JEAN (CRIM)

8/9/2019 JEAN (CRIM)

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Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 102007 September 2, 1994

PEOPLE OF THE P HILIPP INES, plaintiff-appellee,vs.ROGEL IO BAY OTAS y C ORDOVA, accused-appellant.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Public Attorney's Office for accused-appellant.

ROME RO, J.:

In Criminal Case No. C-3217 filed before Branch 16, RTC Roxas City, Rogelio Bayotas y Cordovawas charged with Rape and eventually convicted thereof on June 19, 1991 in a decision penned byJudge Manuel E. Autajay. Pending appeal of his conviction, Bayotas died on February 4, 1992 atthe National Bilibid Hospital due to cardio respiratory arrest secondary to hepatic encephalopathysecondary to hipato carcinoma gastric malingering. Consequently, the Supreme Court in itsResolution of May 20, 1992 dismissed the criminal aspect of the appeal. However, it required theSolicitor General to file its comment with regard to Bayotas' civil liability arising from his commissionof the offense charged.

In his comment, the Solicitor General expressed his view that the death of accused-appellant did notextinguish his civil liability as a result of his commission of the offense charged. The Solicitor General,relying on the case of People v . Sendaydiego 1 insists that the appeal should still be resolved for thepurpose of reviewing his conviction by the lower court on which the civil liability is based.

Counsel for the accused-appellant, on the other hand, opposed the view of the Solicitor Generalarguing that the death of the accused while judgment of conviction is pending appeal extinguishesboth his criminal and civil penalties. In support of his position, said counsel invoked the ruling of theCourt of Appeals in People v . Castillo and Ocfemia 2 which held that the civil obligation in a criminalcase takes root in the criminal liability and, therefore, civil liability is extinguished if accused shoulddie before final judgment is rendered.

W e are thus confronted with a single issue: Does death of the accused pending appeal of hisconviction extinguish his civil liability?

In the aforementioned case of People v . Castillo , this issue was settled in the affirmative. This sameissue posed therein was phrased thus: Does the death of Alfredo Castillo affect both his criminalresponsibility and his civil liability as a consequence of the alleged crime?

It resolved this issue thru the following disquisition:

Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code is the controlling statute. It reads, in part:

Art. 89. H ow criminal liability is totally extinguished . Criminal liability is totallyextinguished:


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1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to the pecuniarypenalties liability therefor is extinguished only when the death of the offender occursbefore final judgment;

W ith reference to Castillo's criminal liability, there is no question. The law is plain. Statutory constructionis unnecessary. Said liability is extinguished.

The civil liability, however, poses a problem. Such liability is extinguished only when the death of theoffender occurs before final judgment. Saddled upon us is the task of ascertaining the legal import of theterm "final judgment." Is it final judgment as contradistinguished from an interlocutory order? Or, is it a

judgment which is final and executory?

W e go to the genesis of the law. The legal precept contained in Article 89 of the Revised Penal Codeheretofore transcribed is lifted from Article 132 of the Spanish El Codigo Penal de 1870 which, in part,recites:

La responsabilidad penal se extingue.

1. Por la muerte del reo en cuanto a las penas personales siempre, y respecto a laspecuniarias, solo cuando a su fallecimiento no hubiere recaido sentencia firme .

xxx xxx xxx

The code of 1870 . . . it will be observed employs the term " sentencia firme ." W hat is "sentencia firme"under the old statute?

XXVIII Enciclopedia Juridica Espaola, p. 473, furnishes the ready answer: It says:

SENTENC I A F IRME. La sentencia que adquiere la fuerza de las definitivas por nohaberse utilizado por las partes litigantes recurso alguno contra ella dentro de losterminos y plazos legales concedidos al efecto.

"Sentencia firme" really should be understood as one which is definite. Because, it is only when judgmentis such that, as Medina y Maranon puts it, the crime is confirmed "en condena determinada;" or, in thewords of Groizard, the guilt of the accused becomes "una verdad legal." Prior thereto, should theaccused die, according to V iada, "no hay legalmente, en tal caso, ni reo, ni delito, ni responsabilidadcriminal de ninguna clase." And, as Judge Kapunan well explained, when a defendant dies before

judgment becomes executory, "there cannot be any determination by final judgment whether or not thefelony upon which the civil action might arise exists," for the simple reason that "there is no partydefendant." ( I Kapunan, Revised Penal Code, Annotated, p. 421. Senator Francisco holds the same view.Francisco, Revised Penal Code, Book One, 2nd ed., pp. 859-860)

The legal import of the term "final judgment" is similarly reflected in the Revised Penal Code. Articles 72and 78 of that legal body mention the term "final judgment" in the sense that it is already enforceable.

This also brings to mind Section 7, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court which states that a judgment in acriminal case becomes final "after the lapse of the period for perfecting an appeal or when the sentencehas been partially or totally satisfied or served, or the defendant has expressly waived in writing his rightto appeal."

By fair intendment, the legal precepts and opinions here collected funnel down to one positive conclusion:The term final judgment employed in the Revised Penal Code means judgment beyond recall. Really, aslong as a judgment has not become executory, it cannot be truthfully said that defendant is definitelyguilty of the felony charged against him.

Not that the meaning thus given to final judgment is without reason. For where, as in this case, the right toinstitute a separate civil action is not reserved, the decision to be rendered must, of necessity, cover "boththe criminal and the civil aspects of the case." People vs . Yusico (November 9, 1942), 2 O.G., No. 100, p.964. See also: People vs . Moll , 68 Phil., 626, 634; Francisco , Criminal Procedure, 1958 ed., V ol. I, pp.234, 236. Correctly, Judge Kapunan observed that as "the civil action is based solely on the felonycommitted and of which the offender might be found guilty, the death of the offender extinguishes the civilliability." I Kapunan, Revised Penal Code, Annotated, supra .

Here is the situation obtaining in the present case: Castillo's criminal liability is out. His civil liability issought to be enforced by reason of that criminal liability. But then, if we dismiss, as we must, the criminalaction and let the civil aspect remain, we will be faced with the anomalous situation whereby we will be


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called upon to clamp civil liability in a case where the source thereof criminal liability does not exist. And, as was well stated in Bautista, et al . vs . Estrella, et al ., CA-G.R.No. 19226-R, September 1, 1958, "no party can be found and held criminally liable in a civil suit," whichsolely would remain if we are to divorce it from the criminal proceeding."

This ruling of the Court of Appeals in the Castillo case 3 was adopted by the Supreme Court in the

cases of People of the Philippines v . Bonifacio Alison, et al ., 4 People of the Philippines v . J aime J ose,et al . 5 and People of the Philippines v . Satorre 6 by dismissing the appeal in view of the death of theaccused pending appeal of said cases.

As held by then Supreme Court Justice Fernando in the Alison case:

The death of accused-appellant Bonifacio Alison having been established, and considering that there isas yet no final judgment in view of the pendency of the appeal, the criminal and civil liability of the saidaccused-appellant Alison was extinguished by his death (Art. 89, Revised Penal Code; Reyes' CriminalLaw, 1971 Rev. Ed., p. 717, citing People v. Castillo and Ofemia C.A., 56 O.G. 4045); consequently, thecase against him should be dismissed.

On the other hand, this Court in the subsequent cases of Buenaventura Belamala v . MarcelinoPolinar 7 and Lamberto Torrijos v . The H onorable Court of Appeals 8 ruled differently. In the former,the issue decided by this court was: W hether the civil liability of one accused of physical injuries whodied before final judgment is extinguished by his demise to the extent of barring any claim thereforeagainst his estate. It was the contention of the administrator-appellant therein that the death of theaccused prior to final judgment extinguished all criminal and civil liabilities resulting from the offense,in view of Article 89, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code. However, this court ruled therein:

W e see no merit in the plea that the civil liability has been extinguished, in view of the provisions of theCivil Code of the Philippines of 1950 (Rep. Act No. 386) that became operative eighteen years after therevised Penal Code. As pointed out by the Court below, Article 33 of the Civil Code establishes a civilaction for damages on account of physical injuries, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action .

Art. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action for damages,entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injuredparty. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shallrequire only a preponderance of evidence.

Assuming that for lack of express reservation, Belamala's civil action for damages was to be consideredinstituted together with the criminal action still, since both proceedings were terminated without finaladjudication, the civil action of the offended party under Article 33 may yet be enforced separately.

