Administrative Law Case Digests 2

1 | P a g e a d m i n l a w c a s e s o n q u a s i l e g i s l a t i v e 2 5 d i g e s t p o o l

Sanado vs CA

Facts: Philippine Fisheries Commission issued to petitioner Calixto Sanado an ordinary Fishpond permit which petitioner leased to private respondent Nepumuceno, but such lease contract does not include the 10 hectares area already cultivated and fully developed by petitioner. After how many years the director of fisheries and aquatic resources recommended to the ministry of natural resources the conversion of the permit to a 25 years fishpond loan agreement which respondent opposed. Sanado then filed with RTC recovery of possession while the case is pending the minister of agriculture and food ordered the cancellation of the lease agreement. Petitioner appealed to the office of the president because private respondent was given a priority to apply for the said area but such petition was dismissed. Prior to the dismissal of Sanados appeal RTC ruled in favor of petitioner which decision is affirmed by CA. Now petitioner avers that the decision of the president is a new matters which should not have been treated by the appellate court with legal force and effect because it was merely incidental to the propriety and impropriety of the issuance of the writ of execution granted by the trial court in favor of Sanado.

Issue: Whether or not the decision of the president is in quasi-judicial nature to justify the cognizance made by the appellate court in its decision.

Ruling: YES, the action of an administrative agency in granting or denying or in suspending or revoking a license, permit, franchise or certificate of public convenience and necessity is administrative or quasi-judicial. The act is not purely administrative but quasi-judicial or adjudicatory since it is dependent upon ascertainment of facts by the administrative agency, upon which a decision is to be made and rights and liabilities determined.

Findings of administrative agencies which have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matter are generally accorded not only respect but even finality.

Carino vs CHR

December 2,1991

Facts: Respondent teachers went to Commission on Human Rights(CHR) to complain Ramon Magsaysay high school that while they were participating in a peaceful mass actions, they suddenly learned of their replacement as teachers, allegedly without notice and consequently for reasons completely unknown to them. Despite the orders of SC upholding Secretary Carinos act of issuing the return to work order, which the teachers disobeyed, CHR continued hearing the case of the teacher and even ruled that they were denied of due process.

Issue: Whether or not CHR have jurisdiction to try and hear the present controversy.

Ruling: NONE, The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is that it may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights violations involving civil and political rights. But fact finding is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or official. The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial function, properly speaking. To be considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence and making factual conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to those factual conclusions to the end that the controversy may be decided or determined authoritatively, finally and definitively, subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law. This function, to repeat, the Commission does not have

The court declares the CHR to have no such power and that it was not meant by the fundamental law to be another court or quasi-judicial agency in this country, or duplicate or much less take over the functions of the latter.


Lastimosa vs VasquezApril 6, 1995

Facts: Jessica Villacarlos Dayon, public health nurse of Santa Fe, Cebu, filed a criminal complaint for frustrated rape and an administrative complaint for immoral acts, abuse of authority and grave misconduct against the Municipal Mayor of Santa Fe, Rogelio Ilustrisimo. The cases were filed with the Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas where they were docketed as OMB-VIS-(CRIM)-93-0140 and OMB-VIS-(ADM)-93-0036, respectively. The ombudsman had ordered the assistant prosecutor of Cebu to file a case against mayor Ilustrisimo, however the assistant prosecutor refused to follow the order of the ombudsman, instead of filling a case of rape, the assistant prosecutor only filed act of lasciviousness.

Issue: Whether or not the ombudsman have the power of supervision and control over the assistant prosecutor?

Ruling: Yes, the ombudsman power to investigate and prosecute includes the investigation and prosecution of any crime committed by a public official regardless of whether the acts or omission complained of are related to or connected with or arise from the performance of his official duty. In the same case , it was explained that the ombudsman is authorized to call on prosecutor for assistance. When a prosecutor is deputized, he comes under the “supervision and control” of the ombudsman which means he is subject to the power of the ombudsman to direct, review, approve, reverse, or modify his (prosecutor’s) decision.

Syquia vs Board of Power and WaterworksNovember 29, 1976

Facts: Several tenants of a residential building filed a complaint to respondent board of power and waterworks against petitioner, the owner of the apartments they were leasing. Respondents argued that petitioner are billing them for electrical consumption in excess of the authorized meralco rates. Petitioner argued that she was charging them not only for the consumption in their individual apartments but also for the fuel adjustments and electricity used in common areas, the servant’s quarters and elevator, which additional costs had been distributed pro rata among all the tenants of the building. Respondent board held that the additional charges were unlawful since the tenants should be required to pay for the electricity used only in their own respective units. Petitioner appealed contesting that respondent board has no jurisdiction.

Issue: Whether or not respondent board of power and waterworks have jurisdiction over the complaints?

Ruling: None, Supreme Court held that tenants complaint “give rise to a question that is purely civil in character that is to be adjudged under the applicable provisions of the civil code, not the public service act, and not by the respondent regulatory board which has no jurisdiction but by the regular courts of general circulation.”

Respondent board as a regulatory board manifestly exceeded its jurisdiction in taking cognizance of and adjudicating the complaints filed by respondents against petitioner.

Respondent board acquired no jurisdiction over petitioner's contractual relations with respondents-complainants as her tenants, since petitioner is not engaged in a public service nor in the sale of electricity without permit or franchise. Respondent board in resolving the complaints against petitioner and requiring her to absorb the additional rising costs of electricity consumed for the common areas and elevator service even at a resultant loss of P15,000.00 a year arrogated the judicial function. Its orders were beyond its jurisdiction and must be set aside as null and void.


Globe vs Public Service Commission

January 21, 1987Section 21 of Public Service Act, C.A No. 146

Facts: A message addressed to Maria Diaz, Monte Esquina 30, Madrid, Spain, filed by private respondent Antonio B. Arnaiz with the telegraph office of the Bureau of Telecommunications in Dumaguete City was transmitted to the Bureau of Telecommunications in Manila. It was forwarded to petitioner Globe Wireless Ltd. for transmission to Madrid. Petitioner sent the message to the American Cable and Radio Corporation in New York, which, in turn, transmitted the same to the Empresa Nacional de Telecommunicaciones in Madrid. The latter, however, mislaid said message, resulting in its non-delivery to the addressee.After being informed of said fact, private respondent Arnaiz, sent to then Public Service Commissioner Enrique Medina an unverified letter-complaint relating the incident. The complaint was docketed as PSC Case No. 65-39-OC and petitioner was required to answer the same. Petitioner, in its answer, questioned PSC's jurisdiction over the subject matter of the letter-complaint, even as it denied liability for the non-delivery of the message to the addressee.

Issue: Whether or not Public Service Commission have jurisdiction?

Ruling: None, had there been such a violation, the commission would have been authorized to impose the fine assailed in this case. It was shown, however, that the petitioner operated under a legislative franchise, so “ there were no terms or conditions of any certificate by the commission to violate. Neither was there any order, decision and regulation from the commission applicable to petitioner that the latter allegedly violated, disobeyed or disregarded”

Too basic in administrative law to need citation of jurisprudence is the rule that the jurisdiction and powers of administrative agencies, like respondent Commission, are limited to those expressly granted or necessarily implied from those granted in the legislation creating such body; and any order without or beyond such jurisdiction is void and ineffective. The order under consideration belonged to this category.

RCPI v. NTC

Facts: Juan Alegre sent two (2) RUSH telegrams through petitioner RCPI Taft Manila to his sister and brother-in-law in Valencia, Bohol and another sister-in-law in Espiritu, Ilocos Norte informing them of the death and interment of Manong Poling. Both telegrams did not reach their destinations on the expected dates. Private respondent filed a letter-complaint against the RCPI with the National Telecommunications Commission (NTC) for poor service. NTC, acting under EO 564 which purportedly broadened its supervisory power, assumed jurisdiction over the controversy and imposed fines against RCPI for failing to render adequate service to a consumer.RCPI contended that NTC has no jurisdiction to adjudicate the case in point insofar as its predecessor PSC (Public Service Commission) jurisdiction is limited only to the fixing of rates.

Issue: Whether or not NTC has jurisdiction to administratively impose fines on a telegraph company for failing to render adequate service to a consumer.

Held: NONE. E. O. 546 is couched in general terms. The NTC stepped "into the shoes" of the Board of Communications which exercised powers pursuant to the Public Service Act. The power to impose fines should therefore be read in the light of the Francisco Santiago case because subsequent legislation did not grant additional powers to the Board of Communications. The Board in other words, did not possess the power to impose administrative fines on public services rendering deficient service to customers, ergo its successor cannot arrogate unto itself such power, in the absence of legislation.The Executive Order is not an explicit grant of power to impose administrative fines on public service utilities, including telegraphic agencies, which have failed to render adequate service to consumers. Neither has it expanded the coverage of the supervisory and regulatory power of the agency. There appears to be no alternative but to reiterate the settled doctrine in administrative law that:Too basic in administrative law to need citation of jurisprudence is the rule that jurisdiction and powers of administrative agencies, like respondent Commission, are limited to those expressly granted or necessarily implied from those granted in the legislation creating such body; and any order without or beyond such jurisdiction is void and ineffective.


Boiser vs. CA122 SCRA 945

Facts: PLDT entered into a contract denominated as “Interconnecting Agreement” whereby PLDT bound itself to provide premiere with long distance and overseas facilities through the use of the PLDT relay station in Mandaue City, Province of Cebu. On Feb. 27, 1979, without any prior notice to the petitioner, respondent PLDT issued a “Circuit Authorization Order” to its co-respondent, PLDT employees Roman Juezan and Wilson Morrell to terminate the connection of PLDT’s relay station with the facilities of the petitioner’s telephone system in the province of Bohol. Petitioner avers that this was in gross violation of the aforesaid “Interconnecting Agreement”.

On March 2, 1979, CFI of Cebu issued a TRO against respondent PLDT and directed the preservation of the status quo between the parties. The petitioner filed with the CA had for its object the setting aside of the CFI restraining order which enjoined PLDT and the other respondents from disconnecting the Mnadaue-Tagbiliran telephone connections.

Issue: W/N Administrative Department (NTC) has jurisdiction over the issue and not the regular courts?

Held: No, jurisdiction is conferred only by the Constitution or the Law. There is nothing in the commission’s powers which authorizes it to adjudicate breach of contract cases, much less to award moral and exemplary damages. The two authorities cited by the private respondents in the bid to dissolve the CFI restraining order do not appear adequate to disregard the thirty (30) day prior notice provided by the later “Interconnecting Agreement”. But even if they were, this question is one which should be clarified in the Civil case for breach of contract.

National Federation of Labor and Zambowood Monthly Employees Union v. Hon. Carlito A. EismaGR No L-61236; January 31, 1984

FACTS: The petitioner National Federation of Labor, on March 5, 1982, filed with the Ministry of Labor and Employment, Labor Relations Division, Zamboanga City, a petition for direct certification as the sole exclusive collective bargaining representative of the monthly paid employees of the respondent Zamboanga Wood Products, Inc. at its manufacturing plant in Lumbayao, Zamboanga City.

