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THE DEVELOPM ENT OF THE EUROPEAN SECURITY ANDDEFENC E POLICY AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR NATO:

COOPERATION AND COMPETITION

UDO DIEDRICHSUniversity of Cologne

THE EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY ( E S D P ) AS ATRANSATLANTIC ISSUE: ALIENATION OR NEW PARTNERSHIP?

The considerable debate generated by the European Security and Defence Policy(ESDP) is testimony to its potential to transform not only the EU 's external relations,but also the nature of transatlantic relations and the cond itions under which NATOoperates. If successful, the ESD P w ill represen t the European p illar in security andbe the mechanism through which European nations conduct most of their securitydialogue with the U.S.: thus, in parallel with, instead of through, NATO.

The Constitutional Treaty signed by the heads of state and government in Romeon October 29, 2004, will further contribute to strengthening the EU's securitypolicy, and even though the Constitution has yet to be ratified, it contains a num berof institutional 'offers' which the EU member states will be likely to implementand pursue in their quest to construct the ESDP. On the other hand, however, it isnot altogether clear whether the ESDP can surmount all the current political andorganizational challeng es and em erge as a fully-fledged and coherent policyframework. The landscape of European security is still dominated by NATO as theprime organization for providing military protection. With the growing role ofESDP, the question of how to relate both the EU and the Alliance to each otherbecomes more virulent.The basic argument of this chapter is that the two domains - the internal EUarena and the EU-NA TO relationship - are interrelated. This is not to say that it isa zero-sum game where the EU gains only if NATO loses. On the other hand, itwould be premature to assert that the relation between ESDP and NATO is, bydefinition, harmonious. Both organizations are in a flux, (re)defming their tasksand roles in a changing international security environment, and both need to

mobilize their member states' political as well military and economic resources inorder to be successful.

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The overall assessment of EU-NATO relations will follow from the analysis offour ESDP dimensions: the institutional development; the issue of capabilityimprovement; the emergence of a strategic vision for European security; and thequestion of political leadership in ESDP. Each of these dimensions bears a numberof implications for NATO and transatlantic relations, which will be discussed inthe concluding part of the chapter.

THE INSTITUTIONAL D EVELOPM ENT OF THE EUROPEAN SECURITYAND DEFENCE POLICY

ESD P has grown out of a long-term h istorical process which started in the 1950 s,'but the decisive ignition for creating military structures and capab ilities that w ouldbe available to the European Union came from the meeting between FrenchPresident Chirac and British Prime Minister Blair, at St. Malo, in December 1998.The Franco-British summit's famous formula, that the EU should possess a'capacity for autonom ous action, backed up by credible military forces, the meansto decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in response to intemational c rises'^,was regarded as a breakthrough given British resistance to a military role for theEuropean Union in previous years.^ However, considerable differences still re-mained between Paris and London concerning the precise nature, scope and designof the project. Whilst for France, ESDP represented a chance to render the EUmore autonomous from NATO and the U.S. in terms of military operations, theBritish government viewed ESDP as a tool to keep NATO alive by increasingEurope's weight in military burden-sharing and by improving its military capabilities.

Within this context of ambiguity, a new institutional set-up was established inthe Brussels arena; to some observers, ESDP has been characterized by a processof 'Brusselization"* of actors who traditionally have not belonged to the frame-work of the EU. However, the institutional landscape still requires more clarityand rationalization, making it necessary to avoid an 'institutional overstretch',^and to render the existing set-up more coherent and consistent. There is a wide-spread view in the EU that the institutional, political and military possibilities forshaping E SDP have so far not been fully exploited. As long as unanimity p revailsin dec ision-m aking, it would be difficult to make it work efficiently, particu larly inview of enlargement. Flexible modes of governance seem to provide an answer tothis problem, as they would allow a group of countries to move ahead withoutwaiting for the rest ofth e mem ber states, but the inclusion of such provisions intothe Treaties was blocked at the negotiations on the Treaty of Nice due to theresistance by some member countries.* On the other hand, flexibility within theTreaty could be a measure to prevent some EU countries from more closelycooperating outside the legal framework ofthe Union, totally out of reach for the

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The Development ofthe Europea n Security and Defence Po licyThe ESDP has been a key issue in this debate which finally led to the con-

clusion of the signature of the 'Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe' bythe heads of state and government in Rome, on October 29, 2004. The intensediscussions within the Convention plenary, in its working groups and in the sub-sequent Intergovernmental Conference (IGC), reflected the high degree of rele-vance of the issue, but also the controversy in which the traditional fault-lines inthe European security debate lie.^ In detail, the major innovations introduced bythe Constitutional Treaty include:

A separate chapter on the European Union's 'Common Security and DefencePolicy' (CSDP), which is anchored explicitly in the framework of CFSP bydefining it as an 'integral part' ofthe latter.^

The creation of a foreign minister, combining the roles of the High Repre-sentative for CFSP (with enhanced functions), and of the Commissioner forextemal relations under a 'double h at', can be regarded as an institutional 'experi-ment' of which the outcom e is still difficult to a sse ss. '

The introduction of different forms of flexibility (such as enhan ced coop erationand permanent structured coop eration), allowing a group of mem ber coun tries togo ahead without waiting for the others,'" represents a remarkable step given thefact that under the Treaty of Nice it had been impossible to establish enhancedcooperation for military and defense questions due to the resistance shown bymember states like B ritain."

