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Economic Struggle and Hollywood Imperialism: Europe Converts to SoundAuthor(s): Douglas GomerySource: Yale French Studies, No. 60, Cinema/Sound (1980), pp. 80-93Published by: Yale University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2930006 .

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8/20/2019 2930006


Douglas Gomery

Economic trugglend

Hollywoodmperialism:

Europe Convertso Sound

The comingof sound to

worldcinema has precipitatedmany mpor-

tant studies

of its aesthetic, ocial

and cultural ffects.

urprisingly,

there

exists

very ittle ystematic

nalysis f the consequences

of this

technological

hange for nternational

radeof motion

pictures. ilm

distribution resentsfew

problems

within

single

nation;

interna-

tional

commerce

s not

nearly

o

simple.

Examining rior

work

for

trade

among the USA,

United Kingdom,

Franceand Germany,

ne

finds hree typesof analysis.'

First,

extbooks ell of worlddomina-

tion and exploitation) yHollywood,the successof film roduction

in

Britain

in

1933,

the disastrous

ffect f the world depression

n

France, and

the rise of Hitler (and

Goebbels)

in Germany. No

connections

re made;

the

coming

f

sound simply appens.2

Recent

work makes stronger

laims. On

the

one hand

Thomas Guback

examines the US

film

ndustry's xpansion

into and takeover

of

European

markets fter

World War I. By 1925 Hollywood

products

accounted for

95 percent

f Britishmovierevenues nd 70 percent

f

French.

When the United

States film ndustryxported

ound films,

it utilized this

change

to solidify

ts

hegemony, nd

maintain ts

dominantposition

n the world until fter he second

worldwar. In

contrast,

Robert Sklar

argues

that

in

the late 1920s European

countries,particularly

ritain,

France

and

Germany, egan

to

repel

II examine these particular

ountries ecause in economic terms heywere the

largest. This paper is a

work-in-progress,

he beginning f a larger studyof the

economic history f world cinema. In the future shall examine Eastern and Third

World countries.

Moreover,

this

study

acks

primary

ocumentsfromthe United

Kingdom, France, and Germany nd

so

all conclusions or he presentmustbe taken

as

only tentative.

2See, for example, David Robinson,

The History f World Cinema New

York:

Stein andDay, 1973), pp. 170-175, 195,201 or

Arthur night, he Liveliest rt New

York: MacMillan, 1957), pp. 158-159,

201-202, 207, 222.

80






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Douglas Gomery

Hollywood expansion with a moderate

degree

of

success.

The

addition of sound

helped

these

countries ecause

of the

problems

f

the

troublesome onversion f

films or

different

anguage udiences.3

In this essay I

shall argue thatthe

full mpactof the world-wide

diffusion f sound

can not

be

understood

n

the

simple ermsGuback

and -Sklar

suggest. We need an

explicit

theory

of

international

exchange by which

to structure

ur

analysis. Marxist economics

provides the most

appropriate heoretical

ramework. oth

Guback

and Sklar

(implicitly)

tilize

theneo-classical conomic

model: how

did foreign quotas and tariffs isruptfreedistributionf films?

Combined

with a

dramaticnarrative

tructure-how could a

poor

European countryurvive

he

onslaught f the

Hollywoodmonopoly-

their accounts

make for

compellingreading.Unfortunately

heir

analyses gloss

over

complex

issues

and thus do

not

provide

a

systematic

xplanationof world

exchange

of

motion pictures.The

free-trade

model ignores

questions of imperialism nd cartels;

the

Marxist model

of

international

rade

places expansion

of

trade

to

other countries t

the

core

of the

capitalist

ocial formation.Marxist

economists

argue

that

during

the

late

1920s and early 1930s

the

United

States

moved from

lassical

mperialism

o a new

category

f

international

xploitationfounded on the

productsof the

second

industrial evolution:

teel, the internal

ombusion ngine nd

elec-

tricity-including

motionpictures.4

I

For the

coming f sound to

Europe, the

analysismust ocus n the

question of the

nature

of

economic relationsamong

advanced

capitalist

countries.One

concept

emerges

as

central:

cartelization.

