Crim Pro - Aug 30.pdf

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Conde v Rivera

GR No L-21741; January 25, 1924; Malcolm J

DOCTRINE: where a prosecuting officer, without good cause, secures postponements of the trial of a defendant against his protest

beyond a reasonable period of time, as in this instance for more than a year, the accused is entitled to relief by a proceeding in

mandamus to compel a dismissal of the information, or if he be restrained of his liberty, by habeas corpus to obtain his freedom

FACTS:

Petitioner: Aurelia Conde formerly a municipal midwife in Lucena Tayabas Respondents: Pablo Rivera (provincial fiscal of Tayabas); Federico Unson (justice of peace) 5 informations for various crimes filed against Conde. Conde appeared with witness and counsel on eight different occasions only to see the cause postponed. For over a year

from the time when the 1st

information was filed

SC RULING: All informations ordered dismissed; fiscal shall abstain from further attempts to prosecute pursuant to informations

growing out of the facts set forth in previous informations

Law expressly guarantee that in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to have a speedy trial. Compelled to dance attendance on courts while investigations and trials are arbitrarily postponed without her consent is

palpably and openly unjust to her and a detriment to the public

By use of reasonable diligence, prosecution could have settled upon the appropriate information, could have attended tothe preliminary investigation and prepared a case without vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays

DOCTRINE: where a prosecuting officer, without good cause, secures postponements of the trial of a defendant against hisprotest beyond a reasonable period of time, as in this instance for more than a year, the accused is entitled to relief by aproceeding in mandamus to compel a dismissal of the information, or if he be restrained of his liberty, by habeas corpus to

obtain his freedom

Garcia v. Domingo

G.R. No. L-30104; July 25, 1973; Fernando, J.

Digest prepared by S.J. Lora

Doctrine

What does right to a public trial signify? -- The trial must be public. It possesses that character when anyone interested in

observing the manner a judge conducts the proceedings in his courtroom may do so. There is to be no ban on such attendance. His

being a stranger to the litigants is of no moment. No relationship to the parties need be shown. The thought that lies behind this

safeguard is the belief that thereby the accused is afforded further protection, that his trial is likely to be conducted with regularity

and not tainted with any impropriety.

It suffices to satisfy the requirement of a trial being public if the accused could "have his friends, relatives and counsel present,

no matter with what offense he may be charged."

I. Facts

There was an altercation between a certain Lorenzana and two policemen (Calo and Carbonnel) due to the mode of arrestdone by the latter, thus resulting in charges and counter-charges with eight criminal cases being tried jointly by city court

Judge.

All the 14 trial dates except 3 fell on a Saturday. This was arranged by the parties and the Court upon the insistence orespondents Calo and Carbonnel who, as police officers under suspension because of the cases, desired the same to be

terminated as soon as possible and as there were many cases scheduled for trial on the usual criminal trial days.

Later, Calo and Carbonnel filed a petition for certiorari with the Judge, and he acted on such petition: "declaring that 'theconstitutional and statutory rights of the accused' had been violated, adversely affecting their 'right to a free and impartialtrial' [noting] 'that the trial of these cases lasting several weeks held exclusively in chambers and not in the court room

open the public'"

A petition for certiorari was filed contending that the judge had committed grave abuse of discretion when he stigmatizedas violative of the right to a public trial the holding of the trial of the other respondents

inside the chambers.

II. Issues

WON the respondents right to a public trial was violated when the trial was held in the judges (air-conditioned) chambers

III. Held

Petition granted; nullifying, setting aside, and declaring bereft of any legal force or effect the order of respondent Judge Domingo fo

being issued with grave abuse of discretion


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IV. Ratio

No, there was no transgression on the right to a public trial.

The 1935 Constitution which was in force at the time of the antecedents of this petition, as set forth at the outset, explicitlyenumerated the right to a public trial to which an accused was entitled.

Jose P. Laurel (Chairman of the Committee on the Bill of Rights): "Trial should also be public in order to offset any danger oconducting it in an illegal and unjust manner."

Justice Black detailed the historical lineage of the right to a public trial: "This nation's accepted practice of guaranteeing a public trial to an accused has its roots in [the] English common

law heritage...but it likely evolved long before the settlement of the [United States] as an accompaniment of theancient institution of jury trial.

"the guarantee to an accused of the right to a public trial appeared in a state constitution in 1776." Later it was embodied in the Sixth Amendment of the Federal Constitution ratified in 1791. "Today almost without exception every state by constitution, statute, or judicial decision, requires that all crimina

trials be open to the public."

The crucial question of the meaning to be attached this provision remains: The Constitution guarantees an accused the right to apublic trialwhat does it signify?

Offhand it does seem fairly obvious that here is an instance where language is to be given a literal application: The triamust be public. It possesses that character when anyone interested in observing the manner a judge conducts the

proceedings in his courtroom may do so. There is to be no ban on such attendance. His being a stranger to the litigants is

of no moment. No relationship to the parties need be shown. The thought that lies behind this safeguard is the belief that thereby the accused is afforded further protection, that his

trial is likely to be conducted with regularity and not tainted with any impropriety.

In this case, there is no showing that the public was thereby excluded. It is to be admitted that the size of the room allotted the Judge would reduce the number of those who could be

our present. Such a fact though is not indicative of any transgression of this right. Courtrooms are not of uniform

dimensions; some are smaller than others.