In Torrijos , the Supreme Court held that:

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It should be stressed that the extinction of civil liability follows the extinction of the criminal liability under Article 89, only when the civil liability arises from the criminal act as its only basis. Stated differently,where the civil liability does not exist independently of the criminal responsibility, the extinction of thelatter by death, ipso facto extinguishes the former, provided , of course, that death supervenes before final

judgment. The said principle does not apply in instant case wherein the civil liability springs neither solelynor originally from the crime itself but from a civil contract of purchase and sale. (Emphasis ours)

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In the above case, the court was convinced that the civil liability of the accused who was

charged with estafa could likewise trace its genesis to Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Codesince said accused had swindled the first and second vendees of the property subject matter of the contract of sale. It therefore concluded: "Consequently, while the death of the accusedherein extinguished his criminal liability including fine, his civil liability based on the laws of human relations remains."

Thus it allowed the appeal to proceed with respect to the civil liability of the accused, notwithstandingthe extinction of his criminal liability due to his death pending appeal of his conviction.


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civil liability solely anchored on the criminal (civil liability ex delicto ) is extinguished upon dismissal of the entire appeal due to the demise of the accused.

But was it judicious to have abandoned this old ruling? A re-examination of our decision inSendaydiego impels us to revert to the old ruling.

To restate our resolution of July 8, 1977 in Sendaydiego : The resolution of the civil action impliedlyinstituted in the criminal action can proceed irrespective of the latter's extinction due to death of theaccused pending appeal of his conviction, pursuant to Article 30 of the Civil Code and Section 21,Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court.

Article 30 of the Civil Code provides:

W hen a separate civil action is brought to demand civil liability arising from a criminal offense, and nocriminal proceedings are instituted during the pendency of the civil case, a preponderance of evidenceshall likewise be sufficient to prove the act complained of.

Clearly, the text of Article 30 could not possibly lend support to the ruling in Sendaydiego . Nowhere inits text is there a grant of authority to continue exercising appellate jurisdiction over the accused's civilliability ex delicto when his death supervenes during appeal. W hat Article 30 recognizes is analternative and separate civil action which may be brought to demand civil liability arising from acriminal offense independently of any criminal action. In the event that no criminal proceedings areinstituted during the pendency of said civil case, the quantum of evidence needed to prove thecriminal act will have to be that which is compatible with civil liability and that is, preponderance of evidence and not proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Citing or invoking Article 30 to justify thesurvival of the civil action despite extinction of the criminal would in effect merely beg the question of whether civil liability ex delicto survives upon extinction of the criminal action due to death of theaccused during appeal of his conviction. This is because whether asserted inthe criminal action or in a separate civil action, civil liability ex delicto is extinguished by the death of the accused while his conviction is on appeal. Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code is clear on thismatter:

Art. 89. H ow criminal liability is totally extinguished . Criminal liability is totally extinguished:

1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary penalties, liability therefor is extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment;

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However, the ruling in Sendaydiego deviated from the expressed intent of Article 89. It allowed claimsfor civil liability ex delicto to survive by ipso facto treating the civil action impliedly instituted with thecriminal, as one filed under Article 30, as though no criminal proceedings had been filed but merely aseparate civil action. This had the effect of converting such claims from one which is dependent onthe outcome of the criminal action to an entirely new and separate one, the prosecution of which doesnot even necessitate the filing of criminal proceedings. 12 One would be hard put to pinpoint thestatutory authority for such a transformation. It is to be borne in mind that in recovering civil liability ex delicto , the same has perforce to be determined in the criminal action, rooted as it is in the court'spronouncement of the guilt or innocence of the accused. This is but to render fealty to the intendmentof Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code which provides that "every person criminally liable for afelony is also civilly liable." In such cases, extinction of the criminal action due to death of the accusedpending appeal inevitably signifies the concomitant extinction of the civil liability. Mors Omnia Solvi .Death dissolves all things.

In sum, in pursuing recovery of civil liability arising from crime, the final determination of the criminalliability is a condition precedent to the prosecution of the civil action, such that when the criminalaction is extinguished by the demise of accused-appellant pending appeal thereof, said civil actioncannot survive. The claim for civil liability springs out of and is dependent upon facts which, if true,would constitute a crime. Such civil liability is an inevitable consequence of the criminal liability and is


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to be declared and enforced in the criminal proceeding. This is to be distinguished from that which iscontemplated under Article 30 of the Civil Code which refers to the institution of a separate civil actionthat does not draw its life from a criminal proceeding. The Sendaydiego resolution of July 8, 1977,however, failed to take note of this fundamental distinction when it allowed the survival of the civilaction for the recovery of civil liability ex delicto by treating the same as a separate civil action

referred to under Article 30. Surely, it will take more than just a summary judicial pronouncement toauthorize the conversion of said civil action to an independent one such as that contemplated under Article 30.

Ironically however, the main decision in Sendaydiego did not apply Article 30, the resolution of July 8,1977 notwithstanding. Thus, it was held in the main decision:

Sendaydiego's appeal will be resolved only for the purpose of showing his criminal liability which is thebasis of the civil liability for which his estate would be liable. 13

In other words, the Court, in resolving the issue of his civil liability, concomitantly made adetermination on whether Sendaydiego, on the basis of evidenced adduced, was indeed guiltybeyond reasonable doubt of committing the offense charged. Thus, it upheld Sendaydiego'sconviction and pronounced the same as the source of his civil liability. Consequently, although Article30 was not applied in the final determination of Sendaydiego's civil liability, there was a reopening of the criminal action already extinguished which served as basis for Sendaydiego's civil liability. W ereiterate: Upon death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction, the criminal action isextinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused; the civil actioninstituted therein for recovery of civil liability ex delicto is ipso facto extinguished, grounded as it is onthe criminal.

Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court was also invoked to serve as another basis for theSendaydiego resolution of July 8, 1977. In citing Sec. 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, the Courtmade the inference that civil actions of the type involved in Sendaydiego consist of money claims, therecovery of which may be continued on appeal if defendant dies pending appeal of his conviction byholding his estate liable therefor. Hence, the Court's conclusion:

"W hen the action is for the recovery of money" "and the defendant dies before final judgment in the courtof First Instance, it shall be dismissed to be prosecuted in the manner especially provided" in Rule 87 of the Rules of Court (Sec. 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court).

The implication is that, if the defendant dies after a money judgment had been rendered against him bythe Court of First Instance, the action survives him. It may be continued on appeal.

Sadly, reliance on this provision of law is misplaced. From the standpoint of procedural law, thiscourse taken in Sendaydiego cannot be sanctioned. As correctly observed by Justice Regalado:

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I do not, however, agree with the justification advanced in both Torrijos and Sendaydiego which, relyingon the provisions of Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, drew the strained implication therefrom thatwhere the civil liability instituted together with the criminal liabilities had already passed beyond the

judgment of the then Court of First Instance (now the Regional Trial Court), the Court of Appeals cancontinue to exercise appellate jurisdiction thereover despite the extinguishment of the component criminalliability of the deceased. This pronouncement, which has been followed in the Court's judgmentssubsequent and consonant to Torrijos and Sendaydiego , should be set aside and abandoned as beingclearly erroneous and unjustifiable.

Said Section 21 of Rule 3 is a rule of civil procedure in ordinary civil actions. There is neither authority nor justification for its application in criminal procedure to civil actions instituted together with and as part of criminal actions. Nor is there any authority in law for the summary conversion from the latter category of an ordinary civil action upon the death of the offender. . . .


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Moreover, the civil action impliedly instituted in a criminal proceeding for recovery of civil liability ex delicto can hardly be categorized as an ordinary money claim such as that referred to in Sec. 21,Rule 3 enforceable before the estate of the deceased accused.

Ordinary money claims referred to in Section 21, Rule 3 must be viewed in light of the provisions of

Section 5, Rule 86 involving claims against the estate, which in Sendaydiego was held liable for Sendaydiego's civil liability. " W hat are contemplated in Section 21 of Rule 3, in relation to Section 5 of Rule 86, 14 are contractual money claims while the claims involved in civil liability ex delicto mayinclude even the restitution of personal or real property." 15 Section 5, Rule 86 provides an exclusiveenumeration of what claims may be filed against the estate. These are: funeral expenses, expensesfor the last illness, judgments for money and claim arising from contracts, expressed or implied. It isclear that money claims arising from delict do not form part of this exclusive enumeration. Hence,there could be no legal basis in (1) treating a civil action ex delicto as an ordinary contractual moneyclaim referred to in Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court and (2) allowing it to survive by filing aclaim therefor before the estate of the deceased accused. Rather, it should be extinguished uponextinction of the criminal action engendered by the death of the accused pending finality of his

conviction. Accordingly, we rule: if the private offended party, upon extinction of the civil liability ex delicto desiresto recover damages from the same act or omission complained of, he must subject to Section 1, Rule111 16 (1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended) file a separate civil action, this timepredicated not on the felony previously charged but on other sources of obligation. The source of obligation upon which the separate civil action is premised determines against whom the same shallbe enforced.