During

this

period

a small

group

of

argepowerful

orporations

n

the

3Robert

Sklar,

Movie-Made

America New

York:

Vintage,

1975),

pp. 215-224

and

Thomas

H.

Guback,

The

International ilm

IndustryBloomington: ndianaUniversity ress, 1969),pp. 8-10. These

positions

re

typical

f

many

thers; used

Guback

and

Sklar

because

they re most

accessible.

4Harry

Magdoff,

Imperialism:A

Historical

urvey,"

Monthly

eview

24, No. 1

(May,

1972), pp.

14-16;

Michael

Barratt

Brown,

The

Economics

of

Imperialism

(London:

Penguin, 1974),

pp.

48-72;

James

O'Connor,

The

Corporations

nd the

State

New

York:

Harper,

1974),

pp.

153-196.

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Yale

FrenchStudies

United

States, United

Kingdom,France and Germany

oughtdom-

inance and consequently ormedlliances o "control ompetition" n

an

international cale.

Numerous

pools, cartels and trustswere

formed.

Such

relationshipswere rarely tatic; each

corporate

giant

sought o gain power

from tsrivals.Agreementswould

only astuntil

one

signatory elt

trong nough o extractmore urplus

alue. Cycles

of truce

. .

battle . .

truce

. .

battle were common.Frequently

the

nation-statewould assist resident

orporations,

sing tariffs r

quotas to gain

temporary dvantage.

Pivotal n thisnew mperialism asthe multinationalorporation.

After

World War I a

monopolist orporation arely

perated

in

a

single nation-state.

During the 1920s

United States corporations

began large-scaleexpansion nto

European markets,

specially

nto

thosecountriesmost

damagedbywar.

The so-called

new

technology"

industries-usually

associated withmass consumable

products ike

automobiles

or

motion

pictures-grew

most

rapidly.

uropean

cor-

porations,the formermperialist owers,had to retreat nddevelop

methodsbywhich o respond

o

aggressive nited

tates

ompetitors.5

Hollywood's

multinational

orporations Warners,

RKO, Fox,

Paramount,

Loew's,

Columbia, United

Artists,Universal)began

to

export sound movies late

in

1928. At that

time

there

were few

theatreswiredfor

ound;

conversion

f

cinemas

n

Europe

lagged

far

behind the

U.S. By

the

end

of 1929

only

18

percent

of

European

theatres could present

talkies

while

nearly

half the cinemas

n

the

U.S. could. In all cases the most de luxe picturepalaces (super-

cinemas)

in

the

biggest

itieswere wiredfirst.

hen

cinemas

with

ess

revenue-generating

otential

onverted.

Very

small houses

(100-200

seats)

came

last,

some as

late as 1935. United

Kingdom

exhibitors

wired

most quickly 22 percent

n

1929;

63

percentby

the close of

1930). Germany

heatre wnersmoved more lowly; he

penetration

rate did not

top

60

percent

ntil1932.

French

xhibitors

roved

ven

more recalcitrant.Consequently the United Kingdom became

5Paul

Sweezy,

TheTheory f Capitalist evelopmentNew

York:

Monthly eview

Press, 1970), pp.

254-265; 301-309; Louis Turner,

nvisible

Empires

(London:

Hamish Hamilton,

1970), pp. 1-10; Mira Wilkins, The Maturing

f Multinational

Enterprise, olume

II

(Cambridge:Harvard University ress,

1974), pp.

101-192.

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Douglas Gomery

Hollywood's firstmportantoreignmarket.

ater, Hollywoodwould

utilize experience gained in Great Britainto establishprecedents

which t would try

o followon the Continent. irst,

n

conjunction

withWestern lectric

nd the Radio Corporationf

America

RCA),

the dominantU.S. suppliers

of sound

apparatus,

the

Hollywood

monopolistsgave preferentialreatmento

theowners f the de luxe

(super) cinemas. Western Electric and

RCA wired these theatres

first; ollywood provided he mostpopular

talkiesfor xclusive

irst-

runs.