Moreover, as admitted by Justice Black in his masterly In re Oliver opinion, it suffices to satisfy the requirement ofa trial being public if the accused could "have his friends, relatives and counsel present, no matter with what

offense he may be charged."

Reference may also be made to the undisputed fact at least fourteen hearings had been held in chambers of the citycourt Judge, without objection on the part of respondent policemen.

While the judges concern over to assure the reality as ag ainst the mere possibility of a trial being truly public is commended,further reflection ought to have convinced him though that such a fear was unjustified.

An objective appraisal of conditions in municipal or city courts would have gone far in dispelling such misgivings . Thecrowded daily calendar, the nature of the cases handled, civil as well as criminal, the relaxed attitude on procedural rules

not being strictly adhered to all make for a less tense atmosphere. As a result the attendance of the general public is much

more in evidence; nor is its presence unwelcome.

Flores v. People

G.R. No. L-25769; December 10, 1974; Fernando, J.

Digest prepared by Laurence A. Mopera

I.FACTS1. Francisco Flores and Francisco Angel were charged with Robbery on December 31, 1951.2. On November 29, 1955, they were found guilty as charged. They filed a notice of appeal on December 8, 1955.3. For a period of three years, or until February 10, 1958, the Court of Appeals took no action. On that same day, there was a

resolution remanding the case to the lower court for hearing of a testimony of a witness which is deemed material by the

prosecution.

4. August 5, 1959, the resolution was amended to set aside the previous decision so that evidence for the defense of certainnew facts or matters may be received and that a new decision in lieu of the old one may be rendered in accordance with

the new facts found.

5. Accordingly, the case was remanded to the lower court and the old decision was set aside. However, for a year, nothing wasdone on the case due to the failure of the offended party to appear, notwithstanding the six or seven dates scheduled for

hearing. When he finally appeared, the testimony was characterized as fiasco as he could no longer remember the details of

the said crime, and he could not even identify the accused anymore.


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6. Instead of rendering a new decision, the lower court merely sent the records to the appellate court. At that stage, five ormore years had lapsed without the case being settled.

7. Since their case has been pending for almost a decade (December 8, 1955 May 10, 1965), the accused filed a motion todismiss, invoking the right to speedy disposition of cases.

8. The Court of Appeals was unresponsive and denied the motion as well as its motion for reconsideration.II.ISSUESWhether or not the right to speedy disposition of cases was violated [YES]

III. HELDThe criminal case against the accused was ordered dismissed.

IV. RATIOThe right to a speedy trial means being free from vexatious, capricious and oppressive delay in a case. Through this, an innocent may

be spared from anxiety and if culpable, be not kept in suspense of what might happen to him. Should this be violated, the possible

remedies are certiorari, prohibition or mandamus.

Even before the 1935 Constitution, the doctrine has already been discussed in the case of Conde vs. Rivera, where it was held that

under the organic law and the Philippine Organic Act, the trial must be free from vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays

Further it was held that when a prosecuting officer secures postponement without justifiable cause, such postponement must not

last beyond a reasonable time.

The earliest case after the 1935 Constitution was People vs. Castaneda. In that case, the case has been dragging on for five years and

when the trial finally took place, it was filled with irregularity. The court said that the governments must be the last to set example

of delay and oppression of the administration of justice. The same thing happened in the case of Esguerra vs. Dela Costa where the

case against the accused was dismissed due to his right to speedy trial.

In the case of Mercado vs. Santos, the court said that an accused person is entitled to trial at the earliest opportunity. He cannot be

oppressed by delaying the commencement of the trial for an unreasonable length of time. If the proceedings pending trial are

deferred, the trial itselfis necessarily delayed.

This rule shall apply whether or not the prosecution is conducted by a fiscal. The right to speedy disposition of cases exists

irrespective of the nature of the offense or the manner in which it is authorized to be commenced.

Considering that there was already an original decision in this case, petitioners can validly premise their plea for dismissal on this

constitutional safeguard.

Our decisions on the right to a speedy trial speak too categorically to be misread. This is one of those situations then where, in the

apt language of the then Justice, now Chief Justice, Makalintal, "technicalities should give way to the realities of the situation."

MARTELINO v. ALEJANDRO

G.R. L-30894; March 25, 1970; Castro,J.

Digest by Reinerr

FACTS:

This case is another aspect of the court marital proceedings against the petitioner, Major Eduardo Martelino alias AbdulLatif Martelino, of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and the officers and men under him, for violation of the 94th and

97th

Articles of War.

It was the result of an alleged March 18, 1968 shooting of some Muslim recruits then undergoing commandotraining in Corregidor.

The initial question was with regard to the jurisdiction of the general martial to try the case despite the fact that acomplaint for frustrated murder had been filed in the fiscals office of Cavite City.

The court ruled in favor of the court-martial. In the instant case, Martelino sought the disqualification of the president of the court-martial, Col. Alejandro, based from

the latters admission that he had read newspaper stories of the Corregidor incident:

That the case had received so much media publicity and was being exploited for the purposes of the Nov. 11, 1969presidential elections.


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Daily Mirror July 29, 1969 and other news reports to the effect that coffins are being prepared for thePresident in Jolo,; that, according to Sen. Aquino, massacre victims were given sea burial,; that Sen.

Magsaysay, presidential candidate, had gone to Corregidor and found bullet shells.

Manila Times Aug. 26, 1969: The Jabidah (code name of the training operations] issue was bound tocome up during the presidential campaign. The opposition could not possibly ignore an issue heavily

loaded against the administration.

