no a ltern a tiv e leadership . Except for the outside chance th at the r iv a l p o l i t i c a l lea d ers , shocked by the consequences o f th e ir own feuding, might, discover a b a sis for r ec o n c ilia tio n and that "a rejuvenated AFPFL ./migh^T” r is e , lik e the phoenix, from i t s ashes," F u rn ivall could only ask th a t, in sid e and outside Burma, there be an ’increase o f fa ith , hope and charity ."

. As i t happened,’ the AFPFL has not r isen from it s . ashes; nor have the leaders of Burma'ร f i r s t independent decade yet patched up th e ir d if f e r ­ences. In f a c t , the v itu p erative b ittern ess o f the faction s has scarcely diminished with the passage o f tim e. N evertheless, parliamentary democracy has been granted a reprieve and the governing process i t s e l f has been revived, r e v ita liz e d by two clim actic p o l i t i c a l developments for which F u rn ivall early in September 1958 could not even have hoped. These were General Ne Win's dynamic leadership of the non-partisan Caretaker Government" (November 1958 to April i960) and h is remarkable staging o f Burma's th ird general e le c t io n in February i960 , which returned บ Nu and the "Clean" fa c tio n o f the AFPFL (now the Pyidaungsu, or Union Party) to power.

Perhaps the s in g le most fa sc in a tin g fa c to r in the governmental develop­ment o f Burma over the p ast two years i s th at these changes were carried out e n tir e ly w ith in the estab lish ed Burmese parliamentary system of democracy, w ith the approval and support o f the members o f Parliament e lec ted in 1956, and on the b a sis o f e x is t in g le g is la t io n . General Ne Win's meticulous adherence to the l e t t e r o f Burma’s C onstitution has been an object o f in tern ation a l wonder and a r a r ity indeed among m ilita ry regimes. Only one c o n stitu tio n a l m odification was required, and th is was a "temporary amendment.11 I t was needed to permit General Ne Win and h is Cabinet M inisters, none o f whom were members o f Parliament, to serve le g a lly as the Government for more than s ix months.' To do th is one section o f the C onstitution was declared not to apply to them. When, on A pril 4 , i960 , General Ne Win resigned to turn the adm inistration back to บ Nu, the temporary amendment was voided. At th at time he handed over, in ta c t, the1 / For other d iscu ssion s o f the AFPFL s p l i t , see บ Sein Win, The S p lit รา,ory, (The Guardian Limited, Rangoon, 1959; F.N. Trager. "The P o l i t ic a l C risis in Burma," Far Eastern Survey, October 1958, pp 145- 155; and J.H . Badgley, "Burma's P o l i t ic a l C r is is , P a c if ic A ffa ir s , December 1958,pp. 336-351.

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The Advent of the C aretaker GovernmentPrime M inister Nu's announcement on September 26, 1958 that he had asked General Ne Win to succeed him as head o f the Government, and th at the. General had agreed to serve in a caretaker capacity for s ix months u n t i l general e lec tio n s could be held, caught both the Burmese public and foreign observers by su rp rise . Because o f the "weariness" in บ Nu’s' voice as he made h is announcement and read the exchange o f formal notes, -because o f General Ne Win's a ctiv e m ilitary sta tu s , and because o f the

m ultitude of m ilitary personnel who suddenly stood guard a t stra teg ic loca tion s throughout the country, there were immediate headlines o f a "bloodless take-over" and an Army coup d 'e ta t . 3 / Left-Wing extrem ist ■ elements in the NUF p rotested v io le n t ly . Apart from them, the almost u n iversa l response to the announcement was a sense o f profound r e lie f .. 'The p o l i t i c a l and economic ta i l s p in in to which the country had plunged deeper and deeper during the f i r s t th ree weeks of September was a t la s t, to be h a lte d . And there was no longer a question of c i v i l w arfare, which might e a s ily have been the end to the d isrep u tab le feud.

The response to th e charges of "coup" was immediate and indignan t.A ll of Burma's major p o l i t i c a l le ad e rs , including บ Ba Swe and บ Kyaw Nyein of the opposition s ta b le AFPFL, in s is te d th a t th e re had been no coup. I t was to be in s tead a p e r fe c tly o rd erly and c o n s ti tu tio n a lly c o rrec t t r a n s fe r of power to t i a e over a time of exceedingly try in g circum stances. General Ne Win in s is te d a lso th a t in assuming power he d id not rep resen t the Army or e i th e r p o l i t i c a l fa c tio n and th a t he had agreed to accept the p o st of Prime M inister so le ly "as an in d iv id u a l, a c i t iz e n , and as a s o ld ie r ." Moreover, he had agreed to serve only i f the Chamber of Deputies was w illin g to e le c t him. A ll the evidence a t p re sen t a v a ilab le bears out these claim s, unconvincing though they may have sounded a t the tim e.There was no coup d 'e t a t in any ord inary sense of th e term and in the whole of Ne Win's ad m in is tra tio n , although m ilita ry personnel f i l l e d the major p o s ts , n e ith e r was th e re m ili ta ry government as such. U ltim ately even the NUF conceded as much.

By the time th a t บ Nu resigned , h is own p o s itio n and conditions in the

2/ Since Burma1ร independence, the C onstitution has been amended only four tim es. The "temporary amendment," suspending the time lim it on .Ne Win's tenure o f o f f ic e was the th ird . The f i r s t two amendments were concerned with the establishm ent o f the Karen and Kayah States, w ithin the Union, and the fourth provided th at the Shan seats in the Chamber of N a tio n a lit ie s , now f i l l e d by 25 nominated Sawbwas (hereditary feudal p rin ces), a fte r the present Parliament i s d isso lved (presumably in 1964) sh a ll be f i l l e d by popular e le c t io n from among the Shans. C onstitutional amendment in Burma IS r e la t iv e ly sim ple. A b i l l for amendment must f i r s t be approved by the Chambers o f N a tio n a lit ie s and Deputies s i t t in g separately . Thereafter it .m u st be submitted to a jo in t session o f the two Chambers and receive -a tw o-thirds vo te .3 / The Nation, September 27} .1958. บ Nu has sin ce in s is te d th at the weariness" v:as only the natural r e su lt o f h is extensive tra vels and consu ltations prior to h is d ec ision .

formal structure of government,' just as- he had received it. 2/

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country had so deteriorated that he had no other choice, h j The rea l surprise was th at General Ne Win. was .w illin g to assume r e sp o n s ib ility a t such an ap p a llin g ly low t id e in 'th e country's a f fa ir s . For a l l h is pledges a t'th e o u tse t, he might w ell'have taken advantage o f the s itu a tio n to - e sta b lish an .outright m ilita ry d icta torsh ip and he would h a v e .h a d .lit t le d if f ic u l ty in- mustering c lea r ju s t if ic a t io n s to do so .

: I t was in the June parliamentary showdown between บ Nu and his'form er co llea g u es-o f the AFPFL that Nu a c tu a lly lo s t control o f the Government. From.the narrow vote o f confidence h is r iv a ls , บ Ba Swe and บ Kyaw Nyein, emerged with a far more powerful and b e tter d isc ip lin ed p o l i t i c a l organi­zation than h is own 1 Although บ Nu has always been an extremely astu te p o li t ic ia n , he was never p a r ticu la r ly in terested in p o l i t i c a l organization and a t that time he found h im self able to .ca rry only about one th ird o f h is own party . For the remainder, he had to r e ly on MPs from the ethnic s ta te s and- the Arakan and upon the kb votes o f h is long-time' opponents, the rad ica l le ft-w in g S o c ia l is t s and pro-Communists o f the NUF. Although th is c o a lit io n stood with him in the confidence v o te , he could not'count

.upon i t s s t a b i l i t y in future parliamentary debates. He won the 6 votes o f the- Arakan MPs only because he had gone further, than h is r iv a ls in promising to support statehood for Arakan;: and the NUF MPs had voted for' him only because they d is lik e d and feared him .le ss than the leaders o f the Stable AFPFL. I f บ Nu and h is co lleagues o f - the Clean AFPFL were to survive the f a l l se ss io n o f Parliament, they had only a few months in which to b u ild a new b a sis o f p o l i t i c a l power.

The Clean party used a l l the p o l i t i c a l instruments o f power ava ilab le to a Government in o f f ic e to s tr ik e a t the sources o f sta b le AFPFL strength . Throughout the n ation al and s ta te governmental organ izations, the o f f ic e ­holders who were considered lo y a l to the sta b le party were ousted from patronage p o sts . A new government-sponsored labor fed eration (the Union Labor Organization) was founded to draw workers away from บ Ba Swe's Trade Union Congress (Burma) and was given a monopoly for government- con tro lled jobsT 5 / And, wherever a case could be made, the leaders and organizers o f the sta b le p arty 's mass organizations were arrested . Simul­taneously, the Clean AFPFL Government was able to dangle r ich p rizes — u n fille d cabinet p osts and parliamentary secretarysh ips — before opposi­t io n MPs to lure them to d efect and jo in the Clean party 6/

' ป The account given by บ Sein Win in The S p lit story i s by fa r the most d eta iled yet published.3 / I t was in the area o f labor controversy that the most serious v io len ce between the two AFPFLs occurred.6/. Surprisingly , considering that there were no rea l id e o lo g ic a l d i f f e r ­ence between the two p a r t ie s j no sta b le MP accepted these opportun ities. Only one man, the Speaker o f the Chamber o f Deputies, who had remained neutral on the confidence vote , sh ifte d h is p o s it io n . Bohmu Aung gave h is a lleg ia n ce to บ Nu and was made M inister o f Defense. However, although he was a h igh ly respected hero o f the independence struggle — one o f the Thirty Comrades - - h e appears to have carried no one with him.

