Crim Pro Digest 5

8/3/2019 Crim Pro Digest 5

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Criminal Procedure a2010 page 79 Prof.Rowena Daroy Morales

JARANTILLA v CA171 SCRA 429

JIMENEZ v AVERIA22 SCRA 380

DIZON; March 29, 1968FACTS- Ofelia V. Tang and Estefania de la Cruz Olandaywere charged with estafa in the CFI of Cavite with theinformation alleging that they misappropriatedP20,000 received from Manuel Jimenez for thepurchase of a fishing boat named Basnig. They alsohave the obligation to return the money if they donot purchase the boat, which they did not do.- Before arraignment, the accused filed a civil suitagainst Jimenez in the Quezon CFI contesting thevalidity of a certain receipt signed by them onOctober 26, 1962 wherein they acknowledged havingreceived from him the sum of P20,000.00 with which

to purchase for him a fishing boat and itsaccessories, and the further sum of P240.00 asagent's commission, with the obligation, on theirpart, to return the aforesaid amounts on January 30,1963 in case they were unable to buy the fishingboat. They assert now that they never received anyamount from Jimenez and that they signatures weretaken through the means of fraud and deceit by

Jimenez- After a few days, they filed a motion to suspend theproceedings of the criminal case pending theresolution of the prejudicial question in the civil case whether or not their signatures were taken throughmeans of fraud and deceit by Jimenez.- Judge Averia granted the motion and hence thiscertiorari petition- Pre-ratio:Jimenez erred in the filing of a certioraripetition, and should have filed a mandamus to the SCinstead to compel the lower court to proceed withthe case.

ISSUEWON the determination of the issue raised in the civilcase mentioned heretofore is a prejudicial question,in the sense that it must be first resolved before theproceedings in the criminal case for estafa mayproceed

HELDNO- The issue of fraud and deceit raised in the civil casedoes not constitute a prejudicial question. The

criminal court must now try the estafa case againstthe two accused.Reasoning- A prejudicial question has been define to be onewhich arises in a case, the resolution of which,(question ) is a logical antecedent of the issued

involved in said case, and the cognizance of whichpertains to another tribunal. Simply put, thequestions must be determinative of the case beforethe court, and that jurisdiction to try and resolve saidquestion must be lodged in another tribunal.- Applying these to the case, it will be readily seenthat the alleged prejudicial question is notdeterminative of the guilt or innocence of theparties charged with estafa, because even on theassumption that the execution of the receipt whoseannulment they sought in the civil case was vitiatedby fraud, duress or intimidation, their guilt could stillbe established by other evidence showing, to thedegree required by law, that they had actuallyreceived from the complaint the sum of P20,000.00

with which to buy for him a fishing boat, and that,instead of doing so, they misappropriated the moneyand refused or otherwise failed to return it to himupon demand. The contention of the privaterespondents herein would be tenable had they beencharged with falsification of the same receiptinvolved in the civil action.- If the ruling were otherwise, there would hardly bea case for estafa that could be prosecuted speedily,it being the easiest thing for the accused to block theproceedings by the simple expedient of filing anindependent civil action against the complainant,raising therein the issue that he had not receivedfrom the latter the amount alleged to have beenmisappropriated.

PEOPLE v VELOSO112 SCRA 173

PER CURIAM; February 25, 1982NATUREAutomatic review of CFI decision imposing the capitalpenalty of death on accused Veloso for the crime ofrobbery with homicide and double serious physicalinjuriesFACTS- Veloso and others entered the Odiamars house androbbed them around 7:30 in the evening. They stole

money, tear gas gun, jewelry, old coins.- Hermenegildo Odiamar was shot and killed during

the robbery, while the Odiamar spouses sustainedserious physical injuries.- Veloso, among others, was charged for robberywith homicide and double serious physical injuries- July 5, 1970 (the case says july but I think its atypo probably june) : Judge Templo conducted

preliminary examination- June 22, 1970 Judge Templo set the case forpreliminary investigation to afford the accused theoccasion to confront the witnesses against him andto present his own evidence- instead of availing himself of this opportunity, hefiled a manifestation stating that he Waives his rightto present evidence at the second stage of thepreliminary investigation.- the case was forwarded to the CFI, and it appearsthat accused entered his non-guilty plea withoutraising the question of lack of preliminaryinvestigation.Petitioners' Claim(1) the trial court had no jurisdiction to try the case

for want of preliminary investigation(2) the extrajudicial confession he executed wasobtained through force and intimidation and,therefore, inadmissible in evidence, and(3) in the absence of adequate proof that it was hewho killed the deceased Hermenegildo Odiamar, heshould be held guilty of the offense of robbery only,and not of the complex crime of robbery withhomicide and double serious physical injuries.

ISSUEWON the trial court had no jurisdiction to try the casefor want of preliminary investigation

HELDNOReasoning- When Judge Templo set the case for preliminaryinvestigation to afford the accused occasion toconfront the witnesses against him, the accusedinstead filed a manifestation waiving his right topresent evidence at the second stage of thepreliminary investigation. When the case wasforwarded to the CFI, the accused entered his pleawithout raising the question of lack of preliminaryinvestigation. The aforesaid constitute waiver of theaccuseds right to preliminary investigation. It is well-settled that the right to preliminary investigation is

not a fundamental right and that the same may bewaived expressly or by silence. Such waiver carried


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with it the waiver of any procedural error orirregularity that may have attended the preliminaryinvestigation.Dispositive The judgment under review is herebyaffirmed

ALLADO v DIOKNO232 SCRA 192

PEOPLE v CA (CERBO)(Republic v CA in page 5 of the outline)

301 SCRA 475PANGANIBAN;January 21, 1999

NATUREPetition for Review

FACTS- Private Respondent Jonathan Cerbo shot, atpointblank range, Rosalinda Dy in the presence andat the office of his father private respondent BillyCerbo.- An information for murder was filed against

Jonathan Cerbo.- The daughter of the victim executed an affidavit-complaint charging private respondent Billy Cerbo ofconspiracy in the killing.- Accordingly, the prosecution filed an amendedinformation including Billy Cerbo in the murder case.A warrant for his arrest was later issued.- Billy Cerbo filed a motion to quash warrant of arrestarguing that the same was issued without probablecause.- The respondent judge issued an order dismissing

the case against Billy Cerbo and recalling the warrantfor his arrest.- The Court of Appeals debunked the petitionersassertion that the trial judge committed grave abuseof discretion and that the evidence presented thusfar did not substantiate the charge.. Hence thispetition.

ISSUEWON the CA erred in finding that no probable causeexists to merit the filing of charges against privaterespondent Billy Cerbo

HELDYES- The petition is meritorious.

- The determination of probable cause duringpreliminary investigation is a function that belongs tothe public prosecutor. It is an executive function.- The public prosecutor has the quasi-judicialauthority to determine whether or not a criminal casemust be filed in court.

- Theprimary objective of a preliminary investigationis to free respondent from the inconvenience,expense, ignominy, and stress of defendinghimself/herself in the course of a formal trial, untilthe reasonable probability of his or her guilt in amore or less summary proceeding by a competentoffice designated by law for that purpose.1

- Secondarily, such summary proceeding alsoprotects the state from the burden of theunnecessary expense of an effort in prosecutingalleged offenses and in holding trials arising fromfalse, frivolous, or groundless charges.2

- The determination of probable cause to hold aperson for trial must be distinguished from thedetermination of probable cause to issue a warrant of

arrest, which is ajudicial function.- A judge cannot be compelled to issue a warrant ofarrest if he or she deems that there is no probablecause for doing so.- Corrollarily, the judge should not override the publicprosecutors determination of probable cause to holdan accused for trial, on the ground that the evidencepresented to substantiate the issuance of an arrestwarrant was insufficient, as in the present case.- Therefore, if the information is valid on its face, andthere is no showing of manifest error, grave abuse ofdiscretion and prejudice on the part of the publicprosecutor, the trial court should respect suchdetermination.DispositiveReversed.

BURGOS SR v CHIEF OF STAFF133 SCRA 800

ESCOLIN; December 26, 1984

NATUREPetition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus withpreliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction

FACTS- December 7, 1982 Judge Ernani Cruz-Pao CFI Rizal[Quezon City], issued two search warrants underwhich the premises known as No. 19, Road 3, Project

1 Ledesma v. CA, 278 SCRA 657, Sept. 5, 1997.2Id.

6, Quezon City, business address of Metropolitan Mailnewspaper, and 784 Units C & D, RMS Building,Quezon Avenue, Quezon City, business address ofthe "We Forum" newspaper were searched.- office and printing machines, equipment,paraphernalia, motor vehicles and other articles used

in the printing, publication and distribution of thesaid newspapers, as well as numerous papers,documents, books and other written literaturealleged to be in the possession and control ofpetitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. publisher-editor of the "WeForum" newspaper, were seized.- The questioned search warrants were issued byrespondent judge upon application of Col. Rolando N.Abadilla, Intelligence Officer of the P.C. Metrocom.

The application was accompanied by the JointAffidavit of Alejandro M. Gutierrez and Pedro U.