That this imperiled his right to a free trial. Martelino also raised peremptory challenges against Alejandro and members of the court -martial Lt. Col. Camagay, Lt. Col.

Valones, Lt. Col. Planco and Col. Malig.

It was Martelinos and the other petitioners position that for each specification each accused was entitled to onesuch challenge.

They later changed their stand and adopted that of the trial judge advocate that for each specificationjointlytried, all of the accused are entitled to only 1 peremptory challenge; and for specifications tried commonly, each

of the accused is entitled to 1 peremptory challenge, and that in all, they were entitled to a total of 11 peremptory

challenges.

Respondents: No proof has been presented showing that the court-martials presidents fairness and impartiality had been

impaired.

The Supreme Court had no authority to review the proceedings of the court-martial except on issues of jurisdictionand subject-matter, or, if it had jurisdiction, it had exceeded its powers.

The petitioners failed to exhaust administrative remedies in the military justice system.Issues/Held/ Ratio:

(1) Whether the Court has authority to review proceedings of the court-martial. YES.

It is true that civil courts as a rule exercise no supervision or correcting power over court-martial proceedings and mereerrors in these proceedings are not open to consideration, except as provided by Rule 65, grave abuse of discretion which

gives rise to a defect in their jurisdiction.

It is thus obvious that no other way is open to the Court by which it may avoid passing upon the constitutional issue thrustupon it; and the argument about non-exhaustion of military justice remedies would not hold considering that the issues

raised were questions of law.

(2) Whether the right of Martelino to a just and fair trial was impaired.NO.

The petitioner cited the cases ofIrvin v. Dowd, Rideau v. Louisiana, Estes v. Texas,and Sheppard v. Maxwell: However, the Supreme Court noted that these cases are widely disparate from Martelinos case.

In the Irvin case, after the accused was arrested for 6 murders in Indiana, the prosecutor and the police issuedpress releases stating that the accused had confessed to the 6 murders. A barrage of newspaper headlines, articles

and cartoons was unleashed against the accused 7 months before trial.

The Court reversed the conviction noting the bitter prejudice against the defendant upon the voir direexamination of the jurors. This case marked the first time that a state conviction was struck down solely

on prejudicial publicity.

In Shepherd v. Florida, the reversal of the conviction was on the ground of racial discrimination in the selection ofthe jury, although concurring Justice Jackson (joined by J. Frankfurter) noted that it was hard to imagine a more

prejudicial influence than a press release of an officer of the court, conveyed to the jury, stating that the accused

had confessed to the charges, unseen, uncrossed, un-examined.

In Rideau, the court granted the motion of the lawyers of the accused for a change of venue noting that it was adenial of due process to do so as the accused was given a trial by publicity. A 20-minute video interview of the

accused with the sheriff admitting to the crimes of bank robbery, kidnapping and murder led to his conviction.

In Sheppard, plaintiff Sam Sheppard was accused of killing his wife Marilyn. The Court noted the unfair andprejudicial news comment on pending trials. That trial courts must take strong measures to ensure that the

balance is never weighed against the accused.

Basically, what the Supreme Court noted was the fact that the news cited by the petitioners did not focus on their guilt butrather on the responsibility of the Government for what was claimed to be a massacre of Muslim trainees.

If there was a trial by newspaper at all, it was not of the petitioners but of the Government. What lacks here is a showing of failure of the court-martial to protect the accused from massive publicity encouraged by

those connected with the conduct of the trial. It cannot be said that the trial of the petitioners was being held under

circumstances which did not permit the observance of the imperative decencies of procedure identified with due process.

Even granting the existence of massive and prejudicial publicity, since what the petitioners were contending was simplythe barrage of publicity and not that the court-martial was unduly influenced , the suspension of the court-martial


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proceedings already accomplished the purpose sought by the petitioners challenge for cause, as calmer times had already

returned.

Re: Peremptory Challenge:

Article of War 18:Each side shall be entitled to one peremptory challenge, but the law member of the court shall not bechallenged except for cause.

SC: Each of the petitioners are entitled to one peremptory challenge as a matter of right; the number of specifications orcharges, and whether the trial is joint or common, is of no moment.

Each of the 23 petitioners is entitled to one peremptory challenge: (1) A peremptory challenge is afforded to an accused who, whether rightly or wrongly, feels that the member of

the court peremptorily challenged by him cannot try him, cannot sit in judgment over him, impartially.

It is not enough that objectively the members of the court may be fair and impartial; it is likewisenecessary that subjectively the accused must feel that he is being tried by a fair and impartial body of

officers.

(2) Upon careful examination by the Court ofArticle of War 18 and the US Military Law cited by the respondents,each accused person is entitled to one peremptory challenge whether in a joint or common trial.

(3) Each side from Article of War 18 means each accused person.

People v. Orsal

GR No. L-47069; March 29, 1982; Per Curiam

Doctrine:The test of violation of the right to a speedy trial has always been to begin counting the delay from the time the information is filed

not before the filing. In this case, the delay was for a reasonable cause, and is therefore not to be reckoned with in determining

whether there has been a denial of the right to a speedy trial.

Facts (Not really crucial to the issue though)

Vicente Orsal is one of the 4 accused in separate cases of arson and murder 2 of the other accused were gone at large, so only Orsal and a fellow Ramon Gutierrez stood trial On April 13, 1974, the 4 accused killed Crisanto Bejic, Eduarda Bejic, and their grandchildren Atanacia Legazpi and Roberto

Bejic. After which, they burned the house of Crisanto Bejic

The next day, they then ransacked the house of Jesus Limen, taking his shoes, clothes, paltik revolver, paltic shotguns, and ahand grenade. They then killed Jesus Limen and burned his house.