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While they were working to. r a lly the country1s ac tiv e p o lit ic ia n s to the Clean AFPFL, 1 บ พน1ร colleagues a lso made vigorous moves to convert' the government serv ices — the c i v i l serv ice , the c i v i l and m ilita ry p o lic e , the Pvusawhtis (v i l la g e guards), ana th e-m ilitary forces - - in to : in stru ­ments o f the party . In n ation al e le c tio n s the support.of these, serv ices would have o f f s e t the sta b le AFPFL' ร advantage o f strong party organiza­tio n . According to a published Burmese account, บ Nu'ร co lleagues, through the manipulation o f assignments, promotions, resignations and forced retirem ents, were qu ite su ccessfu l in gaining th is control over a l l the ■services except the m ilita ry fo r ce s . 7/

I t was in. la te August and early September that they tu rn ed .th eir atten tion to the Army. There the m ilita ry fo rces , under the command o f - General We Win, presented qu ite a d iffer en t problem from the othei' govern­ment se r v ic e s . Through years o f f ig h tin g Burma’ร Communist and ethnic insurgents, the m ilita ry forces had developed a strong sense o f unity and had never allowed th e ir organization to be dominated by a p o l i t i c a l party. In June, fo llow in g the AFPFL s p l i t General We Win had given warning that the Army would, serve only the C onstitution and the laws draTrท up thereunder and, as the Army would refra in from in ter fer in g in p o l i t i c s , he urged the p o l i t i c a l leaders to leave the Army alone. 8j The Army leaders watched with growing alarm and d is ta s te as Prime M inister บ พน made in creasin gly generous amnesty o ffer s to the insurgents and as h is colleagues openly moved to take over the government se r v ic e s . When f in a l ly the Government turned i t s a tten tion s to 'th e Army, the Army leaders were f u l ly prepared, and they blocked the manoeuver firm ly . As General We Win la te r explained to Parliament, a fte r the Army had been caught unprepared by the insurrec­tio n s o f 1948-49, i t had draiwn up plans to meet future threats to national secu r ity . By 1953 these plans were completed and when, in September 1958, the'Army saw th at the p o l i t i c a l s itu a tio n was gettin g e n tir e ly beyond con tro l, i t put these secu r ity plans in to e f f e c t . 9/

Published accounts agree that by la te September rumors were r i f e of impending v io len ce and p o l i t i c a l a ssassin ation s and th at armed un its of the already subordinated m ilita ry p o lice and fo r e s t guards were converging on Rangoon for a showdown with the Army. As General We Win la te r reviewed i t : "When the Inspector General o f P o lice was asked the reason why such large numbers o f Union M ilitary F o lice were being c a lled to Rangoon, he rep lied , quite honestly , he did not know anything about the matter a t a l l . The s itu a tio n was that much confused." 10/ I t was on บ พน, ร return from an up-country tr ip , on September 22, th at he was to ld by h is Cabinet that the Army was planning a coup d 'e ta t . Alarmed, บ พน c a lled in th e Army lead ers. He was to ld by Colonel Maung Maung that there was no:plan for a coup and that the Army was not w illin g to e sta b lish a m ilita ry government. Neither was the Army w illin g to allow the p o lit ic ia n s to disrupt i t s7I Sein Win, op. c i t . p . 74. Sein Win a s se r ts , as do most other w riters, that บ พน took no part in the manipulations - - and preferred not to hear of them.8j The Nation, June 24, 1958.9/ We Win, Speech before Parliament on 31 October 1958. Government in the Union o f Burma, 1958 Wov'ember- 1959 February, D irector o f Information, Rangoon, p. 12.10/ Ibid.

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leadership or to try. to. convert i t in to a partisan fo rce . I f attacked, the Army would s tr ik e to defend i t s independence; F in a lly Colonel llaung Haung .to ld u Nu .that he would have to take in-mediate action to curb the p o lit ic a l..e x c e sse s , or- the Army could not guarantee the peace. I t was a fte r - th is that-U.-Nu personally. decided to ask General Ne Win'to take over. He gained' /the reluctan t .consent o f h is co lleagu es, the approval o f h is p o l i t i c a l r iv a l s , - and f in a l ly drafted both h is in v ita tio n to He Win and the. General'ร acceptance o f the Prime M inistersh ip . 11/

Whatever d irec t or in d irect pressures may have compelled บ Nu t o h i s •1d ecis ion , 12 / he had'.in .General Ne Win the id e a l so lu tion to an in to lerab le1 s itu a tio n . Ne Win was, a man o f nation al sta tu re , h ighly respected , and w ith the. so lid support o f h is Army. He was a man experienced in -government leadership but without .p o l i t ic a l am bitions. Above a l l , to step out in favor o f .General Ne.Win.made i t p o ss ib le for บ Nu to avoid.having to y ie ld to a-:sta b le party v icto ry and gave him time to rebuild h is partyT Having decided on th is course, บ Nu made h is resign ation a gesture of magnanimity to spare the country the horrors o f impending bloodshed and the danger o f external in terferen ce . "I v isu a lized th at . . . Burma would e ith er become another Korea or would com pletely d is in te g r a te . 13 /The Ne Win Regime.

Welcome as Ne Win was to บ Nu, to the two fa c tio n s o f the AFPFL and to Burma as a whole, h is nomination marked a sharp departure from the s ty le o f government to which Burma had. become accustom ed.since.independence. The Caretaker regime was a move to the type o f fo r ce fu l government which General Aung San might have provided had he liv e d . For a l l th at General Ne Win i s a man dedicated to parliamentary democracy as he has seen i t emerge in Burma,.his conception o f the Prime M in ister's ro le was one o f leadership and d irec tio n . Clear in h is own mind as to what he wanted to accomplish,, he had l i t t l e regard for the popularity or unpopularity o f h is Government'ร moves. His lead ersh ip ,'an d the leadership o f the numerous Army, Navy and Air Force o ff ic e r s whcm he apppinted to top c iv i l ia n adminis­tr a tiv e r o le s , was fo r c e fu l and d ir e c t , im patient with delay and in s is te n t upon speed and e ff ic ie n c y . As n eith er Ne Win nor any o f h is appointed m ilita ry adm inistrators was dependent upon popular approval for a future career, he was in a p o sitio n to operate e n tir e ly without fear o f future p o l i t i c a l punishment — or hope o f reward. The stron gest s im ila r ity between the Ne Win regime and the p o l i t i c a l adm inistrations before him was the deep sense o f n ation al id e n tity , o f Burma, which i t shared with them. In most other respects the Ne Win adm inistration more c lo se ly resembled the pre-war government under. B r it ish .rule than i t did the AFPFL governments o f the previous decade. This was i t s weakness as w e ll as i t s strength , for l ik e the pre-war governments i t in s is te d upon providing for Burma what the people needed, whether they wanted i t or not - - and in many11/ Sein Win, op. c i t . pp. 81-83.

• 12 / 'บ*-Nu1 S 'a ssertio n th at he, and he alone, decided to ask Ne Win to assume the Prime M inistership , and th at he had not - - and would not - ­y ie ld to anyone1 ร th reats i s w e ll supported by h is record of personal courage in th e 1948-50 period when the insurgency was a t i t s h eigh t..13 / Government in the Union of Burma, op. c i t . , p. 6 .

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General Ne Win took o f f ic e as Prime M inister on October 28 under most ' auspicious circum stances, He had the support o f both the Clean and,stable AFPFLs and the "unanimous" vote o f the Chamber o f Deputies. 1k / His s ta te ­ments on taking o f f ic e seemed to guarantee th at he. would continue the b asic programs and p o lic ie s o f the united AFPFL. In h is formal le t t e r accepting_Nu's in v ita tio n to take over, he made seven reassuring commit- ' ments: (1) to endeavor "to the utuost" to e s ta b lish conditions for f a ir and free e le c tio n s before the end of A pril 1959; (2) to exclude from govern­ment .the a c tiv e leaders o f the p o l i t i c a l p a r ties (except from the ethnic s ta te s ) ; (3) to keep the Army from’in ter fer in g in p o l i t i c a l matters; (4 ) to control and punish acts o f v io len ce and law lessness by m ilita ry personn el;- (5) to act to suppress crime so far as p o s s ib le ; (6) to s tr iv e f o r •in te r n a l. peace; and (7) to maintain Burma's foreign p o licy o f n eu tra lity . 1 5 /

While repeating these pledges in h is p o st-e le c t io n speech* General Ne Win gave a f i r s t in d ica tion o f h is in ten tion s for reform. He warned that h is Government was broadening the d e fin itio n of insurgents and would take "severe action" against the "economic insurgents" who evaded the government's regu lations aga inst p ro fiteer in g and black market a c t iv i t ie s . He a lso guaranteed to bring down the h ig h -c e ilin g p rices o f goods and fo o d stu ff. 16/N eutrality under the Caretaker Government -

General Ne win's seventh pledge - - to maintain Burma's n eu tra lity — was a natural one for h is Government to make as i t f i t t e d c lo se ly with the in tense nationalism of the General and h is top m ilita ry co lleagu es. They had devoted th e ir en tire careers to the struggle for Burmese independence and, a fte r 19^8, to saving th e ir country from d is in teg ra tio n and overthrow. And they were immensely proud of th e ir su ccess. Years o f f ig h tin g Com­munist insurgents had made them firm ly anti-CommuniSt; a t the same tim e, even though a few o f Burma's m ilita ry leaders had any extensive foreign experience, years o f l iv in g on China'ร border made them sharply aware of th e ir v u ln era b ility to a Communist Chinese a ttack . N eutrality was the only lo g ic a l p o sitio n for a Burmese government to hold.