Tango, members of the Metrocom Intelligence andSecurity Group under Col. Abadilla which conducteda surveillance of the premises prior to the filing ofthe application for the search warrants on December

7, 1982.- Respondents aver that the case should bedismissed on the ground that petitioners had cometo SC without having previously sought the quashalof the search warrants before the issuing judge. Butthis procedural flaw notwithstanding, SC tookcognizance of this petition in view of the seriousnessand urgency of the constitutional issues raised, notto mention the public interest generated by thesearch.- Respondents likewise urge dismissal of the petitionon ground of laches, since said search warrants wereissued on December 7, 1982, but the instant petitionimpugning the same was filed only on June 16, 1983.However, SC found that the extrajudicial efforts

exerted by petitioners quite evidently negate thepresumption that they had abandoned their right tothe possession of the seized property, therebyrefuting the charge of laches against them.Petitioners' Claims> Petitioners fault respondent judge for his allegedfailure to conduct an examination under oath oraffirmation of the applicant and his witnesses, asmandated by the constitution as well as Sec. 4, Rule126 of the Rules of Court. However, SC found that aspetitioners themselves conceded during the hearingon August 9, 1983, that an examination had indeedbeen conducted by respondent judge of Col. Abadillaand his witnesses, this issue is moot and academic.> Search Warrants No. 20-82[a] and No. 20-82[b]

were used to search two distinct places: No. 19, Road3, Project 6, Quezon City and 784 Units C & D, RMS


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Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City. Objection isinterposed to the execution of Search Warrant No.20-82[b] at the latter address on the ground that thetwo search warrants pinpointed only one place wherepetitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. was allegedly keeping andconcealing the articles listed therein, i.e., No. 19,

Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City.> although the warrants were directed against JoseBurgos, Jr. alone, articles belonging to his co-petitioners Jose Burgos, Sr., Bayani Soriano and the J.Burgos Media Services, Inc. were seized.> real properties were seized under the disputedwarrants.> that documents relied on by respondents could nothave provided sufficient basis for the finding of aprobable cause upon which a warrant may validlyissue in accordance with Section 3, Article IV of the1973 Constitution

ISSUESWON the two search warrants are:

1. defective for stating only one and the same placeto be searched2. null and void for including properties not owned bythe person named in the warrants3. null and void for including real properties4. null and void for being violative of the constitution,thus encroaching on petitioners' fundamental rights

HELD1. NO- The defect pointed out is a typographical error. Twosearch warrants were applied for and issued becausethe purpose and intent were to search two distinctpremises. The addresses of the places sought to be

searched were specifically set forth in theapplication, and since it was Col. Abadilla himselfwho headed the team which executed the searchwarrants, the ambiguity that might have arisen byreason of the typographical error is more apparentthan real.- In the determination of whether a search warrantdescribes the premises to be searched with sufficientparticularity, it has been held "that the executingofficer's prior knowledge as to the place intended inthe warrant is relevant. This would seem to beespecially true where the executing officer is theaffiant on whose affidavit the warrant had issued,and when he knows that the judge who issued thewarrant intended the building described in the

affidavit. And it has also been said that the executingofficer may look to the affidavit in the official court

file to resolve an ambiguity in the warrant as to theplace to be searched."2. NO- Section 2, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court,enumerates the personal properties that may beseized under a search warrant. The rule does not

require that the property to be seized should beowned by the person against whom the searchwarrant is directed. It may or may not be owned byhim. Ownership, therefore, is of no consequence, andit is sufficient that the person against whom thewarrant is directed has control or possession of theproperty sought to be seized.3. NO- Under Article 415[5] of the Civil Code , "machinery,receptables, instruments or implements intended bythe owner of the tenement for an industry or workswhich may be carried on in a building or on a piece ofland and which tend directly to meet the needs ofthe said industry or works" are consideredimmovable property. Petitioners do not claim to be

the owners of the land and/or building on which themachineries were placed. This being the case, themachineries in question, while in fact bolted to theground remain movable property susceptible toseizure under a search warrant.4. YES- Probable cause for a search is defined as such factsand circumstances which would lead a reasonablydiscreet and prudent man to believe that an offensehas been committed and that the objects sought inconnection with the offense are in the place soughtto be searched. And when the search warrant appliedfor is directed against a newspaper publisher oreditor in connection with the publication ofsubversive materials, as in the case at bar, the

application and/or its supporting affidavits mustcontain a specification, stating with particularity thealleged subversive material he has published or isintending to publish. Mere generalization will notsuffice.- In mandating that "no warrant shall issue exceptupon probable cause to be determined by the

judge, . . . after examination under oath oraffirmation of the complainant and the witnesses hemay produce the Constitution requires no less thanpersonal knowledge by the complainant or hiswitnesses of the facts upon which the issuance of asearch warrant may be justified. In Alvarez v. CFI, SCruled that "the oath required must refer to the truthof the facts within the personal knowledge of the

petitioner or his witnesses, because the purposethereof is to convince the committing magistrate, not

the individual making the affidavit and seeking theissuance of the warrant, of the existence of probablecause."- the search warrants are in the nature of generalwarrants.- As a consequence of the search and seizure, the

premises were padlocked and sealed, with thefurther result that the printing and publication of saidnewspapers were discontinued. Such closure is in thenature of previous restraint or censorship abhorrentto the freedom of the press guaranteed under thefundamental law, and constitutes a virtual denial ofpetitioners' freedom to express themselves in print.Dispositive Search Warrants Nos. 20-82[a] and 20-82[b] issued by respondent judge on December 7,1982 are null and void. All articles seizedthereunder are ordered released to petitioners.

PEOPLE v USANA323 SCRA 754

PEOPLE v DORIA301 SCRA 668

PEOPLE v MARK JIMENEZ

PEOPLE v FITZGERALD505 SCRA 573

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ; October 27, 2006

NATUREPetition for Review on Certiorari assailing theresolution of CA which granted the Motion for bail ofaccused-appellant and herein respondent Victor

Keith Fitzgerald.FACTS- An information was filed in the RTC chargingFitzgerald, an Australian citizen, with the violation ofArt.III Sec 5, par (a), subpar (5) of RA 76103 statingthat, said Fitzgerald, actuated by lust, and by theuse of drugs willfully, unlawfully and feloniouslyinduced complainant AAA, a minor, 13 years ofage, to engage in prostitution by then and thereshowering said AAA with gifts, clothes and foodand thereafter having carnal knowledge of her inviolation of the aforesaid law and to her damage andprejudice.

3Special Protection of Children against Child Abuse, Exploitation and

Discrimination Act


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- RTC rendered a decision finding respondent Guiltyof Sec 5, par (a), subpar (5) of RA 7610 andsentenced to an indeterminate term of prision mayormin (8Y 1D) to prision temporal max (17Y 4M 1D).Upon completion of his sentence, he shall bedeported immediately and forever barred from entry

to the Philippines. He was acquitted on the case ofrape. On the basis of the evidence adduced, thecourt considered the view that the the circumstancesof the accused indicate a probability of flight and thatthere is undue risk that the accused may commit asimilar offense, if released on bail pending appeal.- On appeal, CA affirmed the conviction, modifyingthe penalty to imprisonment of prision temporal (14Y8M 1D) to reclusion perpetua (20Y 1D)- Fitzgerald filed for a Motion for a New Trial and asupplemental appeal to the motion on the groundthat new material of evidence not previouslyavailable has surfaced. CA granted the motion fornew trial. The original records of the case wereremanded to the RTC, which was also directed to

receive new evidence. The motion to transfer therespondent to the National Penitentiary was denied.- The people file a MFR, while Fitzgerald filed aMotion to fix bail with Manifestation. Both motionswere denied by CA. The bail application was deniedpursuant to Sec.7 Rule 114 ROC. The maximumpenalty imposable in accordance with RA 7610 isreclusion perpetua and the evidence of guilt isstrong.- The people filed a petition fro review on certiorari. Itwas dismissed which became final and executory.- Fitzgerald filed with CA a Motion for Early

Transmittal of the Records and for the Re-Examination of the Penalty Imposed and a Motion forBail. CA issued the assailed resolution granting bail.

It stated that although the evidence of guilt is strong,Fitzgerald is of old age and not in the best of health.Bail was granted premised not on the grounds statedin the motion for bail, but on substantial justice andconsidering new trial was granted in the case.- RTC ordered Fitzgeralds temporary release uponfiling a cash bond of P100 000.00.Petitioners Claim> People filed this petition to annul the CA Resolutionarguing that the CA erred in granting the Motion forBail despite the crime charged was punishable byreclusion perpetua and the evidence of guilt isstrong.Plaintiffs Claim> the grant for new trail negated the previous

findings of the existence of strong evidence of guilt. The justification for provisional release is on

humanitarian grounds, citing his deteriorating healthand old age.