Such employees, on April 17, 1982 charged respondent firm before the same office of the Ministry of Labor for underpayment of monthly living allowances. Then came, on May 3, 1982, from petitioner union, a notice of strike against private respondent, alleging illegal termination of Dionisio Estioca, president of the said local union; unfair labor practice; nonpayment of living allowances; and "employment of oppressive alien management personnel without proper permit. It was followed by the union submitting the minutes of the declaration of strike, "including the ninety (90) ballots, of which 79 voted for yes and three voted for no."

On July 9, 1982, private respondent Zambowood filed a complaint with respondent Judge against the officers and members of petitioners union, for "damages for obstruction of private property with prayer for preliminary injunction and/or restraining order." It was alleged that defendants, now petitioners, blockaded the road leading to its manufacturing division, thus preventing customers and suppliers free ingress to or egress from such premises. Six days later, there was a motion for the dismissal and for the dissolution of the restraining order and opposition to the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction filed by petitioners. It was contended that the acts complained of were incidents of picketing by defendants then on strike against private respondent, and that therefore the exclusive jurisdiction belongs to the Labor Arbiter pursuant to Batas Pambansa Blg. 227, not to a court of first instance. There was, as noted earlier, a motion to dismiss, which was denied. Hence, this petition for certiorari.

ISSUE: Whether or not it is a labor arbiter that can pass on a suit for damages filed by the employer.

HELD: YES, the said jurisdiction over the said question is vested in the labor arbiter. On the precise question at


issue under the law as it now stands, this Court has spoken in three decisions. They all reflect the utmost fidelity to the plain command of the law that it is a labor arbiter, not a court that possesses original and exclusive jurisdiction to decide a claim for damages arising from picketing or a strike. In Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. v. Martinez, the issue was set forth in the opening paragraph, in the ponencia of Justice Escolin: "This petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus raises anew the legal question often brought to this Court: Which tribunal has exclusive jurisdiction over an action filed by an employee against his employer for recovery of unpaid salaries, separation benefits and damages — the court of general jurisdiction or the labor Arbiter of the National Labor Relations Commission [NLRC]?" It was categorically held: "We rule that the Labor Arbiter has exclusive jurisdiction over the case." Then came this portion of the opinion: "Jurisdiction over the subject matter in a judicial proceeding is conferred by the sovereign authority which organizes the court; and it is given only by law. Jurisdiction is never presumed; it must be conferred by law in words that do not admit of doubt. Since the jurisdiction of courts and judicial tribunals is derived exclusively from the statutes of the forum, the issue before Us should be resolved on the basis of the law or statute now in force. We find that law in Presidential Decree 1691 which took effect on May 1, 1980, Section 3 of which reads as follows: . . . Article 217. Jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters and the Commission. — (a) The Labor Arbiters shall have the original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide the following cases involving all workers whether agricultural or non-agricultural: . . . 3. All money claims of workers, including those based on nonpayment or underpayment of wages, overtime compensation, separation pay and other benefits provided by law or appropriate agreement, except claims for employees' compensation, social security, medicare and maternity benefits; 4. Cases involving household services; and 5. All other claims arising from employer-employee relations, unless expressly excluded by this Code." That same month, two other cases were similarly decided, Ebon v. De Guzman and Aguda v. Vallejos.

The issuance of Presidential Decree No. 1691 and the enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 130, made clear that the exclusive and original jurisdiction for damages would once again be vested in labor arbiters. It can be affirmed that even if they were not that explicit, history has vindicated the view that in the appraisal of what was referred to by Philippine American Management & Financing Co., Inc. v. Management & Supervisors

Association of the Philippine-American Management & Financing Co., Inc. as "the rather thorny question as to where in labor matters the dividing line is to be drawn" between the power lodged in an administrative body and a court, the unmistakable trend has been to refer it to the former. Thus: "Increasingly, this Court has been committed to the view that unless the law speaks clearly and unequivocally, the choice should fall on [an administrative agency]." Certainly, the present Labor Code is even more committed to the view that on policy grounds, and equally so in the interest of greater promptness in the disposition of labor matters, a court is spared the often onerous task of determining what essentially is a factual matter, namely, the damages that may be incurred by either labor or management as a result of disputes or controversies arising from employer-employee relations.

(Nota Bene: The second paragraph is the very essence of the ruling of the case. I posted the first paragraph for reference purposes in case Ma’am Jacob inquires the basis of the decision)


Angara v. Electoral Commission63 PHIL 139

Facts: In the election of September 17, 1935, petitioner Angara and the respondents Ynsua, Castillo, and Mayor were candidates voted for the position of members of the National Assembly for the district of Tayabas. On October 7, 1935, the provincial board of canvassers proclaimed Angara as member-elect of the National Assembly. On December 3, 1935, the National Assembly passed Resolution No. 8, which in effect, fixed the last date to file election protests. On December 8, 1935, Ynsua filed before Electoral Commission a “motion of protest” against Angara and praying among other things, that Ynsua be named/declared elected member of the National Assembly or that the election of said position be nullified. On December 9, the Electoral Commission adopted a resolution stating that the last day for filing protest is on Dec. 9. Angara contended that the Constitution confers exclusive jurisdiction upon the Electoral Commission solely as regards the merits of contested elections to the National Assembly and the SC therefore has no jurisdiction to hear the case.

Issue: W/N the rules of proceedings adopted by the Electoral Commission in election contest of which it was the “sole judge” is validly prescribed by such commission?

Held: Yes, it is a settled rule of construction that where a general power is conferred or duty enjoined, every particular power necessary for the exercise of the one or the performance of the other is also conferred. The incidental power to promulgate such rules necessary for the proper exercise of its exclusive power must be deemed by necessary application to have been lodged also in the Electoral Commission.

Phil Lawyers Assoc v. Celedino AgravaGR No L-12426; February 16, 1959

FACTS: On May 27, 1957, respondent Director issued a circular announcing that he had scheduled for June 27, 1957 an examination for the purpose of determining who are qualified to practice as patent attorneys before the Philippines Patent Office, the said examination to cover patent law and jurisprudence and the rules of practice before said office. According to the circular, members of the Philippine Bar, engineers and other persons with sufficient scientific and technical training are qualified to take the said examination. It would appear that heretofore, respondent Director has been holding similar examinations.

It is the contention of the petitioner Philippine Lawyer's Association that one of the petitioner Philippine Lawyer's Association that one who has passed the bar examinations and is licensed by the Supreme Court to practice law in the Philippines and who is in good standing, is duly qualified to practice before the Philippines Patent Office, and that consequently, the act of the respondent Director requiring members of the Philippine Bar in good standing to take and pass an examination given by the Patent Office as a condition precedent to their being allowed to practice before said office, such as representing applicants in the preparation and prosecution of applications for patent, is in excess of his jurisdiction and is in violation of the law.

ISSUE: (1) Whether or not a lawyer can be a Patent Attorney even without taking the said examination

(2) Whether or not the respondent Director acted in excess jurisdiction is issuing the said circular

HELD: (1) YES, a lawyer can become such without taking the said examination. The Director of Patents, exercising as he does judicial or quasi-judicial functions, it is reasonable to hold that a member of the bar, because of his legal knowledge and training, should be allowed to practice before the Patent Office, without further examination or other qualification. Of course, the Director of Patents, if he deems it advisable or necessary, may require that members of the bar practising before him enlist the assistance of technical men and scientists in the preparation of papers and documents, such as, the drawing or technical description of an invention or machine sought to be patented, in the


same way that a lawyer filing an application for the registration of a parcel of land on behalf of his client, is required to submit a plan and technical description of said land, prepared by a licensed surveyor.

(2) YES, he acted in excess of his jurisdiction. Section 551 of the Revised Administrative Code authorizes every chief of bureau to prescribe forms and make regulations or general orders not inconsistent with law, to secure the harmonious and efficient administration of his branch of the service and to carry into full effect the laws relating to matters within the jurisdiction of his bureau. Section 608 of Republic Act 1937, known as the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines, provides that the Commissioner of Customs shall, subject to the approval of the Department Head, make all rules and regulations necessary to enforce the provisions of said code. Section 338 of the National Internal Revenue Code, Commonwealth Act No. 466 as amended, states that the Secretary of Finance, upon recommendation of the Collector of Internal Revenue, shall promulgate all needful rules and regulations for the effective enforcement of the provisions of the code. We understand that rules and regulations have been promulgated not only for the Bureaus of Customs and Internal Revenue, but also for other bureaus of the Government, to govern the transaction of business in and to enforce the law for said bureaus.

Were we to allow the Patent Office, in the absence of an express and clear provision of law giving the necessary sanction, to require lawyers to submit to and pass on examination prescribed by it before they are allowed to practice before said Patent Office, then there would be no reason why other bureaus specially the Bureaus of Internal Revenue and Customs, where the business in the same area are more or less complicated, such as the presentation of books of accounts, balance sheets, etc., assessments exemptions, depreciation, these as regards the Bureau of Internal Revenue, and the classification of goods, imposition of customs duties, seizures, confiscation, etc., as regards the Bureau of Customs, may not also require that any lawyer practising before them or otherwise transacting business with them on behalf of clients, shall first pass an examination to qualify.

In conclusion, we hold that under the present law, members of the Philippine Bar authorized by this Tribunal to practice law, and in good standing, may practice their profession before the Patent Office, for the reason that much of the business in said office involves

the interpretation and determination of the scope and application of the Patent Law and other laws applicable, as well as the presentation of evidence to establish facts involved; that part of the functions of the Patent Director are judicial or quasi-judicial, so much so that appeals from his orders and decisions are, under the law, taken to the Supreme Court.

(Nota Bene: The second ruling is the one related to Admin Law. I included the first just in case Ma’am Jacob inquires such. After all, that is the main issue to be answered and was answered by the Supreme Court.)


Agusmin Promotional Enterprises, Inc. vs. CA117 SCRA 369

Facts: Agusmin Promotional Enterprises, Inc. organized by Guiang, Liceralde and six (6) others, which was then issued a consolidated timber license. Guiang and Liceralde, due to some differences with the majority group in the corporation, requested the Secretary of Agriculture and National Resources that they be allowed to withdraw their respective forest areas under their original timber licenses from the consolidated timber license of Agusmin and consolidated them with he timber license of Pedreo B. De Jesus and Sulpicio Lagnoda. The request was referred to the Director of Forestry who declared that the request is beyond his jurisdiction. Guiang, Liceralde and De Jesus formed a corporation known as the P.B. De Jesus & Co., Inc. Agusmin interposed and appealed from the decision of the Secretary stating that it was appealing said decision to the Office of the President.

Issue: W/N the right for procedural due process has been violated by the Executive Secretary?

Held: No, in deciding administrative questions, technical rules of procedure are not strictly enforced and due process of law in the strict judicial sense is not indispensable, little, if any, useful purpose could be gained in further discussing these issues because Letter of Instruction No. 172, which ordered the cancelation of the timber issued to Agusmin, in effect, reversed and set aside the said decision of the Executive Secretary before the same become final and enforceable. In the words of the CA, the said decisions did not acquire and finality.

Administrative rules of procedure would be construed liberally in order to promote their object and to assist the parties in obtaining a just, speedy and inexpensive determination of their respective claims and defenses. There is no denial of due process if the decision was rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected.

OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN v. JOEL S. SAMANIEGO

FACTS: Respondent Joel S. Samaniego, the City Treasurer of Ligao City, Albay, was charged with two administrative complaints for dishonesty and grave misconduct. The Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon found respondent liable for grave misconduct. Via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 43 with a motion for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction in the CA, Samaniego assailed the decision of the Office of the Ombudsman insofar as it found him liable. The prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction was granted. The Office of the Ombudsman filed a motion for intervention and to admit the attached motion to recall the writ of preliminary injunction. The motions however were denied. The Office of the Ombudsman then claims that the CA erred in denying its right to intervene, considering that its joint decision was the subject of the appeal. It also asserts that the writ of preliminary injunction should be recalled.The Court decided, in the interest of justice and practicality, that the issuance of the injunctive writ was a superfluity. It anchored its decision on the case of Office of the Ombudsman v. Laja where it pronounced the scope of Section 7, Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the Ombudsman, as amended. The provisions state that “where the penalty imposed is public censure or reprimand, suspension of not more than one month, or a fine equivalent to one month salary, the decision shall be final, executory and unappealable. In all other cases, the decision may be appealed to the Court of Appeals.” Only orders, directives or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative cases imposing the penalty of public censure, reprimand, or suspension of not more than one month, or a fine not equivalent to one month salary shall be final and unappealable hence, immediately executory. In all other disciplinary cases where the penalty imposed is other than penalties mentioned, the law gives the respondent the right to appeal. In these cases, the order, directive or decision becomes final and executory only after the lapse of the period to appeal if no appeal is perfected, or after the denial of the appeal from the said order, directive or decision. It is only then that execution shall perforce issue as a matter of right. The fact that the Ombudsman Act gives parties the right to appeal from its decisions should generally carry with it the stay of these decisions pending appeal. The penalty meted out to respondent was suspension for one year without pay. Hence, the filing of the appeal or the issuance of an injunctive writ prevents the penalty from being executory.


(NOTE: This is now the case assigned)This is a resolution of the second motion for partial reconsideration filed by petitioner Office of the Ombudsman to our decision dated September 11, 2008, particularly our pronouncement with respect to the stay of the decision of the Ombudsman during the pendency of an appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not an appeal to the Court of Appeals stops the decision of the Office of the Ombudsman from being executor

HELD: No. An appeal shall not stop the decision from being executory. In case the penalty is suspension or removal and the respondent wins such appeal, he shall be considered as having been under preventive suspension and shall be paid the salary and such other emoluments that he did not receive by reason of the suspension or removal.A decision of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative cases shall be executed as a matter of course. The Office of the Ombudsman shall ensure that the decision shall be strictly enforced and properly implemented. The Ombudsman’s decision imposing the penalty of suspension for one year is immediately executory pending appeal. It cannot be stayed by the mere filing of an appeal to the CA. The Rules of Court may apply to cases in the Office of the Ombudsman suppletorily only when the procedural matter is not governed by any specific provision in the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman.7 Here, Section 7, Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, as amended, is categorical, an appeal shall not stop the decision from being executory.Moreover, Section 13 (8), Article XI of the Constitution authorizes the Office of the Ombudsman to promulgate its own rules of procedure. In this connection, Sections 18 and 27 of the Ombudsman Act of 1989 also provide that the Office of the Ombudsman has the power to "promulgate its rules of procedure for the effective exercise or performance of its powers, functions and duties" and to amend or modify its rules as the interest of justice may require. For the CA to issue a preliminary injunction that will stay the penalty imposed by the Ombudsman in an administrative case would be to encroach on the rule-making powers of the Office of the Ombudsman under the Constitution as the injunctive writ will render nugatory the provisions of Section 7, Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman.

In Re Contempt Proceedings against Armando Ramos, Jesus L. Carmelo v. Armando Ramos.

G.R. No. L-17778. November 30, 1962.

Facts: On Feb. 3, 1960, the Mayor of Manila created a Probe Committee to investigate license inspectors and personnel of License Inspection Division of the Office of the City Treasurer. The committee issued several subpoenas to Casa de Alba bookkeeper Armando Ramos in connection with an admin. case against Crisanta Estanislao. Ramos failed to appear always (dates June 3, 8, 9, 15, and 16, and Aug. 4 and 11, 1960).Petitioner Carmelo filed a petition for contempt against Ramos alleging that his refusal tended to impede and obstruct administrative proceedings. CFI dismissed it.

Issue: Whether the Committee has the power to subpoena witnesses to appear before it and to ask for punishment in case of refusal.

Held: NO.Rule 64 of the Rules of Court applies only to inferior and superior courts and does not comprehend contempt committed against administrative officials or bodies like the one in this case, unless said contempt is clearly considered and expressly defined as contempt of court, as is done in Sec. 580 of the Revised Administrative Code. One who invokes Sec. 580 must first show he has authority to take testimony or evidence.There is nothing said in the executive order of the Mayor creating the committee about such a grant of power. Even granting that the Mayor has the implied power to require the appearance of witnesses before him, the rule is that the Mayor cannot delegate this power.


Pascual, Jr. v. Board of ExaminersG.R. No. L-25018. May 26, 1969

Facts: In the initial hearing of the Board of Medical Examiners on the charge against Arsenio Pascual, Jr., counsel for complainants announced that he would present Pascual as his first witness. Pascual objected relying on the constitutional right to be exempt from being a witness against himself. The Board took note, but stated that he will still testify as such witness in the next hearing.Pascual filed an action for prohibition with prayer for preliminary injunction against the Board with the CFI of Manila. The complainants in the administrative case, Salvador Gatbonton and Enriqueta Gatbonton, filed a motion for intervention. Lower court ruled in favor of Pascual.

Issue: Whether in an administrative hearing against a medical practitioner for alleged malpractice, the Board can compel the person proceeded against to take the witness stand without his consent.

Held: NO. 1. The lower court's decision follows the principle in Cabal v. Kapunan, about an adminstrative case, that the accused in a criminal case may refuse not only to answer incriminatory questions but also to take the witness stand. While the matter there referred to an administrative case, there is clearly the imposition of a penalty. The present case is not dissimilar. The self-incrimination clause is applicable to a proceeding that could possibly result in the loss of the privilege to practice the medical profession.

2. The Board is mistaken that the clause is limited to allowing a witness to object to questions the answers to which could lead to a penal liability. That is just one aspect of the right. The constitutional guarantee protects as well the right to silence. In Chavex v. CA, defendant has a right to forego testimony, to remain silent, unless he chooses to take the witness stand.

Quotables:Chief Justice Warren: "the constitutional foundation underlying the privilege is the respect a government ... must accord to the dignity and integrity of its citizens."Justice Douglas: "...Self-Incrimination clause enables the citizen to create a zone of privacy which government may not force to surrender..."

Masangkay v. COMELECG.R. No. L-13827 . Sept.28, 1962

Facts: Masangcay was the provincial treasurer of Aklan designated by the COMELEC in its resolution to among others, take charge of the receipt and custody of the official ballots, election forms and supplies, as well as of their distribution, among the different municipalities of the province. He and several others were charged before the COMELEC with contempt for having opened three boxes containing official and sample ballots for the municipalities of the province of Aklan without the presence of the division superintendent of schools of Aklan, the provincial auditor, and the authorized representatives of the Nacionalista Party, the Liberal Party and the Citizens' Party, in violation of the instructions of said Commission and which are punishable under Section 5 of the Revised Election Code and Rule 64 of the Rules of Court.

He was subsequently convicted by the COMELEC as guilty and sentenced to suffer three months imprisonment and pay a fine of P500, with subsidiary imprisonment of two months in case of insolvency, to be served in the provincial jail of Aklan. Masangkay contended that, even if he can be held guilty of the act of contempt charged, the decision is null and void for lack of valid power on the part of the Commission to impose such disciplinary penalty under the principle of separation of powers.

Issue: W/N COMELEC can exercise the power to punish contempt

Held:NO. The COMELEC, although it cannot be classified a court of justice within the meaning of the Constitution (Section 30, Article VIII), for it is merely an administrative body, may however exercise quasi-judicial functions insofar as controversies that by express provision law come under its jurisdiction. However, when the Commission exercises a ministerial function it cannot exercise the power to punish contempt because such power is inherently judicial in nature.In the instant case, the resolutions which the Commission tried to enforce and for whose violation the charge for contempt was filed against petitioner Masangcay merely call for the exercise of an administrative or ministerial function for they merely concern the procedure to be followed in the distribution of ballots and other election paraphernalia among the different municipalities. Thus, the COMELEC cannot exercise its power to punish contempt.


ARCADIO R. TOLENTINO, petitioner, vs. HON. AMADO INCIONG, as Chairman of the National Labor Relations Commission and DOMINGO CINCO, respondents.

[G.R. No. L-36385. July 25, 1979.]

FACTS: This litigation started with private respondent Domingo Cinco filing a verified complaint on December 12, 1972 with the then National Labor Relations Commission, charging petitioner Arcadio R. Tolentino with violating the constitution of the Batangas Labor Union by refusing, as its president, to call for the election of officers in the month of November, 1972, and praying that such election be conducted immediately. Upon receipt of such verified complaint on January 9, 1973, petitioner on the same date sent an urgent telegram to the respondent National Labor Relations Commission for the cancellation of the hearing of such complaint set for January 12, 1973 as he had to appear on that very day before the then Court of Industrial Relations, a formal motion to such effect being filed on January 11, 1973. But the respondent Chairman paid no heed to the letter and instead allowed the respondent Cinco to proceed with their election, by notifying them on January 30, 1973.

Subsequently, on February 26, 1973, the Batangas Labor Union filed a petition with the Court of First Instance of Batangas, Branch No. VII, Balayan, Batangas, docketed as Civil Case No. 942 for prohibition with a writ of preliminary injunction, against the respondent Domingo Cinco and the National Labor Relations Commission and the Secretary of Labor, seeking to annul the order of January 30, 1973 and to prohibit the respondent National Labor Relations Commission and the Secretary of Labor from enforcing it. The court of first instance then presided by Judge Jaime delos Angeles, now retired, did not grant the writ of preliminary injunction ex parte as prayed for in the petition but instead set the application thereof for hearing on March 1, 1973 with due notice to all the parties, with neither the Commission nor the then Secretary of Labor appearing through counsel, although petitioner did. After such hearing, Judge Jaime delos Angeles reserved his resolution on the matter at issue in view of the intricate legal questions raised therein.

Then and there, the petitioner and Judge delos Angeles were summoned by the respondent Chairman, in order for them to explain why they should be not cited in contempt due to their “refusal to comply”.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Inciong has the power "to hold any person in contempt for refusal to comply", in order to attain the objectives of Presidential Decree 21.

