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DavisDavis--Besse Besse Nuclear Power StationNuclear Power Station

November 26, 2002November 26, 2002

1

Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station

New Containment Emergency Sump Design

DavisDavis--Besse Besse Nuclear Power StationNuclear Power Station

November 26, 2002November 26, 2002

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Opening Remarks . . . . . . . . . . ………………Gary Leidich

New Containment Emergency Sump ………... Jim Powers

Closing Comments………………………….. Gary Leidich

DavisDavis--Besse Besse Nuclear Power StationNuclear Power Station

November 26, 2002November 26, 2002

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Gary Leidich,Executive Vice President - FENOC

DavisDavis--Besse Besse Nuclear Power StationNuclear Power Station

November 26, 2002November 26, 2002

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•Present the new Containment Sump Design/Modification at Davis-Besse

• Obtain NRC comments on Davis-Besse approach

DavisDavis--Besse Besse Nuclear Power StationNuclear Power Station

November 26, 2002November 26, 2002

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CEO of FirstEnergy has set the standard of returning

Davis-Besse back to service in a safe

and reliable manner

We must do the job right the first time and regain the

confidence of our customers, regulators, and investors in our

nuclear program

We are committed to meeting this challenge

DavisDavis--Besse Besse Nuclear Power StationNuclear Power Station

November 26, 2002November 26, 2002

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Reactor Head Reactor Head Resolution Plan Resolution Plan

Bob SchrauderBob Schrauder

Program Compliance Program Compliance PlanPlan

Jim PowersJim Powers

Containment Health Containment Health Assurance PlanAssurance Plan

Randy FastRandy Fast

Restart Test PlanRestart Test PlanRandy FastRandy Fast

Management and Management and Human Performance Human Performance

Excellence PlanExcellence Plan

Lew MyersLew Myers

System Health System Health Assurance PlanAssurance Plan

Jim PowersJim Powers

Restart Action PlanRestart Action Plan

Lew Lew MyersMyers

Restart Overview PanelRestart Overview Panel

Return to Service PlanReturn to Service Plan

DavisDavis--Besse Besse Nuclear Power StationNuclear Power Station

November 26, 2002November 26, 2002

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• New Containment Emergency Sump Design is part of the Containment Health Assurance Building Blockfrom the Davis-Besse Return to Service Plan

• Restore operability as well as add margin to Containment Emergency Sump

• Containment Emergency Sump Intake Screen is on the Davis-Besse IMC 0350 Restart List

DavisDavis--Besse Besse Nuclear Power StationNuclear Power Station

November 26, 2002November 26, 2002

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Jim PowersDirector - Nuclear Engineering

DavisDavis--Besse Besse Nuclear Power StationNuclear Power Station

November 26, 2002November 26, 2002

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• 10CFR50.46 (b)(5) and Appendix A to 10CFR50, Criterion 35 require long term emergency cooling

• Strainer protects Low Pressure Injection (LPI), High Pressure Injection (HPI) and Containment Spray(CS) systems from debris intrusion during a LOCA event

DavisDavis--Besse Besse Nuclear Power StationNuclear Power Station

November 26, 2002November 26, 2002

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• Nominally 14 ft. X 5 ft. X 2 ft. (L x W x H)• Approximately 50 sq. ft. available (vertical) surface area• 1/4” square screen openings, galvanized wire - 53.4%

open area• Vortex Suppression with existing grating qualified by

testing

DavisDavis--Besse Besse Nuclear Power StationNuclear Power Station

November 26, 2002November 26, 2002

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ELEV. 565

LC

TRASH RACK GATE

TRASHRACKGATE

ContainmentSump Area

ReactorVessel

DavisDavis--Besse Besse Nuclear Power StationNuclear Power Station

November 26, 2002November 26, 2002

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DavisDavis--Besse Besse Nuclear Power StationNuclear Power Station

November 26, 2002November 26, 2002

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DavisDavis--Besse Besse Nuclear Power StationNuclear Power Station

November 26, 2002November 26, 2002

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DavisDavis--Besse Besse Nuclear Power StationNuclear Power Station

November 26, 2002November 26, 2002

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DavisDavis--Besse Besse Nuclear Power StationNuclear Power Station

