Tim Stachowski

Hebbeler

PHL430

April 21st, 2014

A Discussion of Kant’s Third Antinomy and the Problem of Free Will

The goal of this paper is to discuss two opposing solutions to Kant’s third antinomy of

pure reason and the problem of free will advanced by Henry Allison and Iuliana Vaida. After

articulating both opposing arguments, I will show through an exhaustive textual analysis of

Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason that Allison’s interpretation is more accurate.1 First, Henry

Allison advances a solution in his book Kant’s Theory of Freedom that insists an interpretation

embracing transcendental idealism is crucial to the resolution of the third antinomy.2 On the

other hand, Vaida claims in her article “A New Kantian Solution to the Third Antinomy of Pure

Reason and to the Free Will Problem,” that in order for the possibility of freedom and to uphold

our common sense understanding of morality, an interpretation relying on a combination of

epistemic modesty, scientific realism, and morality is necessary.3

As stated previously, Allison understands Kant’s insistence that transcendental idealism

(TI) is necessary to the resolution of the third antinomy. Differing from the first two

mathematical antinomies, the third antinomy is dynamic, where both the thesis and the antithesis

are contradictory because both their claims are supposedly true.4 The necessity for TI arises from

the fact that the third antinomy regresses from effect to cause keeping open the possibility that an

event may have a cause that is not sensible (intelligible) and therefore not part of a series of

appearances. This is exactly where the thesis and antithesis differ; the former supports the

possibility of an intelligible cause whereas the antithesis claims that such a cause is impossible

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because it conflicts with the conditions for possible experience. It is this dogmatic assertion that

creates the conflict between the assumable correctness of the thesis and antithesis.5

While the solution to the mathematical antinomies arises from rejecting both the thesis

and antithesis based on a self-contradictory concept, the third antinomy requires a different

strategy.6 Here, Kant means to show how two seemingly disagreeing arguments resulting from

the concept of an explanatory whole can be made compatible with one another and does so

through appealing to transcendental idealism.

Even though the “causality of freedom” is understood to refer to an intelligible ground of

natural causes, it does not necessarily entail a solution for freedom of will within the mechanistic

causality of nature. However, Kant addresses this by distinguishing between the transcendental

idea of freedom and the ordinary conception of free agency. The latter term refers to the

“psychological concept” or practical interpretation of freedom, and entails both an empirical

perspective that understands our wills independent from impulses and desires, while remaining

dependent on the transcendental idea. According to Allison, the transcendental idea involves the

“spontaneity of an action as the ground of its immutability.” It is in this way that the difficulty of

the problem of free will arises out of the necessity to admit an unconditioned causality.7

Furthermore, the difficulty for Kant is to explain how the transcendental idea

(spontaneity) can satisfy both the demand of reason for an unconditioned condition outside of the

series of natural causes (thesis) and at the same time appealed to within the course of nature

(antithesis). Kant goes on to explain that because we are unable to explain both the causality of

freedom and causality of nature, our reason must be satisfied with appealing to a presupposition

of a transcendental notion of causality without a total understanding of it. Kant explains through

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example that a “moment of spontaneity” in determining how to act is the method through which

the transcendental idea of freedom might be imagined to perform within ourselves as agents.8

It is for this same conception of agency that is denied by the antithesis. The antithesis

rejects both the idea of a first beginning to verificationist reasoning, and that even if it were

correct to assume a first beginning within the course of nature it would exist outside the realm of

possible experience. It is in this way that the antithesis advances an alternative account of

agency. Instead of appealing to spontaneity or the transcendental idea of freedom, it points to the

causality of nature. What this account means to say is that every action has a sufficient cause and

therefore denies the notion of an intelligent, free agent.9

Through these examples it can be said that beyond the official cosmological conflict lies

an antinomy of agency, questioning what conditions of an action are attributable to an agent. It is

in this way that the “activity requirement” arises, that is to question what constitutes an action. In

this way according to Allison an action must be distinguished as something done by an agent

itself as opposed to an agent acting in response to something done unto the agent.

Kant believes that the only way in which the activity requirement can be fulfilled is by

appealing to an incompatibilist conception of freedom based on the transcendental idea.10

Finally, it can be said that Kant’s appeal to transcendental idealism is necessary opening the

possibility for an intelligible casual power in addition to the casual mechanism of nature.

While it is clear that Allison’s interpretation of the Kant’s third antinomy relies on the TI

interpretation, Vaida on the other hand employs a perspective reliant on both epistemic modesty

(EM) and scientific realism (SR). As stated previously, it is her hope that through a solution

reliant on the doctrine of SR that the traditional conception of moral responsibility and

incompatibilist freedom can be established.