The accused then took Ramon Jimenez, a companion of Jesus Limen, to different places in Zamboanga City as they wererepairing the shotguns and hiding. They took turns in watching Jimenez so he wouldnt escape

Appellant and Jimenez were eventually captured in Surabay, Zamboanga City.Issues/Holding/Ratio

1. WON the appellant has been denied his right to a speedy trial? NO

Appellant argues that his constitutional right was violated because the information was filed only 9 months after his arrestand investigation

This is incorrect. The test of violation has always been to begin counting the delay from the time the information is filednot before the filing. In this case, the delay was for a reasonable cause, and is therefore not to be reckoned with in

determining whether there has been a denial of the right to a speedy trial.

2. WON there was sufficient evidence to convict him of the crime? YES (Not relevant to lesson) Orsal was identified by Antonio Bejic, the lone survivor in the Bejic household when he heard Orsal shout Hoy prior to the

murdering. He recognized the voice because appellant used to sleep in Antonios grandfathers house

Antonio also saw appellant stab his cousin Roberto Bejic Andrea Bejic testified that prior to the killing, appellant told her not to prepare supper for them anymore as he would eat

supper in her fathers (Crisanto) house

The killing of Jesus Limen and the burning of the house followed the same pattern as the first incident. Ramon Jimeneztestified that he saw the incidents as he was Jesus companion

His testimony is credible as it was very keenly scrutinized Any mistakes with respect to dates of arrest were honest mistakes and not lies


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People v Jardin

GR No. L-33037; Aug 17, 1983; Gutierrez Jr.

Digest prepared by Mara Recto

Rights of the accused speedy trial and freedom from double jeopardy

Long story short: Jardin (accused) kept postponing. He is deemed to have waived or abandoned his right to a speedy trial by his own

acts

FACTS

Demetrio Jardin filed a petition to dismiss the criminal cases filed against him (malversation of public funds thru falsificationof public documents on 6 counts) because his constitutional right to a speedy trial was allegedly violated

Accused moved to postpone the preliminary investigation twiceo On the 3rd and 4th time PI was reset, the accused and his counsel failed to appearo Despite absence, PI was conducted and 6 informations were filed with the CFI

Arraignment was set for May 9, 1967 but was reset for several times (May 9 was reset to June 6 -> June 26 -> Aug 16 ->Sept5) due to motions for postponement filed by the accused

When arraignment was called on Sept 5, counsel of the accused verbally moved for reinvestigation on the ground thataccused was not given opportunity to present defense during the PI

o Court granted and 1st reinvestigation was set on Nov 24 On Nov 24, Investigating Fiscal motu proprio postponed reinvestigation due to non-appearance of the accused and his

counsel. It was again reset and further postponed

On June 27, 1968, accused and his counsel appeared but requested 15 days to file a memorandum

Court issued order transferring the 6 cases to the new branch of the CFI at Mauban, Quezon and trial was set to Dec 3, 1968which was followed by more postponements

Mar 31, 1969, accused moved for postponement of arraignment and requested for reinvestigation Reinvestigation was set to May 5, 1969 which was again reset to June 1 Arraignment and trial was again moved for postponement Sept 8, 1970 Jardin pleaded not guilty, requested for trial to be postponed

o Again postponed on Sept 29, 1970 and again Oct 12, 1970 No one appeared during the hearing

o Counsel for the accused invoked clients right to speedy trial and case was dismissed by the courtW/N Court was correct in dismissing the cases due to the right of the accused to a speedy trial?

NO, court committed GAD in dismissing case and basing it on right to speedy trial

Right to a speedy trial means that the accused is free from vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays, its salutaryobjective being to assure that an innocent person may be free from anxiety and expense of a court litigation or, if

otherwise, of having his guilt determined within the shortest possible time compatible with the presentation and

consideration of whatever legitimate defense he may interpose.

All delays were caused by the accused himself Constitutional right cannot be invoked as it would make a mockery of the justice system if an accused would be allowed to

benefit from his own wrongdoings or tactical maneuvers to frustrate justice

W/N accused would be placed in double jeopardy

NO, no jeopardy can attach, dismissal of the case was void for having no legal basis so acquittal is also void

Requisites for an accused to be protected against double jeopardy

a) Valid complaint/informationb) Competent courtc) Defendant had pleaded to the charged) Defendant was acquitted, convicted or dismissed or terminated

PEOPLE v ANG GIOC

73 PHIL 336; Abad Santos, J.; October 31, 1941

Digested by: Cor Renes

SUMMARY: Ang Gioc evaded his arrest for 13 yrs. When he was finally arrested, it was found that the records of the trial were not

transcribed and the stenographers were already dead. He petitioned for a new trial in the CA. CA granted. SC ruled that CA had no

jurisdiction because Ang Gioc is deemed to have waived his right to appeal when he evaded.


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DOCTRINE: The right to appeal, not being a constitutional right but merely statutory, can be waived either expressly or impliedly.

FACTS

- Ang Gioc, together with Sio Go, Gang Kan, Kee Ya and Chua Chui, was charged with the crime of frustrated murder in the Court of

First Instance of Manila. He was released on bail. After a protracted trial, which lasted several months, Ang Gioc and one of his co

accused, Sio Go, were found guilty and sentenced to twelve years and one day of cadena temporal. Ang Gioc and his sureties were

duly notified to appear before the court for the reading of the sentence, but the former failed to appear and thereupon the trial

judge ordered his arrest and the confiscation of the bond furnished for his temporary release.

