8/12/2019 Pil Digests 1-24

1/21

PRISCILLA C. MIJARES, et. al. vs. HON. SANTIAGO JAVIER RANADA, et. al.,G.R. No. 139325, April 12, 2005, TINGA, J.:

FACTS:On 9 May 1991, a complaint was filed with the United States District Court, District of

Hawaii, against the Estate of former Philippine President Ferdinand E. Marcos (Marcos Estate)by ten Filipino citizens who each alleged having suffered human rights. The presiding judgerendered a Final Judgment awarding the plaintiff class a total of One Billion Nine Hundred SixtyFour Million Five Thousand Eight Hundred Fifty Nine Dollars and Ninety Cents($1,964,005,859.90) which was eventually affirmed by the US Court of Appeals.

On 20 May 1997, the present petitioners filed Complaintwith the Regional Trial Court,City of Makati (Makati RTC) for the enforcement of theFinal Judgment. On 5 February 1998,the Marcos Estate filed a motion to dismiss, raising, among others, the non-payment of thecorrect filing fees.

On 9 September 1998, respondent Judge Santiago Javier Ranada of the Makati RTCissued the subject Order dismissing the complaint without prejudice. Respondent judge opined

that the subject matter of the complaint was indeed capable of pecuniary estimation, as itinvolved a judgment rendered by a foreign court ordering the payment of definite sums ofmoney. RTC estimated the proper amount of filing fees was approximately Four HundredSeventy Two Million Pesos, which obviously had not been paid.

ISSUE:

What provision should apply in determining the filing fees for an action to enforce aforeign judgment?

RULING:

Absent perhaps a statutory grant of jurisdiction to a quasi-judicial body, the claim forenforcement of judgment must be brought before the regular courts.

Thus, we are comfortable in asserting the obvious, that the complaint to enforce the USDistrict Court judgment is one capable of pecuniary estimation. But at the same time, it is also anaction based on judgment against an estate. We find that it is covered by Section 7(b)(3) of Rule141, involving as it does, "other actions not involving property."

As crafted, Rule 141 of the Rules of Civil Procedure avoids unreasonableness, as itrecognizes that the subject matter of an action for enforcement of a foreign judgment is theforeign judgment itself, and not the right-duty correlatives that resulted in the foreign judgment.In this particular circumstance, given that the complaint is lodged against an estate and is basedon the US District Court'sFinal Judgment, this foreign judgment may, for purposes ofclassification under the governing procedural rule, be deemed as subsumed under Section 7(b)(3)of Rule 141, i.e., within the class of "all other actions not involving property." Thus, only theblanket filing fee of minimal amount is required.

8/12/2019 Pil Digests 1-24

2/21

Bayan Muna vs Romulo

G. R. No. 159618, February 01, 2011

Facts:

Petitioner Bayan Muna is a duly registered party-list group established to represent themarginalized sectors of society. Respondent Blas F. Ople, now deceased, was the Secretary ofForeign Affairs during the period material to this case. Respondent Alberto Romulo wasimpleaded in his capacity as then Executive Secretary.

Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court

Having a key determinative bearing on this case is the Rome Statute establishing theInternational Criminal Court (ICC) with the power to exercise its jurisdiction over persons forthe most serious crimes of international concern x x x and shall be complementary to the nationalcriminal jurisdictions. The serious crimes adverted to cover those considered grave under

international law, such as genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and crimes ofaggression.

On December 28, 2000, the RP, through Charge dAffaires Enrique A. Manalo, signed the Rome

Statute which, by its terms, is subject toratification, acceptance or approval by the signatorystates. As of the filing of the instant petition, only 92 out of the 139 signatory countries appear tohave completed the ratification, approval and concurrence process. The Philippines is not amongthe 92.RP-US Non-Surrender Agreement

On May 9, 2003, then Ambassador Francis J. Ricciardone sent US Embassy Note No. 0470 tothe Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) proposing the terms of the non-surrender bilateralagreement (Agreement, hereinafter) between the USA and the RP.Via Exchange of Notes No. BFO-028-037 dated May 13, 2003 (E/N BFO-028-03, hereinafter),the RP, represented by then DFA Secretary Ople, agreed with and accepted the US proposalsembodied under the US Embassy Note adverted to and put in effect the Agreement with the USgovernment. In esse, the Agreement aims to protect what it refers to and defines as persons of

the RP and US from frivolous and harassment suits that might be brought against them ininternational tribunals.8 It is reflective of the increasing pace of the strategic security and defensepartnership between the two countries. As of May 2, 2003, similar bilateral agreements havebeen effected by and between the US and 33 other countries.

The Agreement pertinently provides as follows:1. For purposes of this Agreement, persons are current or former Government officials,

employees (including contractors), or military personnel or nationals of one Party.

2. Persons of one Party present in the territory of the other shall not, absent the express consentof the first Party,

8/12/2019 Pil Digests 1-24

3/21

(a) be surrendered or transferred by any means to any international tribunal for any purpose,unless such tribunal has been established by the UN Security Council, or

(b) be surrendered or transferred by any means to any other entity or third country, or expelled toa third country, for the purpose of surrender to or transfer to any international tribunal, unless

such tribunal has been established by the UN Security Council.