If the same act or omission complained of also arises from quasi-delict or may, by provision of law,result in an injury to person or property (real or personal), the separate civil action must be filed

against the executor or administrator 17

of the estate of the accused pursuant to Sec. 1, Rule 87 of theRules of Court:

Sec. 1. Actions which may and which may not be brought against executor or administrator . No actionupon a claim for the recovery of money or debt or interest thereon shall be commenced against theexecutor or administrator; but actions to recover real or personal property, or an interest therein, from theestate, or to enforce a lien thereon, and actions to recover damages for an injury to person or property,real or personal, may be commenced against him.

This is in consonance with our ruling in Belamala 18 where we held that, in recovering damages for injury to persons thru an independent civil action based on Article 33 of the Civil Code, the same mustbe filed against the executor or administrator of the estate of deceased accused and not against the

estate under Sec. 5, Rule 86 because this rule explicitly limits the claim to those for funeral expenses,expenses for the last sickness of the decedent, judgment for money and claims arising from contract,express or implied. Contractual money claims, we stressed, refers only to purely personal obligationsother than those which have their source in delict or tort.

Conversely, if the same act or omission complained of also arises from contract, the separate civilaction must be filed against the estate of the accused, pursuant to Sec. 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court.

From this lengthy disquisition, we summarize our ruling herein:

1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well asthe civil liability based solely thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, "the death of theaccused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal liability and only the civil liability directly arisingfrom and based solely on the offense committed, i .e ., civil liability ex delicto in senso strictiore ."

2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of accused, if the samemay also be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict. 19 Article 1157 of the Civil Code


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enumerates these other sources of obligation from which the civil liability may arise as a result of thesame act or omission:

a) Law 20

b) Contracts

c) Quasi-contracts

d) . . .

e) Quasi-delicts

3. W here the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an action for recovery therefor may be pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil action and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended. This separate civil action may be enforced either against the executor/administrator or the estate of the accused, depending on the source of obligation

upon which the same is based as explained above.

4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file this separate civilaction by prescription, in cases where during the prosecution of the criminal action and prior to itsextinction, the private-offended party instituted together therewith the civil action. In such case, thestatute of limitations on the civil liability is deemed interrupted during the pendency of the criminalcase, conformably with provisions of Article 1155 21 of the Civil Code, that should thereby avoid anyapprehension on a possible privation of right by prescription. 22

Applying this set of rules to the case at bench, we hold that the death of appellant Bayotasextinguished his criminal liability and the civil liability based solely on the act complained of, i .e ., rape.

Consequently, the appeal is hereby dismissed without qualification.

W HEREFORE, the appeal of the late Rogelio Bayotas is D ISM ISSED with costs de oficio .

SO ORDERED.

People of the Philippines, appellee, vs. Marivic Genosa, appellantJustice Artemio V. Panganiban

Panganiban Artemio V., J. Supreme Court of the Philippines EN BANC. "People of the Philippines, appellee,vs. Marivic Genosa appellant." Manila: 15 January 2004. G.R. No. 135981.

Case Digest

FACTS: This case stemmed from the killing of Ben Genosa, by his wife Marivic Genosa, appellant herein.During their first year of marriage, Marivic and Ben lived happily but apparently thereafter, Ben changed andthe couple would always quarrel and sometimes their quarrels became violent. Appellant testified that everytime her husband came home drunk, he would provoke her and sometimes beat her. Whenever beaten by her husband, she consulted medical doctors who testified during the trial. On the night of the killing, appellant andthe victim were quarreled and the victim beat the appellant. However, appellant was able to run to another room. Appellant admitted having killed the victim with the use of a gun. The information for parricide against


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appellant, however, alleged that the cause of death of the victim was by beating through the use of a lead pipe.Appellant invoked self defense and defense of her unborn child. After trial, the Regional Trial Court foundappellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of parricide with an aggravating circumstance of treachery and imposed the penalty of death.

On automatic review before the Supreme Court, appellant filed an URGENT OMNIBUS MOTION prayingthat the Honorable Court allow (1) the exhumation of Ben Genosa and the re-examination of the cause of hisdeath; (2) the examination of Marivic Genosa by qualified psychologists and psychiatrists to determine her state of mind at the time she killed her husband; and finally, (3) the inclusion of the said experts reports in therecords of the case for purposes of the automatic review or, in the alternative, a partial re-opening of the case aquo to take the testimony of said psychologists and psychiatrists. The Supreme Court partly granted theURGENT OMNIBUS MOTION of the appellant. It remanded the case to the trial court for reception of expert

psychological and/or psychiatric opinion on the battered woman syndrome plea. Testimonies of two expertwitnesses on the battered woman syndrome, Dra. Dayan and Dr. Pajarillo, were presented and admitted bythe trial court and subsequently submitted to the Supreme Court as part of the records.

ISSUE:1. Whether or not appellant herein can validly invoke the battered woman syndrome as constituting self defense.2. Whether or not treachery attended the killing of Ben Genosa.

Ruling: 1. The Court ruled in the negative as appellant failed to prove that she is afflicted with the batteredwoman syndrome.

A battered woman has been defined as a woman who is repeatedly subjected to any forceful physical or psychological behavior by a man in order to coerce her to do something he wants her to do without concern for her rights. Battered women include wives or women in any form of intimate relationship with men.Furthermore, in order to be classified as a battered woman, the couple must go through the battering cycle atleast twice. Any woman may find herself in an abusive relationship with a man once. If it occurs a secondtime, and she remains in the situation, she is defined as a battered woman.

More graphically, the battered woman syndrome is characterized by the so-called cycle of violence, whichhas three phases: (1) the tension-building phase; (2) the acute battering incident; and (3) the tranquil, loving(or, at least, nonviolent) phase.

The Court, however, is not discounting the possibility of self-defense arising from the battered womansyndrome. First, each of the phases of the cycle of violence must be proven to have characterized at least two

battering episodes between the appellant and her intimate partner. Second, the final acute battering episode

preceding the killing of the batterer must have produced in the battered persons mind an actual fear of animminent harm from her batterer and an honest belief that she needed to use force in order to save her life.Third, at the time of the killing, the batterer must have posed probable -- not necessarily immediate and actual-- grave harm to the accused, based on the history of violence perpetrated by the former against the latter.Taken altogether, these circumstances could satisfy the requisites of self-defense. Under the existing facts of the present case, however, not all of these elements were duly established.

The defense fell short of proving all three phases of the cycle of violence supposedly characterizing therelationship of Ben and Marivic Genosa. No doubt there were acute battering incidents but appellant failed to

prove that in at least another battering episode in the past, she had gone through a similar pattern. Neither didappellant proffer sufficient evidence in regard to the third phase of the cycle.

In any event, the existence of the syndrome in a relationship does not in itself establish the legal right of thewoman to kill her abusive partner. Evidence must still be considered in the context of self-defense. Settled inour jurisprudence, is the rule that the one who resorts to self-defense must face a real threat on ones life; andthe peril sought to be avoided must be imminent and actual, not merely imaginary. Thus, the Revised PenalCode provides that the following requisites of self-defense must concur: (1) Unlawful aggression; (2)Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) Lack of sufficient provocation on


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the part of the person defending himself.

Unlawful aggression is the most essential element of self-defense. It presupposes actual, sudden andunexpected attack -- or an imminent danger thereof -- on the life or safety of a person. In the present case,however, according to the testimony of Marivic herself, there was a sufficient time interval between theunlawful aggression of Ben and her fatal attack upon him. She had already been able to withdraw from hisviolent behavior and escape to their childrens bedroom. During that time, he apparently ceased his attack andwent to bed. The reality or even the imminence of the danger he posed had ended altogether. He was no longer in a position that presented an actual threat on her life or safety.

The mitigating factors of psychological paralysis and passion and obfuscation were, however, taken in favor of appellant. It should be clarified that these two circumstances -- psychological paralysis as well as passion andobfuscation -- did not arise from the same set of facts.

The first circumstance arose from the cyclical nature and the severity of the battery inflicted by the batterer-spouse upon appellant. That is, the repeated beatings over a period of time resulted in her psychological

paralysis, which was analogous to an illness diminishing the exercise of her will power without depriving her of consciousness of her acts.