HELD: NO, he has not been granted with such power. We start with a fundamental postulate. As set forth in Villegas v. Subido: "Nothing is better settled in the law than that a public official exercises power, not rights. The government itself is merely an agency through which the will of the State is expressed and enforced. Its officers therefore are likewise agents entrusted with the responsibility of discharging its functions. As such there is no presumption that they are empowered to act. There must be a delegation of such authority, either express or implied. In the absence of a valid grant, they are devoid of power. What they do suffers from a fatal infirmity. That principle cannot be sufficiently stressed. . . . Neither the high dignity of the office nor the righteousness of the motive then is an acceptable substitute. Otherwise the rule of law becomes a myth. Such an eventuality, we must take all pains to avoid." The undeniable concern of respondent Inciong that the objectives of Presidential Decree No. 21 be attained thus afforded no warrant for exercising a power not conferred by such decree. He ought to have known that the competence, "to hold any person in contempt for refusal to comply" certainly cannot extend to a judge of the court of first instance. Correctly construed, it cannot cover the case likewise of a party to a controversy who took the necessary steps to avail himself of a judicial remedy. It must ever be borne in mind by an administrative official that courts exist precisely to assure that there be compliance with the law. That is the very essence of a judicial power. So the rule of law requires. It is true that courts, like any other governmental agencies, must observe the limits of its jurisdiction. In this particular case, it is admitted that the then Judge Jaime delos Angeles, after hearing the arguments on the propriety of issuing the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for, reserved his resolution in view of the intricacies of the legal questions raised. The proper step for an administrative official then is to seek a dismissal of the case before the court precisely on the ground that the matter did not fall within the domain of the powers conferred on it. Instead, respondent Inciong took the precipitate step of citing him for contempt. That was an affront to reason as well as a disregard of well-settled rules. Neither was there any contumacious act committed by petitioner in seeking judicial remedy. It would be a reproach to any legal system if an individual is denied access to the courts under these circumstances. The resort of respondent


Inciong to what has been derisively referred to as epithetical jurisprudence, seeking shelter in the opprobrious term "old society tactics," is an implied admission of his actuation being devoid of support in law. As was so well stated by Chief Justice Hughes: "It must be conceded that departmental zeal may not be permitted to outrun the authority conferred by statute."

(Nota Bene: Presidential Decree 21, though not mentioned in express in the case, has something to do with labor law.)

Ang Tibay v. CIRG.R. No. L-46496 . Feb. 27, 1940

Facts: There was agreement between Ang Tibay and the National Labor Union, Inc (NLU). The NLU alleged that the supposed lack of leather material claimed by Toribio Teodoro was but a scheme adopted to systematically discharge all the members of the NLU, from work. And this averment is desired to be proved by the petitioner with the records of the Bureau of Customs and Books of Accounts of native dealers in leather. That National Worker's Brotherhood Union of Ang Tibay is a company or employer union dominated by Toribio Teodoro, which was alleged by the NLU as an illegal one. The CIR, decided the case and elevated it to the Supreme Court, but a motion for new trial was raised by the NLU. But the Ang Tibay filed a motion for opposing the said motion.

Issue: W/N the motion for new trial is meritorious to be granted.

Held: YES. The Court of Industrial Relations is a special court whose functions are specifically stated in the law of its creation (CA 103). It is more an administrative board than a part of the integrated judicial system of the nation. It is not intended to be a mere receptive organ of the Government. Unlike a court of justice which is essentially passive, acting only when its jurisdiction is invoked and deciding only cases that are presented to it by the parties litigant, the function of the Court of Industrial Relations, as will appear from perusal of its organic law, is more active, affirmative and dynamic. It not only exercises judicial or quasijudicial functions in the determination of disputes between employers and employees but its functions are far more comprehensive and extensive. It has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines, to consider, investigate, decide, and settle any question, matter controversy or dispute arising between, and/or affecting, employers and employees or laborers, and landlords and tenants or farm-laborers, and regulate the relations between them, subject to, and in accordance with, the provisions of CA 103 (section 1). There is in reality here a mingling of executive and judicial functions, which is a departure from the rigid doctrine of the separation of governmental powers.

The CIR is free from rigidity of certain procedure requirements, but not free to ignore or disregard fundamental and essential requirements of due process involving proceedings of administrative character. Their


cardinal primary rights which must be respected even in proceedings of this character:

(1) the right to a hearing, which includes the right to present one's cause and submit evidence in support thereof;(2) The tribunal must consider the evidence presented;(3) The decision must have something to support itself;(4) The evidence must be substantial;(5) The decision must be based on the evidence presented at the hearing; or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected;(6) The tribunal or body or any of its judges must act on its own independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate;(7) The Board or body should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various Issue involved, and the reason for the decision rendered.

The failure to grasp the fundamental issue involved is not entirely attributable to the parties adversely affected by the result. Accordingly, the motion for a new trial should be, and the same is hereby granted, and the entire record of this case shall be remanded to the CIR, with instruction that it reopen the case receive all such evidence as may be relevant, and otherwise proceed in accordance with the requirements set forth.

Clarita Carbonel v. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSIONG.R. No. 187689 ; September 7, 2010

FACTS:Clarita Carbonel, the petitioner, an employee of the Bureau of Jail Management and Penology in Makati City, went to CSCRO IV to secure a copy of the result of the Computer Assisted Test (CATS) Career Service Professional Examination because she lost her copy. However, the Examination Placement and Service Division noticed that the petitioner’s physical appearance and signature were different from those affixed on her form. Because of these discrepancies, CSCRO IV conducted an investigation, where the petitioner, without a counsel, confessed that she accepted the proposal of a certain Bettina J. Navarro for the latter to obtain for petitioner a Career Service Professional Eligibility by merely accomplishing an application form and paying the amount of P10, 000.00. Hence, the formal charge against petitioner. After the formal investigation, the CSCRO IV rendered its decision finding the petitioner guilty of dishonesty, grave misconduct, and falsification of official documents. The petitioner, after three years, filed an appeal to the Civil Service Commission; however, such was dismissed for failure to file within the reglementary period. The petitioner elevated the case to CA, but the latter affirmed the decision of the CSCRO IV. The petitioner filed a petition with the SC contending that CSC’s findings were based solely on her uncounselled admission taken during the investigation by the CSCRO IV. She claims that her right to due process was violated because she was not afforded the right to counsel when her statement was taken.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CSC violated the due process because she was not afforded the right to counsel when her statement was taken

HELD: NO. It must be remembered that the right to counsel under Section 12 of the Bill of Rights is meant to protect a suspect during custodial investigation. Thus, the exclusionary rule under paragraph (2), Section 12 of the Bill of Rights applies only to admissions made in a criminal investigation but not to those made in an administrative investigation.

While investigations conducted by an administrative body may at times be akin to a criminal proceeding, the fact remains that, under existing laws, a party in an administrative inquiry may or may not be assisted by counsel, irrespective of the nature of the charges and of petitioner’s capacity to represent herself, and no duty rests on such body to furnish the person being


investigated with counsel. The right to counsel is not always imperative in administrative investigations because such inquiries are conducted merely to determine whether there are facts that merit the imposition of disciplinary measures against erring public officers and employees, with the purpose of maintaining the dignity of government service.

As such, the admissions made by petitioner during the investigation may be used as evidence to justify her dismissal.

Arsenio Lumiqued vs Apolonio Exevea et alGR No 117565; November 18, 1997

Due Process – Assistance by Counsel

Facts: Lumiqued was the Regional Director of DAR-CAR. He was charged by Zamudio, the Regional Cashier, for dishonesty due to questionable gas expenses under his office. It was alleged that he was falsifying gas receipts for reimbursements and that he had an unliquidated cash advance worth P116,000.00. Zamudio also complained that she was unjustly removed by Lumiqued two weeks after she filed the two complaints. The issue was referred to the DOJ. Committee hearings on the complaints were conducted on July 3 and 10, 1992, but Lumiqued was not assisted by counsel. On the second hearing date, he moved for its resetting to July 17, 1992, to enable him to employ the services of counsel. The committee granted the motion, but neither Lumiqued nor his counsel appeared on the date he himself had chosen, so the committee deemed the case submitted for resolution. The Investigating Committee recommended the dismissal of Lumiqued. DOJ Sec Drilon adopted the recommendation. Fidel Ramos issued AO 52 dismissing Lumiqued.

ISSUE: Does the due process clause encompass the right to be assisted by counsel during an administrative inquiry?

HELD: No. The right to counsel, which cannot be waived unless the waiver is in writing and in the presence of counsel, is a right afforded a suspect or an accused during custodial investigation. It is not an absolute right and may, thus, be invoked or rejected in a criminal proceeding and, with more reason, in an administrative inquiry. In the case at bar, petitioners invoke the right of an accused in criminal proceedings to have competent and independent counsel of his own choice. Lumiqued, however, was not accused of any crime in the proceedings below. The investigation conducted by the committee created by Department Order No. 145 was for the purpose of determining if he could be held administratively liable under the law for the complaints filed against him. The right to counsel is not indispensable to due process unless required by the Constitution or the law.

“. . . There is nothing in the Constitution that says that a party in a non-criminal proceeding is entitled to be represented by counsel and that, without such


representation, he shall not be bound by such proceedings. The assistance of lawyers, while desirable, is not indispensable. The legal profession was not engrafted in the due process clause such that without the participation of its members, the safeguard is deemed ignored or violated. The ordinary citizen is not that helpless that he cannot validly act at all except only with a lawyer at his side.”

In administrative proceedings, the essence of due process is simply the opportunity to explain one’s side. Whatever irregularity attended the proceedings conducted by the committee was cured by Lumiqued’s appeal and his subsequent filing of motions for reconsideration.

NOTES:

EQUAL PROTECTION

Equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. Similar subjects, in other words, should not be treated differently, so as to give undue favor to some and unjustly discriminate against others.

Substantive equality is NOT enough, it is also required that the law be enforced and applied equally. Even if the law be fair and impartial on its face, it will still violate equal protection if it is administered “with an evil eye and uneven hand,’ so as to unjustly benefit some and prejudice others.

The right to equal protection, basic as it is, sheltered by the Constitution is a restraint on all the three grand departments of the government and on the subordinate instrumentalities and subdivisions thereof, and on many constitutional powers, like the police power, taxation and eminent domain.

The equal protection clause exists to prevent undue favor or privilege. It is intended to eliminate discrimination and oppression based on inequality. Recognizing the existence of real differences among men, the equal protection clause does not demand absolute equality. It merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to the privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. Thus, the equal protection clause does not absolutely forbid classifications.

WHO ARE PROTECTED

Equal protection is available to all persons, natural as well as juridical. Artificial persons, however, are entitled to the protection only insofar as their property is concerned.

By constitutional reservation, certain rights are enjoyable only by citizens, such as the rights to vote, hold public office, exploit natural resources, and operate public utilities, although aliens are comprehended in the guaranty. Even ordinary statutes can validly distinguish between citizens and aliens or, for that matter, even between or among citizens only.


OLONGAPO JEEPNEY OPERATORS ASSOCIATION vs. PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION and Diosdado BartoloFebruary 26, 1965. G.R. No. L-20699

FACTS: In connection with the application of Diosdado Bartolo, for a certificate of public covenience to operate a (transportation) public utility service on the route — Sta. Rita (Olongapo) to Magsaysay Drive (Naval Base gate) in Olongapo, Zambales — the Public Service Commission issued an order setting said application for hearing. The order also contained the usual requirement of publication and notice (of said order) to all operators affected, as appearing in the attached list thereto, "at least ten (10) days before the date of hearing, and that applicant, during the hearing, shall submit among others, as proof of compliance therewith, the affidavit of the person who mailed said notices, to the effect that the same was made within the required period.

The records show, however, that while the notice was duly published in 2 newspapers of general circulation on July 5, 1962, the individual notices sent by registered mail to the affected operators were posted in Manila only on July 25, 1962. Consequently, the addressees received the same on the first week of August or after the scheduled date of hearing as appearing in said notice.