3. When the [US] extradites, surrenders, or otherwise transfers a person of the Philippines to athird country, the [US] will not agree to the surrender or transfer of that person by the thirdcountry to any international tribunal, unless such tribunal has been established by the UNSecurity Council, absent the express consent of the Government of the Republic of thePhilippines [GRP].

4. When the [GRP] extradites, surrenders, or otherwise transfers a person of the [USA] to a thirdcountry, the [GRP] will not agree to the surrender or transfer of that person by the third countryto any international tribunal, unless such tribunal has been established by the UN Security

Council, absent the express consent of the Government of the [US].

5. This Agreement shall remain in force until one year after the date on which one party notifiesthe other of its intent to terminate the Agreement. The provisions of this Agreement shallcontinue to apply with respect to any act occurring, or any allegation arising, before the effectivedate of termination.

In response to a query of then Solicitor General Alfredo L. Benipayo on the status of the non-surrender agreement, Ambassador Ricciardone replied in his letter of October 28, 2003 that theexchange of diplomatic notes constituted a legally binding agreement under international law;and that, under US law, the said agreement did not require the advice and consent of the USSenate.In this proceeding, petitioner imputes grave abuse of discretion to respondents in concluding andratifying the Agreement and prays that it be struck down as unconstitutional, or at least declaredas without force and effect.

Issue:Whether or not the RP-US NON SURRENDER AGREEMENT is void ab initio for contractingobligations that are either immoral or otherwise at variance with universally recognizedprinciples of international law.

Ruling:The petition is bereft of merit.

Validity of the RP-US Non-Surrender Agreement

Petitioners initial challenge against the Agreement relates to form, its threshold posture beingthat E/N BFO-028-03 cannot be a valid medium for concluding the Agreement.

8/12/2019 Pil Digests 1-24

4/21

Petitioners contentionperhaps taken unaware of certain well-recognized internationaldoctrines, practices, and jargonsis untenable. One of these is the doctrine of incorporation, asexpressed in Section 2, Article II of the Constitution, wherein the Philippines adopts thegenerally accepted principles of international law and international jurisprudence as part of thelaw of the land and adheres to the policy of peace, cooperation, and amity with all nations. An

exchange of notes falls into the category of inter-governmental agreements, which is aninternationally accepted form of international agreement. The United Nations Treaty Collections(Treaty Reference Guide) defines the term as follows:

An exchange of notes is a record of a routine agreement, that has many similarities with theprivate law contract. The agreement consists of the exchange of two documents, each of theparties being in the possession of the one signed by the representative of the other. Under theusual procedure, the accepting State repeats the text of the offering State to record its assent. Thesignatories of the letters may be government Ministers, diplomats or departmental heads. Thetechnique of exchange of notes is frequently resorted to, either because of its speedy procedure,or, sometimes, to avoid the process of legislative approval.

In another perspective, the terms exchange of notes and executive agreements have beenused interchangeably, exchange of notes being considered a form of executive agreement thatbecomes binding through executive action. On the other hand, executive agreements concludedby the President sometimes take the form of exchange of notes andat other times that of moreformal documents denominated agreements or protocols. As former US High Commissioner

to the Philippines Francis B. Sayre observed in his work, The Constitutionality of TradeAgreement Acts:

The point where ordinary correspondence between this and other governments ends andagreements whether denominated executive agreements or exchange of notes or otherwise begin, may sometimes be difficult of ready ascertainment. x x xIt is fairly clear from the foregoing disquisition that E/N BFO-028-03be it viewed as the Non-Surrender Agreement itself, or as an integral instrument of acceptance thereof or as consent to beboundis a recognized mode of concluding a legally binding international written contractamong nations.

Agreement Not Immoral/Not at Variancewith Principles of International Law

Petitioner urges that the Agreement be struck down as void ab initio for imposing immoralobligations and/or being at variance with allegedly universally recognized principles ofinternational law. The immoral aspect proceeds from the fact that the Agreement, as petitionerwould put it, leaves criminals immune from responsibility for unimaginable atrocities that

deeply shock the conscience of humanity; x x x it precludes our country from delivering anAmerican criminal to the [ICC] x x x.63

The above argument is a kind of recycling of petitioners earlier position, which, as already

discussed, contends that the RP, by entering into the Agreement, virtually abdicated its

8/12/2019 Pil Digests 1-24

5/21

8/12/2019 Pil Digests 1-24

6/21

BAYAN v. ZAMORA G. R. No. 138570 October 10, 2000

Facts:The United States panel met with the Philippine panel to discussed, among others, the possibleelements of the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA). This resulted to a series of conferences and

negotiations which culminated on January 12 and 13, 1998. Thereafter, President Fidel Ramosapproved the VFA, which was respectively signed by Secretary Siazon and United StatesAmbassador Thomas Hubbard.

Pres. Joseph Estrada ratified the VFA on October 5, (2/3) votes.

Cause of Action:

Petitioners, among others, assert that Sec. 25, Art XVIII of the 1987 constitution is applicableand not Section 21, Article VII.