All

technical

problems f compatibilityere easilyeliminated.

Native producers, mporters nd ownersof smaller inemas simply

had

no

choice but

to acquiesce or lose

the chance to

capture

share

of

the surplusprofits.6

However, Hollywood,

RCA

and

Western lectric ould

not

utilize

similarmarketing

trategies

or the Continent ecause

of

language

conversion ifficulties.nitially, ubbing,

ub-titles

nd native

anguage

narratorswere tried-with

little uccess.

The most promising,

ub-

bing, was fraught ith echnologicalimitations,nd caused adverse

audience reaction.

Consequently

he

Hollywood

monopolists egan

to

produce foreignanguage

versions f feature

ilms nd short

ub-

jects.

In

November

1929

Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer

MGM) took

the

lead by embarking n a two million ollar

program o replicate, n

at

least three versions,nearly ll of its feature

ilms.Withfully mor-

tized

sets, costumes

nd scripts, dditional

versions arely ost more

than

30

percent

f the

original.

MGM

also

filmed

few

riginal oreign

language films, suallybased on previouslyuccessful ilents.Early

in 1930

Paramount

established huge studio

at Joinville, ix miles

from

Paris,

to

create foreign ersions

n

five anguages. By March,

1930, this studio was

in full operation, he equivalentof any lot in

California.The otherHollywoodmonopolistsoined Paramount nd

by

the summer of

1930

Joinville

functioned

n

a 24-hour-a-day

6C. J. North and N. D.

Golden, "Meeting Sound Film

CompetitionAbroad,"

Journalof the Societyof

Motion PictureEngineers 5

(Dec., 1930), p. 751;

Variety,10/3/29,. 6; Franklin . Irby, Recent and FutureEconomic Changes n theMotion

Picture

Field,"

Journal

f

the

Society f

Motion

Picture

ngineers

5

(Sep., 1930), p.

343; MartinQuigley (ed.), The

Motion PictureAlmanac

-

1931 (New York: Quigley

Publications, 932), pp. 302=309; Variety, /13/29,

/21/29,2/11/29,2/18/29;nited

Artists

Collection. O'Brien File.

ManuscriptCollection. WisconsinCenter forFilm

and

Theatre Research, Madison, Wisconsin),Box 84-4,

etters, 929.

83





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Yale FrenchStudies

schedule, creating ilmsntwelve anguages.Hollywood ontinued o

make foreignversions n California. On a much smallerscale the

British, rench, nd German film ndustries lso produced heir wn

foreign ersionsforexport.7

Yet withinone year, Hollywood would realize it had grossly

miscalculated. Foreign versionscould not generate a profit.Even

sharing xpenses at Joinville id not keep costsbelow thebreak-even

point. Dubbing

had

greatly mproved

nd

become far ess

expensive.

Late in 1931 the Hollywoodmonopolists,n order o minimizeosses,

turned ompletely o that lternative. he largerevenues orMGM's

dubbed versions

of

Min and

Bill

(in Italian) and TraderHorn (in

French) convinced all concerned. MGM ceased production f sep-

arate versions

arly

n

1932;

the other

Hollywood monopolists

oon

followed.ParamountconvertedJoinvillento Hollywood's dubbing

center

for

Europe. Special language

versionshad

a short ife

1930-

1931), and servedonly s the transitiono thedubbing rocess, till

n

use today.8

As Hollywood

worked

to

resolve ts

language

conversion

rob-

lem, a German cartel ppeared

to

challenge

he

U.S. film

ndustry's

domination

of

European

markets.Three German nventors

ad

de-

veloped an alternative ound-on-film ethodwhich ecame known s

Tri-Ergon.They unsuccessfully

ried

o

innovate heir

ystem

nto he

German

film

ndustry etween

1922

and

1926.