ISSUES1. WON CA had jurisdiction over the motion to postbail after issuing the resolution granting new trial

2. WON CA erred in allowing bail

HELD1. (the ruling on this matter is limited to this specificcase) When the SC grants new trial, it vacates the

judgment of the TC convicting the accused andremands the case to the TC for reception of newly-discovered evidence and promulgation of a new

judgment.- However, when CA grants new trial,notwithstanding Sec1 Rule 125 ROC providing for theuniformity of the procedure between the SC and CA,CA may decide questions of fact and of law. When itgrants a new trial pursuant to Sec14 Rule 124 ROC, itmay either a) receive the new evidence under Sec 12

or b) refer the case to the court of origin forreception of such evidence under Sec 15. in eithercase, it does not relinquish to the TC jurisdiction overthe case. It retains sufficient authority to resolve theincidents in the case and decide its merits.- Even when CA remanded the case to the TC, CAretained appellate jurisdiction. CA retained itsauthority to act on the respondents bail application.2. The right to bail emanates from the right to bepresumed innocent. It is accorded to a person in thecustody of law who may by reason of thepresumption of innocence he enjoys, be allowedprovisional liberty upon filing of a security toguarantee his appearance before any court, asrequired under specific conditions.

- Bail is a matter of right to an accused person incustody for an offense not punishable by death,reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, but a matterof discretion on the part of the court, concerning onefacing an accusation for an offense punishable bydeath, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment whenevidence of guilt is strong. 4

- RTC and CA were unanimous in their findings of theexistence of strong evidence of guilt. Under Sec 6(b)Rule 121, the grant of a new trial allows for receptionof newly discovered evidence, but maintainsevidence already presented or on record. In thepresent case, no new evidence had been introducednegating the earlier findings of the RTC and CA. Bail

4Sec 4 and 5 Rule 114 ROC, and Sec 13 Art III 1987 Consti

was not a matter of right but a mere privilege subjectto the discretion of CA.- However, the CA admitted that the bail was basedon health reasons disregarding the substantive andprocedural requirements on bail.- CA made no specific findings that the respondent

suffered from an ailment of such gravity that hiscontinued confinement during trial will permanentlyimpair his health or put his life in danger.- Moreover, there is finding on the record on thepotential risk of respondent committing a similaroffense.Dispositive petition is granted and the CAresolution annulled and set aside. The bail bondposted is cancelled. Let an order of arrest issueagainst the person of the accused.

PEOPLE v AMBROSIO56 Phil 801

PEOPLE v NAVARRO75 Phil 516BENGZON; December 4, 1945

FACTS- Information for arbitrary detention:

"That from January 27, 1945, and for several daysthereafter, in the municipality of Calapan, Provinceof Mindoro, Commonwealth of the Philippines, andwithin the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, saiddefendants Juan Navarro and Anacleto Atienza,Acting Provincial Governor and Provincial Warden,respectively, both being public officials to whomthe custody and responsibility of prisoners wereentrusted for proper action, without any lawful or

justifiable cause and without legal groundstherefor, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully andfeloniously detain Esteban P. Beloncio in theProvincial Jail of Mindoro which continued for morethan fifteen days but less than six months."

- A pre-trial was held, the Judge asking the parties ortheir attorneys some questions, which the latteranswered, with the result that admissions were madeto the effect that Esteban P. Beloncio and Juan G.Beloncio II had been detained for several days after

January 27, 1945, in the provincial jail of Mindoro byorder of the Commanding General, Western Visayan

Task Force, United States Army. Whereupon,defendants' counsel lost no time in filing a motionto quash, upon the ground that the facts chargeddid not constitute a criminal offense.- The judge dismissed the cases.


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ISSUEWON the motion to quash on the ground that thefacts charged do not constitute and offense must berestricted to the facts charged in the informations

HELDNO- The section of the rule permitting a motion to quashon the ground that "the facts charged do notconstitute an offense" omits reference to the factsdetailed "in the information." Other sections of thesame rule would imply that the issue is restricted tothose alleged in the information.- Prima facie, the "facts charged" are those describedin the complaint, but they may be amplified orqualified by others appearing to be additionalcircumstances, upon admissions made by thepeople's representative, which admissions couldanyway be submitted by him as amendments to thesame information.

- It would seem to be pure technicality to hold that inthe consideration of the motion, the parties and thejudge were precluded from considering facts whichthe fiscal admitted to be true, simply because theywere not described in the complaint. Of course, itmay be added that upon similar motions the courtand the fiscal are not required to go beyond theaverments of the information, nor is the latter to beinveigled into a premature and risky revelation of hisevidence.- But the Court sees no reason to prohibit the fiscalfrom making, in all candor, admissions of undeniablefacts, because the principle can never be sufficientlyreiterated that such official's role is to see that

justice is done; not that all accused are convicted,

but that the guilty are justly punished. Less reasoncan there be to prohibit the court from consideringthose admissions, and deciding accordingly, in theinterest of a speedy administration of justice.- The Beloncios were thus deprived of their liberty byorder of the military authorities, a few days after theliberations of Mindoro. Judicial notice may be taken ofthe fact, that upon military occupation and beforethe establishment of the normal processes of civilgovernment the liberties and rights of citizens arelikely to suffer temporary restrictions, what with theexigencies of military strategy, or the confusionusually resulting from the situation. While theinfringement of constitutional precepts and privilegesis not to be tolerated, war necessities and

consequences cannot be overlooked. At any rate, noreasons are shown why the irregularity, if any,

committed by others, should be visited upondefendants-appellees. The acts imputed to them, donot, of themselves, constitute a punishable offense.Dispositive Appealed decision affirmed.

GALMAN v SANDIGANBAYAN

144 SCRA 43TEEHANKEE; September 12, 1986

FACTS- Ninoy Aquino was cold-bloodedly killed while underescort from his plane that had just landed at theManila International Airport on August 21, 1983. Hisbrain was smashed by a bullet fired point-blank intothe back of his head by a murderous assassin,notwithstanding that the airport was ringed byairtight security of close to 2,000 soldiers and "froma military viewpoint, it was technically impossible toget inside such a cordon." The military investigatorsreported within a span of three hours that the man

who shot Aquino (whose identity was then supposedto be unknown and was revealed only days later asRolando Galman, although he was the personalfriend of accused Col. Arturo Custodio who pickedhim up from his house on August 17, 1983) was acommunist-hired gunman, and that the militaryescorts gunned him down in turn.- Marcos was constrained to create a Fact FindingBoard to investigate. Both majority and minorityreports were one in rejecting the military version aspropounded by the chief investigator, respondentGen. Olivas, that Rolando Galman was the NPA-hiredassassin, stating that "the evidence shows [to thecontrary] that Rolando Galman had no subversiveaffiliations." They were in agreement that "only the

soldiers in the staircase with Sen. Aquino could haveshot him;" that Galman, the military's "fall guy" was"not the assassin of Sen. Aquino" and that "the SWATtroopers who gunned down Galman and the soldierswho escorted Sen. Aquino down the service stairs,deliberately and in conspiracy with one another,gave a perjured story to us regarding the allegedshooting by Galman of Sen. Aquino and the mowingdown, in turn, of Galman himself;" in short, thatNinoy's assassination was the product of a militaryconspiracy, not a communist plot. The onlydifference between the two reports is that themajority report found all the 26 private respondentsheaded by then AFP Chief General Fabian Verinvolved in the military conspiracy while the

chairman's minority report would exclude 19 of themand limit as plotters "the 6 persons who were on the

service stairs while Senator Aquino was descending"and "General Luther Custodio because the criminalplot could not have been planned and implementedwithout his intervention."- As the accused were tried in the Sandiganbayan,Marcos through all his recorded public acts and

statements from the beginning disdained andrejected his own Board's findings and insisted on themilitary version of Galman being Ninoy's assassin.[Note: His private acts in trying to control theoutcome of the case were to be known much laterafter he was already deposed.]- Saturnina Galman and Reynaldo Galman, motherand son, respectively, of the late Rolando Galman,and 29 other petitioners, composed of three former

Justices of this Court, five incumbent and formeruniversity presidents, a former AFP Chief of Staff,outstanding members of the Philippine Bar and solidcitizens of the community, filed the present actionalleging that respondents Tanodbayan andSandiganbayan committed serious irregularities

constituting mistrial and resulting in miscarriage ofjustice and gross violation of the constitutional rightsof the petitioners and the sovereign people of thePhilippines to due process of law. They asserted thatthe Tanodbayan did not represent the interest of thepeople when he failed to exert genuine and earnestefforts to present vital and important testimonial anddocumentary evidence for the prosecution and thatthe Sandiganbayan Justices were biased, prejudicedand partial in favor of the accused, and that theiracts "clouded with the gravest doubts the sincerity ofgovernment to find out the truth about the Aquinoassassination." Petitioners prayed for the immediateissuance of a temporary restraining order restrainingthe respondent Sandiganbayan from rendering a

decision on the merits in the pending criminal caseswhich it had scheduled on November 20, 1985 andthat judgment be rendered declaring a mistrial andnullifying the proceedings before the Sandiganbayanand ordering a re-trial before an impartial tribunal byan unbiased prosecutor.- The Supreme Court resolved by nine-to-two votes toissue the restraining order prayed for. But ten dayslater on November 28, 1985, the Court by the samenine-to-two-vote ratio in reverse, resolved to dismissthe petition and to lift the temporary restrainingorder issued ten days earlier enjoining theSandiganbayan from rendering its decision.[Hmmm tsk]- Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration,

alleging that the dismissal did not indicate the legalground for such action and urging that the case be


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set for a full hearing on the merits because if thecharge of partiality and bias against the respondentsand suppression of vital evidence by the prosecutionare proven, the petitioners would be entitled to therelief demanded: The People are entitled to dueprocess which requires an impartial tribunal and an

unbiased prosecutor. If the State is deprived of a fairopportunity to prosecute and convict because certainmaterial evidence is suppressed by the prosecutionand the tribunal is not impartial, then the entireproceedings would be null and void. Petitionersprayed that the Sandiganbayan be restrained frompromulgating their decision as scheduled anew onDecember 2, 1985.- On December 5, 1985, the Court required therespondents to comment on the motion forreconsideration but issued no restraining order. Thus,on December 2, 1985, as scheduled, respondentSandiganbayan issued its decision acquitting all theaccused of the crime charged, declaring theminnocent and totally absolving them of any civil

liability. [Note: the word used by the Sandiganbayanwas innocent instead of not guilty!]- Respondents submitted that with theSandiganbayan's verdict of acquittal, the instant casehad become moot and academic. On February 4,1986, the same Court majority denied petitioners'motion for reconsideration for lack of merit. [Notethat EDSA I happened before the month ended.]- On March 20, 1986, petitioners filed their motion toadmit their second motion for reconsideration.