Following the argument of the petitioner, under they provision cited, the foreign military bases,troops, or facilities may be allowed in the Philippines un less the following conditions aresufficiently met:a) it must be a treaty,b) it must be duly concurred in by the senate, ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a nationalreferendum held for that purpose if so required by congress, andc) recognized as such by the other contracting state.

Respondents, on the other hand, argue that Section 21 Article VII is applicable so that, what isrequires for such treaty to be valid and effective is the concurrence in by at least two-thirds of allthe members of the senate.

ISSUE:Is the VFA governed by the provisions of Section 21, Art VII or of Section 25, Article XVIII ofthe Constitution?

HELD:Section 25, Article XVIII, which specifically deals with treaties involving foreign military bases,troops or facilities should apply in the instant case. To a certain extent and in a limited sense,however, the provisions of section 21, Article VII will find applicability with regard to the issueand for the sole purpose of determining the number of votes required to obtain the validconcurrence of the senate.

The Constitution, makes no distinction between transient and permanent. We find nothing in

section 25, Article XVIII that requires foreign troops or facilities to be stationed or placedpermanently in the Philippines.

It is inconsequential whether the United States treats the VFA only as an executive agreementbecause, under international law, an executive agreement is as binding as a treaty.

8/12/2019 Pil Digests 1-24

7/21

Tanada v. Angara

Facts:

On April 15, 1994, the Philippine Government represented by its Secretary of the Department of

Trade and Industry signed the Final Act binding the Philippine Government to submit to itsrespective competent authorities the WTO (World Trade Organization) Agreements to seekapproval for such. On December 14, 1994, Resolution No. 97 was adopted by the PhilippineSenate to ratify the WTO Agreement.

This is a petition assailing the constitutionality of the WTO agreement as it violates Sec 19,Article II, providing for the development of a self reliant and independent national economy, andSections 10 and 12, Article XII, providing for the Filipino first policy.

Issue:Whether or not the Resolution No. 97 ratifying the WTO Agreement is unconstitutional

Ruling:

The Supreme Court ruled the Resolution No. 97 is not unconstitutional. While the constitutionmandates a bias in favor of Filipino goods, services, labor and enterprises, at the same time, itrecognizes the need for business exchange with the rest of the world on the bases of equality andreciprocity and limits protection of Filipino interests only against foreign competition and tradepractices that are unfair. In other words, the Constitution did not intend to pursue an isolation alist policy. Furthermore, the constitutional policy of a self-reliant and independent nationaleconomy does not necessarily rule out the entry of foreign investments, goods and services. It

contemplates neither economic seclusion nor mendicancy in the international community.The Senate, after deliberation and voting, gave its consent to the WTO Agreement thereby

making it a part of the law of the land. The Supreme Court gave due respect to an equal

department in government. It presumes its actions as regular and done in good faith unless there

is convincing proof and persuasive agreements to the contrary. As a result, the ratification of the

WTO Agreement limits or restricts the absoluteness of sovereignty. A treaty engagement is not a

mere obligation but creates a legally binding obligation on the parties. A state which has

contracted valid international obligations is bound to make its legislations such modifications as

may be necessary to ensure the fulfillment of the obligations undertaken

8/12/2019 Pil Digests 1-24

8/21

8/12/2019 Pil Digests 1-24

9/21

VINUYA VS ROMULO GR NO 162230 APRIL 28, 2010

FACTS:

Members of the MALAYA LOLAS filed to the Supreme Court a petition to compel the

Philippine Government through the DOJ, DFAand OSG requesting assistance in filing theirclaim against the Japanese officials and military officers who ordered the establishment of

the comfort women stations in thePhilippines during WWII. The officials of the Executive

Department, however, declined to assist the petitioners for the reason that the individual claims

of the victims for compensation had already been fully satisfied by Japanscompliance with the

Peace Treaty between the Philippines and Japan.

ISSUE:

Are all cases implicating foreign relations present political questions depriving the courts the

authority to construe or invalidate treatiesand executive agreements?

RULING:

Certain types of cases are found to present political questions, one such category involves

questions of foreign relations. However, notall cases implicating foreign relations

present political questions and courts certainly possess the authority to construe or

invalidatetreaties and executive agreements. But to the questions whether the Philippinegovernment should espouse claims of its nationalsagainst a foreign government is a foreign

relations matter, the authority for which is committed by our Constitution not to the courts butto

the political branches. In this case, the Executive Department has already decided that it is to the

best interest of the country towaive all claims of the nationals for reparations against Japan in

the Treaty of Peace of 1951.

8/12/2019 Pil Digests 1-24

10/21

AKBAYAN VS AQUINO GR 170516 JULY 16, 2008

Facts:

The signing of the Japan-Philippines Economic Partnership Agreement (JPEPA) at the sidelines

of the Asia-Europe Summit in Helsinkiin September 2006 was hailed by both Japanese Prime

Minister Junichiro Koizumi and Philippine President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo as a milestone

in the continuing cooperation and collaboration, setting a new chapter of strategic partnership

for mutual opportunity and growth (for both countries).