However

n

1928, fter

realizing

the

threat

f

U.S. domination

f world

sound technology,

theGermangovernment ncouraged heformationfan alternative.

The

TonbildSyndicate

A.G.

(Tobis), organized

with

German,Dutch

and

Swiss

money, cquired

the

Tri-Ergon atents

nd

began

to nstall

sound

equipment

n

German

theatres.

imultaneously

he two most

importantGerman electrical manufacturers,iemens

and

Halske,

7Variety,

4/30/29,/7/29, 0/2/29,

0/16/29,1/6/29; usiness

Week, Feb.,

1930,

p.

40; George Lewin,"Dubbing and Its

Relation

o

Sound Motion

Picture roduction,"

Journalof the Societyof Motion PictureEngineers, 6 (January, 931), pp. 38-48;

Variety, /26/30,

/19/30, /30/30, /2/30,

/10/30, /17/30, 0/22/30; . S.

Phillips,

"The Nazi

Control

of

the GermanFilm

ndustry," ournal f

European Studies , No.

1

(1971), p. 42.

8Variety, /19/30,

/6/30, /30/30, 0/29/30, 2/24/30,

/7/31, /15/31,

1/3/31,

4/12/32, /16/32,

/20/33;Alfonso Pinto,

"Hollywood's Spanish Language Films,"

Films

in

Review, 24

(Oct., 1972), pp.

474-483.

84






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FrenchStudies

broke with their

fellow

monopolists,

nd

began to rent

films o

exhibitors n the disputedmarkets.Warnershad little ncentive o

cooperate with

Western

lectric;

thetwowere

n the

middleof a six-

year

arbitration truggle

oncerningWarners'

riginal

ontract. CA

had

created RKO to

provide a

market for

its sound

equipment.

Seizing

on

Western

Electric's

foreign

roblems,

RCA's parentcor-

poration, General

Electric,acquired

part-interestn AEG

and thus

became

part-owner f

Tobis-Klangfilm. oon

afterRCA,

RKO and

Tobis-Klangfilmnitialed

cooperative

greement.

I

The otherHollywoodmonopolists oon acquiesced. In mid-June,

1930,

representatives

rom

Tobis-Klangfilm

Western

Electric,RCA

and the

U.S.

film

ndustry egan

to

confer

n

Paris.

An

international

cartel was the

statedgoal;

thesurplus rofits

ere

estimated

o be a

quarter of a

billiondollars.

Quickly ll parties

greed

to

splitup the

world

for

patentrights

nd thenchargefilm

ompaniesroyalties

or

distribution

ithin

ach

territory.

he

negotiations

asted

one

month.

On July 2, 1930,Western lectric,RCA andTobis-Klangfilmormed

a

loose cartel

which

divided the world nto

four territories. obis-

Klangfilm

ecuredexclusive

ights

or

Europe

and

Scandinavia,

while

Western

Electric and

RCA

obtained the

U.S., Canada,

Australia,

New

Zealand, India,

and the Soviet Union. For

the valuable British

Market, royaltieswere

split one-fourth

or

Tobis-Klangfilm,

hree-

fourths or

Western lectric nd

RCA.

The rest f the

worldbecame

open

territory;

o

company

held

exclusive

rights.

All

parties

ex-

changed and pooled technical nformation. he royalty eesranged

from 500 to

$5,000

per film,

epending

n

how

many

ountrieswere

involved.The

diffusionf

sound eemedto

be

complete,

he

conomic

struggle

ver.'2

In

fact,

the

Hollywood

monopolists

never

formally

atified

he

"Paris

Agreement."

Shortly

fterthe

conference,

Germany

nsti-

tuted

stiffer

uota regulations.

n

protestHollywood

eaders refused

"

Variety,/31/29,/4/29,

1/6/29,1/13/29,2/4/29,

2/11/29,/8/30,/12/30,/9/30,6/25/30;

Douglas Miller, "Difficulties f the Spitzen

Organization n

Germany,"

CommerceReports,18 November

1929, p. 430.