The thrust of the second motion for reconsiderationwas the startling and therefore unknown revelationsof Deputy Tanodbayan Manuel Herrera as reported inthe March 6, 1986 issue of the Manila Times entitled"Aquino Trial a Sham," that the then President had

ordered the respondents Sandiganbayan and Tanodbayan Bernardo Fernandez and theprosecution panel headed by Herrera to whitewashthe criminal cases against the 26 respondentsaccused and produce a verdict of acquittal.- Tanodbayan Fernandez claimed he neversuccumbed to any alleged attempts to influence hisactuations in the premises, having insteadsuccessfully resisted perceived attempts to exertpressure to drop the case after preliminaryinvestigation and actually ordered the filing andprosecution of the two murder cases against private-party respondents. Respondents Justices of theSandiganbayan First Division in their collectivecomment of April 9, 1986 stated that the trial of the

criminal cases by them was valid and regular anddecided on the basis of evidence presented and the

law applicable, but manifested that "if it is true thatthe former Tanodbayan and the Deputy Tanodbayan,Chief of the Prosecution Panel, were pressured intosuppressing vital evidence which would probablyalter the result of the trial, Answering Respondentswould not interpose any objection to the reopening

of those cases, if only to allow justice to take itscourse."- Respondents-accused opposed the second motionfor reconsideration and prayed for its denial. Theaccused-respondents raised the issue of double

jeopardy, and invoked that the issues had becomemoot and academic because of the rendition of theSandiganbayan's judgment of acquittal of allrespondents-accused on December 2, 1985, withcounsels for respondents Ver and Tigas, as well asOlivas, further arguing that assuming that the

judgment of acquittal is void for any reason, theremedy is a direct action to annul the judgmentwhere the burden of proof falls upon the plaintiff toestablish by clear, competent and convincing

evidence the cause of the nullity.- The Supreme Court appointed a three-membercommission composed of retired SC Justice ConradoVasquez, chairman, and retired IAC Justices MilagrosGerman and Eduardo Caguioa as members, to hearand receive evidence, testimonial and documentary,of the charges of collusion and pressures andrelevant matters, upon prior notice to all parties, andto submit their findings to this Court for properdisposition. The Commission submitted the followingrecommendation: Considering the existence ofadequate credible evidence showing that theprosecution in the Aquino-Galman case and the

Justices who tried and decided the same acted underthe compulsion of some pressure which proved to be

beyond their capacity to resist, and which not onlyprevented the prosecution to fully ventilate itsposition and to offer all the evidences which it couldhave otherwise presented, but also predeterminedthe final outcome of the case, the Commission is ofthe considered thinking and belief, subject to thebetter opinion and judgment of this Honorable Court,that the proceedings in the said case have beenvitiated by lack of due process, and herebyrespectfully recommends that the prayer in thepetition for a declaration of a mistrial inSandiganbayan Cases Nos. 10010 and 10011 entitled'People vs. Luther Custodio, et al.,' be granted."

ISSUES

1. WON the petition for a declaration of a mistrial inSandiganbayan Cases Nos. 10010 and 10011 entitled

'People vs. Luther Custodio, et al.,' be granted2. WON a retrial would constitute double jeopardy

HELD1. YESReasoning

-The Supreme Court cannot permit such a sham trialand verdict and travesty of justice to standunrectified. The courts of the land under its aegis arecourts of law and justice and equity. They wouldhave no reason to exist if they were allowed to beused as mere tools of injustice, deception andduplicity to subvert and suppress the truth, insteadof repositories of judicial power whose judges aresworn and committed to render impartial justice toall alike who seek the enforcement or protection of aright or the prevention or redress of a wrong, withoutfear or favor and removed from the pressures ofpolitics and prejudice. More so, in the case at barwhere the people and the world are entitled to knowthe truth and the integrity of our judicial system is at

stake. In life, as an accused before the militarytribunal Ninoy had pleaded in vain that as a civilianhe was entitled to due process of law and trial in theregular civil courts before an impartial court with anunbiased prosecutor. In death, Ninoy is the victim ofthe "treacherous and vicious assassination" and therelatives and sovereign people as the aggrievedparties plead once more for due process of law and aretrial before an impartial court with an unbiasedprosecutor. The Court is constrained to declare thesham trial a mock trial - the non-trial of the century -and that the predetermined judgment of acquittalwas unlawful and void ab initio.2. NORatio Double jeopardy cannot be invoked against

this Court's setting aside of the trial courts' judgmentof dismissal or acquittal where the prosecution whichrepresents the sovereign people in criminal cases isdenied due process. Where the prosecution isdeprived of a fair opportunity to prosecute and proveits case, its right to due process is thereby violated.

The cardinal precept is that where there is a violationof basic constitutional rights, courts are ousted oftheir jurisdiction. Thus, the violation of the State'sright to due process raises a serious jurisdictionalissue which cannot be glossed over or disregarded atwill. Where the denial of the fundamental right of dueprocess is apparent, a decision rendered in disregardof that right is void for lack of jurisdiction.Reasoning

- Legal jeopardy attaches only (a) upon a validindictment, (b) before a competent court, (c) after


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arraignment, (d) a valid plea having been entered;and (e) the case was dismissed or otherwiseterminated without the express consent of theaccused. The lower court was not competent as itwas ousted of its jurisdiction when it violated theright of the prosecution to due process. In effect, the

first jeopardy was never terminated, and the remandof the criminal case for further hearing and/or trialbefore the lower courts amounts merely to acontinuation of the first jeopardy, and does notexpose the accused to a second jeopardy.- More so does the rule against the invoking ofdouble jeopardy hold in the cases at bar where as wehave held, the sham trial was but a mock trial wherethe authoritarian president ordered respondentsSandiganbayan and Tanodbayan to rig the trial andclosely monitored the entire proceedings to assurethe predetermined final outcome of acquittal andtotal absolution as innocent of all the respondents-accused. Notwithstanding the laudable efforts of

Justice Herrera which saw him near the end

"deactivating" himself from the case, as it was hisbelief that its eventual resolution was already aforegone conclusion, they could not cope with themisuse and abuse of the overwhelming powers of theauthoritarian President to weaken the case of theprosecution, to suppress its evidence, harass,intimidate and threaten its witnesses, secure theirrecantation or prevent them from testifying. Fullyaware of the prosecution's difficulties in locatingwitnesses and overcoming their natural fear andreluctance to appear and testify, respondentSandiganbayan maintained a "dizzying tempo" of theproceedings and announced its intention toterminate the proceedings in about 6 months time orless than a year, pursuant to the scripted scenario.

The prosecution complained of "the PresidingJustice's seemingly hostile attitude towards (it)" andtheir being the subject of warnings, reprimand andcontempt proceedings as compared to the nilsituation for the defense. Herrera likewisecomplained of being "cajoled into producingwitnesses and pressed on making assurances that ifgiven a certain period, they will be able to producetheir witnesses," Herrera pleaded for "a reasonableperiod of preparation of its evidence" and cited otherpending cases before respondent court that werepending trial for a much longer time where the"dizzying tempo" and "fast pace" were notmaintained by the court. Manifestly, the prosecutionand the sovereign people were denied due process of

law with a partial court and biased Tanodbayanunder the constant and pervasive monitoring and

pressure exerted by the authoritarian President toassure the carrying out of his instructions. A dictated,coerced and scripted verdict of acquittal such as thatin the case at bar is a void judgment. In legalcontemplation, it is no judgment at all. It neitherbinds nor bars anyone. Such a judgment is "a lawless

thing which can be treated as an outlaw". It is aterrible and unspeakable affront to the society andthe people. To paraphrase Brandeis: If theauthoritarian head of the government becomes thelawbreaker, he breeds contempt for the law, heinvites every man to become a law unto himself, heinvites anarchy.Dispositive Petitioners' second motion forreconsideration is granted. The resolutions ofNovember 28, 1985 dismissing the petition and ofFebruary 4, 1986 denying petitioners' motion forreconsideration are hereby set aside and in lieuthereof, judgment is hereby rendered nullifying theproceedings in respondent Sandiganbayan and its

judgment of acquittal in Criminal Cases Nos. 10010

and 10011 entitled "People of the Philippines vs.Gen. Luther Custodio, et al." and ordering a re-trial ofthe said cases which should be conducted withdeliberate dispatch and with careful regard for therequirements of due process, so that the truth maybe finally known and justice done to all.