The creation of a 'Defence Agency', which will be charged with identifyingoperational requirements, proposing measures to improve capabilities and takinga role in defining an armaments policy, would allow the member states to furtherstreamline their efforts for improving their military records, pooling scarceresources and saving money.

The scope of the Petersberg tasks has been expanded to include, inter alia,disarmament operations, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention,combat forces in crisis management and post-confiict stabilisation, as well as ageneral orientation for the fight against terrorism.A solidarity clause, which in case of a terrorist attack would ensure mutualsupport by the member states, refiects the will to address the new challenges ofinternational security after September 11.

As regards decision-making, no major improvement of the existing situationcould be achieved. The possibilities for qualified majority voting in CFSP do notapply to 'decisions having military or defence implications', while 'constructiveabstention' was confirmed as an option for member states to refrain fromparticipating in a decision without hindering other countries in going ahead, but itcannot be regarded as a substantial opportunity for a more fiexible and efficientCFSP and E SD P

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Minister will be a member of the Commission and representative of the Council.In the field of the Common Security and Defence Policy, he will ensure thecoordination of the civilian and military aspects in the implementation of theextended 'Petersberg ta sks'.'^ This could make him a key player when it comes tocombining EU instruments and national resources in missions with a civilian andmilitary component, both of which are of great importance to ESDP. But the dualnature of the Foreign Ministers' tasks and responsibilities makes it particularlydifficult to delineate his or her political identity between Council and Com-mission.''* The Foreign Minister will have to serve several masters and this mightresult in a personal and political overstretch. In that case, ESDP w ould suffer froma lack of initiative and impetus compared to the existing situation, where the HighRepresentative has gained a key position in defining European security policy, aswas demonstrated by the elaboration of the European Security Strategy.In procedural terms, the introduction of a number of mechanisms for facili-tating flexibility has substantially widened the scope for action. In particular,'permanent structured cooperation' can be regarded as the most importantoption,'^ designed for those m ember states 'w ho se military capabilities fulfillhigher criteria and which have made more binding commitments to one another inthis area with a view to the most demanding missions'. Structured cooperationwas highly disputed within the EU, meeting initially with resolute rejection by theUK , which d id not like the idea of group-building in ESDP in general (tasting toomuch of the French aspirations for forming avant-gardes), and which also fearedthat the implementation of crisis management operations could become mono-polized by a group of countries.'^ Also the candidate countries were rathersceptical towards structured cooperation, expecting a two-class Union to emergein which they would belong to the second rank. As new m embers they were highlyinterested in being regarded as equals by the other countries.

The final wording of permanent structured cooperation represents a com-promise between different aspirations. It will be clearly focused upon capabilityimprovem ent, thus addressing a demand which the British government has alwaysbeen eager to meet. Furtherm ore, there is, after close reading ofthe ConstitutionalTreaty, no possibility of ex-ante exclusion of a country willing to take part; i.e.those m ember states ready to enter will commit them selves from the start to fulfilla num ber of objectives.'^ This will leave structured cooperation sufficiently opento all interested countries, creating an 'inclusive ' version of fiexibility.'*

The Protocol more specifically spells out the criteria and objectives; keyelements are the improvement of military capabilities through the EuropeanDefence Agency and the set-up, by 2007, of 'targeted combat units for themissions plann ed, structured at a tactical level as combat formations, with support

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The Developm ent ofthe Europea n Security and Defence Policycarried out, in particular by finding common objectives concerning the level ofinvestment expenditure on defence equipment, the harmonization andidentification of military needs, the pooling and specialization of defence meansand capabilities, and the participation in equipment p rogrammes in the frameworkof the Defence Agency.

So far, the discussion about structured cooperation has triggered off somedynamics of its own even before formally entering into force. The Franco-British(-German) initiative for the creation of battle groups from February 2004 wasdesigned not least for fulfilling the 2007 objective laid dow n in the ConstitutionalTreaty." In November 2004, the set up of thirteen battle groups was agreed by theEU co untries, including even a non-EU state, Norway. Officially, the battle groupconcep t is regarded as fully compatible with NATO, but in the backg round seriousdoubts remain. It could turn out as a rival to the NATO Response Force (NRF), andlay the foundation for a more autonomous role of the Union in carrying outmilitary operations worldw ide. Should the US lose interest in the NRF, this couldlead even firmly convinced atlanticist EU countries to rethink their attitude and toplace more emp hasis on the battle groups as key compon ents of the ERRF.