'2New York

Times,5/17/30;

ariety, /21/30; .

S.

Gregg, The Shadow of Sound

(New York:

Vantage Press, 1968), pp. 61-62; New

York Times, 6/18/30;

Variety,

6/25/30,

/2/30, /16/30; rvin

Hexner, nternational artels London: Isaac

Putnam

and

Sons, 1946), pp. 374-375;

United Artists

Collection, Box 86-2, Agreement,

American-German ilm

Conference,

2

July 930.

86






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Douglas Gomery

to sign the

pact, but

would continue

o

make

all

necessary

oyalty

payments.WesternElectric,RCA, Tobis-Klangfilm,nd theHolly-

wood

monopolists began meeting

nformally

o negotiate a final

settlement.

inally

n February

932

theyheld

a second

Paris confer-

ence. French represetatives

lso

attended and bitterly

omplained

because under

the

1930

accord

theyhad

to

pay

Western

lectric ne

fee to rent quipment

nd Tobis-Klangfilm

second

fee

for he

right

to distribute he same

film n their own country.Other

disputes

surfaced

nd the cartel

fractured.t endured

mere

18 months.13

Consequently,patentdisputes ruptednEurope andthroughout

the restof the world.

A

typical

hallenge ame

in

Denmark.

n 1929

the dominantDanish

producer,

Nordisk,had acquired

the rights

o

the Peterson-Poulson

ound system. ventually

hesepatents

ecame

part

of

the German

group.

With

the world

ound cartel n disarray,

Nordisk

began

to reassert ts exclusive

rights

or Denmark.

First

Nordiskpetitioned

Danish court

for he

right

o collect

royalties

or

all foreignfilmspresented n Denmarkwhich were not recorded

using

the Peterson-Poulson ystem.

n October

1933,

the

Danish

Court ruled for Nordisk

and

issued an injunction reventing

he

exhibition f

any

film n

Denmark

unless t had been recorded

or re-

recorded)

on the Peterson-Poulson

ystem.

Quickly

Nordisk nsti-

tuted similarsuits

in Norway,

Sweden and Finland. Immediately

tripartite

egotiations pened among

Western

Electric, the Holly-

wood

monopolists, nd Nordisk.

Tobis-Klangfilm

ededall rights.n

November 1934, the Hollywoodmonopolists igned an agreement

withNordiskforDenmark.

Because of court

ulings, ollywood

had

to agree to yet another

pact for

Sweden. Nordisk ost

its suits n

Norway

and Finland.

4

As

Hollywood

negotiatedmore and more

individual

ompacts,

Tobis-Klangfilm,

Western

Electric nd RCA

lost a larger

nd larger

percentage

of the royalties uaranteed

underthe 1930

Paris Agree-

ment.

Consequently

Tobis-Klangfilm

ressured

or modified artel.

During

1935 in

Europe

and the

United States,representatives

rom

13Variety,

7/23/30,

/27/30, /10/30, /2/32, /29/32, /9/32, /11/33;

United

Artists

Collection,

Box 86-2,

Memos, 1935.

"4Variety,

11/15/32,

/12/35,

/1/35; nited Artists ollection,

Boxes

84-7,

85-1,

86-2 and 87-7, letters,

933-1935;

New York

Times,

11/11/32,0/13/34.

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Western

Electric, RCA, Tobis-Klangfilm,he Hollywood monopo-

lists, and several European film ndustriesmet and negotiateda

second "Paris Agreement." The producers ettled all past royalty

claims,

and

secured

lower

rates

for

the future. he

agreementwas

signedon March 18, 1936, and would ast onger han tspredecessor,

nearly three years. The outbreakof World War

II

made any cartel

impossible.

II

In

sum, the second Paris Agreement nd thecomplete onversion

of cinemas

signaled

the end

of

the diffusion f sound for

Europe.

Evaluating

its

impact

for

the United

States, French,

German

and

British

relations proves quite

difficult.

anguage conversion rob-

lems did provide foreign ountries temporary dvantage.