PEOPLE v RELOVA148 SCRA 292

CANIZA v PEOPLE (AGLORO)159 SCRA 16

FELICIANO; March 18, 1988

NATUREPetition for Prohibition and certiorari directed at 1)the CFI Order of Nov. 27, 1979 issued by Branch 23of CFI of Manila in Criminal Case 46768 and 2) saidcourts Order of March 20, 1980 in the same casedenying Canizas Motion for ReconsiderationFACTS- March 20, 1974: Assistant City Fiscal of Manila filedan Information for falsification of public documentsallegedly committed on Nov. 5, 1968 by Caniza.- May 24, 1974: Caniza filed Motion to Quash sayingthat allegations in the information did not constitutean offense, and that the information containedaverments which, if true, would constitute a legal

excuse or justification- trial court granted Motion to Quash, dismissed case

against Caniza- Fiscals Motion for Reconsideration of this Orderwas denied- June 13, 1979: a second Information (docketed asCriminal Case 46768) was filed charging Caniza withsubstantially the same offense as that charged under

the previous information- Caniza moved to quash this second information onthe grounds that 1) the offense charged had alreadyprescribed, 2)quashal of the first Information hadbeen on the merits, 3)the allegations of the secondInformation did not constitute and offense- Respondent judge issued an order denying themotion to quash- He also denied Canizas motion for reconsideration

ISSUES1. WON the offense charged had already prescribed2. WON the filing of the second Information hasplaced the accused in jeopardy of punishment for thesame offense a second time

HELD1. NOReasoning- 5 years, 4 months, and 16 days had elapsedbetween November 5, 1968 (the date of commissionof the alleged offense) and March 20 1974 (date offiling the first information); 4 years, 2 months and 12days had elapsed between April 3, 1975 (date ofdenial by the trial court of the Fiscals motion forreconsideration) and June 13, 1979 (date of filing ofthe second information). A total of 9 years, 6 monthsand 28 days had been consumed by the time thesecond Information was filed in court.- Under Article 90, in relation with Article 172 of the

Revised Penal Code, the crime of falsification ofpublic document committed by a private individual -the offense with which petitioner Caiza is presentlycharged - prescribes in ten (10) years. In this respect,Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code states further:- Computation of prescription of offenses. Theperiod of prescription shall commence to run fromthe day on which the crime is discovered by theoffended party, the authorities, or their agents, andshall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint orinformation, and shall commence to run again whensuch proceedings terminate without the accusedbeing convicted or acquitted, or are justifiablystopped for any reason not imputable to him.2. NO

Reasoning


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- Section 9 of Rule 117 of the Rules of Court 6 liststhe following requisites in order that the defense ofdouble jeopardy may be successfully invoked by anaccused person:a. a valid Complaint or Information or other formalcharge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a

conviction;b. a Court of competent jurisdiction;c. that the accused had pleaded to the chargeagainst him;d. that the accused had been convicted, or acquitted,or the case against him dismissed or otherwiseterminated without his express consent; ande. that the second offense charged is the same asthe first, or an attempt to commit the same or apetition thereof, or that the second offensenecessarily includes or is necessarily included in thefirst offense charged.- Criminal Case No. 16879 was ordered dismissed bythe trial court with the express consent of theaccused i.e., upon Motion to Quash filed by

petitioner Caiza. Generally, a dismissal under suchcircumstance win not bar another prosecution for thesame offense; the defendant, in having the caseagainst him dismissed, thereby waives hisconstitutional right against double jeopardy for thereason that he effectively prevents the trial courtfrom proceeding to trial on the merits and renderinga judgment of conviction against him- Application of the aforestated doctrine of waiver,however, is subject to two (2) sine qua nonconditions: first, dismissal must have been sought orinduced by the defendant, either personally orthrough counsel; and second, such dismissal mustnot have been on the merits and must notnecessarily amount to an acquittal. In this respect,

the record shows that petitioner Caiza moved toquash the first Information (Criminal Case No. 16879)on grounds that the allegations made therein did notconstitute an offense and/or that the first Informationcontained allegations which, if true, constituted alegal excuse or justification. These grounds, uponwhich the trial court anchored its 27 November 1974Order of dismissal, are clearly directed at thesufficiency of said information to sustain theconviction of petitioner Caniza and, hence, indicatethe absence of the first requisite in double-jeopardy.Furthermore, and more importantly, dismissal of acriminal action on this basis is not properlyconsidered as amounting to an acquittal on themerits; from a legal standpoint, the defendant is

deemed as not having been charged with thecommission of any offense whatsoever under the

deficient information. Consequently, petitionerCaizas plea of second jeopardy cannot besustained: he effectively waived his right to assertthat plea when he moved to quash the firstInformation filed against him.Dispositive Petition for Prohibition and certiorari is

DISMISSED. The 8 December 1980 Resolution of thisCourt giving due course to the Petition is withdrawnand the disputed Orders dated 27 November 1979and 20 March 1980 issued by respondent judge inCriminal Case No. 46768 are hereby AFFIRMED. Thiscase is remanded to the court a quo for trial on themerits.

SAMSON v CA103 PHIL 277

BAUTISTA ANGELO; MARCH 31, 1958

NATUREPetition for review by certiorari of a decision of the

Court of AppealsFACTS- On October 2, 1948 Amado L. Cruz asked the helpof his former classmate Rufino T. Samson in gettingthe checks of the two claimants who were with himat Camp Murphy. After being assured twice of theidentity of the supposed claimants and afterexamining their residence certificates attached tothe claim papers, Samson accompanied by Cruz andthe supposed claimants went to talk to Lt. ManuelValencia and requested him to act as guarantor tosecure the claimants check.- acting on the assurance of Samson, Valenciahelped them secure checks in the name of Rosalinda

Perez and Espiridion Lascano. Hese were encashedby Mallari again believing Samson.- Paras didnt know how to write so she insteadplaced her thumbmark at the back of the check whileSamson signed as witness. Lascano placed hissignature while Samson signed as last endorser.- they then proceeded to Aristocrat to eat lunch. HereSamson received P300 supposedly to pay the officerswho helped them and P10 for taxi money.- two days after, Samson was informed of thepossibility that the people who claimed the checkswerent the real people who they claimed to be. Thishe was able to verify. Upon knowing of this, Samsonreported the incident to an officer.- Samson, Cruz and Vergara and two others whose

names are unknown in two separate informationswith the complex crime ofestafa through falsification

of two checks of the Philippine National Bank andwere found guilty. Sentence for each of the threedefendants to suffer in each case a penalty of notless than 6 years and 1 day and not more than 9years, 4 months and 1 day ofprision mayor, to pay afine of P2,500 and the costs. In addition, they were

sentenced to indemnify the Philip-pine RyukyusCommand, the payee of the checks, in the sum ofP5,417.11 in each of the two cases- On appeal before the CA, Cruz and Vergara weregiven reduced penalties. Smason was only foundguilty of committing the crime through grossimprudence and was accordingly sentenced to 4months ofarresto mayorin each of the two cases.

ISSUES1. WONthe acts done by him, as found by the Courtof Appeals constitute gross imprudence2. WON he was correctly found guilty of the offenseestafa through (falsification by) negligence

HELD1. YES- Appellant was, or must have been aware that theclaim was for a sizeable amount, totalling overtwelve thousand pesos, and ordinary prudencerequired that he should satisfy himself by all properand adequate means of the identity of the personsclaiming said amounts, since they we personallyunknown to him. The mere assurance of a formerclass, mate would certainly not be a satisfactoryidentification to justify disbursement of such a largeamount- appellant as a Lieutenant of the Army is sufficientlyintelligent and educated to foresee the possibilitythat the certificates could be forged or stolen

- appellant cooperated in the commission of thecomplex offense of estafa through falsification byreckless imprudence by acts without which it couldnot have been accomplished, and this being a fact,there would be no reason to exculpate him fromliability2. YES- counsel contends that: Samson cannot be convictedof the crime of estafa through falsification byimprudence for the reason that the information filedagainst him charges only a willful act of falsificationand contains no reference to any act of imprudenceon his part; the alleged imprudent act does notinclude or is not necessarily included in the offensecharged in the information because a deliberate

intent to do an unlawful act is inconsistent with theidea of negligence.