There were during Ne Win's adm inistration severa l t e s t s o f Burma'ร n eu tra lity , in which the Caretaker Government tended to favor the non-

1k j There were 25 nomination papers f i l e d in the Chamber o f Deputies —9 by the Clean AFPFL, 15 by the sta b le AFPFL, and one by the J u stice Party (fo m er ly a u n it o f the NUF). A ll were for General Ne Win. In Burmese p ra ctice , nominating papers must be signed by the nominee, the nominator and one seconder. During the nominating speech by บ Nu, one rad ica l MP from the NUF staged a p ro test walk-out and when the vote was being taken the NUF remained conspicuously s i le n t . Government in the Union of Burma, op. c i t . , p . น.15/ The Nation, September 27, 1958* See a lso Sein Win, op. c i t . pp. 87- S9, and Government in the Union o f Burma, op. c i t . pp. 3-£* ~

cases the Burmese might have preferred to he left alone.

16/ The Nation, November 1, 1958, or Government in the Union o f Burma, pp. 10-15.

Communist nations over the Communists, even as บ Nu1 ธ Governments had done. 1 1 / I f there was any actua l s h i f t in Burmese foreign p o lic y , i t was a s h i f t in degree, not in kind, and when Ne Win returned the Government to บ Nu, he handed i t over as c a re fu lly "uncommitted" as i t had been before.For the most p art, preoccupied with gargantuan in tern a l problems, the Government avoided public commitments on most major in tern ation a l develop­ments. Even the Tibetan c r i s i s received no o f f i c ia l comment, although i t aroused strong popular c r it ic ism of China. Where the Government was required to speak out, p a r ticu la r ly in the United Nations, i t follow ed p r e c ise ly i t s e a r lie r p attern s.

The s in g le most important development in Burma's foreign p o licy under Ne Win was the sign ing o f a border agreement with Communist China. In la te January i960, ju s t before the general e le c tio n s were to r e t ir e him from the prime m in istry . General Ne Win v is i t e d Peiping to conclude th is agreement along w ith a trea ty o f friendsh ip and non-aggression. A firm border agree­ment โrlth China from Tibet in the north to Laos in the east has been a prime ob jective o f the Burmese Government from the very s ta r t o f indepen­dence. บ Nu had already obtained an agreem ent-in-principle on th is issu e from Chou E n -la i in 1956, though nothing had been signed and Burma continued to be vulnerable to constant incursions and harassment in the u n settled border areas. General Ne Win’ร border agreement i s in fa c t the f i r s t ever to be signed by the Chinese Communist Government with any o f i t s neighbors and i t i s not unfavorable to Burma. I t d efin es the border on more or le s s tr a d itio n a l l in e s and id e n t i f ie s the two areas which remain for n egotiation between the two cou n tries. 18 /

There was one important reversa l in Burma’s foreign p o licy during the Interim Government's 18-month tenure. Ne Win, v igorously economy-minded, abandoned บ Nu's p o lic y o f accepting a ssis ta n ce from foreign governments only on a loan b a s is . In s is t in g th a t Burma could not afford the luxury of loans, he announced th at h is Government could accept foreign a ssista n ce only on a grant b a s is . Under th is new p o lic y , when the Soviet Union was unw illing to s h i f t i t s economic development p ro jects (made as "gifts" repayable in "gifts" of Burmese r ic e ) , the Interim Government cancelled f iv e out o f e igh t Soviet p ro jects under con tract, continuing only those which were w e ll on the road to com pletion. In the same period, the Burmese Government and the United S tates reached agreement on a major grand program for the b u ild ing o f a new campus for the Rangoon U niversity and agreed on the prelim inary surveys fo r a joint-US-Burma highway between Rangoon and Mandalay.1 7 / This i s the natural consequence o f Burma's long-standing economic, educational and cu ltu ra l patterns which, in so far as they lead outside Burma a t a l l , t i e Burma to India and Western Europe rather than to China or Russia. With the passage o f tim e .sin ce independence, the in te n s ity of fe e lin g aga in st c o lo n ia l and foreign c a p ita l i s t ic ex p lo ita tio n has declin ed , and r e la tio n s Vrith the Western countries improved.18 / As th is i s being w ritte n in la te August i960, n eg o tia tio n s fo r a f in a l border t r e a ty are under way between jo in t Sino-Burmese committees, and p ress rep o rts in d ic a te agreement i s being reached on a l l ou tstand ing is su e s .

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Several in cid ents in th is period a lso tended, to damage the lo c a l standing o f the Communist cou n tries. These were d efection attempts by- three members o f the Soviet and Chinese embassies and a l i b e l case - involving the Tass correspondent in Rangoon. Of the two d efection s from the Soviet embassy, the f i r s t fa ile d and the second succeeded, but what aroused, the Burmese public in both cases was the high-handed methods used by the Soviet rep resen tatives, who to t a l ly ignored Burmese laws and customs. In the f i r s t case, in th e ir anxiety to ship the d efectin g m ilita ry attache back to the Soviet Union without p u b lic ity , they manhandled Burmese newsmen a t the a irport in Rangoon and smashed cameras — thereby bringing down on the Soviet.Union a torrent o f co llo q u ia l abuse from,the Burma Jou rn alists A ssocia tion . The su ccess fu l d efection o f a Soviet Information O fficer was follow ed by h is published exposes o f Russian espionage and propaganda ta c t ic s in Burma, which were w idely reprinted in the Burmese p ress . In the case o f the Tass correspondent, the l i b e l s u it brought aga in st him by the ed itor o f the Rangoon Nation has dragged in to a long-term l i t ig a t io n , the correspondent evading prosecution for more than a year by hiding in the Soviet embassy.

China, too , had an embassy in cid ent in Rangoon. A junior mfember of the embassy s t a f f , involved in a sordid a f fa ir with a young Burmese g ir l , sought refuge in the home o f an American diplomat, who turned him over to Burmese custody. After severa l months, however, the Chinese l e f t Burmese custody and, presumably, returned to Coiianunist China. Thereafter nothing more was reported o f the m atter. None of these in cid ents was ever p articu ­la r ly exp losive , but apparently there were no episodes, even on th is le v e l , , to mar r e la tio n s between the Burmese government and the non-Com­munist nations.Preparations for Reform

Given the partisan b it te r n e s s , the arrogance of the various insurgent groups, the sorry decay of, the governmental structure and the general s ta te of ten sion which had b u i l t up prior to บ Nu1ร resign ation , the Interim Government started i t s reform a c t iv i t ie s remarkably slow ly . (Although in a formal sense the change in government did not occur u n t i l a fte r the October 28 vote in the Chamber of D eputies, to a l l in ten ts p ra c tic a l authority sh ifted to General Ne Win with บ Nu's public announcement on September 26). Parliament was given i t s customary 30 days to assemble and the month of October was spent in reassuring the country th at a l l was w e ll. There was a b r ie f f lu rry o f precautionary arrests immediately fo llow ing'บ Nu's announcement, but the prisoners were quickly released . The "ring of stee l" around Rangoon, commented on e d ito r ia lly on September 27, quickly d isso lv ed , and detachments o f so ld ie r s , sa ilo r s and airmen, under the d irection o f co lo n e ls , were soon to be seen p ea cefu lly sweeping the d ir t from the Shwedagon and from other pagodas throughout the country. Army and government o f f i c ia l s toured the country to explain to v i l la g e headmen and d is t r ic t leaders ju st what has happened. For the b en e fit o f the p o l i t i c a l lead ers, General Ne Win named to h is Cabinet a sm all group of d istinguish ed non-partisan elder statesm en. 1 9 / and announced th at he was19/ Ne Win, by lim itin g the s iz e o f h is Cabinet to 14 — e igh t fu nction al M inisters, f iv e for the ethnic m in orities and him self — instead of the 30-odd who custom arily made up a Government, ind icated th a t posts were to be fu n ction al, not p o l i t i c a l awards th at there would be economy in govern­ment and th at authority in th is Government would be cen tra lized .

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prepared to accept as M inisters for the ethnic s ta te s the men whom the s ta te governing councils nominated.While Parliament was in se ss io n , November passed ju s t 'as' reassuringly . Controversial measures (such as Arakan statehood, which had''been promised b y.u Nu) were s e t asid e as being improper items for a mere caretaker govern­

ment ;to. handle.-. The Budget, prepared by บ Nu's Cabinet# and the issu e on which h is .opposition had expected to d efeat him, was passed without change and without p r o te s t . Tile Government asked, and obtained, the-'passage o f only two con troversia l a c ts , n eith er o f which was p artisan . OneV le g a lis in g .the slaughter and sa le o f b ee f, dismayed .devout Buddhist leaders and undoubtedly would have cost c iv i l ia n p o li t ic ia n s some popular support.But, beyond gestures o f reluctance arid a suggestion th at the l iv e s of Burmese c a t t le could be spared through the import o f Australian b eef, both Chambers o f Parliament rea d ily approved the Government1ร request. 2 0 / The second a c t, which brought p ro tests from responsib le jo u rn a lists as w e ll as from NUF spokesmen, tem porarily increased the Government's power over the press and was aimed e sp e c ia lly a t "seditious" a r t ic le s . The basic p ro test was th at se d itio n was too vaguely defined in the act which might thus be too broadly ap p lied . 2 1 / However, th is b i l l , too , passed without d if f ic u lty . .