When

dubbing

became

universal,

he

advantage wung

back

to

Hollywood.

Patent warfarehelped theU.S. and Germany.Throughout he ebb

and

flow of

this

economic

struggle,

.S. and Germanfirms ictated

the

terms

f

exchange;

the British

nd Frenchwere

simply xploited.

Thus it s not

surprisinghatby 1936,

the Germanshad

recaptured

major

share of theirown marketfrom

Hollywood.

But so

did

the

French and British The Germans had reducedHollywood'sshare

(compared

to

1929, pre-Depression evels) by

36

percent,

heFrench

by

24

percent

nd the British

by

20

percent.

One is

tempted

o side

with Sklar and find hat the

coming

of sound

caused

the

Germans,

principally

because

of

patent hegemony,

to

be able

to ward off

Hollywood's

dominationof German screen time. But this

expla-

nation

cannot

account for he

success

of

the French

nd

British.

or

too

long

the

coming

f

sound to

Europe

has been treated s

a

single,

isolated variable. argue

we must urn

o

other actors

o

help explain

the reduction

of

Hollywood's power.

Without

complete

under-

standing fvariationsneconomic xchange hroughoutheperiodof

'5Variety, 10/9/35;

.

S. Gregg,The Shadow

of Sound (New

York:

Vantage

Press,

1968),

p. 181; UnitedArtistsCollection.

Boxes

85-3

and 86-2, contracts

nd

letters,

1936-1939.

88






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Douglas Gomery

the comingof sound, we can neverfully

nderstand ts

mpact.

6

To keep this presentanalysiswithinmanageablebounds, will

consider only

the two additionalfactorswhichwe should nclude

n

any new analysis: he effect f the state nd the

relative

mpact

f the

world

depression. By 1928, Britain,France,

and Germany

ll

had

state restrictionsegarding

he

exhibition

f

foreign

ilmswithin heir

respective

countries.

n

France,

The

Quota

Commission

required

thatforevery French"

film

roduced, even

U.S.

films ould

come

into France. German and British aws were stronger.

he Germans

required "importpermits" nd withyear-to-year odification ept

their numbersat levels lower than what Hollywood desired. The

British aw

required hat

United

Kingdom

xhibitors nd distributors

reserve

a certain

portion

of

theirbusiness

forBritish

ictures.

The

Cinematograph

ilm

Act

of

1927

established

nitial

minimums f

7

1/2

percent

for

distributors

nd

5

percent

for

exhibitors. hese lower

bounds increased

annually

until both reached

20

percent

for 1936.

There was limited ooperative ction.In 1930the French nd Ger-

man film

nterests nd governmentsgreed to

drop quota restrictions

for

exchange

between those

two

countries.17

This is how government ontrol stood as Hollywood began to

export

ts

sound films.

As with

he

ate

1920s,

he

French

overnment

continued

its

passive

stance

during

he

early

1030s. Its

quota

law

expired

n

October

1931

and,

undermuch

pressure

rom he

U.S. film

industry, he Frenchgovernment id not renew

he aw. U.S. talkies

flowed ntoFrance withno impediments. fterone yeara revised

law was passed (August 1933) which ontrolled

henumber f dubbed

"6William

V.

Strauss,

"Foreign

Distribution

f

American Motion

Pictures,"

Harvard Busines

Review, 8, No.

3

(April, 1930), pp.

307-315;

Jeremy unstall,The

Media Are

American (New

York:

Columbia

University ress,

1977), p. 284;

Jack

Alicoate (ed.), Film

Daily

Yearbook

-

1931 New York:

Film Daily,

1931), 1001,1017,

1025-26,

1050; Film Daily

Yearbook

-

1936

1124-30.

17U.S.

Bureau of

Foreign

and

Domestic

Commerce, Trade

nformationulletin

No.

694,

May, 1930, pp. 6-7, 14; Howard T.