- All attempts to arrest him proved futile. He was finally arrested after nearly 13 years from the date fixed for the reading of the

sentence. He was subsequently brought before the court and the sentence was read to him.- He appealed to the CA where, against the objection of the Solicitor General, he was allowed to file a bond for his temporary

release.

- In perfecting the record on appeal it was found that the stenographic notes taken during the trial were not transcribed and that the

two stenographers who took the notes were already dead. The matter was referred to several stenographers who stated that they

could not transcribe the notes because the deceased had used systems known only to themselves. In this situation, Ang Gioc

petitioned the CA to remand the cause to the court below for a new trial.

- CA remanded for new trial.

ISSUE + HELD: WoN the CA acquired jurisdiction of the appeal filed by him? NO. Remanding order must be set aside, and the

judgment of the CFI Manila declared final and executory.

RATIO:

The accused has rights, one of which is the right of appeal; but this is a purely statutory, not a constitutional, right and thisis not one of those fundamental rights which cannot be waived. This right is granted solely for the benefit of the accused

He may avail of it or not, as he pleases. He may waive it either expressly or by implication. When the accused flees after the

case has been submitted to the court for decision, he will be deemed to have waived his right to appeal from the judgment

rendered against him.

IN THE CASE AT BAR: Such was the situation with reference to the respondent Ang Gioc. He was duly notified to appear before the trial court for the reading of the sentence, but failed to do so When an order was issued for his arrest, the warrant could not be served on him because he could not be found. Whether or not he escaped to China is immaterial for our present purpose. The fact remains that he succeeded in

evading arrest for nearly thirteen years.

The record shows that upon his failure to appear for the reading of the sentence, the trial court declared the confiscation othe bond filed by Ang Gioc, and later issued the corresponding order of execution. This action of the court amounted to a

judicial declaration that Ang Gioc was a fugitive from justice, and such declaration cannot after the lapse of nearly thirteen

years be controverted by proof aliunde.

A contrary view would encourage accused persons to trifle with the administration of justice, and provide meansfor guilty parties to escape punishment. We reject it without the least hesitation by declaring that Ang Gioc had

waived his right to appeal from the judgment rendered against him.

The law will not allow a person to take advantage of his own wrong. Ang Gioc has waived his right of appeal. Court of Appeals acquired no jurisdiction of the appeal filed by him, except to

dismiss it; and that court acted in excess of its jurisdiction when it ordered the cause to be remanded to the court of origin

for a new trial

Samson v CA

L-10364 and L-10376; 31 March 1958; Bautista Angelo J.Digest prepared by Gertrude Gamonnac

DOCTRINE

One offense shall be considered the same as the other not only when one is identical to the other but also when one necessarily

includes or is necessarily included in the other.

FACTS

- Rufino Samson was an army lieutenant. On October 2, 1948, he was approached by his former classmate Amado Cruz asking forhis help in getting the checks of the two claimants who were with him.

- The two claimants were supposedly the only legitimate surviving heirs of Felipe Lascano, a lieutenant of the USAFFE who diedduring the last World War. Espiridion Lascano was his father and Rosalina Paras was his widow.


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- Having been assured twice of the identity of the supposed claimants and after examining their residence certificates attached tothe claim papers, Samson accompanied them to Camp Murphy and assisted them in processing their claims and encashing the

checks. Samson even asked for the help of his friend Lt. Valencia to act as guarantor and Rosario Mallari, a teller.

- When they encashed the checks, the one who was claiming to be Espiridion Lascano signed his name at the back of his checkwhile the one claiming to be Rosalina placed her thumbmark at the back of her check since she didnt know how to write.

Samson signed as a witness on Espiridions check and as a last indorser on Rosalinas check.

- They then proceeded to the Aristocrat Restaurant where they, together with 11 other people, took their lunch.- Amado Cruz gave Samson 300php to be paid to the officers who helped them in securing the checks plus 10php for Samson s

taxi fare.

- Samson learned about the falsification 2 days after the incident when he was informed by one Severino Anda that the checkswere delivered to the wrong parties.

- Samson went to Sorsogon to look for the real claimants. He was able to meet the real Espiridion Lascano, who was too old andweak to leave the house, and Rosalina, a teacher. They told him that they never received any check or money.

- Samson was charged with estafa through falsification of documents but he was found guilty by the trial court and the CA ofestafa through falsification of documents by reckless imprudence.

ISSUE:

WON the CA erred in convicting him of estafa through falsification of documents by reckless imprudence even if the charge

against him was for estafa through falsification of documentsNO

HELD

WHEREFORE the decision appealed from is affirmed, with costs against appellant

RATIO

- The SC looked at the different elements in trying to establish Samsons guilt:- PARTICIPATION: There is no question that he cooperated in the commission of the complex offense of estafa through

falsification by reckless imprudence.

- CA is correct in concluding that he had no prior knowledge of the falsification because if he had, he would have asked for abigger cut instead of merely receiving 310php.

- However, even if he didnt have any intention or knowledge, the crime would not have been committed without hisparticipation.

- His acts of endorsing constituted a written representation that the payees had participated in the cashing of the checkseven when in fact they had no participation in the proceedings. (Art 171 (2) RPC)

- NEGLIGENCE: The SC found that Samson was negligent because he did not exercise due diligence in ascertaining theidentity of the supposed claimants. The mere assurance of a former classmate as well as the submission of residencecertificates is not enough to establish the identity of the persons.