JPEPA which has been referred to as a mega treaty is acomprehensive plan for opening up of

markets in goods and services as well as removing barriers and restrictions on investments. It is a

deal that encompasses even our commitments to the WTO.The complexity of JPEPA became all

the more evident at the Senate hearing conducted by the Committee on Trade and Commerce last

November 2006. The committee, chaired by Senator Mar Roxas, heard differing views and

perspectives on JPEPA. On one hand the committee heard Governments rosy projections on the

economic benefits of JPEPA and on the other hand the views of environmental and trade

activists who raised there very serious concerns about the country being turned into Japans toxic

wastebasket. The discussion in the Senate showed that JPEPA is not just an issue concerning

trade and economic relations with Japan butone that touches on broader national development

concerns.

Issues:

1. Do the petitioners have standing to bring this action for mandamus in their capacity as

citizens of the Republic, as taxpayers, and asmembers of the Congress2. Can this Honorable

Court exercise primary jurisdiction of this case and take cognizance of the instant petition.3. Are

the documents and information being requested in relation to the JPEPA exempted from the

general rules on transparency andfull public disclosure such that the Philippine government is

justified in denying access thereto.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court en banc promulgated last July 16, 2008 its ruling on the case of Akbayan

Citizens Action Party et al vs. Thomas G. Aquino et al (G.R. No. 170516). The Highest

Tribunal dismissed the Petition for mandamus and prohibition, which sought to compel

respondents Department of Trade Industry (DTI) Undersecretary Thomas Aquino et al to furnish

petitioners the full text of the Japan-Philippines Economic Partnership Agreement (JPEPA) and

8/12/2019 Pil Digests 1-24

11/21

the lists of the Philippine and Japanese offers submitted during the negotiation process and all

pertinent attachments and annexes thereto.In its Decision, the Court noted that the full text of the

JPEPA has been made accessible to the public since 11 September 2006, and thus the demand to

be furnished with copy of the said document has become moot and academic. Notwithstanding

this, however, the Court lengthily discussed the substantive issues, insofar as they impinge on

petitioners' demand for access to the Philippine and Japanese offers in the course of the

negotiations.

The Court held: Applying the principles adopted in PMPF v. Manglapus, it is clear that while

the final text of the JPEPA may

not be kept perpetually confidential since there should be 'ample opportunity for discussion

before [a treaty] is approved' the offers exchanged by the parties during the negotiations

continue to be privileged even after the JPEPA is published. It is reasonable to conclude that the

Japenese representatives submitted their offers with the understanding that 'historic

confidentiality' would govern the same. Disclosing these offers could impair the ability of thePhilippines to deal not only with Japan but with other foreign governments in future

negotiations.

It also reasoned out that opening for public scrutiny the Philippine offers in treaty negotiations

would discourage future Philippine representatives from frankly expressing their views during

negotiations. The Highest Tribunal recognized that treaty negotiations normally involve a

process of quid pro quo, where negotiators would willingly grant concessions in an area of lesser

importance in order to obtain more favorable terms in an area of greater national interest. In the

same Decision, the Court took time to address the dissent of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno. It

said: We are aware that behindthe dissent of the Chief Justice lies a genuine zeal to protectour people's right to information against any abuse of executive privilege. It is a zeal that We

fully share. The Court, however, in its endeavor to guard against the abuse of executive

privilege, should be careful not to veer towards the opposite extreme, to the point that it would

strike down as invalid even a legitimate exercise thereof

8/12/2019 Pil Digests 1-24

12/21

PIMENTEL VS. EXEC SECRETARY G.R. No. 158088, July 6, 2005ROME STATUTE Signing of Treaty vs. Ratification Significance of Ratification Who has

power to ratify

FACTS: The Rome Statute established the ICC which shall have the power to exercise its

jurisdiction over persons for the most serious crimes of international concern xxx and shall becomplementary to the national criminal jurisdictions. The Philippines, through Charge dAffairs Enrique A. Manalo of the Philippine Mission to the UN, signed the Rome Statute on Dec.28, 2000. Its provisions, however, require that it be subject to ratification, acceptance or approvalof the signatory states. Petitioners now file this petition to compel the Office of the President totransmit the signed copy of the Rome Statute to the Senate for its concurrence.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Executive Secretary and the DFA have a ministerial duty to transmit to theSenate the copy of the Rome Statute

HELD:We rule in the negative.

In our system of government, the President, being the head of state, is regarded as the sole organand authority in external relations and is the countrys sole representative with foreign nations.As the chief architect of foreign policy, the President acts as the countrys mouthpiece withrespect to international affairs. Hence, the President is vested with the authority to deal withforeign states and governments, extend or withhold recognition, maintain diplomatic relations,enter into treaties, and otherwise transact the business of foreign relations. In the realm of treaty-making, the President has the sole authority to negotiate with other states.

Nonetheless, while the President has the sole authority to negotiate and enter into treaties, theConstitution provides a limitation to his power by requiring the concurrence of 2/3 of all themembers of the Senate for the validity of the treaty entered into by him. Section 21, Article VIIof the 1987 Constitution provides that no treaty or internationalagreement shall be valid andeffective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate.