Lewis (ed.), Harvard

Business

Reports,

No. 8 (New York: McGraw-Hill,1930), pp. 452-472; CarltonJ. H. Hayes, France:A

Nation

of Patriots

New

York:

Columbia

University ress, 1930),

pp.

190-195;

Film

Yearbook, 1926, pp.

858-59;

U.S. Bureau of Foreign

and

Domestic Commerce,

Trade

Information ulletinNo.

542, p. 4;

Howard

T.

Lewis,

The Motion Picture

Industry New York: D. Van

Nostrand,1933), pp.

399-404,

421-423; Political

nd

Economic Planning,

The BritishFilm

Industry London:

PEP, 1952), pp.

41-44;

Variety,

0/6/28, /28/28.

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Douglas Gomery

presentation f

non-German

motion

ictures

o

zero.

Franco-German

"free-trade" apsed in 1936.19

State action

enabled Germany

nd

France,

and

Britain o a lesser

degree, to combat U.S.

movie

imperialism.

o did

the

world-wide

depression.

his

century's

ost evere

conomic risis

rovided rance,

Germany nd Britain

distinct omparative dvantage-in

both the

short nd long-run.As the depression pread throughout

he

world,

exchange rates of

foreign ountries egan

to

fluctuate ignificantly,

usually againstthe

U.S.

corporations

nd

in

favor f

their

uropean

counterparts. uropean governmentsither roze he currency old-

ings of foreign raders,

r used (deflated)currencyxchange ates o

assist native

ndustries

t the expense

of

foreign orporations. hus,

in real dollars

Hollywood extractedfrom ts overseas' operations

smaller and

smaller

revenues, despite

the

popularity

f

the

early

talkies.The U.S. government inally djustedexchange ates

n

1934,

but not before U.S. multinationalorporationsufferedarge osses

abroad.

0

Equally as important-in the ongerrun-was the relative

ffect

of

the Great Depression

in

the four

countriesof concern here.

Germany nd the

United States experienced evere

decline.Between

1929 and 1932 U.S.

national ncome fell

38

percent, ndustrial ro-

duction

nearly

0

percent.

Comparisons

etween

nations re difficult

but

by economists'best

estimates,Germany's

lide

matched

hatof

the United States

while the United

Kingdom declined only

half as

much, and Francethree-quarterss much. shall assume thesegross

declines matched

hose

for

relative onsumer urchasing ower,and

thus

potential

cinema revenues.

n

fact,

he available

(albeit crude)

19Lewis, Motion Picture ndustry, p. 403-404; Roger

Manvell

and Heinrich

Fraenkel,

The German Cinema (New

York:

Praeger, 1971), pp. 69-70;

H. H.

Wollenberg,Fifty ears of German

Film

London:

Falcon

Press,

1948), pp. 35-37;

M.

S. Phillips, "Nazi

Control," pp. 37, 53-54;

David Stewart

Hull, Films

n

the

Third

Reich

(Berkeley: University

f

CaliforniaPress, 1969), pp.

109-112; Film Daily

Yearbook

-

1932, 1031; 1933,

972-973, 992-993; 1934, 1000-1001, 1030; 1935,

1019-1020, 1055; 1936, 1127-1129, 1177, 1179; 1937, 1168-1169, 1219-1220.

20Lester V. Chandler, America's GreatestDepression,

1929-1941 New York:

Harper & Row, 1970), pp. 101-109,

161-169; Charles

P.

Kindleberger, he World

Depression, 1929-1939 (Berkeley:

University

f

California ress, 1973), pp. 177-198;

William

I.

Greenwald, "The Motion Picture

ndustry:

An Economic

Study

of

the

History nd Practices f a

Business,"

Unpublished h.D., New

York

University, 950,

pp.

185-186; Film Daily Yearbook

-

1932, 1004; 1933, 963.

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cinema attendencedata indicates

uch

ogic s acceptable;

for

xam-

ple, U.S. attendancedeclined 35 percent.There also existeda sig-

nificantdifference

n

terms

of

recovery:

trongest

n

Britain (24

percent above

1929

levels by 1937), next

n

Germany 17 percent

above), and the U.S. (3 percent bove).