A ctually there were only three occasions during th is honeymoon period when the Government made any show of i t s p o te n tia l s tr ik in g fo rce . F ir s t , without warning, the Rangoon p o lic e abruptly closed'down &M dismantled newly erected sidewalk vending s t a l l s owned by fo llow ers o f the stab le AFPFL and then, as i f to show i t s im p a rtia lity , reopened, a murder case which had been ly in g dormant for four years, and-arrested an-MP of the Clean AFPFL. The th ird in cid ent involved r io t in g between students o f Mandalay U n iversity and Mandalay Teachers College over the program o f a pwe (outdoor performance). Using batons and tear gas the p o lic e broke up the demonstrations, and 17 students and four p o lic e were injured. Clashes between students and p o lic e have long been used in Burma for anti-Govern­ment demonstrations, and student r io tin g has tra d itio n a lly .b een a respected p o l i t i c a l weapon - - most notably in the student S trikes o f 1936 led by บ Nu, .บ Ba Swe, บ Kyaw Nyein and most o f Burma'ร leading contem­porary p o l i t ic ia n s . On th is occasion, however, although an NUF MP asked for an adjournment o f Parliament to debate the p o lic e action , the Govern­ment was,unmoved. Ne Win's M inister o f Education,, a Rangoon U niversity philosophy lec tu rer o f th ir ty years', standing, gave the'Government1 ร f u l l backing to the p o lic e . He added that the present-day students were working hard to become Members o f Parliament and Parliamentary S ecretaries instead of working a t th e ir lesson s - - and closed the case . 22/ On the whole,

2 0 / Because of wartime herd d ep le tio n , c a t t l e had been p ro tec ted and the sa le of beef in Burma proper p ro h ib ite d . In the e thn ic s ta te s , however, the ban d id not apply, and the Army and i t s dependents was au thorized i t s ra tio n of beef on pre-w ar B r i t is h Army standards.. Prime. Mijj.is]ter-tju. as one of h is f i r s t a c ts on r e s t i n g co n tro l of th e Government, re-imposed the ban.2 1 / The a c t was v igorously app lied , both ag a in s t papers c la s s i f ie d as subversive and, in one case a t le a s t , a g a in s t a humorous colum nist who fa i le d to amuse the Government.22/ The New Burma Weekly, November 22, 1958*

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however, the Government moved so slowly th a t th e re was grumbling in the p ress over i t s in ac tio n .

The sweeping of d ir t from the pagodas had meaning beyond the tr a d i­t io n a l act o f veneration. On November 2b, when Parliament had f in a l ly been prorogued, the tempo o f government changed abruptly. From the d r if t o f the previous two months, i t sh ifte d in to a drive aga inst economic exp lo ita tion by business and p o l i t i c a l lead ers, against p o l i t i c a l ly - protected crim inal elements in the two AFPFLs and7 most vigorously , against p o l i t i c a l leaders o f the NUF. Surprisingly, however, considering that the threat of c i v i l war and insurgent v io len ce had been given as the formal reason for Ne w in's take-over, no a l l-o u t m ilita ry campaign was launched aga inst the insurgents. Instead, the previous pattern of r e la ­t iv e ly sm all-sca le operations continued, stepped up, perhaps, by being put on a year-round b a sis including the rainy season. General He Win withdrew the sweeping amnesty terms which had been offered to the rebels by the Clean AFPFL but guaranteed th at those surrendering would be d ea lt with f a ir ly on an ind iv idual b a sis - - and the flow of insurgents "returning to the ligh t" continued. The r e su lts o f h is p o licy were reviewed with considerable sa t is fa c t io n by the Government in March i960 . In "108 major and 323 lo ca liz ed operations again st the insurgents" 1,872 o f the enemy were k i l le d , 1,959 wounded and 1,238 captured. In add ition , 3,618 insurgents had surrendered to the Government. 23 /Ne Win's S oc ial and Economic Reforms

Once Parliam ent was adjourned, the Ne Win Government quickly took on the c h a ra c te r is t ic s of a "good government" reform movement and, according to the Rangoon Nation, i t s "d rive fo r the moral r e h a b il i ta t io n of the people" became i t s outstanding c h a ra c te r is t ic . The c i ty of Rangoon le n t i t s e l f admirably to such a program and served as an ex c e lle n t model. This e s s e n t ia l ly b e a u tifu l c i ty , as a r e s u l t o f war damage, v a s t overcrowding by refugees f le e in g r u r a l in se c u r ity , the lo ss of the pre-w ar Indian labor fo rce , and b as ic n eg lec t, had become n o to riou sly run-down and f i l t h y . Previous c i ty ad m in is tra tio n s had done l i t t l e to improve the s i tu a t io n .On November 29, by a P res id en tia l Order charging the Mayor of Rangoon and the Rangoon Corporation with "incompetence," the Government d isso lved the e le c t iv e body and appointed in i t s p lace a Commissioner and a n o n -p o lit ic a l advisory committee. When the new Commissioner, Colonel Tun Sein , took over on December 1, the outgoing Mayor (placed on in d e fin ite leave) accepted the P resid en t's charges and warned h is successor that the Rangoon mess was hopeless: the c i ty council was incompetent, the municipal s t a f f was incompetent, and the general public lacked a l l sense o f c iv ic duty. Colonel Tun S ein 's answer was b lunt and m ilitary : as a so ld ie r , he sa id , he was there to carry out orders, and, i f he were to ld ’to , he would sweep the s tr e e ts h im self. 2b /23/ The Nation, 23 March i960 . General Ne Win's success in p re v a ilin g upon the Shan Sawbwas to surrender th e i r feu da l governing r ig h ts c rea ted new insurgen t problems fo r the Army. Numbers of young Shans went in to re v o lt, and th u s , while the number of in surgen ts were decreasing , the number of in surgen t o rgan izations increased .2b j The Nation, December 2, 1958.

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Tun Sp in 'ร impact was immediately apparent. S o ld iers, government workers.and p rivate c it iz e n s by the thousands were organised in to clean-up s q u a d s d o n a t in g free time on'Sundays - - and the accumulated f i l t h of almost two decades was carted from the c i t y . Sewers were cleaned, the p i-aog , ra t and crow population hunted down r u th le ss ly , parks were b ea u tified , and the owners ’o f b u ild ings were forced to renovate, th e ir property. Colonel Tun Sein took a c tiv e personal leadership o f the campaign and, .whether or not he a c tu a lly swept the s tr e e t s , he was photo­graphed re-la y in g a sec tio n o f up-.ended sidewalk. Rangoon's rejuvenation

-p ro jects carried s t i l l further to include the reorgan iza tion .o f the bus system, the elim ination of pony c a r ts , sidewalk s t a l l s and b eteln u t stan d s.2 5 / ..The pattern se t in Rangoon was w idely applied throughout other c i t i e s and town? o f Burma. Further, the vigor.and energy o f Tun Sein was matched by other m ilita ry o f f ic e r s responsib le for the transportation system s, com­m unications, r ic e sa le s and almost every other phase o f Government a c t iv ity .

■ Far more ambitious than the Rangoon .s tr e e t clean-up was the Government program .for r e s e t t l in g squatters and demolishing th e ir squalid hutments throughout the c i t y . Where previous Governments had h esita ted even to move in d iv id u al squatters aga in st th e ir w i l l , the Ne Win regimej - estab lish ed three s a t e l l i t e towns outside Rangoon in to which i t moved' nearly a th ird o f Rangoon's population. Included in th is move was the establishm ent of commuter bus and r a i l system s, sch ools, water a n d .lig h t and hea lth f a c i l i t i e s . , 'Also included for the r e s e t t le d squatters was the grant of t i t le s ' to th e ir new homesteads. ■ In rural areas with sp e c ia l secu r ity problems the Government required iso la ted ' v i l la g e s to move c lo ser to the highways where the Army could p ro tect them. D espite the advantages of these moves, in ev ita b ly many hardships were caused by them, and i t i s doubtful th at any popular Government would have taken the r isk . 26 /

The same process o f "moral reh ab ilita tion " was applied to the govern­ment se r v ic e s . C iv il servants were informed th at so long as they carried out th e ir d u ties e f f ic ie n t ly and responsib ly they had nothing to fear from the new regime. They were a lso p u b lic ly informed th at they would be required to observe o f f ic e hours w ith care (9ะ30 a.m. to 4:00 p .m .) and would not be given a break for lunch. In the heavy shake-up th at follow ed more than three thousand persons were dism issed, forced to resign , or sent on in d e fin ite leave without pay. Laborers working e ith er d ir e c t ly for the Government or for i t s boards and commissions were ordered t 6 d is so c ia te themselves from the labor unions dominated by p o l i t i c a l p a r tie s and to form independent organizations dealing only w ith economic issu es and work con d ition s. ใJhile xh is was merely rev iv in g a longstanding government regu­la t io n , i t was follow ed by an act forbidding persons to be o f f ic ia l s o f mass organizations and p o l i t i c a l party leaders a t the same tim e.25/ So fa r-re ac h in g did th e clean-up appear th a t rumors c irc u la te d th a t morals and fash ions were nex t. Tun Sein had to deny p u b lic ly th a t he would ban l ip s t ic k and sh o rt-s leev ed blouses and explained th a t he would only enforce e x is tin g m unicipal re g u la tio n s .26/ On บ Nu's re tu rn to power he "tem porarily" h a lte d the s t i l l incomplete program of re se ttle m en t from Rangoon, saying th a t i t req u ired fu r th e r study.