- Being an army lieutenant and knowing that the amount involved was sizeable (over 12,000php), he should have beenintelligent and educated enough to foresee the possibility that the certificates could be forged or stolen.

- BASIS OF SC: Relied on Sec 4, Rule 116 (NOW Sec 4, Rule 120), Sec 5, Rule 116 (NOW Sec 5, Rule 120) and Sec 9, Rule 113(NOW Sec 7, Rule 117) *please read ROC 2000

- In this case, Samson was charged with WILLFUL falsification but from the evidence submitted by the parties, the CA foundthat the accused did not act with criminal intent but merely failed to take proper and adequate means to assure himself of

the identity of the claimants as an ordinary prudent man would do.

- All the elements of estafa through falsification is present, except INTENT, hence he is guilty of committing it throughRECKLESS IMPRUDENCE. It is also based on the theory that the greater includes the lesser offense.

- SC gave an example: The crime of theft is included necessarily in that of robbery and therefore a defendant can beconvicted of theft, notwithstanding that he was charged with robbery

- In Sec 5, Rule 116 (now Sec 5, Rule 120) it is not required that all the essential elements of the offense charged in theinformation be proved, it being sufficient that some of said essential elements are established to constitute the crime

proved.

- SC said their conclusion is strengthened by the provisions of Sec 9, Rule 113 (now Sec 7, Rule 117). Appellant could nolonger be prosecuted for estafa by reckless negligence if he is to be acquitted in the case.

DISSENTING OPINION: REYES, JBL

- PARTICIPATION: He cannot be held as a principal by cooperation (ART 17, RPC) because to cooperate necessarily impliesknowledge of the ultimate purpose.

- IN PROVING HIS GUILT: Does not agree with the majority that under a charge of INTENTIONALLY committing a crime, anaccused may be convicted of committing a crime THROUGH NEGLIGENCE or IMPRUDENCE


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- Intentional crimes are punished according to their results, but in crimes of negligence, what the law punishes is thecarelessness itself.

- Intentional falsification and falsification by negligence are different offenses altogether. An offender who is accused ofintentional falsification cannot be held to answer for falsification by negligence, because the essential element of the latte

offense, which is negligence or carelessness, is not involved in the elements of the crime charged. Not only is it not

included, it is excluded by incompatibility.

- GREATER CRIME ABSORBS THE LESSER: In this case, accused was charged with Falsification with imprudence under Article365 instead of Falsification under Article 171 or 172 because it carries a lighter penalty. This is incorrect. Saying that an

accused may be convicted of any lesser crime than the one charged means that he may be convicted with a crime with a

fewer number of elements than the crime charged and not a crime that carries a lighter penalty.- RULES OF COURT where SC based their decision: It has been held that an accused may be found guilty of an offense which

has fewer elements than the offense charged provided that these elements are alleged in the information. However it has

not been held that a crime is included in the offense charged when not only must one element alleged be discarded but

another one, not alleged, must be supplied.

- In the SCs example: Robbery includes that of theft, because to constitute theft, the element of violence from robbery issimply eliminated.

- However, in the case at bar the elements of the crime charged are as follows:a) The accused made a false statement (certified that the impostors signatures are the genuine signaturesb) That he made a false statement in a commercial paper (check)c) That he knew the signature certified to by him is not that of the payeed) That he acted willfully, unlawfully and feloniously

- Clearly the crime of falsification through negligence cannot be inferred by eliminating any one of these elements. Also theelement ofimprudence, the essence of the offense which he is convicted, is missing from those alleged in the information.

- Lastly, the implication of the decision is that each and every charge of a willful offense (except where malice isindispensable) will necessarily imply an alternative charge of criminal negligence. Hence it violates the ROC that says not

more than one offense should be charged.

Galman v. Sandiganbayan

G.R. No. 72670; 12 September 1986; Teehankee, C.J.

Digester: Roxas, borrowing substantially from the digest made by Glenn Agbayani

This case was discussed previously under Motion to Quash- Double Jeopardy

I. Facts

Ninoy Aquino was assassinated on the tarmac of the Manila International Airpoprt by an assassin who shot him point blankin the head. After the shooting, the assassin was shot dead by Aquinos military escorts.

Military investigators reported that the assassin was Rolando Galman, an NPA, communist-hired assassin. Themilitary later filmed a re-enactment of the scene and showed broadcasted it on national TV as if it were the actual

footage.

In the 10 day period of national mourning, the public clamoured to for the truth, prompting then President Marcos tocreate a Fact Finding Board to investigate the murder.

The board came out with a minority and a majority decision, both of which found that Galman had no subversiveaffiliations, that the area, being heavily secured, made it impossible for any unauthorized person to enter the

cordoned area; only the soldiers in the staircase with Ninoy could have shot him. The murder was the product of a

military conspiracy.

The majority decision of the fact finding board listed 26 military soldiers and officials who were involved in thekilling (including General Ver)

Marcos however disdained and rejected the findings of the board and insisted that the military version, was thecorrect in finding Galman to be the assassin.

Criminal cases were filed in the Sandiganbayan against the 26 defendants. Herein petitioners, the Heirs of Galman, along with various members of the AFP, 5 university presidents and solid

members of the public, filed the present action praying that the not be allowed to try the case. They alleged that

the Tanodbayan did not represent the the interest of the people and that he was biased and prejudiced against the

accused.