The participation of the legislative branch in the treaty-making process was deemed essential toprovide a check on the executive in the field of foreign relations. By requiring the concurrence ofthe legislature in the treaties entered into by the President, the Constitution ensures a healthysystem of checks and balance necessary in the nations pursuit of political maturity and growth.

Signing vs. Ratification of Treaty

It should be underscored that the signing of the treaty and the ratification are two separate anddistinct steps in the treaty-making process. As earlier discussed, the signature is primarilyintended as a means of authenticating the instrument and as a symbol of the good faith of theparties. It is usually performed by the states authorized representative in the diplomatic mission.

Ratification, on the other hand, is the formal act by which a state confirms and accepts theprovisions of a treaty concluded by its representative. It is generally held to be an executive act,

8/12/2019 Pil Digests 1-24

13/21

undertaken by the head of the state or of the government.

Purpose of Ratification

Petitioners submission that the Philippines is bound under treaty law and international law to

ratify the treaty which it has signed is without basis. The signature does not signify the finalconsent of the state to the treaty. It is the ratification that binds the state to the provisions thereof.In fact, the Rome Statute itself requires that the signature of the representatives of the states besubject to ratification, acceptance or approval of the signatory states. Ratification is the act bywhich the provisions of a treaty are formally confirmed and approved by a State. By ratifying atreaty signed in its behalf, a state expresses its willingness to be bound by the provisions of suchtreaty. After the treaty is signed by the states representative, the President, being accountable to

the people, is burdened with the responsibility and the duty to carefully study the contents of thetreaty and ensure that they are not inimical to the interest of the state and its people. Thus, thePresident has the discretion even after the signing of the treaty by the Philippine representativewhether or not to ratify the same. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties does not

contemplate to defeat or even restrain this power of the head of states. If that were so, therequirement of ratification of treaties would be pointless and futile. It has been held that a statehas no legal or even moral duty to ratify a treaty which has been signed by its plenipotentiaries.There is no legal obligation to ratify a treaty, but it goes without saying that the refusal must bebased on substantial grounds and not on superficial or whimsical reasons. Otherwise, the otherstate would be justified in taking offense.

President has the Power to Ratify Treaties

It should be emphasized that under our Constitution, the power to ratify is vested in thePresident, subject to the concurrence of the Senate. The role of the Senate, however, is limitedonly to giving or withholding its consent, or concurrence, to the ratification. Hence, it is withinthe authority of the President to refuse to submit a treaty to the Senate or, having secured itsconsent for its ratification, refuse to ratify it. Although the refusal of a state to ratify a treatywhich has been signed in its behalf is a serious step that should not be taken lightly, suchdecision is within the competence of the President alone, which cannot be encroached by thisCourt via a writ of mandamus. This Court has no jurisdiction over actions seeking to enjoin thePresident in the performance of his official duties. The Court, therefore, cannot issue the writ ofmandamus prayed for by the petitioners as it is beyond its jurisdiction to compel the executivebranch of the government to transmit the signed text of Rome Statute to the Senate.

International Law and the Constitutionality of the Milk Code of the Philippines

8/12/2019 Pil Digests 1-24

14/21

In the very fresh en banc constitutional case of PHARMACEUTICAL and HEALTH CARE

ASSOCIATION of the PHILIPPINES vs. HEALTH SECRETARY FRANCISCO T.

DUQUE III, et. al., G.R. NO. 173034, October 9, 2007,

the Philippine Supreme Court PARTIALLY GRANTED the petition by declaring NULL AND

VOID Sections 4(f), 11 and 46 of Administrative Order No. 2006-0012, dated May 12, 2006, forbeing ultra vires and prohibited the Department of Health from implementing the said provisions.

With regard to the issue of whether petitioner may prosecute the case as the real party-in-interest,

the Court held that the modern view is that an association has standing to complain of injuries to

its members. This view fuses the legal identity of an association with that of its members. An

association has standing to file suit for its workers despite its lack of direct interest if its

members are affected by the action. An organization has standing to assert the concerns of its

constituents.

Petitioner assails the RIRR for allegedly going beyond the provisions of the Milk Code, therebyamending and expanding the coverage of said law. The defense of the DOH is that the RIRR

implements not only the Milk Code but also various international instruments regarding infant

and young child nutrition. It is respondents' position that said international instruments are

deemed part of the law of the land and therefore the DOH may implement them through the

RIRR.

The Court however held that the international instruments invoked by respondents, namely, (1)

The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child; (2) The International Covenant on

Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; and (3) the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms

of Discrimination Against Women, only provide in general terms that steps must be taken byState Parties to diminish infant and child mortality and inform society of the advantages of

breastfeeding, ensure the health and well-being of families, and ensure that women are provided

with services and nutrition in connection with pregnancy and lactation; however, they do not

contain specific provisions regarding the use or marketing of breastmilk substitutes. The

international instruments that have specific provisions regarding breastmilk substitutes are the

ICMBS and various WHA Resolutions.