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I t was Ne Win's program fo r economic reform th a t cu t deepest in to Burmese so c ie ty . Following the G eneral1ร October warning to the "economic in su rg en ts ," no r e a l move's were made u n t i l th e end of November. Then, in a s e r ie s of p o lic e ra id s , s to re s and warehouses in kangoon were sea led and the owners were requ ired to b rin g proof of ownership, le g a l im portation , proper p ric in g , as w ell as proof th a t they were not hoarding or p ro f ite e r in g , before they were allowed to reclaim th e i r goods. Im proprie ties led to - quick a r r e s ts and deporta tions of "undesirable" fo re ig n merchants — mainly Indian and Chinese — and j a i l sentences and f in e s fo r Burmese, m erchants. Also unexpectedly, the Government sea led a l l safes and v a u lts , in Rangoon's banks and then requ ired the owners to open them in the presence of government rep re se n ta tiv e s and to account fo r th e i r h o ld in g s.27/

While these sweeping in v estig a tio n s were going on, the Government moved to force r e t a i l p rice reductions through le g a l action , voluntary agreement and government com petition. The Government f ix ed p r o f i t margins on e s se n tia l imported commodities a t between 5 and 72 percent fo r importers and w holesalers and between 10 and 15 perccnt for r e ta ile r s and required a l l items to be c le a r ly marked w ith th e ir p rices a t a l l tim es. 28/ In addition , the Army went in to com petition with p rivate business on a large sc a le . Early in November the Government ordered the 'm ilitary forces to bring f i s h and firewood in to Rangoon and, la te r , when b eef sa le s were authorized, the Army was placed in charge o f r e ta il in g the b eef a t a reasonable ra te . The low co st o f b ee f, in c id e n ta lly , brought down the p rices o f other meat as w e ll. Later, through the Defense Services In st itu te (o r ig in a lly estab lish ed as a commissary fo r m ilita ry fa m ilie s ) the Army went in to exten sive com petition with almost a l l p rivate business in te r e s ts . I t came t o .undertalee manufacturing, shipping, banking and the import-export business and by'the end of the Interim Government was one of the most powerful business in te r e s ts in the country. 29 /

In i t s d rive ag a in s t domestic p ro f ite e r in g and hoarding the Govern­ment a lso took on the job of p o lic in g the im port-export b usiness. With independence, the Burmese Government had n a tu ra lly tended to favor Burmese c it iz e n s over a lie n s in the issu in g of import lic e n se s , in the hope th a t Burmese merchants would develop the in i t i a t i v e to compete suc­c e s s fu lly w ith th e Indian and European firm s in Burma. Although Burmese firm s sprang up, most of them p re fe rre d th e quick p ro f i t s from the re sa le27/ น' Nu1ร daughter was among those queried about her holdings in money and gold , as her sa fe deposit box in a bank held 90,000 kyats and two bars o f gold . Although th is d isclosu re was something o f a p o l i t i c a l embarrassment to บ NuJ h is daughter was able to explain the sources and d isp o sitio n o f the w ealth. The Nation. December 14, 1953.28 / These regulations brought severe complaints from the business com­munity which argued th at the b a sis o f figu rin g c o sts , on which to base p r o f it s , was not properly estab lish ed and thau in many cases the lim ita ­tio n s made business no longer worth w h ile . N evertheless, th is government action e f f e c t iv e ly lowered the cost o f l iv in g .29/ The rapid growth and business success o f the Defense Services I n s t i ­tu te caused much complisnt among p rivate businessmen and even before the end of the Interim Government, i t s d irectors announced th at the In s titu te would s e l l 85 percent o f i t s shares to p rivate in vestors.

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of import lic e n se s to the more complex business .of a c tu a lly importing and d istr ib u tin g merchandise," and a lie n firms' continued"to-'dominate the -f i e ld . In,.an. e f fo r t to break u p!th is p ra ctice , the Interim Government conducted a ca refu l study’o f i t s records and proceeded to r e -r e g is te r ’ those firms which had’not a c tu a lly engaged in importing goods. While d e-reg istra tio n - ­refusing to grant further import lic e n se s to the bogus firms I— struck some a lie n companies,’ i t h i t hardest, among the Burmese firms and before the end'of Ne W in's.tenn almost tw o-thirds o f the Burmese firms once l i s t e d had been struck o f f the record. Although the Government'acted with, im p a rtia lity , i t had obviously struck too. deep - - and was fa i l in g in i t s o r ig in a l indention to 'b u ild up. the Burmese ro le in b u sin ess. Before i t l e f t o f f ic e , i t was searching for. means by which to ju s t i fy r e -r eg ister in g as: many of the Burmese firm s as p o ss ib le . Having found ho sa tis fa c to r y d ev ice, i t went out o f o f f ic e with a sweeping announcement th a t beginning June If i960 (when บ Nu would be the Prime M inister) a i l imports would be handlea through Burmese agents. 30/

The Government*ร economic house-cleaning led a lso in to the area o f outstanding loans made by previous adm inistrations for business and a g r i­cu ltu ra l development. Almost nothing, had been done to obtain repayment.Once the. Interim Government took up th is problem, .'it demanded a f u l l accounting, b la c k lis t in g d efau lters and fo rec lo s in g ru th lessly , on c o lla te r a l. The r e su lt was sw ift , and in.m ost cases repayment was made, although there was considerable p ro test from both the agr icu ltu ra l and the ..business, communities. Former government o f f ic ia l s who had fa ile d to obtain repayment in the past were subjected to in v e st ig a tio n and. some, were prosecuted for corruption.

When the whole area o f foreign economic- a id and advice came under the Government's scru tin y , . i t did not lik e what i t found.. In sweeping moves i t denounced the work o f almost a l l the foreign firms and s p e c ia lis t s (fo r which the Burmese Government was paying) as w astefu l and u n sifted to the Bunnese economy. In December i t can celled the contracts o f i t s two .American advisory firms and sh ortly th erea fter eliminated, f iv e o f the e ig h t Soviet "gift" p ro jec ts , noting th at they were n eith er su ited to Burma's needs nor g i f t s . The Burmese Government p ro jects under foreign management and the jo in t ventures between .the Burmese Government and 1. foreign firms were subjected to sim ilar ไร-cathihg c r it ic ism . F in a lly , in i t s sweeping economy drive the Government dism issed almost a l l the foreign advisors paid by the Burmese Government and ordered them home. 31/

30/ On June 1, the Nu adm inistration announced th at th is'.ru le was "in ' fo r ce . How i t w i l l work out i s s t i l l open to question as the-number o f Burmese firms q u a lified for imports i s c le a r ly in s u f f ic ie n t to meet the country's demands.31/ Mr. F urn ivall h im self was caught in th is house-cleaning. As Pro­fesso r c. H. Luce reported in h is obituary n o tic e , "Burma was then flooded with Advisors from foreign p arts , who know l i t t l e or nothing about Burma, but had a Nostrum that had worked elsewhere. Then 'a new king arose who knew not Josep h ,' but merely c lassed him with the Nostrum-mpngers, and served sudden n o t ic e ,.o n him as w e ll as them, to leave the coiintry w ithin two months. I t was a cru el blow to one who had devoted f i f t y years of h is l i f e , singlem indedly, to Burma. Later the time lim it was ’extended ..." The Nation, July 13," i960;

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Internal Security under the Interim GovernmentGeneral Ne Win*ร army men who served as the ch ie f adm inistrative

o ff ic e r s in h is Government acted everywhere with speed, e ff ic ie n c y and im p artia lity , and nowhere more so than in th e ir handling o f the Government'ร program o f lav; enforcement. B a sica lly , o f course, i t had been the break­down o f order, e sp e c ia lly as i t a ffec ted the Army, • which had led'them to take over. Thus i t was e s se n tia l to a l l the Government*ร reform programs that law and. order be re-esta b lish ed f ir k t . As with i t s other programs, the Government spent i t s f i r s t two months in carefu l preparation. The partisan manipulation of the c i v i l and m ilita ry p o lice was stopped and the serv ices ca re fu lly reorganized. P o lice and m ilita ry o ff ic e r s were given sp e c ia l in ten sive tra in in g courses to fa m ilia r ize them with sound le g a l procedures for making a rrests .