Second, there is a close link between the agenda of structured cooperation andthe activities of the future Defence Agency, in particular concerning the tasksdescribed for enhancing military capabilities. Both elements will have to bestreamlined in the future for efficiently working together. Furthermore, as a widerange of EU countries can be expected to enter structured cooperation, it will benecessary that at least France, Britain and possibly G ermany try to take the lead inall major activities under structured cooperation, in order to deliver the necessarypolitical and military impetus. Otherwise the danger exists that structuredcooperation might turn out as a complex and bureaucratic exercise, lacking inconcrete obligations and com mitments, and too broad to be efficient and effective.

Besides structured cooperation, the IGC has substantially changed another caseof differentiation introduced by the Convention: the closer cooperation on m utualdefence. Designed as a mutual assistance clause for those member countrieswilling to subscribe to it, it triggered off fervent discussions within the Union. Inparticular the 'Atlan ticist' mem ber states rejected the clause as it was regarded asa rival to the NATO Article 5 comm itment, wh ile the non-aligned coun tries fearedthat the EU would develop into a military alliance in the strict sense. In the end theclause was watered down, making reference to the pivotal role of NATO for thecommon defense of its members, and to the special status of some member states'foreign and security policy. Furthermore, the revised clause will apply to all EUstates; i.e. there will be no 'avant-garde' of EU countries moving ahead in mutualdefense. This issue was highly influenced by NATO mem bers like Britain and a lsoby the U.S. which tried to put pressure on the EU countries in order not to weaken

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Compared to the Convention's version, the Intergovernmental Conference hassubstantially modified some of the most problematic provisions and thus reducedthe degree of friction.

CAPA CI TY- BUI LD I NG: NEW I M PETUS BY THE DEFENCE AGENCY AND THEH E A D L IN E G O A L 2 0 1 0 ?

Capacity-building is crucial to the ESDP; to some observers it actually appears tobe theAc hilles ' heel of the wh ole project.^° The EU coun tries have so far identifiedmajor gaps in military effectiveness, prohibiting or at least limiting, the EU'sability to implemen t the full range of Petersberg tasks. The deficiencies are furtheraggravated by the fact that during the last decade, defense budgets have shrunk inmany European countries, increasing the gap compared to American capacities.Although some countries like Britain and France have recently stepped up theirdefense budgets, others - like Germany - lag behind and will probably not catchup in the foreseeable future.

In May 2003, the Council of ministers stated that the 'EU now has operationalcapability across the full range of Petersberg tasks, limited and constrained byrecognized shortfalls'.^' To meet the remaining shortfalls, in 2004 the militarycapability improvement process within the EU was redesigned, producing newdocuments and defining new objectives. The 'Headline Goal 2010' approved bythe EU Council in May 2004, tries to better adjust the E U 's military capab ilities tothe needs of 'rapid and decisive action applying a fully coherent approach to thewhole spectrum of crisis managem ent operations covered by the T re at y '." Amongthe objectives to be achieved are: the establishment, as early as possible in 2004,of a civil-military cell within the EU Military Staff (EUMS) for conducting auto-nomous EU operations; the establishment of the European Defence Agency; thedevelopment of battle groups including the app ropriate strategic lift, sustainabilityand debarkation assets, and the availability of an aircraft carrier with associated airwing and escort by 2008 ; the developm ent of com patibility and network linkage ofall communication equipment, both terrestrial and space, by 20 10; and the develop-ment of quan titative benchm arks and criteria that national forces will have to meetin the areas of deployability and multinational training. These initiatives are of amore concrete nature than many documents in the past, hinting at a more focusedeffort by the EU to address the deficiencies in military capabilities. At the same time,they refiect the turn from a quantitative to a m ore qua litative approach by the EU.̂ ^

A key project mentioned in the new headline goals is the new EuropeanDefence Agency. In a Joint Action adopted by the Council on July 12, 2(X)4, theestablishment of the Agency was approved and should be completed by the end of

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The Developm ent o fthe Europea n Security and Defence Policycreation of a competitive defense equipment market as well as the promotion ofdefence-related research and technology.^^ It represents the first institutional set-up in the EU in w hich the defence ministers w ill be officially recognized , as theywill be - as members of the Steering Board - politically responsible for theAgency. The Agency will be linked to other efforts for capability improvem ent; inparticular it will coordinate and monitor the implementation of the EuropeanCapability Action Plan (ECAP). Furthermore, participation in the Agency hasbeen defined as one criterion for taking part in structured cooperation. L inks to theCommunities - via the Commission - have been foreseen, which could be ofinterest when it comes to combining financial resources from the EU and frommem ber states . Finally, fiexib ility will be possible w ithin the Agency for specificad hoc projects and programmes, so that differentiation among the participatingmember states can be expected to occur, while third countries will be allowed tojoin projects and programmes under the Agency.

These dev elopments in general seem to indicate that the Agency could turn outto be a central element in ESDP's capability improvement process, serving as adriving factor and a framework for ensuring consistency. It could also contributeto streamlining the different processes and mechanisms in military capabilityimprovement w ithin the EU. A more coherent capab ility-building p rocess , includingdefense industrial relations as a key component, would most certainly strengthenthe European p osition a lso in the transatlantic con text, where competition with theU.S. is highly develo ped . So far there is no sign of a single EU procurem ent policy,but step by step the European countries could streamline their financial resourcesand decision-making structures, producing considerable economies of scale andsavings resulting from trans-national synergy effects.