The records do not reveal what took place on July 30. It appears, however, that Atty. Jesus K. Calderon, who was designated to receive applicant's evidence, did so on August 20, 1962, and as none of the affected operators was present, an order of default was entered against them at the instance of the applicant. On November 16, 1962, a decision was rendered granting applicant Bartolo a certificate to operate 2 jeepneys on the route covered by his application. Presumably on account of the general order of default, the affected operators were not also notified of this decision. It was only in December, 1962, upon inquiry made in the Motor Vehicles Office, that they learned of said decision.

ISSUE: Whether or not the jurisdictional requirement of notice to affected parties was not complied with.

HELD: Yes. Although the order of June 28, 1962 specifically required that the notices should be sent to the persons named in the list at least 10 days before the hearing which was scheduled for July 30, 1962, the registry receipts, which were submitted to the commissioner as part of applicant's evidence, show that

the mail was actually posted in Manila only on July 25, 1962. Considering that these were sent by registered mail and the addressees were in Zambales, it was almost a certainty that the latter would not, as they did not, receive the same before July 30. Furthermore, it may be pointed out that although the same order of the Commission required the submission of the affidavit of the person who posted the notices, attesting to the fact that the mailing was made at least 10 days before the date of hearing, no such affidavit was presented. Notwithstanding the foregoing deficiencies, the application was, nevertheless, approved and the disputed decision was rendered.

In this instance, respondent applicant contends that the publication of the notice of hearing in 2 newspapers of general circulation in the province of Zambales is notification not only to the interested parties, but to the whole world in general. This is inaccurate. The order required, in addition to publication, individual notice to the operators affected by the application and whose names appeared in the list attached to the order. The requirement, therefore, is not in the alternative, but conjunctive. It cannot be disputed that this requirement of the Public Service Commission itself in connection with an application for a certificate of public convenience, is within the power of the Commission to impose. The inadequate notification to the interested parties in this case, which resulted in the oppositors' failure to be present during the hearing, deprived them of their day in court. The decision rendered in disregard of said right, consequently, is null and void.


PEFIANCO vs. MORALG.R. No. 132248. January 19, 2000

FACTS: Former DECS Secretary Ricardo T. Gloria filed a complaint against respondent Maria Luisa C. Moral, then Chief Librarian, Catalog Division, of the National Library for dishonesty, grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. The complaint charged respondent Moral with the pilferage of some historical documents from the vaults of the Filipiniana and Asian Division (FAD) of the National Library.

The DECS Investigating Committee conducted several hearings on the complaint. Secretary Gloria issued a resolution finding respondent "guilty of the administrative offenses of dishonesty, grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, for the commission of pilferage of historical documents of the national library, to the prejudice of the national library in particular, and the country in general." She was ordered dismissed from the government service.

Respondent filed a Petition for the Production of the DECS Investigation Committee Report purportedly to "guide [her] on whatever action would be most appropriate to take under the circumstances.”Meanwhile, Secretary Gloria was replaced by Secretary Erlinda C. Pefianco who was thereafter substituted in the case for Secretary Gloria.ISSUE: Whether or not Moral is entitled to be informed of the findings and recommendations of any investigating committee created to inquire into charges filed against her.HELD: No. She is not entitled to the writ she is praying for. There is no law or rule which imposes a legal duty on petitioner to furnish respondent with a copy of the investigation report. On the contrary, we unequivocally held in Ruiz v. Drilon, that a respondent in an administrative case is not entitled to be informed of the findings and recommendations of any investigating committee created to inquire into charges filed against him. He is entitled only to the administrative decision based on substantial evidence made of record, and a reasonable opportunity to meet the charges and the evidence presented against her during the hearings of the investigation committee. Respondent no doubt had been accorded these rights.

The nature of the remedy of mandamus has been the subject of discussions in several cases. It is settled that mandamus is employed to compel the performance,

when refused, of a ministerial duty, this being its main objective. It does not lie to require anyone to fulfill a discretionary duty. It is essential to the issuance of a writ of mandamus that petitioner should have a clear legal right to the thing demanded and it must be the imperative duty of the respondent to perform the act required. It never issues in doubtful cases. While it may not be necessary that the duty be absolutely expressed, it must nevertheless be clear. The writ will not issue to compel an official to do anything which is not his duty to do or which is his duty not to do, or give to the applicant anything to which he is not entitled by law. The writ neither confers powers nor imposes duties. It is simply a command to exercise a power already possessed and to perform a duty already imposed.

In her petition for mandamus, respondent miserably failed to demonstrate that she has a clear legal right to the DECS Investigation Committee Report and that it is the ministerial duty of petitioner DECS Secretary to furnish her with a copy thereof. Consequently, she is not entitled to the writ prayed for.


AMERICAN TOBACCO COMPANY, et al. vs. THE DIRECTOR OF PATENTS, et al.

FACTS: Petitioners, being parties in several opposition, interference and cancellation proceedings in said Office, challenge the validity of Rule 168 of the "Revised Rules of Practice before the Philippine Patent Office in Trademark Cases" as amended, authorizing the Director of Patents to designate any ranking official of said office to hear "inter partes" proceedings. Said Rule likewise provides that "all judgments determining the merits of the case shall be personally and directly prepared by the Director and signed by him." These proceedings refer to the hearing of opposition to the registration of a mark or trade name, interference proceeding instituted for the purpose of determining the question of priority of adoption and use of a trade-mark, trade name or service-mark, and cancellation of registration of a trade-mark or trade name pending at the Patent Office.In accordance with the amended Rule, the Director of Patents delegated the hearing of petitioners' cases to hearing officers, specifically, Attys. Amando Marquez, Teofilo Velasco, Rustico Casia and Hector Buenaluz, the other respondents herein.Petitioners filed their objections to the authority of the hearing officers to hear their cases, alleging that the amendment of the Rule is illegal and void because under the law the Director must personally hear and decide inter partes cases. Said objections were overruled by the Director of Patents, hence, the present petition for mandamus, to compel The Director of Patents to personally hear the cases of petitioners, in lieu of the hearing officers.

ISSUE: Whether the respondent has the power to delegate the hearing of inter partes cases to his subordinates.

HELD: Yes. Under section 3 of RA 165, the Director of Patents is "empowered to obtain the assistance of technical, scientific or other qualified officers or employees of other departments, bureaus, offices, agencies and instrumentalities of the Government, including corporations owned, controlled or operated by the Government, when deemed necessary in the consideration of any matter submitted to the Office relative to the enforcement of the provisions" of said Act. Section 78 of the same Act also empowers "the Director, subject to the approval of the Department Head," to "promulgate the necessary rules and regulations, not inconsistent with law, for the conduct of all business in the Patent Office." The aforecited statutory authority

undoubtedly also applies to the administration and enforcement of the Trade-mark Law (Republic Act No. 166).It has been held that power-conferred upon an administrative agency to which the administration of a statute is entrusted to issue such regulations and orders as may be deemed necessary or proper in order to carry out its purposes and provisions maybe an adequate source of authority to delegate a particular function, unless by express provisions of the Act or by implication it has been withheld. There is no provision either in Republic Act No. 165 or 166 negativing the existence of such authority, so far as the designation of hearing examiners is concerned. Nor can the absence of such authority be fairly inferred from contemporaneous and consistent Executive interpretation of the Act.It is well-settled that while the power to decide resides solely in the administrative agency vested by law, this does not preclude a delegation of the power to hold a hearing on the basis of which the decision of the administrative agency will be made. The rule that requires an administrative officer to exercise his own judgment and discretion does not preclude him from utilizing, as a matter of practical administrative procedure, the aid of subordinates to investigate and report to him the facts, on the basis of which the officer makes his decisions. It is sufficient that the judgment and discretion finally exercised are those of the officer authorized by law. Neither does due process of law nor the requirements of fair hearing require that the actual taking of testimony be before the same officer who will make the decision in the case. As long as a party is not deprived of his right to present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof, and the decision is supported by the evidence in the record, there is no question that the requirements of due process and fair trial are fully met. In short, there is no abnegation of responsibility on the part of the officer concerned as the actual decision remains with and is made by said officer. It is, however, required that to "give the substance of a hearing, which is for the purpose of making determinations upon evidence the officer who makes the determinations must consider and appraise the evidence which justifies them." In the case at bar, while the hearing officer may make preliminary rulings on the myriad of questions raised at the hearings of these cases, the ultimate decision on the merits of all the issues and questions involved is left to the Director of Patents. Apart from the circumstance that the point involved is procedural and not jurisdictional, petitioners have not shown in what manner they have been prejudiced by the proceedings.


EVELIO B. JAVIER vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and ARTURO F. PACIFICADOR

FACTS: The petitioner and the private respondent were candidates in Antique for the Batasang Pambansa in the May 1984 elections. The former appeared to enjoy more popular support but the latter had the advantage of being the nominee of the KBL with all its perquisites of power. On May 13, 1984, the eve of the elections, several followers of the petitioner were ambushed and killed, allegedly by the latter's men. Seven suspects, including respondent Pacificador, are now facing trial for these murders. The incident naturally heightened tension in the province and sharpened the climate of fear among the electorate. Conceivably, it intimidated voters against supporting the Opposition candidate or into supporting the candidate of the ruling party.

It was in this atmosphere that the voting was held, and the post-election developments were to run true to form. Owing to what he claimed were attempts to railroad the private respondent's proclamation, the petitioner went to the Commission on Elections to question the canvass of the election returns. His complaints were dismissed and on July 23, 1984, the Second Division promulgated the decision now subject of this petition which inter alia proclaimed Arturo F. Pacificador the elected assemblyman of the province of Antique. This decision was signed by Chairman Victoriano Savellano and Commissioners Jaime Opinion and Froilan M. Bacungan. Previously asked to inhibit himself on the ground that he was a former law partner of private respondent Pacificador, Opinion had refused. Meanwhile, on the strength of his proclamation, the private respondent took his oath as a member of the Batasang Pambansa. The petitioner then came to this Court, asking us to annul the said decision. The case was still being considered by this Court when on February 11, 1986, the petitioner was gunned down in cold blood and in broad daylight.

ISSUE: Whether the petitioner was granted due process before the Comelec, an administrative body.

HELD: No.Given the general attitude of the Commission on Elections toward the party in power at the time, and the particular relationship between Commissioner Opinion and MP Pacificador, one could not be at least apprehensive, if not certain, that the decision of the body would be adverse to the petitioner. As in fact it was. Commissioner Opinion's refusal to inhibit himself and his objection to the transfer of the case to another division

cannot be justified by any criterion of propriety. His conduct on this matter belied his wounded protestations of innocence and proved the motives of the Second Division when it rendered its decision.

This Court has repeatedly and consistently demanded "the cold neutrality of an impartial judge" as the indispensable imperative of due process. 15 To bolster that requirement, we have held that the judge must not only be impartial but must also appear to be impartial as an added assurance to the parties that his decision will be just. 16 The litigants are entitled to no less than that. They should be sure that when their rights are violated they can go to a judge who shall give them justice. They must trust the judge, otherwise they will not go to him at all. They must believe in his sense of fairness, otherwise they will not seek his judgment. Without such confidence, there would be no point in invoking his action for the justice they expect.