Common crim inal elements, ta in ted p o l i t i c a l figu res high up in both the Clean and sta b le p a r tie s , ana leaders of the le ft-w in g NUF a l l f e l t the force o f the Government's drive. When major arrests began in December, the Government could a sser t that each ind iv idual was being held on "con­c lu siv e evidence." With sp e c ia l reference to t h e ‘le ft-w in g p o l i t ic a l ' leaders who were charged with subversive a c t iv i t i e s , the D irector of Information announced: "We have firm reports that these men were in contact with the reb e ls , and th a t i s why they were arrested ." 32/Not a l l those arrested were immediately brought to court by the

Government; under laws passed in- previous adm inistrations th is was not required and many were held in p ro tective custody. Nor did th e ■Government win or complete a l l the cases i t brought in to court. 33 / I t s overa ll record, however, was one o f su ccess. In period ic reports to the p u b lic ,Army and Police o f f i c ia ls d iscussed and i l l u s t r a t e d the rap id f a l l in the crime r a te , e sp e c ia lly as compared w ith the June to October p erio d of 1958. 3k j One of the fa c to rs which undoubtedly a ffe c te d the crime r a te , over and above the v igo r of the p o lic in g , was the s t if fe n in g of the sentences th a t were handed down and th e sharp decline in the degree of mercy. 35/The In terim Government and P o l i t ic a l P a r tie s

I t was unavoidable th a t the th ree major p o l i t i c a l p a r t ie s in Burma would be weakened during General Ne Win's ten u re . For 18 months they were w ithout the patronage and awards w ith which to encourage lo c a l lead ers to32 / The Nation, December 5, 1958.33/ As Mr. F u rn iv a ll has noted e a r l i e r , Burma c a rr ie d over from the B r it is h experience high standards in the adm in is tra tio n of ju s t ic e which have not been se rio u sly undermined.3k f For examples of these re p o rts , see The Nation, February 8, 1959 J May 15, 1959* and August 2k, 1959*35 / As a Rangoon jo u rn a list noted, between 1954 and 1958 of 270 persons condemned to death, a l l had th e ir sentences commuted to l i f e imprisonment.In the f i r s t six.m onths of 1959 J however, le s s than ten percen t of those condemned had th e i r sentences commuted. The Nation, June 15, 1959*

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b u ild up town and d is t r ic t organ izations. I t was•in ev ita b le ; too , th a t the Interim-Government1 ร example o f adm inistrative e ff ic ie n c y should put the r e la t iv e ly in e ff ic ie n t . AFPFL adm inistrations in a bad l ig h t . True■to the G eneral's p ledge, the Interim Government.a t no time moved aga in st,a n y .o f the le g a l p a r tie s as such, in i t s reform programs, however, i t was.ทo- more le n ie n t toward party leaders than toward others who stood in i t s way and t h u s i n many parts o f Burma, i t p r a c tic a lly wiped out lo c a l p o l i t i c a l leadership through i t s a r r e s ts .

■ From the ou tset the IJUF leaders recognized th at " it was th e ir party : which'stood to lo se most under General. Ne Win'. ' They w ere ,-in fa c t , so weakened'-'by the mere announcement that 'XTพน was resign ing that they were

■forced to make an- immediate public retractio n o f th e ir charges o f coup - aga in st the'Army. 3b / -U พน.1ร resign ation ended for them th eir , b r ie f period of . r ea l p o l i t i c a l power when, through supplying him h is aargin of. v ictory in Parliament; they held a p o te n tia l veto over a l l Government p o lic ie s even thoiigh no NUF members were included in the Cabinet.- Further,, .they. kr.ew that with the Army1 ร in ten se anti-Communist a ttitu d e they, would receive no consideration from,the new Government and would be prosecuted . to the ’f u l l e s t extent p o ss ib le w ith in .the law — and they w ere .-

Although' บ Nu and the Clean AFPFL were form ally General1'Ne Win'ร- ทominators, the party so o n -fo u n d .itse lf mder heavy a tta ck ^ -its organiza­t io n disrupted and.many o f i t s leaders arrested; By mid-December:the Clean AFPFL had become the m ost-vocal c r i t i c o f the adm inistration , charging that i t was being sin g led out for. p ersecution . ‘ I t s lawyers in Rangoon organized a Fundamental Rights Committee to defend i t s members. By- the February sess io n of Parliament, the Clean AFPFL was- outspokenly opposed to any" extension of. General Ne Win's term .of o f f ic e and บ Nu p u b lic ly demanded th at the General honor h is pledge to' hold e le c tio n s before the end of A pril. 37/ When the Clean AFPFL found i t s e l f forced to back .down in - support-of the-temporary c o n stitu tio n a l amendment, บ Nu announced'that regardless o f the consequences hew ould lead a " c iv i l disobedience" campaign (which he a lso ca lled "passive resistance" ) aga in st the Government., i f the in ju s t ic e s about which he had complained were not redressed:

"Don't g ive us any p r iv ile g e s , but stop v ictim iz in g and harassing us7 We do not suggest that the other sid e should be harassed e ith e r . We would not object to" th eir g e ttin g favored treatment even. But leave us alone to manage our p o l i t i c a l- a f fa ir s without hindrance. The knock on the door o f p o li t ic ia n s , and the tak ing away o f our organizers for question ing, are p r a c t ic e s •repugnant to th e ‘democratic mind. To-safeguard the

36 / A fter an in terv iew w ith G eneral Ne Win and h is Army.colleagues on October 1, 1958, NUF lead er บ Aung Than (e ld e r b ro th e r of the martyred General Aung San) reported to th e p re s s ะ "This i s a unique s i tu a t io n .I t i s cer ta in ly not a coup. And yet we know"what we knew. Anyway, the man who devised the method o f tran sfer i s a damned c lever fe llo w .The nation , October 2 , 1958.37/ . บ Nu a t a l l -times made the p oin t th at none of h is charges aga in st the Government were aimed a t General Ne Win, in whom he had absolute confidence.

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freedoms of speech and o rgan iza tion , I am f u l ly prepared tolaunch a campaign of passive re s is ta n c e , even i f I have todie in the attempt* 38/Although th e re was no follow -up to บ Nu1ร th re a t , i t was in d ic a tiv e

o f the antagonism toward the In terim Government which th e Clean AFFFL maintained s tr a ig h t through to th e e le c tio n s .

The S tab le P a r ty 1ร re la tio n s w ith the Government followed a somewhat d if f e re n t p a tte rn . When General Ne Win took over, the S tab le lead ers . assumed th a t he and the Army were ac tin g -at le a s t p a r t i a l ly in th e i r b eh a lf in th e i r grievance ag a in s t บ Nu. There were among the top Army leaders men who were c lo se ly asso c ia ted in the p a s t w ith บ Ba Swe and บ Kyaw Nyein and the Burma S o c ia l is t Party ; the s ta b le p a rty thus assumed th a t the Government1ร p o l ic ie s , i f not favoring them, a t le a s t would not harm them. Warmly welcoming Ne Win to the Prime M inistersh ip and s tron g ly supporting h is y e a r1ร extension in o f f ic e , they made every e f f o r t to appear as the sponsors and supporters of h is regime and a l l i t s reform s.At the o u tse t th e i r assumption of favor seemed ju s t i f ie d : more Celan than s ta b le p o l i t i c a l lead ers were a rre s te d ; more Clean than s ta b le p o l i t ic ia n s were ousted from government p o s t s ' (p a r t ly because.the Clean AFPFL had purged so many between June and October 1958); and th e re was more d is ru p tio n of the Clean o rgan ization than of the s ta b le . Two former Clean Cabinet M inisters were a r re s te d on c rim ina l charges ~ and no s ta b le ex -M in isters. In r e tro s p e c t, ' however,, th is appears to have been more a m atter of chance than design on the p a r t o f the Government. In the se r ie s of m unicipal e lec tio n s w hich 'took p lace a t the end of 1959# the s ta b le AFPFL found th a t the Government would do nothing on i t s b eh a lf and, from then through the February e le c tio n s , i t became as s tron g ly opposed to the In terim regime as th e Clean p a rty .

Throughout the whole of General Ne Win's adm in istra tio n th ere was one p o in t on which p o l i t i c a l leaders agreed: they accepted a t face value the G enera l's pledge th a t he would c a l l n a tio n a l e lec tio n s to re tu rn the Government to c iv i l ia n p o l i t i c a l leadersh ip - - sooner o r l a t e r . Except th a t he d id ju s t th a t , i t is a question whether th e General had as much f a i th in them as they had in him. That he was dedicated to parliam entary democracy, no one doubted, and he obviously considered p a r t ie s necessary in s t i tu t io n s fo r the operating of Burmese democracy. For the a c tu a l p a r t ie s which he saw function ing before him over the previous decade, however, he must have had l i t t l e o r no use . From the p o in t of view of a man dedicated to speed, e ff ic ie n c y , a u th o rity and in te g r i ty in government, a l l th ree of Burma's major p o l i t i c a l p a r t ie s would be almost w orth less.The NUF, dedicated to ra d ic a l change of the C o nstitu tio n , was a danger the country could i l l a ffo rd . The Clean and s ta b le AFPFLs since the s p l i t had ฟ!own themselves to be p e tty , v ic io u s , poorly d isc ip lin e d and in d ec is iv e . Their lead ers condoned in te rn a l co rrup tion and were n e ith e r able to cope38/ According to บ Nu, i t was General Ne Win1ร statem ent, that only the Communists and pro-Communists opposed the Government, which caused the Clean AFPFL to change i t s p o s itio n . บ Nu sa id i f he had voted to oppose an extension he would have fa lle n in to h is opponent1ร trap of being dubbed pro-Communist. "This charge I was not prepared to incur. The Nation, February 14 through 27, 1959, e sp e c ia lly February 19.

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w ith i t nor to c o n tro l th e i r p ersonal antagonism s. P arty members appeared to p u t p erso n a l advancement and p a r ty in te r e s ts ahead o f n a tio n a l w elfare; 39 / ' I n 'h i s dealings as Prime M in is te r, General" Ne: Win kept h is con tac ts w ith th e p o l i t i c a l p a r t ie s as such to an abso lu te minimum.