S T R A T E G Y - B U I L D I N G : G R O W I N G C O H E R E N C E O F N A T IO N A L V I E W S ?A key dimension of ESDP concerns the conceptual and strategic dimension of theproject. In particular a link is needed between the military operational dimensionand the underlying fundamental values and interests of the European Union. Anumber of procedural questions have already been tackled by the EU concerningthe conduct of certain operations,-* but what is perceived as missing is a coherentapproach to what the basic goals of the EU are to be.

France has traditionally defended a rather autonomous role for the EU, beingsceptical of NATO and fearing a devaluation of E SD P by the U.S.A.-^ On the otherhand, Britain is clearly in favour of an Atlanticist approach, relying on close EU-NATO cooperation and the Alliance's right of first refusal. Germany seems tofavour an institutionally strong ESDP, but would like to keep a strong link toNATO.^^ A crucial problem lies in the deterioration of the political relationship

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aligned countries*' and the present D anish opt-out (i.e. that Denmark doe s not takepart in the definition and implementation of a European defense policy) are onlysome of the additional problems facing a coherent strategic orientation. Despitethe 'spirit of St. Malo', differences about the degree of autonomy of ESDP fromNATO and the U.S., as well as divergences between more 'interventionist' andrather 'non-interven tionist' ap proaches, still exist.^° Not least, different national'strategic cultures'^' will have to be approximated, which entails a com plex mu lti-level process.

In December 2003, the adoption of the EU Security Strategy (ESS) can beregarded as an important step in promoting a strategic vision and mission of theEuropean Union.^^ Drafted by Javier Solana, the ESS has been discussed andanalysed by the political, diplomatic and academic exp ert comm unities - less bythe broad public.The ES S is not only a declaratory exercise, but refiects the need for arriving atan understanding ofth e EU 's strategic role in the world.̂ ^ After the poor perform-ance of the EU in the Iraq crisis, the member states were interested in defining acommon ground for their foreign and security policy: 'The process to create aSecurity Concept is being used to heal wounds over Iraq and to provide directionfor a multiple of security instrumen ts that make up the E U 's security "t oo lbo x" ' .•''*The ESS of course, is not a precise operational document from which concretesteps can be derived for the EU's external action. It rather provides a conceptualframework and tries to point to basic principles and values which should guid e theEU in pursuing its goals.

As a guiding concept for addressing the new security th reats, 'effectivemu ltilateralism' plays a key role. The ESS stresses the impo rtance of internationalinstitutions like the U.N. in providing security and stability worldwide. It under-lines that a broad and multiple set of instrumen ts should be used, inc luding civilianand military components also in a preventive way. A 'strategic cu lture ' is regardedas necessary, 'that fosters early, rapid and when necessary, robust intervention'.^'The strengthening of capabilities (including military ones), the promotion ofinternal coherence and the cooperation with international partners are among theguiding principles defined by the ESS .

In comparison to the U .S. approach to international security, there are similari-ties as well as striking differences. In terms of threats and cha llenges, broad con-vergences between the EU and the U.S. can be observed: terrorism, weapons ofmass destruction, failed states, regional confiicts and organized crime.-'^ The mostvisible contrast concerns the principles for action and the importance attached tothe underlying causes of insecurity. The emphasis of the ESS on multilateralembedment and on the role of international institutions is not easily compatible

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The Developm ent ofthe European Security and Defence Policyexpressions of the EU's approach to security. If all EU member states could agreeto its basic principles and objectives, this should give hope for further progress tobe achieved in shaping an EU strategic culture. As recent developments haverevealed, the Atlanticist-European ist divide still plays a major role in the EU . Thedifficulty for ES DP w ill thus reside in finding a path w hich is regarded asacceptable for all different strategic visions within the EU, and in fostering aprocess of Europeanization of strategic views and ideas of security.

POLI TI CAL LEADERSHI P I N ESDP: FROM A W EAKNESS TO A CHALLENGE?Recent developments in CFS P and ESDP have und erlined that political leadershipis still an unresolved issue. In particular in the case of a major crisis, coherencewithin the EU disappears, giving way to highly diverse patterns of coordinationand consultation among the member states. The formation of leadership in CFS Pand ESDP has thus so far been rather ad hoc and subject to instability. In thisregard, the Iraq crisis is a telling example. As Christopher Hill bluntly puts it,'throughout the Iraq crisis the CFSP was almost wholly silent'." Of key impor-tance was the absence of a common position by the 'Big Th ree' (France, Germanyand the U K), that had existed during the Afghanistan operation in O ctober 2001 .This fundamental disagreement prevented every attempt to produce a Europeanview on the crisis and led to the formation of ad hoc coalitions, with the UK, Italyand Spain as key EU states on the side ofth e U.S., while France and Germany triedto organize the opposition to the Bush ad ministration's stance on Iraq.