Due process is intended to insure that confidence by requiring compliance with what Justice Frankfurter calls the rudiments of fair play. Fair play cans for equal justice. There cannot be equal justice where a suitor approaches a court already committed to the other party and with a judgment already made and waiting only to be formalized after the litigants shall have undergone the charade of a formal hearing. Judicial (and also extra-judicial) proceedings are not orchestrated plays in which the parties are supposed to make the motions and reach the denouement according to a prepared script. There is no writer to foreordain the ending. The judge will reach his conclusions only after all the evidence is in and all the arguments are filed, on the basis of the established facts and the pertinent law.

The relationship of the judge with one of the parties may color the facts and distort the law to the prejudice of a just decision. Where this is probable or even only posssible, due process demands that the judge inhibit himself, if only out of a sense of delicadeza. For like Caesar's wife, he must be above suspicion. Commissioner Opinion, being a lawyer, should have recognized his duty and abided by this well-known rule of judicial conduct. For refusing to do so, he divested the Second Division of the necessary vote for the questioned decision, assuming it could act, and rendered the proceeding null and void.


ZAMBALES CHROMITE MINING CO. vs. COURT OF APPEALSG.R. No. L-49711 November 7, 1979 CASE: This is a mining case. The petitioners appealed from the second decision of the Court of Appeals, reversing its first decision and holding that it was improper from Benjamin M. Gozon, as Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, to affirm his own decision as Director of Mines.

The Court of Appeals further held that the trial court's judgment, confirming the Secretary's decision, should be set aside and that the Minister of Natural Resources should review anew the decision of the Director of Mines "and, thereafter, further proceedings will be taken in the trial court". The antecedental proceedings are as follows:Zambales Chromite Mining Co., Inc. or the group of Gonzalo P. Nava referred as Petitioners Groups of Gregorio Martinez and Pablo Pabilona, referred as private respondents-appellees

FACTS: (1) In Mines Administrative Case No. V-227, Director Gozon issued an order dated October 5, 1960 wherein he dismissed the case filed by the petitioners or protestants, wherein petitioners sought to be declared as the rightful and prior locators and possessors of nine mining claims located in Zambales. However Director Gozon found that the petitioners did not discover any mineral nor staked and located mining claims in accordance with law the basis for which he dismissed the case. In that same order, Director Gozon ruled that the mining claims of the groups of Gregorio Martinez and Pablo Pabilona, now the private respondents-appellees, were duly located and registered.

(2) The petitioners appealed from that order to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. While the appeal was pending, Director Gozon was appointed Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. Instead of inhibiting himself, he decided the appeal, DANR Case No. 2151, on August 16, 1963 as it he was adjudicating the case for the first time. 'Thus, Secretary Gozon exercised appellate jurisdiction over a case which he had decided as Director of Mines. He acted as reviewing authority in the appeal from his own decision. Or, to use another analogy, he acted as trial judge and appellate judge in the same case. He ruled that the petitioners had abandoned the disputed mining claims, while, on the other hand, the Martinez and Pabilona groups had validly located the

said claims. Hence, he dismissed the appeal from his own decision.

(3) On September 20, 1963, the petitioner filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Zambales, assailing Secretary Gozon's decision and praying that they be declared the prior locators and possessors of the sixty-nine mineral claims in question. Impleaded as defendants in the case were the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, the Director of Mines and the members of the Martinez and Pabilona groups. After hearing, the lower court sustained Secretary Gozon's decision and dismissed the case. It held that the disqualification petition of a judge to review his own decision or ruling (Sec. 1, Rule 137, Rules of Court) does not apply to administrative bodies; that there is no provision in the Mining Law, disqualifying the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources from deciding an appeal from a case which he had decided as Director of Mines; that delicadeza is not a ground for disqualification; that the petitioners did not seasonably seek to disqualify Secretary Gozon from deciding their appeal, and that there was no evidence that the Secretary acted arbitrarily and with bias, prejudice, animosity or hostility to the petitioners.

(4) The petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Sixth Division of that Court (Pascual, Agcaoili and Climaco, JJ.) in its first decision reversed the judgment of the trial court and declared that the petitioners were the rightful locators and possessors of the said sixty-nine mining claims and held as invalid the mining claims overlapping the same. However, after a motion filed by private respondent-appellees the Court of Appeals in its second decision remanded the case to the Minister of Natural Resources for another review of Director Gozon's decision. This was the prayer of the petitioners in their brief but in their opposition to the motion for reconsideration, they prayed that the first decision of the Court of Appeals in their favor be maintained.

ISSUE: WON Sec. Gozon as the Secretary of Agriculture acted with grave abuse of discretion in reviewing his own order issued as the Director of Mines.

HELD: Yes.We hold that Secretary Gozon acted with grave abuse of discretion in reviewing his decision as Director of Mines. The palpably flagrant anomaly of a Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources reviewing his own decision as Director of Mines is a mockery of administrative justice.


The provision of section 61, The Mining Law, Commonwealth Act No. 13-I, that the decision of the Director of Mines may be appealed to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources contemplates that the Secretary should be a person different from the Director of Mines.

In order that the review of the decision of a subordinate officer might not turn out to be a farce the reviewing officer must perforce be other than the officer whose decision is under review; otherwise, there could be no different view or there would be no real review of the case. The decision of the reviewing officer would be a biased view; inevitably, it would be the same view since being human, he would not admit that he was mistaken in his first view of the case.

A sense of proportion and consideration for the fitness of things should have deterred Secretary Gozon from reviewing his own decision as Director of Mines. He should have asked his undersecretary to undertake the review.

Petitioners-appellants were deprived of due process, meaning fundamental fairness, when Secretary Gozon reviewed his own decision as Director of Mines.

Corona vs. CA214 SCRA 378

Facts: Secretary Reyes Filed a complaint with the Administrative Action Board (AAB) a complaint against Dinopol, then manager of the Port of Davao. For dishonesty, grave misconduct, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and for violation of the Anti-Graft Law. Dinopol actively participated at the hearings although he asserted that the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) not the AAB, had jurisdiction over the case. AAB found Dinopol guilty as charged. Dinopol filed with the RTC of Pasig a petition challenging the jurisdiction of the AAB. The court ruled in favor of Dinopol.

Issue: W/N the Secretary of the DOTC and/or the AAB have jurisdiction to initiate and hear administrative cases against PPA personnel whose rank are below that of an assistant general manager?

Held: No, what is prescribed by law and the Beja case is that all complaints against a PPA official or employee below the rank of Assistant Manager by the proper officials, such as the PPA Police or any aggrieve party. The aggrieved party should not, however, be one and the same official upon whose lap the complaint he has filed may eventually fall on appeal. Nemo potest esse simul actor et judex. No man can be at once a litigant and judge. Unless, of course, in a exceptional case, such official inhibits himself or expresses his willingness at the outset to waive his right to review the case on appeal.


PERLA C. BAUTISTA, GREATER MANILA FEDERATION OF JEEPNEY OPERATORS & DRIVERS ASSOCIATION vs. BOE, MANILA ELECTRIC COG.R. No. 75016 January 13, 1989

FACTS: On May 30, 1986, MERALCO filed with BOE a verified application for an upward revision of its rates. The application alleged among others, that MERALCO suffered net losses of P231.2 million in 1984 and P70.4 million in 1985 due to the devaluation of the peso, the drop in kilowatt sales, limited access to credit, high financing cost and charges of operations and maintenance and the deterioration of system loss. The application averred that the proposed rate schedule is an increase of 9.5 centavos per kilowatt hour in MERALCO's basic distribution charge which is 5.25% of the March 1986 average billing rate. However, consumptions up to 130 kilowatt hours per month of residential customers, and up to 70 kilowatt hours of small commercial customers, and consumptions of government-owned hospitals and public street lighting services are not affected by the increase.

In the same petition, MERALCO prayed for an ex parte provisional approval of the proposed rates anchored on the reasons that under its existing rate schedules, it expects to incur a total cash deficit from its 1986 operations in the amount of P918,317,000.00; that its operating income is not enough to cover the payment of the interests and amortization of its foreign loan, and that it is unable to maintain its distribution system to provide safe and efficient service. Attached to the petition are the affidavits of its key officers with supporting duly certified schedules, computations, documents and papers.

On June 9, 1986, herein petitioners Perla C. Bautista and Greater Manila Federation of Jeepney Operators and Drivers Association, filed an "Opposition to the Application for the Increase in Rates" and prayed that no provisional approval should be granted by the BOE. They alleged that they, together with others similarly situated, are adversely affected by the increase in rates of MERALCO and that the increase in rates is exorbitant and unreasonable as the prices of petroleum products had already gone down.

In an Order dated June 11, 1986, the BOE provisionally approved MERALCO's revised rate schedules without hearing.

Petitioners moved for a reconsideration of the aforesaid order stating that they were not afforded the opportunity to be heard. Without setting for hearing, the BOE denied the motion for reconsideration.

Dissatisfied, petitioners filed this instant petition.

ISSUE: WON the Board of Energy acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it provisionally approved ex-parte the application for increase in rates of MERALCO.

HELD: The records show that the issue has become moot and academic as MERALCO decreased its rate by 12.6 centavos per kilowatt hour in its electric, bills for August 1986, apart from a 4.2 centavo cut per kilowatt-hour for September 1986. In fact a similar petition (G.R. 75045, Philippine Consumers Foundation, Inc. v. Board of Energy et al.) raising a like issue and with the same factual backdrop was dismissed by this Court in the resolution of October 3, 1986 for having become moot and academic.

Assuming that this case has not yet become moot, it is beyond dispute that when BOE provisionally authorized private respondent's application without hearing, it merely exercised a prerogative granted to it by law.

Under similar circumstances, this Court has upheld the authority of regulatory boards like the Energy Regulatory Board (Citizens Alliance for Consumer Protection v. Energy Regulatory Board, et al., G.R. No. 78888-90, June 23, 1988), to grant provisional relief upon the filing of an application, petition or complaint or at any stage thereafter, and without the need of prior hearing, but it shall call a hearing thereon within thirty days thereafter for the determination of its final decision. The order granting Such provisional relief, however, must be based upon substantial evidence — supporting papers duly verified or authenticated, and is without prejudice to rendition of a final decision after hearing. This Court ruled in the case of the Board of Transportation that the provisional nature of the authority and the fact that the primary application is given a full hearing, are the safeguards against its abuses (Matienso v. Abellera, G.R. No. L-45839, June 1988).

In the case at bar, petitioners were given the opportunity to air their side and put to test the reasonableness of the revised rate schedules applied for during the hearings for the determination of the principal relief sought. The allegations, therefore, that due process had been denied


to the petitioners are without basis, they themselves having participated at the hearing for the final determination of the application of MERALCO by the BOE.