Under the 1987 Constitution, international law can become part of the sphere of domestic law

either by transformation or incorporation. The transformation method requires that an

international law be transformed into a domestic law through a constitutional mechanism such aslocal legislation. The incorporation method applies when, by mere constitutional declaration,

international law is deemed to have the force of domestic law.

Treaties become part of the law of the land through transformation pursuant to Article VII,

Section 21 of the Constitution which provides that[n]o treaty or international agreement shall be

valid and effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the members of the

Senate.Thus, treaties or conventional international law must go through a process prescribed by

8/12/2019 Pil Digests 1-24

15/21

the Constitution for it to be transformed into municipal law that can be applied to domestic

conflicts.

The Court held that the ICMBS and WHA Resolutions are not treaties as they have not been

concurred in by at least two-thirds of all members of the Senate as required under Section 21,

Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.

However, according to the Court, the ICMBS which was adopted by the WHA in 1981 had been

transformed into domestic law through local legislation, the Milk Code. Consequently, it is the

Milk Code that has the force and effect of law in this jurisdiction and not the ICMBS per se. The

Milk Code is almost a verbatim reproduction of the ICMBS, but the Court noted that the Milk

Code did not adopt the provision in the ICMBS absolutely prohibiting advertising or other forms

of promotion to the general public of products within the scope of the ICMBS. Instead, the Milk

Code expressly provides that advertising, promotion, or other marketing materials may be

allowed if such materials are duly authorized and approved by the Inter-Agency Committee

(IAC).

Section 2, Article II of the 1987 Constitution provides that the Philippines renounces war as an

instrument of national policy, adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as

part of the law of the land and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom,

cooperation and amity with all nations. The provisions embodies the incorporation method.

Generally accepted principles of international law, by virtue of the incorporation clause of the

Constitution, form part of the laws of the land even if they do not derive from treaty obligations.

The classical formulation in international law sees those customary rules accepted as binding

result from the combination of two elements: the established, widespread, and consistent practiceon the part of States; and a psychological element known as the opinion juris sive

necessitates(opinion as to law or necessity). Implicit in the latter element is a belief that the

practice in question is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring it.

Generally accepted principles of international law refers to norms of general or customary

international law which are binding on all states, i.e., renunciation of war as an instrument of

national policy, the principle of sovereign immunity, a person's right to life, liberty and due

process, and pacta sunt servanda, among others. The concept of generally accepted principles of

law has also been depicted in this wise:

Customary international means a general and consistentpractice of states followed by them

from a sense of legal obligation [opinio juris].This statement contains the two basic elements of

custom: the material factor, that is, how states behave, and the psychological or subjective factor,

that is, why they behave the way they do. The initial factor for determining the existence of

custom is the actual behavior of states. This includes several elements: duration, consistency, and

generality of the practice of states. Once the existence of state practice has been established, it

becomes necessary to determine why states behave the way they do. Do states behave the way

8/12/2019 Pil Digests 1-24

16/21

they do because they consider it obligatory to behave thus or do they do it only as a matter of

courtesy? Opinio juris, or the belief that a certain form of behavior is obligatory, is what makes

practice an international rule. Without it, practice is not law.

It is propounded that WHA Resolutions may constitute soft law or non-binding norms,

principles and practices that influence state behavior. Soft law does not fall into any of the

categories of international law set forth in Article 38, Chapter III of the 1946 Statute of the

International Court of Justice. It is, however, an expression of non-binding norms, principles, and

practices that influence state behavior. Certain declarations and resolutions of the UN General

Assembly fall under this category. The most notable is the UN Declaration of Human Rights,

which this Court has enforced in various cases, specifically, Government of Hongkong Special

Administrative Region v. Olalia, Mejoff v. Director of Prisons, Mijares v. Raada and Shangri-la

International Hotel Management, Ltd. v. Developers Group of Companies, Inc.

The Court stressed that for an international rule to be considered as customary law, it must be

established that such rule is being followed by states because they consider it obligatory tocomply with such rules (opinio juris). However, according to the Court, the respondents have not

presented any evidence to prove that the WHA Resolutions, although signed by most of the

member states, were in fact enforced or practiced by at least a majority of the member states;

neither have respondents proven that any compliance by member states with said WHA

Resolutions was obligatory in nature. Respondents failed to establish that the provisions of

pertinent WHA Resolutions are customary international law that may be deemed part of the law

of the land. Consequently, legislation is necessary to transform the provisions of the WHA

Resolutions into domestic law. The provisions of the WHA Resolutions cannot be considered as

part of the law of the land that can be implemented by executive agencies without the need of a

law enacted by the legislature.

May the DOH may implement the provisions of the WHA Resolutions by virtue of its powers

and functions under the Revised Administrative Code even in the absence of a domestic law?

Section 3, Chapter 1, Title IX of the Revised Administrative Code of 1987 provides that the

DOH shall define the national health policy and implement a national health plan within the

framework of the government's general policies and plans, and issue orders and regulations

concerning the implementation of established health policies.

The crucial issue was whether the absolute prohibition on advertising and other forms of

promotion of breastmilk substitutes provided in some WHA Resolutions has been adopted as

part of the national health policy.