The rift within the EU became widely apparent in February 200 3 with the letterof eight heads of state or government in support of the U.S. position which led topolitical outrage in Pa ris and Berlin. A week before, at the celebration of the 40thanniversary of the Franco-German friendship Treaty (Elisee Treaty), the govern-ments in Paris and Berlin had stressed their determination to do all in their powerto prevent a war in Iraq.

It was at the height of the Iraq crisis, some weeks after the military operationshad begun, that the four nations' summit by France, Germany, Belgium andLuxembourg in late April 2003 in Brussels, called for increased efforts to build upthe institutional and military capabilities of the European Union which shouldenab le it to act even without recourse to NATO assets.^* The de licate fact that thesefour countries all belonged to the 'U.S.-critics' in the Iraq debate conveyed theimpression in W ashington that they were trying to take steps in orde r to detach theEU from NATO, and that their position on Iraq was fed by a more general'Europ eanist' ambition. In particular the proposal of creating an autonom ous EUmilitary 'headquarters' - although the summit declaration did not use this term,speaking instead of a nucleus capacity for planning and conducting EU operations

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from Cen tral and Eastern Euro pe. The U .S. reacted with outrage and tried to keepthe UK on alert.

Some improvement to the political situation within the European Union cameonly after the fall of Saddam Hussein; the U.S. was faced with considerableproblems of a military, political and economic nature, which increased thepressu re to find a long-term solution to Iraq 's future. There w ere at least signs of amo re coherent approach by the EU in so far as the preference given to m ultilateralsolutions was in principle shared by all European partners. The negotiations on anew U.N. resolution involved France, Britain and Germany, bringing them closertogether in the U.N. than ever before during the Iraq crisis.

The post-Iraq phase was also marked by increased efforts for consensus-seekingwithin the IGC on the Constitutional Treaty, where new attempts w ere undertakento find solutions to the key problems. Surprisingly, progress was achieved ratherquickly. The conclave of the Foreign Ministers in Naples in late November 2003was able to agree in principle on the main disputed issues regarding the Consti-tutional Treaty (structured cooperation, closer cooperation on mutual defence),and in the following weeks the famous 'Tervuren'^^ headquarters question wasalso arranged. The key to these developments was a rapprochement between thegovernments in Paris, London and Berlin. It was in particular the GermanChancellor who tried to engage the British in a dialogue over CFSP and ESDP, inorder to overcome the recent disputes and restore 'normal' relations within theEuropean Union and with the U.S. Germ any's quest for 'normalization' met withBlair's efforts to stress his credentials as a 'European', able to take over a leader-ship role within the EU. For Chirac, it was an opportunity to push a number ofissues through the IGC which would not be possible without the British.

These developments hint at a number of relevant developments in ESDP. Firstof all, it seems that old leadership constellations no longer hold. The Franco-Germ an tandem, which had driven the evolution of CF SP forward in the 1990s, nolonger represents a broadly accepted leadership couple within the EU. Bothcoun tries are still of crucial im portance and their cooperation can be considered asa source of dynamics, but it will simply not suffice for 'mak ing the dea l'. Insteadof pre-formulating major European decisions, Franco-German initiatives wereonly able to organize impromptu coalitions (including mainly Belgium andLuxembourg), but evoked the pronounced resistance by other states, due to policydifferences as well as to resistance to a domination by Paris and Berlin. This 'anti-heg em on ic' effect has definitely been a factor in explaining the patterns of reactionwithin the EU.

In contrast, trilateral consultations among France, Germany and the UK appearas much more promising in shaping constitutional decisions for ESDP. The anti-

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The Developm ent ofthe European Security and Defence PolicyEuropeanist drift. It is seen as a torchbeare r of intergovernm entalism and, finally,it represents the leading military power in Europe. All this makes it particularlyhard to oppose a deal among the big three, although criticism was still voiced.

One problem, however, lies in the lack of reliability of such a 'concert' as adurable factor in EU foreign policy. Th e Iraq crisis has underlined the fundamentalpolicy differences between Paris and Berlin on the one hand, and London on theother. Still, the French aspirations for 'Europe puissance' clash with the 'specialrelationship' between the UK and the U.S. Unless it is possible to find ways ofmore coherently co ordinating the positions o fthe three 'big ' EU coun tries, ESDPwill continue to suffer from a political 'leadership gap'.

CONCL USIONS: E SDP-NAT O RE L AT IONS BE T WE E N COOPE RAT IONAND COMPE T IT ION

Relations with NATO have been crucial for ESDP from the very start."*" With therecent developments inside and outside the EU, the issue has even become morecontroversial. The institutional evolution of ESDP might lead to a more coherentand more effective European security policy, which will be easier to handle for theU.S. and NATO. In particular the foreign minister could turn out as an externalrepresentative and institutional 'engine' of the EU's security policy, but so fardoubts remain as to the efficient functioning ofthe new post.