■. There-'were o n ly 1 two.'occasions a fter -th e Caretaker Government started i t s reforms when General Ne Win d ea lt d ir e c t ly with the assembled party p o l i t i c ia n s .— These were the February and August sess io n s of' Parliament

’ • a n .1959, which had to be c a lled according to the requirements o f the Burmese C onstitution.^

Parliament -was c a lled in February because Ne Win was -not prepared to hold e le c tio n s in A pril) as o r ig in a lly pledged, and wished to extend h is . tenure'-; When Ne - Win appeared before the Chamber of -Deputies, he gave an accounting- o f h is stewardship and explained that' he could not recommend holding e le c t io n s under the p reva ilin g conditions o f in secu r ity and would not head-a Government to supervise these e le c t io n s i f Parliament were to c a l l them. He further sa id th at he was not w illin g to serve-another term as prime m in ister under the lim ited tenure imposed on-non-members o f Parliament by the C on stitu tion . I f , however, Parliament wished him to serve and the C onstitution could be changed, he. would be w illin g to hold o f f ic e u n t i l secu r ity conditions were achieved adequate for f a ir and free e le c t io n s . F in a lly , he declared, regardless o f what Parliament might la te r decide, he f e l t ob ligated to o ffe r h is resign ation as he had lo s t the conf idence o f บ Nu and the Clean AFPFL, which had -or ig in a lly nominated him. 40/ Almost immediately the Clean AFPFL, unw illing to force e le c tio n s again st Ne Win's d irect, op p osition , agreed to support .the c o n stitu tio n a l amendment. General Ne.Win was unanimously re-named Prime M inister, h i /

Other business o f -this sess io n included an act e sta b lish in g Burma's f i r s t compulsory m ilita ry serv ice plan and a C on stitu tion al amendment a ffe c tin g Shan representation in Parliament* The Shan feu d al princes gave up th e ir r ig h ts to s i t in the Chamber o f N a t io n a lit ie s , allow ing the sea ts to be f i l l e d by popular e le c t io n s from 1964 on. At the same time, the Shan princes agreed to surrender their, feu d al governing powers in return for government.pensions.

In August a t the 'annual budgetary sessio n o f Parliament there were no such firew orks. The budget was passed in a routine manner. The most important innovation o f the sessio n was an a ct r a is in g the sa la r ie s of Cabinet M in isters, the Speakers and Deputy Speakers of the two Chambers and creating a new sa la r ied post for the leader o f the opp osition . Most important for the country as a whole and for the p o l i t i c a l p a r ties was39 / This i s e s s e n t ia lly the indictm ent o f the AFPFL organization- and membership which บ Nu made in 1956 when, taking a year's leave o f absence from the prime m in istersh ip , he attempted to cleanse and reorganize h is party.ho/ Government in th e Union o f Burma, op. c i t . , pp. 18723*

h i / Ib id ., p . 17. For h is second e le c t io n as Prime M inister, Ne Wi& had 32 nominations - - 2 0 from the sta b le AFPFL, 7 from the.C lean, and .5 from various "independent" p o l i t i c a l groups.

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General He Win'ร announcement that, the Government was prepared' to hold the election s.'ear ly in i960.

General We Win and h is Government undoubtedly* injured and outraged almost a l l o f Burma's major p o l i t i c a l leaders at one time .or anotherT Yet the in ju r ies were-unintended in the sense th at they were in c id en ta l to the reform programs. P o l i t ic a l p a r ties as such were not governmental' ta r g e ts . I t was to rejuvenate the governmental serv ices that the incompe­ten t were fired ; to increase government economy th at outstanding loans were c a lled in; to elim inate causes for partisan c o n f l ic t that government laborers were forbidden to jo in p o l i t i c a l ly oriented trade unions; and. to increase personal and property secu rity that the an ti-cr im e■drive was as ru th less as i t was. Yet each one o f these programs tended to undermine ■the various organizations which had developed as the bases of p o l i t i c a l s tr e n g th .. iEarly in February 1959* by which time 108 p o lit ic ia n s had been arrested , a Government spokesman p u b lic ly announced th at they had been arrested not because they were p o lit ic ia n s but because they a l l had v io la ted crim inal law. k2/ •'

The c lo se s t the Ne Win regime came to organizing a p o l i t i c a l party was i t s establishm ent o f the National S o lid a rity A ssociation movement, intended as a network o f c it iz e n s ' a ssoc ia tio n s throughout the country in both, urban and rural areas. The lo c a l u n its were to be n o n -p o lit ic a l watch-dog organizations guarding aga inst economic insurgency and encouraging c iv ic r esp o n s ib ility ! In fa c t w hile the movement, otherwise manipulated, c er ta in ly .co u ld have become a separate party , i t did not compete.even in the lo c a l e le c t io n s . 4 3 / R ecently, บ Nu ordered the cen tra l executive committee to disband, on the grounds that the need for the NSA was over.The i960 General E lec tion kk/ .

With the Government's August 13 announcement of the coming e le c t io n s , campaigning, which in fa c t had never ceased during the Interim Regime increased r a p id ly .— e sp e c ia lly in the Clean'AFPFL. strangely , the stab le party, which was known to be far b etter organized throughout the country, started slow ly. As events were to prove, i t was grossly over-confident of i t s organization and support.

บ Nu toured widely through the country, campaigning as the underdog and posing as the champion of democracy ag a in st unnamed " f a s c is ts ." He promised i f e lec ted to make Buddhism the s ta te R eligion and guaran teed 'to support statehood fo r the Arakanese and the Mons. As always7 he was received by la rg e and e n th u s ia s tic crowds, who responded to h is happyk2j The Nation, February 8, 19594 3 / For a fu l le r account of the National S o lid a r ity A ssociations, see Richard Butwell, "The New P o l i t ic a l Outlook in Burma," Far Eastern Survey, February i960, pp. 21- 27.kk/ See Richard Butwell and Fred von der Mehden, "The i960 E lection in Burma," P a c if ic A ffa irs , June i960, pp. iU4 - 157j and Lee ร. Bigelow, "The i960 E lection in Burma, Far E astern Survey, May i960, pp. 70_7 fo r f u l l e r d iscussions of the e le c tio n s . 1

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combination of q u a lit ie s — b is exceedingly a ttr a c t iv e p erso n a lity , simple earthy w it and charm, h is deep devotion to h is r e lig io n and h is s in c e r ity which ..he superbly, p ro jec ts . ' '•

; In e f f e c t , บ Nu. had. started h is campaign long before the e lec tio n s were announced in a smashing Kay'Day attack on the "รพe-I!yein leaders" and "some elements o f the Burins. Army" - - r ig h t is t to ta lita r ia n s who were r u th le ss ly suppressing the Clean AFPFL in favor o f the s ta b le and were leading the. country tp in ev ita b le d ic ta to r s h ip .’ The Nation began i t s 1. /.accou n t w ith ะ.!1 "Ex-Prime M inister พน, who loves a crowd and whom the crowd lo v es , packed something l ik e 100,000 in to Martyrs H ill y e sterd a y .. . ”.. .On. the seme page,, i t carried a 'b r ie fe r story reporting on Ba'Swe's speech to a crowd of 30, 000, ■ a lso on May Day, in which he blahed a l l o f Burma's

troubles on บ Nu's "power sick n ess." 45/ -'‘ U n til they had had the re s u l ts o f’ th e m unicipal e lec tio n s in November

and December. 1959, where the Clean AFPFL won in 31 o f 4l towns, Ba Swe and h is colleagues apparen tly , saw no need to match Nu's excessive campaigning. The re tu rn s showed’c le a r ly th e e rro r of the s ta b le p arty * ร ta c t i c s . Even in Moulmein, where บ Ba Swe staked h is p o l i t i c a l rep u ta ­tio n on a S tab le v ic to ry , the Clean p a r ty won w ith a la n d s lid e . I t was thought l a t e r th a t , among o th e r f a c to rs , claim ing Army favor fo r the S table1. candidates had..not helped the p a r ty w ith th e v o te rs - - the irony being th a t any favor extended by the Government or the Army, d esp ite บ พน'ร charges,' was exceedingly sm all.

By this' tim e-in the campaign บ พน had se ized upon a l l the major popular issu es for the Clean AFPFL. The Stable party had lo s t the in i t ia t iv e and was never able to regain i t . When บ Ba Swe and บ Kyaw

_ ; Kyein follow ed บ พน1ร example or becoming Buddhist monks fo r a b r ie fperiod, th e ir previous lack o f in terest, in r e lig io n undermined the popular appreciation o f th e ir gestu re. B a sica lly , the one great weakness in the stab le p arty 's campaign was th at i t la.cked บ พน - - or a spokesman who could r iv a l him in, popularity and Veneration.

Perhaps the only man in Burma who approached th is nation al sta tu s was General We Win - - who was unavailable even as a supporter for e ith er party.As he had done throughout h is adm inistration, he warned both the c i v i l servants and h is Army subordinates to maintain absolute im p artia lity toward, the e le c t io n . His statement o f p r in c ip les i s clear,, i f not e n tir e ly encouraging:' "Let the country m ake'its own cho ice. I t w i l l get the Government i t .d e s e r v e s ."-4๐/. • I t IS iron ic that Burma's President should have chosen th is e le c tio n as the f i r s t time p u b lic ly to remind a Prime M inister o f h is adm inistrative d u ties when i t was th is Prime M inister who u ltim ate ly gave Burma i t s f a ir e s t and f r e e s t e le c t io n s . k jJ In a - le t t e r published on January 20, i960, President Win Maung reminded General Ne Win o f h is pledge o f im p a rtia lity , congratulated him on h is orders to the Army and c iv i l , serv ice , and then warningly drew h is a tten ­tio n to a case o f strong partisansh ip on the part o f government o f f i c ia l s45/ The Nation, May 2 , 1959.46/ The N ation, December 22, 1959.b jJ On the ro le o f the Burmese President, see above, p a rticu la r ly Chapter I I , pp. 33-36.