8/12/2019 Pil Digests 1-24

17/21

Respondents submit that the national policy on infant and young child feeding is embodied in

A.O. No. 2005-0014, dated May 23, 2005. Basically, the Administrative Order declared the

following policy guidelines: (1) ideal breastfeeding practices, such as early initiation of

breastfeeding, exclusive breastfeeding for the first six months, extended breastfeeding up to two

years and beyond; (2) appropriate complementary feeding, which is to start at age six months; (3)

micronutrient supplementation; (4) universal salt iodization; (5) the exercise of other feeding

options; and (6) feeding in exceptionally difficult circumstances. Indeed, the primacy of

breastfeeding for children is emphasized as a national health policy. However, nowhere in A.O.

No. 2005-0014 is it declared that as part of such health policy, the advertisement or promotion of

breastmilk substitutes should be absolutely prohibited. Hence, the Court held that the national

policy of protection, promotion and support of breastfeeding cannot automatically be equated

with a total ban on advertising for breastmilk substitutes.The Milk Code does not contain a total

ban on the advertising and promotion of breastmilk substitutes but instead specifically creates an

IAC which will regulate said advertising and promotion. A total ban policy could be

implemented only pursuant to a law amending the Milk Code passed by the constitutionallyauthorized branch of government, the legislature. The Court emphasized that only the provisions

of the Milk Code, but not those of subsequent WHA Resolutions, can be validly implemented by

the DOH through the subject RIRR.

The Court held that the Sec. 3 of the Milk Code's coverage is not limited only to children 0-12

months old. Section 3 of the Milk Code. The coverage of the Milk Code is not dependent on the

age of the child but on the kind of product being marketed to the public. The law treats infant

formula, bottle-fed complementary food, and breastmilk substitute as separate and distinct

product categories.

Section 4(h) of the Milk Code defines infant formula as a breastmilk substitute x x x to satisfy

the normal nutritional requirements of infants up to between four to six months of age, and

adapted to their physiological characteristics; while under Section 4(b), bottle-fed

complementary food refers to any food, whether manufactured or locally prepared, suitable as a

complement to breastmilk or infant formula, when either becomes insufficient to satisfy the

nutritional requirements of the infant. An infant under Section 4(e) is a person falling within the

age bracket 0-12 months. It is the nourishment of this group of infants or children aged 0-12

months that is sought to be promoted and protected by the Milk Code.

But there is another target group. Breastmilk substitute is defined under Section 4(a) as any

food being marketed or otherwise presented as a partial or total replacement for breastmilk,

whether or not suitable for that purpose.This section conspicuously lacks reference to any

particular age-group of children. Hence, the provision of the Milk Code cannot be

considered exclusive for children aged 0-12 months. In other words, breastmilk substitutes may

also be intended for young children more than 12 months of age. Therefore, by regulating

breastmilk substitutes, the Milk Code also intends to protect and promote the nourishment of

children more than 12 months old. Evidently, as long as what is being marketed falls within the

8/12/2019 Pil Digests 1-24

18/21

scope of the Milk Code as provided in Section 3, then it can be subject to regulation pursuant to

said law, even if the product is to be used by children aged over 12 months.

To resolve the question of whether the labeling requirements and advertising regulations under

the RIRR are valid, the Court had to discuss the nature, purpose, and depth of the regulatory

powers of the DOH, as defined in general under the 1987 Administrative Code, and as delegatedin particular under the Milk Code. Health is a legitimate subject matter for regulation by the

DOH (and certain other administrative agencies) in exercise of police powers delegated to it. The

sheer span of jurisprudence on that matter precludes the need to further discuss it.. However,

health information, particularly advertising materials on apparently non-toxic products like

breastmilk substitutes and supplements, is a relatively new area for regulation by the DOH. The

1987 Administrative Code tasked respondent DOH to carry out the state policy pronounced

under Section 15, Article II of the 1987 Constitution, which is to protect and promote the right

to health of the people and instill health consciousness among them.To that end, it was granted

under Section 3 of the Administrative Code the power to (6) propagate health information

and educate the population on important health, medical and environmental matters which have

health implications.When it comes to information regarding nutrition of infants and young

children, however, the Milk Code specifically delegated to the Ministry of Health (hereinafter

referred to as DOH) the power to ensure that there is adequate, consistent and objective

information on breastfeeding and use of breastmilk substitutes, supplements and related

products; and the power tocontrol such information. Further, DOH is authorized by the Milk

Code to control the content of any information on breastmilk vis--vis breastmilk substitutes,

supplement and related products. The DOH is also authorized to control the purpose of the

information and to whom such information may be disseminated under Sections 6 through 9 of

the Milk Code to ensure that the information that would reach pregnant women, mothers ofinfants, and health professionals and workers in the health care system is restricted to scientific

and factual matters and shall not imply or create a belief that bottle feeding is equivalent or

superior to breastfeeding. It bears emphasis, however, that the DOH's power under the Milk

Code to control information regarding breastmilk vis-a-vis breastmilk substitutes is not absolute

as the power to control does not encompass the power to absolutely prohibit the advertising,

marketing, and promotion of breastmilk substitutes.