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-The rule regarding variance between allegation andproof in a criminal case, is: "When there is variancebetween the offense charged in the complaint orinformation, and that proved or established by theevidence, and the offense as charged, is included inor necessarily includes the offense proved, the

defendant shall be convicted of the offense provedincluded in that which is charged, or of the offensecharged included in that which is proved" (Section 4,Rule 116 now rule 120. Rules of Court).-"An offense charged necessarily includes that whichis proved, when some of the essential elements oringredients of the former, as this is alleged in thecomplaint or information, constitute the latter. Andthe offense charged is necessarily included in theoffense proves, when the essential ingredients of theformer constitute or form a part of those constitutingthe latter" (Section 5, Rule 116, now rule 120)- conviction for a criminal negligent act can be hadunder an information exclusively charging thecommission of a willful offense, upon the theory that

the greater includes the lesser offense- appellant did not act with criminal intent but merelyfailed to take proper and adequate means to assurehimself of the identity of the real claimants as anordinary prudent man would do. In other words, theinformation alleges acts which charge willful,falsification but which turned out to be not willful butnegligent. This is a case covered by the rule whenthere is a variance between the allegation and proof- Moreover, Section 5, Rule 116 now 120, of theRules of Court does not require that all the essentialelements of the offense charged in the informationbe proved, it being sufficient that some of saidessential elements or ingredients thereof beestablished to constitute the crime proved. This

conclusion is strengthened by the provisions ofSection 9, Ruled 113, (I think sec 7 rule 117 na) ofthe Rules of Court under which appellant could nolonger be prosecuted for estafa through falsificationof commercial documents by reckless negligencewere we to acquit him in the cases at bar on theobviously technical theory of the dissenters

SEPARATE OPINION

REYES JBL [dissent]- Quizon vs. Justice of the Peace of Bacolor(97 Phil.,342), July 28, 1955, that criminal negligence is not amere variant of the intentional misdeed; that it is adistinct and separate in itself. We also pointed out inthat case that while willful crimes are punishedaccording to their result in crimes of negligence,

what the law punishes is the carelessness itself, thefailure to take the precautions that society has aright to expect will be taken under the circumstancesof each case- that intentional falsification and falsification bynegligence not only differ in seriousness, but in

essence; they are, by their nature, two differentoffenses altogether. Wherefore, an offender who isaccused of intentional falsification cannot be held toanswer for falsification by negligence, because theessential element of the latter offense, the ingredientthat characterizes it and separates it from all otheroffenses, to wit, the criminal negligence orcarelessness, is not involved in the elements of thecrime charged. Not only is it not included: it isexcluded by incompatibility, because malice or intentcannot co-exist with negligence- On the procedural side, the objections to appellant'sconviction of estafa by falsification throughnegligence are much more serious.Section 5, Rule 116 (now 120), upon which the

majority relies as justifying the conviction, expressesthe following rule:An offense charged necessarily includes that whichis proved, when some of the essential elements oringredients of the former, as this alleged in thecomplaint or information, constitute the latter.(Italic mine)It is not enough, therefore, that the elements ofthe crime for which an accused is convicted shouldbe proved, but then must also be charged oralleged

PEOPLE v LACSONApril 1, 2003

PEOPLE v LACSONOctober 2003

PEOPLE v LARRAAGAPER CURIAM; January 31, 2006

NATUREMFR filed by brothers James Anthony and JamesAndrew, both surnamed Uy, praying for the reductionof the penalties imposed upon the latter on theground that he was a minor at the time the crimeswere committed.

FACTS

- The Uy brothers were convicted of the crimes ofspecial complex crime of kidnapping and seriousillegal detention with homicide and rape; andsimplekidnapping and serious illegal detention. The Uybrothers claim that James Andrew was only 17 yearsand 262 days old at the time the crimes were

committed. He begs leave and pleads that we admitat this stage of the proceedings his Certificate of LiveBirth issued by the NSO, and Baptismal Certificate.He prays that his penalty be reduced, as in the caseof his brother James Anthony.- Since the entry in the birth certificate was notlegible, the court required the SolGen to secure aclear and legible copy from the Civil Registrar ofCotabato as well as the NSO, and thereafter to file acomment on the issue of James Andrew's minority.

The documents showed that James Andrew wasindeed a minor when the crimes were committed.

The SolGen recommended that the penalty imposedbe reduced.

ISSUEWON James Anthony's penalty should be reducedbecause he was a minor at the time the crime wascommitted

HELDYESRatio Article 68 of the RPC provides: Upon a personover fifteen and under eighteen years of age thepenalty next lower than that prescribed by law shallbe imposed, but always in the proper period. Thus,the imposable penalty on James Andrew, by reasonof his minority, is 1 degree lower than the statutorypenalty.Reasoning

- The penalty for the special complex crime ofkidnapping and serious illegal detention withhomicide and rape being death, one degree lowertherefrom is reclusion perpetua. On the other hand,the penalty for simple kidnapping and serious illegaldetention is reclusion perpetua to death. One degreelower therefrom is reclusion temporal. There beingno aggravating and mitigating circumstance, thepenalty to be imposed on James Andrew is reclusiontemporal in its medium period. Applying theIndeterminate Sentence Law, he should besentenced to suffer the penalty of 12 years ofprisionmayor in its maximum period, as minimum, to 17years ofreclusion temporal in its medium period, asmaximum.

Dispositive The MFR is GRANTED. For the crime ofkidnapping and serious illegal detention with


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homicide and rape, James Andrew Uy is sentenced toreclusion perpetua; For the crime of simplekidnapping and serious illegal detention, the penaltyof 12 years ofprision mayorin its maximum period,as minimum, to 17 years of reclusion temporal in itsmedium period, as maximum.

PEOPLE v ALICANDO251 SCRA 293

PUNO; December 12, 1995

NATUREAutomatic review

FACTS- Alicando was charged of rape with homicide for thedeath of Khazie Penecilla on June 12, 1994 in IloiloCity. In the process of raping Khazie, he choked herthus causing her death.

> Khazies father Romeo was having a drink withtwo friends in Romeos house. Alicando eventually joined them. At around 4:30 PM, Romeos friendsleft.> At around 5:30 PM, Rebada, one of Penecillasneighbors, spotted Khazie by the window ofAlicandos house. Khazie offered to buy yemasfrom Rebada but Alicando closed the window.Rebada then heard Khazie crying so sheapproached the house and saw through anopening between the floor and the door thatKhazie was being raped.> Khazie did not come home so Romeo and hiswife looked for her. Rebada did not tell them whatshe saw.

> In the morning, Khazies corpse was found underthe house of Santiago, another neighbor. Rebadathen told the Penecillas what she knew.> Alicando was arrested and her verballyconfessed his guilt to PO3 Tan without theassistance of counsel. Based on his confessionand follow-up interrogations, Khazies slipperswere recovered from Alicandos home along with astained T-shirt and pillow.

- June 29, 1994 Alicando was arraigned andpleaded guilty. After the plea of guilt, the trial courtordered the prosecution to present its evidence.- July 20, 1994 The trial court sentenced Alicando todeath by electric chair or, if the penal facilities wouldbe available by then, by gas poisoning.

ISSUE

WON the accused was properly meted the sentenceof death

HELDNO1. Arraignment of the accused was null and void

Ratio During arraignment, the complaint or theinformation should be read in a language or dialectwhich the accused understands.Reasoning- The trial judge failed to follow the procedureoutlined in Rule 116 of the RoC.- The information was written in English and it wasunknown whether or not the accused couldunderstand English well. It could not be said withcertainty that the accused was informed of thenature and cause of the accusation against him.2. The plea of guilt was null and void.Ratio Rule 116, Sec. 3 provides that in a plea ofguilt, the court should ascertain that the accusedvoluntarily entered into the plea and fully

comprehends the ramifications of such a plea and, inaddition, the prosecution should also be required toprove his guilt and the precise degree of culpability.Reasoning- This rule is a restatement of the doctrine laid downin People vs. Apduhan. The searching inquiry of thetrial court must be focused on: (1) the voluntarinessof the plea, and (2) the full comprehension of theconsequences of the plea.- The questions of the trial court failed to show thevoluntariness of the plea of guilt of the appellant nordid the questions demonstrate appellant's fullcomprehension of the consequences of his plea.

> The records do not clearly illustrate thepersonality profile of the accused.

> The age, socio-economic status and educationalbackground of the accused were not examined.> With regard to voluntariness, questionsregarding the presence or absence ofmaltreatment of the accused are deemedinsufficient when a record of events in the penalfacility indicate that Alicando suffered a hematomafrom being locked up in a cell with violent inmatesupon his arrest.> With regard to comprehension, the trial courtinadequately warned Alicando that a plea of guiltwould result to a mandatory of penalty of deathwithout explaining to him what mandatory meant.