As to the extenuating circumstance of having acted upon an impulse so powerful as to have naturally produced passion and obfuscation, it has been held that this state of mind is present when a crime is committed as aresult of an uncontrollable burst of passion provoked by prior unjust or improper acts or by a legitimatestimulus so powerful as to overcome reason. To appreciate this circumstance, the following requisites shouldconcur: (1) there is an act, both unlawful and sufficient to produce such a condition of mind; and (2) this act isnot far removed from the commission of the crime by a considerable length of time, during which the accusedmight recover her normal equanimity.

2. NO. Because of the gravity of the resulting offense, treachery must be proved as conclusively as the killingitself. Besides, equally axiomatic is the rule that when a killing is preceded by an argument or a quarrel,treachery cannot be appreciated as a qualifying circumstance, because the deceased may be said to have beenforewarned and to have anticipated aggression from the assailant. Moreover, in order to appreciate alevosia,the method of assault adopted by the aggressor must have been consciously and deliberately chosen for thespecific purpose of accomplishing the unlawful act without risk from any defense that might be put up by the

party attacked.

The appellant acted upon an impulse so powerful as to have naturally produced passion or obfuscation. Theacute battering she suffered that fatal night in the hands of her batterer-spouse, in spite of the fact that she waseight (8) months pregnant with their child, overwhelmed her and put her in the aforesaid emotional and mental

state, which overcame her reason and impelled her to vindicate her life and that of her unborn child.

The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of appellant for parricide. However, considering the presence of two (2) mitigating circumstances and without any aggravating circumstance, the penalty is reduced to six (6)years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum; to 14 years 8 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal asmaximum. Inasmuch as appellant has been detained for more than the minimum penalty hereby imposed uponher, the director of the Bureau of Corrections may immediately RELEASE her from custody upon duedetermination that she is eligible for parole, unless she is being held for some other lawful cause.

Metro Manila

Twe lf th Co ng ress

Th ird Re gula r Sess io n

Begun and held in Metro Manila, on Monday, the twenty-eighth day of July, two thousand and three.


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[ REPU BLIC ACT N O. 92 62 ]

AN ACT D EF INING VIOLE NC E AGAINST W OME N AND TH EIR CHI LDR EN, P ROVIDING FO R P ROTECTIVE MEAS URES FO R VICTIMS, P RESCRIBING PE NALTIES TH EREFO RE, AND FO R OTHER PU RPO S ES

Be it enacted by the Senate and H ouse of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled:

SECT ION 1. Short Title.- This Act shall be known as the "Anti- V iolence Against W omen and Their Children Act of 2004".

SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy.- It is hereby declared that the State values the dignity of women and children andguarantees full respect for human rights. The State also recognizes the need to protect the family and its membersparticularly women and children, from violence and threats to their personal safety and security.

Towards this end, the State shall exert efforts to address violence committed against women and children in keeping withthe fundamental freedoms guaranteed under the Constitution and the Provisions of the Universal Declaration of HumanRights, the convention on the Elimination of all forms of discrimination Against W omen, Convention on the Rights of theChild and other international human rights instruments of which the Philippines is a party.

SEC. 3. Definition of Terms.- As used in this Act, (a) " V iolence against women and their children" refers to any act or aseries of acts committed by any person against a woman who is his wife, former wife, or against a woman with whom theperson has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom he has a common child, or against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the family abode, which result in or is likely to result in physical, sexual,psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuse including threats of such acts, battery, assault, coercion, harrasmentor arbitrary deprivation of liberty. It includes, but is not limited to, the following acts:

A. "Physical V iolence" refers to acts that include bodily or physical harm; B. "Sexual violence" refers to an act which is sexual in nature, committed against a woman or her child. It

includes, but is not limited to: a. rap, sexual harassment, acts of lasciviousness, treating a woman or her child as a sex object,

making demeaning and sexually suggestive remarks, physically attacking the sexual parts of thevictims body, forcing her/him to watch obscene publications and indecent shows or forcing thewoman or her child to do indecent acts and/or make films thereof, forcing the wife andmistress/lover to live in the conjugal home or sleep together in the same room with the abuser;

b. acts causing or attempting to cause the victim to engage in any sexual activity by force, threat of force, physical or other harm or threat of physical or other harm or coercion;

c. Prostituting the woman or child. C. "Psychological violence" refers to acts or omissions causing or likely to cause mental or emotional

suffering of the victim such as but not limited to intimidation, harassment, stalking, damage to property,public ridicule or humiliation, repeated verbal abuse and mental infidelity. It includes causing or allowingthe victim to witness the physical, sexual or psychological abuse of a member of the family to which thevictim belongs, or to witness pornography in any form or to witness abusive injury to pets or to unlawful or unwanted deprivation of the right to custody and/or visitation of common children.

D. "Economic abuse" refers to acts that make or attempt to make a woman financially dependent whichincludes, but is not limited to the following:

1. withdrawal of financial support or preventing the victim from engaging in any legitimateprofession, occupation, business or activity, except in cases wherein the other spouse/partner objects on valid, serious and moral grounds as defined in Article 73 of theFamily Code;

2. deprivation or threat of deprivation of financial resources and the right to the use andenjoyment of the conjugal, community or property owned in common;

3. destroying household property; 4. controlling the victims own money or properties or solely controlling the conjugal money

or properties.

(b) "Battery" refers to an act of inflicting physical harm upon the woman or her child resulting to the physical andpsychological or emotional distress.

(c) "Battered W oman Syndrome" refers to a scientifically defined pattern of psychological and behavioral symptoms foundin women living in battering relationships as a result of cumulative abuse.

(d) "Stalking" refers to an intentional act committed by a person who, knowingly and without lawful justification follows thewoman or her child or places the woman or her child under surveillance directly or indirectly or a combination thereof.


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(e) "Dating relationship" refers to a situation wherein the parties live as husband and wife without the benefit of marriageor are romantically involved over time and on a continuing basis during the course of the relationship. A casualacquaintance or ordinary socialization between two individuals in a business or social context is not a dating relationship.

(f) "Sexual relations" refers to a single sexual act which may or may not result in the bearing of a common child.

(g) "Safe place or shelter" refers to any home or institution maintained or managed by the Department of Social W elfareand Development (DS W D) or by any other agency or voluntary organization accredited by the DS W D for the purposes of this Act or any other suitable place the resident of which is willing temporarily to receive the victim.

(h) "Children" refers to those below eighteen (18) years of age or older but are incapable of taking care of themselves asdefined under Republic Act No. 7610. As used in this Act, it includes the biological children of the victim and other childrenunder her care.

SEC. 4. Construction.- This Act shall be liberally construed to promote the protection and safety of victims of violenceagainst women and their children.

SEC. 5. Acts of V iolence Against W omen and Their Children.- The crime of violence against women and their children iscommitted through any of the following acts:

a. Causing physical harm to the woman or her child; b. Threatening to cause the woman or her child physical harm; c. Attempting to cause the woman or her child physical harm; d. Placing the woman or her child in fear of imminent physical harm; e. Attempting to compel or compelling the woman or her child to engage in conduct which the woman or her

child has the right to desist from or desist from conduct which the woman or her child has the right toengage in, or attempting to restrict or restricting the womans or her childs freedom of movement or conduct by force or threat of force, physical or other harm or threat of physical or other harm, or intimidation directed against the woman or child. This shall include, but not limited to, the following actscommitted with the purpose or effect of controlling or restricting the womans or her childs movement or conduct:

1. Threatening to deprive or actually depriving the woman or her child of custody to her/his family; 2. Depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her children of financial support legally due her

or her family, or deliberately providing the womans children insufficient financial support; 3. Depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her child of a legal right; 4. Preventing the woman in engaging in any legitimate profession, occupation, business or activity

or controlling the victims own mon4ey or properties, or solely controlling the conjugal or commonmoney, or properties;

f. Inflicting or threatening to inflict physical harm on oneself for the purpose of controlling her actions or decisions;

g. Causing or attempting to cause the woman or her child to engage in any sexual activity which does notconstitute rape, by force or threat of force, physical harm, or through intimidation directed against thewoman or her child or her/his immediate family;

h. Engaging in purposeful, knowing, or reckless conduct, personally or through another, that alarms or causes substantial emotional or psychological distress to the woman or her child. This shall include, butnot be limited to, the following acts:

1. Stalking or following the woman or her child in public or private places; 2. Peering in the window or lingering outside the residence of the woman or her child; 3. Entering or remaining in the dwelling or on the property of the woman or her child against her/his

will; 4. Destroying the property and personal belongingness or inflicting harm to animals or pets of the

woman or her child; and 5. Engaging in any form of harassment or violence;

i. Causing mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to the woman or her child, including,but not limited to, repeated verbal and emotional abuse, and denial of financial support or custody of minor children of access to the womans child/children.