November 26, 2002November 26, 2002

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Increase Net Positive Suction Head (NPSH) margin for Emergency Core Cooling System under design

basis accident conditions

DavisDavis--Besse Besse Nuclear Power StationNuclear Power Station

November 26, 2002November 26, 2002

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• Conduct reviews of the design basis of the sump

• Identify debris sources (NEI 02-01 guidance):– Containment walkdowns,– Coating evaluations, and, – Foreign material evaluations

• Evaluate the transport of debris to the sump screen

• Develop corrective actions to reduce debris sources

• Develop plan to significantly increase sump intake surface area

DavisDavis--Besse Besse Nuclear Power StationNuclear Power Station

November 26, 2002November 26, 2002

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• Flow Rates– Low Pressure Injection (LPI) 4000 gpm per train– Containment Spray (CS) 1500 gpm per train– Total Strainer Design Flow 11,000 gpm

• Minimum Water Level– Small Break LOCA Elevation 566.76 ft. (1.76 ft. above floor)– Limiting Large Break LOCA Elevation 566.83 ft. (1.83 ft. above floor)

DavisDavis--Besse Besse Nuclear Power StationNuclear Power Station

November 26, 2002November 26, 2002

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• Net Positive Suction Head (NPSH) Margin(NPSH Margin = NPSH Available - NPSH Required)– Approximately 3 feet for LPI (before adding strainer/debris head loss)– Approximately 5 feet for CS (before adding strainer/debris head loss)

Note: No credit taken for containment over pressure above vapor pressure of water (Licensing Basis)

DavisDavis--Besse Besse Nuclear Power StationNuclear Power Station

November 26, 2002November 26, 2002

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• Increase NPSH available• Increase strainer surface area

– Lower approach velocity– Lower head loss

• Increase margin • Design based on conservative approach

for debris generation, transport and head loss

DavisDavis--Besse Besse Nuclear Power StationNuclear Power Station

November 26, 2002November 26, 2002

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• Available surface area ~ 1200 sq. ft. – Upper strainer ~ 400 sq. ft.– Lower Strainer ~ 800 sq. ft.

• Strainer and supporting structure made from stainless steel

• Strainer made from 10 gauge perforated plate with 3/16” diameter holes with 41% open area

• Strainer designed to ASME Section III, Subsection NF Code to withstand 5 psi differential pressure

• Vortex suppression designed to the guidance of RG 1.82, Rev.2

DavisDavis--Besse Besse Nuclear Power StationNuclear Power Station

November 26, 2002November 26, 2002

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Tunnel AccessSump Access

Lower StrainerTunnel Floor 537’ Elevation

Containment 565’ Elevation

DavisDavis--Besse Besse Nuclear Power StationNuclear Power Station

November 26, 2002November 26, 2002

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Containment Floor, 565’elev. “Upper Strainer”

“LowerStrainer”

Reactor Annulus

Incore Tunnel Stairs

DavisDavis--Besse Besse Nuclear Power StationNuclear Power Station

November 26, 2002November 26, 2002

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DavisDavis--Besse Besse Nuclear Power StationNuclear Power Station

November 26, 2002November 26, 2002

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• New design facilitates two controlling pipe break scenarios

– Hot Leg break at top of OTSG (Case I)– Hot Leg break at RPV (Case II)

• Case I generates largest volume of debris– Both upper and lower strainer sections available

• Case II generates smaller volume of debris– Upper strainer section available– No credit taken for lower strainer due to potential

damage from pipe break blowdown

DavisDavis--Besse Besse Nuclear Power StationNuclear Power Station

November 26, 2002November 26, 2002

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• NEI 02-01, “Condition Assessment Guideline: Debris Sources Inside Containment”

– Conducted field walkdowns to collect plant specific data

• Methodology used:– BWROG Utility Resolution Guidance methodology

(plus NRC comments)– Conservative Zone of Influence (ZOI)– 100% destruction of fibrous insulation in ZOI– 42% destruction of Reflective Metal Insulation

(RMI) in ZOI• Unqualified Coatings

– Assumed 100% failure under Design Basis Accident

DavisDavis--Besse Besse Nuclear Power StationNuclear Power Station

November 26, 2002November 26, 2002

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• Pipe Breaks– Loss-of-Coolant-Accident (LOCA) locations

per NRC’s Standard Review Plan (MEB 3-1)– Pipe breaks on Reactor Coolant System

included– Critical pipe breaks

–Hot Leg break at top of OSTG (Case I)–Hot Leg break at RPV (Case II)

DavisDavis--Besse Besse Nuclear Power StationNuclear Power Station

November 26, 2002November 26, 2002

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Debris Type Case ICase II

Fiber 42 ft3 3ft3RMI Foils 67,700 ft2 11,900 ft2

Dust, Dirt, Concrete 475 lbs.Rust 159 lbs.