Structured cooperation could tum out to become the major tool by which theEuropeans try to substantially improve their capabilities, but that might also helpthem to grow more closely together in terms of institutional and politicalcoherence. The success of the military objective of structured cooperation is alsoimportant from NA TO 's point of view, as capab ility improvem ent by the Europeancountries is crucial for balancing the Alliance and improving interoperabilitybetween the U.S. and the other allies. On the o ther hand, any attempt to establish akind of F rench-inspired 'avant-garde' will certainly create considerable problemsfor and with W ashington. At the m om ent it rather seems that British influence andthe weight of the new me mber states will avoid a drift towards 'Europ e puissance'and prevent a move away from the Alliance. In particular after the Iraq crisis -which was a European as well as a transatlantic quarrel- there seems to be aneffort to calm down EU-U.S. disputes on security policy. As stated, the 'choco-latiers"^^ summit in April 2003 was widely received with criticism by theAtlanticist camp in the EU, and was heavily attacked by the U.S. In the monthsfollowing the Brussels summit, the close consultations taking place betweenFrance, Britain and Germany led to the conclusion of a compromise (i.e. thecreation of a military-civilian cell at the EUMS for planning and conductingautonomous EU operations), acceptable to the British interests of not endangering

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presumptive order in the procedure for engaging in a nfiilitary crisis managementoperation, preserving a priority for NATC*' Additionally, the creation of an EUcell at Shape and of a NATO liaison arrangem ent at the EUM S should ensure thatboth the EU and NATO will better streamline and coordinate their militaryplanning and preparation activities for crisis management missions in the future.

Also, the solution ofth e mutual defense clause was very much to the taste ofth eAtlanticist camp, underlining the role of the Alliance for its member states andremoving any remnant in the Constitutional Treaty of an operational mechanismthat would prescribe a kind of automatism to be followed in case of an attack. Thenew provisions are clearly less binding in their wording, compared to the earlierversion of the Convention.

Thus, the outcome of the IGC has substantially contributed to ease the m ood inNATO, and particularly that of the U.S., and it seems to have paved the way forfurther progress in relations with the EU. Th e Istanbul NATO sum mit in June 2004agreed to the takeover of the NATO SFOR mission in Bosnia by the EU, whilstpreserving a headquarters in Sarajevo responsible for some operational tasks in thefields of counter-terrorism , the pursuit of war criminals and intelligence sharing."*^

As regards military capab ilities, the operational balance of ESD P is not as badas many pessimists had assum ed some years earlier, but it is clear that the EU willdepend on NATO assets for a considerab le time to com e. The adoption of the EU-NATO Declaration on December 16,2002, after consensus had been reached withTurkey, opened the way for carrying out military operations under the B erlin Plusarrangements.'*' In the late 2004, the mission in Bosnia passed to the Union'sresponsibility (falling under the B erlin P lus arrangement). This last operation w illbe a proof both of the efficiency and effectiveness of EU-NATO cooperation aswell as of the Union's capacity in general to successfully carry out bigger andmore comprehensive peacekeeping missions.

The decision by the Prague NATO summit in December 2002, to set up aResponse Force (NRF), represents a highly relevant and possibly problematicaspect of transatlantic security relations. So far, official declarations define theEuropean Rapid Reaction Forces (ERRF) and the NRF as complementary andcompatible but there is no clear picture yet as to the division of labor. Nor is theprocess of force generation, which has started for the NRF in 2003, sufficientlycoordinated with the EU activities. This problem might get worse in the wake ofbuilding up the battle groups, stressing the need for cooperation in the fields offorce generation, plannning, training and deployment of troops.

The process of defense transformation, high on the NATO agenda, also deeplyaffects European military forces and their future design, but so far there is noregular and stable dialogue on this subject and its impact on both organisations.

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The Developm ent ofthe Europea n Security and D efence Policyamong them. They are unlikely to abandon the search for stronger Europeaninstitutions but they may also find that the 'flexible option' within the EU is lessflexible than it appears. In this case, the ESDP's political momentum could slowdown because European nations simply agree to disagree, or because the searchfor political initiative mov es outside the EU - to coalitions o fth e willing. Po ssiblythe European Security Strategy could prevent this from happening by providing amore coherent conceptual framework (for exam ple, in the shape of 'effectivemu ltilateralism') but it will take time to assess its de facto impact on the memberstates' security cultures. Furthermore, recent discussions within NATO reveal thelack of strategic orientation which also exists within the Alliance and w hich makesarrangements with ESDP rather difficult to achiev e. Chance llor Sc hro der's surpri-sing speech at the Munich security conference in February 2005 has highlighteddivergent assessments of NATO's role and status, and emphasised the need for astrategic dialogue in the transatlantic co ntext. It remains to be seen if this will leadto another reform of NATO , and how far it will influence relations with ESDP. Inthe end, it could lead to a strengthening of ESDP at the expense of NATO, if andwhen a majority of EU countries - including the UK, France and Germany - makea fresh start after Iraq, supported by a successful ratification of the ConstitutionalTreaty.