Nonetheless, the Court held that the framers of the constitution were well aware that trade must

be subjected to some form of regulation for the public good. Despite the fact that our present

Constitution enshrines free enterprise as a policy, it nonetheless reserves to the government thepower to intervene whenever necessary to promote the general welfare. Free enterprise does not

call for removal of protective regulations.It must be clearly explained and proven by

competent evidence just exactly how such protective regulation would result in the restraint of

trade. In this case, petitioner failed to show that the proscription of milk manufacturers

participation in any policymaking body (Section 4(i)), classes and seminars for women and

children (Section 22); the giving of assistance, support and logistics or training (Section 32); and

8/12/2019 Pil Digests 1-24

19/21

the giving of donations (Section 52) would unreasonably hamper the trade of breastmilk

substitutes. Petitioner has not established that the proscribed activities are indispensable to the

trade of breastmilk substitutes. Petitioner failed to demonstrate that the aforementioned

provisions of the RIRR are unreasonable and oppressive for being in restraint of trade.

In fine, the Court held that except Sections 4(f), 11 and 46, the rest of the provisions of the RIRRare in consonance with the objective, purpose and intent of the Milk Code, constituting

reasonable regulation of an industry which affects public health and welfare and, as such, the rest

of the RIRR do not constitute illegal restraint of trade nor are they violative of the due process

clause of the Constitution.

8/12/2019 Pil Digests 1-24

20/21

Kuroda v. JalandoniG.R. No. L-2662, March 26, 1949

THE FACTS

S h i n e g o r i K u r o d a , a f o r m e r L i e u t e n a n t G e n e r a l o f t h e J ap an es e Im pe r i a l Ar my and Commandi ng Gener a l o f t heJ apanes e I mper i a l For ces i n t hePhilippines was chargedbefore the Philippine Military Commission for war crimes. Ashewas the commanding general during such period of war, hewas tried for failure todischarge his duties and permitting thebrutal atrocities and other high crimescommitted by his menagainst noncombatant civilians and prisoners of the Japaneseforces, inviolation of of the laws and customs of war.Kuroda, in his petition, argues that theMilitary Commission isnot a valid court because the law that created it,ExecutiveOrder N o. 68 , i s unco nst i tut i ona l . He fu r the r cont end s that using asbasis the Hague Conventions Rules and Regulationscovering Land Warfare for the warcrime committed cannotstand ground as the Philippines was not a signatory of

suchrules in such convention. Furthermore, he al leges that theUnited States isnot a party of interest in the case and that thetwo US prosecutors cannot practice law in thePhilippines.

THE ISSUES Was E.O. No. 68 valid and constitutional?

THE RULING

[ T h e C o u r t DENIED t h e p e t i t i o n a n d u p h e l d t h e validity andconstitutionality of E.O. No. 68.]

YES, E.O. No. 68 valid and constitutional.

Article 2 of our Constitution provides in its section 3,thatThe Philippines renounces war

as an instrument of national policy and adopts the generally accepted principles

of international law as part of the law of the nation. In accordance with the generally accepted

principle of in t e rna t i on a l l a w o f th e p r es en t d ay i n c l ud in g th e Hague

Convention the Geneva Convention and significant precedents of international jurisprudence

established by the United Nationa those person military or civilian who have been

gu il ty of planning preparing or waging a war of aggression and of the

c o m m i s s i o n o f c r i m e s a n d o f f e n s e s c o n s e q u e n t i a l a n d incidental thereto

in violation of the laws and customs of war of

h u m a n i t y a n d c i v i l i z a t i o n a r e h e l d a c c o u n t a b l e t h e r e f o r . C o n s e q u e

n t l y i n t h e p r o m u l g a t i o n a n d e n f o r c e m e n t o f Ex ecutio n Order No. 68 the

President of the Phil ippines hasacted in conformity with the generally accepted and policies

of international law which are part of the our Constitution

8/12/2019 Pil Digests 1-24

21/21

.xxx xxx xxx Petitioner argues that respondent Military Commission

h a s n o j u r i s d i c t i o n t o t r y p e t i t i o n e r f o r a c t s c o m m i t t e d i n violation of

the Hague Convention and the Geneva Convention because the Philippines is not

a signatory to the first and signed the second only in 1947. It cannot be denied

that the rules and regulation of the Hague and Geneva conventions form, part of and

are wholly based on the generally

a c c e p t e d p r i n c i p a l s o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l l a w . I n f a c t s t h e s e r u l e s a n d p r i n c

iples were accepted by the two belligerent nations the Uni te d St at e an d Ja pa n

wh o wer e s i gna to r i e s t o t he t wo Convention. Such rule and principles therefore form

part of the law of our nation even if the Philippines was not a signatory to the conventions

embodying them for our Constitution has been de l ib e r a t e l y gen e r a l an d

ex t ens i ve in i t s s cop e an d i s n o t confined to the recognition of rule and principle of

international law as contained in treaties to which our government may have been or shall be a

signatory.