In contrast, n 1937 France

remained

18

percentbelow

1929

evels. The French conomy id not

decline

as

severely

s thatof the U.S. or Germany, ut

t

neverdid

regain previous levels

of

economic activity

uringthe coming of

sound.

Germany

nd

the

United

Kingdom

urged

back

strongly.

he

U.S.

economy simply eturned o pre-Depresion

evels.2'

For cinema exhibition herewere threeverydifferenteactions

for

the Germans, French

and

British.

Specifically

n

Germany he

downturn

or

cinema

attendance ame

in 1930.

Numerouscinemas

closed.

In

response, he

Nazi

government

anned doublefeatures,

n

order

to

place

the most

popular

films

n

the

maximum

number

f

theatres,

nd initiated n

embargo

on construction

f

new theatres.

Attendancebeganto creep up in 1934androse dramaticallyn 1936.

In

France cinema

attendanceremained trong

ntil

1933, declined

severely

or wo

years,

nd

then

tagnated

t that ower evel.

During

the Depression the

United

Kingdom experienced

an increase in

movie-going. New cinemas opened;

in

1932,

at the nadir of the

economic

crisis,

50

new theatres

were

built, ncluding

everal

picture

palaces. Withrapid and strong ecovery

f thenational conomy, he

British

film

ndustry rew stronger

while

Hollywood

was weakest.

The French

made

small

gains

until

1933;

the

Germans

dissipated.

Across the

sea,

U.S. movie admissions

lunged;

threeof

the

Holly-

wood

monopolistswent bankrupt

nd had to

be reorganized y

the

federal

government: aramount,

ox and RKO. In

1936

Hollywood

did

regain

its

power

and

the potential

trength

o

surge

forward n

foreign

markets.

Throughout

the

early 1930s, despite

its

patent

position, Hollywood

saw

exports

decline.

In 1936

foreign

evenues

began to increaseagain,but not n thestronger uropean countries,

2'Christopher

H. Sterling nd Timothy

R. Haight eds.), The Mass Media (New

York: Praeger,

1978),

p. 187; W. Arthur ewis,

Economic Survey,

919-1939New

York: Harper,

1949),

pp. 52-69; Kindleberger,

World Depression,

pp.

128-145,

232-246.

92






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Douglas Gomery

only n weaker markets uch as France and

Latin

America.22

In sum the impactof the comingof sound to Europe cannot be

properly eparated from uestionsof the power

of the state and the

relativeeffect f the world economicdepression.

Guback and Sklar

pose

limited

uestions.

nstead

we shouldanalyzethe ntroduction

f

sound as

part of

a

complete system

f world

film

xchange. This

articlehas suggestedhow

such a

studymight egin.

have purposely

excluded-for thesake ofbrevity-questionsofproductionnd in-

dustry tructure, onduct

and

finance

for each separate country.

Quite simply,

we

have

much o

learn,

nd

should

arefully

e-examine

the commonplaceconclusions

which

dot

our histories f the coming

of sound.

22Georges Sadoul, Le

Cinema

Franpais

Paris: Flammarion,

962),pp. 141, 145;

Balcon

et al., Twenty

Years, p. 18; Perry, The Great BritishPicture

Show, p.73;

Phillips,"Nazi Control," p. 53; Ernest Betts, The FilmBusiness London: George

Allen

& Unwin, 1973), pp.

75-106; Political nd EconomicPlanning, p.

55-78; Film

Daily Yearbook

-

1931,

1017, 1025-1026, 1050-51; 1932, 1002-04,

1023, 1030-3r,

1050-51; 1933, 962-963,

970-75, 986-993, 1014;1934,998-1001,

1Q23-24,

1030-31;

1935, 1013-22, 1049-50,

1055-56, 1079-80;

1936, 1121-29, 1124-25, 1169, 1171,

1179, 1207; 1937, 116-69,

1215-21, 1253.

93

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