CoatingsInorganic Zinc 9620 ft2

(577 lbs.)Epoxy 9620 ft2 (481 lbs.)Alkyds 3500 ft2 (105 lbs.)

(Preliminary Results)

DavisDavis--Besse Besse Nuclear Power StationNuclear Power Station

November 26, 2002November 26, 2002

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Sample Davis-Besse Debris Transport Logic Tree (Per NUREG/CR-6369) (RMI Transport)

B r e a k T y p e a n d L o c a t i o n D e b r i s S i z e B l o w d o w n

T r a n s p o r t

C o n t a i n m e n t S p r a y W a s h d o w n

T r a n s p o r t

R e c i r c u l a t i o n P h a s eT r a n s p o r t F i n a l L o c a t i o n

U p p e r C o n t a i n m e n t

S m a l l C o n t a i n m e n t F l o o r

R e a c t o r A n n u l u s

L a r g e

L B L O C AR V N o z z l e

B r e a k

C o n t a i n m e n tF l o o r

R e a c t o r A n n u l u s

S e d i m e n t

C o n t a i n m e n tF l o o r

E C C S S u m p

S e d i m e n t

I n c o r e T u n n e l

E C C S S u m p

S e d i m e n t

I n c o r e T u n n e l

E C C S S u m p

S e d i m e n t

U p p e r C o n t a i n m e n t

U p p e r S t r a i n e r s

C o n t a i n m e n t F l o o r

L o w e r S t r a i n e r s

I n c o r e T u n n e l F l o o r

U p p e r S t r a i n e r s

C o n t a i n m e n t F l o o r

L o w e r S t r a i n e r s

I n c o r e T u n n e l F l o o r

U p p e r S t r a i n e r s

C o n t a i n m e n t F l o o r

R e s u s p e n d

S e d i m e n t

U p p e r S t r a i n e r s

A n n u l u s F l o o r

R e s u s p e n d

S e d i m e n t

L o w e r S t r a i n e r s

A n n u l u s F l o o r

DavisDavis--Besse Besse Nuclear Power StationNuclear Power Station

November 26, 2002November 26, 2002

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• All Significant flow paths modeled

• Interactions between access tunnels and containment floor

• Strainers incorporated• Models movement and

settling of debris• Computational cells

~ 2,000,000

CFD Modeling of Davis-Besse Incore Tunnel

Tunnel AccessSump Access

Lower Strainer

DavisDavis--Besse Besse Nuclear Power StationNuclear Power Station

November 26, 2002November 26, 2002

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• All significant flow obstructions modeled

• Interactions between containment floor and incore tunnel

• Emergency sump and strainers incorporated

• Movement and settling of debris is modeled

• Computational cells ~ 500,000

CFD Modeling of Davis-Besse Containment Floor

Tunnel AccessSump Access (Upper Strainer)

DavisDavis--Besse Besse Nuclear Power StationNuclear Power Station

November 26, 2002November 26, 2002

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• Red: Turbulence > RMI debris suspended

• Break on lower right• Flow: 11,000 gpm• Pool height: 2 feet• Elevation: +1.5 inches

above floor level

CFD Analysis of Davis-Besse Containment Floor

DavisDavis--Besse Besse Nuclear Power StationNuclear Power Station

November 26, 2002November 26, 2002

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• New strainer features greatly increased surface area

• Preliminary calculations indicate that Emergency Core Cooling System pumps will have NPSH margin under Design Basis Accident debris loading

DavisDavis--Besse Besse Nuclear Power StationNuclear Power Station

November 26, 2002November 26, 2002

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Gary Leidich,Executive Vice President - FENOC

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