SEC. 6. Penalties.- The crime of violence against women and their children, under Section 5 hereof shall be punishedaccording to the following rules:

a. Acts falling under Section 5(a) constituting attempted, frustrated or consummated parricide or murder or homicideshall be punished in accordance with the provisions of the Revised Penal Code.


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If these acts resulted in mutilation, it shall be punishable in accordance with the Revised Penal Code; thoseconstituting serious physical injuries shall have the penalty of prison mayor; those constituting less seriousphysical injuries shall be punished by prision correccional; and those constituting slight physical injuries shall bepunished by arresto mayor.

Acts falling under Section 5(b) shall be punished by imprisonment of two degrees lower than the prescribed

penalty for the consummated crime as specified in the preceding paragraph but shall in no case be lower thanarresto mayor.

b. Acts falling under Section 5(c) and 5(d) shall be punished by arresto mayor; c. Acts falling under Section 5(e) shall be punished by prision correccional; d. Acts falling under Section 5(f) shall be punished by arresto mayor; e. Acts falling under Section 5(g) shall be punished by prision mayor; f. Acts falling under Section 5(h) and Section 5(i) shall be punished by prision mayor.

If the acts are committed while the woman or child is pregnant or committed in the presence of her child, the penalty to beapplied shall be the maximum period of penalty prescribed in the section.

In addition to imprisonment, the perpetrator shall (a) pay a fine in the amount of not less than One hundred thousandpesos (P100,000.00) but not more than three hundred thousand pesos (300,000.00); (b) undergo mandatorypsychological counseling or psychiatric treatment and shall report compliance to the court.

SEC. 7. V enue.- The Regional Trial Court designated as a Family Court shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over cases of violence against women and their children und er this law. In the absence of such court in the place where theoffense was committed, the case shall be filed in the Regional Trial Court where the crime or any of its elements wascommitted at the option of the compliant.

SEC. 8. Protection Orders.- A protection order is an order issued under this act for the purpose of preventing further actsof violence against a woman or her child specified in Section 5 of this Act and granting other necessary relief. The relief granted under a protection order serve the purpose of safeguarding the victim from further harm, minimizing anydisruption in the victims daily life, and facilitating the opportunity and ability of the victim to independently regain control

over her life. The provisions of the protection order shall be enforced by law enforcement agencies. The protection ordersthat may be issued under this Act are the barangay protection order (BPO), temporary protection order (TPO) andpermanent protection order (PPO). The protection orders that may be issued under this Act shall include any, some or allof the following reliefs:

a. Prohibition of the respondent from threatening to commit or committing, personally or through another, any of theacts mentioned in Section 5 of this Act;

b. Prohibition of the respondent from harassing, annoying, telephoning, contacting or otherwise communicating withthe petitioner, directly or indirectly;

c. Removal and exclusion of the respondent from the residence of the petitioner, regardless of ownership of theresidence, either temporarily for the purpose of protecting the petitioner, or permanently where no property rightsare violated, and if respondent must remove personal effects from the residence, the court shall direct a lawenforcement agent to accompany the respondent has gathered his things and escort respondent from theresidence;

d. Directing the respondent to stay away from petitioner and designated family or household member at a distancespecified by the court, and to stay away from the residence, school, place of employment, or any specified placefrequented by the petitioner and any designated family or household member;

e. Directing lawful possession and use by petitioner of an automobile and other essential personal effects,regardless of ownership, and directing the appropriate law enforcement officer to accompany the petitioner to theresidence of the parties to ensure that the petitioner is safely restored to the possession of the automobile andother essential personal effects, or to supervise the petitioners or respondents removal of personalbelongingness;

f. Granting a temporary or permanent custody of a child/children to the petitioner;

Directing the respondent to provide support to the woman and/or her child if entitled to legal support. Notwithstanding

other laws to the contrary, the court shall order an appropriate percentage of the income or salary of the respondent to bewithheld regularly by the respondents employer for the same to be automatically remitted directly to the woman. Failure toremit and/or withhold or any delay in the remittance of support to the woman and/or her child without justifiable cause

shall render the respondent or his employer liable for indirect contempt of court;

h. Prohibition of the respondent from any use or possession of any firearm or deadly weapon and order him tosurrender the same to the court for appropriate disposition by the court, including revocation of license anddisqualification to apply for any license to use or possess a firearm. If the offender is a law enforcement agent, the


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court shall order the offender to surrender his firearm and shall direct the appropriate authority to investigate onthe offender and take appropriate action on matter;

i. Restitution for actual damages caused by the violence inflicted, including, but not limited to, property damage,medical expenses, childcare expenses and loss of income;

j. Directing the DS W D or any appropriate agency to provide petitioner may need; and k. Provision of such other forms of relief as the court deems necessary to protect and provide for the safety of the

petitioner and any designated family or household member, provided petitioner and any designated family or household member consents to such relief.

Any of the reliefs provided under this section shall be granted even in the absence of a decree of legal separation or annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage.

The issuance of a BPO or the pendency of an application for BPO shall not preclude a petitioner from applying for, or thecourt from granting a TPO or PPO.

SEC. 9. W ho may file Petition for Protection Orders. A petition for protection order may be filed by any of the following:

a. the offended party;

b. parents or guardians of the offended party; c. ascendants, descendants or collateral relatives within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity; d. officers or social workers of the DS W D or social workers of local government units (LGUs); e. police officers, preferably those in charge of women and childrens desks; f. Punong Barangay or Barangay Kagawad; g. lawyer, counselor, therapist or healthcare provider of the petitioner; h. At least two (2) concerned responsible citizens of the city or municipality where the violence against women and

their children occurred and who has personal knowledge of the offense committed.

SEC. 10. W here to Apply for a Protection Order. Applications for BPOs shall follow the rules on venue under Section409 of the Local Government Code of 1991 and its implementing rules and regulations. An application for a TPO or PPOmay be filed in the regional trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court, municipal circuit trial court with

territorial jurisdiction over the place of residence of the petitioner: Provided, however, That if a family court exists in theplace of residence of the petitioner, the application shall be filed with that court.

SEC. 11. How to Apply for a Protection Order. The application for a protection order must be in writing, signed andverified under oath by the applicant. It may be filed as an independent action or as incidental relief in any civil or criminalcase the subject matter or issues thereof partakes of a violence as described in this Act. A standard protection order application form, written in English with translation to the major local languages, shall be made available to facilitateapplications for protections order, and shall contain, among other, the following information:

a. names and addresses of petitioner and respondent; b. description of relationships between petitioner and respondent; c. a statement of the circumstances of the abuse;

d. description of the reliefs requested by petitioner as specified in Section 8 herein;

e. request for counsel and reasons for such; f. request for waiver of application fees until hearing; and g. an attestation that there is no pending application for a protection order in another court.

If the applicants is not the victim, the application must be accompanied by an affidavit of the applicant attesting to (a) thecircumstances of the abuse suffered by the victim and (b) the circumstances of consent given by the victim for the filling of the application. W hen disclosure of the address of the victim will pose danger to her life, it shall be so stated in theapplication. In such a case, the applicant shall attest that the victim is residing in the municipality or city over which courthas territorial jurisdiction, and shall provide a mailing address for purpose of service processing.

An application for protection order filed with a court shall be considered an application for both a TPO and PPO.

Barangay officials and court personnel shall assist applicants in the preparation of the application. Law enforcementagents shall also extend assistance in the application for protection orders in cases brought to their attention.

SEC. 12. Enforceability of Protection Orders. All TPOs and PPOs issued under this Act shall be enforceable anywherein the Philippines and a violation thereof shall be punishable with a fine ranging from Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) toFifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) and/or imprisonment of six (6) months.


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SEC. 13. Legal Representation of Petitioners for Protection Order. If the woman or her child requests in the applicationsfor a protection order for the appointment of counsel because of lack of economic means to hire a counsel de parte, thecourt shall immediately direct the Public Attorneys Office (PAO) to represent the petitioner in the hearing on theapplication. If the PAO determines that the applicant can afford to hire the services of a counsel de parte, it shall facilitatethe legal representation of the petitioner by a counsel de parte. The lack of access to family or conjugal resources by theapplicant, such as when the same are controlled by the perpetrator, shall qualify the petitioner to legal representation bythe PAO.

However, a private counsel offering free legal service is not barred from representing the petitioner.