The supreme court initially granted the TRO prayed for, preventing the Sandiganbayan from trying the case, butlater reversed its decision.

The case proceeded and the Sandiganbayan acquitted all the accused of the crime charged.


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Petitioners filled a (1st) motion for reconsideration alleging that the Sandiganbayan Justices committed serious irregularitiesin rendering their decision which amounted to a mistrial. They petitioned to the Supreme Court to declare the

Sandiganbayan decision void for being violative and to reopen the case for new trial. The 1st

MR was denied.

A 2nd MR was filed based on a new material fact- the revalation by Deputy Tanodbayan that there was a secret Malacanangmeetinging where Marcos ordered the Justices of the Tanodbayan to whitewash the Galman murder case.

Respondents argue that since the Sandiganbayan has already rendered a judgment of acquittal, reopening the case for trialwould result in double jeopardy.

Issue:

WON the Sandiganbayan decision is void - YESWON there is double jeopardy - NO

Held: SC ordered a retrial of the case.

Ratio:

The 2nd MR is allowed, being based on a new material fact- the secret Malacanang meeting. The Sandiganbayan decision is void because 15 months after the Marcos was ousted, Deputy Tanodbayan Manuel Herrera

confessed that the Sandiganbayan Justices and Tanodbayan prosecutors were ordered by Marcos to whitewash the

Aquino-Galman murder case. A prepared resolution was sent to the investigating panel. He claimed that Marcos ordered

the Justices that the resolution be revised by categorizing the participation of each respondent into principals, accomplices

or accessories and that one Justice Pamaran handle the trial.

The Court, having been convinced that Marcos corrupted the Sandiganbayan Justices, declared the decision of theSandiganbayan void for being violative of due process.

Since the acquittal was void, there can be no double jeopardy. A void judgment is in effect no judgment at all.

PEOPLE vs. RELOVA

G.R. No. L-45129, March 06, 1987; Feliciano.

Digest by Ian

Facts: This involves an ice plant which have installed wiring and devices, without the necessary authority from the city government,

to lower its electrical consumption.

Feb. 1, 1975- Equipped with a search warrant, Batangas City Police and personnel of Batangas Electric System searched andexamined the premises of Opulencia Carpena Ice Plant and Cold Storage. They discovered that electric wiring, devices and

contraptions had been installed, without the necessary authority from the city government, and "architecturally concealedinside the walls of the building" in the plant with the purpose of lowering or decreasing the readings of electric current

consumption in the electric meter.

Nov. 24, 1975 (after more than 9 months), an information was filed by an Assistant City Fiscal of Batangas City before theCity Court of Batangas City against the ice plant owner Manuel Opulencia for violation of Ordinance No. 1, Series of 1974,

Batangas City which requires that prior authorization should be obtained from the Superintendent of the Batangas City

Electrical System or the District Engineer before the installation.

Counsel for defendant filed a motion to quash alleging prescription because the offense is a light felony which prescribes in2 months after discovery and the information was filed only after more than 9 months since the offense was discovered.

The motion to quash was granted on April 6, 1975.

April 20, 1975- Acting City Fiscal files before CFI of Batangas another information against Opulencia this time for theft ofelectric power under Art. 308 in relation to 309, par. 1, of the RPC.

May 5, 1975- Before he could be arraigned thereon, Manuel Opulencia filed a Motion to Quash, alleging that he had beenpreviously acquitted of the offense charged in the second information and that the filing thereof was violative of his

constitutional right against double jeopardy.

Issue: WON there was double jeopardy and such can be pleaded in a motion quash.

Held: Yes, there was double jeopardy because the same set of facts is punishable under the RPC and the municipal ordinance and by

express provision of the Constitution, this constitutes double jeopardy.


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The dismissal on account of prescription is equal to an acquittal by reason of Art. 89 which states that prescription of crimes

result to the total extinguishment of criminal liability.

Ratio: The 1973 Constitution provides that:

"No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If an act is punished by a law and an

ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act."

Based on the provision, there are 2 kinds of double jeopardy:

1. 1st

Paragraph: Same offenseWhere the offenses charged are penalized either by different sections of the same statute or by different statutes, the

important inquiry relates to the identity of offenses charged: the constitutional protection against double jeopardy is available only

where an identity is shown to exist between the earlier and the subsequent offenses charged

2. 2nd

Paragraph: Same act punished under a law and an ordinance.

Where one offense is charged under a municipal ordinance while the other is penalized by a statute, the critical inquiry is to

theidentity of the acts which the accused is said to have committed and which are alleged to have given rise to the two offenses

the constitutional protection against double jeopardy is available so long as the acts which constitute or have given rise to the first

offense under a municipal ordinance are the same acts which constitute or have given rise to the offense charged under a statute.

Reason behind the rule: The question may be raised why one rule should exist where two offenses under two different sections of

the same statute or under different statutes are charged, and another rule for the situation where one offense is charged under a

municipal ordinance and another offense under a national statute. If the second sentence of the double jeopardy provision had not

been written into the Constitution, conviction or acquittal under a municipal ordinance would never constitute a bar to another

prosecution for the same act under a national statute. An offense penalized by municipal ordinance is, by definition, different from

an offense under a statute. The two offenses would never constitute the same offense having been promulgated by different rule

making authorities though one be subordinate to the other and the plea of double jeopardy would never lie. The discussions

during the 1934-1935 Constitutional Convention show that the second sentence was inserted precisely for the purpose of extending

the constitutional protection against double jeopardy to a situation which would not otherwise be covered by the first sentence.