- The rule requires that after a free and intelligentplea of guilt the trial court must require the

prosecution to prove the guilt of the appellant andthe precise degree of his culpability beyond

reasonable doubt. Rule 116, Sec. 3 modifies priorituisprudence that a plea of guilt even in capital offensesis sufficient to sustain a conviction charged in theinformation without need of further proof.3. Some prosecution evidence, offered independentlyof the plea of guilt of the appellant, were

inadmissible, yet were considered by the trial courtconvicting the appellant.Ratio Fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine: oncethe primary source (the "tree") is shown to havebeen unlawfully obtained, any secondary orderivative evidence (the "fruit") derived from it isalso inadmissible. In other words, illegally seizedevidence is obtained as a direct result of the illegalact, whereas the "fruit of the poisonous tree" is theindirect result of the same illegal act. The "fruit of thepoisonous tree" is at least once removed from theillegally seized evidence, but it is equallyinadmissible.Reasoning- The rule is based on the principle that evidence

illegally obtained by the State should not be used togain other evidence because the originally illegallyobtained evidence taints all evidence subsequentlyobtained.- The Court admitted as evidence the things seized inAlicandos house. These are inadmissible evidencefor they were gathered by PO3 Tan of as a result ofcustodial interrogation where appellant verballyconfessed to the crime without the benefit ofcounsel.- This is in violation of Art. 3, Sec. 12 of the 1987Constitution which requires the assistance of counselfor the accused as well as provides for the right ofthe accused to remain silent and to be informed ofthe nature of the accusation against him and that

these rights cannot be waived subject to exceptions.A violation of this provision renders the evidencegathered inadmissible.- Even if the evidence gathered were admissible,they are still insufficient as evidence.

> The alleged bloodstains on the pillow and shirtwere never proven with laboratory tests.> There was no testimony that the shirt inquestion was worn by the accused when hecommitted the crime. It was not unnatural for himto have a shirt with bloodstains because he was abutcher.

- The burden to prove that an accused waived hisright to remain silent and the right to counsel beforemaking a confession under custodial interrogation

rests with the prosecution. It is also the burden of theprosecution to show that the evidence derived from


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confession is not tainted as "fruit of the poisonoustree."DispositiveThe Decision convicting accused of thecrime of Rape with Homicide and sentencing him tosuffer the penalty of death is annulled and set asideand the case is remanded to the trial court for further

proceedings.

SEPARATE OPINION

KAPUNAN [dissent]- There was substantial compliance with therequirements for arraignment and plea.

> There is nothing on the record which wouldwarrant a finding that the information was not readin the language or dialect known to the appellant.> The rule on arraignment and plea does notabsolutely require that the same be indicated inthe record of every criminal case> Rule 116 contains nothing requiring trial courts,to indicate in the record the fact that theinformation was read in the language or dialectknown to the defendant even if the same was infact actually complied with by the lower court.And yet, even in Metro Manila alone, one observesthat the bulk of proceedings in our trial courts,including the process of arraignment is conductedin the vernacular> Three things which need to be accomplishedafter the accused in a criminal case enters a pleaof guilty to a capital offense, which have all beencomplied with in this case:

1. the court should conduct a searchinginquiry into the voluntariness and fullcomprehension of the consequences of theaccused's plea. There is no rule on conductinginquiry except that in People vs. Dayot, it washeld that a searching inquiry ... compels the

judge to content himself reasonably that theaccused has not been coerced or placed undera state of duress - and that his guilty plea hasnot therefore been given improvidently - otherby actual threats of physical harm frommalevolent quarters or simply because of his,the Judge's, intimidating robes.2. the lower court should require theprosecution to prove the guilt of the accusedand the precise degree of his culpability3. the court should inquire whether or not theaccused wishes to present evidence on hisbehalf and should allow him to do so if he sodesires

- The plea of guilt was not improvident.

> When the appellant pleaded guilty in open court,the appellant was clearly assisted by counsel.

> The trial court, on its own, in fact went out of itsway to repeatedly inform the defendant of thenature of his plea and the implications of the plea

he was making. He was asked a number of timesif he was sure of the plea he was making.> The records fail to indicate that appellantquestioned his plea of guilty at any stage of thetrial. He did not put up any defense with regard tothe evidence and the testimonies and evendirected the police to the location of the evidence.> The accuseds silence can counter the assertionof the Court that the plea of guilt was improvident.Silence is assent as well as consent, and may,where a direct and specific accusation of crime ismade, be regarded under some circumstances as aquasi-confession. An innocent person will defendhimself so silence can be understood as a persondeferring to do just that.> The absence of an extra-judicial confession doesnot detract from the efficacy or validity ofappellant's plea of guilty. It does not affect therequirement compelling the prosecution to provethe guilt of the accused and the precise degree ofhis culpability. Nowhere in the rules does it statethat an extra-judicial confession is a prerequisitefor a conviction based on a plea of guilty.

- The physical evidence objected to falls under theexclusionary rule.

> The 1987 Constitution's exclusionary rulesabsolutely forbid evidence obtained from illegalsearches and seizures or evidence resulting fromuncounseled custodial investigations of accusedindividuals.> The doctrine is not without its exceptions, andthe evidence in dispute in the instant case fallswithin those exceptions.

+ The discovery of the victim's body near thehouse of the accused would have naturally ledauthorities to undertake a more thoroughinvestigation of the site, particularly in thoseareas where the victim was last seen.+ Under one of the recognized exceptions ofthe fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine, themore appropriate question in such cases iswhether the evidence to which the objection ismade would not have been discovered at allbut for the illegality or would have beendiscovered anyway by sources or proceduresindependent of the illegality.

+ Another exception refuses to treat thedoctrine as absolutely sacred if the evidencein question would have been inevitablydiscovered under normal conditions.

- There is adequate legal evidence to sustain the trialcourts conviction with moral certainty. The

testimony of a lone witness, free from signs ofimpropriety or falsehood, is sufficient to convict anaccused even if uncorroborated.

AQUINO v MILITARY COMMISSION 263 SCRA 546

ANTONIO; May 9, 1975

FACTS- After Martial Law was proclaimed, Benigno Aquino

Jr. was arrested (on Sept 22, 1972), pursuant toGeneral Order No. 2-A of the President for complicityin a conspiracy to seize political and state power inthe country and to take over the Government.

- On September 25, 1972, he sued for a writ ofhabeas corpus in which he questioned the legality ofthe proclamation of martial law and his arrest anddetention.- SC issued a writ of habeas corpus and heard thecase. SC dismissed the petition and upheld thevalidity of martial law and the arrest and detention ofpetitioner.- In the present case, petitioner challenges the

jurisdiction of military commissions to try him, aloneor together with others, for illegal possession offirearms, ammunition and explosives, for violation ofthe Anti-Subversion Act and for murder.- When the proceedings before the MilitaryCommission opened, petitioner questioned the

fairness of the trial and announced that he did notwish to participate in the proceedings even as hedischarged both his defense counsel of choice andhis military defense counsel.- For the petitioner's assurance, a Special Committeewas created to reinvestigate the charges againstpetitioner. Petitioner filed supplemental petitionquestioning the legality of the creation of the SpecialCommittee.- On March 24, 1975, petitioner filed an "UrgentMotion for Issuance of Temporary Restraining OrderAgainst Military Commission No. 2"; praying that saidCommission be prohibited from proceeding with theperpetuation of testimony under its Order datedMarch 10, 1975, the same being illegal, until further

orders from the Supreme Court.


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- On April 14, 1975, this Court also issued arestraining order against respondent MilitaryCommission No. 2, restraining it from furtherproceeding with the perpetuation of testimony underits Order dated March 10, 1975 until the matter isheard thereto.

- When this case was called for hearing, petitioner'scounsel presented to this Court a Motion to Withdrawthe petition and all other pending matters and/orincidents in connection therewith.

ISSUES1. WON the court has jurisdiction despite petitionersmotion to withdraw2. WON Military Commission No. 2 has been lawfullyconstituted and validly vested with jurisdiction tohear the cases against civilians, including thepetitioner.3. WON Administrative Order No. 355, creating theSpecial Committee strips the petitioner of his right todue process

4. WON the denial to an accused of an opportunity tocross-examine the witnesses against him in thepreliminary investigation constitutes an infringementof his right to due process,5. WON the taking of testimonies and depositionswere void6. WON petitioner may validly waive his right to bepresent at his trial

HELD1. YES- The court denied the motion, since all matters inissue in this case have already been submitted forresolution, and they are of paramount public interest,it is imperative that the questions raised by

petitioner on the constitutionality and legality ofproceedings against civilians in the militarycommissions, pursuant to pertinent General Orders,Presidential Decrees and Letters of Instruction,should be definitely resolved.2. YES- Military Commission No. 2 has been lawfullyconstituted and validly vested with jurisdiction tohear the cases against civilians, including thepetitioner.Reasoning- The Court has previously declared that theproclamation of Martial Law is valid andconstitutional and that its continuance is justified bythe danger posed to the public safety.

- To preserve the safety of the nation in times ofnational peril, the President of the Philippines

necessarily possesses broad authority compatiblewith the imperative requirements of the emergency.On the basis of this, he has authorized in GO No. 8the Chief of Staff of the AFP, to create militarytribunals & try and decide cases "of militarypersonnel and such other cases as may be referred

to them." In GO No. 12, the military tribunals werevested with jurisdiction "exclusive of the civil courts",among others, over crimes against public order,violations of the Anti-Subversion Act, violations of thelaws on firearms, and other crimes which, in the faceof the emergency, are directly related to the quellingof the rebellion and preservation of the safety andsecurity of the Republic.- Petitioner is charged with having conspired withcertain military leaders of the communist rebellion tooverthrow the government, furnishing them armsand other instruments to further the uprising. UnderGO No. 12, jurisdiction over this offense has beenvested exclusively upon military tribunals. It cannotbe said that petitioner has been singled out for trial

for this offense before the military commission.Pursuant to GO No. 12, all "criminal cases involvingsubversion, sedition, insurrection or rebellion orthose committed in furtherance of, on the occasionof, incident to or in connection with the commissionof said crimes" which were pending in the civil courtswere ordered transferred to the military tribunals.