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In her revisionist interpretation, Vaida claims that in order to understand Kant’s

distinction between appearances and things-in-themselves, one must be able to first secure the

identity of reference and secondly to know the “specification of the standpoint of the corrected

view.” In this way, she understands Allison’s “two-aspect” interpretation to only understand the

first by stipulation and the second as subjective based on the human cognitive faculties and by

abstraction independent of cognition. Therefore, Vaida claims that proponents of the two-aspect

perspective will state that we are able to conceive this corrected view although we cannot know

anything about it.11

Furthermore, Allison claims that the crucial part to understanding the distinction between

appearances and things-in-themselves is found in Kant’s distinction between “epistemic

conditions” and “ontological conditions.” Epistemic conditions are defined as “conditions of the

possibility of representing objection” whereas ontological conditions are “conditions of the

possibility of the existence of things.” Following from this, space, time, and causal determination

are understood to be epistemic conditions and therefore things-in-themselves are neither

spatiotemporal nor causally determined.

Vaida on the other hand believes that epistemic conditions should be understood as

sufficient conditions for experience and therefore allow us to claim that we know a small amount

of real properties of things-in-themselves as opposed to epistemic conditions as necessary, which

allows us to know nothing about things-in-themselves. It is though this reasoning that Vaida

claims that her method strengthens the justification for SR and scientific knowledge.

Furthermore, understanding epistemic conditions in this way establishes the limitations of our

knowledge as well as preventing us from assuming things beyond experience. The point that

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Vaida hopes to forward here is that Allison’s arguments fail to establish that things-in-

themselves are not causally determined.12

Furthermore, Vaida employs the distinction between the “conditional view” and the

“absolute view” posited previously by Guyer. Within the conditional view, the a priori rules of

experience are rules that must be satisfied if experience is to be possible but that the mind not

have the ability to enforce during certain instances. On the other hand, the absolute view states

that the a priori principles can validly be imposed onto an object under all circumstances. Again,

these two different views similarly correspond the distinction that Vaida made earlier with

Allison’s epistemic conditions. Guyer and Vaida similarly believe that Kant employed the

absolute view as an attempt to establish TI on the basis of the transcendental theory of

experience.13 Vaida agrees with Guyer for the single belief that one should remain a realist until

serious evidence forces otherwise. Because of this, she believes that relative view is seemingly

simpler and without rejection of the SR that we commonsensically apply to experience.

Therefore, it is through using a perspective of SR that Vaida posits her solution to Kant’s

third antinomy. Through this interpretation, we have good reasons to believe that space, time,

and causal determination correctly characterize things-in-themselves through explanatory and

predictive scientific theory. However, the purpose of applying the notion of EM to Vaida’s

scientific realism interpretation is to serve as a reminder that the realm of objects that SR is

occupied with is not equivalent with reality.

Similarly with Allison, Vaida finds that the third antinomy is an argument deeper than

just the conflict between two conflicting cosmological views. Vaida however, believes that the

third antinomy contains a legitimate concern in moral philosophy, mainly between

incompatibilist freedom that is assumed by our common sense understanding of moral

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responsibility and the scientific worldview. In this way Vaida understands space, time, and

causal determination to be characteristics of things-in-themselves, and the forms of our

sensibility and understanding to be limiting factors of experience. Furthermore, because

determinism and freedom (spontaneity) are incompatible, the same event cannot be both causally

determined and free. However, even though the previous might be true, Vaida claims that our

understanding regarding causal determination is not incompatible with the possibility of free

choice or spontaneous events. This claim stems from the necessity that the universality of causal

determinism is not absolute, objective features of reality that are restricted to possible

experience. Therefore according to EM, if free choice exists, they are not among the objects

possible experience.

While one can easily speculate about the possibility of objects that exist on the borderline

between what is knowable by experience and at the same time unknowable, it is impossible for

human beings to be that type of object. This follows from the scientific ability to study ourselves

with respect to psychological states that explain our behavior, motives, and desires even though

we remain unknown in terms of moral law.14

The last section of Vaida’s article claims that the because of SR, freedom is only possible

through an incompatibilist interpretation. In order for our ordinary conception of moral

responsibility and justice to be meaningful, we must in some sense be free. And although science

gives us reason to believe that we are not free in a natural sense, it is unable to do so in a

transcendental sense, which is to say that the causality for freedom goes beyond SR (EM).

Likewise, Vaida believes that morality gives us a prima facie reason to believe that we are free

beyond the scope of scientific knowledge. Vaida claims that morality carries a self-evident

justification for freedom, which is to say that freedom is inferred from morality.15

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Although Vaida raises several interesting points, I find that Allison’s transcendental

idealism perspective is more accurate when not only looking at Kant’s third antinomy but the

Critique as a whole. Through the following textual analysis I will prove that Allison’s

interpretation is more successfully than Vaida’s in understanding the third antinomy and problem

of free will.