SEC. 14. Barangay Protection Orders ( BPOs); Who May Issue and H ow. - Barangay Protection Orders (BPOs) refer tothe protection order issued by the Punong Barangay ordering the perpetrator to desist from committing acts under Section5 (a) and (b) of this Act. A Punong Barangay who receives applications for a BPO shall issue the protection order to theapplicant on the date of filing after ex parte determination of the basis of the application. If the Punong Barangay isunavailable to act on the application for a BPO, the application shall be acted upon by any available Barangay Kagawad.If the BPO is issued by a Barangay Kagawad the order must be accompanied by an attestation by the Barangay Kagawad that the Punong Barangay was unavailable at the time for the issuance of the BPO. BPOs shall be effective for fifteen (15)days. Immediately after the issuance of an ex parte BPO, the Punong Barangay or Barangay Kagawad shall personallyserve a copy of the same on the respondent, or direct any barangay official to effect is personal service.

The parties may be accompanied by a non-lawyer advocate in any proceeding before the Punong Barangay.

SEC. 15. Temporary Protection Orders. Temporary Protection Orders (TPOs) refers to the protection order issued bythe court on the date of filing of the application after ex parte determination that such order should be issued. A court maygrant in a TPO any, some or all of the reliefs mentioned in this Act and shall be effective for thirty (30) days. The courtshall schedule a hearing on the issuance of a PPO prior to or on the date of the expiration of the TPO. The court shallorder the immediate personal service of the TPO on the respondent by the court sheriff who may obtain the assistance of law enforcement agents for the service. The TPO shall include notice of the date of the hearing on the merits of theissuance of a PPO.

SEC. 16. Permanent Protection Orders. Permanent Protection Order (PPO) refers to protection order issued by thecourt after notice and hearing.

Respondents non-appearance despite proper notice, or his lack of a lawyer, or the non-availability of his lawyer shall not be a ground for rescheduling or postponing the hearing on the merits of the issuance of a PPO. If the respondents

appears without counsel on the date of the hearing on the PPO, the court shall appoint a lawyer for the respondent and immediately proceed with the hearing. In case the respondent fails to appear despite proper notice, the court shall allow ex parte presentation of the evidence by the applicant and render judgment on the basis of the evidence presented. The

court shall allow the introduction of any history of abusive conduct of a respondent even if the same was not directed against the applicant or the person for whom the applicant is made.

The court shall, to the extent possible, conduct the hearing on the merits of the issuance of a PPO in one (1) day. W herethe court is unable to conduct the hearing within one (1) day and the TPO issued is due to expire, the court shallcontinuously extend or renew the TPO for a period of thirty (30) days at each particular time until final judgment is issued.The extended or renewed TPO may be modified

by the court as may be necessary or applicable to address the needs of the applicant.

The court may grant any, some or all of the reliefs specified in Section 8 hereof in a PPO. A PPO shall be effective untilrevoked by a court upon application of the person in whose favor the order was issued. The court shall ensure immediatepersonal service of the PPO on respondent.

The court shall not deny the issuance of protection order on the basis of the lapse of time between the act of violence andthe filing of the application.

Regardless of the conviction or ac quittal of the respondent, the Court must determine whether or not the PPO shall become final. Even in a dismissal, a PPO shall be granted as long as there is no clear showing that the act from which the

order might arise did not exist. Sec. 17. Notice of Sanction in Protection Orders . The following statement must be printed in bold-faced type or in capitalletters on the protection order issued by the Punong Barangay or court:

"V iolation of this order is punishable by law."


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Sec. 29. Duties of Prosecutors/Court Personnel . Prosecutors and court personnel should observe the following dutieswhen dealing with victims under this Act:

a. communicate with the victim in a language understood by the woman or her child; and b. inform the victim of her/his rights including legal remedies available and procedure, and privileges for

indigent litigants.

Sec. 30. Duties of Barangay Officials and Law Enforcers . Barangay officials and law enforcers shall have the followingduties:

a. respond immediately to a call for help or request for assistance or protection of the victim by entering thenecessary whether or not a protection order has been issued and ensure the safety of the victim/s;

b. confiscate any deadly weapon in the possession of the perpetrator or within plain view; c. transport or escort the victim/s to a safe place of their choice or to a clinic or hospital; d. assist the victim in removing personal belongs from the house; e. assist the barangay officials and other government officers and employees who respond to a call for help; f. ensure the enforcement of the Protection Orders issued by the Punong Barangy or the courts; g. arrest the suspected perpetrator wiithout a warrant when any of the acts of violence defined by this Act is

occurring, or when he/she has personal knowledge that any act of abuse has just been committed, and

there is imminent danger to the life or limb of the victim as defined in this Act; and h. immediately report the call for assessment or assistance of the DS W D, social W elfare Department of

LGUs or accredited non-government organizations (NGOs).

Any barangay official or law enforcer who fails to report the incident shall be liable for a fine not exceeding Ten ThousandPesos (P10,000.00) or whenever applicable criminal, civil or administrative liability.

Sec. 31. H ealthcare Provider Response to Abuse Any healthcare provider, including, but not limited to, an attendingphysician, nurse, clinician, barangay health worker, therapist or counselor who suspects abuse or has been informed bythe victim of violence shall:

a. properly document any of the victims physical, emotional or psychological injuries; b. properly record any of victims suspicions, observations and circumstances of the examination or visit; c. automatically provide the victim free of charge a medical certificate concerning the examination or visit; d. safeguard the records and make them available to the victim upon request at actual cost; and e. provide the victim immediate and adequate notice of rights and remedies provided under this Act, and

services available to them.

Sec. 32. Duties of Other Government Agencies and LGUs Other government agencies and LGUs shall establishprograms such as, but not limited to, education and information campaign and seminars or symposia on the nature,causes, incidence and consequences of such violence particularly towards educating the public on its social impacts.

It shall be the duty of the concerned government agencies and LGUs to ensure the sustained education and training of their officers and personnel on the prevention of violence against women and their children under the Act.

SEC. 33. Prohibited Acts. A Punong Barangay, Barangay Kagawad or the court hearing an application for a protectionorder shall not order, direct, force or in any way unduly influence he applicant for a protection order to compromise or abandon any of the reliefs sought in the application for protection under this Act. Section 7 of the Family Courts Act of 1997 and Sections 410, 411, 412 and 413 of the Local Government Code of 1991 shall not apply in proceedings whererelief is sought under this Act.

Failure to comply with this Section shall render the official or judge administratively liable.

SEC 34. Persons Intervening Exempt from Liability. In every case of violence against women and their children asherein defined, any person, private individual or police authority or barangay official who, acting in accordance with law,responds or intervenes without using violence or restraint greater than necessary to ensure the safety of the victim, shallnot be liable for any criminal, civil or administrative liability resulting therefrom.

SEC. 35. Rights of V ictims. In addition to their rights under existing laws, victims of violence against women and their children shall have the following rights:

a. to be treated with respect and dignity; b. to avail of legal assistance form the PAO of the Department of Justice (DOJ) or any public legal assistance office; c. To be entitled to support services form the DS W D and LGUs d. To be entitled to all legal remedies and support as provided for under the Family Code; and


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e. To be informed of their rights and the services available to them including their right to apply for a protectionorder.

SEC. 36. Damages. Any victim of violence under this Act shall be entitled to actual, compensatory, moral and exemplarydamages.

SEC. 37. H old Departure Order. The court shall expedite the process of issuance of a hold departure order in casesprosecuted under this Act.

SEC. 38. Exemption from Payment of Docket Fee and Other Expenses. If the victim is an indigent or there is animmediate necessity due to imminent danger or threat of danger to act on an application for a protection order, the courtshall accept the application without payment of the filing fee and other fees and of transcript of stenographic notes.

SEC. 39. Inter-Agency Council on V iolence Against Women and Their Children (IAC- V AWC). In pursuance of theabovementioned policy, there is hereby established an Inter-Agency Council on V iolence Against W omen and their children, hereinafter known as the Council, which shall be composed of the following agencies:

a. Department of Social W elfare and Development (DS W D);

b. National Commission on the Role of Filipino W omen (NCRF W ); c. Civil Service Commission (CSC); d. Council for the W elfare of Children (C W C); e. Department of Justice (DOJ); f. Department of the Interior and Local Government (D ILG); g. Philippine National Police (PNP); h. Department of Health (DOH); i. Department of Education (DepEd);

j. Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE); and k. National Bureau of Investigation (NB I).

These agencies are tasked to formulate programs and projects to eliminate V AW based on their mandates as well asdevelop capability programs for their employees to become more sensitive to the needs of their clients. The Council willalso serve as the monitoring body as regards to V AW initiatives.