This jurisdiction of the tribunal, therefore, operatesequally on all persons in like circumstances.- The guarantee of due process is not a guarantee ofany particular form of tribunal in criminal cases. Amilitary tribunal of competent jurisdiction, accusationin due form, notice and opportunity to defend andtrial before an impartial tribunal, adequately meetthe due process requirement. Due process of law

does not necessarily mean a judicial proceeding inthe regular courts. The procedure before the MilitaryCommission, as prescribed in PD No. 39, assuresobservance of the fundamental requisites ofprocedural due process, due notice, an essentiallyfair and impartial trial and reasonable opportunity forthe preparation of the defense.- It is asserted that petitioner's trial before themilitary commission will not be fair and impartial,since the President had already prejudgedpetitioner's cases and the military tribunal is a merecreation of the President, and "subject to his controland direction." We cannot, however, indulge inunjustified assumptions. Prejudice cannot bepresumed, especially if weighed against the great

confidence and trust reposed by the people upon thePresident and the latter's legal obligation under his

oath to "do justice to every man". Nor is it justifiableto conceive, much less presume, that the membersof the military commission, the Chief of Staff of theAFP, the Board of Review and the Secretary ofNational Defense, with their corresponding staff

judge advocates, as reviewing authorities, through

whom petitioner's hypothetical conviction would bereviewed before reaching the President, would all beinsensitive to the great principles of justice andviolate their respective obligations to act fairly andimpartially in the premises.

This assumption must be made because innocence,not wrongdoing, is to be presumed.3. NO- It was precisely because of petitioner's complaintthat he was denied the opportunity to be heard in thepreliminary investigation of his charges .ThePresident created a Special Committee toreinvestigate the charges filed against him in themilitary commission. It is intended that theCommittee should conduct the investigation with

"utmost fairness, impartiality and objectivity"ensuring to the accused his constitutional right todue process, to determine whether "there isreasonable ground to believe that the offensescharged were in fact committed and the accused isprobably guilty thereof." Petitioner, however,objected by challenging in his supplemental petitionbefore this Court the validity of Administrative OrderNo. 355, on the pretense that by submitting to the

jurisdiction of the Special Committee he would bewaiving his right to cross-examination becausePresidential Decree No. 77, which applies to theproceedings of the Special Committee, has doneaway with cross-examination in preliminaryinvestigation.

4. NO- The Constitution "does not require the holding ofpreliminary investigations. The right exists only, ifand when created by statute." It is "not an essentialpart of due process of law." The absence thereofdoes not impair the validity of a criminal informationor affect the jurisdiction of the court over the case.As a creation of the statute it can, therefore, bemodified or amended by law.- It is also evident that there is no curtailment of theconstitutional right of an accused person when he isnot given the opportunity to "cross-examine thewitnesses presented against him in the preliminaryinvestigation before his arrest, this being a matterthat depends on the sound discretion of the Judge or

investigating officer concerned."5. NO,


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the taking of the testimony or deposition was properand valid.- Petitioner does not dispute respondents' claim that

on March 14, 1975, he knew of the order allowing thetaking of the deposition of prosecution witnesses onMarch 31, to continue through April 1 to 4, 1975.

- The provisions of PD No. 328, dated October 31,1973, for the conditional examination of prosecutionwitnesses before trial, is similar to the provisions ofSection 7 of Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Court.- In Elago,the court said that the order of the courtauthorizing the taking of the deposition of thewitnesses of the prosecution and fixing the date andtime thereof is the one that must be served on theaccused within a reasonable time prior to that fixedfor the examination of the witnesses so that theaccused may be present and cross-examine thewitness.- 'The opportunity of cross-examination involves twoelements:"(1) Notice to the opponent that the deposition is to

be taken at the time and place specified, and"(2) A sufficient interval of time to prepare forexamination and to reach the place,"(2) The requirements as to the interval of time arenow everywhere regulated by statute * * *; therulings in regard to the sufficiency of time are thus sodependent on the interpretation of the detailedprescriptions of the local statutes that it would beimpracticable to examine them here. But whether ornot the time allowed was supposedly insufficient orwas precisely the time required by statute, the actualattendance of the party obviate any objection uponthe ground of insufficiency, because then the partyhas actually had that opportunity of cross-examination for the sole sake of which the notice

was required."6. YES- Under the present Constitution, trial even of acapital offense may proceed notwithstanding theabsence of the accused. It is now provided that "afterarraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding theabsence of the accused provided that he has beenduly notified and his failure to appear is unjustified."- On the basis of the aforecited provision of theConstitution which allows trial of an accused inabsentia, the issue has been raised whether or notpetitioner could waive his right to be present at theperpetuation of testimony proceedings beforerespondent Commission.- As a general rule, subject to certain exceptions,

any constitutional or statutory right may be waived ifsuch waiver is not against public policy. The personal

presence of the accused from the beginning to theend of a trial for felony, involving his life and liberty,has been considered necessary and vital to theproper conduct of his defense. The "trend of modernauthority is in favor of the doctrine that a party in acriminal case may waive irregularities and rights,

whether constitutional or statutory, very much thesame as in a civil case."- There are, certain rights secured to the individualby the fundamental charter which may be thesubject of waiver. The rights of an accused to defendhimself in person and by attorney, to be informed ofthe nature and cause of the accusation, to a speedyand public trial, and to meet the witnesses face toface, as well as the right against unreasonablesearches and seizures, are rights guaranteed by theConstitution. They are rights necessary eitherbecause of the requirements of due process toensure a fair and impartial trial, or of the need ofprotecting the individual from the exercise ofarbitrary power. And yet, there is no question that all

of these rights may be waived. Considering theaforecited provisions of the Constitution and theabsence of any law specifically requiring hispresence at all stages of his trial, there appears,therefore, no logical reason why petitioner, althoughhe is charged with a capital offense, should beprecluded from waiving his right to be present in theproceedings for the perpetuation of testimony, sincethis right, like the others aforestated, was conferredupon him for his protection and benefit.- It is also important to note that under Section 7 ofRule 119 of the Revised Rules of Court (Deposition ofwitness for the prosecution) the "Failure or refusal onthe part of the defendant to attend the examinationor the taking of the deposition after notice

hereinbefore provided, shall be considered a waiver"- Presidential Decree No. 328 expressly providesthat the failure or refusal to attend the examinationor the taking of the deposition shall be considered awaiver. "

SEPARATE OPINION(on waiver of presence only)

CASTRO [concur and dissent]- My understanding of the provisions of the newConstitution on waiver of presence in criminalproceedings is that such waiver may be validlyimplied principally in cases where the accused has

jumped bail or has escaped, but certainly may not beasserted as a matter of absolute right in cases where

the accused is in custody and his identification isneeded in the course of the proceedings.- Thus, I voted for qualified waiver.- the accusedmay waive his presence in the criminal proceedingsexcept at the stages where identification of hisperson by the prosecution witnesses is necessary. I

might agree to the proposition of "total" waiver inany case where the accused agrees explicitly andunequivocally in writing signed by him or personallymanifests clearly and indubitably in open court andsuch manifestation is recorded, that whenever aprosecution witness mentions a name by which theaccused is known the witness is referring to himand to no one else.

TEEHANKEE [dissent]- Petitioners presence at the proceedings could notbe compelled by virtue of his express waiver thereofas explicitly allowed by the Constitution and by P.D.No. 328 itself.- Petitioner's submittal that he cannot be compelledto be present at the proceedings even against his willby virtue of his express waiver is meritorious.Whereas previously such right of waiver of theaccused's presence in criminal proceedings wasgenerally recognized save in capital cases (leading tothe suspension of trial whenever the accused was atlarge) or where the accused was in custody althoughfor a non-capital offense, the 1973 Constitution nowunqualifiedly permits trial in absentia even of capitalcases, and provides that "after arraignment, trialmay proceed notwithstanding the absence of theaccused provided that he has been duly notified andhis failure to appear is unjustified," thus recognizingthe right of an accused to waive his presence. P.D.No. 328 under which the perpetuation proceedingsare being conducted in military commissions (as thecounterpart rule for similar proceedings before theregular civil courts, as provided in Rule 119, section7 of the Rules of Court) explicitly provides that afterreasonable notice to an accused to attend theperpetuation proceedings, the deposition by questionand answer of the witness may proceed in theaccused's absence and "the failure or refusal toattend the examination or the taking of thedeposition shall be considered a waiver." Thus, anaccused's right of total waiver of his presence eitherexpressly or impliedly by unjustified failure or refusalto attend the proceedings is now explicitlyrecognized and he cannot be compelled to bepresent as against his express waiver.


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BARREDO [concur]- Petitioner has the right to waive his presence at theperpetuation proceedings before the respondentCommission.I find eminent merit in the contention ofpetitioner that even for identification purposes hecannot be made to be present at the trial against his

will. Since under the Constitution, trial of criminalcases in the absence of the acc

Documents

Crim Pro Digest 5