In summary: The general rule for double jeopardy is that there is no double jeopardy if the first offense is different from the second

although they spring from the same set of facts. The exception is provided by the 2nd

sentence which declares that double jeopardy

attaches when the same set of facts is punished under a national statute and an ordinance.

In the case at bar, we use the 2nd

type. So, how do we deal with the question of identity of the acts which have generated liabilityboth under a municipal ordinance and a national statute?

When the acts of the accused as set out in the two informations are so related to each other in time and space as to be

reasonably regarded as having taken place on the same occasion and where those acts have been moved by one and the same, or a

continuing, intent or voluntary design or negligence, such acts may be appropriately characterized as an integral whole capable of

giving rise to penal liability simultaneously under different legal enactments (a municipal ordinance and a national statute).

Note that the rule limiting the constitutional protection against double jeopardy to a subsequent prosecution for the same offense is

not to be understood with absolute literalness. The identity of offenses that must be shown need not be absolute identity: the first

and second offenses may be regarded as the "same offense" where the second offense necessarily includes the first offense or is

necessarily included in such first offense or where the second offense is an attempt to commit the first or a frustration thereof.Thus

for the constitutional plea of double jeopardy to be available, not all the technical elements constituting the first offense need be

present in the technical definition of the second offense.

In the case at bar, the relevant acts took place within the same time frame: from November 1974 to February 1975. During this

period, the accused Manuel Opulencia installed or permitted the installation of electrical wiring and devices in his ice plant without

obtaining the necessary permit or authorization from the municipal authorities. The accused conceded that he effected or permitted

such unauthorized installation for the very purpose of reducing his electric power bill. This corrupt intent was thus present from the

very moment that such unauthorized installation began. The immediate physical effect of the unauthorized installation was the

inward flow of electric current into Opulencia's ice plant without the corresponding recording thereof in his electric meter. In other

words, the "taking" of electric current was integral with the unauthorized installation of electric wiring and devices.


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Joel Caes v IAC

G.R. No. 7489-90; November 6, 1989; Cruz

Digest Prepared by Hans Cedric I. Santos

I. Facts Joel Caes was charged in two separate informations with the crimes of illegal possession of firearms and illegal possession of

marijuana. The cases were consolidated. He was arraigned and pleaded not guilty. Trial was set for October 13, 1982 but was

rescheduled a total of eleven times.

On November 14, 1983 the prosecution moved to have the case provisionally dismissed. This motion was granted by the trialcourt in view of the failure of prosecution witnesses Capt. Dacanay and Sgt. Lustado to appear.

On January 9, 1984, these witnesses filed a motion to revive the cases alleging that they could not attend the November 1983hearing due to lack of notice. The judge granted this motion since there had been no opposition filed by the defense or fisca

and the case was only provisionally dismissed.

Caes filed a writ of certiorari with the SC which referred it to the IAC. The IAC dismissed the petition.II. Issues-HeldWON the motion to revive was invalid for not being filed by the proper party and not serving a copy to Caes: Yes, it was invalid.

WON the revival of the case would place Caes under double jeopardy: Yes, it would.

III. RatioThe proper party to have filed the motion to revive the case was the public prosecutor. The fact that he did not interpose any

objection was not enough to justify the actions of the witnesses. The fact that Caes was not informed made the irregularity even

more serious.

The court described double jeopardy as res judicata in prison grey prohibiting the prosecution of a person for a crime of which he

had been previously acquitted or convicted. The requirements of double jeopardy are:

Valid complaint or information Filed before a competent court To which the defendant had pleaded Of which he/she has been previously acquitted or convicted or which was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his

express consent

The first three requisites are clearly present in this case. Caes alleges that the dismissal was not provisional since he had not

expressly consented thereto. The court agreed with him and said that for a dismissal to be provisional, it must have been made on

motion of the accused or of the prosecution with the express consent of the accused . The consent of the accused cannot be

presumed. Implied consent cannot be enough not may it presumed from presumption of regularity since we are dealing with

constitutional rights. Thus, though it was designated as provisional, the dismissal was final.

The court also enumerated when a dismissal is final even when made upon motion of the accused.

The first is when a demurrer to evidence is filed after the prosecution has rested its case . Such a dismissal is in effect a judgment on

the merits and operates as an acquittal.

The second is when the accused moves to dismiss because of a denial of his right to a speedy trial. This is in effect a failure to

prosecute. In this case, the accused had been arraigned but never tried after eleven postponements despite always being present at

the hearings. Instead the hearings were rescheduled due to the absence of the witnesses, or of the prosecutor or because the cour

lacked material time. The court said (though it was never raised by the petitioner) that Caes could have moved to dismiss the case

due to denial of his right to speedy trial and such a dismissal would have been final.

Because of the denial of the right to speedy trial and because the accused did not expressly consent to the dismissal of the case

against him, the accused was entitled to a final dismissal and the trial judge erred in ordering the revival of the cases.

The court also expressed disapproval of the conduct of the City Prosecutor of Caloocan City in hastily filing the information without

insuring the evidence against the accused and in perfunctorily moving for resetting of hearings without exerting effort to secure the

attendance of his witnesses.

Order of the Trial Court SET ASIDE and dismissal of the criminal cases declared FINAL. Copy of the decision is sent to the Secretary of

Justice.

Documents

Crim Pro - Aug 30.pdf