The EU's ability to handle these highly complex and interwoven issues,reaching into the transatlantic and the European security spheres, depends to ahigh degree upon its capacity to mobilize sufficient political leadership. What isrequired therefore is a durab le and reliable commitmen t - in particular by the largemember states. Recent signs seem to hint at efforts for closer coordination byFrance, the UK and Germany. Such a 'trilateral concert', or 'directoire', mightmeet with problems of acceptance as the new member states would reject second-class membership and countries like Spain, Italy and Poland would regardthemselves as large enough to join the concert. But in the end it would provide theonly powerful and effective tool for balancing the European and Atlanticambitions in security policy and for compromising political and militarydifferences among the member states. 'Effective trilateralism' could injectsufficient dynamics into ESDP and, at the same time, be a serious interlocutor tothe U.S. in questions of European security and defense; it could contribute to acooperative relationship with NATO and the U.S., and serve as a balancing factorin the transatlantic contex t.

NOTESSee Anne Deighton, The European Security and Defence Policy', Journal of CommonMarket Studies, 40, 4 (2002), p . 720.

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UdoDiedrichspp. 8-9.See Jolyon Howorth, 'European defence and the Changing Politics of the EuropeanUnion: Hanging Together or Hanging Separately?', Joumal of Common Market Studies,39, 4 (2001), pp. 765-789; Deighton, 'The European Security and Defence Policy'.

"* Elfriede R egelsberger, 'D ie Gemeinsam e AuBen- und Sicherheitspolitik nach "N izza " -begrenzter Reformeifer und auBervertragliche Dynamik', in Mathias Jopp, BarbaraLippert und Heinrich Schneider (eds.), Das Vertragswerk von Nizza und die Zukunft derEuropdischen Union. Berlin, 20 01 , pp. 112-122.' Ibid; see also Mathias Jop p, Jan Reckmann and Elfriede Regelsberger, 'Ansa tzpun kteund Optionen zur institutionellen Weiterentwicklung von GASP und ESVP',Integration, 3 (2002), pp. 230-237.* See U do Diedrichs and Ma thias Jopp , 'Flexibility in ESDP: From the Convention to theIGC and Beyond', CFSP Forum, 2 (2004), pp. 1-5.' In the following, the Con stitutional Treaty as signed by the Rome summit on October 29,2004 will be taken as a reference. See the consolidated version of the draft Treatyestablishing a C onstitution for E urope, CIG 87/2/04, Brussels, October 29,2 00 4; and theconsolidated version of the protocols and declarations annexed to the Treaty establishinga Constitution for Europe, CIG 8 7/2/04 ADD 1 REV 1, and CIG 87/2/04 ADD 2 REV 2,Brussels October 29, 2004.* Art. 1-41 (1) of the Co nstitutio nal Treaty.' See Hill, Ghristoph er. 'A Foreign Minister without a Foreign Ministry - or with TooMany? ' , CFSP Forum, 1 (2003).'° See U do Diedrichs and Mathias Jopp , 'Flexibility in the ESDP: From the Convention tothe IGC and Beyond'." See Elfriede R egelsberger, 'D ie Gemeinsam e AuBen- und Sicherheitspolitik'.'" See Wolfgang Wessels, 'Eine institutionelle Architektur fur eine globale (Zivil-) Macht?Die Artikel zur Gemeinsamen AuBen- und Sicherheitspolitik des Vertrags liber eineVerfassung fur Europa', Zeitsclirift fiir Staats- und Europa wissetischaften, 3 (2003), p.418-420; Christopher Hill, 'A Foreign Minister without a Foreign Ministry'.'̂ Th e Petersberg tasks were expan ded by Art. III-309 of the Constitutional T reaty,including henceforth also joint disarmament operations, military advice and assistancetasks, conflict prevention and post-conflict stabilization; a reference to the fight againstterrorism, to which these tasks may contribute, was also added.'"* See Christopher Hill, 'A Foreign Minister without a Foreign Ministry', p. 2." See Art. 1-41 (6) and Art. I1I-312 of theCon stitutional Treaty as well as Protocol (No . 23)

on permanent, structured cooperation annexed to the Constitutional Treaty, op. cit (note20).'* See Fitiancial Times, November 13, 2003." See Javier Solana, 'Gemeinsame AuBen-, Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik dererweiterten EU', Europdische Sicherheit, 6 (2004).'* S ee U do Diedrichs and M athias Jopp, 'Flexibility in the ESDP: From the Convention tothe IGC and Beyond', op.cit.'^ See Gerrard Quille, '"Battle Groups" to strengthen EU Military Crisis management?'.ISIS European Security Review, April 2004.-" See Julian Lindley-French, 'Combined and Joint? The Development of a Security andOperational Doctrine for the European Union', in Erich Reiter, Reinhard Rummel andPeter Schmidt (eds.), Europas feme Streitmacht, Ch ancen iind Schwierigkeiten derEuropdischen Union beim Aufbau der ESVP, Ham burg, Berlin. Bonn, Forschungen zur

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The Development of the Europea n Security and D efence Po licySchwierigkeiten der Europdischen Union beim Aufbau der ESVP, Hamburg. Berlin,Bonn. Forschungen zur Sicherheitspolitik, 6 (2002), pp. 11-42; Huber, Reiner K.,'Standards und Konvergenzkriterien fiir die Weiterentwicklung der europaischenStreitkrafte', Europdische Sicherheit,5\,4 (2002), pp. 45-50.