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in the P re s id e n t'ธ own e lec tio n d i s t r i c t . He requested Ne Win to see to i t th a t h is o rders were being p roperly c a rr ie d out* 48/ .The r e s u l t of the February 6 e le c tio n fo r the a ll- im p o rta n t Chamber- .

o f Deputies was an overwhelming v ic to ry fo r บ Nu and h is p a rty . Of the 235 d i s t r i c t s where the voting was h e ld on tim e, the Clean p a rty and i t s a sso c ia te s won 168 while the s ta b le p a r ty and i t s a sso c ia te s won ori-ly 45. Furtherm ore, the s ta b le p a rty saw most of i t s top leader's ( บ Ba Swe,บ Kyaw Nyein and the men who had been high in th e un ited AFPFL) go down in d e fe a t: ' The NUF fa i le d to win a s in g le s e a t . The r e s u l ts yere almost . id e n tic a l in th e -e le c tio n s fo r the Chamber o f N a tio n a li tie s ,, which'were held l a t e r in the month.

The v ic to ry (more sweeping even than those in 1951-52 and 1956 when the AFPFL was a u n if ie d p a rty ) re tu rned Burma to th e one-party ru le which i t has known ever since independence, except fo r the b r ie f period from June to October 1958. More than th i s , i t showed บ Nu to be the cou n try 's dominant p o l i t i c a l leader,- now in h is own r ig h t . I f he i s able to m aintain d is c ip lin e w ith in h is p a r ty , he has the power to shape Burma's fu tu re as he s e e s : f i t . 1 -

On A pril 4 , General Ne Win stepped out of o ff ic e and back to h is ro le as Commander in Chief of Burma's Defense Forces. The 70 top m ilita ry men who had served as h is ad m in is tra tiv e o ff ic e rs re tu rned to th e i r reg u la r m ili ta ry assignm ents. บ Nu and the new Pyidaungsu (Union) p a rty took over the c o n tro l of the Government. 1

The Army has proved i t s e l f to be an e ffe c tiv e device fo r checking and c o rrec tin g p o l i t i c a l excesses w ithout abusing i t s power - - and w illin g , a t le a s t once, to r e t i r e v o lu n ta r ily from p o l i t i c a l c o n tro l.

Economic conditions in the country which Nu in h e rite d from Ne Win in A pril were g en era lly hea lthy and apparently s ta b le . The 1959 r ic e crop was ex c e lle n t and, through improved and im aginative marketing techniques, the C aretaker Government had a lready sold 75 p ercen t of the2 m illio n ton exportable Surplus, thus assu ring the Union P arty Government of adequate fo re ig n exchange re se rv es . These rese rves, to ta l in g $158 m illio n , were the h igh est since the break in ;th ^ world r ic e market in 1953* Burma's gross, n a tio n a l product of about $1, 200, 000,000 was fo r the f i r s t time since World War I I p ra c t ic a l ly equal to th a t .o f the pre-w ar period although, because of the in crease in population , the' per c a p ita income, estim ated a t $57> was s t i l l f a r below pre-war le v e ls . Along w ith i t s o ther reform programs, the In terim Regime was able to continue in Burma South­e a s t A s ia ' s h igh est r a te of c a p i ta l form ation (20.3 p ercen t of the co u n try 's gross n a tio n a l p roduct) and lowest ra te of consumer expenditures (64.2 p e rc en t) , w ith government expenditures absorbing th e r e s t . A ll these developments re f le c te d th e basic s tren g th of Burma's economy as Nu stepped in .

In the f i e ld o f fo re ig n investm ents, too, d esp ite the In terim Regime's w ariness of fo re ig n economic ven tures, the Government tu rned over an improved s i tu a tio n to the Union P arty . For the f i f t h year ru n n in g ,. th ere was a ne t inflow of p riv a te fo re ig n c a p ita l and, fo r 1959, th is .was th ree tim es as la rg e as the inflow in 1958.. Although i t was probably the improved se c u rity conditions which accounted la rg e ly fo r th is .gain,-.the48/ The Nation, January 20, i960.

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th e Government's Investment Act o f 1959 a lso improved the business and ad m in is tra tiv e atmosphere. This a c t gave firm guarantees to fo re ign in v e s to rs ; th a t "the ir ventures'W ould not he n a tio n a liz e d fo r a t l e a s t ten years and provided fo r ta x b e n e f its and the r e p a tr ia t io n of p r o f i t s and c a p i ta l . , . ' ’ ■

On th e domestic scene, through a com bination 'of p ric e con tro ls and o ther i r e s t r i c t i o n s , . th e In terim Regime reduced the co st o f l iv in g index to the- lowest po in t' s in ce 1954 .'' On a sca le where the year 1958 was s e t as 100, the .averag e co s t o f l iv in g was reduced fo r 1959 to 83.-9 and, even though p ric e s began to r i s e in e a rly i960, the 'Nu Government in h e rite d a s i tu a t io n where the co s t of l iv in g index was 95*2 . ' S im ila rly , although th e re had been p erio d ic shortages o f imported consumer goods during the .We Win regime, when i t l e f t o ff ic e the supply of th ese goods on the Burmese market was considered adequate. •

C ontributing to th e gen era l atmosphere of economic s t a b i l i t y , the Government'ร s tr in g e n t enforcement of labo r le g is la t io n and i t s e f fo r ts to separa te labo r o rgan izations from p o l i t i c a l p a r t ie s , an unusual atmosphere o f labo r peace e x is te d throughout the country and th e re were alm ost no s t r ik e s . This calm' was perhaps deceptive as in a sense the m ili ta ry regim e’s firm c o n tro l tended to tr a n s fe r endemic problems to th e incoming Government.

In f a c t , many o f the co u n try 's economic problems, though reduced in s e v e rity by the Ne Win reform s, were e s s e n t ia l ly handed r ig h t back to บ พน: the continued insurgency, the shortage of Burmese m anagerial and te c h n ic a l personnel, the inadequacies of Burma's tra n sp o r ta tio n systems and the shortage o f both Burmese and fo re ig n c a p i ta l in th e couiitry. F u rth er, Burma's continued dependence upon a s in g le export ( r ic e ) fo r almost a l l i t s fo re ig n exchange leaves i t s economy se rio u s ly v u ln erab le . N evertheless, the genera l s ta te of economic h e a lth is such th a t , w ith even m oderately e f f i c ie n t ad m in is tra tio n , an incoming government would be most u n lik e ly to f a i l over economic is su e s . The major t e s t w il l be ra th e r in th e p o l i t i c a l and ad m in is tra tiv e a re a s , p re c is e ly where บ พน'ร Government f a i le d in 1958.

บ Nu has been given a ra re second chance to make parliam entary democracy work. I f he and h is colleagues f a i l to make good use of th is rep riev e , they m aybe req u ired once again to surrender c o n tro l to the Army. As Commodore Than Pe, the Vice Chief of S ta f f (Navy) reminded th e public in reassurance and warning: " I would l ik e to make a statem ent fo r the inform ation of the publicT Whenever the Nation i s a t the c ross-roads of a c r i s i s , the Armed Forces w i l l always be a l e r t and ready to come to the a id o f the n a tio n . _We w il l always be ready and w illin g to p ro te c t the ludu / th e common manj and to ca rry out any re s p o n s ib i l i ty en tru s ted to u s ." 49 /

The w orld’s p o l i t i c a l re p o rte rs have been p ro perly impressed by th e way in which General lie Win c a rr ie d out th is t r u s t . 50/ Undoubtedly theb9j The Nation, March 29, i960. This statem ent came as the conclusion to Commodore Than Pe’s Armed Forces Day address, which was, in e f fe c t , the swan song o f the C aretaker Government before i t stepped o u t.50/ Only re c e n tly Ne Win was nominated fo r the i960 Ramon Magsaysay award fo r ou tstand ing governmental se rv ice b u t, exp lain ing he could not accept an award fo r merely doing h is duty, he has declined th e honor. The Nation, August 4 , i960.

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greatest credit for Burma's survival of its political crisis belongs personally to -the General., Had it not been for his deep devotion to Burma*ร emerging constitutional democracy and .his .personal distaste for political power7.the outcome of-the "bloodless takeover" in 1958 might., well have followed the more usual course to military dictatorship.

The military regime has left its mark on the constantly' developing system of Burmese government. Mp.ny of its achievements will certainlyjbe lost -*• some intentionally, to satisfy disgruntled supporters of the new ■ Government, and some inadvertently, through the loss of administrative drive and energy, which so far in Burma seems to be almost exclusively.an; Army attributeT Nevertheless, it is safe to predict that at the very least no future Burmese Government will dare allow the country to sink so far into chaos and stagnation as it did in 1958*

Where Mr. Furnivall in September 1958, with little but optimism to ... support him, could only ask for an increase of faith, hope and. charity, inside and outside Burma, the developments of these past two years have ... placed the hopes and expectations for Burma's continued growth on a foundation of fact.

Chevy Chase, Maryland August 27, i960

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