The Council members may designate their duly authorized representative who shall have a rank not lower than anassistant secretary or its equivalent. These representatives shall attend Council meetings in their behalf, and shall receiveemoluments as may be determined by the Council in accordance with existing budget and accounting rules andregulations.

SEC. 40. Mandatory Programs and Services for V ictims. The DS W D, and LGUs shall provide the victims temporaryshelters, provide counseling, psycho-social services and /or, recovery, rehabilitation programs and livelihood assistance.

The DOH shall provide medical assistance to victims.

SEC. 41. Counseling and Treatment of Offenders. The DS W D shall provide rehabilitative counseling and treatment toperpetrators towards learning constructive ways of coping with anger and emotional outbursts and reforming their ways.W hen necessary, the offender shall be ordered by the Court to submit to psychiatric treatment or confinement.

SEC. 42. Training of Persons Involved in Responding to V iolence Against Women and their Children Cases. Allagencies involved in responding to violence against women and their children cases shall be required to undergoeducation and training to acquaint them with:

a. the nature, extend and causes of violence against women and their children; b. the legal rights of, and remedies available to, victims of violence against women and their children; c. the services and facilities available to victims or survivors; d. the legal duties imposed on police officers to make arrest and to offer protection and assistance; and e. techniques for handling incidents of violence against women and their children that minimize the likelihood of

injury to the officer and promote the safety of the victim or survivor.

The PNP, in coordination with LGUs shall establish an education and training program for police officers and barangayofficials to enable them to properly handle cases of violence against women and their children.


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SEC. 43. Entitled to Leave. V ictims under this Act shall be entitled to take a paid leave of absence up to ten (10) days inaddition to other paid leaves under the Labor Code and Civil Service Rules and Regulations, extendible when thenecessity arises as specified in the protection order.

Any employer who shall prejudice the right of the person under this section shall be penalized in accordance with theprovisions of the Labor Code and Civil Service Rules and Regulations. Likewise, an employer who shall prejudice any

person for assisting a co-employee who is a victim under this Act shall likewise be liable for discrimination. SEC. 44. Confidentiality. All records pertaining to cases of violence against women and their children including those inthe barangay shall be confidential and all public officers and employees and public or private clinics to hospitals shallrespect the right to privacy of the victim. W hoever publishes or causes to be published, in any format, the name, address,telephone number, school, business address, employer, or other identifying information of a victim or an immediate familymember, without the latters consent, shall be liable to the contempt power of the court.

Any person who violates this provision shall suffer the penalty of one (1) year imprisonment and a fine of not more thanFive Hundred Thousand pesos (P500,000.00).

SEC. 45. Funding The amount necessary to implement the provisions of this Act shall be included in the annualGeneral Appropriations Act (GAA).

The Gender and Development (GAD) Budget of the mandated agencies and LGUs shall be used to implement servicesfor victim of violence against women and their children.

SEC. 46. Implementing Rules and Regulations. W ithin six (6) months from the approval of this Act, the DOJ, theNCRF W , the DS W D, the D ILG, the DOH, and the PNP, and three (3) representatives from NGOs to be identified by theNCRF W , shall promulgate the Implementing Rules and Regulations ( IRR) of this Act.

SEC. 47. Suppletory Application For purposes of this Act, the Revised Penal Code and other applicable laws, shall havesuppletory application.

SEC. 48. Separability Clause. If any section or provision of this Act is held unconstitutional or invalid, the other sections

or provisions shall not be affected. SEC. 49. Repealing Clause All laws, Presidential decrees, executive orders and rules and regulations, or parts thereof,inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.

SEC. 50. Effectivity This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days from the date of its complete publication in atleast two (2) newspapers of general circulation.

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 173876, June 27, 2008]

VALCESAR ESTIOCA Y MACAMAY, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,RESPONDENT.

D E C I S I O N

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

In this Petition for Review on C ertiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, [1] petitioner Valcesar Estioca yMacamay prays for the reversal of the Decision [2] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 00036 dated 30June 2006, affirming with modification the Decision [3] and Order [4] dated 5 April 2004 and 17 August 2004,respectively, of the Ozamiz City Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 35, in Criminal Case No. 3054, findinghim guilty of robbery under Article 299, subdivision (a), number (2) of the Revised Penal Code.


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Culled from the records are the following facts:

On 31 July 2001, an Information [5] was filed before the RTC charging petitioner, Marksale Bacus (Bacus),Kevin Boniao (Boniao) and Emiliano Handoc (Handoc) with robbery, thus:That on July 28, 2001, at about 8:00 o'clock in the morning, in the City of Ozamiz, Philippines, and within the

jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent of gain, did then and there helpingone another, willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously break, destroy, and destroyed the padlock of the main door of the classroom of MS. SELINA M. PANAL and once inside, the accused took, stole and carried away thefollowing:

A. One (1) Panasonic Colored TV 14 worth P6,000.00;

B. One (1) Sharp Karaoke Tower Single Player color black worth P6,000.00; and

C. One (1) 3D Rota Aire Stand Fan color brown worth P3,000.00;

belonging to the Ozamiz City Central School represented herein by MS. SELINA M. PANAL, all valued atP15,000.00, to the damage and prejudice of the said school thereof, in the aforementioned sum of P15,000.00,Philippine Currency.When arraigned on separate dates with the assistance of their counsels d e oficio , petitioner, Bacus, Boniao andHandoc pleaded "Not guilty" to the charge. [6] Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.

The prosecution presented as witnesses Nico Alforque (Nico) and Mrs. Celina M. Panal (Mrs. Panal). Their testimonies, woven together, bear the following:

On 28 July 2001 (Saturday), at about 8:00 in the morning, Nico, then eleven years old and a Grade VI student of Ozamiz City Central School (OCCS), and his cousin, Mark Alforque (Mark), went to the OCCS and cleaned theclassroom of a teacher named Mrs. Myrna Pactolin (Mrs. Pactolin). They received P30.00 each from Mrs.Pactolin for the chore. Afterwards, Mark went home while Nico stayed inside the OCCS because Mrs. Pactolinrequested him to get some "waya-waya" and " d apna" inside the OCCS's canal to be used as fish food. [7]

While catching waya-waya and d apna inside the OCCS's canal, Nico saw petitioner and Bacus enter theOCCS's premises by climbing over the OCCS's gate. Petitioner and Bacus then proceeded to the classroom of another teacher, Mrs. Panal, which was located near the OCCS's canal. Thereupon, petitioner and Bacusdestroyed the padlock of the classroom's door using an iron bar and entered therein. Subsequently, petitioner and Bacus walked out of the classroom carrying a television, a karaoke and an electric fan, and thereafter

brought them to the school gate. They went over the gate with the items and handed them over to Boniao andHandoc who were positioned just outside the OCCS's gate. The items were placed inside a tricycle. After

petitioner, Bacus and Boniao boarded the tricycle, Handoc drove the same and they sped away. [8]

On the following day, 29 July 2001, Mrs. Panal went to the OCCS for a dance practice with her students. She proceeded to her classroom and discovered that it was forcibly opened, and that the karaoke, television andelectric fan therein were missing. She immediately reported the incident to the police. The OCCS principalinformed her that Nico witnessed the incident. Thereafter, petitioner, Bacus, Boniao and Handoc were chargedwith robbery. [9]

The prosecution also submitted object evidence to buttress the testimonies of its witnesses, to wit: (1) a T-shaped slightly curved iron bar, which is 10 mm. by 12 inches in size, used in destroying the padlock of Mrs.Panal's classroom and marked as Exhibit A; and (2) a Yeti brand, colored yellow, padlock used in Mrs. Panal'sclassroom, marked as Exhibit B.

For its part, the defense presented the testimonies of petitioner, Bacus, Rolly Agapay (Agapay), Boniao andHandoc to refute the foregoing accusations. Petitioner and his co-accused denied any involvement in theincident and interposed the defense of alibi.