PHILIPPINE AIR LINES, INC. vs. CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD

G.R. No. L-24219 June 13, 1968

FACTS: On September 16, 1964, Fairways filed with CAB the corresponding application for a "certificate of public convenience and necessity", was objected to by herein petitioner, Philippine Air Lines, Inc. After several hearings before the CAB officer, on December 14, 1964, Fairways filed an "urgent petition for provisional authority to operate" under a detailed "program of implementation" attached to said petition, and for the approval of its bond therefor, as well as the provisional approval of its "tariff regulations and the conditions of carriage to be printed at the back of the passenger tickets." PAL opposed but CAB gave a resolution issued on January 5, 1965, granting the petition of Fairways provisional authority to operate scheduled and non-scheduled domestic air services with the use of DC-3 aircrafts", subject to specified conditions which through evidence showing prima facie its fitness, willingness and ability to operate the services applied for and the public need for more air transportation service, and to encourage and develop commercial air transportation. Pursuant to Republic Act No. 4147, granting thereto "a franchise to establish, operate and maintain transport services for the carriage of passengers, mail, industrial flights and cargo by air in and between any and all points and places throughout the Philippines and other countries". A reconsideration of the resolution was denied, PAL filed the present civil action alleging that, in issuing said resolution, CAB had acted illegally and in excess of its jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion.

ISSUE: Whether or not (1) CAB is not empowered to grant any provisional authority to operate, prior to the submission for decision of the main application for a certificate of public convenience and necessity; (2) CAB had no evidence before it that could have justified the granting of the provisional authority complained of; (3) PAL was denied due process when CAB granted said authority before the presentation of its evidence on Fairway's main application; and (4) In granting said provisional authority, the CAB had prejudged the merits of said application.

HELD: 1.) NO. Because under Section 10-C(1) of Republic Act No. 776: (C) The Board shall have the following specific powers and duties:(1) In accordance with the provisions of Chapter IV of this Act, to issue, deny, amend, revise, alter, modify, cancel suspend or


revoke, in whole or in part, upon petitioner complaint, or upon its own initiative, any temporary operating permit or Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity; Provided, however, That in the case of foreign air carriers, the permit shall be issued with the approval of the President of the Republic of the Philippines explicitly authorizes CAB to issue a "temporary operating permit," and nothing contained, either in said section, or in Chapter IV of Republic Act No. 776, negates the power to issue said "permit", before the completion of the applicant's evidence and that of the oppositor thereto on the main petition.

The CAB's authority to grant a temporary permit "upon its own initiative," strongly suggests the power to exercise said authority, even before the presentation of said evidence has begun. In connection with the commercial air transport service, from the policy of our public service law, which sanctions the issuance of temporary or provisional permits or certificates of public convenience and necessity, before the submission of a case for decision on the merits. The overriding considerations in both instances are the same, namely, that the service be required by public convenience and necessity, and, that the applicant is fit, as well as willing and able to render such service properly, in conformity with law and the pertinent rules, regulations and requirements.

2. & 3.) No. Apart from PAL's assertion being contradicted by the tenor of said order, there is the legal presumption that official duty has been duly performed. The CAB is vested with powers said to be quasi-judicial in nature, in connection with the enforcement of laws affecting particular fields of activity, the proper regulation and/or promotion of which requires a technical or special training, aside from a good knowledge and grasp of the overall conditions, relevant to said field, obtaining in the nation. The consequent policy and practice underlying our Administrative Law is that courts of justice should respect the findings of fact of said administrative agencies, unless there is absolutely no evidence in support thereof or such evidence is clearly, manifestly and patently insubstantial. Petitioner has not satisfactorily shown that the aforementioned findings of the CAB are lacking in the necessary evidentiary support.

In the case at bar, we are concerned with an interlocutory order prior to the rendition of said decision. In fact, interlocutory orders may sometimes be issued ex parte, particularly, in administrative proceedings, without

previous notice and hearing, consistently with due process. Again, the constitutional provision to the effect that "no decision shall be rendered by any court of record without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based", applies, not to such interlocutory orders, but to the determination of the case on the merits.

4.) No. Because the provisional nature of the permit granted to Fairways refutes the assertion that it prejudges the merits of Fairways' application and PAL's opposition thereto. As stated in the questioned order, CAB's findings therein made reflect its view merely on the prima facie effect of the evidence so far introduced and do not connote a pronouncement or an advanced expression of opinion on the merits of the case.


Judge Abelita III v. Doria G.R. no. 170672

FACTS: Judge Abelita III filed a complaint for Damages under Articles 32(4) and (9) of the Civil Code against P/Supt. Doria and SPO3 Cesar Ramirez alleging that on 24 March 1996, at around 12 noon, he and his wife were on their way to their house in Bagumbayan, Masbate when Doria and Ramirez , accompanied by 10 unidentified police officers, requested them to proceed to the Provincial PNP Headquarters at Camp Boni Serrano, Masbate. Abelita was suspicious of the request and told respondents that he would proceed to the PNP Headquarters after he had brought his wife home. Abelita alleged that when he parked his car in front of their house, Ramirez grabbed him, forcibly took the key to his Totoya Lite Ace van, barged into the vehicle, and conducted a search without a warrant. The search resulted to the seizure of a licensed shotgun. Abelita presented the shotgun’s license to respondents. Thereafter, Ramirez continued his search and then produced a .45 caliber pistol which he allegedly found inside the vehicle. Respondents arrested petitioner and detained him, without any appropriate charge, at the PNP special detention cell. Doria alleged that his office received a telephone call from a relative of Rosa Sia about a shooting incident in Barangay Nursery. SPO3 Ramirez later reported that a certain Sia was wounded while petitioner, who was implicated in the incident, and his wife just left the place of the incident. Doria looked for petitioner and when he found him, he informed him of the incident report. Doria requested petitioner to go with him to the police headquarters as he was reported to be involved in the incident. Petitioner agreed but suddenly sped up his vehicle and proceeded to his residence. Doria and his companions chased petitioner. Upon reaching petitioner’s residence, they caught up with petitioner as he was about to run towards his house. The police officers saw a gun in the front seat of the vehicle beside the driver’s seat as petitioner opened the door. They also saw a shotgun at the back of the driver’s seat. The police officers confiscated the firearms and arrested petitioner. Doria alleged that his men also arrested other persons who were identified to be with petitioner during the shooting incident. Petitioner was charged with illegal possession of firearms and frustrated murder. An administrative case was also filed against petitioner before this Court. The trial court ruled in favor of Doria which resulted to a motion for reconsideration by Abelita but was denied. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: 1. Whether the warrantless arrest and warrantless search and seizure were illegal under Section 5, Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure; 2.Whether respondents are civilly liable for damages under Articles 32(4) and (9) of the Civil Code; and 3.Whether the findings in the administrative case against petitioner are conclusive in this case.

HELD: 1.) NO. For the warrantless arrest under this Rule to be valid, two requisites must concur: (1) the offender has just committed an offense; and (2) the arresting peace officer or private person has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it. Personal knowledge of facts must be based on probable cause, which means an actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion. The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief of the arresting officers, the suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense is based on actual facts. A reasonable suspicion, therefore, must be founded on probable cause, coupled with good faith on the part of the peace officers making the arrest. Section 5, Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure does not require the arresting officers to personally witness the commission of the offense with their own eyes. Ramirez investigated the report and learned from witnesses that petitioner was involved in the incident. They were able to track down petitioner, but when invited to the police headquarters to shed light on the incident, petitioner initially agreed then sped up his vehicle, prompting the police authorities to give chase. Petitioner’s act of trying to get away, coupled with the incident report which they investigated, is enough to raise a reasonable suspicion on the part of the police authorities as to the existence of probable cause.

The seizure of the firearms was justified under the plain view doctrine which states that objects falling in the plain view of an officer who has a right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence. The police authorities were in the area because that was where they caught up with petitioner after the chase. They saw the firearms inside the vehicle when petitioner opened the door. Since a shooting incident just took place and it was reported that petitioner was involved in the incident, it was apparent to the police officers that the firearms may be evidence of a crime. Hence, they were justified in seizing the firearms.


2.) NO. It was established that petitioner was lawfully arrested without a warrant and that firearms were validly seized from his possession. The trial court found that petitioner was charged with illegal possession of firearms and frustrated murder, and that respondents were presumed to be performing their duties in accordance with law. Hence, respondents should not be held civilly liable for their actions.

3.) NO. For res judicata to apply, the following requisites must be present:(a) the former judgment or order must be final; (b) it must be a judgment or order on the merits, that is, it was rendered after a consideration of the evidence or stipulations submitted by the parties at the trial of the case; (c) it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; and (d) there must be, between the first and second actions, identity of parties, of subject matter, and of cause of action; this requisite is satisfied if the two actions are substantially between the same parties

The present case and the administrative case are based on the same essential facts and circumstances, the doctrine of res judicata will not apply. An administrative case deals with the administrative liability which may be incurred by the respondent for the commission of the acts complained of. The deals with the civil liability for damages of the police authorities. There is no identity of causes of action in the cases. While identity of causes of action is not required in the application of res judicata in the concept of conclusiveness of judgment, it is required that there must always be identity of parties in the first and second cases. There is no identity of parties between the present case and the administrative case. The administrative case was filed by Sia Lao against petitioner. Sia Lao is not a party to this case. Respondents in the present case were not parties to the administrative case between Sia Lao and petitioner. Hence, while res judicata is not a defense to petitioner’s complaint for damages, respondents nevertheless cannot be held liable for damages.

Governor San Luis, et al. v. CA & Berroya, Jr.GR No. L-80160, 26 June 1989

Facts: Berroya had been the quarry superintendent in Laguna. He denounced graft & corrupt practices by employees of the provincial gov’t. Gov. San Luis issued an office order transferring Berroya to the ofc of the Provincial Engineer. Berroya challenged the transfer & the Civil Service ruled the same violative of RA 2260 & ordered that Berroya be reverted to his regular position of quarry superintendent. Instead of complying w/ the CSC directive, San Luis suspended Berroya. The CSC reiterated its directive & ruled the 1-yr suspension illegal. San Luis appealed the said directive to the Office of the President. Said ofc issued a decision reversing the CSC rulings but later reversed its decision on motion for reconsideration.

San Luis dismissed Berroya for alleged neglect of duty but the CSC declared the dismissal unjustified & directed Berroya’s reinstatement. The CSC Merit System Board denied San Luis’ Motion for Reconsideration in its Resolution. Berroya’s formal demand for reinstatement having been disdained he sought a mandamus to compel his reversion to the position of quarry superintendent.

The trial court upheld the validity of Berroya’s dismissal but the CA reversed said ruling on appeal.

Issue: Whether decisions of the CSC & the OP, w/c had become final & executory, can be reviewed by the courts

Held: No. Whenever any board, tribunal or person is by law vested w/ authority to judicially determine a question, like the Merit Systems Board of the CSC & the OP, such determination, when it has become final, is as conclusive between the same parties litigating for the same cause as though the adjudication had been made by a court of general jurisdiction.

Decisions of administrative officers shall not be disturbed by the courts, except when the former have acted w/o or in excess of their jurisdiction, or w/ grave abuse of discretion. Findings of administrative officials & agencies who have acquired expertise bec their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters are generally accorded not only respect but at times even finality if such findings are supported by substantial evidence.


The decisions rendered by the OP & the Merit Systems Board had attained finality w/o petitioners having taken any timely legal recourse to have the said decisions reviewed by the courts. The appropriate administrative agencies having determined w/ finality that Berroya’s suspension & dismissal were w/o just cause, his reinstatement becomes a plain ministerial duty of the Provincial Governor, a duty whose performance may be controlled & enjoined by mandamus.