' See Declaration on EU M ilitary Capabilities by the Council of the European U nion, May19-20, 2003, Council Document 9379/03 (Presse 138).- Council of the European Union, Headline Goal 2010, approved by General Affairs andExternal relations Council on May 17, 2004 endorsed by the European C ouncil June 17and 18.2004. p. 13.See Gerrard Quille, '"Battle Groups" to strengthen EU Military Crisis management?'.See Council Joint Action 2004/551/CFSP of July 12, 2004 on the establishment of theEuropean Defence Agency, OJ L 245, July 17, 2004.' See ibid.* See Council of the European Union, Presidency Report on European Security andDefence Policy, Brussels, June 22, 2002, 10160/02 REV 2.See Yves Boyer, 'France and the European Security Defence Policy: A Leadership RoleAmong Equals', in Ehrhart, Hans-Georg (ed.). Die Europdische Sicherheits- undVerteidigungspolitik. Positionen, Perzeptionen, Probleme, Perspektiven, Baden-Baden.Nomos, 2001.Regelsberger, 'Die Gemeinsame AuBen- und Sicherheitspolitik nach "Nizza"'.See Gunilla Herolf and Bo H uldt, 'The E uropean Union and the Inclusion of a Co llectiveDefence Clause', in Erich Reiter, Reinhard Rummel and Peter Schmidt (eds.), Europasfeme Streitmacht, Chancen un d Schwierigkeiten der Europdischen Union beim Aufbau derESVP, Hamburg, B erlin, Bon n, Forschungen zur S icherheitspolitik, 6 (2002), pp. 60-85.° See Sten Rynning, 'A European Strategic Culture? The ESDP and 21st CenturyGeopolitics', paper presented at the ECPR workshop no. 12, Edinburgh, March 28 toApril 2, 2003, p. 3; Jopp , 'Europaische Sicherheits- und V erteidigungspolitik', pp. 217-226.' Per M. Martinsen, 'The European Security and Defence policy (ESDP) _ a Strategicculture in the M akin g?', paper presented at the ECPR conference Section 17, Marburg,September 18-21, 2003; Sten Rynning, 'A European Strategic Culture?'; Howorth,'European defence and the Changing Politics of the European U nion', p. 784.See 'The European Security Strategy, A Secure Europe in a Better World', Brussels,December 12,2003.See Jocelyn M awdsley and Gerrard Quille, (with contributions from Malcolm Chalm ers,Timothy Garden, Andrea Grazioso, Roland Kastner, Otfried Nassauer, StephenPullinger, Herbert W ulf), 'The EU Security Strategy: A New Framework for ESD P andEquipping the EU Rapid Reaction Force'. ISIS Europe, ISIS Report, December 2003;Quille, "'Battle Groups" to strengthen EU Military Crisis management?'.

^ Mawdsley and Quille, 'The EU Security Strategy: A New Framework for ESDP'.'European Security Strategy 2003' , p. 11.See R obert Hunter, 'T he U S and the European Union: Bridging the Strategic G ap? ', TheInternational Spectator, Vol. XXXIX, 1 (2004), p. 40.Christopher Hill, 'Renationalizing or Regrouping? EU Foreign Policy Since September\l , 200V, Journal of Common Market Studies, 42, I (2003 ), p. 151.See the Conclusions of the M eeting of the Heads of State and Governmen t of G ermany,France, Luxembourg and B elgium on European D efence, Egm ont Palace, Brussels, April29, 2003.

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Udo Diedrichsheadquarters. Soon it becam e a catchword - mostly used by critics - for the wholeconcept of establishing autonomous EU capacities for conducting military operationswithout recourse to NATO.*" See Webber, Croft, How orth, Terriff and K rahm ann, T h e governance of EuropeanSecurity', p. 16."" The title of 'chocolatiers' was given to the heads of state and government of France,Germany, B elgium and Luxem bourg after their Brussels summ it on ESDP in April 2003,hinting at the Belgian art of manufacturing chocolates; the term was used by their criticsin an attempt to expose their efforts to ridicule.

*^ See Council of the European Union, European Defence: NATO/EU Consultation,Planning and Operations, Brussels, December 2003.« See ibid."^ See 'Istanbul Summit Communique', Issued by the Heads of State and Governmentparticipating in the meeting of the N orth Atlantic Cou ncil, June 2 8, 2004."' The B erlin Plus arrangements ensu re the EU access to NATO assets and capabilities forplanning and conducting military operations w here NATO as a w hole is not engaged.

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