Petitioner Estioca testified that on 28 July 2001, he cleaned his house located at Laurel Street, Ozamiz City,from 8:00 in the morning up to 10:00 in the morning. After cleaning the house, he ate lunch and rested. At


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around 3:00 in the afternoon of the same day, he went to the house of his neighbor/friend, Junjun Ho (Junjun),to help the latter in cleaning his houseyard. However, Junjun's father arrived, and since the father and son had todiscuss important things, he decided to go home which was about past 3:00 in the afternoon. Upon arrivinghome, his aunt, Myrna Macamay, told him that some people had gone to the house looking for him. Later, twounidentified persons, accompanied by Boniao, came to his house and brought him to the City Hall Police

Station for investigation as regards the incident.[10]

During the interrogation inside the police station, a certain Michael approached him and inquired as to where hesold the television stolen from the OCCS. He told Michael not to accuse him of stealing as it is not a good joke.Michael called Bacus and Boniao who were then standing nearby, and the two pointed to him as the one whosold the television. Afterwards, one of the police officers therein told him to approach a certain Colonel Bationwho was also inside the police station. Upon approaching Colonel Bation, the latter punched him in the stomachcausing him to kneel down in pain. Colonel Bation asked him where he sold the television but he told him hehad nothing to do with it. Colonel Bation took a whip and smacked him with it several times on the body. Anemergency hospital worker named Dennis Fuentes, who was also present, stripped him naked and burned hisscrotum, chest and palm with lighter, cigarette butts and matchsticks. Thereafter, he was jailed. [11]

B acus , a resident of Barangay Lam-an, Ozamiz City, declared that on the night of 27 July 2001, he slept at theguardhouse of the Ozamiz City National High School (OCNHS) which is located in front of the OCCS. On thefollowing day, 28 July 2001, at about 7:00 in the morning, he woke up and helped his mother in selling bananas

beside their house which is situated in front of the OCNHS. At about 11:00 in the morning of the same day,while on his way to Barangay Tinago, Ozamiz City, to buy chicken feed, a certain Michael Panal and anunidentified companion blocked his path and asked him if he was the one who robbed the OCCS. He told thetwo that he had nothing to do with the incident. The two then brought him to the nearby seashore where theywere met by a group of persons headed by a certain Maning. Thereupon, they tortured and beat him for refusingto admit involvement in the incident. Subsequently, he was taken to the Ozamiz City Hall for investigation. [12]

Agapay , an OCNHS working student and a resident of the said school, narrated that he knows Bacus becausethe latter resided in a house located just in front of the OCNHS; that he and Bacus usually slept at theguardhouse of the OCNHS; that on the night of 27 July 2001, he and Bacus slept at the guardhouse of theOCNHS; and that Bacus woke up on the following day, 28 July 2001, at about 8:30 in the morning. [13]

B oniao , 14 years old and resident of Barangay Tinago, Ozamiz City, testified that on 28 July 2001, at 8:00 inthe morning, he cleaned his parents' house and thereafter watched television. On 30 July 2001, at 7:00 in themorning, he and Bacus went to the OCCS to pick up plastic bottles scattered therein. After gathering some

plastic bottles, he and Bacus left the OCCS. While on their way home, a certain Leoncio apprehended him and brought him to his parents' house. Upon arriving home, his mother beat him and forbade him to go out of thehouse. Subsequently, several persons went to his parents' house and arrested him. He was taken to a nearby portwhere he was asked to identify the persons involved in the robbery of the OCCS. When he could not sayanything about the incident, he was brought to the City Hall Police Station where he was jailed. [14]

Handoc , a pedicab driver residing at Barangay Tinago, Ozamiz City, stated that he helped his brother-in-law inquarrying gravel at Panay-ay Diot, Clarin, Misamis Occidental, on the whole morning of 28 July 2001; that hewent back to Barangay Tinago, Ozamiz City, at about 4:00 in the afternoon of 28 July 2001; that TomasMedina, the former b arangay captain, arrested him and took him to the City Hall; that police officers in the CityHall inquired as to where he sold the television stolen from the OCCS but he replied that he had nothing to dowith it; that he was repeatedly beaten by police officers for denying any involvement in the incident; and that hewas detained at the City Hall Jail. [15]

After trial, the RTC rendered a Decision on 5 April 2004 convicting petitioner, Bacus, Boniao and Handoc of robbery under Article 299, subdivision (a), number (2), paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code. The trial courtimposed on petitioner, Bacus and Handoc an indeterminate penalty ranging from six years and one day of

prision mayor as minimum, to fourteen years, eight months and one day of reclusion temporal as maximum.Since Boniao was a minor (14 years old) when he participated in the heist, he was sentenced to a lower prisonterm of six months of arresto mayor as minimum to four years and two months of prision correccional asmaximum. They were also ordered to pay P15,000.00 as civil liability. Nonetheless, the sentence meted out to


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Boniao was suspended and his commitment to the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD)was ordered pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 603. [16] The dispositive portion of the decision reads:WHEREFORE, finding accused Valcesar Estioca y Macamay alias "Bango," Marksale Bacus alias "Macoy,"Emeliano Handoc y Bullares alias "Eming" and minor Kevin Boniao guilty beyond reasonable doubt of thecrime of robbery defined and penalized under Article 299, subsection (a), paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal

Code and upon applying Art. 64, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code and Indeterminate Sentence Law andPrivileged Mitigating Circumstance of two (2) degrees lower than that prescribed for by law (Art. 68, par. 1)unto Kevin Boniao, a minor, who was 14 years old at the time of the commission of the crime, this court herebysentences them (a) Valcesar Estioca, Marksale Bacus, Emeliano Handoc to suffer the indeterminate penaltyranging from six (6) years and one (1) day of Prision Mayor as minimum to fourteen (14) years, eight (8)months and one (1) day of Reclusion Temporal as maximum and (b) Kevin Boniao (minor) to suffer the penaltyof six (6) months of Arresto Mayor as minimum to four (4) years and two (2) months of Prision Correccional asmaximum and all of the accused to suffer the accessory penalty provided for by law, to indemnify the civilliability of P15,000.00 and to pay the costs.

With respect to Kevin Boniao, the sentence imposed upon him is hereby suspended pursuant to PD 603 as

amended and he is therefore committed to the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) for reformation, otherwise if he is incorrigible, then the sentence shall be imposed upon him by the court. TheDSWD is hereby ordered to have close surveillance and supervision upon him and to constantly observe thedevelopment of his behavior and to submit to the court a report/recommendation on the matter as prescribed for

by law.

The Order of this court dated August 20, 2001 is hereby cancelled and revoked.

The accused are entitled 4/5 of the time they were placed under preventive imprisonment.

The cash bond in the amount of P24,000 posted by accused Valcesar Estioca is hereby cancelled and the same isordered released and returned to the bondsman concerned. [17] Petitioner, Bacus, Boniao and Handoc filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the RTC Decision arguing thatthere was no conspiracy among them and that the penalty imposed was erroneous. [18] On 17 August 2004, theRTC issued an Order partially granting the motion. [19] The trial court lowered the penalty imposed on them butaffirmed its earlier finding of conspiracy and conviction. It also ordered the DSWD to release and turn over Boniao to his parents. It concluded:WHEREFORE, as herein modified, the imposable indeterminate penalty meted to accused Valcesar Estioca,Marksale Bacus and Emeliano Handoc being guilty beyond reasonable doubt of he crime of Robbery, definedand penalized under paragraph 4 of Art. 299 of the Revised Penal Code upon applying Indeterminate SentenceLaw with paragraph 1 of Art. 64, Revised Penal Code, ranges from four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1)day of prision correccional as minimum to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum withaccessory penalty provided for by law; and for minor accused Kevin Boniao, the penalty of four (4) months of arresto mayor upon applying the privileged mitigating circumstance in Art. 68, paragraph 1 of the RevisedPenal Code with Art. 64, paragraph 1 of the same Code. All of the accused shall indemnify jointly the civilliability of P15,000.00 and to pay the costs.

As aforestated, minor accuser Kevin Boniao is hereby ordered released from DSWD and returned to the custodyof his parents. [20] Unsatisfied, petitioner appealed the RTC Decision and Order before the Court of Appeals. [21] Bacus, Boniao andHandoc did not appeal their conviction anymore. On 30 June 2006, the Court of Appeals promulgated itsDecision affirming with modification the RTC Decision and Order. The appellate court held that Boniao isexempt from criminal liability but his civil liability remains pursuant to Republic Act No. 9344 otherwiseknown as Th e Juvenile Justice an d Welfare Act of 2006 , thus:On a final note, considering that it is axiomatic that an appeal opens the entire case for review and consideringfurther that any decision rendered in the appeal does not bind those who did not appeal except if beneficial tothem, We hold that herein accused Kevin Boniao should be acquitted and his criminal liability extinguished

pursuant to Republic Act No. 9344, otherwise known as the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006, whichtook effect on May 22, 2006. The pertinent provision thereof provides, thus:"Sec. 6. Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility. - A child fifteen (15) years of age or under at the time of thecommission of the offense shall be exempt from criminal liability. However, the child shall be subjected to


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Section 20 of this Act.

x x x x

The exemption from criminal liability herein established does not include exemption from civil liability, which

shall be enforced in accordance with existing laws."WHEREFORE, premises foregoing, the appeal is hereby DISMISSED and the assailed Decision

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