While I think Vaida’s reliance on SR might be a valid approach for a common sense

interpretation of freewill and perhaps a method of avoiding scientific speculation, I find that it is

inadequate for answering reason’s ultimate search for the unconditioned condition.

“In using the principles of the understanding we apply our reason not merely to objects of

experience, for the use of principles of understanding, but instead venture to also extend

these principles beyond the boundaries of experience” (A421/B449).

In the same way, while an appeal to SR might restrict the scope of scientific research to things

within the bounds of experience, because reasons demands to arrive at ‘a completeness in a

series,’ this is not a sufficient approach. In this application, EM serves simply as a reminder that

reality is not equivalent to SR and therefore does not fulfill reason’s desire, it actually promotes

speculation, leading exactly to the “euthanasia of pure reason” that Kant is working to avoid by

encouraging people to think beyond SR and experience (A407/B434).

Furthermore, Vaida’s appeal to SR and EM seems to side heavily with the antithesis of

the antinomy and does not give the thesis its full due.

“Everything in the world takes place solely in accordance with the laws of nature

(A455/B473).”

As previously mentioned, at first glance it seems as though Vaida believes through SR that the

world is strictly understood in terms of causality studied by scientific theory. However, by

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appealing to EM and stating that science has so far been unable to prove or rule out the notion of

freedom, she finds that the causality of freedom must lie beyond our knowledge. However, along

the lines of SR, all this might mean is that so far science has been unable to answer the question

of freedom, it does not mean that the question is entirely out of reach. Following Vaida’s appeal

to SR, it is very possible that with advancement in technology that this problem might be solved

in the decades to come. Whether or not science is eventually able to come up with an answer,

Vaida’s approach ultimately leads to speculation and the dissatisfaction of reason’s desire for an

unconditioned condition.

Based on the previous evidence against and SR/EM interpretation, now I will argue that

TI is the only viable solution for the third antinomy. Proving that the causality of freedom lies

outside experience the thesis states,

“Either, therefore, reason through its demand for the unconditioned must remain in

conflict with itself, or this unconditioned must be posited outside the series of the

intelligible” (A564/B592).

However, while this satisfies reason’s desire for an unconditioned conditioned, it is exactly the

opposite of the antithesis,

“Freedom from the laws of nature is indeed a liberation from coercion, but also from the

guidance of all rules. For one cannot say that in place of the laws of nature, laws of

freedom enter into the course of the world, because if freedom were determined

according to laws, it would not be freedom, but nothing other than nature” (A447/B475).

The antithesis not only denies the justification for appealing to a conception of transcendental

freedom, but also claims that spatiotemporal conditions are characteristics of things-in-

themselves (a claim that Vaida’s SR strongly supports). Based on this assumption, using either

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an interpretation of SR or transcendental realism leaves both the reality of nature and freedom

unresolved because the thesis demands an absolute causal beginning while the antithesis claims

causation based on the laws of nature. However, by appealing to TI, Kant proves that it remains

possible for mechanisms of nature to coexist with a necessary being.

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Notes

1 Kant, Immanuel, Paul Guyer, and Allen W. Wood. Critique of Pure Reason. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1998. Print.2 Allison, Kant’s Theory of Freedom, 22. 3 Vaida, “A New Kantian Solution to the Third Antinomy of Pure Reason and to the Free Will Problem,” The Southern Journal of Philosophy 47 (2009): 403. 4 Allison, Kant’s Theory of Freedom, 22.5 Allison, Kant’s Theory of Freedom, 23.6 Allison, Kant’s Theory of Freedom, 24.7 Allison, Kant’s Theory of Freedom, 25.8 Allison, Kant’s Theory of Freedom, 26.9 Allison, Kant’s Theory of Freedom, 27. 10 Allison, Kant’s Theory of Freedom, 28.11 Vaida, “A New Kantian Solution to the Third Antinomy of Pure Reason and to the Free Will Problem,” The Southern Journal of Philosophy 47 (2009): 407.12 Vaida, “A New Kantian Solution to the Third Antinomy of Pure Reason and to the Free Will Problem,” The Southern Journal of Philosophy 47 (2009): 410-415.13 Vaida, “A New Kantian Solution to the Third Antinomy of Pure Reason and to the Free Will Problem,” The Southern Journal of Philosophy 47 (2009): 416.14 Vaida, “A New Kantian Solution to the Third Antinomy of Pure Reason and to the Free Will Problem,” The Southern Journal of Philosophy 47 (2009): 419-420.15 Vaida, “A New Kantian Solution to the Third Antinomy of Pure Reason and to the Free Will Problem,” The Southern Journal of Philosophy 47 (2009): 422.