Nasipit Lumber, Co. vs. NLRC177 SCRA 93

Facts: Acting Secretary of labor issued an order affirming the order and granting petitioner’s application for clearance to dismiss Collado, employe by the latter as security guard for alleged theft of four crates of lawanit boards containing 1,000 panels. Collado filed a complaint before the Butuan District Labor Office. The labor arbiter conceded that NALCO acted in good faith in terminating Collado’s employment to protect its business interests. However, he was constrained to arrive at said conclusion ordering the reinstatement of Collado because of the order of the Nasipit Municipal Judge finding that there was nothing in the testimony of the prosecution witness to establish the probable guilt of Collado. NALCO filed an appeal with the NLRC. However, NLRC favored collado.

Issue: W/N the NLRC acted with grave abuse of discretion?

Held: Yes, in this case, petitioner supported its application for clearance to terminate Collado’s employment with sworn statements implicating him in the theft. Such sworn statements are sufficient to warrant dismissal. On the other hand, the dropping of the qualified theft charges against Collado is not binding upon a labor tribunal. The doctrine of res judicata does not apply to or may not be invoked in labor relation proceedings considering that Section 5, Rule XIII, Book V of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Labor Code provides that such proceedings are non-litigious and summary in nature without regard to the legal technicalities obtain in courts of law.


United Pepsi-Cola Supervisory Union (UPSU) v. Hon. Bienvenido E. Laguesma & Pepsi-Cola Products, Phil., Inc.GR No. 122226, 25 Mar 1998

Facts: Petitioner union filed a petition for certification election on behalf of the route managers at Pepsi-Cola Products Phil., Inc. However, its petition was denied by the med-arbiter &, on appeal, by the Sec. of Labor & Employment, on the ground that the route managers are managerial employees &, therefore, ineligible for union membership under the Labor Code.

Petitioner brought a suit challenging the validity of the order of the med-arbiter, as reiterated in the order of the Sec. of Labor & Employment. Said petition was dismissed by the 3rd Division for lack of showing that Laguesma committed grave abuse of discretion. Petitioner then filed a motion for reconsideration presenting the question as to whether route managers are managerial employees. This question was the subject of 2 previous determinations by the Sec. of Labor & Employment, in accordance with w/c the case was decided by the med-arbiter.

Citing the ruling in Nasipit Lumber Co. v. NLRC, petitioner argues that these previous administrative determinations do not have the effect of res judicata in this case, bec labor relations proceedings are non-litigious & summary in nature w/o regard to legal technicalities.

Issue: Whether res judicata applies in this case

Held: Yes. Res judicata did not apply in Nasipit Lumber because it involved labor relations proceedings of a non-adversary character. But the doctrine of res judicata certainly applies to adversary administrative proceedings. It applies to judicial or quasi judicial proceedings & not to the exercise or administrative powers. Proceedings for certification election, such as those involved in the case, are quasi judicial in nature &, therefore, decisions rendered in such proceedings can attain finality.

DEMETRIO R. TECSON vs. SANDIGANBAYAN AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINESG.R. No. 123045 November 16, 1999

Facts: Upon the offer of Tecson, who was then the mayor of Prosperidad, Agusan Del Sur, he and Mrs. Luzana agreed to engage in an investment business which is to sell tickets at PhP 100 each which after 30 days would earn PhP 200 or more. She would buy appliances and cosmetics at a discount, with the use of the proceeds of the sales of tickets, and resell them. Tecson does not appear to have given any financial contribution.

After having already sold 40 tickets in the amount of P4,000.00, bringing with him a Mayor's Permit in the name of Mrs. Luzana for their business called "LD Assurance Privileges," he asked for a cash advance of P4,000.00 which he would use during the fiesta on September 29, 1989, and he would not release the Mayor's Permit unless the cash advance was given him. Mrs. Luzana reluctantly acceded, saying that it was not the due date yet, so he was getting the cash advances on his share. Tecson signed for the cash advance.

On October 3, 1989, Mrs. Luzana secured a Business Permit in accordance with the instructions of Tecson. The permit was in her name but the same was for the operation of "Prosperidad Investment and Sub-Dealership," the new name of the business. In the session of the Sangguniang Bayan of Prosperidad, Agusan del Sur on October 17, 1989 presided over by Tecson, Resolution No. 100 was passed revoking the business permit at the instance of the Provincial Director of the Department of Trade and Industry.

Suzana now filed an administrative case against petitioner, for violation of Section 3 [c], R.A. No. 3019 and Section 60 of B.P. Blg. 337 with the DILG. She also filed a also filed a civil case against petitioner for damages with the Regional Trial Court. Lastly, another complaint was filed with the Ombudsman for violation of R.A. No. 3019, otherwise known as the "Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act:.

The Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Agusan del Sur dismissed the administrative case. As to the civil case, a compromise agreement was reached between the litigants. The trial court approved the same on December 6, 1991.


The Sandiganbayan, however, issued an order for petitioner's arrest. The First Division rendered the assailed decision convicting appellant of violating R.A. No. 3019.

On his appeal, the Tecson argued that the dismissal of the administrative case before the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Agusan del Sur is conclusive and binding upon the parties by virtue of the doctrine of res judicata. Also, that having been tried before the Sandiganbayan violated his constitutional protection against double jeopardy since the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Agusan del Sur had already cleared him of all charges.

Issues: 1. Whether or not the decision of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan exonerating the accused serves as a bar by prior judgment to the decision of the Sandiganbayan.

2. Whether or not there was a violation of the Constitutional right of the accused against double jeopardy.

Held: 1. No. First, it must be pointed out that res judicata is a doctrine of civil law. 7 It thus has no bearing in the criminal proceedings before the Sandiganbayan. Second, it is a basic principle of the law on public officers that a public official or employee is under a three-fold responsibility for violation of duty or for a wrongful act or omission. This simply means that a public officer may be held civilly, criminally, and administratively liable for a wrongful doing.

Finally, such violation may also lead to suspension, removal from office, or other administrative sanctions. This administrative liability is separate and distinct from the penal and civil liabilities. Thus, the dismissal of an administrative case does not necessarily bar the filing of a criminal prosecution for the same or similar acts, which were the subject of the administrative complaint.

As to the amicable settlement, it is settled that a complaint for misconduct, malfeasance or misfeasance against a public officer or employee cannot just be withdrawn at any time by the complainant. This is because there is a need to maintain the faith and confidence of the people in the government and its agencies and instrumentalities. 9 The inescapable conclusion, therefore, is that the order of the trial court

dismissing Civil Case No. 716 did not bar the proceedings before the Sandiganbayan.

2. No. Double jeopardy attaches only: (1) upon a valid indictment; (2) before a competent court; (3) after arraignment; (4) when a valid plea has been entered; and (5) when the defendant was acquitted or convicted or the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused. 10 None of the foregoing applies to the hearings conducted by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Agusan del Sur in the administrative case. It must be stressed that the said proceedings were not criminal, but administrative in nature. Hence, double jeopardy will not lie.


EDILLO C. MONTEMAYOR v. LUIS BUNDALIAN, RONALDO B. ZAMORA, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, AND GREGORIO R. VIGILAR, SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS G.R. No. 149335; July 1, 2003

Facts: An unverified letter-complaint, dated July 15, 1995, addressed by private respondent Luis Bundalian against Montemayor was sent to the Philippine Consulate General in San Francisco, California, U.S.A. for accumulating unexplained wealth, in violation of Section 8 of Republic Act No. 301. Petitioner was then OIC-Regional Director, Region III, of the DPWH. That in 1993, petitioner and his wife purchased a house and lot at 907 North Bel Aire Drive, Burbank, Los Angeles, California, making a down payment of US$100,000.00. Private respondent accused petitioner of amassing wealth from lahar funds and other public works projects. c

Petitioner, represented by counsel, submitted his counter-affidavit before the Philippine Commission Against Graft and Corruption alleging that the said house is owned by her sister-in-law. He also pointed out that the charge against him was the subject of similar cases filed before the Ombudsman. He attached to his counter-affidavit the Consolidated Investigation Reportof the Ombudsman dismissing similar charges for insufficiency of evidence.

While petitioner participated in the proceedings and submitted various pleadings and documents through his counsel, Bundalian could not be located as his Philippine address could not be ascertained. In the course of the investigation, the PCAGC repeatedly required petitioner to submit his Statement of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth (SALN), Income Tax Returns (ITRs) and Personal Data Sheet. Petitioner ignored these directives and submitted only his Service Record.

After the investigation, the PCAGC concluded that the petitioner could not have been able to afford to buy the property on his annual income of P168,648.00 in 1993 as appearing on his Service Record. It likewise found petitioner’s explanation as unusual, largely unsubstantiated, unbelievable and self-serving. The PCAGC concluded that as petitioner’s acquisition of the subject property was manifestly out of proportion to his salary, it has been unlawfully acquired. Thus, it recommended petitioner’s dismissal from service pursuant to Section 8 of R.A. No. 3019.

August 24, 1998, the Office of the President issued Administrative Order No. 12,[4] ordering petitioner’s dismissal from service with forfeiture of all government benefits.

In this Petition for Review on Certiorari, Montemayor alleged that he was denied due process in the investigation before the PCAGC and that his guilt was proved by substantial evidence. Lastly, that the earlier dismissal of similar cases before the Ombudsman rendered the administrative case before the PCAGC moot and academic.

Issues: 1. Whether or not whether he was denied due process in the investigation before the PCAGC.

2. Whether or not the earlier dismissal of similar cases before the Ombudsman rendered the administrative case before the PCAGC moot and academic.

Held: 1. No. The essence of due process in administrative proceedings is the opportunity to explain one’s side or seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. As long as the parties are given the opportunity to be heard before judgment is rendered, the demands of due process are sufficiently met.

Petitioner's active participation in every step of the investigation effectively removed any badge of procedural deficiency, if there was any, and satisfied the due process requirement. He cannot now be allowed to challenge the procedure adopted by the PCAGC in the investigation.

Neither can we sustain petitioner’s contention that the charge against him was unsupported by substantial evidence as it was contained in an unverified complaint. Despite petitioner's denial of the ownership of the house, he failed to explained why the house was named after him and the sister-in-law did not even submitted any support that she indeed was the owner therof.

2. No. The decision of the Ombudsman does not operate as res judicata in the PCAGC case subject of this review. The doctrine of res judicata applies only to judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings, not to the exercise of administrative powers. Petitioner was investigated by the Ombudsman for his possible criminal liability for the


acquisition of the Burbank property in violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and the Revised Penal Code. For the same alleged misconduct, petitioner, as a presidential appointee, was investigated by the PCAGC by virtue of the administrative power and control of the President over him. As the PCAGC’s investigation of petitioner was administrative in nature, the doctrine of res judicata finds no application in the case at bar

Note: Basic principles in administrative investigations. First, the burden is on the complainant to prove by substantial evidence the allegations in his complaint. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, even if other minds equally reasonable might conceivably opine otherwise.

Second, in reviewing administrative decisions of the executive branch of the government, the findings of facts made therein are to be respected so long as they are supported by substantial evidence.

Third, administrative decisions in matters within the executive jurisdiction can only be set aside on proof of gross abuse of discretion, fraud, or error of law. These principles negate the power of the reviewing court to re-examine the sufficiency of the evidence in an administrative case as if originally instituted therein, and do not authorize the court to receive additional evidence that was not submitted to the administrative agency concerned.

Documents

Administrative Law Case Digests 2